CHINA S SOLAR PV

VALUE CHAIN
Opportunities to improve prots
Spring 2011

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About the China Greentech Initiative
Founded in 2008, the China Greentech Initiative (CGTI) Partner Program has rapidly grown to become
the only China-international collaboration platform of 100+ organizations, focused on identifying,
developing and promoting green technology solutions in China. Partnering organizations are technology
buyers and sellers, service providers, investors, policy makers and influencers. Sector tracks addressed
during the 2011 CGTI Partner Program include Cleaner Conventional Energy, Renewable Energy, Electric
Power Infrastructure, Green Building, Cleaner Transportation and Clean Water.
Built on two cornerstones, strategic market research and a community of 300+ industry experts, CGTI
provides participating organizations with three core benefits: world class market insights that enable
better decisions, meaningful relationships that lead to business opportunities, and thought leadership
and education that position participants as leaders in Chinas greentech markets.
In addition to the Partner Program, CGTI offers Advisory Services, conducts briefings and publishes
public content, including White Papers and the annual China Greentech Report. The flagship China
Greentech Report, released at the World Economic Forum, together with the China Greentech Report
2011, have more than 60,000 copies in use globally and have helped establish CGTI as the authority on
Chinas ever evolving greentech markets.

Renewable Energy Sector Definition

The China Greentech Initiative defines Renewable Energy as energy produced from sources that
are naturally replenishing, such as sunlight, wind, waves, underground heat, surface water flows
and biomass. Of these, CGTI focuses on the markets and technology for wind power, solar energy
and bioenergy (including power, cooling and heating).

www.china-greentech.com | CGTI WHITE PAPER 2011

Executive Summary
Given current challenges in world solar markets, Chinas solar photovoltaic (PV) producers seek
opportunities to reduce costs and preserve gross margins through vertical integration and industry
consolidation.
Solar producers face uncertain times: While global solar PV markets may continue to grow, rapidly
falling prices, unstable subsidy schemes and module oversupply result in falling margins across the value
chain. Low-cost Chinese producers are raising production capacity to new records, in turn driving down
selling prices and margins. At the same time, as domestic competition increases, the pressure to
increase profits and market share has intensified. Chinas historically fragmented solar industry, with
hundreds of small players across the value chain, are looking for strategies to strengthen financial
performance, including vertical integration and capacity expansion, which is already widespread, and
industry consolidation. While the number of manufacturers in China may not decline in the short-term,
stakeholders should expect the top-tier players, with strong cost advantages, to continue to grow in size
and market share. Thus far, however, vertical integration and expanding production capacity do not
appear to guarantee profitability. Companies must also seek innovative strategies and partnerships to
stay ahead of the market.

Definition and Scope

This White Paper focuses on opportunities for companies to reduce costs and improve profitability along
the solar PV value chain in China. The value chain includes seven segments:

Polysilicon

Ingots

Wafers

Cells

Modules

Systems

Projects

The White Paper does not cover thin film PV or concentrated PV due to their relatively small current
market share in China. The White Paper begins with an overview of global solar market conditions, and
then explores opportunities and trends for vertical integration and industry consolidation (horizontal
integration).
Industry Consolidation (horizontal integration) occurs when the number of companies involved declines
as successful companies grow in size and smaller companies are either bought out or go out of business.
Consolidation is particularly common for high-tech industries with high barriers to entry, who focus on
the importance of reaching economies of scale in production. Many experts anticipate consolidation in
Chinas solar industry, particularly in the commoditized module segment of the value chain, which
currently has hundreds of competitors.
Vertical Integration occurs when companies acquire new production or service capabilities along the
value chain, in either an upstream or downstream manner relative to their core competency. For
example, a company that produces solar cells may vertically integrate upstream by producing
polysilicon, or integrate downstream by producing solar modules or systems.

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Market Context
Subsidy cuts slow growth in European markets, while solar PV demand grows in non-
European markets
Following a year of robust global growth in 2010 with 16.6 GW of installed capacity, solar PV
continued its rapid expansion in 2011. Established European markets, such as Germany and Italy,
continued to account for the majority of early 2011 installations representing up to 60% of market
demand.1 Due to recent subsidy cuts, however, total demand in Europe is falling. Italy, for example, has
made capped funding for large-scale installations, reduced feed-in tariffs beginning in 2012, and
removed all tax breaks for solar production and installation. At the beginning of 2011, uncertainties
surrounding these new policies resulted in a dramatic slow-down in installations and an accumulating
module inventory in Italy reaching nearly 3 GW.2 Feed-in tariffs have also been cut in the Czech Republic,
France and Spain. The impact of subsidy cuts may be less drastic than feared in the worlds largest PV
market, Germany, following the decision to decommission all nuclear power plants by 2022. Germany
currently obtains 23% of electricity from nuclear power, leaving room for new renewable energy
capacity development.3 German installations, however, declined 32% from 2010 as a result of a 13% cut
in the countrys favorable feed-in tariff, potentially due to falling PV equipment prices.4
Global solar PV demand, while recently concentrated in Europe, is diversifying as a result of the
growing interest in low-carbon energy sources, concerns raised by the March 2011 nuclear disaster in
Japan, and rapidly dropping module prices, which has accelerated the discussion of grid-parity cost for
solar. State-based incentives in California, New Jersey and Texas may make the U.S. the fastest growing
market, with 241% growth in 2010.5 Other incentives and policy mandates are driving demand in other
new markets. For example, Ontario, Canada has introduced a feed-in tariff for projects under 10 MW,
Japan has increased emphasis on solar development through a residential feed-in tariff scheme, and
India has established a 20 GW installation target for 2020.
Long a major exporter of solar modules, China looks set to develop its domestic market and
become one of Asias largest solar energy producers. By the end of 2010, China had 860 MW of installed
solar power capacity, whereas it produced nearly 8 GW of modules annually. This imbalance has left
Chinas solar producers vulnerable to fluctuations in overseas markets. The government, which supports
domestic PV manufacturers, has recognized this and is working to ensure a continued demand for
domestically-produced modules through the creation of feed-in-tariff policies. This is in-line with the
central governments focus on reducing carbon emissions and improving environmental conditions, as
emphasized in the current 12th Five-Year Plan. The plan, which lays out Chinas policy priorities for the

1

European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015, May,
2011
2
Osborne, Mark, Italy has a new FiT, PV-Tech, May 6, 2011, www.pv-tech.org
3
The Guardian, Germany pledges nuclear shutdown by 2022, May 30, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk
4
Hughes, Emma, Germany Feed-in Tariffs, PV-Tech, Dec. 13, 2010, www.pv-tech.org
5
Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), Solar Policies, www.seia.org, (accessed on May 9, 2011)

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2011-2015 period, targets 10 GW of solar power by 2015 and 50 GW by 2020.6 Exactly how China will
achieve these ambitious targets remains to be seen, but given the rapid growth experienced in the wind
industry, few doubt Chinas ability to meet its targets.7

Production capacity may exceed demand by 6 GW in 2011, fueling fears of oversupply

While demand for solar modules and systems has increased, production capacity is growing at an
even faster rate. In 2010, production capacity outpaced demand by over 1 GW and, in 2011, this
discrepancy may grow to as much as 6 GW.8 Much of the 26 GW of predicted new supply comes from
Chinese producers, whose astounding expansion plans will account for 80% of global production
capacity growth, while recognizing that economies of scale are important for eventual success. This
sentiment was echoed by one CGTI interviewee who noted that manufacturers producing less than 1
GW per year will not survive. By the end of 2011, Chinese companies may produce almost 16 GW of
solar PV, or roughly 60% of global capacity, up from 50% in 2010, and only 8% in 2005.9

Leading Chinese players JA Solar and LDK Solar exemplify this trend. LDK Solar plans to more than
double its wafer production capacity from 2009 levels of 1.8 GW to 4 GW by the end of 2011, while JA
Solar hopes to reach 2.2 GW of solar cell and module capacity by the beginning of 2012.10

6

EPIA, Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015, May, 2011
China Greentech Initiative (CGTI) Partner interviews
8
EPIA, Global market outlook for photovoltaics until 2015, May, 2011
9
Ibid.
10
CGTI analysis
7

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This rapid acceleration has had multiple effects on the industry. The first is a significant decline in
average selling prices (ASPs) globally. Between May 2010 and February 2011, ASPs dropped by 16% on
average. Since the beginning of 2011, cell and module ASPs have fallen by a staggering 30%.11 Crystalline
silicon (c-Si) solar cell ASPs are approaching the US$ 1/W mark, their lowest price to date, with modules
dipping below US$ 1.50/W.12 The second effect is a growing fear of oversupply spreading throughout
the industry, particularly as European countries scale back the costliest subsidy programs. The degree of
overcapacity that will be created is in dispute, depending on the ability of manufacturers to trim back
expansion plans or the variable effects of newly-introduced subsidies on the market. At any rate,
oversupply fears could accelerate further declines in ASPs, which would hurt the financial performance
of smaller, lower-tier producers.13

Falling module selling prices squeeze profits across the value chain
Falling ASPs, caused by capacity expansions, as well as technology and manufacturing
improvements and competition from low-cost producers, places pressure on gross profits across the
value chain. Module producers, in particular, have experienced substantial declines. Some analysts
estimate gross profit declines of 84% between 2008 and the end of 2011 for module producers relative
to declines of 64% in aggregate profits across the value chain during the same period.14 While wafer
producers currently boast higher profits than cell and module producers, this segment remains
vulnerable. Upstream polysilicon producers, however, have maintained the highest gross margins of
roughly 50%.
In this context of increasing competition and uncertain demand, solar PV producers must look for
new strategies to ensure profitability and preserve gross margins. One of the most popular strategies is
vertical integration, which has become the mantra of many producers, particularly in China. Many
analysts also expect to see the initiation of industry consolidation given the high number of independent
companies in downstream module and project development segments. The following sections of this
White Paper explore how these strategies and trends are playing out, and what impacts they may have
on key producers across the value chain.

11

Seeking Alpha, ReneSola could face higher than expected silicon wafer price pressure in Q2, Jun. 12, 2011,
www.seekingalpha.com
12
Buemi, David, Update: Continuing ASP Decline in the PV Supply Chain, The PV Advocate, Apr. 29, 2011,
www.davebuemi.com
13
Williams, Andrew, Growing Fears of PV Module Oversupply in 2011, Renewable Energy World, Mar. 3, 2011,
www.renewableenergyworld.com
14
Deutsche Bank, Solar Industry 2011 Outlook, Jan. 5, 2011

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Vertical Integration Trends

Paths to vertical integration vary widely by company and do not guarantee high
margins
All of the worlds largest solar PV module suppliers in 2010 were vertically integrated to some
degree, with companies such as Hanwha SolarOne (China) and REC (Norway) fully integrated from
polysilicon production to project development. Vertical integration most commonly occurs across the
ingot to module segments of the value chain (which includes wafers and cells), with capital and energy-
intensive polysilicon production and service-oriented project development left to specialists. However,
not all companies follow the same path to integration. Some producers, such as Yingli and Hanwha
SolarOne, began in the module segment of the value chain and gradually expanded into polysilicon
production. LDK Solar, on the other hand, started out in wafer production and then simultaneously
integrated upstream into polysilicon and downstream into cells and modules.15
Although many companies have capabilities across the value chain, production capacity is not
necessarily spread evenly. For example, in 2010, JA Solar shipped nearly 2 GW of cell capacity and only
500 MW of module capacity, while LDK Solar shipped 628 MW of wafers and only 27 MW of cells.16 This
uneven integration leaves producers open to value chain bottlenecks and potential conflicts of interest
with downstream customers who may also be competitors.17

15

CGTI analysis
Ibid.
17
CGTI interviews
16

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Fluctuating demand driven by incentive policies, barriers to entry in upstream portions of the value
chain, and production bottlenecks in a rapidly expanding market have increased the appeal of vertical
integration. However, vertical integration at this stage of market development has not necessarily led to
higher gross margins and better financial performance. According to CGTIs analysis, there appears to be
no correlation between the degree of vertical integration and gross profit margin. The same data also
reveals that increased production capacity and presumed economies of scale is no guarantee of gross
margin success. While many factors determine a companys gross margin, including pricing strategy,
manufacturing efficiencies and technology, the lack of clear correlation suggests companies should
consider these other areas of potential competitive advantage before pursuing a vertical integration
model.

Upstream integration can help control costs and secure supply, but faces high barriers
Upstream integration in the crystalline silicon value chain generally refers to polysilicon production.
Polysilicon, made from quartz through a chemical production process, is the primary raw material used
in solar PV modules. For many module producers, securing a high-quality, stable supply of polysilicon
remains one of the biggest challenges. Polysilicon production remains concentrated in a small number of
companies, of which the top four produce more than 50% of global capacity.18 In 2008, when polysilicon
was in short supply, spot prices skyrocketed to more than US$ 450 per kilogram, forcing prices up across
the value chain and eating into downstream profits.19 While prices have fallen dramatically since then to
less than US$ 75 per kilogram, companies still struggle to secure high-quality polysilicon supply. This
phenomenon is particularly evident in China, where domestic production cannot keep pace with
demand. In 2010, China imported 50% of its polysilicon, and much of its domestic supply came from
small, low-quality producers.20
Downstream Chinese producers have three main ways of procuring polysilicon: buying on the spot
market, signing long-term supply contracts and producing in-house. Given supply constraints in China,
many companies have chosen to develop in-house capacity, including Yingli, LDK and ReneSola.
Advantages to this approach include:
Cost reduction potential (since polysilicon makes up 15% of the total cost of a solar module)
Higher gross margin capture (the polysilicon segment of the value chain has enjoyed 50% gross
margins compared to 20-30% for module producers)
Reduced exposure to polysilicon price and supply fluctuations
Assured source of consistent polysilicon for better product quality
Despite the advantages listed above, there is no consensus on in-house polysilicon production as
the best strategy. The investment and time required to develop in-house supply is high, and production

18

Shah, Abhishek, List of Worlds Top (Solar, Semi) 8 Polysilicon Companies Asia Rising as Big get Bigger, Green
World Investor, Mar. 2, 2011, www.greenworldinvestor.com
19
Wilkinson, Sam, Silicon update: polysilicon suppliers call the shots, IMS Research, Apr. 12, 2011,
www.solarnovus.com
20
Research Report on China Polysilicon Industry, 2011-2012, (Maryland, US: Market Research, 2011)

www.china-greentech.com | CGTI WHITE PAPER 2011

is only efficient at a very large scale. As Chinese companies like GCL-Poly expand rapidly (which is
projected to be the largest producer in the world in 2012), supply constraints may ease, in turn making
supply-contracts more cost-effective and discouraging the significant financial investments required for
upstream integration.

Downstream integration gives companies new revenue streams and access to new
markets
While many solar companies in the U.S. and Europe have long been active in project
developmentSunPower and Solar World, for exampleChinese solar companies have focused on
manufacturing modules and other components. With many markets across the world growing rapidly,
companies look to project development and operation and maintenance (O&M) services as promising
new revenue streams, as well as a path to secure demand for their own modules in new markets.21 In
China, downstream integration success will depend on business models dictated by the evolution of
market support policies, and will largely be determined by the role that large state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) will play in project development and ownership.
Feed-in tariffs and other measures to stimulate growth have remained elusive, but Chinas solar
market is set to grow rapidly in the coming years based on government targets. If Chinas experience
with wind power is any indication, concession rounds will be used to stimulate growth in the near-term.
The government will use these concession rounds to allow for controlled development of the market, by
concurrently providing developers with practical experience and allowing the price of solar power
generation to drop to acceptable levels before the government would implement broader subsidies. To
date, the small-scale Golden Sun and Solar Roofs subsidy programs, in addition to two concession
rounds (where developers bid for individual projects) for utility-scale projects, have resulted in 860 MW
of solar power capacity.22
Solar PV producers, which are mostly private companies, will have to compete or cooperate with
Chinas powerful SOEs for project development and operation rights. Some examples of downstream
activity by module producers exist, such as Suntechs 10 MW project in Tibet and China Sunergys 7 MW
building-integrated PV roof in Nanjing, but the largest projects, thus far, have been developed by SOEs
who have won all of the major projects in the first two concession rounds. 23 While these concession
rounds are not expected to result in high profits for participating companies, early participation in these
concession rounds may help companies continue scaling production and secure a piece of what may be
a RMB 125 billion solar pie by 2020.24

21

This opportunity assessment focused on downstream opportunities in China and the U.S., but similar
opportunities exist elsewhere in the world.
22
CGTI analysis
23
National Energy Administration, , [Result of the second concession round],
(accessed on May 10, 2011)
24
CGTI analysis

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The U.S. installation market also looks particularly promising as it shifts to more utility-scale
projects.25 Up to 3 GW of new capacity may be installed in 2011 in solar-friendly states, with tax
incentives and government loan guarantees piquing the interest of developers worldwide. This is the
case in California, where the states Solar Initiative will subsidize 3 GW of rooftop installations before
2016.26 Chinese producers have already established strong distribution channels into the U.S. and supply
roughly 40% of all modules to the California program.27 Chinese companies will continue to supply
modules to the U.S. in the years to come, but expanding into the solar project development segment
will be complex.
Because the U.S. lacks coordinated federal government support for solar power the current 30%
investment tax credit grant may expire at the end of 2012 state-based initiatives have been embraced
by the industry. Yet, navigating state-based initiatives can be a daunting task, particularly for Chinese
companies accustomed to a more centralized approach. Incentives favoring U.S. producers, as well as
increasing overseas shipping costs (shipping from China adds an estimated 2.5% to the cost of each
module28), will put increasing pressure on producers to consider local manufacturing when entering the
U.S. market. Even though manufacturing costs are higher in the U.S., some companies have chosen this
approach. Suntech, for example, has set up a factory in Phoenix, Arizona, with 30 MW of capacity, while
other companies are taking exploratory steps and establishing representative U.S. offices. 29 Few
examples of Chinese-led projects exist, but this may change as Chinese companies gain more experience,
and their ability to offer project financing through support from the China Development Bank or China
Ex-Im may give them a competitive advantage.

Industry Consolidation
Hundreds of Chinese companies occupy the module segment, but only a few produce
at large-scale
Thanks to local government support for the solar industry, hundreds of Chinese companies have
entered the market and several production clusters have emerged in Baoding and Changzhou. Most of
these companies are in the module manufacturing segment, due to the relative ease of market entry
compared to the more capital- or technology-intensive polysilicon and solar cell segments of the value
chain. Turn-key manufacturing lines can be purchased, installed and rapidly put into production and, as

25

Utility-scale projects are more lucrative for project developers.

SEIA, U.S. Solar Market Insight: 2010 Year, 2011, www.seia.org
27
Woody, Todd, Californias solar power increasingly Chinese made, Grist, Jan., 18, 2011, www.grist.org
28
CGTI interviews
29
Landberg, Reed, Suntech boosts employment, production at Arizona solar factory, Bloomberg, Jan. 31, 2011,
www.bloomberg.com
26

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a result, there are over 600 module producers in China compared to 167 cell companies and fewer than
50 polysilicon producers.30

While hundreds of module companies exist in China today, most production is concentrated in the
factories of only a few top-tier producers. The top five module companies in China account for over 60%
of production capacity.31 These large companies, like Suntech and Trina Solar, differentiate themselves
by having over 1 GW of production capacity, sourcing select materials from foreign suppliers, using
advanced manufacturing equipment, and focusing resources on marketing and branding. 32 Some
companies are even beginning to develop their own manufacturing equipment, one of the last areas of
the solar value chain still dominated by foreign companies.33

The pace of M&A in China will depend on local incentives, but global consolidation will
accelerate
While Chinas market appears ready for consolidation, few mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have
taken place to date. The pace of consolidation and M&As in the Chinese domestic market will be
influenced in part by the amount of financial support from local governments for local industry.
Provincial and local governments have offered low-interest loans, land at reduced cost and capital
subsidies, often regardless of profitability. The lack of Chinese M&A activity to date may also stem from
difficulties related to integrating new companies with incompatible production equipment or

30

CGTI analysis
Ibid.
32
CGTI interviews
33
Ibid.
31

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management structures and, in many cases, expanding internal capacity is seen as simpler than
acquiring it from other companies.
In the past year, rapid growth in Chinese production capacity, global pricing pressure and a series
of high-level international downstream deals suggest that global solar industry consolidation may be
close at hand: MEMC acquired developer SunEdison, First Solar acquired developer NextLight
Renewable Power, and the petrochemical company Total acquired a controlling interest in the
manufacturer SunPower.34
In March 2010, China Sunergy acquired CEEG Solar Science & Technology and CEEG New Energy Co.
for US$ 47 million, adding 220 MW of new module capacity. The acquisition represented a downstream
move for China Sunergy, which subsequently gained distribution networks in the U.S., Europe and
Southeast Asia.35 Also, in 2010, LDK Solar invested US$ 21.5 million in Best Solars 600 MW module
manufacturing plant. (LDK Solar formerly supplied solar cells to Best Solars module facility.)
Interestingly, Best Solar will continue to produce thin film modules and remain a downstream
competitor to LDK Solar.36

34

Ausick, Paul, The Solar Consolidation Phase May Just Be Starting, 24/7 Wall St., Jul. 1, 2011,
www.247wallst.com
35
China Sunergy, China Sunergy announces acquisition of two solar module manufacturers, Mar. 15, 2010,
http://zd.qiye8.com
36
PRNewswire, LDK Solar acquires Best Solars crystalline module manufacturing plant, www.prnewswire.com,
(accessed on May 1, 2011)

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The Path Ahead

Challenging market conditions require innovative business development strategies
In a period of oversupply and uncertain demand, companies should investigate a range of
opportunities, including vertical integration, to increase profitability and reduce costs. Vertical
integration is an increasingly popular trend for companies but, as this White Paper suggests, does not
necessarily lead to increased profitability.
Stakeholders can improve profit across the solar PV value chain in a number of ways:

Solar PV Producers should identify the most effective cost-reduction strategies to retain
margins, and analyze potential benefits of polysilicon production and developing in-house
manufacturing equipment. In Chinas downstream market, close partnerships with SOEs will
result in access to concession-round projects, and localization or acquisitions in markets like the
U.S. will help producers overcome local content requirements.

Materials and Components Suppliers should anticipate the continued vertical integration of
their customers and assess the impact of industry consolidation on their current and future
customer-base.

Solar PV Developers and Project Owners should plan for continued declines in solar PV ASPs
while understanding the potential for solar PV producers to move downstream and become
competitors.

Financial Service Firms should prepare for simultaneous consolidation in solar PV industry and
continued production capacity expansions. They should also facilitate M&A between industry
players across the supply chain, both domestically and cross-border.

Regulators, particularly in China, should set strong policy targets with clear implementation
roadmaps to provide more certainty to producers and bring greater stability to the industry
which will benefit all stakeholders. Regulators should also strengthen quality standards and
certification programs to prevent reckless development and poor grid integration.

All producers, including material and component suppliers, must watch for pending Chinese
domestic policy incentives and expansion of production capacity in China to understand the impact on
global supply/demand balances and the pace of industry consolidation. With continued reduction in
solar PV pricing, new installation markets independent of subsidies will potentially emerge yielding new
investment opportunities.

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that new content is distributed using a comparable license, and this work is attributed as: China Greentech Initiative (Greentech
Networks Limited), Chinas Solar PV Value Chain Spring 2011. Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at
www.china-greentech.com.
The China Greentech Initiative and The China Greentech Report are trademarks of Greentech Networks Limited, a Hong Kong
limited liability company. While significant input was received in the creation of this Report, with the large number of
participating organizations, by necessity this is not a consensus deliverable. All opinions expressed herein are based on the
judgment of CGTI at the time of distribution, and are subject to change without notice due to economic, political, industry and
firm-specific factors.
Greentech Networks Limited and its partners and advisors make no representation or warranty, express or implied, concerning
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Acknowledgements
Hundreds of individuals provide input into the work of CGTI and the content of this White Paper,
including leaders of major Chinese enterprises, foreign companies, entrepreneurs, investors,
government, NGOs and policy advisors. CGTI Partners and Advisors that support the Renewable Energy
Sector are presented on the front cover of this White Paper.
CGTI wishes to acknowledge several organizations for their support of this White Paper, including Bayer,
BP, Dow Corning, DuPont, Hanwha SolarOne, J Capital Research, Suntech, Talesun, Trina Solar and Tsing
Capital. CGTI Senior Research Analysts Claire Nelson, Olivier Pincon and Jackie Wang led the writing of
this White Paper based on an Opportunity Assessment, under the direction of Manager Anders Hove
and Managing Director Alan Beebe. Cina Loarie provided copyediting support and managed publication
of the White Paper. CGTI Partner Relations team members Mark Wehling and Chitra Hepburn supported
the Opportunity Assessment, under the direction of Managing Director Ellen Carberry.

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