Evidence Cases For Feb. 05

February 5, 2014
Marital disqualification,
Rule 130, section 22 (differentiate from relative incompetencies)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10396
July 29, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TERESA CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
The defendant was charged with a violation of the Opium Law. The
complaint alleged that she had in her possession and under her
control a quantity of opium. She was arrested, arraigned, pleaded not
guilty, tried, found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of P300 and
costs.
From that sentence she appealed to this court. In this court she
alleges that the lower court committed several errors, both of law and
of fact. Upon the question of fact, she alleges that the lower court
committed an error in deciding that the evidence adduced during the
trial of the cause was sufficient to show that she was guilty of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon that question the Attorney-General, in a carefully prepared brief
in which he analyzes the proof, reaches the conclusion that the facts
are insufficient to show that she is guilty of the crime charged.
It appears from the evidence that on the night of the 2nd of
December, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the
defendant, where she was living with her husband, Felix Ricablanca.
Upon arriving there, they obtained permission to enter and
immediately proceeded to make a search of the premises for opium.
While there is some dispute concerning the fact, we believe the proof
shows that the defendant, during the time the policemen were
searching the house, went to a bed located in the house, after being
so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a pillow a small
can of opium, said to contain about 7 grams of opium, and
attempted to throw it away. At that moment the policemen took
possession of the can. There is some conflict in the proof as to just
what took place at that moment. That the policemen inquired to whom
the opium belonged is not denied. The conflict arises in the answer
which was given to that question. The defendant in the present case,
according to some of the witnesses, declared that it belonged to her.
Her husband, Felix Ricablanca, according to some witnesses,
declared that he was the owner of the house and was responsible for
everything that was found within it. The policemen, at that moment,
evidently believed that the opium belonged to the husband, Felix
Ricablanca, for the reason that they arrested him and took him to the
pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a violation of the
Opium Law .He was later brought to trial and was acquitted.
No complaint was presented against the present defendant until after
a period of more than ten months had elapsed. The policemen who
were present at the time the opium was found certainly knew no more
about the facts at the time the complaint was presented against the
present defendant than they did on the night when the opium was
found and when they arrested her husband. The fact that the
defendant took the opium from under the pillow on the bed, at the
request of her husband, seems to us to be entirely supported by the
proof. Her husband was a confirmed user of opium. He admitted that
he was in the habit of smoking opium. That the defendant was
temporarily in possession of the opium is not denied, even by her.
That her possession was such a possession as is prohibited by the
law, she strongly denies. The mere fact that she had in her
possession the opium for but a moment and took possession of it
under her husband's order, is not, in our opinion, such a possession
of opium as is intended to be condemned by the law. She certainly
did not intend, even remotely, to have in her possession opium. She
did exactly what any other faithful wife would have done under similar
circumstances. There is no proof that she was a user of opium in any

form. There is no proof that she knew that the can contained opium
and consequently there is no proof of the animus possidendi. In the
absence of such proof there can be no conviction under the complaint
for the illegal possession of opium.
The appellant makes another assignment of error which presents an
important question of law. She alleges that the lower court committed
an error in permitting the testimony of her husband to be presented
against her over her objection. She alleges that the admission of that
testimony was in violation of paragraph 3 of section 383 of the Code
of Civil Procedure in Civil Actions. Said paragraph provides: "A
husband can not be examined for or against her husband without his
consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without her consent;
nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by
one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not
apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, or to a
criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against
the other."
It will be noted that said action prohibits a husband from giving
testimony against his wife without her consent, except in a civil action
between husband and wife, and in a criminal action when the crime
was committed by one against the other. The present is not a civil
action between husband and wife, neither it is a criminal action where
the crime was committed by one against the other. It would seem to
clear, therefore, that the testimony of the husband is not admissible if
the wife objected. The testimony of the husband should not have
been admitted.
There still another objection to the admissibility of the testimony of the
husband. His testimony was not given in the present case. It was a
copy of his declaration given in another case, in which he was the
defendant and in which he was charged with the illegal possession of
the opium in question. It will be remembered that at the time the
opium was found in the house of the defendant, the husband of the
present defendant was arrested; that later a complaint was presented
against him. During the trial he testified in his own behalf. It was the
testimony given in that case which was presented as proof in the
present case. He was not called as a witness. His testimony is not
only not admissible under the provisions above quoted of section
383, but it is not admissible under the Philippine Bill, which provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf."
The defendant was not given an opportunity "to meet the witness
face to face." The acceptance of the testimony of her husband, given
in another case, was in absolute violation of her rights and in direct
contravention of the law .The presentation and acceptance of the
testimony of the husband violated two well-recognized rules of law
first, paragraph 3 of section 383 of Act No. 190, and [second],
paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
At the common law the rule was that husband and wife could not
testify for or against each other in any criminal proceedings, except in
the prosecution of one for criminal injury to the other. The commonlaw rule has been adopted in practically all of the States of the United
States. The rule is based upon considerations of public policy
growing out of the marital relation. To allow one to testify for or
against the other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to
commit perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence of the
marital relation. The cases supporting the rule are innumerable.
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence of conviction must be
revoked, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be
dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25643
June 27, 1968
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo,
JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of the LA PAZ ICE
PLANT and COLD STORAGE CO., INC., and THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Efrain B. Trenas and Sergio D. Mabunay for petitioners.
Ricardo J. Gerochi for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife, who
is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a
hostile witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, without infringing on her marital privilege not to
testify against her husband under section 20 (b) of Rule 130. The trial
court, presided by the respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in
the affirmative and required the wife to appear and testify. The
petitioners sued for certiorari but the Court of Appeals dismissed their
petition1 and denied their motion for reconsideration.2 Hence this
appeal.3
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N. Hodges and
Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
for the annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice
Plant by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 39827.
Named as defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor
judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama. The complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by
the Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership
of Dineros; that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C.
Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he

had supposedly lent to it; that summons was served not on the
receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and
that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain
judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that,
because the summons was served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead
of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired no
jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision
of that court was void.
1vvphi1.nt
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while

admitting that the company was placed under receivership,
maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained
president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had authority to
receive in behalf of the company the court summons in civil case
39827. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred
that they did not contest Roque's claim because they knew it to be a
legitimate obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred
pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the
hearing Dineros asked the court to issue asubpoena to Paquita
Lezama to testify as "a witness summoned by the plaintiffs in
accordance with the Rules of Court." The request was granted over
the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of
the Rules of Court:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without
her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his
consent, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other.4
This provision deals with two different matters which rest on different
grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify in
each other's behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify against
each other.5 The fundamental theory of the common law is said to be
that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the
basis of the disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled

"Disqualification by reason of ... relationship."
On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional reasons has been
offered7 for the privilege, the "true explanation [which] is after all the
simplest"8 and which constitutes "the real and sole strength of the
opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the natural repugnance in
every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the
means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the
humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life
partner.9
Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to
do no more than testify as an adverse party in the case and, indeed,
in the light of the allegations both in the complaint and in the answer,
the request was apparently one that could reasonably be expected to
be made. Thus, the complaint charged
13. That in obtaining the judgment by default in Civil Case No.
39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila against the La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. defendants, in gross and
evident bad faith, and in fraudulent conspiracy, made it appear
that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained
a loan of P150,000.00 from defendant Marciano C. Roque thru
defendant Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an authority
vested upon defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the alleged
Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
Inc. allegedly evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the
Board of Directors of the said corporation signed by defendant
Jose Manuel Lezama and attested to by Benjamin Luis Borja
and Paquita B. Lezama and that defendants spouses Jose
Manuel Lezama and Paquita B. Lezama had manipulated the
books of the corporation by making it appear that such fictitious
loan was then in existence.
On the other hand, the answer claimed
13. That the herein defendants specifically deny all the
allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint; the truth
is, that the herein defendants have not conspired and acted in
bad faith with the plaintiff [Marciano C. Roque] in Civil Case No.
39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the rendition of
the said judgment referred to therein; for the truth is, that the
herein defendants, in their capacities as President-Manager and
Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.,
believing as they believe that the obligation sought to be
enforced by said civil action being legitimate and the allegations
of the complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem it wise to contest
the same; that the obligation of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice
Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., which the defendant Marciano C.
Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila was legitimately contracted in
accordance with law; that said obligation was duly entered in the
books of the corporation and that the said loan is not fictitious;
that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of
the said corporation.
Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was
fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita Lezama
who, as secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the meeting
at which Jose Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate
the loan and that it was she who, likewise as secretary, made the
entry in the books of the corporation.
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan
transaction was above board that Dineros, the company receiver,
wanted Paquita Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse
witness "for or against her husband," but rather as an adverse party
in the case.
It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays into his
opponent's position on the strength of section 6 of Rule 132 which
provides:
Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. A party
may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading
questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or

of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and
interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach
him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party
and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached
by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be crossexamined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of
his examination in chief.
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where
the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging fraud against the
spouses, can the wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party
witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without
violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?
It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony
would be receivable only against her.10 It is even suggested that
"each may testify in his or her own behalf, although the testimony
may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or against his or her own
interest, although the testimony may also militate against the other
spouse."11 Upon the other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita
Lezama to testify will transgress section 20(b) of Rule 130, especially
if her testimony will support the plaintiff's charge.
The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on the part of the
spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make it appear that the La
Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The
wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an adverse party
witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged
fraudulent scheme: "that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of
the company signed the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel
Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was
she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of the
corporation."
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on what actually
transpired during the meeting and will be asked questions on the
matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the
corporation. Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or
beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her
against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this case
are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's own
interests would tend to show the existence of collusive fraud between
the spouses and would then work havoc upon their common defense
that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the
wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly
testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which provides
merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or against her husband
without his consent," it is further argued that "when husband and wife
are parties to an action, there is no reason why either may not be
examined as a witness for or against himself or herself alone," and
his or her testimony could operate only against himself or herself. 12
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to the
rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this
case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses
and a third person, and the evident purpose of examination of the
wife is to prove that charge.
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected
to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both
spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses
are separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is
merely a formal or nominal party.13
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from
testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife as an
instrument of fraud; for then what better way would there be to
prevent discovery than to make a co-conspirator in fraud immune to
the most convenient mode of discovery available to the opposite
party? This argument overlooks the fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is
a mere concession, for the sake of discovery, from the rule which
precludes the husband or the wife from becoming the means of the
other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore not
be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's

spouse in a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros
has not demonstrated that there is no evidence available to him other
than the Lezamas' testimony to prove the charge recited in the
complaint.
1wph1.t
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are versed, and this

case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1
Resolution 52, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Nov. 24, 1965.
Resolution 12, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Jan. 6, 1966.
While the appeal was pending in this Court, the receivership

was dissolved and, consequently, Jose S. Dineros, who was
originally made a party respondent, was dropped and the La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. substituted in his stead. Resolution,
Oct. 26, 1966.
3
Rule 130, sec. 20(b).
See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2227 at 211, sec. 2228 at 216

(McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereafter cited as 8 Wigmore].
5
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 603 at 737 (3d ed. 1940)

[hereafter cited as 2 Wigmore].
6
For instance, in United States v. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182

(1915) the basis of the rule is said to be the "considerations of
public policy growing out of the marital relation." Said the Court:
"To allow one to testify for or against the other would be to
subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to
7
endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital relation." At

187. On the other hand, in People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694
(1947), the Court gave as reasons for the privilege the following:
"First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of
perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to
guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk
of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such
evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion
and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other." At 703.
8
8 Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212.
Id., sec. 2228 at 217.
10
See 8 Wigmore 227.
11
97 C.J.S. 477.
See Menzel vs. Tubbs, et al., 53 NW 653, 656 cited in 58 Am.

Jur. 129.
12
13
97 C.J.S. 477.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, respondents.
Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel Vicente Macalino for
petitioner.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent Judge, Hon.
Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the Information, as
follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the

Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with
deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and
forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a
deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a
house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said
spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No.
1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized
by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it
appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her
marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did
not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness

stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking
Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly as
herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without
her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent, except in a civil case by one against the other
or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that
the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending that it is a
"criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the
motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against
her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for
reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent
Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial
Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, seeking set aside
the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying that a
preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by
this Court enjoining said judge from further proceeding with the trial of
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved (a) to issue a temporary
restraining order, and (b) to require the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance on June
4
27, 1977, and its Memorandum in support of the Petition on August 30, 1977.
6
The respondents filed their Memorandum
on September 5, 1977. Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision.
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the

sole issues determinative of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not
the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document filed against
herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto who allegedly
forged the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of
sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her marital consent
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife
and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the
marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed
by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of
Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature
in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that
had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's
name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same
breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly,
filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a
crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of
the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense
may be classified as a crime committed by one spouse against the
other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the case
of Ordoo v. Daquigan, 8this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to be
followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this

jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac
64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong
upon the is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic within the exception
is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoo v.
Daquigan this Court held that the rape committed by the husband of
the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by the
husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed
by the accused in that can was not his wife but their daughter, this
Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the reason that said
criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where
the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and
vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the
act Of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in connection with the
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively,
the actuations of the witness-wife underacore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions, "identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
11
Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the

wife should not be disqualified from testifying against her husband in
the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o
espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of
a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he

could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license
to injure and prejudice her in secret all with unabashed and
complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court
dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying
for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No.
1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion
for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case, allowing
Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 See Annexes "A", "B", and B-1" of the Petition (Rollo, pp11-15).
2 Annex "C" of the Petition (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
3 Rollo, p. 39.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Ibid., p. 76.
6 Ibid., p. 87.
7 Ibid., p. 99.
8 G.R. No. L-39012, January 31, 1975,62 SCRA 270, at
273.
9 Id., p. 274.
10 Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel assisted the

Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga in filling the instant petition
for certiorari (rollo, pp. 9-10). Furthermore, she file on Aug.
22, 1977 a memorandum in support of the petition (rollo, pp.
68-74), and, on Dec. 28, 1977, a pleading entitled
Chronologically Effected Observations and
Circumstances in Support of or to Butress Memorandum for
Private Petitioner Victoria M. Manaloto, dated August 18,
1977 informing this Court that the trouble in her marital
relation with her husband the herein private respondent is
"beyond repair." (rollo pp- 105- 108).
11 People vs. Fransisco 78 Phil 694, 704 (cited in Ordono
vs. Daquigan, supra.).
Rule 130, section 23
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-58164. September 2, 1983.]
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO
ESPIRITU, assisted by her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORIO
GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, Et Al., Petitioner, v. ST. CLARES
REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T. GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO,
assisted by ANGELO CARDEO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc., Et
Al., Respondents.
Romeo J. Callejo, for Petitioners.
Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredez Law Offices for
respondent United Housing Corp.
Neptali Gonzales & Associates for respondent Guerreros.
F.B. Santiago & Associates for respondent St. Clares Realty Co., Ltd.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; INCOMPETENCY UNDER SEC.
20(a), RULE 130, RULES OF COURT, CONSTRUED. The plain truth is that
Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs
aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who
owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero;
that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to
Manuel Guerrero. It may be said that competency to testify established in Sec.
20(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court, affects only the persons therein mentioned,
and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties
plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
are not included in the prohibition. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166) By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses
and by barring them from further testifying, upon reasoning that unduly
strained the meaning of the provisions of the Rules of Court relied upon, the
trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing the truth in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEAD MANS RULE; INAPPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased
Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot
is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of
dead mans rule. "It has been held that statutes providing that a party in
interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane,
must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective
of their spirit. The law uses the word against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person. It should be noted that after the
mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative
follows, which means that the word representative includes only those who,
like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not
personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words
against the estate of such deceased persons, which convey the idea of an
estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and
that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in
the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such
representative." (Moran, ibid., pp. 169-171)
3. ID.; ID.; IMPROVIDENT EXCLUSION AND PRECLUSION FROM PRESENTING
FURTHER PROOF; CASE AT BAR. Prior to the issuance of the courts order of
June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to have waived their right
to further present or formally offer their evidence," the following had testified
as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora, Roman Mataverde,
Moises Javillionar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong, Frisco Cervantes,
Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold that the testimonial
evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such
evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling
the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon
appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on the Revised Rules of Court, Vol.
6, 1970 ed., p. 122)
4. ID.; JUDGMENT RENDERED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF DEFENDANTS
EVIDENCE DISREGARDING THAT OF THE PLAINTIFFS; REMAND TO TRIAL
COURT PROPER RECOURSE. The trial court rendered its decision solely on
the basis of the defendants evidence and without regard to the proofs that the
plaintiffs had presented on July 17, 1974 before the Court of Appeals could
finally resolve plaintiffs petition to disqualify the trial judge. As modified by
the Court of Appeals, the decision sentences the plaintiffs to pay damages and
attorneys feet, apart from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of Two
Million One Hundred Eighty Three Thousand and Five Hundred
(P12,183,500.00) Pesos, without plaintiffs having been gives, the chance to
complete their evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and
to present rebuttal evidence. The way the trial court and the Court of Appeals
proceeded in this case, litigation became more a game of technicalities than a
proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. No other fairer course of
action is demanded but for this Court to remand the case for further
proceedings.
DECISION
VASQUEZ, J.:
In their petition for review by certiorari, petitioners are seeking a reversal of

the decision of the former Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate
Court) dated April 30, 1981 in CA-G.R No. 57597-R, and its resolution dated
September 3, 1981 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereof. Our resolution of May 25, 1981 gave due course to the petition.
The action initiated by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
prayed for a judgment:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"1. Declaring the in existence of the Deed of Sale of Lands, Annex A hereof,
and Deeds of Absolute Sale, Annexes B and C, as well as the Original
Certificate of Title No. 4591 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 339629 and
340842 of the Registry of Deeds, null and void;
2. Declaring the plaintiffs (now petitioners) the owners in fee simple of the
aforedescribed property, pro-indiviso;
3. Ordering the private defendants (now private respondents) to reconvey to
the plaintiffs the aforedescribed lot;
4. Declaring the Joint Venture Agreement executed by the defendant
partnership and the defendant corporation null and void and ineffective insofar
as the plaintiffs are concerned;
5. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs over the said lot;
6. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to
pay the plaintiffs, actual and exemplary damages, the amounts of which they
will prove during the hearing of the instant case on the merit;
7. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to
pay to the plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00; plus costs of
suit." (Printed Record on Appeal, pp. 116-118.)
Petitioners original and amended complaints alleged that during their lifetime
the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of
the disputed property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The
spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and
Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro
Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained
that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his
share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots.
Accordingly, upon the death of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically
possessed the lot and cultivated it through his tenant Dominador Ramirez, who
earned a 50% share in the net produce, the other 50% being retained by
Andres Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation expenses and real estate taxes
on the property. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation,
Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and
allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owners share in
the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina
Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the
owners share in the produce for as long as she needed the property.
Dominador Ramirez continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of
Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by
his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners
in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres
Guerrero.
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land
was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero
as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Paraaque Cadastre.
Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced
themselves as agents or buyers of the land approached some of the plaintiffs
in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were
informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero.
Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered the following: that Manuel Guerrero
was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a Deed of Sale of
Land dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he
caused the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot No. 4752 and he was issued
advance Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that in the advance plan
issued to him, it was duly noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously
surveyed for Andres Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by
Felicisimo Guerrero, father of the defendants Guerreros, filed an application for
registration of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that
notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court
ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors appeal to a
higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591
to the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by
Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of
Deeds gave due course to the registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No.
4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate No. 339629 in its stead; that on the
same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros
caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clares Realty
Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28,
1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute
Sale" to the St. Clares Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company.
According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of
Manuel Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among
others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she
purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of
the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St.
Clares Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer certificates of title in their favor
are fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs for the
reason, among others, that at the time of execution of the Deeds of Sale, the
defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero;
that long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs
came to know that the St. Clares Realty Company, Ltd. executed a "Joint
Venture Agreement" with the United Housing Corporation under which the
latter bound itself to develop the property into a residential subdivision; and
that the said agreement was entered into in gross and evident bad faith.
Separate answers were filed by the defendants Guerreros, St. Clares Realty
Company, Ltd. and United Housing Corporation. The defendants Guerreros
alleged that Cristina Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property; that the
action of the plaintiffs had prescribed and they are guilty of laches. St. Clare s
Realty Company, Ltd. averred that its contract with United Housing Corporation
was made in good faith. United Housing Corporation averred that there is no
privity of interest between plaintiffs and this defendant considering that the
plaintiffs are not parties to the Joint Venture Agreement.
Issues having been joined, the case proceeded to trial.
Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina Guerrero, testified as a witness of the
plaintiffs that having had previous information that the disputed lot was
borrowed from Andres Guerrero and that Cristina Guerrero merely mortgaged
it to Manuel Guerrero, he went to the house of Manuel Guerrero in Barrio San
Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, in 1968 at the behest of the plaintiffs, to inquire
about the mortgage; that in reply, Manuel Guerrero stated that the land had
been sold but it would be changed with another lot of the same area; that in
1970, Sotero Cervantes and Laura Cervantes, children of Cristina Guerrero,
and he went to see Manuel Guerrero at the Sta. Rita Church in Paraaque;
that Sotero and Laura asked if they could get the land back, that Manuel
Guerrero answered that it were better to change the disputed lot with another
parcel of the same area and value; that as he was not satisfied with the
answer, Frisco Cervantes went to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasig,
Rizal, where he obtained a copy of a Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero
which he delivered to the children of Andres Guerrero.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated

as Officer-In-Charge of the Surveys Division, testified for the plaintiffs that in
the Bureaus Lot Data Computation Book showing the list of claimants for Lot
4752, Case 4, Cadastre 299, Paraaque, Rizal, (Exhibit A), which was
surveyed on December 10, 1957, Andres Guerrero is listed as claimant. The
records of the Bureau of Lands from 1957 (when Lot 4752 was cadastrally
surveyed for Andres Guerrero) until 1962 show no claimant to the property
except Andres Guerrero. In 1962, the Bureau of lands received a letter with an
affidavit attached to it from Manuel Guerrero requesting that an advance plan
be made. Advance Plan No. 10008 was made without Andres Guerrero being
notified. But in the advance plan, the Bureau of Lands listed Andres Guerrero
as original claimant so that he would not be prejudiced when a case comes to
trial.
Dominador Ramirez testified that during the rainy season of 1936, Andres
Guerrero asked him to work on his land located at Barrio San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Rizal, with an area of four (4) hectares, more or less. As tenant,
his agreement with Andres Guerrero was that he would till the land in
consideration of 50% of the harvests with Andres Guerrero shouldering the
cultivation expenses. From 1936 to about 1941 or 1942, he worked on the
land and gave 50% of the produce to Andres Guerrero who went personally to
the field to get the same. In 1941 or 1942, he stopped working on the land
because war had broken out.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina
Guerrero, had been sick for a long time before she died at the age of 80 years
in 1948; and that her mother could walk only inside their house in Paraaque;
that the money spent for the illness of her mother came from Manuel
Guerrero; and that, through her children, Cristina Guerrero could ask money
from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that Andres Guerrero had lent to
her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros
objected to the line of questioning on the ground that the said witness was
testifying "on matters which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court." The trial court having ruled that the witness "may answer",
defendants counsel registered a continuing objection. The court allowed the
witness to continue her testimony subject to such objection. (TSN, pp. 9-20,
October 19, 1973.)
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was lent by
Andres Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money to
Cristina Guerrero for quite some time; that shortly after the death of Cristina
Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo
Guerrero, and summed up the loans he had extended to Cristina Guerrero in
the total amount of P1,900.00; and that Felicisimo Guerrero asked Laura
Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to attest to the fact that a certain amount
of money had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero.
cralawnad
On October 24, 1973, the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to

disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule
130, of the New Rules of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On
November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and declared that
Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly situated,
are disqualified to testify in the case.
On February 12, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Motion For The Honorable Presiding
Judge Of This Honorable Court To Inhibit Himself And/Or To Transfer Case To
Another Branch." Oppositions to the said motion were filed. On April 26, 1974,
the trial court denied the motion.
At the continuation of the trial on June 14, 1974, plaintiffs and their counsel
failed to appear despite due notice and repeated previous warnings to their
lawyer. Instead of appearing in court, plaintiffs, thru counsel, filed an urgent
motion to reset the hearing, which was opposed by the defendants. On even
date, the court issued an order as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"In view of the non-appearance of the plaintiffs as well as their counsel for
todays hearing, they are deemed to have waived their right to further present
or formally offer their evidence in court, and on motion of defendants
counsels, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Juan A. Carambas, is hereby authorized and
commissioned to receive the evidence for the defendants. After the defendants
have closed their case, they are given 10 days within which to file their
respective memoranda and the case is deemed submitted for decision after
receipt of the complete transcript of stenographic notes." (Record on Appeal,
p. 212.)
On June 22, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that they did
not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine
defendants witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence; and that they were
reserving the exercise of those rights upon the finality of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the Presiding Judge of the trial court, which they were then preparing to file.
Indeed, on June 25, 1974, plaintiffs instituted the said special civil action,
which was docketed in the Court of Appeals as its CA-G.R. No. SF-03120. The
action sought the disqualification of the trial judge from continuing with the
hearing of the case. On June 27, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition outright. Copy of the resolution was received by the plaintiffs on July
2, 1974. They filed a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1974.
On the same date, July 17, 1974, the trial court rendered its decision with the
following dispositive part:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants (and)

against the plaintiffs:
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1. Dismissing the complaint and Amended Complaint;

2. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the private defendant Guerreros the amount of
P20,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages and
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant St. Clares Realty Co. Ltd., the
amount of P1,923,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant United Housing Corporation the
amount of P90,500.00 as actual damages; P100,000.00 for loss of goodwill
and business reputation, P80,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as
lawyers fees; and
5. To pay the cost of suit.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby directed to cancel the Lis Pendens in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340842 in the name of the St. Clares Realty
Co., Ltd., Book T-1971. Meanwhile, the defendant United Housing Corporation
is ordered to proceed and continue with its commitments under the
Memorandum Agreement dated October 12, 1971." (Record on Appeal, pp.
259-261.)
cralawnad
On July 20, 1974, or three (3) days before plaintiffs received the decision,
they filed with the trial court a "Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela" praying that
should the Court of Appeals render an adverse resolution in CA-G.R. No. SF03120, the lower court should set aside its order of June 14, 1974 and allow
plaintiffs to present other evidence, cross-examine witnesses of the
defendants, and present rebuttal evidence.
On August 21, 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
which they received on July 23, 1974.
Early in 1975, Judge Arsenio Alcantara who rendered the decision was
replaced by Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. In her order of February 13,
1975, Judge Castro-Bartolome resolved that:
"1) The plaintiffs Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela dated July 18, 1974, having
been passed upon by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara by the rendition of the
Decision dated July 17, 1974, is deemed to have been clearly denied by the
Honorable Judge who penned the said decision;
2) The plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration dated August 21, 1974 and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated August 22, 1974, have to be
as they are hereby, denied;
x
5) The plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration are not pro-forma and have suspended the running of the
period of appeal."
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On February 21, 1975, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals
where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57597-R. On April 20, 1981, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision as follows:
"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision appealed from is

hereby affirmed, with modification in regard to damages as follows: (a) for the
defendants Guerreros, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P10,000.00 exemplary
damages; (b) for the defendant St. Clares Realty Co., Ltd., P10,000.00
exemplary damages; (c) for the defendant United Housing Corporation,
P40,000.00 for loss of goodwill and business reputation and P10,000.00
exemplary damages. The actual damages and attorneys fees are hereby
maintained."
On May 27, 1981, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.
In their instant petition for review, petitioners have raised substantive and
procedural points on which the lower tribunals have allegedly erred. The
substantive issues refer to the lack of basis for the grant of actual, moral and
exemplary damages in the huge amount of over two million pesos; and the
error of ruling that the action was barred by prescription and laches.
Petitioners underscore the procedural errors they attribute to the lower courts
which resulted in the deprivation of their full opportunity to ventilate their case
and prove the validity of their claim. They assail the ruling that their witnesses
Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes "and others similarly situated" are
disqualified to testify; and that they waived the right to present their evidence
when they failed to appear at a hearing set by the trial judge during the
pendency of proceedings taken by the petitioners to disqualify him due to
alleged hostility manifested by the latter towards the petitioners.
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At this instance, We consider it unnecessary to discuss the substantive merits

of the petitioners cause of action. The record reveals that they have not yet
completed the presentation of their evidence. Whatever evidence they had
previously presented were apparently not considered in the rendition of the
questioned decisions for not having been "formally offered." It does not strike
Us as fair and just that the petitioners would be made answerable for damages
in such a huge amount for having filed an allegedly baseless and unfounded
action without affording them the full opportunity of establishing the merit of
their claim. On the face of the record, We are convinced that they had been
denied that chance due to some mistaken and capricious application of
pertinent procedural rules.
The first question of importance that engages the attention of this Court is
whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were
correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded
on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, which provides
as follows:
"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The

following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested,
directly or indirectly as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case

is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such became of unsound mind."
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the
affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made
in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not
parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor
"persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by
whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its
alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but
merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
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"Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify

established in the provision above quoted, affects only the persons therein
mentioned, and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors,
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither
parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition." (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.)
By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and by barring them from
further testifying, upon reasoning that unduly strained the meaning of the
provisions of the Rules of Court relied upon, the trial court deprived itself of
the opportunity of knowing the truth in this case.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the
deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or
administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot
is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the
dead mans rule.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent
to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in
accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses
the word against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person. It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or
administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the
word representative includes only those who, like the executor or
administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. And that
is emphasized by the law by using the words against the estate of such
deceased persons, which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the
deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his
rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person
representing him, not the personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid,
pp. 169-171.)
The next question that requires attention is whether or not the exclusion of
plaintiffs evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was
correctly sustained by the respondent Court of appeals. Prior to the issuance of
the courts order of June 14, 1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to
have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence", the
following had testified as witnesses of the plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora,
Roman Mataverde, Moises Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong,
Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold
that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that
without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial
evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify
before the court upon appropriate questions. (Moran, Comments on the
Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., p. 122.)
Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the

defendants, the witnesses discovered the following facts: In the 1930s Andres
Guerrero physically possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate taxes for
it, had the same cultivated through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation
expenses, and exclusively enjoyed the owners share in the harvests. Andres
Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, before he died. Cristina
Guerrero became ill prior to the year 1948. She could walk only inside her
house in Paraaque, Rizal. The money spent for her illness was borrowed from
Manuel Guerrero. After the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel Guerrero and
Felicisimo Guerrero came to her house and the money loaned to her was
totalled in the amount of P1,900.00. On December 10, 1957, the questioned
lot was cadastrally surveyed and denominated as Lot 4752 of the Paraaque
Cadastre. Andres Guerrero was the lone claimant. Until 1962, no other person
claimed the lot.
The foregoing proofs bear materially on the questions raised by the plaintiffs
as to whether or not: (1) Cristina Guerrero or Andres Guerrero owned the lot
when the former purportedly sold it to Manuel Guerrero in 1948; (2) Cristina
Guerrero really sold or merely mortgaged the land to Manuel Guerrero; (3)
Manuel Guerrero and, after him, the defendants Guerreros were buyers in
good faith. Instead of insulating itself from evidence that could lead it to the
truth, the trial court should have addressed itself to the questions why: (1) if it
is true that Cristina Guerrero was the owner of the disputed lot in 1948, the
cadastral surveyors who actually repaired to the field listed Andres Guerrero as
the sole claimant of the property, (2) until 1962, no other person except
Andres Guerrero claimed the lot as his own; (3) notwithstanding the purported
deed of sale by Cristina Guerrero to Manuel Guerrero was executed on April
24, 1948, it was presented for registration with the Register of Deeds almost
ten (10) years later only on February 27, 1958 (TSN, p. 15, January 9, 1974);
(4) in the deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero, it is stated that he appeared in
Paraaque, Rizal, before Atty. Jose D. Villena who was a notary public in
Makati, Rizal; (5) the area of the land bought by Manuel Guerrero was 33,090
square meters whereas the area of the land sold by him to the defendants
Guerreros was 42,299 square meters. The court also ought rather to have
noticed the fact that in the deed of sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero, it is
stated that the subject parcel of land "is surrounded by muddikes besides the
stone monuments that visibly marked all its "boundaries", which clearly
indicate a previous survey and which may in turn lead to the question if the
deed of sale to Manuel Guerrero might have been made after the cadastral
survey in 1957 and not in 1948.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the defendants
evidence and without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had presented on
July 17, 1974 before the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs
petition to disqualify the trial judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the
decision sentences the plaintiffs to pay damages and attorneys fees, apart
from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of Two Million One Hundred
Eighty Three Thousand and Five Hundred (P2,183,500.00) Pesos, without
plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to crossexamine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal evidence. The
way the trial court and the Court of Appeals proceeded in this case, litigation
became more a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth
and mete justice. No other fairer course of action is demanded but for this
Court to remand the case for further proceedings.
chanrobles.com .ph : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby set

aside. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin with
instruction to the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to complete their evidence,
to cross-examine the defendants witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence
if they so desire, and thereafter to decide the case anew.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986
GENARO GOI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P.
VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA,
VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE
P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P.
VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE
ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondentsappellees.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioners-appellants.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Office for
respondents-appellees.
FERNAN, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 27800-R entitled,"Gaspar Vicente, PlaintiffAppellant, vs. Genaro Goni, et. al., Defendants-Appellants" as well as
from the resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual backdrop is as follows:
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce
Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros
Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T.
Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with
TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he
did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the
consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one
Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Allegedly because TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction
between Villanueva and Villegas, without a guaranty private
respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor

of TABACALERA. The guarantee was embodied in a document
denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta." 1
Either because the amount realized from the transaction between
Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the
three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by
private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell
to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to
writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of
Villanueva, thus:
En consideracion a la garantia que Don Gaspar Vicente
assume con la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de Filipinas por el
saldo de Don Santiago Villegas de P43,539.75 asumido por
Don Joaquin Villegas el que Subscribe Praxedes T.
Villanueva se compromete ceder es venta a Don Gaspar
Vicente los campos nos. 3, 4 y 13 del plano de porcelario de
la Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, en compra projectada
de la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de Filipinas. Estas campos
representan 6-90-35 hectares por valor de P13,807.00 que
Don Gasper Vicente pagara directamente a Praxedes T.
Villanueva
Bais Central, Octubre 24, 1949.
Fdo. Praxedes T. Villanueva
Por: Fdo Genaro Goi Apoderado 2
Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit
from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the
balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of
P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only
the latter amount was debited from private respondent's account. The
difference was supposedly paid by private respondent to Villanueva,
but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented in court,
this fact was disputed by petitioners.
It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the

contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling
a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private
respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract/promise to sell However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had
already been debited from private respondent's account, it was
agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria
would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of
five (5) years starting with crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of
15% of the gross income, said rent to be deducted from the money
advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to Villanueva
would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the
stipulated period of lease.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of
sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos.
3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter
registered in the name of Villanueva under TCT No. T-4780 of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. The fields were likewise
mortgaged by Villanueva to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC), later transferred to the Philippine National Bank on December
16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of
P334,400.00. 3
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent
Vicente after the 1949-1950 milling season in January and February,
1950.
On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a "Documento de la Venta
Definitive" in favor of Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the
Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627 square meters,
more or less. (Hacienda Sarria). A supplemental instrument was later
executed by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include in the sale of
June 17, 1950 the sugar quota of the land.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were
instituted on November 24, 1951 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, docketed as Special Case No. 777.
Among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court
were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Field no. 13 with an area of 1 hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares was
listed as Lot no. 723 of the inventory while fields nos. 3 and 4, with
areas of 3 hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, and 1 hectare, 69 ares
and 80 centares, respectively, were included in Lot no. 257 of the
inventory.
On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were
ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes Villanueva
delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action
for recovery of property and damages before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goi in his capacity as
administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. In his
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent
Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre
de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to
sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October
24, 1949. He likewise prayed by way of attorney's fees and other
costs the sum of P2,000.00 and for such other further relief which the
court may deem just and equitable in the premises. 4
On October 25, 1954, petitioner Goni as defendant in Civil Case No.
2990, filed an answer with counterclaim for accounting of the produce
of fields nos. 4 and 13, as well as the surrerder thereof on June 20,
1955, the end of the fifth crop-year, plus moral damages in the sum of
P30,000.00 and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. After an answer to the
counter-claim had been filed, private respondent Vicente amended
his complaint on September 1, 1955, to include a prayer for damages
representing the produce of field no. 3 from 1949-50 until delivery
thereof to him. An answer with counterclaim to the amended
complaint was duly filed, and on April 25, 1956, private respondent
Vicente amended his complaint anew to include as partiesdefendants the heirs of the late Praxedes Villanueva.
On July 13, 1957, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts,
agreeing, among others, on the costs of production and produce of
the three fields in question. The case thereafter proceeded to trial.
Plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: then party-plaintiff Gaspar
Vicente, himself, who over the objection of therein defendants

testified on facts occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva,
and Epifanio Equio a clerk of TABACALERA Agency in the Bais
Sugar Central. Defendants presented Genaro Goni, who testified on
the alleged verbal lease agreement.
On December 18, 1959, the trial court rendered a decision ordering
therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to
execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor
of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or compensatory damages in the
amount of P 81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross income of
field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-59, and such other
amounts as may be due from said field for the crop years subsequent
to crop-year 1958-59, until the field is delivered to Vicente, and to pay
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs. Therein
defendant Goi was relieved of any civil liability for damages, either
personally or as administrator of the estate. 5
Both parties appealed the decision to the then Court of Appeals; the
plaintiff from the portion awarding damages on a claim that he was
entitled to more, and defendants, from the entire decision.
On December 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming that of the lower court, with the modification that
the amount of damages to be paid by defendant-heirs to the plaintiff
should be the total net income from field no. 3 from the crop year
1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the plaintiff plus interest
thereon at the legal rate per annum. 6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but were denied the
relief sought in a resolution dated February 9, 1967. Hence, the
present appeal by certiorari whereby petitioners raise the following
questions of law:
MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE TESTIFY ON
MATTERS OF FACT OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH
OF PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH CONSTITUTES A
CLAIM OR DEMAND UPON HIS ESTATE. IN VIOLATION
OF RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE 130, SEC.
20 PAR. (A)?
MAY NOT A WRITTEN PROMISE TO SELL DATED
OCTOBER 24,1949 BE NOVATED INTO A VERBAL
AGREEMENT OF LEASE DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE
PROMISSOR, WHOSE DEATH OCCURRED ON
NOVEMBER 12, 1951, BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SUBSTANTIATED BY COMPETENT ORAL EVIDENCE IN
THIS CASE?
SHOULD THE PROMISEE IN A PROMISE TO SELL, WHO
PAID P12,460.24 WHICH WAS TO BE ACCOUNTED AND
TO BE CREDITED AS RENTALS AFTER FIVE (5) YEARS
OF LEASE, WHO IN HIS ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT
ALLEGE NOR PROVE DAMAGES, EXCEPT THE SUM OF
P2,000.00 AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, RECEIVE A
JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P74,056.35 WHICH CONSISTS OF P37,121.26 PLUS
LEGAL INTEREST FOR THE CROP YEARS 1950-51 TO
1958-59 AND FOR P3,624.18 TO P4,374.78 FOR EVERY
CROP YEAR SUBSEQUENT TO 1958-59 PLUS
INTEREST? 7
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court erred in ruling for the
admissibility in evidence of private respondent Vicente's testimony.
Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente 8 would be disqualified
by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section
20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or

relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as
herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person,
or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to

any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation
to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the
part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit
upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
testimony. 9 It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
10
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes

Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them,
remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the
defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased,
not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent
or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed
in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained
from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might
have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might
have been interested to establish, if living. 11
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for
petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver
occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the
plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. 12 It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as
plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in
the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been
brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is

competent to testify to transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of
such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to
testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to
those transactions or communications which were had with the
agent. 13 The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was
privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the
opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar,
for the reason that petitioner Goi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an

obligation is changed or altered. 14 In order, however, that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each
other.
15
"Novation is never presumed. It must be established that the old and the new contracts are incompatible in all points, or that the will to novate appear by
express agreement of the parties or in acts of equivalent import.
16
The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal

agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly proven not only by
the testimony of petitioner Goi, but likewise by the acts and conduct
of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to
sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields
nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields
nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name
and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva likewise executed a deed of
sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these
were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any
steps toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3,
4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that
the latter execute a similar document in his favor, or causing notice of
his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said lots.
If it were true that he made demands on Villanueva for the surrender
of field no. 3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of
sale, he should have, upon refusal of the latter to do so, immediately
or within a reasonable time thereafter, instituted an action for
recovery, or as previously observed, caused his adverse claim to be
annotated on the certificate of title. Considering that field no. 3,
containing an area of three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is
the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary prudent man would
have taken these steps if he honestly believed he had any right
thereto. Yet, private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact such
inaction persisted even during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings wherein he could have readily intervened to seek
exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the inventory of properties of
the late Praxedes Villanueva.
The reason given by private respondent Vicente that field no. 3 was
not delivered to him together with fields nos. 4 and 13 because there
were small sugar cane growing on said field at that time belonging to
TABACALERA, might be taken as a plausible explanation why he
could not take immediate possession of lot no. 3, but it certainly could
not explain why it took him four years before instituting an action in
court, and very conveniently, as petitioners noted, after Villanueva
had died and at the time when the verbal contract of lease was about
to expire.
Both the trial and appellate courts chose to believe in the
contract/promise to sell rather than the lease agreement, simply
because the former had been reduced to writing, while the latter was
merely verbal. It must be observed, though, that the contract/promise
to sell was signed by petitioner Goi as attorney-in-fact of the late
Praxedes Villanueva, an indication, to our mind, that final
arrangements were made by petitioner Goi in the absence of
Villanueva. It was therefore natural for private respondent Vicente to
have demanded that the agreement be in writing to erase any doubt
of its binding effect upon Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal
lease agreement was negotiated by and between Villanueva and
private respondent Vicente themselves. Being close friends and
relatives 17 it can be safely assumed that they did not find it necessary to reduce the same into writing.
In rejecting petitioners' contention respecting the verbal lease
agreement, the appellate court put much weight on the failure of
petitioners to demand an accounting of the produce of fields nos. 4
and 13 from 1950 to 1954, when the action for recovery of property
was filed. Such failure was satisfactorily explained by petitioners in
their motion for reconsideration filed before the then Court of Appeals,
in this manner:
... Mr. Genaro Goni is also a farmer by profession and that
there was no need for him to demand a yearly accounting of
the total production because the verbal lease agreement
was for a term of 5 years. The defendant Mr. Genaro Goni
as a sugar planter has already full knowledge as to the
annual income of said lots nos. 4 and 13, and since there
was the amount of P12,460.25 to be liquidated, said
defendant never deemed it wise to demand such a yearly
accounting. It was only after or before the expiration of the 5

year lease that said defendant demanded the accounting
from the herein plaintiff regarding the production of the 2 lots
that were then leased to him.
It is the custom among the sugar planters in this locality that
the Lessee usually demands an advance amount to cover
the rental for the period of the lease, and the demand of an
accounting will be only made after the expiration of the
lease period. It was adduced during the trial that the amount
of P12,460.75 was considered as an advance rental of the 2
lots which was leased to the Plaintiff, lots nos. 4 and 13; so
we humbly believe that there was no necessity on the part
of defendant Mr. Genaro Goi to make a yearly demand for
an accounting for the total production of 2 parcels leased to
the plaintiff. 18
Petitioners, having clearly and sufficiently shown that the
contract/promise to sell was subsequently novated into a verbal lease
agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a favorable decision on
their counterclaim. Discussion of the third issue raised therefore
becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The
judicial administrator of the estate of private respondent Gaspar
Vicente and/or his successors-in-interest are hereby ordered to: a)
surrender possession of fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria to petitioners; b) render an accounting of the
produce of said fields for the period beginning crop-year 1950-51 until
complete possession thereof shall have been delivered to petitioners;
and c) to pay the corresponding annual rent for the said fields in an
amount equivalent to 15% of the gross produce of said fields, for the
periods beginning crop-year 1950-51 until said fields shall have been
surrendered to petitioners, deducting from the amount due petitioners
the sum of P12,460.24 advanced by private respondent Gaspar
Vicente.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur,
Footnotes
1 par. 22, Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal p. 74,

Rollo.
2 Annex "A", Petition, p. 20, Rollo.
3 par. 17, Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal p. 73,
Rollo.
4 Record on Appeal pp. 47-49, Rollo.
5 Record on Appeal, pp. 75-88, Rollo.
6 Annex "A ", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.
7 Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo.
8 Private respondent Gaspar Vicente died during the
pendency of this appeal. He is substituted by the judicial
administrator of his estate, Ignacio Vicente.
9 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol 5, p. 4249.
10 Icard v. Masigan et. al., 71 Phil. 419.
11 97 C.J.S. 648.
12 Francisco, Commentaries on the Revised Rules of Court,
Vol. VII, pp. 237-238.
13 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, supra, p. 4397.
14 Art. 1291, Civil Code of the Philippines.
15 Art. 1292, Ibid.
16 Martinez v. Cavives, 25 PhiL 581: Tiu Suico v. Habana.
45 Phil. 707; Asia Banking Corp. v. Lacson Company, Inc.,
48 Phil. 482.
17 p. 12. Rollo.
18 p. 96, Rollo.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN,
in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased
JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E.
RAZON, INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the
ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by
Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered
under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation.
The then Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court
of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No.
74306 is the owner of the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial
court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father
of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of
the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for
reconsideration. Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision
reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while Vicente Chuidian
asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him.
The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.
The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on

November 16, 1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo
Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de
Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered
to deliver certificates of stocks representing the
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E.
Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the
defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a
writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of defendants
having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of
the properties of defendant corporation . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged
that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of
record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant,
Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement
between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of
stock were actually owned and remained in the possession
of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that neither the late
Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the
administrator of the intestate estate of Juan Telesforo
Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon,
Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of
Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose
Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez
de Tagle.
On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares
of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of
Juan T. Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T.
Chuidian and after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected
as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served
and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April
1966 up to April 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned
the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in
question and had not brought any action to have the
certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant
Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff,
until the same was surrendered by defendant Razon and
deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc.,
Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock previously placed
in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to
some friends including Juan T. Chuidian
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock
upon instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was
personally delivered by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the
Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who
was himself an associate of the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs.
C & 11). Since then, Enrique Razon was in possession of
said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late
Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered the said
stock certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of
defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic)
delivered it for deposit with the bank under the joint custody
of the parties as confirmed by the trial court in its order of
August 7, 1971.
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No.

003 were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because
it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the
shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the
owner of the said shares of stock and was to have
possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor
by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp.
4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22,
1980, Exhs. "C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o 74306, pp. 6668)
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate
court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's
statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to
the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the
case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement
between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership
of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the
deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was
subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or
relationship The following persons cannot testify as to
matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as
herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person,
or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact accruing before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound

mind." (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim
against the estate of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by
him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely
impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no
longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."
(Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co
Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of
an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.
(See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is
that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the
administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant
agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the
deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of
the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within
the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the
estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never
objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature
of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's
testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private
respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony
is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We
ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence
which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but
has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to
object thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a
civil suit, as well as the allowance of improper questions that
may be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in
the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by
timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence.
In any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the
testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge
has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could
have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike
it out on its own motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v.
Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)
The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible
having been settled, we now proceed to discuss the fundamental
issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for
the purpose of participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators were Enrique Razon,
Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim,
Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however,
did not start operations until 1966. According to the petitioner, some
of the incorporators withdrew from the said corporation. The petitioner

then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the
late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. The
shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as
nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of
stock were owned and held by the petitioner but Chuidian was given
the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement, Chuidian in
1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had
in his possession the certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it
for deposit with the Philippine Bank of Commerce under the parties'
joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial
court's order.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards
the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his
ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petitioner's contention is not correct.
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA
492 [1990]) we ruled:
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode
and manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be
followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74 SCRA 65).
As provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68
otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery
to the transferee of the certificate properly indorsed. Title
may be vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly
indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in Rivera v.
Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall be
valid, except as between the parties until the transfer is
properly recorded in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63,
Corporation Code of the Philippines; Section 35 of the
Corporation Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500

shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan
Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records show
that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of
Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a
stockholder of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code)
From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the
owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who
claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that
the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements
for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the
corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers
Marketing Corporation, 74 SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the
provisions of law.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present
any by-laws which could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were
effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the corporation's bylaws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the
provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant
case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be
effective, the certificate must be properlyindorsed and that title to
such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of
the duly indorsedcertificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code)
Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of
stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never
indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the
questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's
asseveration that he did not require an indorsement of the certificate
of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late Juan Chuidian
can not overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law
or the proper conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate,
indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory requirement of
law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate

court's factual findings that the shares of stock were given to Juan T.
Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal counsel who
handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the
testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock were
given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the
corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the
appellate court's decision declaring his deceased father Juan T.
Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc.
should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the preemptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all
incidents of stock ownership.
The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his
status as stockholder issued to him; second, to vote at
meetings of the corporation; third, to receive his
proportionate share of the profits of the corporation; and
lastly, to participate proportionately in the distribution of the
corporate assets upon the dissolution or winding up.
(Purdy's Beach on Private Corporations, sec. 554) (Pascual
v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87)
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned
decision and resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
Resolution insofar as it denied the petitioner's motion to clarify the
dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock
dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and
attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are
declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Privilege Communications,
Rule 130, section 24
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13109
March 6, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, defendant-appellant.
Irureta Goyena and Recto for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Batangas, charged with the murder of one Fortunato
Dinal. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision
he was appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the
refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the
man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as
a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying
declarations. The witness was called to the stand and having stated
that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what
occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected
upon the following ground:
I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified
that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that
being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the
rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be
with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot
grant that permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified
from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured
party.
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent,
arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind
relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties

to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution
of a criminal case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been
dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and
therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of
marriage.
These propositions were rejected by the trial judge, and the objection
of the fiscal as to the testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was
sustained. To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer
to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to
establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is sufficient at
this time to say that some of them would be both material and
relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the
court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they
purported to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased,
concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his
injuries were due to fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime
committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife
shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal
action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in Underhill's work on
Criminal Evidence (second edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a competent
witness for or against the other in any judicial proceedings, civil
or criminal, to which the other was a party. . . . If either were
recognized as a competent witness against the other who was
accused of crime, . . . a very serious injury would be done to the
harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the confidence
which should exist between them.
In Greenleaf's classical work on evidence, in section 337 [vol. I], the

author says, in stating the reasons for the rule at common law:
The great object of the rule is to secure domestic happiness by
placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential
communications between husband and wife; and whatever has
come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed
confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards
divulged in testimony even though the other party be no longer
living.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon
which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused
persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by
the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such
confidential communications might have been made from the
obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries
he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he
received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense
confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the
express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the
declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of
his death.
The same theory as that upon which section 58 of General Orders
No. 58 is based, underlies section 383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190,
which reads as follows:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without
her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his
consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be,
without the consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the other during the marriage;
but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding
by one against the other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for
a crime committed by one against the other.
The only doubt which can arise from a reading of this provision
relates to the meaning of the words "during the marriage
or afterwards," and this doubt can arise only by a consideration of this
phrase separately from the rest of the paragraph. Construed as a
whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in which the testimony
of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to
which the other is a party. The use of the word "afterwards" in the
phrase "during the marriage or afterwards" was intended to cover
cases in which a marriage has been dissolved otherwise than by
death of one of the spouses as, for instance, by decree of
annulment or divorce.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain
impending death, concerning the circumstances leading up to the
death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with
killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil., Rep., 530.) Such dying
declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as
against him. (Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly
held in several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the
deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations. In the case of
the State vs. Ryan (30 La. Ann., 1176), cited by appellant in his brief,
the court said:
The next bill is as to the competency of the widow of the
deceased to prove his dying declarations. We see no possible
reason for excluding her . . . after the husband's death she is no
longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as between husbands
and wives, are no longer applicable.
In the case of Arnett vs. Commonwealth (114 Ky., 593, 596), the
testimony of the widow of the deceased as to his dying declarations
made to her was objected to upon the express ground that under the
terms of the Kentucky Code, "the wife was incompetent to testify
even after the cessation of the marriage relation, to any
communication made by her by her husband during the marriage."
This contention was rejected, the court saying:
On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her
husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by
reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a
dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the
trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased
made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this
proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the
statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this
character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It can not be
contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness
was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it
was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express
purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the
defendant.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in
excluding the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by
reason of such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his
essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be granted.
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set
aside and a new trial is granted at which the testimony of the witness
Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, together with any additional
evidence which may be offered on the part of the prosecution or the
defense. At the new trial granted the accused, the testimony taken at
the former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this appeal shall
be de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm,
and Avancea, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.
Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in
evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage
grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the
report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not
the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn,
invoking the rule on privileged communication between physician and
patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of
the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate
court, she is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were
married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino,
Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the
relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In
1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In
1973, they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio
Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting

the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his
church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at
the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite."
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now

Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. 3In his petition, he cited the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried
to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her
"continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that
would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication
rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal
basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being
6
completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after
their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even
during her absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the

introduction of the confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and
afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record.
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the

Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to

sustain the Opposition to the respondent's Motion; first,
because the very issue in this case is whether or not the
respondent had been suffering from psychological
incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report

was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not
object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged
communication between patient and physician. What was
raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report
was irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of
justice and for the purpose of determining whether the
respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from
psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very
material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn,
Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to
dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the
petitioner and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same
if the latter will be presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to
Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and directed that the
Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was
likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of
Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider
the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the

contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her
Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She
argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE
REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared
by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient."
says that the reason behind the prohibition is
12
She
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential

disclosure by a patient to his physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure
and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the

physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents
of the psychiatric evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous
precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of
physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to
be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates
under oath what she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to
verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed.
She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and
simple pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the
place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from the
records.
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the

rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician.
Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at
bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the
privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify
against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication

may be waived by the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner
expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of
the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to
the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account
among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null
and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave
her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to the
admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described
the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate,
failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the
evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an
implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private
respondent posits that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer
and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with
the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the
communication between physician and patient, as well as the
reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making
communications between physician and patient privileged are
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to
make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and
condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that will result in
18
humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient.

For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the
law recognizes the communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
19
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure.

The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended
to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information
communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
20
21
privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records confidential.
Thus, it has been observed
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be
prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim

v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to
the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e)
the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed
is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this
does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony
be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of
private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his
Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked
the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the
testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to
the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his
right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered
may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full
attention of this Court. The allegations contained in the Statement for
the Records are but refutations of private respondent's declarations
which may be denied or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment.
Three years have already lapsed and private respondent herein, as
petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony
thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective
counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and
avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all
lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge
in the course of trial and include in their appeals depthless issues,
there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts
will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel
should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise
only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases.
Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of
the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after
coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life
either alone or in the company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Annex "C," Comment, Rollo, p. 128.
2 Annex "D," Comment, Rollo, p. 129.
3 Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 144, Judge Candido P.

Villanueva, presiding.
4 Answer in Civil Case No. 90-2906, p. 3, par. 7, Rollo, p.
63.
5 Manifestation, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 74-78.
6 Statement for the Record (Respondent's Confirmation and
Verification of her Answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim), p. 2, Annex
"G," Rollo, p. 80.
7 Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 83-85.
8 Annex "I," Rollo, p. 86.
9 Order of the trial court issued 4 June 1991; Rollo, p. 91.
10 Decision penned by Associate Justice Salome A.
Montoya and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente V.
Mendoza, Chairman, and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Special
Third Division.
11 Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: . . .
(c) A surgeon authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
12 Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 7, Rollo, p. 189.
13 Citing Will of Bruendi, 102 Wis. 47, 78 N.W. 169.
14 Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 15, Rollo, p. 197.
15 Id., p. 29, Id., p. 211.

16 Memorandum of Private Respondent, p. 6, Rollo, p. 172.
17 81 Am. Jur. 2d 392, citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Brei (CA2 NY) 311 F2d 463, 6 FR Serv 2d 5, 100
ALR2d 634; Binder v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 196 Cal App
3d 893, 242 Cal Rptr 231; and many others.
18 Id., citing Post v. State (Alaska) 850 P2d 304; Binder v.
Superior Court (5th Dist), see Note 17; Steinberg v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 263 45, 188 NE 152, 90 ALR 642; and
many others.
19 Id., citing Binder v. Superior Court (5th Dist), see Note
18.
20 81 Am Jur 2d 393, citing Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices
Com. (Alaska) 570 P2d 469.
21 81 Am Jur 2d 394, citing Mavroudis v. Superior Court of
San Mateo Country
(1st Dist) 102 Cal App 3d 594, 162 Cal Rptr 724.
22 G.R. No. 91114, 25 September 1992, 214 SCRA 273.
23 Salita v. Judge Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 16 May 1994.
69. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts
Raul Roco and his colleagues from the ACCRA Law Office were charged
together with EduardoConjuangco for acquiring ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG
based its charge from the refusal of thelaw firm to divulge information as to
who had been involved in PCGG Case No. 0033, despitethe nature of the
services performed by ACCRA (e.g. the law firm knows the assets,
personaltransactions, and business dealings of their clients).Later, the PCGG
amended the complaint, resulting in the exclusion of Roco from the list of
defendants. Such exclusion was based from the manifestation of Roco that he
would identifythe persons and stockholders involved in the said PCGG case.
The law firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the same treatment as
what had beenaccorded to Roco. It was only at this point that the PCGG
answered with a set of requirementsand conditions for exclusion which
were:1)disclosure of the identity of the clients2)submission of documents
purporting
to
the
substantiation
of
the
lawyer-client
relationship3)presentation of the deeds of assignments which the lawyers
executed in favor of its clients,covering the shareholdings of the latter To
bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed proof to the effect that Roco
hadcomplied with such conditions The 1St Division of the Sandiganbayan
denied the petition of ACCRA.
Issue/s
1)whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving the law firm equal
treatment as thatof Roco despite the fact that the confession of Roco did not
really reveal the informationbeing asked by the PCGG2)whether or not the
Sandiganbayan strictly applied the concept of agency3)whether or not the
Sandiganbayan did not uphold the sanctity of the lawyer-clientrelationship
Resolution
1)yes violation of the equal protection clause2)no3)yes violation of the
confidentiality privilege
Rationale
1)the inclusion of the ACCRA lawyers was merely being used as a leverage to
compel them toname their clients classifying persons as to those who can
give valuable informationapart from those who cannot is not a valid
classification espoused by the equal protectionclause2)an attorney is more
than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust
and confidence reposed on him by his client3)as a general rule, the identity of
the client should not be shrouded with mystery, as arequirement of due
process, except when :a)revealing the name of a client would implicate the
latter in the very activity forwhich he sought the advice of the lawyerb)the
disclosure would expose the client to civil liabilityc)the content of the client
communication is relevant to the subject matter of thelegal problem on which
the client seeks legal assistance
B
the case of the prosecution must be built upon evidence gathered by them
from their ownsources, not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
information prejudicial totheir client
B
the confidentiality privilege extends even after the termination of the lawyerclientrelationship
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA,
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks
the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's motion
for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized
as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. 1
The records show that during the dates material to this case,
respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-BunawanRosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively
the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet
was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in
several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent
Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the
Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was
approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated
in thepoblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the
3
aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that
respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently,
respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the

subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury 5 was filed against
6
respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however,
directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription,
hence the proceedings were terminated.
respondent Sansaet as counsel.
In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the

Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using
his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the
Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free
patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes'
counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the
criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for
reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the

complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984
under the same set of facts and the same evidence . . . but
said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the
court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice.
Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignmentand
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will
be a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent court's resolution of August 1,
1991
11
and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had

initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes,
sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three
respondents herein for falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly
13
taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.

These falsified documents were annexed to respondent
Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to
support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification

that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury
case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said
perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since
action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the
Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet
subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had
made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations
and Rectifications, 15respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under
preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent
Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified
by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent
Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution
pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification
charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a

lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to
conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit
a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases,
Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls
under the mantle of privileged communication between the
lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented
in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution
17
and, ostensibly to
forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each
18
of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,

each of which named one of the three private respondents here
as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27,
1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It
was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section
9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as
respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there
was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of
documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan,
hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in
their opposition to the prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to
establish that client and lawyer relationship existed between
Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and
after the period alleged in the information. In view of such
relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other
confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused
Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his
professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty.
Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied,
20
the
controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar

actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony
of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence
thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the
lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein respondents
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been
disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet,
as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further
since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against
accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege
cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of
both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside
some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that
Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to
him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred
to "any communication," without distinction or qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule
was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege
is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client

to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by
the client to the attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering
their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in
view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were
prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on
the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion
is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by
Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case
before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house
and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the

instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands
charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future
crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is
admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is
not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent
Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and
consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a
somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be
considered is the date when the privileged communication was made
by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in
the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the
future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorneyclient privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the
client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does
not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client'scontemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof,
are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in
reference to communications between attorney and client. 25 (Emphases
supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from

Sansate as state witness are the communications made to him by
physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he
and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications
thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with
his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the
pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission
of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada
concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in
order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a
client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the
attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice."
27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent

Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended
for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving
counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto
of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the
rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential
inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps
criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify
for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a
contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this
second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are
now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We shall,
however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring
preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon
the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to
be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that
issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and
evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a
position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the
ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve
the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private
respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It will
be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for
falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein.
That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further
controversy, one information was filed against each of the three

respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of
falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the
deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr.
Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block
Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless,
be discharged even if indicted under a separate information.
I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial
since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of
the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division
of cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact.
Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet
stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state
witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately
from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly,
which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and
joint trial has the effect of making the three accused coaccused or joint defendants, especially considering that they
are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
indicted for the same offense and tried together are called
joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the
same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the
several actions lost their separate identities and became a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the
different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a
single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation
"(w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint"
was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the
accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
manner in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means
"common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or
more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or
"shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the accused should
always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in
consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of

falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of
the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is
that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be the least
32
guilty
as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held
guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter:

It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind.
It is believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno,
not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not
actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to
discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators
of the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy
that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged with
five others in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their
35
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

one of the co-conspirators was
discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not
the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account
with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate

court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not
be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is
untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or
nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged
compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in
law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity

articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in
extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy
the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state
witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could
satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant
asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he
is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other
witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but
even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without
his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony
could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material
points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision.
Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence
reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any
prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even
assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most
guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be
sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense
and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the
accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet
one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree
of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no
evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor

General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be
utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which
may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with
the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually
responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the
robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said
then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence,
his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly
warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon
conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the
concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into
concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of
depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the
classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens
rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the
consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be
equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps
criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations,
such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that
not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty
that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide
for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other
requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual

commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the
formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other corespondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the
prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that
purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and
has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of
his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanation and
Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points
by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of
their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur;
Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor
Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated
the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file
the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco
Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge
Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that
respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special
Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that
he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural
aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the
proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be
emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been
exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts
and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan
eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its
Second Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment
38
dated June 14, 1995, as required
by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof
39
declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993

and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was
penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice
Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been already
discussed and passed upon by the Second Division in the
aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the
arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and reassessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg
leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We
are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions
and to grant the prosecution's motion to discharge accused
Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper
Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted
SETTING ASIDE the impunged resolutions and ORDERING that the
present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
1 Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-92, Second Division; both
penned by Atienza, J. with Escareal and Amores, JJ .,
concurring; Rollo, 37-41, 42-43.
2 Civil Case No. 512, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
3 Per Judge Carlo H. Lozada; Rollo, 167-185.
4 Rollo, 128.
5 Criminal Case No. 1393; Rollo, 195-198.
6 First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San FranciscoRosario-Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, presided by Judge
Ciriaco Ario.
7 Rollo, 204-207.
8 Ibid., 210-219.
9 Ibid., 221.
10 Criminal Case No. 13800.
11 Penned by Garchitorena, P.J., with Hermosisima, Jr. and
Del Rosario, JJ., concurring; Rollo, 227-237.
12 Rollo, 247-352; Case No. OMB-MIN-90-0053.
13 Ibid., 72-74.
14 Ibid., 241-248.
15 Ibid., 57-85.
16 Ibid., 255-258.
17 Ibid., 259-260.
18 Criminal Cases Nos. 17791, 17792 and 17793.
19 Rollo, 40.
20 Ibid., 42-43.
21 Ibid., 46.
22 Section 24 (b), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
23 In re Carter's Will, 204 N.Y.S. 393, 122 Misc. 493; State
vs. Dawson, 1 S.W. 827, 90 Mo. 149.
24 As noted, ante, this was later filed as Criminal Case No.
13800 but ultimately dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
25 58 Am Jur, Witnesses, Sec. 516, 288-289.
26 Ibid., id., Sec. 515, 288; 81 Am Jur, Witnesses, Secs.
393-394, 356-357; see also 125 American Law Reports
Annotated, 516-519.
27 Underhill, H.C., A Treatise of the Law of Criminal
Evidence, Vol. 2. Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, at 836-837.
28 Quisumbing et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
60364, June 23, 1983, 122 SCRA 703; Lianga Bay Logging
Co., Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L37783, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 357; Tejones vs.
Gironella, etc., et al., G.R. 305506, March 21, 1988, 159,
SCRA 100; Quillian vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
55457, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 279.
29 Citing 8A Words and Phrases 358, on the authority of
Kenedy vs. Empire State Underwriters of Watertown, N.Y.,
24 S.E. 2d 78, 79, 202 S.C. 38.
30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed.,
1219.
31 Sec. 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court.
32 People vs. Faltado, et al., 84 Phil. 89 (1994); People vs.
Bayona, etc., et al., 108 Phil. 104 (1960); People vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 55533, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA
107.
33 G.R. Nos. 65345-47, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 1989.
34 G.R. Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 169.
35 G.R. No. L-42637, March 21, 1990, 183 SCRA 388.
36 G.R. No. 94555, August 17, 1992, 212 SCRA 646.
37 Justices Narciso T. Atienza and Augusto M. Amores.
38 Rollo, 320-322.
39 Justice Romeo M. Escareal, Chairman, and Justices
Minita Chico-Nazario and Roberto M. Lagman, members.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D.
VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53,
and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.
Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS;
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. This rule on
the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the
general interest of the community.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. Since the object of the
privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made to the physicians testimony.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. In order that the privilege may be
successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is
claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. These requisites conform with the four
(4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege
against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1. The
communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered 4. The
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. The physician

may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is
to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES THEREOF. One
who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES, NOT
PRIVILEGED. There is authority to the effect that information elicited during
consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the
casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege,
and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have
reached a contrary result."
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. while it
may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal
motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to
testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel
had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it
elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial courts
advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic
notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioners Petition and
Memorandum, and in the private respondents Memorandum, do not at all
show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to
seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physicianpatient relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being
violative thereof the resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to annul the order of the
trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as
an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.

On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on
the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness
called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the
present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial
on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before
taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11 January
1989, private respondents counsel announced that he would present as his
next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital,
Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said
counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989.
Petitioners counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony
sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had
examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued
on 12 January 1989.
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On 24 January 1989, petitioners counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to

quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the
motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court
heard this urgent motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the
petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying
under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.
Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would
be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information
acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial
court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for
private respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions
related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined
and treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and
the medicines she had prescribed.
Since petitioners counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be
reduced to writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same
date:
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989,
petitioner seeks to prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she
saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her professional capacity perforce
her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness
and that she will not testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending
to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court

denied the respondents motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify.
However, the Court advised counsel for respondent to interpose his objection
once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered
by the privileged communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to
qualify her as an expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as
to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to
render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours of
a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she
never revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the
result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED."
1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals
a petition 2 forcertiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No.
16991, to annul the aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that
the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
Acampados testimony.
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On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3

denying due course to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from
Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the respondent
Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the
respondent Court discussed the conditions which would render as inadmissible
testimonial evidence between a physician and his patient under paragraph (c),
Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and made the following
findings:
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person
whose testimony is sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a
physician, who was summoned by the patient in her professional capacity for
curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is whether the
information given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January
25, 1989 was a privileged communication. We are of the opinion that they do
not fall within the realm of a privileged communication because the
information were (sic) not obtained from the patient while attending her in her
professional capacity and neither were (sic) the information necessary to
enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim.
And neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken
the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr.
Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service
of the National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist
Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatrists. She was
summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of
petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampados testimony, We find

no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has
acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her
patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified that she examined
and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set
of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion
regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the
hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not
disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patients ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer
solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v. Role, 242
Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a
physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a
person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does
not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him
in his professional capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and
patient proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the communication to
deserve protection must be confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not to
be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be
implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the
privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts necessary
to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information
given." 4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took
this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent
Court of Appeals "seriously erred" :
"I.
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physicianpatient privileged communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case
at bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado was summoned as an expert witness and
not as an attending physician of petitioner.
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made no declaration that touched (sic)
or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly
Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity.
IV.
. . . in declaring that the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential
nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado." 5
We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and
the petitioner submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed
their separate Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which reads:
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a

civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient."
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of
the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of the
word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn is a
reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court
with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which would tend
to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes affected
the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient
if the information would tend to blacken the character of the patient. In the
1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative
that the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by
the substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a
distinction between these two concepts." Character is what a man is, and
reputation is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.Character
depends on attributes possessed, and reputation on attributes which others
believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what
is accepted to be reality at present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make

safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the
general interest of the community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if
no timely objection is made to the physicians testimony. 13
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
requisites must concur:
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary
for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain
communications, to wit:
"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when
he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment.
Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable
him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege.
16 It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that
is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of
a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged
from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course
of action but to agree with the respondent Courts observation that the
petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was
presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her
examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampados
answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical
problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner.
Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or
knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness,
her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this
point is summarized as follows:
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"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the
statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by
permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a
strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion
is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding
any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient.
But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is
asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the
facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal
knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient
relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal
professional knowledge of the patients condition he should not be permitted to
testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampados testimony that the petitioner
was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the
presence of a third party, thus:
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history,
I interviewed the patient, Nelly.
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before,
once in the month of April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June
1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim,
who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?

A Yes, I understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I
could not get anything from Dr. Lim.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any
doctor who was also present during that interview?
A No, sir, I dont remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation
with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such information
from the mantle of the privilege:
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys
the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient and
thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may
testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioners sweeping claim that" (T)he information
given by Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner
by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court and the public that the
latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called schizophrenia which
caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and reputation
of petitioner and her family," 22 which is based on a wrong premise,
nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information
obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the formers "character" (or
"reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from
the petitioner regarding the latters ailment and the treatment recommended
therefor.
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Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral
request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and
filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the
witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings
that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the
trial courts advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the
testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited
is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of
the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioners Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondents
Memorandum, 25 do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the
privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official leave.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, 34.
2. Id., 41-58.
3. Id., 33-38; per then Associate Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr., concurred in by
Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr.
4. Rollo, 36-37.
5. Rollo, 14-15.
6. Id., 99.
7. Id., 84-89.
8. Id., 94-97.
9. .FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed.,
248.
10. Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 211.
11. FRANCISCO, op. cit., 267, citing Will of Bruendi, 102 Wis., 47, 78 N.W.
169.
12. 81 Am Jur 2d, 263.
13. Whartons Criminal Evidence, vol. III, 12th ed., 1955, 175-176.
14. FRANCISCO, op. cit., 268; MORAN, M.V., Comments on the Rules of Court,
vol. 5, Part I, 1980 ed., 199.
15. WIGMORE, Evidence In Trials at Common Law, vol. VIII, 1961 ed., 527.
16. FRANCISCO, op. cit., 269, citing Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo., 162, 105
S.W., 709; Rule 220, Model Code of Evidence.
17. WIGMORE, op. cit., 846.
18. Id., 833.
19. 81 Am Jur 2d, 277-278; Citations omitted.

20. TSN, 25 January 1989, 33-36, quoted in the Memorandum for Private
Respondent; Rollo, 108-109.
21. Underhills Criminal Evidence, Vol. II, Fifth ed., 1956, 853.
22. Rollo, op. cit., 26.
23. Rollo, 18-25.
24. Id., 121-128.
25. Id., 106-110.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the
amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated
for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried
to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter
to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri
are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees
and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any
way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by
a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought likely contains important evidence and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive

and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received
by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of
a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners
claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear
before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them
during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven
(11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
Ramon Quisumbing and Norberto Quisumbing and Emmanuel
Pelaez for petitioner.
Inigo B. Regalado, Jr. counsel for Central Bank.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez for respondents.
RESOLUTION
On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Bank filed in the instant case a
"Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF Officers and Employees from
February to August 29, 1985" in connection with its "Opposition to
Respondents" Motion for Reconsideration or for Clarification of the
Resolution of the Court En Banc of October 8, 1985." On November
7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to pay back salaries to
Branch 136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the Makati
Regional Trial Court, which this Court had earlier directed under our
Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in G.R. No. 77054, to conduct
hearings on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and its
alleged pre-planned liquidation.
On January 22, 1986, said Regional Trial Court, after considering the
petitioner's motion of November 4, 1985, the respondents' opposition
thereto dated January 15, 1986; the petitioner's Reply dated January
16, 1986, and the respondents' Rejoinder dated January 20, 1986,
issued an order directing the respondents herein "to pay all officers
and employees of petitioner their back salaries and
wages corresponding to the period from February to August 29,
1985."
On February 4, 1986, respondents herein filed with this Court an
"Appeal from, or Petition to Set Aside, order to Pay Back Salaries
dated 22 January 1986" praying for the reversal and setting aside of
the aforestated trial court's Order dated January 22, 1986. This was
formally opposed by Petitioner when it filed its "Answer to Appeal (re:
back salaries)" on February 26, 1986. A month later, on March 26,
1986, respondents filed their "Reply to the Answer" which petitioner
traversed in a "Rejoinder to the Reply" dated April 2, 1986.
In a normal situation, no controversy would be expected in the matter
of the payment of said back salaries because in the instant case, the
party praying for the same is the employer Bank. The attendant
circumstances here present have, however, created a peculiar
situation. There is resistance to the claim because the management
of the assets of the Bank has been transferred to the Respondents'
Receiver who perceived that the directive to pay back salaries after
closure of the Bank would be dissipation of the banks' assets to the
prejudice of its various creditors.
There is, however, in this case a significant matter that deserves
consideration of this Court and which must be viewed from the standpoint of equity. What stands out is that, regardless of whether the
employees of Banco Filipino worked or not after January 25, 1985,
there is the uncontested manifestation found in BF's Answer to the
Appeal, dated February 26, 1986 (Vol. IV of Case Records) that:
2. In the fact the receiver/liquidator Carlota Valenzuela had
paid Union employees of petitioner BF back salaries for no
work from January 25, 1985 up to June, 1985. .. (Emphasis
supplied)
All employees, thereto, of petitioner Banco Filipino who have not yet
received their back salaries corresponding to the period from January
25, 1985 up to June, 1985 manifestly deserve and ought to be
similarly paid by the respondent Monetary Board. It is but fair that the
issue whether or not the employees of petitioner Bank had actually
worked during said period should now be discounted considering this
voluntary act of respondent Monetary Board which would remove by
estoppel any impediment to the receipt by all bank employees of their
back salaries from January 25, 1985 up to June, 1985, assuming that
some of them have not yet received the same.
As the remaining period from June, 1985 to August, 1985, involves

but a minimal period only of two (2) months, and considering the
unfortunate plight of the numerous employees who now invoke the
symphathetic concern of this Court, and inasmuch as the appealed
Order for the payment of back salaries is only for a limited period or
up to August, 1985, the appealed order of November 7, 1985 may be
sustained.
Petitioner BF and its stockholders have long put on record their
consent to this patment of back salaries of its separated officers and
employees. It is also averred that BF intends to reopen its bank and
branches, and the payment of back salaries to its employees, no less
would help in the preservation of its personnel which is the bank's
most important assest, apart from doing justice to those aggrieved
employees. It is mentioned that the Central Bank Liquidator has now
more than a billion pesos in cash of Banco Filipino since it continued
to receive payments from BF borrowers some P1.5 million a day. It is
also said that with the deposits of petitioner BF with the Bank of PI,
there is money sufficient to allow the withdrawal of the sums needed
to pay the salaries of the employees who have been now out of work
for over a year. Apparently, no substantial prejudice for the payment
of the distressed employees of the bank for only a specified limited
period until the other issues in the consolidated consideration.
WHEREFORE, ruling that the Order of November 7, 1985 of Judge
Ricardo Francisco, granting salary to the officers and employees of
Banco Filipino for the period from February, 1985 to August 29, 1985,
may now be deemed moot and academic insofar as it relates to the
period from January 25, 1985 to June, 1985 up to August, 1985,
covers but a minimal span of two (2) months, the Court RESOLVES,
for the reasons of equity, to allow the aforestated Order to remain
undisturbed and to DISMISS the appeal therefrom. This Order is
immediately held executory.
Gutierrez Jr., J., took no part.
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986

BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce
Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the Order of Branch 136,
Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of the
petitioner herein, based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of
Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain
papers and records which are claimed as needed by the
Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections,
and exceptions to the Conservator's report dated January 8,
1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19, 1985. The
documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied
are the following:
(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB)
deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino (BF) and its
meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr.
Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank Governor Jose
Fernandez;
(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and
penalties charged by the CB against BF;
(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr.

Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1985;
(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;
(6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr.
Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas
of same report;
(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to
P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela
dated October 25, 1985.
In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view
that the Supreme Court's resolution referring to it the matters
relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner
from availing of this mode of discovery as an additional means
of preparing for the hearing. It considered the documents
sought to be produced as not privileged because these
constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the
Court. These materials are said to comprise of records of the
administrative proceedings conducted by respondent's officials
and representatives from the inception of and preparation of the
challenged reports and the resolution placing petitioner under
receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is the
regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings
which are being assailed by the petitioner, the trial court saw no
reason why said documents should be thus concealed from it.
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception
to the said order and pray in their petition before this Court for
the reversal and setting aside of the same. The grounds recited
in support of their petition are the following:
(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because
the proceedings before it do not at all deal with either the
administrative proceedings conducted by the respondents or

the regularity and impartiality of the CB actions on BF; it does
so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was given BF prior
to those actions of closure and liquidation. However, no such
prior hearing had been called as none is required by the law and
by the Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural Bank
of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and Rural Bank of Bato vs.
IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984).
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of
the Central Bank Act.
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal
interest. Whenever any member attending a meeting of
the Monetary Board has a material personal interest,
directly or indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of
any given matter, said member shall not participate in
the discussion or resolution of the matter and must
retire from the meeting during the deliberation thereon.
The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made
available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall
note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As
amended by PD No. 1827).
Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member of the Monetary
Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank who
wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties shall be
held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as
a result of such violation or negligence. Similar
responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any
information of a confidential nature about the
discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board,
except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or about the
operations of the Bank, and to the use of such
information for personal gain or to the detriment of the
Government, the Bank or third parties. (As amended by

Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).
(3) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held
subsequent t the submission of the CB reports. They did not
enter into the making of those reports and can have no
materiality to any question of fact that may be raised in relation
to their contents.
On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed its Comment on
Respondent's petition to set aside the order for the production
of the documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank assails
the respondent's petition on the following grounds:
(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should not be
furnished the documents, particularly Nos. 3 to 9 of its motion,
when these are merely attachments to the Supervision and
Examination Sector, Dept. It (SES) Reports, copies of which were
given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court order.
(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the
RTC Makati intended full evidence taking of the proceeding for
judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme
Court, the trial court being better equipped for evidence taking.
(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to
produce the Central Bank records because it is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a
precedent the doctrine established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in
a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law."
(4) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank
are material and relevant because BF is entitled to prove from
the CB records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a
MB resolution and without examiner's reports on the financial
position of BF; (b) that a MB resolution was later made to

legalize the BF closure but it had no supporting examiner's
report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy respondent
Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and the
conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to "improve" them; and (d) that
the reports were then fabricated.
Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is disclosure of their
proceedings because petitioner has accused the CB governor of
(a) covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing BF securities
in trickles as fuel a run, (c) appointing a conservator when the
President ordered the MB to grant petitioner a P 3 Billion credit
line, (d) replacing Estanislao with Gilberto Teodoro when the
former wanted to resume normal operations of BF, and (e)
changing the conservatorship to receivership when it appointed
Carlota Valenzuela as receiver again without hearing.
On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board filed their Reply
to Petitioner Bank's Comment dated April 15, 1986. Respondents
argue that:
(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by
petitioner are inapplicable becausea) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege
based only on the generalized interest of confidentiality
or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive.
On the other hand, the so-called MB deliberations are
privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court because statements and
opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members
of the MB are specifically vested with confidentiality
under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The
"public interest" requirement for non-disclosure is
evident from the fact that the statute punishes any
disclosure of such deliberations.
b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance
or need to produce the alleged MB deliberations. What
petitioner intends to prove are not "issues" raised in the

pleadings of the main petition.
(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence,
but in practicing oppression by the forced publication
of the MB members' confidential statements at board
meetings.
(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board
are in truth merely the individual statements and
expressions of opinion of its members. They are not
statements or opinions that can be imputed to the
board itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of
stenographic notes on the deliberations of the MB are
not official records of the CB; they are taken merely to
assist the Secretary of the MB in the preparation of the
minutes of the meetings. And as advertedly also, the
tape recordings are not available as these are used over
and over again.
The motion for the production of the subject documents was
filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of
Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the
production of books, documents and papers which are material
and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or
defense" (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for
Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Martin, Rules of Court,
3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial
judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the
sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and
practicability" (Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil.
176, 180). "On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize
the production or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books,
papers which because of their confidential and privileged
character could not be received in evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In
passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts
should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are
relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules Powder Co.

vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service,
659, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed.
Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms
that official records are confidential should be liberally
construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, p.
801, citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the court
below in granting petitioner's motion for the production of the
documents enumerated herein. We accept the view taken by the
court below that the documents are not privileged and that these
constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being
inquired into by the Court.
With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the
Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II (SES) Reports
submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were
taken into consideration by said respondents in closing
petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the
petitioner. We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the
annexes thereto should be withheld. Petitioner cannot
adequately study and properly analyze the report without the
corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant, these could be
useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its
comment, objections and exceptions to the Conservator's
reports and receiver's reports.
Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator,
Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary Board and to Central
Bank Governor Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as
petitioner has asserted that the above-named Conservator had
in fact wanted to resume normal operations of Banco Filipino
but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The
letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of
petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should be

allowed to photocopy the same.
As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board
deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meetings
on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents
contend that "it is obvious from the requirement (Sections 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter (of the
deliberations), when resolved. . . shall be made available to the
public but the deliberations themselves are not open to
disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." This Court,
however, sees it in a different light. The deliberations may be
confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is
no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections
13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are
relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before
it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for
personal gain. There is no indication that such disclosure would
cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third
parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in
obtaining what it considers as information useful and
indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter
being inquired to by the court below.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules
of Court which states:
Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term
of office or afterwards, as to communications made to
him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by disclosure.
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the
protection of public officers but for the protection of public
interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no
public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will
not be applicable.
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to
communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that the
public interest would suffer by the disclosure
question. ... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, cited in
Martin Rules of Court of the Philippines, Third Edition,
Vol. 5, p. 199).
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that
public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner
bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure
of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it
trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of
production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public
officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of
their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke
fear of disclosure
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the
disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its
employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are
entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid
and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be
well to consider that
Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it
means something in which the public, the community at
large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected (State vs. Crocket, 206,

p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce
documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by the court below in
S.C.- G.R. No. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies
of the tapes relative to the Monetary Board deliberations on the
closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meetings
on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are
actually no longer available taking into account respondent
Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape recording of the
deliberations of that Board are, for purposes of economy, used
over and over again inasmuch as these tapes are not required to
be kept or stored. (See Respondent's Reply, dated May 12, 1986;
Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65674 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO B. CAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Bayani Ma. Rino for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal interposed by accused Danilo B. Capulong from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, 4th Judicial Region, Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch XXVI finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous
Drugs Act of the 1972 as amended and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against Capulong alleged:
That on or about October 14, 1982 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Santissima, Municipality of Santa Cruz, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, without lawful authority
and not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully
and feloniously, sell six (6) small transparent plastic bags of
dried marijuana, leaves in the amount of FIFTY (P 50.00)
PESOS, to a poseur buyer without any authority or license
to sell Id marijuana, which is a prohibited drug in Violation of
Sec. 4, Art. II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. (p. 8, Rollo)
When arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The prosecution's evidence which formed the basis for the appellant's
conviction can be summarized as follows:
On October 14, 1982, a special mission of the Constabulary AntiNarcotics Unit composed of Sgt. Lino Jarilla as head, Sgt. Adjare
Jasani and Patrolman Reynaldo Resurreccion as members
proceeded to Santissima Cruz, Santa Cruz, Laguna to conduct a "buy
bust" operation for the purpose of apprehending pushers who are
engaged in the selling of marijuana. Their specific assignment was to
locate Danilo Capulong, the accused-appellant who was the alleged
number one pusher in the sale of marijuana in Santa Cruz, Laguna.
The team arrived at Santissima Cruz at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same day. With them was an informant, Larry
Estacio. The informant was given instructions to contact the accused
after which the team positioned themselves at strategic places.
Estacio then approached Capulong pretending to buy marijuana
leaves for himself. Capulong agreed to sell six (6) plastic bags of
dried marijuana for the price of P 50.00 winch was paid by Estacio.
The transaction was witnessed by the team so that immediately after
Capulong received the marked money (P 50.00) from Estacio, the
former arrested Capulong. With Capulong at the time was Bernardo
Paynaganan who was also charged for violation of section 8, Art. II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act (Criminal Case No. SC-2816 of the
Regional Trial Court, Santa Cruz, Laguna).
Found in the possession of Capulong was the marked money, a fifty
peso bill with serial No. JF 247521, while one stick of marijuana was
found in the possession of Paynaganan.
Capulong was brought to the headquarters at Calamba, Laguna
where he was investigated. Thereafter, he executed an extra-judicial
confession admitting his guilt. After a laboratory examination at the
PC Laboratory, the bags containing dried leaves were found positive
for marijuana.
On his part, Capulong's defense is summarized as follows:
On October 14, 1982 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was

with Bernardo Paynaganan in Aling Nelia's store watching a
basketball game in a vacant lot when Larry Estacio, who was drunk,
arrived. Estacio was holding a fifty peso (P 50.00) bill, and asked
Capulong and Paynaganan if they had marijuana to which they
replied in the negative. Estacio then left but returned a few minutes
later carrying with him six (6) plastic bags of marijuana and one (1)
stick of marijuana. After giving the stick of marijuana to Paynaganan,
Estacio left.
A little later, Estacio returned with CANU officials riding in a jeep and
Paynaganan and Capulong were immediately handcuffed.
The defense also tried to prove that Capulong was maltreated several
times by the investigators forcing him to sign an extra-judicial
confession admitting his guilt. In addition, he asserted that his pieces
of jewelry amounting to P 3,000.00, his new Adidas pair of shoes
worth P 500.00 and his Zeppo lighter worth P 80.00 were taken by
investigator, Lino Jarilla.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and
rejected that of the appellant. Accordingly, Capulong was found guilty
as charged.
The issues raised in this appeal can be categorized into the following:
(1) whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Capulong is
admissible in the light of the force, duress and intimidation which
allegedly attended the execution thereof and 2) credibility of the
witnesses.
The records are clear to the effect that the extrajudicial confession of
Capulong was made without the assistance of counsel. Therefore,
applying our pronouncements in the case of People v. Benigno
Pineda y Dimatulac, (G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988), this issue
has become academic. We said:
A discussion of the alleged coercion and intimidation in the
first assigned error has become academic with the change
in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution regarding the
rights of the accused. Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution specifically provides that the rights of the
accused, among them the right to counsel, cannot be
waived except in writ and in the presence of counsel. Thus,
even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, since it
was made without assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
After a careful examination of the records, however, we find no
reason to depart from the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of
the prosecution and that of the defense.
On the credibility of the witnesses, the well-settled rule is that the trial
court's findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in
the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the
witnesses (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).
In the instant case, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He was caught in flagrante delicto by the CANU
officers who were then on a mission to conduct a "buy bust" operation
for the purpose of apprehending marijuana pushers in Santissima,
Santa Cruz, Laguna. What the team did was to employ ways and
means of entrapping and catching him in flagrante. The three CANU
officers were eyewitnesses to the crime committed by the appellant.
We give credence to the narration of the incident by the three officers
of the team because they are law enforcers and are, therefore,
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v.
Patog, 144 SCRA 429; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People
v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were accepted by the trial court as credible. Going over the
details of said testimonies, we see no reason not to follow the
conclusions of the trial court.
Moreover, the record does not show that the CANU officers who were
responsible for the appellant's entrapment were motivated by any
improper motives other than to accomplish their mission (See People
vs. De Jesus, supra.)
The appellant alleges that he was a victim of a pre-planned extortion.

To prove his allegation. The appellant cites the following
circumstances: The complaint against him was filed only on October
20, 1982, six days after his arrest; that the complaint was filed without
any supporting documents; affidavits of the accused were attached
only on October 21, 1982; the alleged marijuana leaves were
submitted for laboratory examination only on October 27, 1982 or
after a period of 13 days from the arrest of the accused and 7 days or
the complaint was filed. These delays according to the appellant were
for the purpose of extorting money from him and his relatives
especially his half-sister who was the common-law wife of a rich
Chinese businessman. Thus, the appellant alleges that the filing of
the complaint was completed only on October 27, 1982, after his
sister failed to see Patrolman Resurreccion for the delivery of the
money being demanded from the appellant in exchange for his
freedom.
We are not inclined to believe his extortion angle of the case. As the
lower court said:
In his attempt to weaken the evidence of the prosecution,
the accused tried to prove that, in the course of the
investigation, investigating officials, particularly a certain
Pat. Reynaldo Resurreccion of the INP was extorting P
30,000.00 from him in order to fix the case and that for their
failure to raise the necessary amount, this case was
fabricated against him. Be that as it may, that the
investigator was extorting from the accused does not
disprove the commission of the crime. In fact, it is even an
admission of a crime. Why would anybody extort from
another unless there is a case to be fixed? Bernardo
Paynaganan, one of the witnesses for the accused, testified
and was corroborated by Violets Osano that the CANU
officials were asking the sum of P 30,000.00, but according
to Violeta, she was not able to raise said amount and the
case had already been filed. If it were true that the accused
was not actually engaged in any illegal activity selling
prohibited drugs, the demand could have been rejected
outright and they could have reported the matter to the

higher authorities. While Violeta Osano alleged to have
gone to Colonel Antonio to denounce the actuation of
Resurreccion, she testified that she did not want to be
responsible for the suspension of said officer from his work,
because she had observed Resurreccion's poor economic
condition. Between Resurreccion and her own brother, the
accused in this case, it is against human nature that she
would think of the effect of Resurreccion's suspension on his
future life and disregard the would be effect on that of her
brother. Contrary to her allegation that the case was filed
because they had failed to produce the required amount,
she testified on cross that on October 20, she already knew
about the case filed before the municipal court. Despite that
fact, she mentioned having gone to Resurreccion's place on
the 24th of said month but Resurreccion was not in his place
at that time (tsn May 16, 1983, pp. 19-20). Another witness
for the defense Bernardo Paynaganan, the companion of
the accused at the time of the apprehension by the CANU
officers, claimed that he was not able to produce the amount
because he is only a fisherman. (p. 25-27, Rollo)
Finally, the appellant questions the non-presentation of Larry Estaclo,
the informant used by the CANU officers in entrapping him
in flagrante. The number of witnesses to be presented and the nature
of the facts to be established during the examination of those
witnesses is a discretionary function of the prosecution.
The non-presentation of Estacio as witness is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. His testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative (See People v. Cerelegia 147 SCRA 538).
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The questioned
decision of the Regional Trial Court, 4th Judicial District, Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch XXVI is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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February 5, 2014

July 29, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

circumstances. There is no proof that she was a user of opium in any

June 27, 1968

JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA LEZAMA, petitioners,

First Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000, which sum he

In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners), while

basis of the disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled

director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or

be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one's

ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are versed, and this

Resolution 52, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Nov. 24, 1965.

Resolution 12, CA-G.R. 36718-R, Jan. 6, 1966.

While the appeal was pending in this Court, the receivership

Rule 130, sec. 20(b).

See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2227 at 211, sec. 2228 at 216

2 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 603 at 737 (3d ed. 1940)

For instance, in United States v. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182

endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital relation." At

8 Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212.

Id., sec. 2228 at 217.

See 8 Wigmore 227.

See Menzel vs. Tubbs, et al., 53 NW 653, 656 cited in 58 Am.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness

The respondents filed their Memorandum

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the

We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this

Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.

3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the

a husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he

10 Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel assisted the

Rule 130, section 23

In their petition for review by certiorari, petitioners are seeking a reversal of

Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated

On October 24, 1973, the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants (and)

1. Dismissing the complaint and Amended Complaint;

5) The plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for

"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision appealed from is

At this instance, We consider it unnecessary to discuss the substantive merits

"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case

"Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify

Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby set

Teehankee (Chairman), J., took no part.

respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor, for Villegas in favor

It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the

were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

Vicente, himself, who over the objection of therein defendants

Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or

against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is

Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an

express agreement of the parties or in acts of equivalent import.

The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal

accounting. It was only after or before the expiration of the 5

Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur,

1 par. 22, Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal p. 74,

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992