Regalian Doctrine

Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided and the necessary
majority is not obtained, the case is redeliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the
voting remains the same, the petition is dismissed pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.After due deliberation on the petition, the members of
the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition.
1. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371.
2. Chief Justice Davide joined Justice Kapunan
3. Justice Bellosillo joined Justice Kapunan
4. Justice Quisumbing joined Justice Kapunan
5. Justice Santiago joined Justice Kapunan
6. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions
of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
7. Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing
to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
1. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
2. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
3. Justice Melo joined Justices Panganiban and Vitug
4. Pardo joined Justices Panganiban and Vitug
5. Buena joined Justices Panganiban and Vitug
6. Gonzaga-Reyes joined Justices Panganiban and Vitug
7. De Leon joined Justices Panganiban and Vitug
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources; Public Lands; The

Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first
introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas.The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the states
power of dominium. This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees
embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia
is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government, and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States; The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed
in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to
certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act
496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system
under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine
Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the
Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachusetts
Land Registration Act of 1898, which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure
of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned
it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires
that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. The certificate
of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are

quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land
conveyance and negotiation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention
very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources
was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans, so to remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.The
Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization
and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was
introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Same; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA. No. 8371); Ancestral Domains: Ancestral
Lands; Customary Laws; The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants the
indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains, and the ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.Republic Act
No. 8371 is entitled An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. It is simply known as The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the
existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Indigenous Cultural Communities or
Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory.Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group
of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people
have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of
ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance

to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and

cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest
or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The abrogation of the Filipinos ancestral rights in land
and the introduction of the concept of public domain were the most immediate
fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.All lands lost by the old
barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to
them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging
to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to nonFilipinos. The abrogation of the Filipinos ancestral rights in land and the introduction
of the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of
Spanish colonial theory and law. The concept that the Spanish king was the owner
of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited
both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish
rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to
Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them
into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were
difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security. Thus, the
infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to
preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. Their own
political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant. The
pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and
the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited
both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the 1973 Constitution, for the first time in
Philippine history, the non-Christian tribes or the cultural minorities were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as cultural
communities.It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following
provision: The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of
national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State
policies. For the first time in Philippine history, the non-Christian tribes or the
cultural minorities were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they
were referred to as cultural communities. More importantly this time, their
uncivilized culture was given some recognition and their customs, traditions,

beliefs and interests were to be considered by the State in the formulation and
implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full
integration into the larger community, and at the same time protect the rights of
those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community. In
short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Aquino government signified a total shift from the
policy of integration to one of preservation.The Aquino government signified a
total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking her powers
under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim
Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern
Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State, by recognizing the right of tribal Filipinos to
their ancestral lands and domains, has effectively upheld their right to live in a
culture distinctly their own.The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions
which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. This
Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the
rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has
effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Land titles do not exist in the indigenous
peoples economic and social systemthe concept of individual land ownership
under the civil law is alien to them.Land titles do not exist in the indigenous
peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land ownership
under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land
laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the
Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress passed and approved the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997.It was to address the centuries-old
neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two
BillsSenate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Ancestral Domains, Explained.
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary

dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral

domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also
include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ancestral Lands, Explained.Ancestral lands
are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains
except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied
and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Customary Laws; The National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) issues a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
in the name of the community concerned, leaving the allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan)
claimants to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions while with respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domains, the
NICP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).Upon due application and
compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP
that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. The allocation of
lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family
or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with
customs and traditions. With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral
domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). CADTs and
CALTs issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of
Deeds in the place where the property is situated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands
and domains held by native title as never to have been public landdomains and
lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private.Native title refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights
to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as
memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include
ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned
ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. Like a Torrens title, a CADT is
evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right

of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native
title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands andare
private.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The concept of native title first upheld in Cario
v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 (1909), 212 US. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594, and enshrined
in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs.In
the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing
Cario did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains
and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter
altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public
agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land
Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. The land ceases to be part of the
public domain, ipso jure, and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the prescribed statutory period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain; they are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the
public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral
lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four
categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will
render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of
the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of
sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to protect
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands and that
Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain. It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life
into this constitutional mandate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership which
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property.The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains

the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It
is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private
character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs
and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the
ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally
held. These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership
rights under the Civil Code. Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand
partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that
[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is
concerned. To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not
only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary Laws; The IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces
a new concept of ownership, a concept that has long existed under customary law.
Following the constitutional mandate that customary law govern property rights
or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, the
IPRA, by legislative flat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept
that has long existed under customary law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary law is a primary, not secondary,
source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs, and its recognition
does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law.Custom,
from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a
source of law. Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should
be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other words, in the
absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven,
can define rights and liabilities. Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source
of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not
depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and
land registration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; There is nothing in IPRA that grants
to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of
ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this ownership is
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as: Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership
The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains; The ICCs/IPs are
given the right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. It
will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied

by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting
grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred
places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains.
Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the
State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of natural resources in Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7
(b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.The
constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail
the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. Nevertheless, to avoid
any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the
inclusion of natural resources in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing
Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to negotiate the terms and conditions
over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the
purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation
measures in the ancestral domainit does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the
right to manage and conserve them for future generations, benefit and share
the profits from their allocation and utilization, and negotiate the terms and
conditions for their exploration for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection and conservation measures. It must be noted that the
right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only
their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It
does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources. Simply
stated, the ICCs/IPs rights over the natural resources take the form of management
or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of
their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains are conserved for future generations and that the utilization of these
resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and
customary laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The limited rights of management and use in
Section 7 (b) of the IPRA must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of
natural resources as distinguished from large-scale utilization.The limited rights of
management and use in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale

utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section

2, Article XII of the Constitution in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold
panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural
resources for their daily sustenance and survival. Section 7 (b) also expressly
mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure
environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their
very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large-scale development and exploitation.The rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the
ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not
mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has
several options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue.
Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the
law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land
where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their
subsistence and survival.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ecology and Environment; Indigenous rights came as a
result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part
of todays priorities for the international agenda.Presently, there is a growing
concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of the
increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human
rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples environment, together with
the national governments inability to deal with the situation. Indigenous rights
came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of todays priorities for the international agenda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary Laws; If the evolution of the Filipino people
into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a
whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is the
Supreme Courts duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary
laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national
legal system.The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been
plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences were carried over and
magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal
order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the present

legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically,
the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to
the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of
contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our
legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but
through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a
democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the
evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed
democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of
continuing democratization, it is this Courts duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the
land laws in our national legal system.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Until an exact
balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from
the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what
may be considered to be of overriding concern.Nevertheless, where a most
compelling reason exists, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance
and paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the liberal approach that
recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and
taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. This Court thus did so in a
case that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an
exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free Itself
from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to
what may be considered to be of overriding concern. National Patrimony; Regalian
Doctrine; Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); The provisions
Sections 7 and 57 of the IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context
of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an
unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country
and its patrimony.IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called
ancestral domains covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community
property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some
forms of self-governance over the carved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in
Section 7 of the law which states that the rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected, subsumed
under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to
develop, control and use lands and natural resources, including the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the
areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; (par. b); the
right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands. In
case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the
right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right
to resolve land conflicts. In accordance primarily with customary law (par. h).
Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given priority rights in the

harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within

the ancestral domains. These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view,
beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue
delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant
area of the country and its patrimony.
Same; Same; Same; The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cario v.
Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 (1910), holding that a parcel of land held since
time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed
never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the
regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the
Constitution.The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cario vs. Insular
Government, holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by
individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to have been
public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot
override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them
that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. It
is not then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the
fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the
sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate. Customary Laws; I do not
see the statement in Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allowing Congress to
provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains as saying
that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws
shall govern and end it there.The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of
the Constitution allows Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains. I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact
a law that would simply express that customary laws shall govern and end it
there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without
having to still commission Congress to do it.
Same; Customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law,
must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and
effective as such.The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look
closely into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew
them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The due process clause, as I
so understand it in Taada vs. Tuvera would require an apt publication of a
legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also
customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must
first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective
as such.
KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); Words and Phrases; International Law; In
international law, the definition of what constitutes indigenous peoples attains

some degree of controversy.The term indigenous traces its origin to the Old
Latin word indu, meaning within. In the sense the term has come to be used, it is
nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means native. Indigenous
refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a particular land,
and has not been introduced from the outside. In international law, the definition of
what constitutes indigenous peoples attains some degree of controversy. No
definition of the term indigenous peoples has been adopted by the United Nations
(UN), although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the 1986
Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo.
Same; Same; In Philippine constitutional law, the term indigenous peoples
pertains to those groups of Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity
from pre-Conquest culture.In Philippine constitutional law, the term indigenous
peoples pertains to those groups of Fili-pinos who have retained a high degree of
continuity from pre-Conquest culture. Philippine legal history, however, has not
been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as uncivilized,
backward people, with barbarous practices and a low order of intelligence.
Same; Same; The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority, its
indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly
pronounced, if not dominant.Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same
stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture exhibits only the last vestiges
of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination have
created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of
cultural minorities. The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the
majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are
decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. While the culture of the majority reoriented
itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially
native character.
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; When the State machinery is set into motion to
implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, the Supreme Court possesses
sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the
constitutional process.In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving
a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government agencies
concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully
maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the
contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an
unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and
other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to
implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient
authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional
process.

Same; Same; Parties; Locus Standi; Taxpayers Suits; Citizens Suits; In a sense, all
citizens and taxpayers suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the
conduct of government and the allocation of power.In addition to the existence of
an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or
will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Evidently, the rights
asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a generalized grievance. Yet, in a
sense, all citizens and taxpayers suits are efforts to air generalized grievances
about the conduct of government and the allocation of power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National Patrimony; The preservation of
the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a
citizens suit.Petitioners, as citizens, possess the public right to ensure that the
national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution.
Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the
benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has
sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional
requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national
patrimony is a proper subject of a citizens suit.
National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; The theory of jura regalia was nothing more
than a natural fruit of conquest; The Regalian theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.Generally, under the
concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express
or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial
government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish
Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to
land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. In its
broad sense, the term jura regalia refers to royal rights, or those rights which the
King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or
propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the
sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally
held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were
permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the
title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands,
and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of
jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. The
Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial.
Same; Same; Natural Resources; The mere fact that Section 3(a) of IPRA defines
ancestral domains to include the natural resources, found therein does not ipso
facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the
indigenous people.Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains,

and describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting
forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be
considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a)
serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral
domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural
resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative
of a right or title. The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is,
to our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private
properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process.
The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural
resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in
relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of
indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it recognizes ancestral
domains as their private but community property.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase private but community
property is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples concept of ownership as
distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code.The phrase private but
community property is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples concept of
ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law,
ownership is the independent and general power of a person over a thing for
purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby. The civil law
concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive
from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even
destroy that which is owned, and jus vindicandi or the right to exclude other
persons from the possession the thing owned. In contrast, the indigenous peoples
concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership.
By virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common
cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed because it was meant to benefit the whole
indigenous community and not merelythe individual member.
Same; Same; Same; The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native
title to land, has not been recognized in the Philippines.Finally, the concept of
native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized
in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza in
support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this
jurisdiction. They insist that it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest
on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935
Constitution. However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to
the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to
natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to
claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Same; Same; Same; Upon the certification of certain areas as ancestral domain
following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the

government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases
but the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies
are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State,
which is the owner thereof.Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as
ancestral domains may still be under the administration of other agencies of the
Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to
agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with
respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as
ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA,
jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming
part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such
certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer
the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section
52[i] as divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of
jurisdiction over the natural resources within the ancestral domains would be
inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural resources are owned by
the State.
Same; Same; Same; Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the
pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the
other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement, cannot
be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural
resources without the States direct participation.In addition to the means of
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources stated in
paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third
paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs
the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the
preferential use of marine and fishing resources. Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when
interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law,
and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a
sequestered pronouncement, cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and
all forms of utilization of natural resources without the States direct participation.
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; By the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport
to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or
ancestral domains.Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to
annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral
domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for the proper
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the
fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of
an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral
lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the

interest of the Republic of the Philippines. With regard to ancestral domains, the
following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the
Ancestral domains Office (ADO) of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO;
fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission
of the final report of the ADO. With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are
within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural
requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation
and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
submission of a report by the ADO. Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the
petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous
peoples. Indigenous Peoples; Due Process; The fact that the NCIP is composed of
members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or
will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples.
The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not
mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering
justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A persons possession of the trait of
impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In
this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the nonindigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice.
Same; Customary Laws; The use of customary laws under the IPRA is not absolute,
for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.Anent the use of customary laws in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that
such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said
provision states, The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of
the ancestral domains. Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. The IPRA prescribes the
application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution
acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This
interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules.
Same; Same; When one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an
indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the application of customary law is not required.The application of
customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the
parties involved are members of indigenous peoples, specifically, of the same
indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a
non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved
belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Administrative Law; Presidency; Power of Control; Words and Phrases; An
independent agency is an administrative body independent of the executive
branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a
subordinate agency or an administrative body whose action is subject to

administrative review or revision.The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the
primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the
indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their
rights thereto. It has been granted administrative, quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIPs functions
renders it impossible to place said agency entirely under the control of only one
branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its characterization by
Congress as an independent agency. An independent agency is defined as an
administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a
superior head of department, as distinguished from a subordinate agency or an
administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.
Same; Same; Same; The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was
placed by Congress under the office of the President and, as such, is still subject
to the Presidents power to control and supervision with respect to its performance
of administrative functions.That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under
the control of the President in all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which
provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by
Congress under the office of the President and, as such, is still subject to the
Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as
the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the Presidents approval in obtaining loans
to finance its projects; (2) it must obtain the Presidents approval for any negotiation
for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever form and
from whatever source; (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and
achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the
indigenous peoples; and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be directed
by the President. The President is also given the power to appoint the
Commissioners of the NCIP as well as to remove them from office for cause motu
proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community.
MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion:
Courts; Judicial Review; The judicial power vested in the Supreme Court by Art. VIII,
1 extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of such
proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or
the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.The judicial power vested in this
Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and controversies for the determination
of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. In this case, the purpose
of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government
and other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as
a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the

doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case
will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will
bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such
judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of
opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question.
Same; Same; The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not
really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but
to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the
decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.I do
not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution
to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative
and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to
cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, 5 can fail to note that, in
enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins
with the phrase all cases . . . The statement that the judicial power includes the
duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted
in Art. VIII, 1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong
it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in
order to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties
are alleged.
Same; Same; The judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not
involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among
the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only
to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them.Indeed, the judicial power cannot
be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without
upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and
erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch
of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet
that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume
jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to
the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as
applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on
its face.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Chilling Effect Syndrome; The only instance
where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expressioninvalidation of the statute on its face rather than as
applied is permitted in the interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of
expression.The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is
when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the
overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even
though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to

others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute on its face rather than as applied is permitted in the
interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of expression. But in other
cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will
decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the
rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
Same; Same; To decline the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine
controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal
department of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the
fundamental law, are presumed to be valid.To decline, therefore, the exercise of
jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show timidity but
respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts,
unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be
valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in
the Angara case when he said that this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota,
presented. For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort; and as
a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
individuals. Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of
the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must
be accorded to it.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion (Concurring and Dissenting):National Patrimony;
Ancestral Domains; Ancestral Lands; I respectfully reject the contention that
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been
owned by the State.It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over lands
of the public domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources which, under
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, are owned by the State and shall not be
alien-ated. I respectfully reject the contention that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State. Such
sweeping statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the
scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino
people. As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the
entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nations natural
wealth.
Same; Same; Same; I cannot agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to
the nations wealth or to stamp the Courts imprimatur on a law that offends and
degrades the repository of the very authority of the Supreme Courtthe
Constitution of the Philippines.Consistent with the social justice principle of giving
more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in its wisdom may grant
preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to
the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe
in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in
order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot,

however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nations wealth or

to stamp the Courts imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository
of the very authority of this Courtthe Constitution of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Though laudable and well-meaning, IPRA, however, has
provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin
and authority.RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was
primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to
recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development. Though laudable and well-meaning,
this statute, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law
from which it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5,
6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine
the basic foundation of the States property regime. Vested Rights; Property;
Ownership; Because of the States implementation of policies considered to be for
the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions,
even vested rights of ownership.I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether
indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its
allencompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions
spoke in absolute terms. Because of the States implementation of policies
considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under
certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership. National Patrimony; Ancestral
Domains; Ancestral Lands; Four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot
be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be.Verily, as
petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history
cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The
perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by
conceding the nations resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more
privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen
not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now
maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of
native title thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have
abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the
countrys resources.
Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; The concerted effort to malign the Regalian
Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must failour Constitution vests the
ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial
past must fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in
colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution,
this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitutionnot to
dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including
the natural resources found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these
ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Sections 3 are merely definitions and should not be construed independently of the
other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is a statement of the
meaning of a word or word group. It determines or settles the nature of the thing
or person defined. Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several items, one
cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one or
more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the
people who would be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines
ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein and further
states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can
own natural resources.
Same; Same; Same; Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a
minority group the States power of ownership and full control over a substantial
part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.But
again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of
ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned.
Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and
manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the
allocation and the utilization thereof. And they may exercise such right without any
time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25
years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of
ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to
such period. In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources, a right vested by the
Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in
favor of a minority group the States power of ownership and full control over a
substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most
fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law,
Congress is effectively mandating reverse discrimination.Indigenous peoples
may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not,
however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution
withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority
in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and
domains. But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nations substantial
wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live
and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but
also subversive of the rule of law. In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our
fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating reverse discrimination. In
seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of
the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the
roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration

of national proportions. Social Justice; The law must help the powerless by enabling
them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by
preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them.Peace cannot be
attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the
few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be
approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can
the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored
minorities. Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take
advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the
powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice
empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus,
equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity. [Cruz vs. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128(2000)]

Trillanes vs. Pimentel

Criminal Law; Equal Protection; Congress; Election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcementit cannot be gainsaid that a person
charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice.The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be gainsaid that a
person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration
of justice.Bail; The Rules of Court state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, and within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.The
Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That
the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged._______________* EN BANC.472472SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDTrillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.Same; The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or
imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty, which justification
for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners or convicted prisoners.It is uncontroverted that petitioners
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination
that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Such justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court
observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 (2005), it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining
jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights
upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than
those of the public.Same; Flight; Circumstances indicating probability of flight find
relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling
a discretionary grant of bail.Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The
assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past
security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel

to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the Manila Pen
Incident, proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would
escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding
became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance
as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a
discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is
established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.473VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008473Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.Same; Same;
If denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face
the verdict of the jury.Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo, 49 O.G.
No. 5 (May 1953), 1855, to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner,
the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, was able to rebut the strong
evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein
that if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the
proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the jury. At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital
offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong, the Court noted the
obvious reason that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly
strong temptation to flee. Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied,
he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him
out.Same; The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized
as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of
pre-trial detentionthe officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and
prevent the escape of the detainee.The effective management of the detention
facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of
conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. The officer with custodial
responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.
Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on
security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that
pleadings are not impositions upon a court.Same; Election Law; Administrative Law;
Doctrine of Condonation; The doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
caseselection, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge.The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And
there is no prior term to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or
more precisely, re-474474SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDTrillanes IV vs.
Pimentel, Sr.election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the
Senate, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
[and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.Same; Same; It is
opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by

the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudencethe mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law.In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, it is opportune to
wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of
the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law.Same; Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.Same; Congress;
Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a
free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his positionsuch an aberrant
situation not only elevates his status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.Petitioners position fails. On
the generality and permanence of his requests475VOL. 556, JUNE 27,
2008475Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.alone, petitioners case fails to compare with
the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds: x x x Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court. The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for petitioner. The Solicitor
General for respondents. [Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471(2008)]

Romero vs. Estrada

Remedial Law; Sub Judice Rule; The sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.The sub judice
rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for the rule adverted to
is set out in Nestl Philippines v. _______________* EN BANC.397VOL. 583, APRIL 2,
2009397Romero II vs. EstradaSanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987): [I]t is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of
such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.Same; Same; An
issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and
value.The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which
the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground
of mootness, save in certain exceptional instances, none of which, however, obtains
under the premises.Same; Same; A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and
court proceedings has different purposes; On-going judicial proceedings do not
preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.A legislative investigation in
aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of
a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.Same; Same; Court has no authority to
prohibit a Senate Committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it
in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not
belabor the other issues raised in this recourse. 398398SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDRomero II vs. EstradaSuffice it to state that when the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of
the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to
prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it

in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those
subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating
questions are expected to be asked.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court
Prohibition. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Roberto A. Abad for
petitioners. The Senate Legal Counsel for respondents. [Romero II vs. Estrada, 583
SCRA 396(2009)]

Veterans vs. COMELEC

Constitutional Law; Congress; Party-List System; The Constitution makes the
number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of
seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, a formulation which means that any
increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district representatives

x .20 = No. of party-list .80 representatives This formulation means

that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by
law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats.
246 246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Veterans
Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections Same; Same; Same; Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatoryit merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to
promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives in
order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it
necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system
to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage
could have additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three
seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of
the law provides: (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats. Considering the foregoing statutory requirements,
it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. Same; Same;
Same; Statutes; Republic Act 7941; Courts; Rule of Law; The prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change the two percent threshold rests in Congress,
as the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.On
the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our

task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of
the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an
innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within
the context of the actual election process. Indeed, the function of the Supreme
Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a
valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This
is the essence of the rule of law. 247
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 6, 2000 247 Veterans
Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections Same; Same; Same; Republican
State; Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them, but
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people.The two percent threshold is consistent not only with
the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of representation. Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features
the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat
to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio to ensure meaningful local representation. Same;
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The statutory provision on the two percent
requirement is precise and crystallinewhen the law is clear, the function of courts
is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.All in all, we hold that
the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline.
When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation
or circumvention. Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 7941; Words and Phrases;
Qualified as used in Republic Act 7941 means having hurdled the two percent
vote threshold.Consistent with the Constitutional Commissions pronouncements,
Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. Qualified means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such
three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. Same; Same; Same; Niemeyer
Formula; Under the Niemeyer formula, the number of additional seats to which a
qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining
number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party
and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified
parties.Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula,
which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Veterans
Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of

additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by

multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of
votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes
garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will
be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Same;
Same; Same; Same; The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany,
finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the
non-mandatory character of the twenty-percent allocation.The Niemeyer formula,
while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirementstwo percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences
between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents, one
half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important,
there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of
small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit
to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory
difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philip-pines or Guimaras mangoes
in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
between the two party-list models. Same; Same; Same; Parameters of the Filipino
Party-List System.It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a
unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally
defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a
qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino partylist system. As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows: First, the
twenty percent allocationthe combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two
percent threshold--only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the
House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limit-each. qualified party, regard249
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 6, 2000 249 Veterans Federation Party vs.
Commission on Elections less of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representationthe additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes. Same;
Same; Same; Formula for Determining Additional Seats for First Party.Now, how do
we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be
entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters
number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of
seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows: Number of votes of first party
Proportion of votes of =
first party relative to Total votes for party-

list system
total votes for party-list system If the proportion of votes received by
the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid
votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a
rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then
the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion
is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional
seat.Same; Same; Same; Formula for Determining Additional Seats of Other
Qualified Parties.Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional
seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of

concerned party

_____________

Total No. of votes

Additional seats
for party-list system
No. of additional
for concerned
=

x seats allocated to
party
No. of
votes to
the first party
first party
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Veterans
Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections
Total No. of vote

for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned
the first party

Additional seats concerned party No. of additional

for
= --------------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of
first party

Same; Same; Same; Obtaining absolute proportional representation

is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots.
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero.
The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties
as well. The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of
the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a

number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining

absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
Administrative Law; Commission on Elections; The Comelec, which is tasked merely
to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority.The Comelec, which is
tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act.
Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and
enactment by the legislature. Judicial Review; It is basic that to strike down a law or
any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.A reading of the
entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provi251
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 6, 2000 251 Veterans Federation Party vs.
Commission on Elections sions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that
to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a
clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute
permits.PUNO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:Election Law; There is no
constitutional right to win elections, only the constitutional right to equal
opportunity to participate in and influence the selection of candidates.There is no
constitutional right to win elections, only the constitutional right to equal
opportunity to participate in and influence the selection of candidates. It is not a
violation of equal protection to deny legislative seats, to losing candidates. The fact
that minorities or interest groups in an electoral unit find themselves consistently
outvoted and without a person elected from their particular group is no basis for
invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that the complaining
minority or interest group has been denied access to the political system. Congress;
Party-List System; The party-list system was devised to replace the reserve seat
systemthe very essence of the party-list system is representation by election.In
the past, it cannot be gainsaid that there was a hostility against sectoral groups as
their unelected representatives were criticized as people who owed their seats to a
constitutional provision and could not rise to the same status or dignity as those
elected by the people. This criticism was laid to rest with the passage of the partylist system where sectoral representatives had to undergo an election. To be sure,
these sectoral candidates were given a favored treatment. During the Senate
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1913, which later became R.A. 7941, Senator
Tolentino emphatically declared that the purpose of the party-list system is to give
access to the House those who are considered as marginal political groups that
cannot elect a representative in one district, but when taken together nationally,
they may be able to have a representative. But while given a favored treatment,
the sectoral candidates were not guaranteed seats. Indeed, the party-list system
was devised to replace the reserve seat system. For unlike the reserve seat system

which assured sectoral groups of a seat in the House of Representatives, the partylist system merely provides for a mechanism by which the sectoral groups can run
for election as sectoral representatives. The very essence of the party-list system is
representation by election. 252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections Statutory Construction;
Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of law must be read in harmony with the other
provisions.Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of the Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts, x x x and
those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The record of the ConCom will show
that the delegates considered this provision as a grant of authority to the
legislature, and hence should not be viewed as either directory or mandatory.
Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof, that the party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. Axiomatic is the rule that a
provision of law must be read in harmony with the other provisions. Consequently,
subparagraph (2) should be accorded a similar treatment as subparagraph (1), i.e.,
that it is neither directory nor mandatory, but simply a grant of legislative authority.
MENDOZA, J., Dissenting Opinion: Party-List System; The number of additional seats
to which a 2 percenter is entitled to should be determined by multiplying the
number of seats remaining by the total number of votes obtained by that party and
dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the 2 percenters.
Accordingly, the number of additional seats to which a 2 percenter is entitled
should be determined by multiplying the number of seats remaining by the total
number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes (3,429,438) garnered by all the 2 percenters. The 2 percenters are
each entitled to the additional seats equivalent to the integer portion of the
resulting product. Same; Judicial Legislation; While the majority disavows any
intention to reinvent or second-guess [the law], it in reality does so and in the
process engages in a bit of judicial legislation.The majority holds that the
Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character
of the twenty percent allocation. Claiming that it is obvious that the Philippine
style party-list system is a unique model which demands an equally unique
formula, the majority instead allocates seats to the winning groups in a manner
which cannot be justified in terms of the rules in 11. While it disavows any
intention to reinvent or second-guess [the law], the majority in reality does so and
in the process engages in a bit of judicial legislation. 253
VOL. 342, OCTOBER 6,
2000 253 Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections Same; The law
does not distinguish between the first ranking party and the rest of the other 2
percenters insofar as obtaining additional seats is concerned.If the formula applies
only to the first party, then it is no formula at all because it is incapable of
consistent and general application. It is even iniquitous. If a party got 5.5 percent of
the votes and is given two (2) seats, it is hard to see why the next ranking party,
which got 5 percent of the votes should get only one (1) seat. Indeed, the law does
not distinguish between the first ranking party and the rest of the other 2

percenters insofar as obtaining additional seats are concerned. The law provides
that those garnering, more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The operative word is
their which refers to none other than the total number of votes cast for the 2
percenters. The lain language of the law is that the basis for the allocation of
additional seats is the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. This rule
applies to all parties obtaining more than 2 percent of the votes cast for the winning
parties. Same; Republic Act 7941, 11 requires the determination of two types of
proportionsfirst, the determination of the proportion of the votes obtained by a
party in relation to the total number of votes cast for the party list, and, second, is
the determination of number of votes a party obtained in proportion to the number
of votes cast for all the parties obtaining at least 2 percent of the votes.RA. No.
7941, 11 requires the determination of two types of proportions. The first is the
determination of the proportion of the votes obtained by a party in relation to the
total number of votes cast for the party-list. The purpose of the rule is to determine
whether a party was able to hurdle the 2 percent threshold. The second is the
determination of number of votes a party obtained in proportion to the number of
votes cast for all the parties obtaining at least 2 percent of the votes. The purpose
for determining the second proportion is to allocate the seats left after the initial
allocation of one (1) seat each to every 2 percenter. The total number of votes
obtained by a party in relation to the total number of votes obtained by all 2
percenters is multiplied by the remaining number of seats. Same; Only in a
Pickwickian sense can the result of the application of the majority formula be
considered proportional representation.In essence, the majority formula
amounts simply to the following prescription: (1) follow the 1 seat for every 2%
rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2) with respect to the rest
of the 2 percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets
at least six percent, in which case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes
of the first ranking party should get an extra seat. I cannot see how this
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Veterans
Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections formula could have been intended by
Congress. Only in a Pickwickian sense can the result of the application of such
formula be considered proportional representation. Same; In practical terms, the
majority formula violates the Constitution ilnsofar as it makes it improbable to
obtain the ceiling of 20 percent thereby preventing the realization of the framers
intent of opening up the system of party-list representatives.The formula adopted
by the majority effectively deprives party-list representatives of representation
considering that it eliminates the ratio 4 district representatives to 1 party-list
representative in the House. This is so because, under the rule formulated by the
majority, it becomes very difficult to reach the ceiling of 20 percent of the House. In
the case at bar, to fill 52 seats in the House, the first ranking party would have to
obtain exactly 6 percent of the votes and 25 other parties must get at least 3
percent. In practical terms, this formula violates the Constitution insofar as it makes
it improbable to obtain the ceiling of 20 percent thereby preventing the realization
of the framers intent of opening up the system to party-list representatives.
[Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections, 342 SCRA 244(2000)]

BANAT vs. Comelec

Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional.We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.Same; Same;
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.In determining the
allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941,
the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be212212SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDBarangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on
Electionsranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.Same; Same; Neither
the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system.Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the

contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.Same; Same; By a
vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On
the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.213VOL. 586, APRIL 21, 2009213Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on ElectionsPUNO,C.J.,
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:Constitutional Law; Party List System; Same;
Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political
parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the
constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good etc.The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related
constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the
party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, the President
was permitted to fill by appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation
under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the respective
sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the elected
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa
tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral
representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status
of dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral
representatives, the President was given all the leeway to break new ground and
precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the sectoral
representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the process of
drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral
representation. Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and
excluding the major political parties from participating in the election of their
representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good; the right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities
that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary
social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights
of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions
and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the
indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.214214SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDBarangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on ElectionsSame; Same; If we allow major
political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will

surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.The evils that faced our
marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the
Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution,
our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups
can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and
chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the
voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic
spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list
system.NACHURA,J., Separate Opinion:Constitutional Law; Party List System;
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, it merely provides a
ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress.It is correct to say, and I
completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of
party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by
Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision,
contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach,
totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition
as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom
of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that
constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory
construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a
constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual. [Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections, 586
SCRA 210(2009)]

Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC

Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.The 1987
Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House
of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her
party-list group or organization of choice.Same; Same; The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties.Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but
not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution.Same; Same; The common denominator
between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections.The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is
that they cannot expect to win in487VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013487Atong Paglaum,
Inc. vs. Commission on Elections legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates
can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional
parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.Same; Same; The
party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in
Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three
different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups.
The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed
of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.Same; Same; Political Party and Sectoral
Party, Distinguished.Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a
political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the
other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an

organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5

hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a
sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.Same;
Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.R.A. No. 7941 does488488SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong
Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections not require national and regional parties
or organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To
require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them
from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or
cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of
their economic status as citizens.Same; Same; Same; The economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.The phrase marginalized
and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are:
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these
sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not
mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one,
or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low489VOL. 694,
APRIL 2, 2013489Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Electionsincome group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.Same; Same; Same; Major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the

prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major
political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a
majority of whose members are marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies, will facilitate the entry of the marginalized
and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political constituencies as
members of the House of Representatives.Same; Same; Same; The 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in partylist elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the
marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list
elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of
whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself
an490490SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941, which provides that component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which
they form part does not participate in the party-list system.Same; Same; Same; A
party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide partylist nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the
qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification
only for the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. A party-list nominee
must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to

represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for
such sector.Sereno, C.J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:Election Law; Party-List
System; View that the place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme
was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political
arena.The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it
provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena. The
concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald: First, an idea
that has received much491VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013491Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Electionsattention among democratic theorists is that
representatives should be selected to mirror the characteristics of those being
representedin terms of gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to
be socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some recent
democratic debates focused on the need for special representation of
disadvantaged and underrepresented social groups within democratic assemblies.
The applicability of this idea of mirror representation is not confined to debates
about representing marginalized minorities within nation-states; Iris Young further
applies this model of representation to global politics, arguing that global
representation should be based on representation of the various peoples of the
world, each of which embodies its own distinctive identity and perspective. In
practice, special representation for certain social groups within a mirror framework
can be combined with election mechanisms in various wayssuch as by according
quotas of elected representatives to designated social groups. But since the
selection of these social groups for special representation would nonetheless
remain a distinct element of the process of selecting legitimate representatives,
occurring prior to the electoral process, such mirror representation is still
recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting representative agents.Same;
Same; Principle of Subordinate Legislation; View that the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation
of governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not
only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in
reinforcing the stability of our Constitution, because the legislature is certain to find
it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in
carrying laws into effect. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental
powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only execute
elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest. This is the principle of subordinate legislation dis492492SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission
on Electionscussed in People v. Rosenthal and in Pangasinan Transportation vs.
Public Service Commission.Same; Same; View that the disqualification of a party-list
group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only reasonable if based on
material misrepresentations regarding the nominees qualifications.I propose the
view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its

nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the

nominees qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should not
disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang
Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia,
that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group); and (2)
one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons explained below.
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
Consistent therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve proportional
representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature. Because of this policy, I
believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant
of purely administrative, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto
disqualify party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single nominee.Same;
Same; View that any disqualification of a party-list group based on the
disqualification of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation
regarding that nominees qualifications.It should also be pointed out that the law
itself considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying circumstance.
However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation of election laws, it must
be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The
standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC. Thus,
any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee
must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominees
qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which493VOL.
694, APRIL 2, 2013493Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections considers
declaring untruthful statements in its petition as a ground for
disqualification.Same; Same; View that party-list groups should have at least one
qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in
the elections.Party-list groups should have at least one qualified nominee among
its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections. This is
because if all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not
cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the elections, and should it obtain the
required number-of votes to win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it,
because the law does not allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee
through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in
relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.Same; Same; View that only in case of death,
incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to change the ranking
of its nominees in the list it initially submitted.Only in case of death, incapacity, or
withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to change the ranking of its
nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed
through, substitution, which according to Section 8 is done by placing the name of
the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names that come after the
now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect, the new list
with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among the
nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the first to the last, in
accordance with Section 13.Same; Same; View that if any/some of the nominees

is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed; This means that if the first
nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the elections and
becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first nominees
place and represent the party-list group.If any/some of the nominees is/are
disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their ranking remains the same
and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in determining the one/s that
will represent the winning party-list group in Congress. This means that if the first
nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the elections and
becomes entitled to one representative,494494SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections the second cannot
take the first nominees place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the
party-list group gets enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second
nominee can represent it.Same; Same; View that the primary purpose of an election
case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate.In
Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 593 SCRA 139 (2009), it was also held that the
primary purpose of an election case is the ascertaimnent of the real candidate
elected by the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before there can be
an election case. Since the national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May
2013, the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under the
Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for
reconsideration under Section 3, is not required.Brion, J., Separate Concurring
Opinion:Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system came into
being, principally driven by the constitutional framers intent to reform the then
prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and underrepresented parties.The
party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional framers
intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and
underrepresented parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the legislative district
elections and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect
themselves there, but whonationallymay generate votes equivalent to what a
winner in the legislative district election would garner) the chance to participate in
the electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives
through a system other than the legislative district elections.Same; Same; View that
major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot
participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list
parties and run as a coalition in the party-list elections.Major political parties, if
they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot participate in the partylist elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a
coalition in the party-list elections. A coalition is a formal party participant in the
party-list system; what the party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation
in495VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013495Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on
Electionsboth electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do indirectly
through a coalition. No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that
they can form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for the partylist elections. The party-list component of these informal alliances is not prohibited
from running in the party-list elections.Same; Same; View that a nominee who does
not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented status represented by
the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern

of the marginalized and underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be

a nominee.Considering the Constitutions solicitous concern for the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors as understood in the social justice context, and RA
7941s requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the party-list
group, a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a
genuine advocate of the interest and concern of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee. This
classification of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and
organizations which are marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice
sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics. To be
consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of
the members of the party must actually belong to the sector represented, while
nominees must be a member of the sectoral party or organization. Since political
parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona fide
membership, in accordance with the political partys constitution and by-laws, would
suffice.Same; Same; View that as a basic constitutional point, the business and
principal function of the Supreme Court (and of the whole Judiciary) is not to create
policy or to supplant what the Constitution and the law expressly provide.As a
basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and of
the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and
the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and Congress (through
RA No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of the
Constitution and the law,496496SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong
Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections and through the intents the framers;
both were considered and cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly
read and understood. The whole Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these
policies in the course of their assigned task of adjudication without adding anything
of our own; we can interpret the words only in case of ambiguity. This Court and its
Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social justice or for any
ideology for that matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned to us by the
Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or to formulate policies that fall within
the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of our sworn
duty.Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for the writ of
certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.For the writ of certiorari to issue, the
Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of discretion is in keeping with the
office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within the bounds of
its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law. The term grave abuse of discretion,
while it defies exact definition, generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and

hostility.Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; View that in the adjudication
of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution itself that reign supreme.It should be considered, too, that in the
adjudication of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of
the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The Courts previous ruling on a matter
serves as a guide in the resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior
ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future actions. As the highest Court in
our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past actions,
particularly when the497VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013497Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on ElectionsConstitution is involved; it is invested with the innate
authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the
Constitution.Election Law; Party-List System; Prospectivity of Laws; View that by
ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in
accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Courti.e., allowing political
parties to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are
marginalized and underrepresented (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong
Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or
organization may be validly included in the list of nomineesthe Court would not be
violating the principle of prospectivity.By ordering the remand of all the petitions
to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the new ruling laid
down by the Courti.e., allowing political parties to participate in the party-list
elections without need of proving that they are marginalized and
underrepresented (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in
recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be
validly included in the list of nomineesthe Court would not be violating the
principle of prospectivity. The rationale behind the principle of prospectivityboth in
the application of law and of judicial decisions enunciating new doctrinesis the
protection of vested rights and the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling
overrules a prior ruling, the prospective application of the new ruling is made in
favor of parties who have relied in good faith on the prior ruling under the familiar
rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.Same; Same; View that in March 1995, Congress
enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law that would implement
the party-list election scheduled for May 1998.In March 1995, Congress enacted
RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law that would implement the partylist election scheduled for May 1998. The law at the same time fleshed out the
mechanics for party-list elections, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.
The law specifically provided for: a. a declaration of the policy behind the law; b. a
definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national, political, regional, and
sectoral parties, and their coalitions; c. the requisites and terms for registration; the
grounds for refusal and cancellation of registration; and the498498SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Electionscertified list
of registered parties; d. the nomination and qualification for party-list
representatives; e. the manner of voting; f. the number and procedure for the
allocation of party-list representatives; and g. the proclamation of the winning partylist representatives, their term of office; the limitation on their change of affiliation;
their rights; and the provisions in case of vacancy.Same; Same; View that the aim of
the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is principally to

reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of electing the
members of the House of Representatives.The aim of the party-list provision,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is principally to reform the then existing
electoral system by adding a new system of electing the members of the House of
Representatives. The innovation is a party-list system that would expand
opportunities for electoral participation to allow those who could not win in the
legislative district elections a fair chance to enter the House of Representatives
other than through the district election system.Same; Same; View that the members
of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who would be
elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to
future legislation.The members of the House of Representatives under the partylist system are those who would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving
the mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are likewise constitutionally
identified as the registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations,
and are the party-list groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free
and open party system that should be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people within the limits of the Constitution. From the perspective of
the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster proportional
representation that would lead to the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-defined constituencies; but (3) who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are proportional
representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack of well-defined
constituencies.499VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013499Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission
on ElectionsSame; Same; View that as the constitutional debates and voting show,
what the framers envisioned was a multiparty system that already includes sectoral
representation.As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers
envisioned was a multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation.
Both sectoral representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are
concepts that comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system.
Thus, both the text and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of
exclusive sectoral representation under the party-list system; what was provided
was an avenue for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in
the electoral systemit is an invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance
on what democracy and republicanism can offer.Same; Same; View that the
nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group to
which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of
the party-list group.The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns
of the party-list group to which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies
the causes and ideals of the party-list group. However, unlike the political parties
official candidateswho can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run
as an independent candidatethe linkage between a nominee and his party-list
group is actually a one-way mirror relationship. The nominee can only see (and
therefore run) through the party-list group but the party-list group can see beyond
the nominee-member.Same; Same; View that what the 1987 constitutional framers
simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to open up the electoral system by

giving more participation to those who could not otherwise participate under the
then existing system.What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way
of electoral reform, was to open up the electoral system by giving more
participation to those who could not otherwise participate under the then existing
systemthose who were marginalized in the legislative district elections because
they could not be elected in the past for lack of the required votes and specific
constituency in the winner-take-all legislative district contest, and who, by the
number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district elections, showed
that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in the legislative district
would 500500SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Electionsgarner. This was the concept of marginalized and
underrepresented and the lack of political constituency that came out in the
constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the Constitution. RA
No. 7941 subsequently faithfully reflected these intents.Reyes, J., Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion:Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); View that
under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in
the enforcement and administration of election laws.Under the present
Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement
and administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history in the
1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of the COMELEC had
continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times.Same;
Same; View that essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section
2(1) of Article IX-C partakes of the general grant of the power to the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.Essentially, the COMELEC
has general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IX-C partakes of the general
grant of the power to the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall. The authority given to the COMELEC under this provision encapsulates
all the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in providing
this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide latitude in dealing with
matters under its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the performance of its
functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The rest of the
enumeration in the mentioned provision constitutes the COMELECs specific
powers.Same; Same; View that the COMELEC does not simply register every party,
organization or coalition that comes to its office and manifests its intent to
participate in the elections. Registration entails501VOL. 694, APRIL 2,
2013501Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections the possession of
qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its qualifications
before registration will follow as a matter of course.The power to register political
parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The COMELEC does not simply
register every party, organization or coalition that comes to its office and manifests
its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the possession of
qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its qualifications
before registration will follow as a matter of course. Similar with all the specific

powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political parties, organizations and
coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its general power to
enforce and administer election laws is being realized. The exercise of this power
must thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its duty of
ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who possess the
qualifications set by the law.Same; Party-List System; View that consistent with the
principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is incumbent upon
aspiring participants in the party-list system of representation to satisfactorily show
that they have the required qualifications stated in the law and prevailing
jurisprudence.Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a
privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring participants in the party-list system of
representation to satisfactorily show that they have the required qualifications
stated in the law and prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or
organization applying for registration in the first instance must present sufficient
evidence to establish its qualifications. It is only upon proof of possession of
qualifications that registration follows. The process, however, does not end with
registration. Party-list groups and organizations that are previously allowed
registration and/or accreditation are duty-bound to maintain their
qualifications.Same; Same; View that similar to individual candidates, registered
party-list groups, organizations and coalitions must also establish their continuing
compliance with the requirements of the law which are specific to those running
under the party-list system of representation. Registration does not vest them the
perpetual right to participate in the election.The fact that a candidate was
previously allowed to run or hold public office does not exempt him from estab502502SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission
on Electionslishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for reelection. He
must maintain and attest to his qualifications every time he is minded to join the
electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of candidacy even if he is an
incumbent elective official or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding
elections. Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations
and coalitions must also establish their continuing compliance with the
requirements of the law which are specific to those running under the party-list
system of representation. Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to
participate in the election. The basis of the right to participate in the elections
remains to be the possession of qualifications. Resolution No. 9513 is a formal
recognition of the COMELECs duty to ensure that only those who are qualified must
be allowed to run as party-list representative. It cannot be defeated by a claim of
previous registration.Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Res
Judicata; View that the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending
registration and existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups,
organizations and coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly
cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.
The COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and existing
registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions on
the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-

judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Moreover, the

application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four (4)
elements, viz.: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.Same; Same; View that the party-list
system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
verita-503VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013503Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on
Electionsble lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them.The party-list system is a social
justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It is not simply a mechanism for electoral reform. To simply regard it
as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and existing electoral
system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from which the law
breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the underprivileged
and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to become partners of the
State in pursuing greater causes.Same; Same; View that considering that the
provisions on party-list system of representation are not self-executing, the
Congress enacted RA 7941.Considering that the provisions on party-list system of
representation are not self-executing, the Congress enacted RA 7941. The said law
defined the parameters of the party-list system, the procedural guidelines and the
qualifications of those intending to participate in the exercise. In enacting RA 7941,
the legislature did not mean to depart from the impetus which impelled the
members of the Constitutional Commission to provide for this scheme of
representationsocial justice. The underlying principle remains to be the reduction
of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and political power. Certainly,
there could be no other intended beneficiaries for this provision than the powerless
and underprivileged. It could not have been intended for those who already have
the power and resources who may be lesser in number but are in command of the
machinery of the government.Same; Same; View that the intent of the Constitution
to keep the party-list system exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of the law and
the sacred intention to hold inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in
the Constitution.The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To
hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold
inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the Constitution. In the same
line, RA 7941 must504504SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum,
Inc. vs. Commission on Elections not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral
reform. It could not have been that too simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral
reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the primacy of social
justice in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only

implementing the specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It

should not be disengaged from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the
mentioned provision was not simply to reform the electoral system but to initiate
the equitable distribution of political power. It aims to empower the larger portion of
the populace who sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance to
participate in legislation and advance their causes.Same; Same; View that a
marginalized and underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason
of status or condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata.RA 7941
gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition must
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized and
underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or
condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core
of institutional power, their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the
least of the governments priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and
social services and are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political
inequalities.Same; Same; View that while a party-list group is allowed to represent
various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to address the multifarious
interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents.It is likewise imperative for
the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent various sectors, it
must prove, however, that it is able to address the multifarious interests and
concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-sectoral party-list group
undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the
sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it supposedly represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a meaningful
and effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.505VOL.
694, APRIL 2, 2013505Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on ElectionsSame;
Same; View that the majority of the membership of the party-list group,
organization or coalition belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
This means that a majority of the members of the sector must actually possess the
attribute which makes the sector marginalized.Equally important is that the
majority of the membership of the party-list group, organization or coalition belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the
members of the sector must actually possess the attribute which makes the sector
marginalized. This is so because the primary reason why party-list groups are even
allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the House of
Representatives, who are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to
the members of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected. This intention
is put to naught if at least the majority of the members of the party-list do not
belong to the same class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the party-list
applicant to present all the evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a
convincing proof of legitimate membership of a majority of the marginalized, the
COMELEC has no reason to believe otherwise and may thus deny a petition for
registration or cancel an existing registration.Same; Same; View that political
parties shall only be allowed to participate in the party-list system if they do not
field candidates in the election of legislative district representatives.I, however,
agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely disqualify from

the party-list system the major political parties solely by reason of their
classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not
be without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to
participate in the party-list system if they do not field candidates in the election of
legislative district representatives. The justification therefor is reasonable. The
party-list system was adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by
their limited resources and citizens base per district, find difficulty in placing
representatives in Congress. Major political parties that field candidates for district
representatives can do so with ease, given that they satisfy the standards set by
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification,
to wit: (a) the established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now
compose them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past
elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety
(90) days before506506SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections the election; (c) their identifiable political organizations
and strengths as evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability to fill a
complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of the
President; and (e) other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative
organizations and strengths.Same; Same; View that the move to open the party-list
system free-for-all will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the doors even
to illegitimate organizations.The move to open the party-list system free-for-all
will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the doors even to illegitimate
organizations. Organizations aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt
the law and organize themselves as a political party to take advantage of the more
lenient entrance. The organization need only to register as a political party to
dispense with the stringent requirement of representing a sector. It will
automatically be off the hook from the danger of being disqualified on the ground
that it is not representing a marginalized and underrepresented sector. Other
organizations, even those organized as sectoral parties, may follow through and
may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to become political parties
instead because it is the easier way to be allowed participation in the party-list
elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented
are lagged behind.Same; Same; View that owing to the peculiarity of the party-list
system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be a resident or a
registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted for
and not the appointed nominees.Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the
nominee are practically the same as those required of individual candidates for
election to the House of Representatives. He must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b)
a registered voter; (c) a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; (d) able to read and write;
(e) bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days before the day of election; (f) at least twenty five (25) years
of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a nominee for the youth sector, he must
at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not
required that the507VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013507Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Electionsnominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular

district since it is the party-list group that is voted for and not the appointed
nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list group at least
ninety (90) days before the elections.Same; Same; View that aside from the
qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective
districts, the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he
acquires when he enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety
(90) days before the election.To be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be
harmonized with Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the
qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from the
qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective
districts, the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he
acquires when he enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety
(90) days before the election. From the point in time when the person acquires the
status of being a bona fide member, he becomes one belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is my view that the foregoing
interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees: 1. One who actually shares
the attribute or characteristic which makes the sector marginalized or
underrepresented (the first type); 2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and
actively promoting the causes of the sector he wishes to represent (the second
type).Same; Same; View that there are instances when one or some of the
nominees are disqualified to represent the group but this should not automatically
result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the
nominees the same significance which the law holds for the party-list groups of the
marginalized and underrepresented.Indeed, there are instances when one or
some of the nominees are disqualified to represent the group but this should not
automatically result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold otherwise is to
accord the nominees the same significance which the law holds for the party-list
groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to emphasize that the
formation of party-list groups organized by the marginalized and underrepresented
and their participation in the process of legislation is the essence of the party-list
system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still the fact
that the party-list group satisfied the508508SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Electionsqualifications of the
law that is material to consider. That one or some of its chosen agents failed to
satisfy the qualifications for the position should not unreasonably upset the
existence of an otherwise legitimate party-list group. The disqualification of the
nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It
should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with
defect.Same; Same; View that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice
of the members of the party-list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and
is solely dependent upon the will of the party.It is worth emphasizing that the
selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the party-list
group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the
will of the party. More often than not, the choice of nominees is grounded on trust
and confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of qualifications under the
law. The method or process by which the members of the party-list group choose
their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or guidelines can be

imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their representatives
lest we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.Remedial Law;
Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be
justified, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision,
order or resolution with grave abuse of discretion.For an extraordinary writ of
certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the
assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of discretion. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), the Court recognized that along
with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion.Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion:Election Law; Party-List System; View that national political parties may
participate in party list elections, provided that they have509VOL. 694, APRIL 2,
2013509Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections no candidate for
legislative districts.National political parties may participate in party list elections,
provided that they have no candidate for legislative districts. The constitution
disqualifies political parties, which have candidates for legislative districts, from the
party list system. I also agree that they need not be organized sectorally and/or
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.Same; Same; View that there is
no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the party list system
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups as mentioned in
Republic Act No. 7941.There is no constitutional requirement that all those who
participate in the party list system must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. This law is
unconstitutional in so far as it makes a requirement that is not supported by the
plain text of the Constitution. There is also a constitutional difference between the
political parties that support those who are candidates for legislative districts and
those that participate in the party list system. It is inconsistent for national political
parties who have candidates for legislative districts to also run for party list. This,
too, is the clear implication from the text of article VI, section 5(1) of the
Constitution.Same; Same; View that the party list system is an attempt to introduce
a new system of politics in our country, one where voters choose platforms and
principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily.The party list system is
an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters
choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily. As
provided in the Constitution, the party list systems intentions are broader than
simply to ensure that those who are marginalized and represented become
lawmakers themselves.Same; Same; View that it is the party or the organization
that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a
democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that
can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she
act inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization.The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It
could not have been intended to enhance and further entrench the same system. It
is the party or the organization that is510510SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATEDAtong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections elected. It is the party

list group that authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of
its nominees. It is also the party list group that can delist or remove their nominees,
and hence replace him or her, should he or she act inconsistently with the avowed
principles and platforms of governance of their organization. In short, the party list
system assists genuine political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable
true representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a democratic
and republican state.Same; Same; View that to require that all the seats for party
list representatives remain sectoral in one form or the other is clearly and patently
unconstitutional.Surely, it should be the electorate, not the COMELEC, which
should decide whether their groups should participate in our legislative
deliberations. That these groups could be excluded even before the vote is not what
the party list system is all about. These two instances arising from the consolidated
petitions we are considering clearly show why the text of article VI, section 5 (2)
provides: (2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sectors. (emphasis provided) What is plain from a reading of the text is that the
qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the three consecutive terms
after the ratification of the Constitution. Only one-half of the seats within that
period is reserved to the sectors that were enumerated, clearly implying that
there are other kinds of party list groups other than those who are sectoral. To
require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form or
the other is clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its
rationale and its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these
provisions.Same; Same; View that to claim that the framers of the Constitution left it
to Congress to complete the very framework of the party list system is to question
the fundamental character of our constitution.The 1987 Constitution is a complete
document. Every provi-511VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013511Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Electionssion should be read in the context of all the other
provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made clear. To claim that the
framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete the very framework of the
party list system is to question the fundamental character of our constitution. The
phrases in accordance with law and as may be provided by law is not an
invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent
assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from
the text of the constitution in the light of its context in the document and
considering the contemporary impact of relevant precedents.Same; Same; View
that with respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is
clearly reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).With
respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly
reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution
in article VI, section 17 clearly provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of

all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members... A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to
disqualifying registered political party list groups should prevail over the more
general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and administer ele
on laws. Besides, that the HRET is the sole judge clearly shows that the
constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 694 SCRA 477(2013)]

Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections
(COMELECs) moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere
in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified
to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act
No. 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.We find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.Same;
Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsis-_______________* EN BANC.33VOL. 618, APRIL 8,
201033Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Electionstent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval.We are not
blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censurereligious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust
of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law;
Nuisance, Defined.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings.Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of
public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal

conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of

laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system.We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of3434SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Electionshomosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular
morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal
Protection Clause; Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. In
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA
299 (2004), we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges xxx have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply
with equal force to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.From the standpoint of the political
process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors.Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and
this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb.Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate35VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 201035Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Electionsaim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.Same; Same;

Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts

forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the
protection of the freedom of association guarantee.A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in
order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political
party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy
does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.Same;
Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-discrimination
requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.The principle of non-discrimination
requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex
in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation. Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.Same; Same;
Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international
law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines.Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international
law professors, areat bestde lege ferendaand do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for
human3636SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Electionsrights, most of which amount to no more than wellmeaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.PUNO,
C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List
System; View that the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.The
assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the
non-establishment clause of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of
the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legalmuch less constitutionalterms, as it
denied Ang Ladlads petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the
ground that it tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and
Muslim) beliefs. To be sure, the COMELECs ruling is completely antithetical to the
fundamental rule that [t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily
secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions.Same; Same; Same; View
that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are
violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are
violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. Ang Ladlads right of political participation was
unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal

prejudices of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious
court or worse, a morality police.Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) capitalized on Ang Ladlads definition of the term sexual
orientation, as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with
men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality; This position would deny homosexual and bixesual individuals a
fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal
liberty.The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlads definition of the term sexual
orientation, as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with
men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, how-37VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 201037Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Electionsever, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals
a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal
liberty. For, the ability to [independently] define ones identity that is central to any
concept of liberty cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the
emotional enrichment from close ties with others.Same; Same; Same; View that
at the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.It has been said that
freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the due process clause. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.Same; Same; Same;
View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect
classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.The ponencia of Mr. Justice
Del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in
themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down
the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational
basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. I humbly
submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a
quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.Same; Same;
Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection
despite some recent political progress.It would not be difficult to conclude that
gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some
recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered has been so
pervasive and severeeven though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on
their ability to contribute to or perform in3838SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Electionssocietythat it is
highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that
discrimination.Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical
prejudice and stereotyping.It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state

action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate
treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the
product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.Same; Same; Same; View that the
position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community cannot
participate in the party-list system because it is not a marginalized and
underrepresented sector is belied by the Supreme Court ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where the Court held that the enumeration
of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.It has been
suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system
because it is not a marginalized and underrepresented sector enumerated either
in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. However, this position is belied by
our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698
(2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.CORONA,J., Dissenting
Opinion:Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list
system is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the
fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the
crafting of national laws.The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the
fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the
crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the advancement of
the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement of the
common good and of our nations democratic ideals.39VOL. 618, APRIL 8,
201039Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on ElectionsSame; Same; Same;
Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or
sectors that may qualify as marginalized to the hands of Congress.The
Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as
marginalized to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate,
RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.Same; Same; Same; View
that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those
sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past.In Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court stressed that the party-list
system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the
past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and
even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate).
They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy although their
sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the
national interest.Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by
concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.
The concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list
scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed
to be significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a

constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the
Constitution, namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and
professionals.Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a
say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to
say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of
their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.The longmuffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective
interests are intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the na4040SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission
on Electionstional democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a
particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine
society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in
governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say
something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their
traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.Same; Same; Same;
View that the majoritys decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of
the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector.The
enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the
fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without
significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA
7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Partys eight
guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors or
organizations must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. For this reason, I submit the majoritys decision
is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner
is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner.Same; Same;
Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system
but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are such other sectors as may be
provided by law duly enacted by Congress.Marginalized sectors qualified to
participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are
such other sectors as may be provided by law duly enacted by Congress. It is also
consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which
requires that a general word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to
include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.Same; Same; Same; View that
even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly
con-41VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 201041Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Electionssidered as marginalized under the party-list system.Even assuming that
petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as
marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the
sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA
7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot

establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not
even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an
altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.Same; Same;
Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those sectors
mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to participate in
the party-list system.In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority
under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3(d)
and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as
qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system.
Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Courts duty in our scheme of government
require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to
those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the
party-list system.Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends
the law to include the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other
sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress determination on the matter
is proper.The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by
strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of
marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The
Court has no power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the
guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the
authority to determine such other [marginalized] sectors qualified to participate in
the party-list system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law
to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to
Congress determination on the matter is proper.Same; Same; Same; View that the
party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance
of any and all4242SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections socially misunderstood sectors.While bigotry, social
stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly
just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined
purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for
the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by
nature and history, also the nations but which interests have not been sufficiently
brought to public attention because of these sectors underrepresentation.Same;
Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to
determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the
Courts task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Courts task is to respect
that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly
expand such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an
act of political will and not of judicial judgment.ABAD,J., Separate
Opinion:Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the
underlying policy of Republic Act No. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a
direct part in enacting the laws of the land.The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or
The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors

of society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 359
SCRA 698 (2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem
to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded
about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a
right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating
this case, unravel some of the difficulties.Same; Same; Same; View that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when it denied Ang Ladlads petition for
sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral groundsthe COMELEC43VOL.
618, APRIL 8, 201043Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections has never
applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress.Here, I fully agree that the
COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlads petition for sectoral party accreditation
on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on
regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang
Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.Same;
Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on
the Courts reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941 intends the
excessively limited coverage that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) now
suggests.The COMELECs proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is
inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of
Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Courts reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the
COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941
is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of
society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and
underrepresented in general.Same; Same; Same; View that Congress did not
provide a definition of the term marginalized and underrepresented.Congress
did not provide a definition of the term marginalized and underrepresented. Nor
did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible,
however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No
doubt, Congress crafted that termmarginalized and underrepresentedfrom its
reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution itself gives of groupings that
are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban
poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors.
Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they are,
which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an
abstract description of them.Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that
will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate
party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral
parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives.An interpretation that will
allow concretely or specifically defined4444SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDAng Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Electionsgroups to seek
election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in
the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will
defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough
votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle
drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the

legislature.Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted

estimate that one out of every 10 persons is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBTs) of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about
8.7 million.In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs).
Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an
LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million.
Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from
the mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied
Ang Ladlads petition on religious and moral grounds is proof of this
discrimination.Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it
meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditationtheir members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth.Ang Ladlad has amply proved that
it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow
definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a subgroup within the class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang
Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Certiorari. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618
SCRA 32(2010)]