00271-20020304 Us Opp Brief

0 R r GI '4.
A
1 DAVID W. SHAPIRO (NYSB 2054054) FILED
United States Attorney
2
J. DOUGLAS WILSON (pA BAR 44915) HAR q tOl
3 Chief, Criminal Division RiCf-iJ,
4 scon FREWING (CSBN 191311) u.s.D'S)~1 CO ~T
JOSEPH SULLN AN (FLSBN 988723) NO.DIST.0 ! .J.
5 Assistant United StatesAttorneys
6 280 S. First Street, Room 371

San Jose, California 95113
7 Telephone: (408) 535-5060
FAX: (408) 535-5066
8
Attorneysfor Plaintiff
9
1.0 UNrI'l!.l) STATESDISTRICf COURT

1.1. NORnIERN DISTRICf OF CALIFORNIA
12 SAN JOSEDIVISION
1.3
1.4 UllfuED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CROl-20138 RMW

15 Plaintiff, UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
1.6 v. DISMISS THE INDICTMENT ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
1.7 ELCOM LTD.,
a/k/aELCOMSOFf CO. LTD., Date: April 1, 2002
1.8 Time: 9:00 am
Court: Hon. RonaldM. Whyte
19 Defendant.
20
21
22
23
2.
2S
26
27
28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOnONS
TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUllONAL
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW]
1. TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 TABLEOFAUTHORrrlES
.. ... ill
3
INTRODUcnON
~
FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
5
6
I. Elcomsoft'sAdvancedeBookProcessor.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
7 II. Adobe'sAcrobateBookReader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
8
ill. eBookEndUserLicenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9
IV. Elcomsoft's Refusalto Complywith DMCA ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10
1.1.
STATEMENTOF ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
12 POINTSANDAUlHORffIES 6
1.3
I. Backgroundof the DMCA 6
It
A. Congress'
ReviewofCopyrlghtLawin theDigital Age. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
15
16 B. The Statutory Framework. .................................... 9
17 ll. CongressProperlyEnactedSections1201(b) and 1204of the DMCA Pursuantto the

18
Commerce
Clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . ~ II
3.9
A. CongressMay RegulateElectronicCommerce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12
20
21. B. CongressMay Act Pursuantto the CommerceClauseto ProtectRights Granted
22 Underthe IntellectualPropertyClause 14
23
ill. Sections1201(b)and 1204Do Not Violate the First Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16
24
A. ElcomsoftMay Not Make a Facial First AmendmentChallenge. . . . . . . . .. 16
25
26 B. Elcomsoft's Saleof CircumventionTechnologyIs Not Speech 18
27
28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS
TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 1
1 1. ElcomsoftWasSellinga Technology
Product. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18
2 The AEBPR in ObjectCodeForm Is Not Speech. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19

2.
3
c. Even ifElcomsoft WasEngagedin ExpressiveConduct,Its Challengeto
4
Sections1201(b)and 1204Fails Under First AmendmentPrinciples. . . . .. 21
5
6 1 Sections1201(b)and 1204areContentNeutral. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
7 Sections1201(b)and 1204Furtheran ImportantGovernmentInterest. 23

2.
8
3, Sectionsl20l(b) and 1204Are Sufficiently Tailored to Satisfy
9
Constitutional
Requirements.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23
10
1.1. D. A Fair Use DefenseIs Not Applicable in this Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24
12 1. ElcomsoftDoesNot Have Standingto AssertFair Use on

1.3
Behalf of Third Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. . . .. . . . .. 24
14
2. ThisCaseDoesNot PresentanInfringementClaim. . . . . . . . . . . .. 24
1.5
1.6 3. Although the Court NeedNot Reachthe Issue,Sections1201(b)and 1204
17 Are Consistent
with FairUse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25
1.8
IV. Sections1201(b)and 1204of the DMCA Comportwith Due Process. . . . . . . . . .. 30
19
A Sections1201(b)and Section1204Are Not UnconstitutionallyVagueas
20
21. Appliedto Elcomsoft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 31

22 B. Elcomsoft'sDueProcess
ArgumentsFail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33
23
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35
24
2S
26
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 11
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Federal Cases
3 RandomHouse,Inc. v. RosettaBooks,150F. Supp.2d613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) . . . . . . . . .. 2,29
4 Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2ndCir. 2001) . . . . . .. 7, 18,20,21,23,24,26-27
5 SonyCorp. of America v. UniversalStudios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 7
6 Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2M Cir. 1982) . . ~. . . . . . . 7
7 Apple Computer,Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521,523 (9thCir. 1984) 7
8 UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514 U.S. 549 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12,13,14
9 Gibbonsv. Ogden,9 Wheat.1 (1824) 12
1.0 UnitedStatesv.Moghadam,
175F.3d1269(11tbCir.1999) . 13
1.1. TheTrade-MarkCases,100U.S. 82 (1879) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) . 14
13 SouthDakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14
14 RailwayLabor ExecutivesAss'n v. Gibbons,455 U.S. 457 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
15 Roulettev. City of Seattle,97 F.3d 300 (9thCir. 1996) 16, 18
1.6 Broadrickv. Oklahoma,
413U.S.601(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16, 17,24
17 4805 ConvoyInc. v. City of SonDiego, 183F.3d 1108(9thCir. 1999) 16,17

18 Baby Tam& Co.,Inc. v. City of Las Vegas,154F.3d 1097(9thCir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16
1.9 New YorkStateClub Ass'n, Inc. v. City o/New York,487 U.S. 1 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16
20 City Council of Los Angelesv. Taxpayers
for Vincent,466 U.S. 789 (1984) 16
21. Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 103-04(9thCir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,17,23
22 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
23 455 U.S. 489 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17,31,32-33,34

24 Ohralik v. Ohio StateBar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
25 Giboneyv. Empire Storage& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) 19
26 Spence
v. Washington,
418U.S.4OS(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
27
28 GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS
GROUNDS
[CR01-20138][RMW] III
1 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6thCir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19,20,21
2 Name.Space,Inc. v. Network Solutions,Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (200Cir. 2000) 19

3 Bernsteinv. UnitedStates,922 F. Supp.1426(N.D. Ca!. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20
. Karn v. United StatesDept. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ca!. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 ComputerAssoc./nt'lv.Altai,/nc. 982 F.2d 693 (2°OCir.1992) 20
6 SonyComputerEntertainmentInc. v. ConnectixCorp., 203 F.3d 596 (9d1Cir. 2000) 20
7 AdventSystems
Ltd. v. UnisysCorp.,925F.2d670,675(3rdCir.1991) 21
8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21
United
States
v.
O'Brien,
391
U.S.
367
(1968)
9 TurnerBroadcastingSys.,Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,22,24
10 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public ServoComm In of New York,
11 447U.S.557(1980) 21
1.2 PittsburghPressCo.v. HumanRelationsComm'n, 413U.S.376(1973) 21
13 Wardv. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
14 UniversalCity Studios,Inc. v. Reimerdes,

111F. Supp.2d294(SD.N.Y. 2000) 22,23,25
1.5 Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985) . . .. 23,24,25,29
1.6 FECv. Nat'/Right to WorkCommittee,459 U.S. 197(1982) 24
17 United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9d1Cir. 1993) ...24
18 Campbellv. Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510U.S. 569 (1994) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26

1.9 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services. Inc.
20 923 F. Supp.1231(N.D. Cat. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

21. Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194 (9thCir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 28
22 Laddv. Law & TechnologyPress,762 F.2d 809 (9thCir. 1985) . . .. 28
23 Micro-SPARC, Inc. v. Amtype Corp.t 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984) . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 28
24 Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 597 F. Supp.5 (N.D. 1ll.1983) .28
25 Greenbergv.Nat'IGeographicSoc.,244F.3d 1267,1274(1IIhCir. 2001) 29
26 S.O.S.,Inc. v. Payday,Inc. 886 F.2d 1081(9d1Cir. 1989) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] tv
1. Group One,Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,Inc., 254 F.3d 1041(Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
2 Lipscherv. LRPPublications, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305(11thCir. 2001) 29
3 ProCD v. Zeidenberg,86 F.3d 1447(7d1Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
4 AdobeSystemsInc. v. OneStopMicro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d1086(N.D. Ca!. 2000) . . . . . . .. 29
5 SoftmanProductsCo.,LLC v. AdobeSystems,Inc., 171F. Supp.2d1075(C.D. Ca!. 2001) .. 29
6 Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters,
7 87 F. Supp.2d976 (N.D. Ca!. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30
8 SonyComputerEntertainmentAmerica,Inc. v. Bleem,214 F.3d 1022(9d1Cir. 2000) . . . .. 30

9 Graynedv. CityofRockford,408U.S.104(1972} 30
1.0 Kolenderv. Lawson,461U.S.352(1983) 31

1.1. Smithv. Goguent
415U.S.566(1974). . . . . . . . .°. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 31
1.2 Forbesv. Napolitano,236 F.3d 1009(9thCir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . 31-32
1.3 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . .. 31
14 Posters 'N' Things,Ltd. v. United States,511 U.S. 513 (1994) 33
1.S Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . .. 33

Richmond Boro Gun Club v. City o/New York, 97 F.3d 681 (21M1
1.6 ExxonCorp. v. Governorof Maryland, 437 U.S. 117(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34
1.7 Melugin v. Hames,38 F.3d 1478(9thCir. 1994) 34
1.8 UnitedStatesv. Morales, 108F.3d 1031(9thCir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35

1.9 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) . . . . .. 3S
20 Screwsv. UnitedStates,325U.S.91 (1945). . . .f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35
21 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35
22 United StatesConstitution
23 u.s. Const.Art. I, § 8, ct. 18 11
24 U.S.Const.Art. I, § 8, cl.t8 .. . . . . . . . . . .. 11
25 12
U.s.
Const.
Art.!,
§
8,
cl.
3
26 U.S. Const.5thAmend. . . . . . . . . . . .. 30
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] v
1.
2 Statutes
3 17U.S.C.
§1201(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
4 17U.S.C.§1204 passim
5 18U.S.C. §2319(c) 7
6 RecordRentalAmendmentof 1984,Pub.L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727
7 (codifiedat 17V.S.C.§ 109) 7

8 SoundRecordingAct of 1971,85 Stat.391 7
.9 17U.S.C.§lOl 8
1.0 17U.S.C.§1201(a) 9
11 17U.S.C.§§1201(d)-G)
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10,24,27
12 17U.S.C.§ 107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26,30
13 17U.S.C. § 117 28
1.4 Le&islative Materials
15 s. Rep.105-190(1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-9,10,IS
~
16 H.R Rep. 105-551(II) (1998) 9,11,12,13,27

1.7 144CongoRec. E2136-02 11, 13, 15
1.8 H.R.Rep.106-216(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23
19 H.RRep.94-1476(1976) 26
20 Other Authorities
21 JenniferL. Schenker,The Trillion Dollar SecretBeneaththe Hype, theInternet Is Fosteringa
22 SilentRevolutionThroughOnlineE.xchanges
that Allow Fast and Efficient TradingAmong
23 CorporateIT Systems,Time Magazine,Feb.28, 2000 available at 2000 WL 543326 . . . . 6
24 TheRiseof the Infomediary: TheInternet is Producinga String of RacyNew BusinessModels,
25 The Economist,June26, 1999,available at 1999WL 7363618 . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 6
26 IntellectualProperty: TheProperty of the Mind - Digital Technologyand the Developmentof
27
TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUTIONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] VI
1 the Internet Are Making it Easy to Copy or Alter All Sorts of Information and Art, from
2 Music to ComputerSoftware.Can CopyrightStill Be Protected?The Economist,July 27.

3 1996,available at 1996WL 11247237. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 RobertLemos,SecurityExpertsProtest CopyrightAct, ZDNet News, Sept.6, 2001,
5 available at 2001 WL 4733227 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13
6 BennyEvangelista,Judge'sRulingsBoostStrengthof Digital CopyrightLaw, SanFrancisco
7 Chronicle,Nov. 29, 2001, at B-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13
8 Orin S. Kerr, Are WeOverprotectingCode? 11Ioughtson First-GenerationInternet Law,
9 57 Wash.Lee L. Rev. 1287(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20
1.0 Mark A. Lemley & EugeneVolokh, Freedomof Speechand Injunctions in Intellectual Property
1.1. Cases,.48 DUke L.J. 147 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20,21
1.2 Melville Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright(2001) ""' '..' 25
13
1.4
15
1.6'
17
1.8
1.9
20
21
22
23
24
2S
26
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] VII
1 INTRODucnON
2 The United Statesof America opposesdefendantElcomsoft's motions to dismissthe
3 indictmenton Constitutionalgrounds. Congressactedpursuantto its authority underthe
4 CommerceClauseto enact sections1201(b)and 1204of Title 17, United StatesCode,aspart of
5 the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct ("DMCA "), to (1) addresswhat Congressperceivedas
6 new challengesto copyright law arisingfrom the adventof electroniccommerce,and (2) to
7 implementthe World IntellectualPropertyOrganizationCopyright Treaty. Sections1201(b)and
8 1204do not targetspeechor expressiveconduct andcannotbe subjectedto a facial First
.9 Amendmentchallenge. Likewise, Elcomsoftcannotsucceedin an as-appliedFirst Amendment
1.0 challengebecauseit was not engagedin protectedexpression,and evenif the Court concludes
11 incidentalprotectedexpressionwas involved, sections1201(b)and 1204arenarrowly tailoredto

1.2 addressCongress'compellingconcernsregardingelectroniccommerce.Finally, Elcomsoft's
13 proceduraldue processchallengemust also fail given that sections1201(b)and 1204clearly
14 defineproscribedconduct. For thesereasons,the Court shoulddenyElcomsoft's motionsto
15 dismissthe indictment.
1.6 FACTS
1.7 I. Elcomsoft's Advanced eBook Processor
1.8 On or aboutJune20,2001, defendantElcomsoftbeganoffering a softwareprogram,the
1..9 AdvancedeBookProcessor(" AEBPR"), for saleon its Internetwebsite,www.elcomsoft.com.
20 Declarationof AlexanderKatalov in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Indictmentfor Violations of

21. Due Process13 (filed January25,2002) ("Katalov Declaration"). Elcomsoft advertisedthe
22 AEBPR programasa product for decryptingelectronicbooks ("ebooks") fonnatted for the
23 AdobeAcrobat eBookReader,a softwareproductdistributedby Adobe Systems,Incorporated
24 ("Adobe"). Affidavit of SpecialAgent Daniel O'Connell in Supportof Complaint16 (filed July
25 11,2001) ("Complaint Affidavit"). Elcomsoftstatedon its websitethat the AEBPR program
26 would decryptany ebookfonnattedin the AdobeAcrobat fonnat andproducean electronicfile
27
28 GOV'r OPP.TO MOTIONS
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 1
1 without anyrestrictionssuchas limitations on editing, copying,or printing the ebook. ld.
2 II. Adobe's Acrobat eBook Reader
3 Adobe's Acrobat eBook Readeris a producttargetedat publishersor distributorsof
4 electronicbookswho wish to distributeelectronicbooksin a mannerthat permits them to control
5 the distribution of the ebook,typically to thosewho pay for a copy of the ebook.Declarationof
6 ThomasDiaz15 (filed concurrentlywith this opposition);seealso RandomHouse,Inc. v.
7 RosettaBooks, 150F. Supp.2d613, 615 (SD.N.Y. 2001) (describinguseof Adobe Acrobat
8 eBookReader). As a result, Adobe's ebookproductsadd additional securityattributesto ebooks
9 not found in electronicdocumentsdistributedin Adobe's PortableDocument("PDF') fonnat.
10 [d. In contrastto "naked" PDF files, an Adobe ebookfile is intendedto remain on the computer
11 usedto purchaseor downloadthe ebookfile. A userof the Acrobat eBookReadermay readan
1.2 ebookandmake otherusesof the ebookon the computerto which the eoookwas downloaded,
13 but the usermay not e-mail or copy the ebookto anothercomputer. [d.
14 Adobe distributesthe Adobe Acrobat eBookReaderfor free to consumers,who can
15 obtainit from Adobe's websiteaswell as from ebookpublishersand distributors,and Adobe
16 licensesthe Adobe ContentServer,a productthat allows for the creationof ebooksaswell as
1.7 their distribution. [d. 1 6. Ebook retailerssuchasBames&Noble~com
andAmazon.comusethe
18 AdobeContentServerto managesalesanddistribution of ebooks. Id.
19 A publisherof ebookscanusethe Adobe ContentServerto packagea PDF file that
20 would otherwisebe ableto be copied(a so-called"naked" PDF file) so that it cannotbe copied
21 or further distributed. [d. 1 8. The Adobe ContentServerpermits the publisherto choosefrom a
22 nwnberof privileges to grant to, or withhold from, the conswneror readerof the ebook,
23 including the following:
24 a. The publishercanchoosewhetherthe consumerwill be able to copy the
25 ebook.
26 b. The publishercanchoosewhetherthe ebookwill be able to be printed to
27
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 2
1 paper. The publishercan decidewhetherto allow full printing of the ebook,to deny all printing
2 of the ebook,or to limit the numberof pagesprinted during a specifiedperiod of time.
3 c. The publishercanchoosewhetherto enablea lending function that
.. permitsthe purchaseror consumerto lendthe ebookto anotherindividual on the samenetwork
5 of computersasthe original purchaser.Justasin the physicalworld, when the original purchaser
6 lendsthe ebookto anotherindividual, the original purchaseris unableto usethe ebook. The
7 lenderof the ebookcan seta time limit for the expirationof the loanedebook.
8 d. The publishercanchoosewhetherto permit an ebookto be readaudibly

9 by a speechsynthesizerprogram. Certainpublishersof ebookswho useAdobe ContentServer
1.0 do not enablethe speechsynthesisfunction on certainebooksbecausethe publishers
11 independentlysell or licensethe audiorights to the ebookto other entities,suchas a publisherof
12 booksontapes. fd.' 8.
1.3 When a consumerpurchasesan ebookformattedfor the Adobe Acrobat eBookReader
3.4 from an Internetwebsite,the ebookis downloadedto the consumer'scomputerfrom the ebook
15 distributor's Adobe ContentServer. Id.' 9. The copy of the ebookprovidedto the consumeris
1.6 accompaniedby an electronicvoucherthat is recognizedby the Adobe Acrobat eBook Readerso
17 that the consumeris able to readthe book on the computerto which the ebookwas downloaded.
18 The AdobeAcrobat eBook Readerreadsthe voucherto "know" that the copy of the ebook
19 purchasedby the consumermay only be readon the computerto which it is downloaded(unless
20 the book is borrowedusing the lending function describedabove). ld.
21. HI. eBook End User Licenses
22 Ebookspurchasedfor usewith the Adobe AcrobateBook Readermay be distributed
23 subjectto an End User License("BULA").l SeeDeclarationof SpecialAgent Daniel O'Connell
24
25 Ilronically, like the ebooksfor which it providedcircumventiontechnology,Elcomsoft

distributedthe AEBPR programsubjectto a EULA. Declarationof SpecialAgent Kevin McGee
26 , 6 (filed Feb. 8, 2002). In its licenseElcomsoftinvokedprotectionsunderUnited States
27 copyrightlaw, aswell asprotectionsunderthe DefenseAcquisition Regulationsof the United

GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 3
1. "3-6 (filed with this opposition)("O'Connell Decl."). At leastthreeof the purchasersof
2 Elcomsoft'sAEBPR programwho soughtto useit to circumventprotectionson an ebookthey
3 hadpurchasedhadpurchasedthe ebooksubjectto an EULA. Id. One suchEULA includedthe
4 following terms:
5 1. You may install and view the eBook on one computer, which
may be a desktop computer or a portable laptop computer. You
6 may not install the eBook for use over a network. If you want to
have the eBook available on several computers in a network, a
7 license to download the eBook will need to be purchased for each
such computer (volume discounts are available; call [#]). The
8 eBook may not be leasedor loaned to a third party.
9 2. You may occasionally print a few pages of the eBook's text for
your personal use only (each printed page bears a diagonal
1.0 watennark saying, "Copyright Law Prohibits Copying or
Distributing"). Personal use means printing a few pages to set
11 aside for your later readin~. You may not copy or distribute any
eBook content to others WIthOutthe written permission of
12 [publisher] (depending upon the nature of the request, a license fee
may be char~). To request permission, send an e-mail to
13 pennissioDS($[publisher].com. Include the following information:
(a) the matenal you wish to use (specifying the page number(s»;
14 and (b) a description of the planned use (including quantity).
Pleaseallow severaldaysfor a reply.
1.5
3. All contentin the eBookis copyrightedunderthe U.S.
1.6 copyrightlaws, and [publisher1 ownsthe copyright andthe eBook
itself. Purchasermay not modIfy, remove,delete,aue;ment,add to,
17 publish, transmit,participatein the transferor saleof, create
derivativeworks from, or in any way exploit any of the eBook's
3.8 content,in whole or in part. The unauthorizedsubmissionor
distribution of copyrightedor otherpro\>rietarycontentis illegal
19 andcould subjectthe purchaserto criminal prosecutionaswell as
personalliability for damagesin a civil suit. Purchaserwill be
20 liable for any damageresultingfrom infringementof copyrightsor
proprietaryrights, or from any otherharm arising from such
21 submission.
22 4. Your \,urchase of the eBook license for a designated
subscription \,eriod is non-refundable, except as described herein.
23 If the eBook IS not successfully downloaded due to a malfunction
with [distributor's] computer systems,the Internet network system
24 or the purchaser's computer, [publisher] agreesto re-deliver the
eBook at no extra cost. Each party will be given a reasonable
25 period of time to repair their malfunctioning computer equipment,
26
27 States.[d.

GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 4
1 but if no delivery is madewithin 21 days,then the purchaserwill
be given a full refund.
2
...
3
7. Your useof the eBookconstitutesyour agreementto the above
4 termsand conditions.
5 ld. 14, Exhibit A. Contraryto assertionsin Elcomsoft'smotions, at leastone publisherof
6 ebooks,asa matterof policy, allows circumventionof the protectionson its publicationswith the
7 publisher'sapprovalin order to allow blind or dyslexiccustomersto makethe publicationsinto
8 audiblebooks. Id. 1 5. One of the ebooksto which a purchaserof the AEBPR intendedto apply
9 the programwas distributedby this publisher. Id.
1.0 IV. Elcomsoft's Refusal to Comolv with DMCA
11 On or aboutJune25, 2001,Adobe sentElcomsoftceaseand desiste-mails and
1.2 demandingthat Elcomsoftstop distributingthe AEBPR program.ComplaintAffidavit" 10, 14.
13 Elcomsoftdid not comply with Adobe's request,and in the following days,after having its
14 websiteblockedby its United StatesbasedInternetserviceprovider, Elcomsoft indicatedthat it
1.S did not intend to comply with Adobe's requestsunderthe DMCA. Complaint Affidavit' 14.
16 On August 28,2001, a Grand Jury in the NorthernDistrict of California indictedElcom
1.7 Ltd., a/k/aElcomsoftCo. Ud, for conspiracyand violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright
18 Act. See17U.S.C. §§ 1201(b),1204. Specifically,thegrandjurychargedElcomsoftwith
19 conspiringto traffic for gain in technologydesignedto circumventtechnologythat protectsa
20 right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 18,United StatesCode,Section371; with
21 trafficking for gain in technologyprimarily designedto circumventtechnologythat protectsa
22 right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 17,United StatesCode,Sections1201(b)( 1)(A)
23 and 1204;andwith trafficking in technologymarketedfor usein circumventingtechnologythat
24 protectsa right of a copyrightowner in violation of Title 17, United StatesCode, Sections
25 1201(b)(1)(C)and 1204.
26
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] s
1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
2 1. Whether Congress properly enacted sections 1201(b) and 1204 pursuant to the
3 CommerceClause.
4 2. WhetherElcomsoft's trafficking in the AEBPR programconstitutesexpression
5 protectedby the FirSJAmendment.
6 3. If someportion of Elcomsoft'sconductwas sufficiently expressiveto deserve
'7 protectionunderthe First Amendment,whethersections1201(b)and 1204further Congress'
8 goal of promoting andprotectingelectroniccommercewith only incidentalrestrictionson First
9 Amendmentfreedoms.
1.0 4. Whethersections1201(b)and 1204sufficiently defineproscribedconductto
1.1. provideproceduraldueprocessto Elcomsoft.
1.2 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

13 I. BackKround of the DMCA
14 A. Conlress' Review of Con~rilht Law in the Di&ital Ale
1.5 The Internetand the widespreaddigitization of variousproductsand serviceshave
16' presentedenormousopportunitiesfor internationalcommunication,meansof conductingtrade,
1.7 andnew fonns of creativeexpression.See,e.g.,JenniferL. Schenker,The Trillion Dollar Secret
18 Beneaththe Hype, theInternet Is Fosteringa Silent RevolutionThroughOnline Exchangesthat
19 Allow Fast and Efficient Trading AmongCorporateIT Systems,Time Magazine,Feb.28,2000
20 availableat 2000 WL 543326; TheRiseof the Infomediary: TheInternet Is Producing a String
21 of RacyNew BusinessModels, The Economist,June26,1999, available at 1999WL 7363618.
22 With its valuablepotential for global productdistribution at far lower transactioncosts,
23 electroniccommercehasalso creatednew businesschallenges,particularly for vendorsof
24 intellectualproperty. SeeIntellectual Property: TheProperty o/the Mind - Digital Technology
25 and theDevelopmentof theInternet Are Making it Easyto Copy or Alter All Sorts of Information
26 and Art, from Music to ComputerSoftware.Can CopyrightStill Be Protected?The Economist,
27
TODISMISS
ONcoNsmunoNAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 6
1 July 27, 1996,available at 1996WL 11247237.Until fairly recently,artistsand authorshad
2 only to contendwith the bootleg distribution of their works in hard-copyform, but now they face
3 the reality of uncontrollable,worldwide on-line infringement. Embracingthe digital mediumas
4 their own, infringersof copyrightedworks arenow ableto immediatelydistribute counterfeit
5 copiesof copyrightedworks worldwide. As a result, infringers can threatento usurpmuch,if not
6 all, of the Internetmarketfor a particularcopyrightedwork.
7 lust as Congresspreviouslyupdatedcopyrightlaws to addressthe impact of changing
8 technology,2Congresssoughtduring the 1990sto updatecopyright law to addressthe adventof
9 electroniccommerceandthe Internet. The statutethat is the focus of this case,the DMCA, is
10 oneof severalstatutesCongressenactedto addressthe impact of the Internetand digital
11 technologyupon copyrightlaw. 17U.S.C. § 1201et seq;seealso No Electronic Theft Act, 18
1.2 V.S.C. § 2319(c)(criminalizing reproductionand distribution of copyrightedworks without
13 requirementof private financial gain). Congressenactedthe DMCA after many yearsof

14 Congressionalhearingsseekingto addressthe challengesto copyright law presentedby the rise
15 of electroniccommerce.SeeUniversalStudiosv. Corley,273 F.3d 429,440 (2ndCir. 2001).
1.6 Congressrecognizedthe challengesdigital technologiespresentedto the usesof
17 copyrightedworks as early as 1974whenit createdthe National Commissionon New
18 TechnologicalUsesof CopyrightedWorks ("CONTU") to study andmakerecommendations
19 about,inter alia, computerusesof copyrightedworks. SeeApple Computer,Inc. v. Formula
20 Int'/Inc., 725 F.2d 521,523 (91bCir. 1984). Out of the work ofCONTU grew an understanding
21
22
2Sincethe founding of the republic,Congresshasupdatedcopyright law to addressnew
23 technologies.See,e.g.,RecordRentalAmendmentof 1984,Pub. L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727
2~ (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(1984»; SoundRecordingAct of 1971,85 Stat.391 (respondingto
piracy problemscreatedby the developmentof the audiotaperecorder); SonyCorp. of America
25 v. UniversalStudios,Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.ll (1984)(citing EasternMicrowave, Inc. v.
DoubledaySports,Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 129(2ndCir. 1982» (describingthe enactmentof 17
26
U.S.C. §§ 111(d)(2)(B),111(d)(5)to addressthe developmentof technologythat madeit
27 possibleto transmittelevisionprogrammingby cableor microwave».
28 GOV'T OPB.TO MOTIONS
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 7
1. of the challengesof evaluatingandprotectingcopyrightrights in the digital age.
2 In 1993,PresidentClinton formedthe InformationInfrastructureTask Force("llTF") to
3 updateU.S. copyrightlaw regardingdigital transmissionsand to implementthe President's
4 vision for the National Information Infrastructure("Nll"). S. Rep. 105-190,at 2 (1998). The
5 llTF establishedthe Working Groupon IntellectualPropertyRights "to investigatethe effectsof
6 emergingdigital technologyon intellectualpropertyrights and makerecommendationson any
'7 appropriatechangesto U.S. intellectualpropertylaw andpolicy." Id. The Working Group
8 issueda report in 1995known asthe White Paperwhich madevariousrecommendationsto
9 ensurecopyrightlaw remainedcurrentin light of new technologies.[d. Among the activities
1.0 conductedby the Working Group in preparingthe White Paperwas holding severalhearingsthat
1.1. includedtestimonyfrom industries,libraries,educators,andbeneficiariesof the public domain.
12 Id. at 2-3.
13 In 1995,SenatorsHatch andLeahyintroducedthe National Infonnation Infrastructure
l~ CopyrightProtectionAct of 1995to implementthe recommendations
of the White Paper.ld. at
15 3. Congressheld varioushearingsregardingthe Nil CopyrightProtectionAct of 1995from late
16 1995through 1997that includedtestimonyfrom a numberof copyright industriesaswell as
17 expertsfrom the World IntellectualPropertyOrganization,the Commissionerof Patentsand
18 Trademarks,andthe Librarian of Congress.Id. at 3-4.
1.9 Concurrentwith Congress'efforts to updateU.S. copyright laws, the governingbody of
20 the BerneUnion3calledupon the World IntellectualPropertyOrganization("WIPO") to fonD a
21 committeeto considera supplementaryagreementto the Berne Convention. This resultedin
22 formal proposalsto updatethe BerneConventionto addressissuesarisingfrom the spreadof
23 digital technology. In December1996tthe WIPO held a diplomatic conferenceculminatingin
24 the adoptionof the WIPO CopyrightTreatyandthe WIPO Performancesand Phonograms
25
26
~e BerneUnion is the internationalorganizationresponsiblefor the BerneConvention,
27 ratified by the United Statesin 1989. See17 U.S.C. § 101(defining "Berne Conventionwork").

GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 8
1. Treaty. Id. at 4-6.
2 As a result of thesejoint domesticand internationalefforts, Congressenactedthe DMCA

3 in 1998to implementthe WIPO CopyrightTreatyand to define "whether consumersand
4 businesses
may engagein certainconduct,or usecertaindevices,in the courseof transacting
5 electroniccommerce"andto address"all issuesrelatingto interstateand foreign commerce,
6 including commercetransactedover all electronicmediums,suchasthe Internet,and regulation
7 of interestsand foreign communications."HR. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 22 (1998).
8 Becauseof Congress'focuson electroniccommerce,the centralelementsof the DMCA
9 statutearethe provisionsrelating to circumventionof technologiesdesignedto control accessto,
1.0 anddesignedto protectthe rights of ownersof, copyrightedworks sold in electronicform. See
1.1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a),1201(b). Congressspecificallysoughtto encourageandprotect the
12 nascentmarketfor electroniccommerce,andmore particularly, electroniccommercein

13 copyrightedworks. SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll),at 23 (1998). Congresswished to support"a
14 thriving electronicmarketplace"that would provide "new andpowerful ways for the creatorsof
15 intellectualpropertyto maketheir works availableto legitimateconsumersin the digital
1.6 environment." Id.
1.7 B. The StatutoQ: Framework
1.8 The DMCA containsthreeprohibitionsrelatedto circumvention. First, it prohibits the
1.9 actof"circumvent[ing] a technologicalmeasurethat effectively controlsaccessto a work
20 protected[by the CopyrightAct]" 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(A) (emphasisadded). A second
21 provision forbids trafficking in technologyor productsdesignedto circumventa technological
22 measurethat controlsaccessto a copyrightedwork. Id. at § 1201(a)(2)(emphasisadded). The
23 third provision, the focusof this case,prohibits trafficking in technologyprimarily designedor
24 marketedto circumventmeasuresthatprotect a copyright owner's rights underthe Copyright
25 Act See17 V.S.C. § 1201(b)(emphasisadded).
26 Whereasthe focusof § 1201(a)(2)is technologythat blocks accessto the copyrighted
27
TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUnONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 9
1 work - suchas a devicethat pemrits accessto an article on an Internetwebsiteonly by thosewho
2 pay a fee or havea password- the focusof § 1201(b) is technologythat protectsthe copyright
3 itself - suchas a deviceon the samewebsitethat preventsthe viewer from copying the article
4 onceit is accessed.SeeS. Rep. 105-190,11-12(1998).

5 The DMCA providesseveralexceptionsto theseprohibitions. The statutepermits an
6 individual to circumventan accesscontrol on a copyrightedwork, or, in limited circumstances,to
7 sharecircumventiontechnology:(1) in order for a schoolor library to determinewhetherto
8 purchasea copyrightedproduct; (2) for law enforcementpurposes;(3) to achieveinteroperability
.9 of computerprograms;(4) to engagein encryptionresearch;(5) asnecessaryto limit the Internet
1.0 accessof minors; (6) asnecessaryto protectpersonallyidentifying infonnation; or (7) to engage
11 in securitytestingof a computersystem.See17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-G).
12 In addition,the DMCA providesthat its prohibition on the act of accesscircumvention,§
13 1201(a)(l)(A) (not the focusof this case),would not apply to usersof certaintypesof works if,
1.4 uponthe recommendationof the Registerof CopyrightStthe Librarian of Congressconcludesthat
15 the ability of thoseusers"to makenoninfringing usesof that particular classof work" is "likely
16 to be . adverselyaffected"by the prohibition. 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B). The statutemakes
17 clear,however,that any exceptionsto § 1201(a)(l)(A) adoptedby the Library of Congressare
1.8 not defensesto violations of the anti-trafficking provisionscontainedin § 1201(a)(2)and §
19 1201(b). See17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(E).
20 The DMCA providescriminal penaltiesfor thoseviolations of eachprohibition relatedto
21 circumventionwhenthe violations aremadewillfully andfor financial gain. See17 U.S.C. §
22 1204. Theseadditionalelementsof willfulness andprivate financial gain are centralto the case
23 beforethe Court, and arevirtually ignoredin the manybriefs filed by defendantElcomsoftand
- - .
24 amIcI cunae.
25
26
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 10
1 n. CongressProperly Enacted Sections1201(b)and 1204 of the DMCA Pursuant to the
CommerceClause
2
The Framersentrustedto Congressthe authority"[t]o make a111aws
which shallbe
3
necessaryandproperfor carrying into Execution"the powersvestedby the Constitutionin the
4.
governmentof the United States.U.S. Const.Art. I, § 8, ct. 18.
5
Elcomsoftarguesthat enactmentof Sections1201(b)and 1204of the DMCA wasnot a
6
valid exerciseof an enumeratedpowerby Congressunderthe IntellectualPropertyClause4of the
7
Constitution.SIn advancingthat argument,Elcomsoftbeginsfrom the flawed premisethat
8
Congressenactedthe DMCA pursuantto its authorityunderthe IntellectualPropertyClause.6
9
The legislativehistory of the DMCA reflectsthat Congressexpresslybasedits exerciseof
1.0
authorityover circumventiontechnologyon the CommerceClauseratherthan the Intellectual
11
PropertyClause.7SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35 (1998)("Constitutional Authority Statement:
1.2
Pursuantto clause2(1)(4) of Rule XI of the Rulesof the Houseof Representatives,
the
13
Committeefinds that the Constitutionalauthorityfor this legislation is provided in Article I,
1.4
Section8, clause3, which grantsCongressthe power to regulatecommercewith foreignnations,
1S
amongthe severalStatesand with the Indian tribes."); 144CongoRec.E2136-02,2137.
16
Coming out of the House-Senate
conferencethat finalized drafting of sections1201(b)
17
1.8
4ArticleI, Section8, Clause8 of the Constitution,which grantsto Congressthe power to
19 "promotethe Progressof ScienceandusefulArts" is referredto hereinalternativelyasthe
20 IntellectualPropertyClauseor the CopyrightClause.
21 SElcomsoftMemorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss

Basedon First Amendmentat 17-18.
22
6Likewise,amici law professorsinaccuratelystatethat "[ n]either the text nor the
23 legislativehistory of the DMCA indicateswhich power Congressrelied on." Memorandumof
24. PointsandAuthorities of Amicus Curie (sic) at 1. SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35 (1998); 144
CongoRec.E2136-02(1998).
2S
7Amici law professorsat leastrecognizethat Congressmay haveactedpursuantto the
26 CommerceClausein enactingthe DMCA. Memorandumof Points andAuthorities of Amicus
27 Curie (sic) at 13.
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 11
1 and 1204of the DMCA, and speakingbeforethe Housevoted on the bill, CongressmanTom
2 Bliley, Chainnanof the HouseCommitteeon Commerce,declaredthat "given that the
3 ConferenceReportcontainsseveralnew provisions,I want to supplementthe legislativehistory
4 for this legislationto clarify the Conferees'intent, aswell asmake clearthe constitutionalbases
5 for our action." After first commentingthat the Committeeon Commerceactedunderboth the
6 CopyrightClauseandthe CommerceClausewith regardto the DMCA, and then acknowledging
7 a concernthat the bill could be seenasa "paracopyrlght"measureextendingbeyondthe
8 regulatorysphereof intellectualpropertylaw (andbeyondthe scopeof Congress'authorityto act
9 underthe IntellectualPropertyClause),the Chairn1anspecificallyrecognizedthat "[i]n this
1.0 respect,then,the constitutionalbasisfor legislatingis the commerceclause,not the 'copyright'
1.1. clause." Id. Seealso H.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 22 (1998)(noting that the bill "is aboutmuch
12 morethanintellectualproperty- It defineswhetherconsumersandbusinessesmay engagein

13 certainconduct,or usecertaindevices,in the courseof transactingelectroniccommerce.Indeed,
1.4 manyof theserules may determinethe extentto which electroniccommercerealizesits
1.5 potential. "}

1.6 A. ConKressMa1:R~ulate Electronic Commerce
1.7 Article I, Section8, Clause3 of the Constitutiondelegatesto Congressthe power "[t]o
18 regulateCommercewith foreign Nations,and amongthe severalStates,andwith the Indian
1.9 Tribes." "The commercepower 'is the power to regulate;that is, to prescribethe rule by which
20 commerceis to be governed. This power, like all othersvestedin Congress,is completein itself,
21 maybe exercisedto its utmost extent,andacknowledgesno limitations, other than areprescribed

22 by the Constitution. '" UnitedStatesv. Lopez,514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (citing Gibbonsv.
23 Ogden,9 Wheat. 1, 196(1824». As definedby the SupremeCourt, the terDl"commerce"as

24 referencedin the Constitutionis "commercialintercourse"which "is regulatedby prescribing
25 rules for carryingon that intercourse."[d. at 189-190. Specifically,suchregulationmaybe
26 directedat protectingchannelsof interstatecommerce,instrumentalitiesof interstatecommerce
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 12
1 or thingsin interstatecommerce.Lopez,514 U.S. at 558 (citationsomitted).
2 In creatingsections1201(b)and 1204of the DMC~ Congressactedunderthe
3 CommerceClauseto directly regulatespecificthingsmoving in commerce(circumvention
4 technology)and to indirectly protectchannelsof interstatecommerce(electroniccommerce).
5 The legislativehistory reflectsthat the statutedevelopedout of "a wide-rangingreview of all the
6 issuesaffectingthe growth of electroniccommercettanda concernaboutinappropriate
7 distributionof productshanDfulto the marketfor digital content.H.R. Rep lO5-551(ll), at 22;
8 144Cong.Rec.E2136-02,2137. Moreover,the factsallegedin the indictment in this case
.9 reflect suchan intent put into practice: chargesagainsta companyfor marketingand salesover
10 the Internet(electroniccommerce)ora softwareprogram(circumventiontechnology).
1.1. Evenmore thanthe civil provisions,the criminal provisionsof the DMCA chargedin this
1.2 casefall squarelyunderthe commercepower of Congress.Becausesections1201(b) and 1204
1.3 requirethe governmentto prove trafficking "for gain," an elemententirely lacking in the civil
14 provisionsof the law, therecanbe no questionthat the statuteimpacts"commercial
15 intercourse."sUnitedStatesv. Moghadam,175F.3d 1269(11thCir. 1999)(recognizingthat
16 becausethe anti-bootleggingstatute,18U.S.C. § 2319A(a),containsa "financial gain" element,
17 it necessarilyis intertwinedwith commerce).
18
1.9
S'fheeconomicgain elementis oneof the two significant distinctionsbetweenthe civil
20 andcriminal provisionsof the DMCA. Amici law professorsignoredthis elementin their brief
filed beforethe SecondCircuit in the Corley caseand in this case. The failure to appreciatethe
21
distinctionhasled to much unfoundedconcernin the academiccommunity that well-intentioned
22 scholarscould be prosecutedcriminally for sharingencryptionresearch.SeeRobert Lemos,
SecurityExpertsProtest CopyrightAct, ZDNet News, Sept.6, 2001,available at 2001 WL
23 4733227. Unfortunately,this misperceptionhasbeenfed by certainindividuals and
24 organizationspursuinga political agenda.SeeBennyEvangelista,Judge'sRulings Boost
Strengthof Digital CopyrightLaw, SanFranciscoChronicle,Nov. 29, 2001, at B-3 ("But EFF
25 attorneyRobin Grosssaidthe computerscientistsstill do not believe they are immune from
lawsuits. 'The judge's denial is very problematicbecauseit puts the scientistsin a position now
26 wherethey haveto facethe threatof prosecutionin orderto be ableto challengethe
27 constitutionalityof this law,' Grosssaid.").

GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 13
1 B. CongressMay Act Pursuant to the Commerce Clause to Protect Rights
Granted Under the Intellectual Pro»el1\: Clause
2
Congressmay act pursuantto the CommerceClauseto passlegislationthat protectsand
3
createsrights in intellectualpropertyevenwherethat legislationwould not be pennittedunder
4
the IntellectualPropertyClause. The Trade-MarkCases,100U.S. 82,99 (1879). The Supreme
5
Court haslong recognizedthat while eachof the powersof Congressis alternativeto all of the
6
others,"what cannotbe doneunderoneof them may very well be doableunder another."
7
Moghadam,175F.3d at 1276. For example,despitethe fact that the public accommodation
8
provisionsof the Civil Rights Act of 1964may havereachedbeyondthe authority of the
9
FourteenthAmendment,the SupremeCourt in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,379
1.0
U.S. 241 (1964),upheldthe legislationasa valid act predicatedupon the CommerceClause. See
1.1.
also SouthDakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207 (1987)(holding that Congresscould act pursuant
12
to SpendingClauseto imposerestrictionsthat would be beyondits power to enactdirectly).
1.3
The CommerceClausemay be usedasa basisto legislatewithin a context contemplated
1.t
by anothersectionof the Constitution,but the power of the Congressto legislatepursuantto the
15
CommerceClauseis not without limitation. SeeLopez,514 U.S. at 553-59(discussinghistorical
1.6
limits of CommerceClauseauthority). While the SupremeCourt in the vast majority of negative
17
CommerceClausecaseshasdevotedits efforts to limiting congressionalattemptsto regulate
18
intrastatebusinessactivity, the Court hasalsorecognizedthat Congressmay not usethe
1.9
CommerceClauseasajustification to overridean otherwiseexisting Constitutionalrestraint.
20
RailwayLabor ExecutivesAss'n v. Gibbons,455 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down act by Congress
21.
underCommerceClausethat violated BankruptcyClause'suniformity requirement).
22
In Moghadam,175F.3d at 1277,the EleventhCircuit addressedthe very question
23
broughtbeforethis court by amici law professors:"whetherCongresscan useits Commerce
24
Clausepower to avoid the limitations that might preventit from passingthe samelegislation
25
underthe CopyrightClause." Contrastingthe Trade-MarkCasesandHeart of Atlanta Motel
26
cases(authorizingCommerceClauseto accomplishwhat may not be pennissibleunderthe
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 14
1 CopyrightClause)with the Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n case(prohibiting useof Commerce
2 Clauseto eradicatea limitation placedupon Congressby anothergrant of power), and
3 recognizingthat "modem trademarklaw is built entirely on the CommerceClause,"the court
4 concludedthat "the Copyright Clausedoesnot envisionthat Congressis positively forbidden
5 from extendingcopyright-likeprotectionunderother Constitutionalclauses,suchasthe
6 CommerceClause." The EleventhCircuit found most persuasiveboth that "[t]he grant itself is
7 statedin positive tenDS,and doesnot imply any negativepregnant"that would suggest"a ceiling
8 on Congress'ability to legislatepursuantto other grants"and that "[ e]xtending quasi-copyright
9 protectionalso furthersthe purposeof the CopyrightClauseto promotethe progressof the useful
1.0 arts." [d. at 1280.
1.1. As reflectedin the legislativehistory of the DMCA, Congressrecognizedthat while the
1.2 purposeof the DMCA was to protectintellectualpropertyrights, the meansof doing so involved
13 a dramaticshift from the regulationof the useof information to the regulationof the devicesby
1.4 which infonnation is delivered. 144CongoRec.E2136-2. For this reason,the legislatorsviewed
15 the legislationas"paracopyright"legislationthat could be enactedunderthe CommerceClause.

16 Id. at 2137. Sucha stepby Congressto protectthe marketfor digital contentas an actionunder
1.7 the CommerceClausecannotbe saidto overrideConstitutionalrestraintsof the Intellectual
18 PropertyClause,becauseCongress'fundamentalmotivation was to protectrights grantedunder

1.9 the IntellectualPropertyClausein the digital world. Congressrecognizedthat traditional
20 intellectualpropertylaws regulatingthe useof infonnation borderon unenforceablein the digital

21 world; only regulationof the devicesby which infonnation is deliveredwill successfullysave
22 constitutionallyguaranteedintellectualpropertyrights. SeeS. Rep. 105-190,at 8 ("Due to the
23 easewith which digital works canbe copiedanddistributedworldwide virtually instantaneously,
24 copyrightownerswill hesitateto maketheir works readily availableon the Internetwithout
25 reasonableassurancethat they will be protectedagainstmassivepiracy.")
26
27
TO DISMISS ON CONSTlTUnONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 15
1 m. Sections1201(b)and 1204Do Not Violate the First Amendment
2 A. Elcomsoft May Not Make a Facial First Amendment ChaUenie to the DMCA
3 A party may only make a facial challenge9to a statute under the First Amendment when
4 the statute proscribes "spoken words" or conduct that is "patently 'expressive or
5 communicative." or integralto, or commonlyassociatedwith expression. Roulettev. City of

6 Seattle,97 F.3d 300,303 (9d1Cir. 1996)(quotingBroadrick v. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601,612-13
7 (1973». Statutesareonly susceptibleto suchchallenges"'when the legislation allegedlyvests
8 governmentofficials with unbridleddiscretion' and 'when thereis a lack of adequateprocedural
9
safeguards
necessaryto ensureagainstunduesuppressionof protectedspeech.", 4805 Convoy
1.0 Inc. v. City of San Diego, 183 F .3d 1108, 1111 (9thCir. 1999) (quoting Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v.
11 City of Las Vegas,154F.3d 1097,1100(9thCir. 1998». "[ A] facial freedomof speechattack

1.2 must fail, unlessat a minimum, the challengedstatute'is directednarrowly and specificallyat
1.3
'" Roulette,97 F.3d at 305. Hence,Elcomsoft
expressionor conductassociatedwith expression.
1~ canonly make sucha challengeif the court finds that "every applicationof the statutecreate[s]
3.5 an impennissiblerisk of suppressionof ideas." New YorkStateClubAss'n, Inc. v. City of New
16 York,487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (citing City Councilo/LosAngeles v. Taxpayers/or Vincent,466
17 u.s. 789,798, n.15 (1984» (emphasisadded).
18 In this case,the statutein questionis not directedspecifically at expressionor conduct
19 associatedwith expression,andthe statutehasnumerouspennissibleapplications.See17U.S.C.
20 §§ 1201(b),1204. Sections1201(b)and 1204arestatutesof generalapplicationfocusedupon
21. trafficking in technologyfor private financial gain; they arenot focusedupon speech.See
22 Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 103-04(9thCir. 1994)(holding that California antipiracystatute
23
24 9It is not entirely clear whetherdefendantElcomsoft's challengeto the DMCA underthe
First Amendmentis a facial or as-appliedchallenge. CompareMemorandumof Points and
25 Authoritiesin Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon First Amendmentat 9-12 with
Memorandumof Points andAuthorities in Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon First
26 Amendmentat 15,line 16.Regardless,both typesof challengefail for the reasonsstatedin this
27 opposition.
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 16
1 not subjectto facial challenge,in part becausethe statutefocusedupon infringementfor
2 commercialadvantageor private financial gain). The statutetargetsmany forms of technology,
3 suchashardware,that do not constitute"spokenwords" or "expressiveor communicative
4 conduct"andthe statute,therefore,is not susceptibleto a facial challenge.1oSeeBroadrick v.
5 Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).
6 Not only is the statutenot targetedat speechor expressiveconduct,the statuteexplicitly
7 providesfor adequateproceduralsafeguardsto ensurethat First Amendmentconcernsare
8 addressed.See4805 ConvoyInc. v. City of SanDiego, 183F.3d 1108,1111.( citing absenceof
9 proceduralsafeguardsasan elementin facial challengeanalysis). For example,thesesafeguards
1.0 includedirecting the Librarian of Congressto ensurethat noninfringing usesof copyrighted
1.1. works arenot prevented.17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(B).
1.2 Further,the overbreadthdoctrineprofferedby Elcomsoftas a facial challengeto the
1.3
DMCA doesnot apply.I I First, the statutedoesnot pose"a realistic dangerthat the statuteitself
14 will significantly compromiserecognizedFirst Amendmentprotectionsof third partiesnot before
1.5 the COurt."12New York State Club Ass 'n, 487 U.S. at 11; Anderson v. Nidorj; 26 F .3d at 103-04.
1.6 Second,the overbreadthdoctrinedoesnot apply to commercialspeech.Village of Hoffman
17 Estatesv. Flipside, HoffmanEstates,Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) (Flipside). Hence,to the
1.8 extentthat sections1201(b)and 1204reachanytype of speech- a position the governmentdoes
19 not concede- sections1201(b)and 1204aretargetedexclusivelyat commercialconduct,namely
20
10 Although the technologytargetedby the DMCA can include computersoftwarewhich,
21
accordingto Elcomsoft,implicatesexpression,sections1201(b)and 1204do not, on their face,
22 targetcomputersoftware. Indeed,the statuteis aimedat many typesof technology,including
hardwaredevicessuchas so-called"black boxes."SeeS. Rep. 105-190,at 27 (1998).
23
24 "See Memorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Basedon
First Amendmentat 9-10 n.6.
25
12Elcomsoft'sclaim regardingfair useby third partiesis not sufficient for an overbreadth
26 claim asfair useis not a true Constitutionalor First Amendmentdoctrine. Seeinfra section
27 Ill.C.3.a.
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 17
1. the willful offering, importing, andtrafficking of technologyfor private financial gain. 17U.S.C.
2 §§ 1201(b), 1204.
3 SincedefendantElcomsoftmay not makea facial challenge,this oppositionbrief now
j turnsto the reasonsElcomsoftcannotsuccessfullysustainan as-appliedFirst Amendment

5 challengeto sections1201(b)and 1204. SeeRoulette,97 F.3d at 302 (indicating that facial First
6 Amendmentchallengesshouldbe distinguishedfrom as-appliedchallenges).
7 B. Defendant's Sale of Circumvention Technolo2VIs Not Soeech.
8 1. Defendant Elcomsoft Was Sellin2 a Product.
9 The first stepin any First Amendmentanalysisis to determinewhetherany form of
1.0 speechis implicated. Elcomsoft asksthe Court to find that it was engagedin speechon the basis
1.1. that the AEBPR programitself constitutesspeech.13
Sections1201(b) and 1204and the
1.2 indictmentin this case,however,do not targetthe mereexistenceof the AEBPR program.
13 Instead,sections1201(b)and 1204prohibit trafficking in or selling the AEBPR for private
1.4 financial gain. In this respect,this caseis different than UniversalStudiosv. Corley, 273 F.3d
1S 429 (200Cir. 2001),which involved the postingon a websiteof sourcecodeand object codeto a
1.6 computerprogramthat decrypteddigital versatiledisksor "DVDS.,,14Corley did not involve
17 commercialtrafficking in the circumventiontechnology.
18 The questionthat confrontsthis Court, therefore,is not whetherthe AEBPR is protected
1.9 speechbut whetherElcomsoft's act of selling and trafficking in the AEBPR constitutes
20 expressiveconduct. Justbecausethe technologyin this casehappensto be computersoftware
21. that mayor may not be consideredspeech,the government"does not loseits power to regulate
22
23 13Memorandumof Points andAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Basedon First
24 Amendmentat 3-6.
14Although Corley providessubstantialsupportfor this Court denyingElcomsoft's
25
motions,Corley is also different in at leastone otherrespect:the technologyat issue
26 circumventedaccesscontrolsin violation of 17U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) ratherthan the copyright
27 protectionsat issuein this case. Compare17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).

TO DISMISS ON CONSmullONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 18
1. commercialactivity deemedharmful to the public wheneverspeechis a componentof that
2 activity." Ohralik v. Ohio StateBar Assn.,436 U.S. 447,456 (1978). "'[I]t hasneverbeen
3 deemedan abridgementof freedomof speechor pressto make a courseof conductillegal merely
4 becausethe conductwas in part initiated, evidenced,or carriedout by meansof language,either
5 spoken,written or printed. /d. (quoting Giboneyv. Empire Storage&/ce Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
6 (1949).
7 That Elcomsoft's act of selling the AEBPR programdoesnot constituteexpressive
8 conductis apparentfrom the factual contextin which its salesoccurred. SeeSpencev.
9 Washington,418 U.S. 405 (1974) (holding that whethera nonverbalact constitutesspeech
10 dependsupon the natureof the activity, the factualcontextin which it occurs,whetheran intent
1.1. to conveya particularizedmessagewaspresent,andwhetherthe messagewould be understood).
12 Elcomsoft'sinitial statementsregardingthe AEBPR programdemonstrateElcomsoft engagedin
1.3 the conductof trafficking merely to sell copiesof the AEBPR program,not to engagein any fonn
1.4 of commentaryor protest. SeeO'Connell Decl. 17, Exhibit D. The act of trafficking in the
15 AEBPR programhad no expressivepurposeandwas solely aimedat generatingprofits.
1.6 2. The AEBPR in Object Code Form Is Not SReech.
1.7 As part of their evolutionaryapproachto new computertechnologiesand the First
18 Amendment,IS courtshave struggledwith the questionof whethercomputercodeconstitutes
1.9 expression.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 429; Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (~Cir. 2000). A
20 consensusappearsto be emerging,however,that sourcecode(as opposedto object code)16

can
21.
22 ISInevaluatingFirst Amendmentlaw in the digital age,courtshave appropriatelytakenan

"'evolutionary' approachto the task of tailoring familiar constitutionalrules to novel
23 technologicalcircumstances,favoring 'narrow' holdingsthat would permit the law to matureon
24 a 'case-by-case'basis."Corley, 273 F.3d at 445 (citing Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions,
Inc. 202 F.3d 573, 584 n.ll (2ndCir. 2000».
25
16Computer programsarewritten in specializedalphanumericlanguages,or "source
26 code."In order to operatea computer,sourcecodemustbe translatedinto computerreadable
27 form, or "object code." Object codeusesOsand Is in combinationswhich representthe
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 19
1 be a protectedfoml of expression.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 445-49; Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d
2 481 (6thCir. 2000) (noting that "issueof whetheror not the First Amendmentprotectsencryption
3 sourcecodeis a difficult one becausesourcecodehasboth an expressivefeatureand a functional
4 feature"but concludingthat sourcecodeis protected).

5 In contrastto sourcecode,no consensushasarisenwith regardto whetherobject code
6 constitutesFirst Amendmentprotectedexpression.CompareCorley, 273 F.3d at 445-46
7 (suggestingobject codemay be protected)with Bernsteinv. UnitedStatesDept. of State,922 F.
8 Supp.1426,1436(N.D. Ca!. 1996)(holding that sourcecodeconstitutesspeechbut not reaching
9 objectcodequestion),and Karn v. UnitedStatesDept. of State,925 F. Supp. 1, 9 n.19

],0 (D.D.C.1996)(assumingthat sourcecodeis protectedspeechwhenjoined with commentary,but
1.1. statingthat sourcecodealoneis "merely a meansof commandinga computerto perform a
12 function~"thus indicating the object codewould be lessdeservingof protection); seealso
13 Name.Space,Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F .3d 573, 586 (200Cir. 2000) (holding that
1.4 functionalInternettop level domainnamesnot protectedexpression);Orin S. Kerr, Are We
15 OverprotectingCode?Thoughtson First-GenerationIntemetLaw, 57 Wash.& Lee L. Rev,
1.6 1287(2000); Mark A. Lemley & EugeneVolokh, Freedomof Speechand Injunctions in
3.7 IntellectualProperty Cases,48 Duke L.J. 147,236-37(1998) ("most executablesoftwareis best
1.8 treatedasa virtual machineratherthanasprotectedexpression").

1.9 Computerprogramsare "essentiallyutilitarian" works. ComputerAssoc.Int'l v. Altai,
20 Inc. 982 F.2d 693,704 (2Jx\Cir. 1992). A computerprogramis in its most functional form when
21 it is in object code,a fonD that generallyonly hasmeaningto the computerexecutingits
22 instructions. See Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F .3d 596, 600 n.2
23 (9thCir. 2000). The AEBPR productwhich Elcomsoftdistributedas a completedproductin

2.
2S alphanumericcharactersof the sourcecode.See,e.g.,SonyComputerEntertainmentInc. v.
ConnectixCorp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 n.2 (9thCir. 2000);SegaEnters.v. Accolade,977 F.2d 1510,
26 1515n.2 (9thCir. 1993); JohnsonControlsInc. v. PhoenixControl Systems,Inc., 866 F.2d 1173,
"
27 1175 n.2 (9thCir. 1989).

GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 20
1 objectcodefonn possessed
only functionalcharacteristics;it was not usedto conveyinfonnation
2 or to assertvaluesto its users. Similarly, the AEBPR programdoesnot "speak" to its usersin
3 anyexpressivemannerwhen it is used.
4 The Court shouldbe reluctantto extendFirst Amendmentprotectionto the act of
5 trafficking in a functionalproductor goodthat merelyactsas a machine. SeeLemley & Volokh,
6 48 Duke L.J. at 236-37; see also Advent SystemsLtd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F .2d 670, 675 (3MCir.
7 1991)(holding that softwareis a goodfor purposesof PennsylvaniaUnifOml CommercialCode).

8 c. Even if Elcomsoft Was Engagedin Expressive Conduct, Its Challenge to
Sections1201(b) and 1204Fails Under First Amendment Princi(!les.
9
Even if the Court concludesthat Elcomsoft'sconductin trafficking in the AEBPR was
1.0
sufficiently expressiveto deserveprotectionunderthe First Amendment,sections1201(b)and
1.1.
1204neverthelessmeetFirst Amendmentrequirements."When 'speech'and 'nonspeech'
1.2
elementsarecombinedin a singlecourseof conduct,a sufficiently important governmentinterest
1.3
in regulatingthe nonspeechelementcanjustify incidentallimitations on First Amendment
14
freedoms." UnitedStatesv. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);Junger v. Daley 209 F.3d 481,485
1S
(~Cir. 2000) (subjectingregulationsgoverningexportof encryptionsoftwareto O'Brien test).
1.6
Seealso Corley, 273 F .3d at 429 (holding that First Amendmentanalysisrequirescomputercode
17
be treatedascombiningnonspeechand speechelements). A statutethat is contentneutralwill
1.8
satisfythe First Amendment"if it furthersan importantor substantialgovernmentinterest;if the
1.9
governmentalinterestis unrelatedto the suppressionof free expression;and if the incidental
20
restrictionon allegedFirst Amendmentfreedomsis no greaterthan essentialto the furtheranceof
21
that interest." TurnerBroadcastingSys.Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,662 (1994) (quoting
22
0 'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). Further,the Constitutionaccordsa lesserprotectionto commercial
23
speechthan to other constitutionallyprotectedexpression.
I?Central Hudson Gas& Elec. Corp.
24
v. PublicServ. Comm'nof New York,447 U.S. 557,562-63(1980).
25
26 17 The governmentmay alsoban commercialspeechrelatedto illegal activity. Pittsburgh
27 Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,388 (1973).

TO DISMISS ON CONSTITUnONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 21
1 1. Sections12010!} and 1204are Content Neutral.
2 The principal inquiry in deternriningcontentneutrality "is whetherthe governmenthas
3 adopteda regulationbecauseof agreementor disagreementwith the messageit conveys."
4 TurnerBroadcastingSys.,512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Wardv. RockAgainstRacism,491 U.S. 781,
5 791 (1999». "The government'spurposeis the controlling consideration." Ward,491 U.S. at
6 791
7 In evaluatingthe DMCA for contentneutrality,the Court shouldfollow the Second
8 Circuit's reasoningin Corley, in which the SecondCircuit detemIinedthat the DMCA targeted
9 only the nonspeech,functional componentsof computersoftware.Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. The
1.0 SecondCircuit statedthe following regardingthe DMCA and DeCSS,the DVD decryption
11 softwareat issuein that case:
1.2 Neither the DMCA nor the posting provision is
concerned with whatever capacity DeCSS might
1.3 have for conveying infonnation to a human being. .
. The DMCA and the postin~ prohibition are applied
14 to DeCSS solely becauseof Its capacity to instruct a
computer to decrypt CSS. That functional
lS capability is not speechwithin the meaningof the
First Amendment.
16
Id. Seealso UniversalCity Studios,Inc. v. Remierdes,111F. Supp.2d 294,329 (S.D.N.Y.
1.7
2000)("The reasonthat Congressenactedthe anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA had
18
nothingto do with suppressingparticularideasof computerprogrammersand everythingto do
1.9
with functionality.").
20
The Corley analysisappliesequallyto sections1201(b) and 1204which, in this case,only
21.
targetthe nonspeechfunctional elementsof the AEBPR program. The DMCA appliesto the
22
AEBPR programbecauseof the capacityof AEBPR to instruct a computerto circumvent
23
Adobe'sAcrobat eBookReader. The statutedoesnot reachthe AEBPR becauseof anycapacity
24
the AEBPR may haveto communicateideasor information to a humanbeing. SeeCorley 273
25
F ,3d at 454; see also Reimerdes, 111 F, Supp,2d at 304-05 ("In an era in which, , '. computer
26
codealsois capableof inflicting otherhann, societymust be ableto regulatethe useand
27
TO DISMISS ON CONSTfi'UTIONAL
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138](RMW] 22
1 disseminationof codein appropriatecircumstances.The Constitution,after all, is a framework
2 for building ajust and democraticsociety.It is not a suicidepact.").
3 2. Sections1201~) and 1204Further an ImRortant Government Interest
4 The Government'sinterestin preventingunauthorizedcopying of copyrightedworks is
5 unquestionablysubstantial.SeeCorley,273 F.3d at 454; Andersonv. Nidorj; 26 F.3d 100, 103-
6 04 (9d1Cir. 1994). Congresshasrepeatedlyfound that copyright and,morebroadly, intellectual
7 propertypiracy areendemic. Reimerdes,111F. Supp.2dat 335 n.230.18As describedabove,
8 Congressenactedthe DMCA specificallybecauseit wishedto protect American copyrighted
9 works and"facilitate making availablequickly andconvenientlyvia the Internetthe movies,
10 music,software,andliterary works that arethe fruit of American genius." S. Rep. 105-190,at 8.
11 The magnitudeof theseinterestsshouldnot be underestimatedsince"the Framersintended
" Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation
1.2 copyrightitself to be the engineof free expression.
1.3 Enterprises,471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).

It
15
1.6
17
18
19
20
21.
18TheReimerdescourt cited H.R. Rep. 106-216(1999)which statesthat
22 "[n]otwithstanding[penaltiesfor copyrightinfringement]copyrightpiracy of intellectual
propertyflourishes,assistedin largepart by today'sworld of advancedtechnologies.For
23 example,industry groupsestimatethat counterfeitingandpiracy of computersoftwarecostthe
24 affectedcopyrightholdersmore than $11 billion last year(othersbelievethe figure is closerto
$20billion). In somecountries,softwarepiracy ratesareashigh as 97% of all sales.The U.S.
25 rateis far lower (25%), but the dollar losses($2.9 billion) arethe highestworldwide. The effect
of this volume of theft is substantial:lost U.S.jobs, lost wages,lower tax revenue,andhigher
26 pricesfor honestpurchasersof copyrightedsoftware.Unfortunately,the potential for this
27 problemto worsenis great."
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] ~
1 3. Sections1201(b)and 1204Are Sufficiently Tailored to Satisfy
Constitutional Reguirements.
2
Sections1201(b) and 1204aresufficiently tailored for First Amendmentpurposes.The
3
SupremeCourt hasemphasizedthat a content-neutralregulation"neednot be the leastspeech-
4
restrictivemeansof advancingthe Government'sinterest." Turner Broadcasting,512 U.S. at
5
662.Seealso Corley,273 F.3d at 455. Rather,a statuteis sufficiently tailored "so long as. . . [it]
6
promotesa substantialgovernmentinterestthat would be achievedlesseffectively absentthe
7
regulation." TurnerBroadcasting,512U.S. at 662 (citationsomitted). The SecondCircuit in
8
Corleyconcludedthat the DMCA prohibitionsagainsttrafficking in circumventiontechnology
9
satisfythe "sufficiently tailored" standard.Corley, 273 F.3d at 454-55.
1.0
The numerousexceptionsto the DMCA also demonstrate,in part, the closetailoring of
11
the DMCA. Congresscarefully balanced,inter alia, the needsof law enforcementandother
12
governmentagencies,computerprogrammers,encryptionresearchers,andcomputersecurity
13
specialistsagainstthe seriousproblemscreatedby circumventiontechnology. See17 U.S.C. §§
14
-
1201(e) 1201(g), 12010). That defendantElcomsoft'sconductdid not fall within the
1.5
exceptionsdoesnot suggest,let aloneprove,the DMCA sweepstoo broadly. SeeFEC v. Nat'[
1.6
"
Right to WorkCommittee,459 U.S. 197,208 (1982)("statutoryprohibitions and exceptions-
17
regardingpolitical contributionsby corporationsandunionsheld "sufficiently tailored to
18
avoid unduerestrictionon the associationalinterestsasserted"by political organization).
1.9
D. A Fair Use Defenseis Not ARRlicablein this Case
20
1. Elcomsoft Does Not Have Standing To Assert a Fair Use Defense on
21 Behalf of Third Parties
22 Elcomsoftdoesnot have standingto asserta fair usedefenseon behalf of third parties.

23 "[A] personto whom a statuteconstitutionallymay be appliedmay not challengethat statuteon
24 the groundthat it conceivablymay be appliedunconstitutionallyto othersin situationsnot before
25 the Court." Broadrickv. Oklahoma,413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). Seealso United Statesv.
26 Edwards,13 F.3d 291,295-96 (9th Cir. 1993),overruledon other grounds. Elcomsoft doesnot
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 24
1. claim to be making fair useof copyrightedmaterials;rather,it advancesa hypotheticalfair use
2 argumenton behalf of usersof the AEBPR program.
3 2. This CaseDoesNot Presentan Infrine:ement Claim.
4 Not only doesElcomsoft not havestandingto assertfair usein this context,but in
5 addition,the fair useargumentis immaterialto Elcomsoft'sdefense. As this Court has
6 previouslyobserv~ fair useis an affirmative defenseto a claim of copyright infringement. See
7 ReligiousTechnologyCenterv. NetcomOn-line CommunicationServices,Inc., 923 F. Supp.
8 1231,1242-43(N.D. Ca!. 1995);seealso Campbellv.Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510U.S. 569, 590
9 (1994)(statingthat fair useis an affinnative defenseto an infringementclaim); Harper & Row,
1.0 Publishers.,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,417 U.S. 539 (1985) (same).
11 Fair useis nota defenseto a 1201(b)charge. In Corley, the SecondCircuit notedthat

1.2 while "the DMCA targetsthe circumventionof digital walls guardingcopyrightedmaterial(and
1.3 trafficking in circumventiontools), [it] doesnot concernitself with the useof thosematerials
1t after circumventionhasoccurred." 273 F.3d at 443. Thereforethe "alleged importanceof [the
lS circumventingdevice] to certainfair usesof encryptedcopyrightedmaterial [i]s immaterialto . .
1.6 statutoryliability" underSection1201(b)0[doat 4420Seealso Melville Nimmer & David
1.7 Nimmer,Nimmer on Copyright §§ 12A.06[B][3], 12A.18[C] (2001). BecauseElcomsofthas
1.8 beenchargedundersections1201(b)and 1204,which bar trafficking in a circumvention
19 technologyand do not concerncopyrightinfringement,Elcomsoftwastesits breatharguinga fair
20 usedefenseto a fictional charge.
21 3. Although the Court Need Not Reach the Issue, Sections1201(b)and
1204 are Consistentwith Fair Use.
22
a. Fair useis not a static doctrine.
23
Fair useis ajudicially createddoctrinethat "limits the exclusiveright of a copyright
24
holderby pennitting othersto makelimited useof portionsof the copyrightedwork, for
25
appropriatepurposes,free of liability for copyrightinfringement." Universal City Studios,Inc. v.
26
Reimerdes,111F. Supp.2d 294,321 (S.D.N.Y 2000). Seegenerally Campbellv. Acuff-Rose
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 25
1. Music,Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Although someregardfair useashaving Constitutional
2 underpinnings,no court hasheld that fair useis a Constitutionaldoctrine. SeeCorley, 273 F.3d
3 at 458 ("[T]he SupremeCourt hasneverheld that fair useis constitutionallyrequired."). Until
4. enactmentof the 1976Copyright Act, fair useexistedonly at commonlaw. Congressintended
5 thenew Section107definition of fair useto maintainthe statusquo. 17U.S.C. § 107;H.R. Rep.
6 94-1476,at 66 (1976). While it providesguidelines,the statuterefrains from establishing
7 bright-line rules on what constitutesfair use,reflecting the notion that "the courtsmust be free to
8 adoptthe doctrineto particular situationson a case-by-case
basis." H.R. Rep.No. 94-1476,at
9 65-66(1976). Seealso Campbellv. Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (noting
10 that the statutedoesnot createbright-line rules). Congressexplicitly craftedthe statuteto avoid
1.1. "freez[ing] the doctrinein the statute,especiallyduring a period of rapid technologicalchange."
12 H.R. Rep.94-1476,at 65-66 (1976). Congresssoughtto establisha doctrinethat, though

1.3 codified,was neverthelessflexible enoughto respondto changingneedsof society.
1.4 b. Copyright owners do not have an affirmative
oblieation to Rrovide meansfor fair use of works.
15
While the fair usedoctrine immunizescertainusesof protectedworks from infringement
1.6
claims,no elementof the doctrineguarantees
usersthe meansfor exploiting the fair use.
1.7
Therefore,fair useallows a researcherto quotelines from a copyrightedwork, but it doesnot
18
guaranteethe researcherthe ability to cut-and-pastethe text from a digital copy, eventhoughthat
19
might be more efficient that typing out the lines by hand. As JudgeNewmanemphaticallystated
20
in Corley,
21
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as
22 protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution,
guaranteescopying by the optimum method or in the identical
23 format of the original Fair use has never been held to be a
guaranteeof accessto copyrighted material in order to copy it by
24 the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the original.
25 273 F.3d 429,459 (2ndCir. 2001). Applying this notion to the circumventionofDVD access
26 controls,JudgeNewmanconcludedthat "[t]he fact that the resulting copy will not be asperfect
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 26
1 or asmanipulableasa digital copy obtainedby havingdirect accessto the DVD movie in its
2 digital fornl, providesno basisfor a claim of unconstitutionallimitation of fair use."Id. at 459.
3 Digital technologyfacilitatesaccessto copyrightedworks, but it doesnot follow that our
4 right to exploit fair useshouldbe necessarilyexpanded.Fair use saysonly that you may freely
5 makea certainuseof a protectedwork. The doctrinedoesnot promisethe ability to exercisethat
6 fair useright by the most expedientmethodavailable. A law that proscribescircumventionof a
7 protectivedevicedoesnot constrainthe freedomto makelegitimate,fair useof a copyrighted
8 work. SeeCorley, 273 F.3d at 458-59.
9 c. The DMCA exolicitly accountsfor fair use.
1.0 The DMCA reflectsampleconcernfor the preservationof a robustconceptof fair use.
11 The legislativehistory of the Act is rife with discussionof how bestto ensureits preservation.
1.2 SeeH.R. Rep. 105-551(ll), at 35-37 (1998). The statutemakesnumerousexplicit allowancesfor
13 traditional fair usesof protectedworks. Specifically,the statutepermitsnonprofit libraries,

1... archives,and educationalinstitutionsto circumventtechnologicalmeasuresin order to decide
1.5 whetherto purchasea copy of a work. It createsan exceptionto the circumventionban for
1.6 activitiessuchasencryptionresearch,securitytesting,reverseengineering,shieldingchildren
17 from inappropriateonline content,andprotectingprivacy interests'.See17U.S.C. §§ 1201(e)-
18 1201(g), 1201(j).
1.9 Evenbeyondthe enactedexemptions,Congressinstituted a "fail-safe" mechanismto

20 assurethat if any significant constraintson fair usedid in fact arisefrom the legislation,they
21. would be addressedand additional,warrantedexemptionsimplemented. Section 1201(a)(I)
22 providesfor a triennial rulemakingreview by the Library of Congressto assesson the basisof
23 evidencecollectedover the three-yearperiod "whetherthe prevalenceof thesetechnological
24 protections,with respectto particularcategoriesof copyrightedmaterials,is diminishing the
25 ability of individuals to usetheseworks in waysthat areotherwiselawful." H.R Rep 105-551
26 (ll), at 37 (1998). Given the proteannatureof the technologiesthat promptedthis legislation,
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 27
1 Congresswisely did not attemptto addresswithin the scopeof the statutoryprovisions every
2 perceivedpotential effect on users' access.
3 d. The AEBPR gro2:ramis not a fair use device.
4 The claims of Elcomsoftand amici that purchasersof ebooksrequirethe AEBPR
5 programto engagein fair usesaremisleadingandwrong.19
6 First, the activities identified by Elcomsoftdo not fall within fair use. For example,
7 making a backupcopyof a literary work su<::h

asan ehookis not the fair usebackupright granted
8 in 17U.S.C. § 117. Section117 appliesonly to computersoftware,not to all digital works such
9 asebooks.20
See17 U.S.C. § 117.In addition,comparingtraditional bookswith ebooks
1.0 demonstrates
the fallacy of the backup-copyclaim; sellersof traditional books do not provide
11 back-upcopiesfor boundbooksthat arelost or damaged.Similarly, Elcomsoft's argumentthat

12 copyrightprotectionmeasuresthat preventa computerfrom readingan ebookaloud improperly
1.3 forbid a fair useis not correct.A copyrightowner'sexclusiverights havealwaysbeendivisible,
14 andthe copyrightownermay apportionrights to different publishersasshewishes. SeeBagdadi

15 v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194,1197(9d1Cir. 1996);Ladd v. Law & TechnologyPress,762 F.2d 809,
1.6 813 n.4 (9thCir. 1985). A copyrightownermay legitimately assignprint and electronicrights to
1.7 different licensees,anda distributor with print rights but not electronicbook rights may not
1.8
19
19See
Memorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to DismissBasedon
20 First Amendmentat 14-16.
21. 2O'fhebackupright in section117is construednarrowly. SeeMicro-SPARC, Inc. v.
22 AmtypeCorp., 592 F. Supp.33 (D. Mass. 1984);Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, 597 F. Supp.5 (N.D.
lli.1983) (holding that a copy of a programembodiedin a ROM is not subjectto the privilege of
23 archivalreproduction). This narrow constructionis appropriategiven that the needfor backup
copiesof computersoftwarearoseat a time when softwarewas largely transferredon floppy
24
disks,which were particularly susceptibleto damagefrom scratching,bending,or demagnetizing.
2S Today,CDs and DVDs are far more reliablemedia,andthe backupneedarticulatedin section
117is essentiallyobviated- or at leastthe risk of damageis no greaterthan the risk that any
26 book or videocassette will be inadvertentlydamaged,and'thedangersto which a printed book is
27 exposedhavenot beendeemedto warrantan archival copy privilege.
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 28
1 distribute electronic books.21 See Greenberg v. Nat'! Geographic Soc., 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th
2 Cir. 2001)(holding that subsequentelectronicpublicationof photographspreviously printed in
3 magazinesconstituteda derivativework andwas not a fair use); RandomHouse,Inc. v. Rosetta
4 Boob, 150F. Supp.2d613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that claim for copyright infringementfor
5 licensingof electronicbooksunlikely to succeedunderlicensefor printed books). Likewise,
6 purchasinga copy of a printed book doesnot entitle a consumerto alsoreceivean audiocopy.
7 The Court shouldnot be misled by the fact that in a digital medium,varying fonnats suchas
8 soundandtext, which in other contextsarenecessarilyseparate,can exist as componentsof a
9 singleproduct. The natureof the divisible rights, however,shouldnot change.22
1.0
1.1. 21Divisibilityis especiallyrelevantin the digital realm,where licensingparticularrights,

ratherthan selling a copy of the work, is common. The Court will want to considerthat usersof
12 Adobe'sAcrobateBookReaderandebooksin generalmaybe licensees
- boththereader
softwareandthe electronicbooksthemselvesmay be subjectto a license. While somecourts
1.3
havequestionedthe scopeof theselicenses,the practiceof contractingin copyright rights is
1.4 clearlylegitimate.SeeS.O.S.,Inc. v. Payday,Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087(9th Cir. 1989)(stating
that licenseeinfringes copyright owner'scopyrightby exceedingscopeof the license);Group
1.5 One,Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,Inc., 254 F.3d 1041,1053(Fed.Cir. 2001) (indicating that seller
canrestricttermsof salethrough shrinkwraplicense);Lipscher v. LRP Publications,Inc., 266
1.6
F.3d 1305,1318-19(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that breachof contractclaim is not preemptedby
17 CopyrightAct); ProCD v. Zeidenberg,86 F.3d 1447,1450-53(7th Cir. 1996)(upholdingvalidity
of shrinkwraplicenseunderUCC); AdobeSystemsInc. v. OneStopMicro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d
18 1086(N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that EULA constitutesvalid license). But seeSolimanProducts
1.9 Co.,LLCv. AdobeSystems.Inc., 171F. Supp.2d1075(C.D. Cal. 2001).
20 22Indeed, cautionis warrantedin the digital fair usearenabecausea heavy-handed

requirementthat publishersdistributemultiple typesof rights with a singleproduct could
21 unintentionallysuppressnew productsthat would addressthe needsof consumers(suchas
22 audiblebooks).SeeHarper & Row,Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9
(1985)("Economistswho haveaddressed the issuebelievethe fair useexceptionshouldcome
23 into play only in thosesituationsin which the marketfails or the price the copyright holder
would askis nearzero. . . In the economists'view. permitting 'fair use' to displacenormal
24 copyrightchannelsdisruptsthe copyrightmarketwithout a commensurate public benefit.")
25 (citing T. Brennan, Harper & Row v. TheNation, Copyrightability and Fair Use,Dept. of Justice
EconomicPolicy OfficeDiscussionPaper 13-17(1984); Gordon,Fair Useas Market Failure: A
26 Structural and EconomicAnalysisof theBetamaxCaseand its Predecessors,82 Colum. L. Rev.
1600,1615(1982)). Seealso Diaz Decl. 1 8.d.
27
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 29
1. Second, militating against potential fair use purposes of the AEBPR is the fact that the
2 AEBPR producesnot an exactcopy (or backup)of the original ebookbut a work that is better
3 classifiedas a derivativework. See17U.S.C. § 101(defining derivativework). Making an
4 adaptation or derivative work from a protected work is a right that attaches exclusively to the
5 copyright owner; it is not deemed a fair use of the work. Absent permission from the copyright
6 owner, a person who creates an adaptation or a derivative work engagesin copyright
7 infringement. SeeSonyComputerEnt. Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters,87 F. Supp.2d 976,990 (N.D.

8 Cal. 1999)(finding useof derivativework for commercialpurposeswithout pennissionof
9 copyrightowner is barredby copyrightact); Campbellv. Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
10 593 (1994). The AEBPR programdoesnot simply bypassebookcopyrightprotections;it
1.1. removesthem. The result is not a duplicatecopy of the copyright-protectedebook,but insteada
12 copyof the work in plain-vanilla AdobePDF fonnat. This nakedPDF file, without any
13 restrictionson copying,transferring,andprinting, is not the samework as an ebook file with
14 numerousprotectionsin place.
15 Finally, a legitimateuserof an ebookmay avail herself of substantialfair usesWithout
16 runningafoul of the DMCA, suchaswriting a review of the content,quoting portions of the text,
1.7 readingit aloud, "lending" it to a colleague,and eventaking screenshotsof pages. See17
18 u.s.c.§ 107; SonyComputerEntertainmentAmerica,Inc. v. Bleem,214 F.3d 1022,1026-30

19 (9dtCir. 2000) (determiningthat useof screenshotsof video gamesconstitutedfair use).
20 IV. Sections1201{b}and 1204of the DMCA Comaort with Due Process
21. The Fifth Amendmentto the Constitutionprovidesthat "No person...shall be ...deprived
22 of life, liberty, or property,without dueprocessof law." It is a basicprinciple of suchdue
23 processthat crimina11awsmay not be vaguein their prohibitions. Graynedv. City of Rockford,
24 408 U.S. 104, 108(1972). A law must clearly definewhat is prohibitedbecause:(1) a vaguelaw
25 mayobfuscateratherthanprovide fair warning to thoseseekingto steerclear of unlawful

26
27
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 30
1. conduct;23
and (2) a vaguelaw may encouragearbitraryor discriminatoryenforcementby
2 governmentpersonnel!4[d. The moreimportantaspectof the vaguenessdoctrine "is not actual
3 notice,but the otherprincipal elementof the doctrine-therequirementthat a legislatureestablish

4 minimal guidelinesto governlaw enforcement."Kolenderv. Lawson,461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)
5 (citing Smithv. Goguen,415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974».
6 A. Sections1201(b) and Section 1204Are Not Unconstitutionally Vague as
ARRliedto Elcomsoft
7
In this case,Elcomsofthasbeenchargedwith conspiringto violate and violating two
8
separatelaws. The indictmentallegesthat the companywillfully trafficked in a devicedesigned
9
to circumventcopyrightprotectionin violation of Sections1201(b)(I)(A) and 1204of Title 17,
1.0
andwillfully trafficked in a devicemarketedfor usein circumventingcopyrightprotectionin
11
violation of Sections1201(b)(I)(C) and 1204of Title 17. Much of the two laws that Elcomsoft
12
hasbeenchargedwith violating arethe same: (1) both sharethe sameintroductory language
13
from Section1201(b)that "no personshallmanufacture,import, offer to the public, provide,or
It
otherwisetraffic in anytechnology,product,service,device,component,or part thereof,that-";
lS
and(2) both sharethe samerequirementfrom Section1204that the personmust violate Section
1.6
1201"willfully and for purposesof commercialadvantageor private financial gain... The only
17
distinction between the two laws is that for purposes of 1201(b)(l)(A), the device being
1.8
trafficked in must be "primarily designedor producedfor the purposeof circumventing
19
protectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasurethat effectively protectsa right of a copyright
20
21.
22 2300
Although only constructiveratherthan actualnotice is required,individuals must be
givena reasonableopportunityto discernwhethertheir conductis proscribedso they canchoose
23 whetheror not to comply with the law." Forbesv. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 1011(9thCir.
24 2000)(citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,382 U.S. 399,402-03 (1966)).
2S 2~ere is alsoa concernthat a vaguelaw may causepersonsto avoid constitutionally

protectedspeechin their efforts to steerclear of unlawful conduct,but suchconcernsare
26 addressedunderthe overbreadthdoctrine,which in any eventis not applicableto commercial
27 speech.Village of HoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982). Seeinfra section
ill.A.
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 31
1 owner," andfor purposesof 1201(b)(l)(C), the devicebeing trafficked in must be "marketed[by
2 the defendant]for usein circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasurethat
3 effectivelyprotectsa right of a copyrightowner."
t The Court shouldbegin its analysisof thesesectionsof law with the presumptionthat
5 Sections1201(b)and 1204are constitutional. Forbes,236 F.3d at 1012(applyingpresumption
6 of constitutionalityat outsetof dueprocessanalysisof criminal law challengedfor vagueness).
7 The Court shouldthen extrapolatethe allowablemeaningof the statutefrom the words of the law
8 itself. Grayned,408 U.S. at 110. The Court shouldnot, however,expector require
9 "mathematical certainty from our language" or "meticulous specificity" in the"drafting of the
1.0 statute.[d.
1.1. From the plain language,both sectionsof law containthe following elementsthat the
12 governmentmust prove:
1.3 1 the defendanttrafficked in a technology,product,or device;
1.. 2. the defendantactedwillfully; and
1.5 3. the defendantactedfor purposesof commercialadvantageor private
1.6 financial gain.

1.7 For purposesof 1201(b)(I)(A), the fourth elementthat the governri1entmust prove is:
18 4. the devicebeingtrafficked in was "primarily designedor producedfor the
19 purposeof circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasure
20 that effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner."
21 And, for purposesof 1201(b)(1)(C),the fourth elementthat the governmentmust prove is:
22 4. the devicebeingtrafficked in was "marketed[by the defendant]for usein
23 circumventingprotectionaffordedby a technologicalmeasurethat
24 effectively protectsa right of a copyright owner."
25 These statutoryprovisionsregulatingtrafficking in devices"designed"or "marketed"for
26 a particularpurposearevery similar to the statutoryprovisionsanalyzedby the SupremeCourt in
27 Villageof HoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982),and the Court's analysisin this case

GROUNDS
[CR 01-20i38] [RMW] 32
1. shouldfollow the reasoningadoptedby the SupremeCourt in that case. In Flipside, the owners
2 of a retail storeclaimedthat a village criminal ordinancemaking it unlawful to distributeitems
3 "designedor marketedfor use" with unlawful drugswithout a licensewas unconstitutionally

4 vaguein its applicationto the plaintiff's saleof lawful materialssuchas"pipes, water pipes,
5 pins, an herb sifter, mirrors, vials, rolling papers,andtobaccosnuff." The plaintiffs claimedthat
6 the statutewas too vaguebecauseit did not identify with sufficient particularity the type of
7 merchandisethat the village was attemptingto regulateunderthe untbrellaphrase"designedor
8 marketedfor use." [d. at 500.
9 The Supreme Court concluded that the language "designed or marketed for use" was not
1.0 vague in its application to the retailer primarily becausethe phrase "designed for use" would, to a
1.1. businesspersonof ordinaryintelligence,refer to "the designof the manufacturer,not the intent
1.2 of the retailer or customer,"and the alternative"marketedfor use" standardcontaineda scienter

3.3 requirementand clearly encompassed
"a retailer's intentionaldisplay andmarketingof
14 merchandise."[d. at 502. Seealso Posters'N' Things,Ltd. v. United States,511 U.S. 513 (1994)
lS ("primarily intended... for use" drug law not unconstitutionallyvague);RichmondBoro Gun
16 Club v. City of New York,97 F.3d 681,685-86 (2ndCir. 1996)("designed"for usegun law not
1.7 unconstitutionally vague).
1.8 In this case,the samestandardsexist: the phrase"designedfor use" presentin the fourth
1.9 elementof section1201(b)(l)(A), shouldbe readon its faceto refer to "the designof the
20 manufacturer,not the intent of the retaileror customer." Seeid. Likewise, with regardto the
21 phrase"marketedfor use" presentin the fourth elementof section 120I(b)(I)(C), this Court
22 shouldfind that the scienterrequirementandthe expresslanguageof the statutemakeclearthat
23 the provision is applicableto the defendant'sintentional"marketing of merchandise."Seeid.
24 B. Elcomsoft's Due ProcessAreuments Fail
25 Elcomsoft's argumentsthat Sections1201(b)and 1204are unconstitutionallyvagueas
26 appliedin this caseare flawed for the following reasons:
27 1 Elcomsoft'~primary argumentis that the statuteimpennissibly
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 33
1. encompasses
Elcomsoft's conducfs regardlessof whetherthe company'spurposein making and
2 selling the AEBPR was "to allow unlawfi41distribution of copyrightedworks" or to "allow a
3 lawful owner to havemore freedomto readthe book how and/orwherethe owner wanted.,,26
4 That argumentmissesthe point of a proceduraldueprocessvaguenesschallenge;the analysisof
5 a law regulatingdistribution of devicesdoesnot focuson whetherthe underlyingconductfor
6 which the devicesareusedis unlawful or lawful, but whetherthe statuteclearly defines
7 prohibitedconduct. Seeid. at 497 n.9 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governorof Maryland, 437 U.S.
8 117, 124-25(1978) (noting that an objectionto a law that would "inhibit innocentusesof items
9 foundto be covered"by the law would be a substantivedue processchallengeratherthan a
1.0 proceduraldue processchallenge,andconcludingin any eventthat sucha claim would haveno
11 merit because"[ r]egulationof items that havesomelawful aswell asunlawful usesis not an
1.2 irrational meansof discouraging"the unlawful uses».
1.3 2. Elcomsoftalsoarguesthat the absenceora scienterprovision in 1201(b)

1~ and 1204as appliedto Elcomsoftweighsin favor of a finding ofvagueness!7 Aside from the
1.5 fact that a scienterelementis not essentialin overcomingvagueness,the suggestionthat the
1.6 statutedoesnot containany scienterrequirementis incorrect. Section 1204requiresthe
1.7 governmentto prove that Elcomsoftacted"willfully," which in this circuit, requiresthe
1.8
19
2SA constitutionaldueprocessvaguenesschallengemay be madeto the facial application
20 of a statuteor to the applicationof the statuteto the factsof the particular case. Flipside, 455
21 U.S. at 494. While a bit unclearfrom the text of the argument,the Table of Contentsin
Elcomsoft'sMotion to Dismiss Indictmentfor Violation of Due Process(Section111-"AS
22 APPLIED TO ELCOMSOFf") clarifies that the company'smotion is only an as applied
challenge.In any event,becausea party "who engagesin someconductthat is clearly proscribed
23 cannotcomplainof the vaguenessof the law asappliedto the conductof others,"the government
24 will respondonly to the argumentthat Sections1201(b)and 1204violate due processasapplied
to Elcomsoft.Id. at 495; Melugin v. Hames,38 F.3d 1478,1486(9thCir. 1994).
25
26ElcomsoftMotion to DismissIndictmentfor Violation of Due Processat 4,16
26 (e(I1phasis
in original).
27
27Elcomsoft
Motion to DismissIndictmentfor Violation of Due Processat 18.
GROUNDS
[CR 01-20138][RMW] 34
1 governmentto provethat the companyacted"voluntarily and intentionally, and not through
2 ignorance,mistakeor accident." UnitedStatesv. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1036(9thCir. 1997)
3 (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructionsfor the Ninth Circuit, Section5.05 (1995».
4 Seealso Posters 'N'Things, Ltd. v. UnitedStates,511 U.S. at 519 (discussingobjectivescienter
5 element rooted in language "primarily intended ... for use"). The presence of this scienter
6 element eliminates the concern that a statute will trap those who act in good faith. Colautti v.
7 Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); Screwsv. UnitedStates,325 U.S. 91,102 (1945) (plurality
8 opinion) (holding that "requirementthat act must be willful or purposeful... doesrelieve [a
9 criminal] statuteof the objection that it punisheswithout warning an offenseof which the
1.0 accusedwas unaware.");BoyceMotor Lines v. UnitedStates,342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952)
1.1. (upholdingcriminal law againstvagueness

challengebecause"statuteonly punishesthosewho
12 knowingly violate the Regulation.

1.3 CONCLUSION
1.4 For the foregoingreasons,the governmentrespectfullyrequeststhe Court deny defendant
15 Elcomsoft'smotionsto dismissthe indictment.

16
17 DATED: March 4, 2002 Respectfullysubmitted,
1.8 DAVID W. SHAPIRO
United StatesAttorney
1.9
20
21. SC
As
22
23
~~~
24
ASsistantUnited StatesAttorney
25
26
27
TO DISMISS ON CONSTrruTIONAL
GROUNDS
[CROl-20138] [RMW] 35
1
2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
U.S. v. ELCOM LTD.. a/k/a ELCOMSOFT
3 CR-Ol-20138(RMW)
4
I, Lauri Gomez,declarethat I am a citizen of the United States,over the ageof 18 yearsand
5
not a party to the within action.
6
I herebycertify that a copy of the foregoing:
7
1. UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO
8 DISMISS THE INDICTMENT BASED ON FIRST AMENDMENT AND
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
9
was servedtoday- by hand;-X- by facsimile;- by FederalExpress-X- by first class
10
!mail by placing a true copy of eachsuchdocument(s)in a sealedenvelopewith postagethereonfully
11
Inaid,eitherin a U.S. Mail mailbox or in the designatedareafor outgoingU.S. Mail in accordance
12
with the Donna!practiceof the United StatesAttorney's Office; by placing in the Public
13
Defender'spickup box locatedin the U.S. District Courthouseand addressedto the following
14
Counselof Record:
15
JOSEPH BURTON, ESQ. CINDY COHN
16 Duane, Morris & Hecksher LLP ElectronicFrontier Foundation
100 Spear Street, Suite 1500 454 Shotwell Street
SanFrancisco,California 94105
17 !Fax: San Francisco~California 94110
(415) 371-2201 Fax: (415) 436-9993
18 !Phone:(415) 371-2214 Phone:(415) 436-9333ext. 104
19 JOHN KEKER. ESQ. JULIE COHEN

Keker & VanNest Professorof Law
20 710 SansomeStreet 600 New JerseyAvenue,N.W.
SanFrancisco,California 94111-1704 WashingtonD.C. 20001
21 It'ax: (415) 397-7188 Fax: (202) 662-9411
!Phone:(415) 391-5400 Phone:(202) 662-9871
22
23
24 I declareunderpenaltyof perjury that the foregoingis true and correct,and that this certificate
was executedat SanJose,California.
25
!DATED: March 4,2002
26
/'
LegAlSecretary
~

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1.0 UNrI'l!.l) STATESDISTRICf COURT

1.4 UllfuED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CROl-20138 RMW

17 ll. CongressProperlyEnactedSections1201(b) and 1204of the DMCA Pursuantto the

21. B. CongressMay Act Pursuantto the CommerceClauseto ProtectRights Granted

2 The AEBPR in ObjectCodeForm Is Not Speech. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19

7 Sections1201(b)and 1204Furtheran ImportantGovernmentInterest. 23

12 1. ElcomsoftDoesNot Have Standingto AssertFair Use on

1.6 3. Although the Court NeedNot Reachthe Issue,Sections1201(b)and 1204

21. Appliedto Elcomsoft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 31

17 4805 ConvoyInc. v. City of SonDiego, 183F.3d 1108(9thCir. 1999) 16,17

23 455 U.S. 489 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17,31,32-33,34

2 Name.Space,Inc. v. Network Solutions,Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (200Cir. 2000) 19

14 UniversalCity Studios,Inc. v. Reimerdes,

18 Campbellv. Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510U.S. 569 (1994) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26

20 923 F. Supp.1231(N.D. Cat. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2 Lipscherv. LRPPublications, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305(11thCir. 2001) 29

3 ProCD v. Zeidenberg,86 F.3d 1447(7d1Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29

4 AdobeSystemsInc. v. OneStopMicro, Inc., 84 F. Supp.2d1086(N.D. Ca!. 2000) . . . . . . .. 29

5 SoftmanProductsCo.,LLC v. AdobeSystems,Inc., 171F. Supp.2d1075(C.D. Ca!. 2001) .. 29

6 Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters,

7 87 F. Supp.2d976 (N.D. Ca!. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30

8 SonyComputerEntertainmentAmerica,Inc. v. Bleem,214 F.3d 1022(9d1Cir. 2000) . . . .. 30

1.0 Kolenderv. Lawson,461U.S.352(1983) 31

1.S Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . .. 33

1.6 ExxonCorp. v. Governorof Maryland, 437 U.S. 117(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34

1.7 Melugin v. Hames,38 F.3d 1478(9thCir. 1994) 34

1.8 UnitedStatesv. Morales, 108F.3d 1031(9thCir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 35

6 RecordRentalAmendmentof 1984,Pub.L. No. 98-450,98 Stat. 1727

7 (codifiedat 17V.S.C.§ 109) 7

12 17U.S.C.§ 107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26,30

16 H.R Rep. 105-551(II) (1998) 9,11,12,13,27

2 Music to ComputerSoftware.Can CopyrightStill Be Protected?The Economist,July 27.

1.1. Cases,.48 DUke L.J. 147 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20,21

11 incidentalprotectedexpressionwas involved, sections1201(b)and 1204arenarrowly tailoredto

20 Declarationof AlexanderKatalov in Supportof Motion to Dismiss Indictmentfor Violations of

8 d. The publishercanchoosewhetherto permit an ebookto be readaudibly

25 Ilronically, like the ebooksfor which it providedcircumventiontechnology,Elcomsoft

28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS

2 Elcomsoft'sAEBPR programwho soughtto useit to circumventprotectionson an ebookthey

3 hadpurchasedhadpurchasedthe ebooksubjectto an EULA. Id. One suchEULA includedthe

28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS

1.2 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

13 requirementof private financial gain). Congressenactedthe DMCA after many yearsof

28 GOV'T OPP.TO MonONS

2 As a result of thesejoint domesticand internationalefforts, Congressenactedthe DMCA

12 nascentmarketfor electroniccommerce,andmore particularly, electroniccommercein

4 onceit is accessed.SeeS. Rep. 105-190,11-12(1998).

21 SElcomsoftMemorandumof PointsandAuthorities in Supportof Motion to Dismiss

12 morethanintellectualproperty- It defineswhetherconsumersandbusinessesmay engagein

1.5 potential. "}

18 regulateCommercewith foreign Nations,and amongthe severalStates,andwith the Indian

21 maybe exercisedto its utmost extent,andacknowledgesno limitations, other than areprescribed

23 Ogden,9 Wheat. 1, 196(1824». As definedby the SupremeCourt, the terDl"commerce"as

28 GOV'T OPP.TO MOTIONS

15 the legislationas"paracopyright"legislationthat could be enactedunderthe CommerceClause.

18 PropertyClause,becauseCongress'fundamentalmotivation was to protectrights grantedunder

20 intellectualpropertylaws regulatingthe useof infonnation borderon unenforceablein the digital

4 the statute proscribes "spoken words" or conduct that is "patently 'expressive or

5 communicative." or integralto, or commonlyassociatedwith expression. Roulettev. City of

11 City of Las Vegas,154F.3d 1097,1100(9thCir. 1998». "[ A] facial freedomof speechattack

2 commercialadvantageor private financial gain). The statutetargetsmany forms of technology,