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The Phoenix rising from its flames and the silhouette of the soldier bearing a
rifle with fixed bayonet was the emblem of the Junta. On the header the word
Greece () and on the footer 21 April 1967, the date of the coup d'tat,
can be seen in Greek.
In 1947, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine, and began to
actively support a series of authoritarian governments in Greece, Turkey, and
Iran in order to ensure that these states did not fall under Soviet influence.[1]
With American and British aid, the civil war ended with the military defeat of
the communists in 1949. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was outlawed,
and many Communists either fled the country or faced persecution.[citation
needed] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Greek military began
to work closely, especially after Greece joined the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in 1952. This included notable CIA officers Gust
Avrakotos and Clair George. Avrakotos maintained a close relationship with
the colonels who would figure in the later coup.[2]
Greece was a vital link in the NATO defense arc which extended from the
eastern border of Iran to the northernmost point in Norway. Greece in
particular was seen as being at risk, having experienced a communist
insurgency. In particular, the newly founded Hellenic National Intelligence
Service (EYP) and the Mountain Raiding Companies (LOK) maintained a very
close liaison with their American counterparts. In addition to preparing for a
Soviet invasion, they agreed to guard against a left-wing coup. The LOK in
particular were integrated into the Gladio European stay-behind network.[3]
Although there have been persistent rumors about an active support of the
coup by the U.S. government, there is no evidence to support such claims.[4]
[5] The timing of the coup apparently caught the CIA by surprise.[6]
The Apostasia and political instability[edit]
Main article: Apostasia of 1965
After many years of conservative rule, the election of the Center Union's
Georgios Papandreou, Sr. as Prime Minister was a sign of change. In a bid to
gain more control over the country's government than his limited
constitutional powers allowed, the young and inexperienced King Constantine
II clashed with liberal reformers, dismissing Papandreou in 1965 and causing
a constitutional crisis known as the "Apostasia of 1965".
After making several attempts to form governments, relying on dissident
Centre Union and conservative MPs, Constantine II appointed an interim
government under Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, and new elections were called
for 28 May 1967. There were many indications that Papandreou's Centre
Union would emerge as the largest party, but would not be able to form a
single-party government and would be forced into an alliance with the United
Democratic Left, which was suspected by conservatives of being a proxy for
the banned KKE. This possibility was used as a pretext for the coup.
A "Generals' Coup"[edit]
Greek historiography and journalists have hypothesized about a "Generals'
Coup",[7] a coup that would have been deployed at Constantine's behest
under the pretext of combating communist subversion.[8][9]
Before the elections that were scheduled for 28 May 1967, with expectations
of a wide Center Union victory, a number of conservative National Radical
Union politicians feared that the policies of left-wing Centrists, including
Andreas Papandreou (the son of Georgios Papandreou, Sr.), would lead to a
constitutional crisis. One such politician, George Rallis, proposed that, in case
of such an "anomaly", the King should declare martial law as the monarchist
constitution permitted him. According to Rallis, Constantine was receptive to
the idea.[10]
According to U.S. diplomat John Day, Washington also worried that Andreas
Papandreou would have a very powerful role in the next government,
because of his father's old age. According to Robert Keely and John Owens,
American diplomats present in Athens at the time, Constantine asked U.S.
Ambassador William Phillips Talbot what the American attitude would be to an
extra-parliamentary solution to the problem. To this the embassy responded
negatively in principle adding, however, that, "U.S. reaction to such move
cannot be determined in advance but would depend on circumstances at
time." Constantine denies this.[11] According to Talbot, Constantine met the
army generals, who promised him that they would not take any action before
the coming elections. However, the proclamations of Andreas Papandreou
made them nervous, and they resolved to re-examine their decision after
seeing the results of the elections.[11]
In 1966, Constantine sent his envoy, Demetrios Bitsios, to Paris on a mission
to persuade former prime minister Constantine Karamanlis to return to
Greece and resume his prior role in politics. According to uncorroborated
claims made by the former monarch, Karamanlis replied to Bitsios that he
would only return if the King imposed martial law, as was his constitutional
prerogative.[12] According to New York Times correspondent Cyrus L.
Sulzberger, Karamanlis flew to New York City to meet with USAF General
Lauris Norstad to lobby for a conservative coup that would establish himself
as Greece's leader; Sulzberger alleges that Norstad declined to involve
himself in such affairs.[9] Sulzberger's account rests solely on the authority of
his and Norstad's word. When, in 1997, the former King reiterated
Sulzberger's allegations, Karamanlis stated that he "will not deal with the
former king's statements because both their content and attitude are
unworthy of comment".[13]
The deposed King's adoption of Sulzberger's claims against Karamanlis was
castigated by Greece's left-leaning media, which denounced Karamanlis as
"shameless" and "brazen".[13] It bears noting that, at the time, Constantine
referred exclusively to Sulzberger's account to support the theory of a
planned coup by Karamanlis, and made no mention of the alleged 1966
meeting with Bitsios, which he would refer to only after both participants had
died and could not respond.
As it turned out, the constitutional crisis did not originate either from the
political parties, or from the Palace, but from middle-rank army putschists.