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Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?

Nathalie Tocci

Online Publication Date: 01 April 2005

To cite this Article Tocci, Nathalie(2005)'Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?',South European Society and

Politics,10:1,73 83
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13608740500037973
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608740500037973

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South European Society & Politics

Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 7383

Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger

or Anchor for Reform?

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Nathalie Tocci

Since late 2001, successive Turkish governments have pursued an ongoing and
unprecedented process of domestic political reform. Given the correlation between political
reforms and relations with the EU, this process of change has been associated with
Turkeys Europeanization. This article analyzes the link between Turkeys reform process
and its path to EU accession. Did the accession process trigger the reforms as an external
force driving internal change; or has domestic change been spearheaded by domestic actors
that have used and been strengthened by the external EU anchor? What appears to be in
the making is a process of change largely driven by endogenous factors, whose precise form
and timing is intricately linked with the launch of Turkeys accession process.
Keywords: Turkey; Europeanization; Democratization; Human Rights; Accession Process

Particularly since late 2001, successive Turkish governments, supported by large

parliamentary majorities, have pursued an ongoing and unprecedented process of
domestic political reform. This is not to say that the reforms adopted are flawless and
complete. Less still that the reforms are all effectively respected and implemented by
the relevant actors within the Turkish state and society. Yet what appears irrefutable is
that an important process of progressive and democratic change is in the making; and
that such a change is the most extensive of Turkeys Republican history.
More specifically, in October 2001 under the former coalition government led by
Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved 34 constitutional
amendments, most of them in the area of human rights.1 These were followed by a set
of seven harmonization packages passed in 2001 2003, which amended the laws in the
Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law that were most commonly used in restricting
human, cultural and political rights.2 The first two packages concentrated on the
freedoms of expression and association. The extensive third harmonization package
abolished the death penalty and lifted the ban on broadcasting and education in
ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/13608740500037973

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languages other than Turkish. The fourth and fifth packages amended the Law on
Political Parties, increased penalties for torture crimes, expanded the freedom of the
press and freedom of association and allowed for retrials of cases contrary to ECHR
judgements. The two packages passed in July 2003 extended freedom of speech and
association, increased the civilianization of the (previously military-dominated)
National Security Council (MGK) and extended cultural, religious and linguistic
rights. A further set of constitutional amendments (amending ten articles) was passed
in May 2004.3 The amendments further enshrined the abolition of capital punishment,
strengthened gender equality, provided for the civilianization of the Higher Education
Board (YOK) and abolished the infamous State Security Courts. This was followed by
an eighth harmonization package in June 2004, which implemented the second set of
constitutional amendments. There has also been a new Law on Associations (July
2004), a legislative package Reforming Public Administration (July 2004), a Law on
Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts (July 2004) and a new Penal
Code which, amongst other matters, strengthened womens rights (September 2004).
Particularly since 2003, the Turkish government has also appreciated the need to
ensure the effective implementation of the new laws. The government has thus
established human rights boards in major towns and cities, responsible for handling
human rights complaints. In Ankara, a Reform Monitoring Group has been set up to
monitor compliance with the legal reforms and overcome bureaucratic inertia. The
Board includes representatives of several ministries and government departments.
The authors in this File observe that the reform process coincided with the initiation
of Turkeys EU accession course. Steps towards democratic change were made before
the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, which accorded Turkey EU candidacy.
However, until then, reforms had been largely superficial and ad hoc. They did not
represent a fully-fledged and committed programme of democratic transformation.
Given the correlation between political reforms and relations with the EU, this process
of change has been associated with Turkeys Europeanization (or EUization). In other
words, this latest phase of Turkeys democratization has been linked to the countrys
European integration. The meaning of Europeanization has tended to vary according
to the specific context in which it has been applied. In the present File, Diez,
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber observe that in all its applications, Europeanization is
about the construction and spread of what come to be regarded as European norms
regarding particular policies, political procedures or societal self-definitions.
The paragraphs below analyze and attempt to disentangle the link between Turkeys
reform process and its path to EU accession. More specifically, did the accession
process cause or trigger the reforms in Turkey as an external force driving if not
imposing internal change? Or can domestic change be explained better by the
interaction between internal and external factors, whereby the external EU anchor was
perceived and used by internal actors to gain sufficient strength and credibility to
advance domestic reforms? This question also links to the distinction made by Diez,
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber in this File between policy Europeanization and political
Europeanization. In other words, can Turkeys domestic change be explained more by

South European Society & Politics 75

the policy responses of the requirements of EU accession, or have policies altered as a

result of a prior change in domestic institutions and the context in which they operate?
These two mechanisms of change are closely interrelated. Nonetheless, this article
attempts to pinpoint the principal causal avenues underlying Turkeys process of
domestic reform.

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The EU as External Trigger for Reform

For the Turkish political as well as military elites, EU membership was the natural
corollary of the modernization and westernization movement pioneered by Ataturk in
the 1920s (see Heper in this issue). Hence, the 1987 application for membership and
the lip-service paid by virtually all actors within the Turkish establishment to the
desirability of EU accession. However, in expressing a strong and persistent aspiration
to become an EU member state, Turkey had to commit itself to the criteria for entry,
that is, the Copenhagen criteria. In particular the fulfilment of the Copenhagen
political criteria, necessary for an initiation of Turkeys accession negotiations, entailed
a radical departure from the status quo in the country.
Like other candidates, Turkey has received annual Commission Progress Reports,
which review the domestic developments pertinent to the compliance with EU
criteria.4 EU criteria in turn are also grounded upon the laws and norms of other panEuropean organizations such as the Council of Europe. With the recognition of
Turkeys candidacy, Turkey also received its first Accession Partnership in March 2001
(Council of Ministers of the European Union 2001). The Accession Partnership set out
a list of short and medium-term priorities that Turkey was expected to address in
order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. The Accession Partnership was revised in
March 2003, based on the reviews of the 2001 and 2002 Progress Reports (European
Council 2003). In response, Turkey adopted a National Programme (in March 2001,
and then revised in July 2003), which set out the extent and means through which
Turkey intended to address EU priorities. The National Programme was cited as the
justification for the governments proposed (and then adopted) constitutional
amendments and reform packages.
A straightforward explanation of domestic change in Turkey would be the linear
relationship, driven by EU conditionality, between externally demanded conditions
that are accepted domestically by adopting policy (constitutional, legal and
administrative) reforms. Yet a set of reasons suggests that such a linear relationship
does not and probably could not in itself drive an extensive reform process in Turkey
(or indeed in any other country).
The Costs of Compliance
A key aspect in the success of EU conditionality concerns the perceived costs of
demanded conditions. When domestic decision makers consider the costs of
compliance higher than the rewards, then the latter are likely to default on the

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conditions.5 This is frequently the case when conditions touch upon what are viewed
as existential questions impinging on the countrys national security. In the case of
Turkey, many of the reforms affecting human, cultural and minority rights are viewed
by many domestic actors as too costly to enact for the sake of an externally imposed
condition. For example, when the civil war between the Turkish state and the separatist
PKK was raging in the southeast in the 1980s and 1990s, calls for the extension of
cultural rights in line with EU standards largely went unheard by successive Turkish
governments.
The problem is exacerbated by what is commonly referred to as the Sevre`s
syndrome in Turkey, that is, the belief that in the legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sevre`s,
western powers are inclined to sponsor hostile neighbours (for example, Greece) or
ethnic minorities (for example, the Kurds) to dismember Turkey. In other words, the
cost of compliance is perceived to be excessively high because reforms are demanded
externally by EU member states and institutions. According to several actors in Turkey,
Europe, rather than acting as a security provider, has used a human rights discourse
to threaten Turkeys security.
The launch of Turkeys accession process slowly began to transform these negative
dynamics. While underlying mistrust of European attitudes and intentions is slow to
disappear, Turkeys candidacy symbolically demonstrated a European readiness to
contribute, through inclusion, to Turkeys stability and security. However, a necessary
reassessment of the costs of compliance with EU political conditions, can only occur
through a process of endogenous change. Only when the majority of Turkish actors
come to view democratic practice as the only long-term guarantee of Turkish
security, rather than as a threat, will the equation underpinning EU conditionality
transform.
The Value of the Benefits
While costs lie on one side of the coin, the perceived value of the benefits lies on the
other. The perceived value depends both on the objective elements offered in the EU
contract and on the subjective assessment of those benefits. Regarding the objective
elements of the contract, the equation was radically transformed at and after the
Helsinki European Council. The recognition of Turkeys candidacy opened the way to
Turkeys EU accession path. However, the formal as well as the effective gap between
Turkey and the other candidate states remained. While all other candidates had a
roadmap for accession and clear indications of their future roles in EU institutions,
Turkey had neither. Furthermore, although it gained the formal title of EU candidate,
in practice its integration with the Union was not immediately and significantly
enhanced. The decision formally to include Turkey in the accession process in 1999
was initially mainly a symbolic, albeit important, gesture.
The process began to acquire more tangible significance by 2001, with the adoption
of Turkeys Accession Partnership and the increase in EU financial assistance to Turkey.
The gap between EU aid to the CEECs and to Turkey was and remained remarkable

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South European Society & Politics 77

(Avci 2001). However, by 2001 the Commission presented a single financial framework
regulating financial assistance to Turkey, including pre-accession credit facilities,
MEDA and customs union assistance, as well as European Investment Bank loans. Preaccession aid was increased further at the December 2002 Copenhagen European
Council.
The next critical step in Turkeys accession process was taken at the 2002
Copenhagen Council meeting. The European Council deemed that Turkey did not yet
fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. Yet it decided to review the situation in
December 2004. If by then, on the basis of the Commission Progress Reports, the
European Council considered Turkey to have met the criteria, accession negotiations
would be opened without delay (European Council 2002, para. 19). The 2004
Commission Progress Report and Recommendation on Turkey indeed advised that, in
view of the sufficient fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria in Turkey,
accession negotiations should be opened (Commission of the EC 2004a, 2004b).
Nevertheless, EU ambiguity vis-a`-vis Turkeys membership persists, questioning the
credibility and thus the perceived value of Turkeys accession process. EU actors have
increasingly voiced their (non-Copenhagen criteria related) concerns about Turkeys
accession. These have included Turkeys size, demographic growth and level of
economic development (with evident concerns over Turkish immigration to western
Europe), as well as Turkeys location bordering the volatile Middle East and Caucasus.
Other groups, and most vociferously members of Christian Democratic/Conservative
parties, have been openly sceptical of Turkeys membership due to the countrys
different culture and religion. In its 2004 Recommendation and Impact Study on
Turkey, the Commission both advised starting accession negotiations with Turkey and
highlighted the gains from Turkeys accession. However, not least due to the challenges
arising from Turkeys accession, the Commission overemphasized the open-ended
and long-term nature of the accession process, the possibility of halting the
negotiations, and, perhaps most problematic of all, the prospect of permanent
restrictions on the free movement of persons from Turkey into the rest of the EU
(Commission of the EC 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
This does not mean that the Commission and the member states secretly decided
against Turkeys membership and have used the Copenhagen criteria as a pretext to
fend Turkey off. Yet the very existence of an ongoing debate on the desirability of
Turkeys membership is understandably received in Turkey as evidence of the lack of a
clear and consistent EU strategy and commitment. This in turn reduces the perceived
objective value of promised EU benefits.
Apart from the objective value of membership, equally important is the subjective
appreciation of EU-related benefits. Subjective evaluations vary according to different
domestic actors. Domestic actors have different aims, strategies and tactics, driven by
different interests, visions and self-identifications. As such, their assessment of the
Union differs. For example, Heper quotes the statements by Tuncer Klnc, Secretary
General of the National Security Council, arguing that Turkey should consider
alternative alliances with Russia and Iran. To nationalists or euro-sceptics, EU

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N. Tocci

accession, far from representing a valuable gain, may be considered a threat, reducing
rather than increasing incentives to reform. Hence, while the initiation of an accession
process was pivotal in the launch of an internal reform process, without the rising
strength of genuinely pro-European and reformist domestic forces, reforms were
bound to remain limited, superficial and inconsequential. This in turn is linked to
what Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber have defined as the Europeanization of
identities: Turkeys accession process is viewed as valuable by domestic actors to the
extent that their conceptions of Europe and the EU resonate with their ideas about the
Turkish nation and its desirable evolution.

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Time Inconsistency
A third and related problem of EU conditionality is that of time inconsistency. Particularly
within the accession process, expected reforms are demanded in the short and medium
term, but the actual delivery of the benefits (that is, membership) occurs in the long term.
The process is front-loaded with obligations and back-loaded on the delivery of the
benefits. This generates two sets of problems. First, and related to the discussion regarding
the value of benefits, expected long-term gains are valued less than short-term ones. The
unpredictability of the long term reduces the value of the benefit and in turn the incentives
for reform. Time inconsistency may also induce domestic policy makers to delay reforms
until the delivery of the benefit is closer. This may be particularly true when reforms are
considered risky and potentially threatening to national security. EU membership can be
viewed as a means to hedge against risk, due to the security guarantees embedded in
accession. As such, candidate countries may be reluctant to pass reforms until the
prospects of membership are closer and surer.
In the case of Turkey, even if accession negotiations begin in 2005, membership itself is
expected to occur at least a decade later. Turkey needs to pass and implement fundamental
reforms and complete 31 chapters of negotiations over the acquis communautaire. For its
part, the EU needs to ratify and implement its new constitution. Most critically, it must
absorb at least 12 new member states (the ten new members as at May 2004, plus Romania
and Bulgaria), if not more (Croatia and Macedonia if not the rest of the Western Balkans).
In its Recommendation, the Commission has made explicit that the long-run would be
after 2014, due to the need to revise the EUs financial perspectives then. In other words,
the expected delivery of the conditional benefits to Turkey remains in the distant future.
The uncertainty of the process, due both to its timing and to the developments that will
unfold in the meantime, inevitably affects Turkeys incentives to engage in difficult
reforms in the short-term.
The EUs Limited Influence: Timing, Condition Specification, and Monitoring Capability
Another limit inherent in EU conditionality is the extent to which institutions can
induce precise reforms at a sustained pace. Current EU positions have identified the
need for candidates to respect the Copenhagen political criteria before accession

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South European Society & Politics 79

negotiations are opened. However, the watersheds of the two key decisions of opening
accession negotiations and admitting a candidate to the Union also imply a limited EU
ability to induce reforms, particularly in the political domain (that is, reforms that are
largely unrelated to the negotiating chapters of the acquis) at a sustained pace during
the (long) period of EU accession negotiations. The Commissions Recommendation
proposed that despite the opening of accession negotiations, the EU should continue
to monitor political reforms. Through the revised Accession Partnerships, the Union
would update the short and medium-term priorities that Turkey should follow. The
Commission also stated that reforms could be suspended in the event of a reversal of
the reform process. However, it did not explain how the ongoing monitoring process
could be linked to the successive opening of negotiating chapters, and thus how
conditionality could be exerted consistently throughout the period of negotiations.
Moreover, many of the EUs demanded reforms are vaguely defined. When are human
rights respected? When is a country fully democratic? Human rights violations and
features of undemocratic practice, racism and xenophobia exist within the EU as well as
outside it. The fulfilment of criteria is rarely clear-cut and often a question of degree. Most
critically, there is a lack of a precise legal definition or of a homogenous practice in the
respect of minority rights within the Union. In principle, minority rights are part of the
Copenhagen political criteria. Yet in reality, the EU legal framework does not have
adequate instruments to assure the protection of these rights. On the contrary, the
emphasis in EU law is on individual human rights, which in some instances may contrast
with the protection of minorities (de Witte 2002). Within EU law there is neither an
attempt to define minority rights, nor a concrete mechanism to ensure their protection
(Hughes and Sasse 2003). In practice, there is also a significant discrepancy among the
minority policies of different EU member states. Most notably, France and Greece do not
recognize the existence of minorities within its borders. These practices are flagged by
Turkish officials as evidence of EU double standards.
The problem is further exacerbated by the European Commissions method of
monitoring compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Monitoring essentially takes place
through the annual drafting of the Commission Progress Reports. For its information about
developments on the ground, the Commission relies on its delegation in Ankara, as well as
on member state embassies and human rights organizations. The Reports indeed provide an
adequate general picture of ongoing developments. However, the sources of information are
insufficient to provide a comprehensive as well as detailed analysis of precise events.
The EU as an External Anchor for Domestic Actors Pursuing Reforms
Underlying the articles in this File is a far more subtle argument about the mechanisms
of domestic change in Turkey. Change occurred and is occurring not simply because it
is imposed from the outside, but also because it interacts with domestic developments
on the inside. The authors present three inter-related strands of this argument.
Muftuler Bac mentions the re-alignment within Turkish domestic politics in favour of
more progressive forces. Connected to this, Goksel and Gunes, Rumelili, and Diez,

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Agnantopoulos and Kaliber refer to the rising credibility and empowerment of civil
society actors pushing for democratization as well as Greek Turkish rapprochement.
Finally, Heper refers to an independent self-reassessment of the role of other domestic
actors such as the military. Let us delve deeper into these arguments.

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The Re-Alignment in Domestic Politics: The Rise of the AKP

In discussing the re-alignment of domestic politics in Turkey, a key feature has been
the rising power of the AK party through and since its landslide victory in the 3
November 2002 elections. The AKP governments commitment to political reforms
and EU accession has both important interest and ideology-related explanations.
Beginning with interests, a commitment to reform and EU accession is viewed as the
most effective means for the AKP to raise its legitimacy and shed its Islamist past vis-a`vis the international community and the secular establishment in Turkey.
Furthermore, democratic reform and EU accession is considered to be the best
guarantee for the AKPs political survival. The AKPs predecessors (which were far
more Islamist in nature) were successively banned by the Constitutional Court for
allegedly threatening the secular nature of the Republic.
A commitment to reform and EU accession is also part of the AKPs political ideology.
The AKP refuses to define itself as an Islamic party but rather calls for greater religious
freedoms. In order to carry a consistent political message it advocates personal freedoms
in other spheres as well, including in the cultural and linguistic domains. Its support for
EU membership is not only viewed as an end to be attained through painful reforms. In
the AKPs rhetoric, the EU anchor is also portrayed as a means of attaining the objectives
of reform, which are as important as membership itself. Indeed government officials have
repeatedly dubbed the Copenhagen criteria as the Ankara criteria.6
Paraphrasing Muftuler-Bac, yesterdays conservatives have become todays reformers,
whereas the most vociferous critics of the current reforms speak in the name of the
twentieth century Republican project. Behind this statement is the idea that on the one
hand, todays reform process while being supported by the more liberal elements of the
establishment, is being spearheaded by the exponents of a previously religious-based and
anti-establishment party. It is also supported by other anti-establishment groups such as
pro-Kurdish organizations and parties. On the other hand, resistance to change has come
from the most conservative elements of the establishment. These have included exponents
from the nationalist right and the nationalist left in both the civilian and military
establishments. The rhetoric of these critics has been marked by an unwavering resistance
to altering the status quo, for fear that this would undermine the Republican project
inspired and initiated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
The Role of Civil Society
An increasing credibility of Turkeys EU accession process has also served to raise the
credibility of civil society actors who have been pushing for democratic change. Civil

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South European Society & Politics 81

society is and has been both a subject and an object in the reform process. Different civil
society groups in Turkey have been active in a wide array of activities and have come from
very different political persuasions. They have included liberal, left-wing as well as
religion-inspired groups. These organizations have pursued both different and
overlapping agendas, ranging from civil and socio-political rights, to collective and
individual human rights, to religious rights and freedoms, gender issues, environmental
concerns and so on. The method of work of civil society actors has been both through
dialogue with, and opposition to, the official establishment. As well as aspiring to be
subjects in the reform process, civil society actors have also been objects of the reform
agenda, particularly as far as reforms in the areas of freedom of expression and of
association are concerned.
In view of this double role as subjects and objects, the EU accession process has had two
mutually supporting effects on civil society. First, it has increased the credibility and
legitimacy of the claims of these domestic actors. Explicit in Goksel and Guness article is
the idea that civil society pushing for democratization in Turkey gained an external ally.
The establishment came under pressure for change both from above (the EU level) and
from below (civil society). Furthermore, a more credible EU accession process allowed
actors pushing for democratic change (including civil society) to defend and justify their
proposed reforms. The resonance of the arguments advanced by domestic critics who
appealed to the risks involved in democratic change, was reduced as the EU engaged in a
more substantial integration project with Turkey. For example, civil society movements
had lobbied for years in favour of the reform of the Law on Associations. Indeed the
groundwork prepared by these domestic actors proved pivotal in shaping the substance of
the revised Law. Yet without the momentum generated by the EU accession process, either
change would not have occurred at all, or it would have taken place at a much later date.
Second, the reform process is gradually empowering civil society actors in Turkey.
The more freedoms are extended, the more civil society groups are able to work
without being stifled by repressive laws and bureaucratic procedures and in turn, the
greater the flourishing of civil society in Turkey. Indeed, the present government has
engaged in an effort to consult and work together with civil society groups while
pursuing the reform agenda (Denemec 2004). There has certainly been an
acknowledged difference in the freedom and status of several civil society groups.
However, as recognized by Goksel and Gunes, the groups that have benefited most
have been those closer to the establishment, that have traditionally opted for dialogue
with official institutions. Those civil society groups and movements whose demands
have been more far-reaching and have chosen the path of (non-violent) opposition
to the establishment, have not benefited to the same extent from the reforms.
The Role of the Military
A final strand of the argument highlighting the interconnection between domestic
developments and EU accession is elaborated in Hepers article assessing the role of the
military. Heper notes that perhaps the principal reason explaining the militarys more

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or less tacit acceptance of the political reforms (including the reforms that redefined its
very role) has been the self-reassessment of the militarys role in Turkish politics.
Despite evident (although adamantly denied) differences of opinion within the
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), important personalities (most notably Chief of General
zkok) have come to the conclusion that the militarys interference in
Staff Hilmi O
politics failed to deliver stability. There is therefore an increasing willingness within the
military to give politics a chance. This does not necessarily entail an agreement with
the substance of the reforms. It has rather meant an increased willingness to desist
from interference and to leave politics to the politicians.
It is in this context that a more credible EU accession process is playing an
important role. Giving politics a chance in Turkey is viewed by many, particularly
within the TAF, as a high-risk strategy, given the precedents of the past. In this
respect, the EU accession process, traditionally viewed by the military (and by the
Kemalist establishment in general) as an important provider of security, acts as a
source of guarantee. In other words, a more credible EU accession course raises the
readiness within the military to step out of politics.
Conclusion
The accession process is proving to be a key anchor in supporting democratization and
modernization in Turkey. This is occurring not simply through a linear relationship
based on EU policies of conditionality. It is also doubtful that it is taking place simply
through an externally inspired process of social change in Turkey. As Muftuler Bac
points out, to date the accession process has not entailed sufficiently dense and
widespread contacts between Turkish official and non-official actors with the EU
institutional framework. As such, it is doubtful that such contact can in itself generate
a process of social learning or socialization with EU standards in Turkey.
What instead appears to be in the making is a process of change largely driven by
endogenous factors. However, the precise form and timing of domestic change is
intricately linked with the launch of Turkeys accession process. In other words,
policy Europeanization is occurring also because political Europeanization is
taking place. The latter in turn is occurring because the endogenous process of
change within the Turkish institutional, political, economic and social context is
interlocking with the external dynamics embedded in the accession process.
Increasingly, Turkish actors talk about the desirability of reforming and redefining
Kemalism in the twenty-first century (see the comments by Chief of the General
zkok, quoted in Hepers paper); or about the need to adopt the
Staff, Hilmi O
Copenhagen (or Ankara) criteria for Turkeys own sake rather than for that of the
EU. Such a process of endogenous change is largely explained by the ongoing
development trajectory of the Turkish nation-state. Yet at this particular juncture,
Turkeys development path is being pivotally affected and supported by the EU
accession course, giving this general process of modernization and democratization
an important Europeanization twist.

South European Society & Politics 83

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Notes
[1] Law No. 4709 Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasnn Baz Maddelerinin Degistirilmesi Hakknda
Kanun [Law on the Amendment of Certain Provisions of Constitution of the Republic of
Turkey], 3 October, 2001, published in Official Gazette No. 24556, 17 October, 2001.
[2] These reform packages, called a variation of C
esitli (baz) Kanunlarda Degisiklik Yaplmasna
Iliskin (dair) Kanun [Law on (Regarding) the Amendment of Various (Certain) Laws] had the
following numbers and were adopted by Parliament on the following dates: (1) Law No. 4744
on 6 February, 2002; (2) Law No. 4748 on 26 March 2002; (3) Law No. 4771 on 3 August 2002;
(4) Law No. 4778 on 2 January 2003; (5) Law No. 4793 on 23 January 2003; (6) Law No. 4928
on 19 June and 15 July 2003; and (7) Law No. 4963 on 30 July 2003.
[3] The May 2004 package provided for amendments to articles 10, 15, 17, 30, 38, 87, 90, 131, 143
and 160 of the Constitution.
[4] Turkey has received Reports since 1998, although it was only recognized as a candidate in
December 1999.
[5] On the costs of compliance, see Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2002).
[6] Keynote speech by Minister of the Economy Ali Babacan at an informal EU Turkey
Brainstorming meeting organized by the European University Institute and Sabanci University,
Florence, 6 7 May 2004.

References
Avci, G. (2001) Putting the Turkish Candidacy into Context, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 7,
no. 1, pp. 91 110.
Commission of the EC (2004a) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkeys Progress Towards
Accession, 6 Oct. 2004, COM(2004) 656 final, Brussels.
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