PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs.

TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO PORRAS, (Rule 110,

Section 6)
Respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed before the RTC of Iloilo 112 cases of Qualified Theft against respondents Teresita Puig
(Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of private
complainant Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc for taking various amounts of money with grave abuse of
confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the bank, to the damage and prejudice of the bank.
The RTC dismissed the cases and refused to issue a warrant of arrest against Puig and Porras on the
ground of lack of probable cause because the complaint failed to state the facts constituting the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence and the element of taking without the consent of the owner,
since the owner of the money is not the Bank, but the depositors therein.
MR was filed but it was also denied.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE 112 INFORMATIONS FOR QUALIFIED THEFTSUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE
THE ELEMENT OF TAKING WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THEOWNER, AND THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE.
RULING: Yes. Qualified Theft, as defined and punished under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed as follows,
ART. 310.
Qualified Theft
The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant ,or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
Theft, as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the physical taking of anothers
property without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. The elements of the crime
under this Article are: 1. Intent to gain; 2. Unlawful taking; 3. Personal property belonging to another; 4.
Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. To fall under the crime of
Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said
property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without
the owners consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
On the sufficiency of the Information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires,
inter alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions complained of as constitutive of the
offense. On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, is enlightening:

Section 9.
Cause of the accusation
The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. It is evident that the
Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.
[5]
The portion of the Information relevant to this discussion reads: [A]bove-named [respondents],
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the
Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the
knowledge and/or consent of the management of the Bank x x x.
It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come into
possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their employer.
Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very
clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship
between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of
the New Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:
Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership
thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be
governed by the provisions concerning loan.
In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly established the nature of possession
by the Bank of the money deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who have
custody of the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has consistently considered the
allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to
the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the
money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft Where the Informations
merely alleged the positions of the respondents; that the crime was committed with grave
abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Bank,
without necessarily stating the phrase being assiduously insisted upon by respondents, of a
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance, between the respondents and the
offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between them, which
respondents abused ,and without employing the word owner in lieu of the Bank were
considered to have satisfied the test of sufficiency of allegations.
As regards the respondents who were employed as Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Bank in this case, there
is even no reason to quibble on the allegation in the Informations that they acted with grave abuse of

confidence. In fact, the Information which alleged grave abuse of confidence by accused herein
is even more precise, as this is exactly the requirement of the law in qualifying the crime of
Theft. In summary, the Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the employees
of the Bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in
them, occupy positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all the essential
elements constituting the Crime of Qualified Theft.

Cheng vs. Sy Digest (Rule 111, Section 1)

Nature of Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order
dated January 2, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manilain Civil Case No. 05-112452
entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
Facts:
A. Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (1. Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and 2.
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of
which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed
account.

B. Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two
(2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

C. On March 16, 2004, (RTC Branch 7)

The RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases (Both OF THEM)
Reason: Failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.
The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of
Tessie Sy.
On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 (thats the second criminal case)
contained a statement, hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely civil, not
criminal in nature.

D. February 7, 2005 (Dismissal of BP22 Cases)

Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases

Reason: The failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order
also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.

E. April 26, 2005, (Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money)

Petitioner then lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint for collection of
a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of
P600, 000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22
cases.

F. January 2, 2006
The RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
Reason: That the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

G. The Denial of the Motion For Reconsideration

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied in its Order dated June 5, 2006. Hence,
this petition.
Other Law Discussions:
1. The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted
the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal case

ISSUE: With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the
question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa
cases. Then May petitioners action to recover respondents civil liability be also allowed to
prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?

Petitioners Other Arguments

1.

Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective application. She

further contends that that her case falls within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to
the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;

(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the right to
have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 31[11] of the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.

2.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

Courtss Rulings/ Findings:

The court then cited
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

1. On the Main Issue:

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22
includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be
stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact,
the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer
file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where
petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22
cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of
res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not
applicable
What Petitioners Should Have done after being faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg.
22 cases:
Petitioners should have appealed the civil action to recover the amount loaned to
respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within
the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to
recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor
in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.
2. Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply
even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The reason for this is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Sps Balaguan vs. Ca Digest (Rule 112, Section 3)

Nature of Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
Assailing the 28 April 2006 Decision and 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 00068, which annulled and set aside the 6 April 2004 and 30 August 2004 Resolutions of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 02-9230-I, entitled The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation v. Katherine Balangauan, et al. The twin resolutions of the DOJ affirmed, in essence, the
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City, which dismissed for lack of probable
cause the criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa, filed against petitioner-Spouses Bernyl
Balangauan (Bernyl) and Katherene Balangauan (Katherene) by respondent Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, Ltd. (HSBC).

Facts:
A. Katherene and Roger Dwayne
Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of respondent bank,
HSBC. As a PCSR, she managed the accounts of HSBC depositors with Premier Status. One such
client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne York (York).

B. April 2002 (Yorks Deposit: P2.5 Million no trace)

York maintained several accounts with respondent HSBC. Sometime in April 2002, he went to
respondent HSBCs Cebu Branch to transact with petitioner Katherene respecting his Dollar
and Peso Accounts. Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the time, York was attended to
by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the status of his time deposit in the
amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who attended to him, however, could not find
any record of said placement in the banks data base.

C. Yorks allegations (2 allegations)

York adamantly insisted,
a. That through petitioner Katherene, he made a placement of the aforementioned amount in a higherearning time deposit.
b. That petitioner Katherene explained to him that the alleged higher-earning time deposit scheme was
supposedly being offered to Premier clients only.
D. Findings of HSBC (four findings)
Upon further scrutiny and examination, respondent HSBCs bank personnel discovered that: (1) on 18
January 2002, York pre-terminated a P1,000,000.00 time deposit; (2) there were cash movement
tickets and withdrawal slips all signed by York for the amount of P1,000,000.00; and (3) there were
regular movements in Yorks accounts, i.e., beginning in the month of January 2002, monthly deposits
in the amount of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 were made, which York denied ever making, but surmised
were the regular interest earnings from the placement of the P2,500,000.00.

D. The Transactions were made using Katharines computer and only Katharine could have
done the same
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were transacted using petitioner
Katherenes computer and work station using the code or personal password CEO8. The significance
of code CEO8, according to the bank personnel of respondent HSBC, is that, [i]t is only Ms.
Balangauan who can transact from [the] computer in the work station CEO-8, as she is
provided with a swipe card which she keeps sole custody of and only she can use, and
which she utilizes for purposes of performing bank transactions from that computer.[7]

E. Affifdavits of HSBC Personnel (One mentioning Bernyl and the Other Mentioning
Katherene)

Bank personnel of respondent HSBC likewise recounted in their affidavits that prior to the filing of
the complaint for estafa and/or qualified estafa, they were in contact with petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene.
1. Petitioner Bernyl supposedly met with them on two occasions. At first he disavowed any
knowledge regarding the whereabouts of Yorks money but later on admitted that he knew that
his wife invested the funds with Shell Company. He likewise admitted that he made the phone
banking deposit to credit Yorks account with the P12,500.00 and the P8,333.33 using their
landline telephone.
2. With respect to petitioner Katherene, she allegedly spoke to the bank personnel and York on
several occasions and admitted that the funds were indeed invested with Shell Company but
that York knew about this.

So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients, respondent HSBC reimbursed York
the P2,500,000.00.

F. Criminal Complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa

Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent HSBC, through its personnel, filed a
criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu
City.
G. The Counter Affidavit of Bernyl and Katharine
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint counter-affidavit basically denying the
allegations contained in the affidavits of the aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC as well as
that made by York.
They argued that the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavits were pure fabrications. Petitioner
Katherene denied 1) having spoken on the telephone with Dy and York; and
2) having admitted to the personnel of respondent HSBC and York that she took the P2,500,000.00
of York and invested the same with Shell Corporation.
Petitioner Bernyl similarly denied 1) having met with Dy, Iigo, Cortes and Arcuri; and
2) having admitted to them that York knew about petitioner Katherenes move of investing the
formers money with Shell Corporation.
H. Their Defenses
Respecting the P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 regular monthly deposits to Yorks account made using
the code CEO8, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, in their defense, argued that since it was a
deposit, it was her duty to accept the funds for deposit. As regards Yorks time deposit with
respondent HSBC, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene insisted that the funds therein were never
entrusted to Katherene in the latters capacity as PCSR Employee of the former because monies
deposited at any bank would not and will not be entrusted to specific bank employee but to the
bank as a whole.
Procedural Journey: [ACP-Secretary of the DOJ-DOJ-Motion for RECON-Court of Appeals (65)Motion for Recon CA- Supreme Court]

A. Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor C. Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu City (21
February 2003)
There was no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the
criminal complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the ACP recommended the dismissal of respondent HSBCs complaint.
Reason: Mr. York -Based on his affidavits1- could not have been that unwary and unknowingly innocent to
claim unfamiliarity with withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets which Ms. Balangauan made him to
sign on several occasions. He is a premier client of HSBC maintaining an account in millions of pesos. A
withdrawal slip and cash movement tickets could not have had such intricate wordings or terminology so
as to render them non-understandable even to an ordinary account holder. Mr. York admittedly is a longstanding client of the bank. Within the period of long-standing he certainly must have effected some
withdrawals. It goes without saying therefore that the occasions that Ms. Balangauan caused
him to sign withdrawal slips are not his first encounter with such kinds of documents.

B. HSBC Appeal to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. (1 July 2003)
It dismissed the petition.
Sec. 12 (c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 2, 2000 provides that the Secretary of Justice may,
motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned
resolution.

We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no reversible error that would justify a
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.

C . HSBCs Motion for Reconsideration to the DOJ August 30, 2004

It was denied with finality by the DOJ
Reason: A perusal of the motion reveals no new matter or argument which was not taken into
consideration in our review of the case. Hence, we find no cogent reason to reconsider our
resolution.
1. Appellant HSBC failed to present any iota of evidence directly showing that respondent Katherene
Balangauan took the money and invested it somewhere else. All it tried to establish was that Katherene
unlawfully took the money and fraudulently invested it somewhere else x x x, because after the
withdrawals were made, the money never reached Roger York as appellant adopted hook, line and sinker
the latters declaration, despite Yorks signatures on the withdrawal slips covering the total amount of
P2,500,000.00 x x x. While appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene for the loss of the
P2,500,000.00 as per Yorks bank statements, the cash deposits were identified by the numerals CEO8 and
1 18. For purposes of opening these two time deposits (sic) accounts, Ms. Balangauan asked me to sign
several Bank documents on several occasions, the nature of which I was unfamiliar with.
`20. I discovered later that these were withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets, with which
documents Ms. Balangauan apparently was able to withdraw the amount from my accounts, and take the
same from the premises of the Bank.

it was only Katherene who could transact from the computer in the work station CEO-8, plus alleged
photographs showing Katherene leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky plastic bag presumably
containing cash since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not, however, dwell on
possibilities, suspicion and speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid evidence.

D. HSBCs Appeal to Court of Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting respondent HSBCs petition,
thereby annulling and setting aside the twin resolutions of the DOJ.
Effect: The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby ORDERED to file the appropriate
Information against the private respondents

E. Bernyl and Katherenes Motion for Recon Court of Appeals (June 29, 2006)
Denied

F. Supreme Court
Issue: WON Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ (focus on Probable Cause)
No

In reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene contend
that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals, when it resolved to grant the petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No. 00068, did so on two
grounds, i.e.,
1) that the public respondent (DOJ) gravely abused his discretion in finding that there was no reversible
error on the part of the Cebu City Prosecutor dismissing the case against the private respondent without
stating the facts and the law upon which this conclusion was made; and
2) that the public respondent (DOJ) made reference to the facts and circumstances of the case leading to
his finding that no probable cause exists, x x x (the) very facts and circumstances (which) show that there
exists a probable cause to believe that indeed the private respondents committed the crimes x x x charged
against them.

The CA explained that:

In refusing to file the appropriate information against the private respondents because he does not
dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation and that he rules based on hard facts and solid evidence,
(sic) the public respondent exceeded his authority and gravely abused his discretion. It must be
remembered that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. The term does not mean actual or positive cause; (sic) nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. [Citation omitted.] A
trial is there precisely for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

10

In this case, the petitioner had amply established that it has a prima facie case against the private
respondents. As observed by the public respondent in his second assailed resolution, petitioner was
able to present photographs of private respondent Ms. Balangauan leaving her office carrying
a bulky plastic bag. There was also the fact that the transactions in Mr. Yorks account used the
code CEO8 which presumably point to the private respondent Ms. Balangauan as the author
thereof for she is the one assigned to such work station.

Furthermore, petitioner was able to establish that it was Ms. Balangauan who handled Mr. Yorks account
and she was the one authorized to make the placement of the sum of P2,500,000.00. Since said sum is
nowhere to be found in the records of the bank, then, apparently, Ms. Balangauan must be made to
account for the same.

The appellate court then concluded that:

These facts engender a well-founded belief that that (sic) a crime has been committed and that
the private respondents are probably guilty thereof. In refusing to file the corresponding
information against the private respondents despite the presence of the circumstances making out a
prima facie case against them, the public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, defends
the DOJ and assert that the questioned resolution was complete in that it stated the legal basis for
denying respondent HSBCs petition for review that (after) an examination (of) the petition and
its attachment [it] found no reversible error that would justify a reversal of the assailed
resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.

Is A PI A Quasi-Judicial Proceeding?
It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[34] this Court
held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
Does the Prosecutor in a PI Determine the guilt or innocence of the Accused?
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
What is its purpose then?
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

11

Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasijudicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer
of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this
point.[36] A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[37] A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information against a person
charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by
issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBCs motion for reconsideration.

Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals decision and resolution are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause, this Court finds the petition
dismissible.

The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ. In the
resolutions of the DOJ, it affirmed the recommendation of ACP Laborte that no probable cause existed to
warrant the filing in court of an Information for estafa and/or qualified estafa against petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene. It was the reasoning of the DOJ that [w]hile appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene
for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per Yorks bank statements, the cash deposits were identified by the
numerals CEO8 and it was only Katherene who could transact from the computer in the work station CEO8, plus alleged photographs showing Katherene leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky plastic bag
presumably containing cash since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not, however, dwell on
possibilities, suspicion and speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid evidence.[38]

We do not agree.
What is Probable Cause?
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

In requiring hard facts and solid evidence as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the
definition of probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certaintyIt is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no
evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were teeming;
or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was adequate to
excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s
complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to

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grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

From the records of the case, it is clear that a prima facie case for estafa/qualified estafa exists against
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. A perusal of the records, i.e., the affidavits of respondent HSBCs
witnesses, the documentary evidence presented, as well as the analysis of the factual milieu of the case,
leads this Court to agree with the Court of Appeals that, taken together, they are enough to excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, that the Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan are guilty of
the crime complained of. Whether or not they will be convicted by a trial court based on the same
evidence is not a consideration. It is enough that acts or omissions complained of by respondent HSBC
constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified estafa.

The Effect of the Photographs and the Affidavits

Collectively, the photographs of petitioner Katherene leaving the premises of respondent HSBC carrying a
bulky plastic bag and the affidavits of respondent HSBCs witnesses sufficiently establish acts
adequate to constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified estafa. What the affidavits bear out
are the following: that York was a Premier Client of respondent HSBC; that petitioner Katherene handled all
the accounts of York; that not one of Yorks accounts reflect the P2,500,000.00 allegedly deposited in a
higher yielding account; that prior to the discovery of her alleged acts and omissions, petitioner Katherene
supposedly persuaded York to invest in a new product of respondent HSBC, i.e., a higher interest yielding
time deposit; that York made a total of P2,500,000.00 investment in the new product by authorizing
petitioner Balangauan to transfer said funds to it; that petitioner Katherene supposedly asked York to sign
several transaction documents in order to transfer the funds to the new product; that said documents
turned out to be withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets; that at no time did York receive the cash as
a result of signing the documents that turned out to be withdrawal slips/cash movement tickets; that Yorks
account was regularly credited loose change in the amounts of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 beginning in the
month after the alleged transfer of Yorks funds to the new product; that the regular deposits of loose
change were transacted with the use of petitioner Katherenes work terminal accessed by her password
CEO8; that the CEO8 password was keyed in with the use of a swipe card always in the possession of
petitioner Katherene; that one of the loose-change deposits was transacted via the phone banking feature
of respondent HSBC and that when traced, the phone number used was the landline number of the house
of petitioners Bernyl and Katherene; that respondent HSBCs bank personnel, as well as York, supposedly a)
talked with petitioner Katherene on the phone, and that she allegedly admitted that the missing funds
were invested with Shell Company, of which York approved, and that it was only for one year; and b) met
with petitioner Bernyl, and that the latter at first denied having knowledge of his wifes complicity, but later
on admitted that he knew of the investment with Shell Company, and that he supposedly made the loosechange deposit via phone banking; that after 23 April 2002, York was told that respondent HSBC had no
new product or that it was promoting investment with Shell Company; that York denied having any
knowledge that his money was invested outside of respondent HSBC; and that petitioner Katherene would
not have been able to facilitate the alleged acts or omissions without taking advantage of her position or
office, as a consequence of which, HSBC had to reimburse York the missing P2,500,000.00.

The Circumstances make up the elements enumerated under Article 315 of the
RPC, therefore the filing of an INFORMATION against them was warranted.
From the above, the alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up the elements of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa
and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to the presumption or reasonable belief that the offense of
estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information against petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene is warranted. That respondent HSBC is supposed to have no personality to file any
criminal complaint against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene does not ipso facto clear them of prima facie
guilt. The same goes for their basic denial of the acts or omissions complained of; or their attempt at

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shifting the doubt to the person of York; and their claim that witnesses of respondent HSBC are guilty of
fabricating the whole scenario. These are matters of defense; their validity needs to be tested in the
crucible of a full-blown trial. Lest it be forgotten, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can best be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits. Litigation will prove petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes innocence if their defense
be true.

No Showing that CA acted in despotic manner

In fine, the relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances
to justify the same. Try as we might, this Court cannot find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals, when it reversed and set aside the resolutions of the DOJ. There is no showing that
the appellate court acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner, so patent or gross as to amount
to an evasion or unilateral refusal to perform its legally mandated duty. On the contrary, we find
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals to be more in accordance with the evidence on
record and relevant laws and jurisprudence than the resolutions of the DOJ.

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition above, we hereby dismiss
the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner
Bernyl and Katherenes failure to sufficiently show that the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 28
April 2006 Decision and the 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB- SP No. 00068,
are hereby AFFIRMED

Quintin Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel Genio VS Sandiganbayan and People GR No. 184537, April 23,
2010
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal, denying the Motion for Preliminary
Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
30192. At first, the Information was quashed for lack of amount of actual damaged cause in the alleged

2 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
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crime which is essential. The information was re-filed thus, petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition. Petitioners contend that
there was a substitution of the first Information which should have preceded by a preliminary investigation.
Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima
facie cause to file the case. The prosecutors on the other hand argues that the re-filed information did not
change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the
offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another
preliminary investigation. Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the
accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order. The
motions filed by the petitioners were denied by the court hence, this petition to the highest court.
Issues:
WON the Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary.
Rulings:
The court found no merit on the petition. Petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and second
Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior
conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments
were made in the second Information, and that its submission should have been preceded by a new
preliminary investigation. The court ruled that the use of the disjunctive term or connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), as 2 different modes of committing the offense.
This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused
may be charged under either mode or under both which implies that theres no substituted information.
Preliminary investigation is applicable only when there was substantial amendment in the Information
such as the facts which was altered however; no such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there
was no modification in the nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners. Finally, the newly discovered evidence mandates
due re-examination of the finding of prima facie Cause to file the case, deserves scant consideration. But
the court ruled that it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence
prior to the re-filing of the case.

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