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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16995

October 28, 1968

JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee,

vs.
JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee.
Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the former Judge
Wenceslao L. Fernan presiding, dated September 21, 1959, now on
appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect: "Regarding the writ of
possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a
writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past
has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period
of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and
inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows
that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered
1
owner."
Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of movant, now
appellee, Julio Lucero. There was an opposition on the part of
oppositors, all surnamed Loot, now appellants. The lower court
failed to see merit in the opposition interposed. It explained why:
"The opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect that
there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the
motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently
2
untenable." Accordingly, the writ of possession, as prayed for, was
issued.
There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by
3
the oppositors on September 25, 1959, followed by a motion for
4
reconsideration on October 10, 1959, which was denied in an order
5
of October 23, 1959. As set forth in such order of denial: "After
weighing the arguments adduced by the movant represented by
Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor represented by Atty. Loot, this
Court adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of
possession has been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of
this Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as
amended." There was a second motion for reconsideration filed by
6
oppositors on November 3, 1959, which was denied in an order of
7
December 10, 1959. Not satisfied, there was still another motion
for reconsideration of the above order filed by oppositors on
8
December 28, 1959, which similarly met the same fate, an order of
9
denial being issued on February 20, 1960. The appeal was taken
direct to us.

decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision

promulgated in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29,
1941. It was not incorrect for the lower court to state, therefore,
that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if
nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered
11
owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there
is "no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
12
13
possession, ..." In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario, it has been
made clear that the purpose of the statutory provision empowering
the then Court of Land Registration, now the ordinary courts of first
instance, to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same
way that the judiciary does is so that the winning party could be
placed in possession of the property covered by such decree.
Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the
further delay to which a successful litigant would be subjected if he
were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for the
purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
There was a restatement of the above principle in Demorar v.
14
Ibaez, the closest in period of time to the challenged order of the
lower court. Thus: "We have heretofore held that a writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration
is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end
the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the
final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ
of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said
writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact,
15
in a 1948 decision, it was held by us that "the fact that the
petitioners have instituted, more than one year after the decree of
registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of
First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of
fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied
for by the registered owners."
A few months after the issuance of such a challenged order of
16
September 21, 1959, Marcelo v. Mencias was decided, where this
Court went so far as to hold that "if the writ of possession issued in a
land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the
land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must,
likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective."

The sore issue, therefore, is whether on the above facts, the order
granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. The
answer must be in the affirmative. This appeal cannot prosper.

It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found, the

validity of the challenged order cannot be impugned. It is equally
clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no questions of fact may
17
be raised. As was held recently in Perez v. Araneta: "Nothing is
better settled than that where the correctness of the findings of fact
of the lower court are assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper
forum. If resort be had directly to us, then appellant must be
deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his to inquire
into such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of
the law applied."

No other view would be compatible with the pertinent provision of

10
the Land Registration Act, as uniformly interpreted by this Court.
As was noted in the order of September 21, 1959, there was a final

The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants in bringing the

matter direct to us was to show that the above two-page order on
the meager but sufficient facts as found, was vitiated by error or

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errors in law. It was far from easy, therefore, considering as above
shown that on the authority of applicable decisions, the lower court
was left with no choice but to issue the writ of possession sought.

EN BANC

Resolute and undaunted, oppositors did their best to accomplish a

task formidable in its complexity. It seemed they overdid it. They
assigned twenty-one errors a great many of them factual, and,
therefore, not for us to consider, and the remaining, except the last,
far from decisive in view of the rather settled state of the law
concerning the issuance of a writ of possession. Nor did the twentyfirst error assigned suffice to call for a reversal, as will be more fully
explained. That is why, as earlier stated, the appeal was doomed to
futility.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

It would not be amiss, though, to discuss even briefly one of them,

18
the fourteenth. Invoking three of our previous decisions, they
would impugn the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground
that they were not oppositors and defeated parties in the land
registration proceeding. They would ignore the fact, however, that
in the above decisions relied upon, the basis for the impropriety of
issuing a writ of possession was that the parties adversely affected
entered the property in question after the issuance of the decree.
There is nothing in the challenged order that such is the case here.
Thus, they would raise a factual issue a matter not properly
cognizable by us.

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR
CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA
DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE
POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEES OF
MALABON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 123346

December 14, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134385

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

A reminder may not be out of place. The apparent ease with which
oppositors-appellants could conjure up so many alleged errors,
while it may be a tribute to their ingenuity in making a two-page
order yield so many instances of the rankest violation of legal
precepts, hardly contributes to the persuasiveness of their brief. As
a matter of fact, the suspicion could be legitimately entertained that
in thus attempting to paint the highly unrealistic picture of a terse
and brief order being so sadly riddled with errors, oppositorsappellants were trying in vain to bolster what inherently was a weak
case.
That is all that needs be said about this appeal except for the
disposition of the twenty-first error assigned, referring to the
19
existence of a pending case between the parties for reconveyance.
There was no denial in the brief for movant-appellee that such a
case was then pending at the time the respective briefs were filed.
What is decided here cannot affect whatever final decision might
possibly have been rendered by this time in the aforesaid
reconveyance action. Nonetheless, the mere fact that such suit was
then pending did not oust the lower court of its jurisdiction to issue
the writ of possession. As stated by our present Chief Justice in
20
Agreda v. Rodriguez: "Besides, it is clear that respondent Judge
had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of Santiago Agreda for the
issuance of a writ of possession. Whether or not the motion should
have been denied, in view of institution of said Civil Case No. 6267,
is a matter that does not affect said jurisdiction."
WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting the writ of
possession in favor of movant-appellee, and the orders of October
23, 1959, December 10, 1959 and February 20, 1960, denying the
reconsideration thereof, are affirmed. With costs against oppositorsappellants.

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The stability of the countrys Torrens system is menaced by the

infestation of fake land titles and deeds. Any decision of this Court
that breathes life into spurious or inexistent titles all but contributes
to the blight. On the contrary, the judicial devotion is towards
purging the system of illicit titles, concomitant to our base task as
the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy.
1

These two petitions involve properties covered by Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342
2
hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over
three (3) cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states
3
of Monaco and the Vatican. Despite their prime location within
Metropolitan Manila, the properties included in
OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and sullied by
apparent fraud, cloudy titles and shady transfers. It may as well be
renamed the "Land of Caveat Emptor."
The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has not eluded
this Court. Since 1992, our findings and ruling in MWSS v. Court of
4
Appeals have stood as the Rosetta Stone in deciphering claims
emanating from OCT No. 994, as was done in Gonzaga v. Court of
5
Appeals, and in the Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005
6
(2005 Decision) in these cases. Yet in the course of resolving these
motions for reconsideration came the revelation that OCT No. 994
was lost in translation following MWSS. Certain immutable truths
reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must emerge and gain vitality,
even if we ruffle feathers in the process.
I.

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A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been extensively
narrated in the 2005 Decision, is in order. For clarity, we narrate
separately the antecedent facts in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385.
A.
G.R.
No.
123346,
Manotok
Realty,
and
Manotok
Estate
Corporation,
CLT Realty Development Corporation

Inc.
vs.

On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT)

sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate in an action filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
7
City, Branch 129.
CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds,
which title in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10
December 1988. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimsons
(Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. Dimsons
8
title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied
on by CLT, claiming that Dimsons title, the proximate source of
CLTs title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and
subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks
asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived
it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing
9
Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source
OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918, was transferred to
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired
the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de Venta"
10
executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis. On 3
March 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the property to Francisco
Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 when the
property was transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana
Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez, Francisco
Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No.
35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21 November 1946,
subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the
11
Gonzalezes.
The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and
conclusions arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed to
resolve the conflict of titles. It was established that the entire
Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which
12
OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal; that Lot
26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from
the Dimson title and that on the basis of the technical descriptions
of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latters property
13
indeed encroached on the property described in CLTs title.
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
14
decision of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having
15
been denied, they filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the trial
courts decision which decided the case on the basis of the majority
3|P a g e

commissioners report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority

16
commissioners report.
B.
G.R.
No.
of
Agriculture,
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.

134385,
Inc.

v.

Araneta
Institute
Heirs
of

On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal,

Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta).
Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part of the
Maysilo Estate in Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been
illegally occupying the land and that the latter refused to vacate the
same despite repeated demands, he prayed that Araneta be ordered
to vacate the same and remove all improvements thereon and to
return full possession thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted
occupancy of the disputed land by constructing some buildings
thereon and subdividing portions thereof in the exercise of its right
as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimsons title to the subject land
17
was void and hence he had no cause of action.
The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993
with these findings: first, there were inherent technical infirmities or
defects in the titles that formed each link in the chain of ownership
that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e., that the technical
descriptions in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in
the alleged mother title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an
abnormal state that deviated from the usual practice in the issuance
of titles; and second, it was established procedure to indicate in the
certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificate, the date
of the original survey of the mother title together with the
succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence
of the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on Manotoks chain of
titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not
the mother title not only because the original survey dates were
different but also because the original survey date must always be
earlier than the issue date of the original title. OCT No. 994 was
issued on May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date
18
indicated in the succeeding titles, which is December 22, 1917.
Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower courts
19

decision. In so holding, the appellate court declared that the title

of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimsons
TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on April
19, 1917" and that the same was obtained by Dimson
simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and
15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order
dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It was
also pointed out that Aranetas TCT No. 13574 and 21343 were both
derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917" which was
previously "declared null and void by the Supreme Court in
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
20
Appeals."
Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
attributing error to the Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it

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had a better right of possession over the property than did
21
Dimson.

1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012,

9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407,
33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 63268, 55896, T-1214528,
163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc.,
and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of Manotok Estate
Corporation;

As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the

validity of the parties separate titles to portions of the greater
22
Maysilo Estate, they, along with G.R. No. 148767 , were
consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March 2002.
Also in 2002, the Republic of the Philippines sought and was allowed
intervention in these cases.

2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta

Institute of Agriculture; and

On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the

23
2005 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto.

Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed

Decisions and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners.

All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 in the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same city.

SO ORDERED.

24

B. Respondents Title:

The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the

petitions is whether the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of
CLT are valid. Noting that this question is one purely of fact, the
Court held that the same was beyond its power to determine and so,
the factual findings of the trial courts in these cases as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals must be accorded the highest degree of
respect and not disturbed at all.
Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit in
the petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the
Court upheld the validity of the trial courts adoption of the
commissioners majority report as part of the decision inasmuch as
the same is allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and
that a case of overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the
assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering who, on
account of their experience and expertise, are in a better position to
determine which of the contending titles is valid. For this reason, the
Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their findings and
conclusions. Second, the Court pointed out that the titles of
respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on 19 April 1917.
However, because the validity of said mother title was upheld by the
Court itself in MWSS and reiterated in Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court
chose not to delve anymore into the correctness of the said
decisions which had already attained finality and immutability.
The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. On 5 June 2006, the cases were elevated to the
Court en banc, which heard oral arguments on 1 August 2006. The
Court formulated the issues for oral argument, thus:
From the above petitions, the following principal issues are
gathered:
I.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid:
A. Petitioners titles:
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1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty

Development Corporation;
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and
3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development
Corporation/
All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or
on April 19, 1917, covering the same Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
Estate.
II.
Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan
Water Works and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 103558, November 17, 1992) and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September 3, 1996) sustaining
the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullify
the same OCT No. 994 registered later, or on May 3, 1917?
III.
How will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the Senate
Fact-Finding Committee, not presented in evidence before the trial
courts concluding that the valid title is OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917, affect the disposition of these cases?
Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to
determine which of the Certificates of Title are valid? If so, which
25
trial court?
A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The Republic,
26
through the Solicitor General, strenuously argued that contrary to
the supposition reflected in the Advisory, there was, in fact, only one
OCT No. 994.
x x x In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the
Court of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto Romualdez presiding,

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acting on Land Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment
ordering the GLRO to issue a decree. Pursuant to this order, the
GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same on April 19,
1917 at 9:00 oclock in the morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be
observed that at the face of the OCT 994 which was then on file at
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan and now kept in the LRA, the
following entry can be seen. Received for transcription at the Office
of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of May
1917 at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of
inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the
Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the transcription of the
decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to speak of. In
the records of the Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT
994, on its face appears the date of transcript, May 3, 1917. The
validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their origin from OCT
27
994 should be tested in the light of these set of facts. x x x
On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral
argument that he had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was
28
dated 19 April 1917, and manifested that he could attach the same
29
to CLTs memorandum. At the same time, on even date, the Court
directed the Solicitor General and counsel for CLT to submit to the
Court "certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994
dated May 3 1917 and April 19, 1917, respectively, on or before
30
Friday, August 4, 2006."
In response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and the
counsel for CLT submitted their separate "Compliance" to this Court,
with their respective copies of OCT No. 994 attached thereto. Both
copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the Solicitor General and CLT
indicate on their face that the decree of registration issued on 19
April 1917 was received for transcription at the office of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on 3 May 1917. Indeed, there is no
evident variance between the copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by
the OSG and CLT, and CLT admits just as much in its Memorandum
31
dated 3 September 2006.

Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of

said Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and
twelve.
Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice
Received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of P.I. this third day of May, nineteen hundred and
seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (emphasis supplied)
As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration
was issued on 19 April 1917, and actually "received for
transcription" by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. Interestingly,
even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that which
33
the Solicitor General had presented to the Court, it maintains that
the OCT should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of
the decree of registration, 19 April 1917, instead of the date it was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917.
The argument is based on the theory that it is "the decree of
registration [that] produces legal effects," though it "is entered
before the transmittal of the same for transcription at the Register
34
of Deeds."
This argument marks a radical departure from CLTs earlier theory
that there were two OCTs No. 994, one dated 19 April 1917 and the
other 3 May 2007, a theory which was likewise reflected in the
35
Courts earlier Advisory on the issues prior to the oral argument.
Yet the argument smacks of plain sophistry.
The process involved is what this Court called "the method of giving
36
a paper title." It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act:

The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994
was duly confirmed though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente
of the 2005 Decision has recognized this fact, as indicated in her
present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary as
it is to the crucial predicate underlying the issues presented in the
Courts Advisory, has changed the essence and complexion of the
controversy. The key to grant or deny the motions for
reconsideration is the answer to the question: which is the true date
of OCT No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917?

SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration

the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the
court, to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city
in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the
decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf,
or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each
title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each
case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by
him and sealed

II.

with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be numbered
consecutively, beginning with number one. The register of deeds
shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original certificate,
including the seal, but putting on it the words 'Owner's duplicate
certificate,' and deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney
duly authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate
certificate and the original certificate the original shall prevail. The
certified copy of the decree of registration shall be filed and
numbered by the register of deeds with a reference noted on it to
the place of record of the original certificate of title: Provided,
however, That when an application includes land lying in more than
one province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court shall

We turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the quoted

portion of the certified true copy thereof submitted by the Republic
32
of the Philippines:
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the
name of said xxx

5|P a g e

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cause the part lying in each province or in the city of Manila to be
described separately by metes and bounds in the decree of
registration, and the clerk shall send to the register of deeds for
each province, or the city of Manila, as the case may be, a copy of
the decree containing a description of the land within that province
or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same and issue an
owner's duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters pertaining
to registration under this Act the portion in each province or city
shall be treated as a separate parcel of land.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
registration book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to
decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and
place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate
shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like
form, but shall be entitled 'Transfer from number' (the number of
the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the
words 'Originally registered' (date, volume, and page of
registration.")
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two
vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate
of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is transcribed.
In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked distinction
between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate of
title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land
registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the
37
register of deeds. Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act
No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is issued in
pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it was
stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the
transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of
38
deeds in the registry.
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is
the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is
precisely the recipient from the land registration office of the decree
for transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less.
Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994
indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that date that is the date of
registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the
decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being
39
the original certificate of title. Moreover, it is only after the
transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the
certificate of title is to take effect.
The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration are
unanimous on the matter. The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas,
widely acknowledged as the leading authority on the subject during
his time, wrote, thus:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of
registration, the Registrar of Land Titles transcribes the same in the
registry book called the "Registration Book" and issues an owners
duplicate certificate of title to the applicant upon payment by him of
the necessary registration fees. The entry made by the Registrar of
Land Titles in his registry book is actually the original copy of the
original certificate of title and shall be signed by him and sealed with
6|P a g e

the seal of the Court and of his office. Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 113,
the Registrar of Land Titles may now use only the seal of his office,
40
dispensing with the court seal.
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the
same conviction:
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the
Commissioner of Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the
name of the Judge to the fact that the land described therein is
registered in the name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as
the case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the
registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the page on
which the transcription is made become the "original certificate of
title," more commonly called the Torrens title.
xxx
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of
the decree in the original registration book by the register of deeds,
the date and time of such transcription being set forth in the process
and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate of title.
xxx
The issuance of the original and owners duplicate certificates are
basic for the valid existence of the title. Issuance of additional copies
are permissive and their non-existence does not affect the status of
title. A certificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the
41
issuance of the original copy and owners duplicate.
So was Professor Francisco Ventura:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of
registration, the Commissioner of Land Registration sends a certified
copy thereof, under seal of the said office, to the Register of Deeds
of the province where the land lies, and the register of Deeds
transcribes the decree in a book, called the Registration Book," in
which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order should be devoted
exclusively to each title. The entry made by the Register of Deeds in
said book constitutes the original certificate of title and is signed by
42
him and sealed with the seal of his office.
The same view came from Professor Narciso Pea, also a former
Assistant Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and
Acting Register of Deeds of Manila, as he wrote, thus:
Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the certificate first
registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any
parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book "Original
Certificate of Title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of decree and
the number of the case). This certificate shall take effect upon the
date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates
relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled.
"Transfer from number (the number of the next previous certificate
relating to the same land)," and also the words "Originally registered
43
(date, volume, and page of registration).

LTD 2015
The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these
two dates is ultimately inconsequential. It cannot be so for
otherwise, the recent decision of the Court in Alfonso v. Office of the
44
President would simply be wrong. In Alfonso, the Court precisely
penalized Alfonso, the former register of deeds of Caloocan because
she acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of OCT No.
994, as reflected in several subsequent titles purportedly derived
from that mother title, from 3 May 1917 to 19 April 1917. If indeed
the difference in dates were "inconsequential," then it should not
have really mattered that Mrs. Alfonso, as found by the Court, had
invariably issued certificates of title, reflecting either the 19 April or
3 May date, a circumstance which, the Court concluded, was
irregular. But if the Court were to accede to the dissent and agree
that it did not really matter whether the date of registration of OCT
No. 994 was 3 May or 19 April, then poor Mrs. Alfonso should be
spared of the penalty of dismissal from the service which the Court
had already affirmed.
III.
Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there
is an OCT No. 994 registered or dated 19 April 1917. This new stance
squarely contravenes or deviates from the following unequivocal
pronouncement in the 2005 Decision:
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these
three (3) cases involves the validity of the parties' overlapping titles.
The titles of the respondents in these cases were derived from OCT
No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on April
19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has already been upheld
by this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSS v. Court of Appeals, et al.
dated November 17, 1992 earlier cited in the assailed Decisions.
Significantly, the ruling in MWSS was reiterated in G.R. No. 96259,
Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals dated September 3,
1996.
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of
this Court in MWSS. The said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT
No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from which the titles of the
respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become final
and executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
45
the highest court of the land.
This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court had to say
regarding OCT No. 994 "dated April 19, 1917" in the adverted MWSS
46
v. Court of Appeals decision:
It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer
from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered
on May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondents' title was
derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917. Where
two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
7|P a g e

interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is

entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of
priority of issuance, private respondents' title prevails over that of
47
petitioner MWSS.
Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v. Court of
48
Appeals decision, which essentially reaffirmed foregoing factual
pronouncements made in MWSS.
Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed the MWSS
and Gonzaga decisions, the dissent now claims that said decisions
confirmed "the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917."
But if we examine MWSS closely, it appears to be beset with
semantic confusion. We make the following relevant references
from that decision, presented sequentially:
(1) "Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel
land situated in Balintawak, Kalookan City with an area of
213,012 square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT
No. C-15167 which was registered on June 8, 1978. Said
parcel of land was originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate
(OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in Land Registration
49
Case No. 4429."
(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be
noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both
with an area of 599 square meters was based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34,
while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No.
50
994 issued on April 19, 1917;
(3) "It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS
was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the
other hand, private respondent's title was derived from
51
the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917;"
(4) "Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if
it is shown that the same land had already been registered
5
and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.
Since the land in question has already been registered
under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and
52
void;"
In one (1) out of the four (4) times that reference was made to the
mother title of Dimson in MWSS, it was "OCT No. 994 issued on April
19, 1917" which is the language preferred by the dissent since it
hews to the date of issuance of the decree of registration in the
authentic OCT No. 994. However, the same decision inconsistently
refers to it also as OCT No. 994 "registered on April 19, 1917",
"dated April 19, 1917," and "registered under OCT No. 994 dated
April 19, 1917." Notably, the context of MWSS in making the final
citation, "registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917," was
to point out that as a result "the subsequent registration of the
same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void;" hence, no other

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conclusion can be reached than that the Court deemed Dimsons
mother title as having been registered on a date earlier than 3 May
1917.
Since the dissent and even CLT now acknowledge that there is only
one OCT No. 994 which was registered by the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal on 3 May 1917, the earlier factual finding in MWSS is
indefensible. MWSS recognized an OCT No. 994 registered on 19
April 1917, a title that never existed and, even assuming that it did
exist, is now acknowledged as spurious.
Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a
finding that the case involved "facts that are exactly the same as
those that we have passed and ruled upon in the [MWSS case]." The
title which was affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT No. C-26806
in the name of Lilia Sevilla, was "a transfer from Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917
53
pursuant to Decree No. 36455." It was further observed by the
Court that "on the one hand, *therein+ petitioners titles indicate
original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917, but on the
other hand, private respondents title indicates original registration
54
to have been made on April 19, 1917."
It was the title originally registered on 19 April 1917 which was
made to prevail in Gonzaga, following MWSS. Since there is no OCT
No. 994 originally registered on 19 April 1917, as now
acknowledged, it follows that Gonzaga, like MWSS, is no longer
reliable as well.
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005 Decision
that the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 must be distinguished from "OCT
No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga
cases" because the former title was "based on the Cadastral Survey
of Kalookan City under Cadastral Case No. 34, also covering the
Maysilo Estate." It is elemental to note that assuming said 3 May
OCT was somehow flawed because it was based on Cadastral Case
No. 34, it does not mean that the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No.
994 is valid or had existed in the first place. Since even the dissent
now discounts the existence of the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No.
994, it should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced from
the 17 April 1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable
whatever questions there may be about the veracity of the 3 May
1917 OCT based on Cadastral Case No. 34.
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to reiterate MWSS
and Gonzaga when they effectuated the OCT No. 994 registered on
19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the same time that the same OCT
never existed, the genuine OCT No. 994 being that which was
registered on 3 May 1917. We need not go as far as to revive the
MWSS or Gonzaga decisions, but certainly we can decline to infuse
further validity to their erroneous basic premise that there was an
OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. The dissent proposes that
we perpetuate the erroneous premise even as the error is plainly
acknowledged, a stance that will not serve the Court well should it
prevail.
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions
now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different
parcels of land. The present petitioners could not be bound by the
decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and and
8|P a g e

their properties were not involved therein. As we very recently

reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
55
bound by judgment rendered by the court.
We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court
in dealing with municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning
56
with Pelaez v. Auditor General, the Court declared as a general
principle that the President had no power to create municipalities
through executive orders. However, instead of nullifying the
creation of all municipalities created in the same manner, the Court
only annulled those municipalities whose creation was specifically
attacked in the petition filed by then-Vice President
57

Pelaez. With respect to the other municipalities which were not

annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few decades, annul
only the municipalities which were specifically challenged in
58
petitions raised before the Court. However, after the adoption of
the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory recognition
to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled, the
59
Court started to affirm the legal existence of such municipalities.
As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the "doctrines" pronounced in
MWSS and Gonzaga can extend only to the parties and properties
involved in said cases, even if it can be argued that the rights
involving other parties and properties are afflicted with
inconsistency as regards the legal rulings therein, similar to the
municipalities created which though created by void executive
orders were not however annulled. Yet with the emergence of a
new factthe enactment of the Local Government Code vis--vis
Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3 May 1917
OCT No. 994 exists vis--vis MWSS and Gonzagasubsequent rulings
would be informed primarily by the new developments, rather than
by the previous precedents that were not able to take into account
the true or new factual premises.
IV.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this
Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles
invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from
the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are
void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the
true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that
there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS
and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus
officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can
no longer be relied upon as precedents.
This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005
Decision and the dissenting view, which dwells in the main on the
alleged flaws in the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta,
without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and the
Heirs of Dimson. Since the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of
Dimson was ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now
acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary focus should
have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons are valid
and with force and effect. To that end, we need only examine the
titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons.

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In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for
annulment of the titles in the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it
was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by
TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Reproduced below is what appears on the face of TCT No. T60
177013:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of April, in the year, nineteen hundred and seventeen
in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as Original Certificate of Title No.
994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No.
_____in the name of ___________.
This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R17994/T-89, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the
above-described land is concerned.
Entered at City of Kalookan
Philippines, on the 15th day of March
In the year nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.
CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on 10
December 1988 from Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994,
61
is depicted, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in
the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume NA, page NA, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record
No. ________.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. R15166/T-75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the
above-described land is concerned.
Entered at the City of Caloocan
Philippines, on the 12th day of December
in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight at 3:30 p.m.
Dimsons original complaint for recovery of possession against
Araneta was founded on the claim that he was the absolute owner
of a parcel of land located at Malabon, comprising fifty (50) hectares
of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of
62
Deeds of Caloocan City. Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced below:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen,
in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, Volume NA, page___ , Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record
No. __
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No.
[illegible] which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the abovedescribed land is concerned.
9|P a g e

Entered at Caloocan City

Philippines, on the 8th day of June
in the year nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34 a.m.
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat
the properties they purport to cover were "originally registered on
the 19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in
the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal."
Note, as earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally
registered on 19 April 1917.
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three
titles can be accorded recognition simply because the original title
commonly referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise
would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could
be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on
19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given
the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court, but they did
not. In fact, CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994
they concede as true is also the one which the Office of Solicitor
General submitted as true, and that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May
1917.
Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the
2005 Decision which sustained the complaints for annulment of title
and/or recovery of possession filed by CLT and the Dimson when
their causes of action are both founded on an inexistent mother
title. How can such actions prosper at all even to the extent of
dispossessing the present possessors with title?
The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917
OCT from which the Dimson and CLT titles are sourced. As earlier
mentioned, the focus is instead placed on the purported flaws of the
titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta notwithstanding that said
parties swere the defendants before the lower court and,
therefore, the burden of proof did not lie on them. The established
legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is
that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence
63
that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
64
defendant's claim.
V.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the
present acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917 and the titles involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It
dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the MWSS and
Gonzaga cases, which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3
May 1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34
also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent
that there are, in effect, two competing sources of title the OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 arising from the issuance of Decree No.
36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3
May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in
Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the registration of

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lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34, even if the date of such
registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration could not
supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles
in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court, the effect would
have been to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal scholars,
professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands
already registered in ordinary land registration cases was
65
acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin. Such
jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors
in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not
impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his
66
67
title." It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz that the limited
jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to
the determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered
titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a
complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be
68
within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings."
69

The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar concerned the validity of an

order of a cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates
of title in the name of Sideco and his children, at Sidecos own
prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo
Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not
amount to a readjudication of the title. After the cadastral
proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor had
reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a
decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name
of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and
a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may
determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated
that "[t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the
title already issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They
were precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued,
because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his
desire with respect thereto, and the courts order precisely followed
70
the petition of the registered owner."
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former
Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to
order the issuance of new titles in place of the title issued under
voluntary registration proceedings:
"Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number,
it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral
number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does not mean
that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in the
previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify
the said decree. It does not adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals
with the certificate of title. This is for the
convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify
his property inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral
71
survey are designated by cadastral numbers."
10 | P a g e

What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of

land, already issued in the name of a person, in the name of
another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in
his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his
72
substantial rights. Yet such prohibition does not mean that the
cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action involving
the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and
Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all
even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered
owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the
simplistic conclusion that because there was a cadastral case
covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such
titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such
titles issued, and they would be valid for so long as they do not
impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994
dated 3 May 1917 was issued.
VI.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the following
binding conclusions. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it
appears on the record, that mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that
should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on
the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree
of registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be
considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took
effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the
Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since
they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient
to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if
singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their
respective titles.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar,
especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither
could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the
factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.
With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to
take with respect to the pending motions for reconsideration?
Considering that CLT and the Dimsons clearly failed to meet the
burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for
annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be
made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before
the trial court. However, such solution may not satisfactorily put to
rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.
More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with this
Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, had sought
to intervene.1wphi1 The Republic did not participate as a party
when these cases were still before the trial courts and the Court of

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Appeals. While the Republic had originally prayed for the grant of
the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases,
instead it presently seeks of the Court the promulgation of a new
73
74
ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued or registered
on May 3, 1917. Rather than suggest whether the petitions be
granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this
Court that it is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a remand
of this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle which among the
private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is
75
proper"
Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the
remand of the petition, albeit under differing qualifications. The
Manotoks submit that there should be a remand to the court of
origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be
76
conducted by the trial court. On the other hand, Araneta proposes
four (4) options for the Court to consider: (1) the dismissal of the
original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a ruling granting Aranetas
appeal and dismissing Dimsons complaint, but at the same time
remanding the case to a new division of the Court of Appeals for
factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion for
reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals
for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the proceedings to
the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence,
particularly the Senate and DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, and the consequent resolution by the
appellate court of the instant petitions.
The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for
reconsideration, then Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a
remand may be required to determine the status of the original
77
title. Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/
registered on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to
determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the
said genuine OCT No. 994. On the one hand, the appreciation of
facts is beyond the province of this Court, since it is not a trier of
78
fact as well as not capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first
instance. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the
competence to engage in that undertaking.
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for
79
certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual
issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any
80
of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The
delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings
81
of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded
great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and
has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter
pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of
82
Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the
controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area
reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of
the Cultural Center Complex which are open spaces and/or areas
reserved for certain purposes, determining in the process the
11 | P a g e

validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the

83
areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the
evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioners Report"
84
shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a
deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the
grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the
present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court
may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a
question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion
or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or
85
order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively
to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may
86
likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner
is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon
87
the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In
Republic, the commissioners report formed the basis of the final
adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain
herein.
VII.
The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the respective
investigations and reports by the Department of Justice and the
Philippine Senate, components of the two other co-equal branches
of the government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August 1997 and
the Senate Report dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only
one (1) OCT No. 994 issued or registered on 3 May 1997. The OSG
argues that the contents of both of these reports may be considered
as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that these reports may be
taken judicial notice of by this Court, following Section 1, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports
fall within the ambit of "the official acts of the legislative [and]
88
executive departments."
It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were rendered on
28 August 1997 and 25 May 1998 respectively. They were issued
some years after the trial courts had promulgated their respective
decisions in the Manotok and Araneta cases, and even after the
Court of Appeals handed down its decision against the Manotoks
89
which is assailed in its present petition. In Aranetas case, the
Court of Appeals had first ruled against Araneta in its Decision dated
30 May 1997, or just shortly before the rendition of the DOJ and
Senate Reports.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt
the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider
whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions
may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the
parties. The Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account
the reports on the regrettable premise that they could somehow
90
"override" the judicial decisions earlier arrived at. The reports
cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same
level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The
fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not,
in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The
facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo

LTD 2015
judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the
discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that
could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals.
The Manotoks and Araneta advert to certain factual allegations
relating to their titles and backstories to advance their respective
positions. Still, if it indeed emerges from the determination of the
Court of Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of
the title of respondents the titles of petitioners are cut from the
same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the Philippines, an
intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway with any and all
appropriate remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the
properties in question.
VIII.
The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these
cases are spelled out in Part VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions
serve to guide the Court of Appeals in hearing these cases on
remand.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear these cases on remand. The Special Division shall be
composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,
namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice
Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B.
Dimaampao as Junior Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude
the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of
this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail,
the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations
based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as
may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back
their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne
by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and
Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of
Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are
true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor
of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of
Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the
subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are
those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
12 | P a g e

Government and whether any of the parties is able to

trace its title to the title acquired by the Government
through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining
which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in
accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173289

February 17, 2010

ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO
MALABANAN NAMED TERESA MALABANAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
1
of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision dated
February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines,
Inc. and affirmed the Resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June
28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.
The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following:
Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan,
2
the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a Complaint dated March 2,
1998 for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
the RTC, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City against petitioner Eland
Philippines, Inc. Respondents claimed that they are the owners, in
fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355,
Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-008367, situated in Barangay Iruhin,
Tagaytay City, containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Four
Thousand One Hundred Twelve (244,112) square meters, by
3
occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the
Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
For having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as
owners of the said lot for at least thirty years, respondents stated
that they were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or
equitable interest or claim on the same lot until the time they were
requesting that the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out
that the lot was the subject of a land registration proceeding that
4
had already been decided by the same court where their complaint
was filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC
Record No. N-62686, was already issued on August 20, 1997 to the
petitioner pursuant to the Decision dated June 7, 1994 of the same
court. They averred that they were not notified of the said land
registration case; thus, they claimed the presence of
misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud. Thus, they
argued that they were also entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents,
representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to refrain
from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were served on
the petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998, petitioner filed an
5
Entry of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time, which the
6
trial court granted for a period of ten (10) days within which to file
a responsive pleading. Petitioner filed a Second Motion for
7
Extension of Time to File Answer dated April 29, 1998, which the
8
trial court likewise granted.
13 | P a g e

LTD 2015

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss dated May 9, 1998,

stating that the pleading asserting the claim of respondents stated
no cause of action, and that the latter were not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, setting the same for
hearing on May 21, 1998. On the date of the hearing, the trial court
10
issued an Order, which granted the respondents ten (10) days from
that day to file a comment, and set the date of the hearing on July
23,
1998.
Respondents
filed
a
Motion
to
Admit
11
Comment/Opposition to Defendant Eland, together with the
12
corresponding Comment/Opposition dated June 8, 1998.
On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial court
13
issued an Order, considering the Motion to Dismiss submitted for
resolution due to the non-appearance of the parties and their
respective counsels. The said motion was eventually denied by the
14
trial court in an Order dated September 25, 1998, ruling that the
allegations in the complaint established a cause of action and
enjoined petitioner Eland to file its answer to the complaint within
ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed two
15
Motions for Extension to File an Answer.
Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for
16
Reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated September 25,
1998, denying the former's Motion to Dismiss. Again, petitioner filed
17
a Motion for Final Extension of Time to File Answer dated
November 6, 1998. Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 1998.
Subsequently, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
18
reconsideration in an Order dated January 11, 1999.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland
19
in Default dated November 17, 1998. On December 4, 1998
Petitioner Eland filed its Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare
20
Defendant Eland in Default) dated December 2, 1998, while
respondents filed a Reply to Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to
21
Declare Defendant Eland in Default) dated December 29, 1998.
22
Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order dated January 11, 1999
declaring the petitioner in default and allowed the respondents to
present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a Motion for
23
Reconsideration (of the Order dated 11 January 1999) dated
February 5, 1999 on the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss
24
and in declaring it in default. The trial court in an Order dated
March 18, 1999, denied the former and granted the latter. In the
same Order, the trial court admitted petitioner's Answer Ad
Cautelam.
Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With Compulsory
25
Counterclaim) dated November 12, 1998. Respondents countered
26
by filing a Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records
dated December 2, 1998. Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff's
27
Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records) dated
December 21, 1998, as well as a Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to
28
Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records) dated January 26,
1999.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of
29
Evidence Ex Parte dated January 18, 1999, which was granted in an
30
Order dated January 22, 1999.

LTD 2015
On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their evidence before
the Clerk of Court of the trial court which ended on February 3,
1999; and, on February 10, 1999, respondents filed their Formal
31
Offer of Evidence. However, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
32
Suspend Plaintiff's Ex Parte Presentation of Evidence dated
33
February 8, 1999. In that regard, the trial court issued an Order
dated February 11, 1999 directing the Clerk of Court to suspend the
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed

Resolution dated November 3, 1999, of the RTC, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.

34

On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification as to

whether or not the evidence presented ex parte was nullified by the
admission of petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam. Petitioner filed its
35
Comment dated May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the
36
parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. However, petitioner filed a
37
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated May 24, 1999 on the ground
that the same petitioner had filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, asking for the nullification of the Order dated March 18, 1999 of
the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari was
38
subsequently denied; and a copy of the Resolution dated June 14,
39
1999 was received by the trial court. Hence, in an Order dated July
7, 1999, the trial court ruled that the reception of evidence already
presented by the respondents before the Clerk of Court remained as
part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right
to cross-examine the witness and to comment on the documentary
exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion
40
for Reconsideration dated July 19, 1999, but it was denied by the
41
trial court in an Omnibus Order dated September 14, 1999.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:

5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED
THAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATED AUGUST 05, 1999 DID NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
5.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED
THAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN
AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
5.3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED
THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE
ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-1784.

42

Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

43
dated August 5, 1999, while petitioner filed its Opposition to the
44
Motion dated August 31, 1999. In its Resolution dated November
3, 1999, the trial court found favor on the respondents. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary
judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful
possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay Cadastre,
subject to the rights of occupancy of the farm workers on
the one-third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration
Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No. N-217313,
LRC Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and
void;
3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be
canceled, as well as tax declaration covering Lot 9250,
Cad-355.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA,
which dismissed it in a Decision dated February 28, 2006, which
reads:
14 | P a g e

5.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE
COURT A QUO, BASED ON TESTIMONIES OF
RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT GRANTING
HEREIN PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND
UPON DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
5.5 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE
COURT A QUO BASED ON FALSIFIED "EVIDENCE."
5.6 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FAILED
TO RULE THAT THE COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED
PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING
ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
5.7 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD
THAT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL

LTD 2015
PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO.
0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.
According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must
be served at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing
thereof, and that a hearing must be held to hear the parties on the
propriety of a summary judgment, per Sec. 3 of Rule 35 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which was not observed because the
petitioner received a copy of the respondents' motion for summary
judgment only on August 20, 1999, or the very same day that the
motion was set for hearing. Petitioner further claims that the trial
court never conducted any hearing on the motion for summary
judgment.
Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to
a claimant seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory relief, and does not include cases for
quieting of title. Furthermore, petitioner also averred that a
summary judgment has no place in a case where genuine factual and
triable issues exist, like in the present case. It added that the
genuine and triable issues were all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to crossexamine the witnesses for the respondents without fault on its part.
It also stated that the trial court did not issue any order admitting in
evidence the documentary exhibits presented by the respondents.
Hence, according to the petitioner, the trial court gravely erred in
relying upon the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondents,
without having the latter cross-examined; and upon the
documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its Resolution
dated November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence.

respondents' evidence in order to suspend further proceedings that

were intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that
petitioner neglected to avail itself of, or to comply with, the
prescription of the rules found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by
opting not to avail itself of the hearing of its opposition to the
summary judgment after receiving the Order dated August 20, 1999;
by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or admission in the
records; and by not objecting to the decretal portion of the said
Order dated August 20, 1999, which stated that the motion for
summary judgment has been submitted for resolution without
further argument. With regard to the contention of the petitioner
that the trial court wrongly appreciated falsified evidence,
respondents asserted that petitioner's counsel failed to study
carefully the records of the proceedings for the presentation of the
evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was not only a singleday proceeding, and that more than one witness had been
presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely
on the photographs of the houses of the occupants of the property
in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated
that their complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title
under Art. 476 of the New Civil Code and for the review of the
decree of registration pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property
Registration Decree or P.D. No. 1529, because they are
complimentary with each other.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the
propriety of the summary judgment in this particular case of
quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering summary

judgment, the trial court deprived the former of its right to due
process.
45

Respondents, in their Comment

dated October 16, 2006,
countered the first issue raised by the petitioner, stating that their
filing of the motion for summary judgment fourteen (14) days
before the requested hearing of the same motion was in compliance
with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.
As to the second and third issues, respondents argued that
petitioner had a constricted perception of the coverage of the Rules
of Summary Judgment, and that the latter's citation of cases decided
by this Court showed the diverse causes of action that could be the
subject matters of summary judgment. Respondents also posited
that petitioner's statements in its Answer Ad Cautelam, although
denominated as Specific Denial, were really general denials that did
not comply with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court.
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite
the opportunity, or the right allowed in the Order dated July 17,
1999 of the trial court, for the petitioner to cross-examine
respondents' witnesses and to comment on the documentary
evidence presented ex parte after the default order against the
same petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside
15 | P a g e

SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover

upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall be
served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on
file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
46
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a
summary judgment.
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated,
because the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served
only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It
also added that even if the petitioner received a copy of the motion
only on August 20, 1999, there was no hearing conducted on that
date because the trial court issued an order giving petitioner 10 days
within which to file its comment or opposition.

LTD 2015
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was
correct in its observation that there was substantial compliance with
due process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day
notice rule was substantially complied with because when the
respondents filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9,
1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day
as shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for
hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing
thereof.

documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No.

TG-423 before this Honorable Court the markings and descriptions
of such documents are stated in the Judgment quoted as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; x x x.
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; x x x.
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; x x x.

Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always

and in all situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due
process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit one's evidence in support of his defense. What the law
prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice, but the
47
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an
action for quieting of title. This particular argument, however, is
misplaced. This Court has already ruled that any action can be the
subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception of actions
for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
48
separation.
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of
summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
49
genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is
the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment,
and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The
trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would
necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of
the case shows otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to
clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They
merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of
title and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer
Ad Cautelam, to wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and
uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more litigious
or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the
merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue
has already become nil because of not only the lack of seriousness in
the allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel of
land Lot 9250 was proven by the approved plan Ap-04-008367 that
was already presented and offered in evidence as Exhibit "B" for the
plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by
prior judgment rule is unavailing considering that the vital
16 | P a g e

(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" x x x.

are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the
plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No. 217313
issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant
to the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable
Court penned by the acting presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero in
said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the
complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing
evidence as the well-nigh or almost incontrovertible evidence of a
registerable title to the subject land in the proceedings conducted
on the reception of evidence ex-parte for the plaintiffs establishing
in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession
as aspects of acquisitive prescription as confirmed in the affidavit
herein attached as Annex "A";
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial
court merely stated that:
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs
cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is
based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings
of Lot 9250, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of
244,112 square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre,
containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant
Eland in its answer practically and mainly interposed the defenses
of: (a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the
parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423;
(b) the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this
Court in said Land Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs' complaint is
barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case No. TG423 that was decided previously by this Court with the case at bench
was imperatively made by this Court. Being minded that the Court
has and can take judicial notice of the said land registration case,
this Court observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried
on the merits. Firstly, because the supposed identity crisis of the
controverted parcel of land covered by the Land Registration Case
No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap04-006275 (Exhibit "N") LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367
(Exhibit "B" of the plaintiffs) and the Technical Description of Lot
9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit "B-1" of the plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior
judgment rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since not
only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and
established by the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of

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Appeals, G. R. No. 1184436, pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is
incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the
judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within
one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree
No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not attained
incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the
interaction of the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is
that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance
with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as
hereinafter illustrated.
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court,
propounded thus:
The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary
judgment is not only limited to solving actions involving money
claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Court, except as to the
amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. The term
"genuine issue" has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is appropriate
when there are no genuine issues of fact, which call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if on their
face the pleadings appear to raise issues, but when the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine,
then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a
matter of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered the
assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very court that
decided the LRC Case No. TG-423. Such being the case, the court a
quo was privy to all relevant facts and rulings pertaining to LRC Case
No. TG-423 which it considered and applied to this case. Thus,
where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court,
summary judgment may be granted as a matter of right.
On the contrary, in petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine,
factual and triable issues were raised, aside from specifically denying
all the allegations in the complaint, thus:
2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint insofar
as it alleges the personal circumstances of the plaintiff and
one A. F. Development Corporation for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof.

17 | P a g e

2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations

contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of said allegations. And if the property
referred to in said paragraphs is that parcel of land which
was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG423 which was previously decided by this Honorable Court
with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically
denied for the obvious reason that the said property had
already been adjudged with finality by no less than this
Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.
2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint insofar as it
alleged that "(u)pon exercise of further circumspection,
counsel for the plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the
1994 request of the plaintiffs to have the subject parcel of
land be declared for taxation purposes" and insofar as it is
made to appear that parcel of land being claimed by the
plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. TG-423 for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein
plaintiffs were never mentioned during the entire
proceedings in said land registration case and by reason of
the Affirmative Allegations contained hereunder.
2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d),
10 (e), 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason that
there is no showing that the parcel of land being claimed
by the plaintiff is the same parcel of land which was the
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG- 423, and
in the remote possibility that the parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land
subject of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, the
allegations contained in said paragraphs are still
specifically denied for the reason that no less than the
Honorable Court had decided with finality that the parcel
of land is absolutely owned by herein defendant to the
exclusion of all other persons as attested to by the
subsequent issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in
favor of answering defendant and for reasons stated in the
Affirmative Allegations.
2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint for the
obvious reason that it was the plaintiffs who appear to
have been sleeping on their rights considering that up to
the present they still do not have any certificate of title
covering the parcel of land they are claiming in the instant
case, while on the part of herein defendant, no less than
the Honorable Court had adjudged with finality that the
parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No.
TG-423 is absolutely owned by herein defendant.
2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint for the reason
that defendant has never ladgrabbed any parcel of land
belonging to others, much less from the plaintiffs, and

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further, answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations therein that plaintiffs engaged the services of a
lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge r information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the
Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as the truth thereof.
2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the reason that,
as above-stated, if the parcel of land being claimed by the
plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject matter
of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, this Honorable
Court had already decided with finality that said parcel of
land is absolutely owned by herein answering defendant
and additionally, for those reasons stated in defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations
contained in paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth thereof.
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the
same Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
xxxx
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states
no cause of action as asserted in the Motion To Dismiss
filed by herein answering defendant and for the reason
that there is no evidence whatsoever showing or attesting
to the fact that the parcel of land being claimed by the
plaintiffs in the Complaint is the same parcel of land which
was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment
rendered by this Honorable in Land Registration Case No.
TG-423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in
that OCT No. 0-660 had become incontrovertible by virtue
of the Torrens System of Registration; and to allow
plaintiffs to question the validity of answering defendant's
title through the instant complaint would be a collateral of
OCT No. 0-660 which is not permissible under the law.
4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission
from filing the present complaint under the principles of
estoppel and laches.
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as
they appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said
Land Registration Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such
knowledge, plaintiffs never bothered to present their
alleged claims in the proceedings.
18 | P a g e

4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice,

given everyone his due, and observed honesty and good
faith in his dealings.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for
summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by
petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a
full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot
50
take the place of trial. In the present case, the petitioner was able
to point out the genuine issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact
that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
51
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already
the registered owner (Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 0-660
issued by the Register of Deeds) of the parcel of land in question,
pursuant to a decree of registration (Decree No. N-217313, LRC
Record No. 62686) based on the ruling of the same court that
granted the summary judgment for the quieting of title.
Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in the disputed
summary judgment were obtained through judicial notice of the
facts and rulings pertaining to that earlier case (LRC Case No. TG423) wherein the same trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It
is, therefore, disorienting that the same trial court reversed its
earlier ruling, which categorically stated that:
x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the
vendors listed in Exhibit "HH," with submarkings, are the previous
owners of the parcel of land mentioned in the same deed of sale and
aside form the tax declarations covering the same property (Exhibits
"Q" to "T," inclusive), the uncontroverted testimony of Atty. Ruben
Roxas establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant's
(referring to herein defendant-appellant) sellers/predecessors-ininterest are the grandchildren, great grandchildren and great great
grandchildren of the spouses Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate,
the former owners of the same property, whose ownership is
further bolstered by tax receipts showing payments of realty taxes
(Exhibits "U" to "GG," inclusive, with submarkings).
xxx
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and
considering that applicant is a domestic corporation not otherwise
disqualified from owning real properties in the Philippines, this
Court
finds
that
applicant
has
satisfied
all
the
conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its application
pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as
amended, inspite of the opposition filed by the Heirs of the late
Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant's petition appears to
be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant petition for
land registration and, thus, places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-006275 and
containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in

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addition to other proofs adduced in the name of the applicant,
ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez
Ave. (Espaa Extension), Quezon City, Metro Manila.

but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or

unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding

decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast

upon title to real property or any interest therein.

SO ORDERED.

In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may
bring an action to quiet title, thus:

By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect

annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession and
ownership of the same land for more than thirty years without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that the respondents seek to
nullify the original certificate of title issued to the petitioner on the
claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a
number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a
material fact exists. This, together with the failure of the
respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved,
should have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for
summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial
courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
52
material fact.
Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to delve
briefly on the nature of the action of quieting of title as applied in
53
this case. This Court's ruling in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al. is
instructive on this matter, thus:
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in
54
Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court,
quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any
cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure
x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever
afterward free from any danger of hostile claim. In an action for
quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, x x x not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has
no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but
also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed
of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby
cast on the complainants title to real property or any interest
therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
19 | P a g e

Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper,
the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on
the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et
55
al. vs. CA, we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiffs title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the
owners in fee-simple title of the subject land by occupation and
possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Thus, it appears that
the first requisite has been satisfied. Anent the second requisite,
respondents enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the
invalidity of the claim of the petitioner. All of these claims, which
would correspond to the two requisites for the quieting of title, are
factual; and, as discussed earlier, the petitioner interposed its
objections and duly disputed the said claims, thus, presenting
genuine issues that can only be resolved through a full-blown trial.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title,
the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of
registration come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or

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confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent
purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it
shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.

certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a

title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown,
whether actually served with notice or not, and includes all who
have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the
registration of their own estate or interest in the property in the
name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default,
and, in the absence of fraud, such judgment is conclusive. If an
interest in the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of
60
registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.
61

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of

registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for
the fraud.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No.
0-660 of petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a
Decree issued on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the
quieting of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on
March 5, 1998; hence, applying the above provisions, it would seem
that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration has not elapsed for the review thereof. However, a
closer examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate
that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the
proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or
decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved
56
within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely
on actual fraud. Shedding light on the matter is a discussion
presented in one of the recognized textbooks on property
57
registration, citing decisions of this Court, thus:
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening
58
and revising a decree of registration. One of the remedies
available to him is a petition for review. To avail of a petition for
review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the
land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the
decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority;
and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent
59
purchaser for value.
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of
title obtained under the Torrens system. An important feature of a
20 | P a g e

As further pointed out in the same book, the petition for review
must be filed within one year from entry of the decree of
registration. As written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from
the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated
and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the
62
control and sound discretion of the registration court. After the
lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no
longer subject to reopening or review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of
registration may be filed "not later than one year from and after
the date of entry of such decree of registration." Giving this
provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the
petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has
been entered. However, it has been ruled that the petition may be
filed at any time after the rendition of the court's decision and
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree
63
of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran, there can be no
possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait until the
final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to reopen and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of
registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and
64
issued by the Land Registration Administrator.
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall
bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the national government, and Sec. 32
that the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of
absence, minority or other disability or by any proceeding in court,
save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from
the entry of the decree, must be understood as referring to final and
unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is
sometimes called after entry, a decree of a registration court, does
not become final and unappealable until fifteen days after the
interested parties have been notified of its entry, and during that
period may be set aside by the trial judge on motion for new trial,
65
upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of Court. An appeal
from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from
becoming final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the
66
appellate court.
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and
distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is
not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the
grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where

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petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any final decree
had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending
and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent
67
purchasers in good faith. 1avvphi1
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed
within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is error for
the court to deny the petition without hearing the evidence in
support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which
the petition is predicated. The petitioner should be afforded an
68
opportunity to prove such allegation.
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus,
a review of the decree of registration would have been the
appropriate remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the
petitioner are necessarily rendered inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland
Philippines, Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated
February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines,
Inc. and affirmed the resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June
28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the resolutions dated November 3,
1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City in Civil
Case No. TG-1784 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22822

August 30, 1968

GREGORIA PALANCA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE AMERICAN FOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TIBURCIO
EVALLE, in his capacity as Director of Patents, respondentsappellees.
Lopez De Joya, Dimaguila and Hermoso for petitioner-appellant.
Domingo F. de Guzman for respondent-appellee American Food
Manufacturing
Company.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee Director of
Patents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
On May 14, 1958, petitioner-appellant Gregoria Palanca filed with
the Philippine Patent Office, Department of Commerce and Industry,
an application to register the trademark, "LION and the
representation of a lion's head," alleging that she had been using the
trademark since January 5, 1958 on bechin (food seasoning). The
application was opposed by herein respondent-appelee. The
American Food Manufacturing Company, on the ground that
petitioner's trademark was similar to its (respondent's) trademark
"LION and representation of a lion" previously adopted and used by
it on the same type of product since August 3, 1953.
After hearing, the Director of Patents, on June 14, 1961, rendered a
decision, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
The record of the case consisting of respondent1
appellant's application, the testimonies on behalf of the
2
parties with accompanying exhibits and the opposer's
memorandum have been given careful consideration.
There is no memorandum for respondent-applicant.
"There can be no question but that the trademarks and
the goods of the parties are similar. Accordingly the only
issue presented is that of priority of use.
Opposer's record establishes that it has at least since
1957, prior to January 5, 1968, the earliest date of use
asserted by respondent-applicant, continuously used LION
and representation thereof, as a trademark for bechin
(food seasoning). The opposer is therefore the prior user
while the respondent-applicant is the later user of
substantially the same trademark.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, the opposition
is hereby sustained and application Serial No. 6321 of
Gregoria Palanca is rejected.
The record shows the petitioner's counsel was furnished with copy
3
of the decision on June 16, 1961. No appeal was taken from the
decision of the Director of Patents within the reglementary period
from June 16, 1961.

21 | P a g e

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On December 14, 1961, however, herein petitioner-appellant filed
with the Patent Office a petition to set aside the aforementioned
judgment of June 14, 1961, invoking section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court, alleging fraud and/or negligence committed by her former
counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Medel, in that the latter failed to file a
memorandum before the case was submitted for decision; that she
had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the proceedings in
the case; that her counsel had not informed her of the decision thus
preventing her from resorting to all the legal remedies available to
her; that she came to known of the decision only about the latter
part of October, 1961, through her friend, Mr. Domingo Adevoso;
that she had evidence to disprove the claim of opposer The
American Food Manufacturing Company that it had been using the
same trademark even before 1958; and that she had evidence to
show that the bechin that the opposer sold prior to 1958 were not
of the "Lion" brand but of the "Lion-Tiger" brand, another trademark
of opposer.
In its answer to the petition to set aside the judgment, the opposer,
herein respondent-appellee be American Food Manufacturing
Company, denied the allegations of the petition and put up special
and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the petition was filed out of
time; that the evidence proposed to be presented was not new but
was already existing and available at the time of the hearing of the
case; and that the decision was not rendered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, as is contemplated in
Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The petition to set aside the judgment was set for hearing, wherein
petitioner-appellant and a witness, Ricardo Monfero, testified.
Witness Monfero testified that he was the owner of a grocery store
in San Pablo City, that the receipts issued to him by the American
Food Manufacturing Company on October 16, 1957 showing that
Lion blue bechin had been sold to his store really referred to LionTiger brand bechin After this hearing, herein respondent-appellee
Director of Patents issued resolution No. 20, dated October 14,
1963, denying the petition to set aside judgment, pertinent portions
of which resolution reads:
Therefore, from the facts established, no extrinsic or
collateral fraud would warrant the setting aside of the
judgment herein already rendered.
This office has also carefully considered the possible value
of the evidence purportedly showing that the Opposer
falsified its receipt to be proven through the testimony of
Ricardo Monfero. His testimony is of course, immaterial to
the issue because what should have been proven was the
alleged fraud but, inasmuch as the purpose for his
presentation as witness and the nature of his testimony
has been revealed, this Office might as well rule now that
such character of evidence can not be considered as a new
evidence which would alter the result of the proceedings.
Her motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the
petition to set aside judgment having been denied, petitionerappellant filed a notice of appeal "from the decision of the Director
of Patents to the Supreme Court on the ground that said decision is
not supported by the evidence presented and is contrary to law."

22 | P a g e

In her brief, petitioner-appellant contends that respondent Director

of Patents committed the following errors:1wph1.t
1. In denying the petition to set aside judgment and
resolving that there was no fraud perpetrated against
petitioner-appellant, as contemplated under section 2 of
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court; .
2. In holding that a client is bound even by fraudulent and
deliberate lapses of his counsel;.
3. In holding that the testimony of the petitionerappellant's witness, Ricardo Monfero, is immaterial and
that it cannot be considered as a newly discovered
evidence which would alter the result of the proceedings;
4. In holding that the prior user of the trademark in
question is the respondent-appellee, The American Food
Manufacturing Company;
5. In giving more credence to the invoices of
respondent company than on the testimony of
respondent
company's
customers
denying
genuineness and the truth of the facts contained in
invoices;

the
the
the
said

6. In not considering the failure of the respondent

company to register the trademark in question earlier than
1958 as negating its claim of its prior use as early as 1953;
and.
7. In rejecting the application for registration of trademark
Lion and Representation in the vetsin food products of
petitioner-appellant and in sustaining the opposition of
the respondent company.
We have noted, upon a reading of herein appellant's notice of
appeal and appeal brief, that she does not only question the
correctness of the resolution of appellee Director of Patents denying
the petition to set aside the decision of June 14, 1961 but at the
same time prays for the reversal of the said decision. We believe
that in this appeal the most that appellant can ask this Court is to
pass upon the correctness of the resolution denying the petition to
set aside the decision.
The record shows that the decision proper, which was rendered on
June 14, 1961, had already become final, because counsel for the
appellant had been furnished with copy of said decision on June 16,
1961 and no appeal had been taken from said decision within the
reglementary period. Appellant admits that she had lost completely
4
her right to appeal from the decision. It is a settled rule that notice
of any decision or order of a court to counsel is also notice to the
5
client. Appellant claims that she became aware of the decision only
6
during the last week of October, 1961. Indeed she took the proper
step when on December 14, 1961 she filed a petition to set aside the
decision upon the alleged ground of fraud pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. That petition to set aside the decision,
however, was denied by the respondent-appellee Director of
Patents on October 14, 1963. It is only from this order denying the

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petition to set aside the decision that herein appellant can now
appeal to this Court, and not from the decision proper which was
rendered on June 14, 1961. We are, therefore, concerned only in
determining whether the respondent-appellee Director of Patents
had correctly denied the petition to set aside the decision of June
14, 1961. In this connection, we shall dwell only on the first three
errors that have been assigned by the petitioner-appellant.
Petitioner-appellant, in support of the first three assigned errors
which she discussed jointly, argues that the acts committed by her
former counsel, Atty. Bienvenido Medel, constitute fraud that would
warrant the setting aside of the decision denying her application to
register the controverted trademark. These acts, allegedly, are: his
having kept her ignorant of the proceedings of the case; his having
failed to file a memorandum after the hearing of the evidence
before the Patent Office; his having failed to notify her of the
adverse decision after receiving notice of it, of which decision she
came to know only after five months from the time it was rendered;
his having intentionally kept himself entirely out of her reach,
thereby causing her to lose the right to appeal in due time and
preventing her from informing counsel of the newly discovered
evidence which might have changed the decision had it been timely
presented. Petitioner-appellant also claims that the acts of her
counsel also prevented her from presenting all her case before the
Patent Office and deprived her of other available legal remedies. She
claims, furthermore, that the acts and/or behavior of her counsel
cannot be considered honest mistakes, but are fraudulent and
deliberate lapses or omissions on his part, which cannot bind her as
a client. She also claims that the Director of Patents erred in finding
that the testimony of Ricardo Monfero during the hearing on the
petition to set aside the decision was immaterial, because this
witness precisely testified that the invoices relied upon by the
Director of Patents in finding that respondent The American Food
Manufacturing Company had been using the trademark at least
since 1957 referred to the trademark "Lion-Tiger" of said respondent
and not to the trademark in question, and so this testimony had
directly refuted the basis of the findings of facts of the respondent
Director.
Respondent-appellee Director of Patents, on the other hand,
contends that the basic issue in the petition to set aside the decision
of June 14, 1961 is whether there was fraud, as contemplated in
section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, to justify the setting aside
of the decision. This respondent-appellee maintains that the acts or
omissions of her counsel, cited by petitioner-appellant as
constituting fraud, had not prevented her from presenting fully her
case, such that it could not be said that there had never been a real
contest before the Patent Office regarding the subject matter of the
suit. He further maintains that the acts of petitioner-appellant's
counsel complained of, including the failure to file the
memorandum, refer to procedural matters, and were binding on
her. Regarding the merit, of the testimony of Monfero, respondentappellee Director of Patents contends that there is no use in
discussing the same because fraud as would warrant the setting
aside of the judgment had not been shown.

effect. Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set

aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or
collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for
7
annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the
trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand,
intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial,
such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testimony, which
did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and
8
just determination of the case. The distinctions are pointed out in
the case of United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93,
the very case cited by petitioner-appellant where the court
said:
Where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest
to the other side - these, and similar cases which show
that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may
be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment
or decree, and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that

the court will not set aside a judgment because it was
founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence,
or for any matter which was actually presented and
considered in the judgment assailed.
In this connection, this Court, in the case of Varela vs. Villanueva,
etc., et al., 95 Phil. 248, 258, said:.
The rule is that an action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud, will not lie unless the fraud be extrinsic or
collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, and that
false testimony or perjury is not a ground for assailing said
judgment, unless the fraud refers to jurisdiction (Labayen
vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 68 Phil. 376); that fraud has
been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where it has
prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all
of his case to the court (33 Am. Jur. pp. 230-232). The
reason for this rule has been aptly stated in Almeda, et al.
vs. Cruz, 47 Off. Gaz., 1179:

We uphold the stand of respondent-appellee Director of Patents.

Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment
or order entered against a party through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to that
23 | P a g e

'Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment

must be extrinsic to the litigation. Were not this
the rule there would be no end to litigations,
perjury being of such common occurrence in

LTD 2015
trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing
party could attack the judgment at any time by
attributing imaginary falsehood to his
adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that
judicial determination however erroneous of
matters brought within the court's jurisdiction
cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is
the business of a party to meet and repel his
opponent's perjured evidence.'

The failure of counsel to notify her on time of the adverse

judgment to enable her to appeal therefrom does not
constitute excusable negligence. Notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure
of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting
in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. (Duran v.
Pagarigan, L-12573, Jan. 29, 1960).
xxx

The acts complained of by petitioner-appellant, even if assumed to

be true and fraudulent, were all committed by her own counsel, and
not by the successful party or opponent in the case. Hence,
petitioner-appellant had not shown extrinsic fraud that would
warrant the setting aside of the decision.
Negligence, mistake or fraud of one's own attorney is not
ground for granting a new trial. (O'Quinn v. Tate, [Tex.]
Civ. App. 187 S.W. 2d 241).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Fraud, such as would authorize the setting aside of the

verdict at the instance of the movant, is fraud of
respondent or his counsel. She is not at liberty to avail
herself of the misconduct of her own counsel, for the
purpose of annulling the verdict obtained by respondent.
(Ketchem v. Ketchem, 11 S.E. 2d 788).
xxx

xxx

xxx

In order to obtain relief on this ground it must appear that

the fraud was practiced or participated in by the judgment
creditor, or his agent or attorney. The fraud must have
been practiced upon the opposite party." (Amuran vs.
Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Velayo vs. Shell Company of the
Philippines, Ltd., G.R. No. L-8883, July 14, 1959.).
The record shows that petitioner-appellant had all the opportunity
to present fully her side of the case before the decision was
rendered, because she and her witnesses. Estrellita Concepcion and
Adela Palmario, testified in the case. The decision in question itself
states that "The record of the case consisting of respondentapplicant's application, the testimonies on behalf of the parties with
accompanying exhibits and the opposer's memorandum have been
9
given careful consideration." The failure to submit a memorandum
was also the negligence of her counsel and could not in any manner
be attributed to any fraud or deception practiced by her opponent.
This Court has held that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of
witnesses, the sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof, his failure to introduce certain
evidence, or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are not
proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of counsel
be so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly
10
presenting his case.
Anent appellant's not having been informed of the adverse decision,
this Court has held that:
24 | P a g e

xxx

xxx

Relief under Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who

seeks relief from the effects of a judgment on the ground
of fraud, where the loss of the remedy is due to his own
fault or negligence or that of his counsel." (Echevarri v.
Velasco, 55 Phil. 570.)
The claim of petitioner-appellant that she had evidence, to disprove
the claim of opposer (herein appellee The American Food
Manufacturing Company) that it was the prior user of the trademark
in question, and to show that the receipts issued by opposer
purporting to be in connection with the sale of Lion brand bechin
were falsified, is tantamount to saying that her adversary in this case
had presented false evidence consisting of perjured testimonies and
falsified documents. But even assuming that the evidence presented
by respondent-appellee The American Food Manufacturing
Company was false, this circumstance would not constitute extrinsic
fraud, but only intrinsic fraud. This Court, in a number of cases, held:
Assuming that there were falsities on the aspect of the
case, they make out merely intrinsic fraud which, as
already noted, is not sufficient to annul a judgment.
(Varela vs. Villanueva, etc., et al., supra).
xxx

xxx

xxx

And we have recently ruled that presentation of false

testimony or the concealment of evidentiary facts does
not per se constitute extrinsic fraud, the only kind of fraud
sufficient to annul a court decision. (Cortes vs. Brownell,
Jr., etc., et al., 97 Phil. 542, 548).
xxx

xxx

xxx

That the testimony upon which a judgment has been

based was false or perjured is no ground to assail said
judgment, unless the fraud refers to jurisdiction" (Labayen,
et al. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., 68 Phil. 376, 383, quoting
Scotten vs. Rosenblum, 231 Fed., 357; U.S. vs. Chung Shee,
71 Fed. 277; Giffen vs. Christ's Church, 48 Cal. A. 151; 191
P. 718; Pratt vs. Griffin, 223 Ill., 349; 79 N.E., 102).
xxx

xxx

xxx

As a general rule, extrinsic or collateral fraud would

warrant a court of justice to set aside or annul a judgment,
based on fraud (Labayen, et al. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
G.R. No. 45843, June 30, 1939, L.J. Aug. 15, 1939). In
seeking the annulment of the decision of Civil Case No.

LTD 2015
833 (CA-G.R. No. 8085-R), the alleged fraud does not refer
to jurisdiction, but to the admission by the trial court in
said case, of supposedly false or forged documents, which
is intrinsic in character. (Velasco, et al. vs. Velasco, G.R.
No. L-15129, June 30, 1961).
We find that respondent-appellee Director of Patents correctly ruled
that the testimony of Ricardo Monfero, a witness presented by
the petitioner-appellant during the hearing on the petition to set
aside the decision is immaterial to the issue of whether or not the
decision should be set aside. This witness did not testify on any
matter which would establish extrinsic fraud that would warrant the
setting aside of the decision.
As we have adverted to at the early part of this opinion, this appeal
must be treated only as an appeal from the resolution of
respondent-appellee Director of Patents, dated October 14, 1963,
denying the petition to set aside the decision rendered on June 14,
1961. Having found that respondent Director of Patents committed
no error in denying the petition to set aside the decision, we do not
consider it necessary to discuss the other errors assigned by
petitioner-appellant because those other errors are not pertinent to
the appeal now before this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The resolution of the
Director of Patents, dated October 14, 1963, denying petitionerappellant's petition to set aside the decision, dated June 14, 1961, in
Inter Partes Case No. 130 before the Philippine Patent Office, is
affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.

25 | P a g e