Pacete vs Carriaga

Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which
the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants
failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the
defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to
Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court pending resolution of a
case on appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the case.

As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties,
petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the
administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children.
Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed
that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the
proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were
depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park
which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he
had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio
Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that
it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b)
disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on
October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate
residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife. 1
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of
their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the
Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She also complained that the
petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the United States in favor of his
paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children.
The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new
contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his
consent.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed
for by his wife. 2
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because
no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code, reading as follows:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of the administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated
by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third
person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by
the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petition has no
merit.
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of
conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It
was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from
interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided
in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between
the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in
the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject
of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue
doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may
be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff. 3
As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief against
future acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo,
rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent
future wrongs although no right has yet been violated." 4
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the
Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment
of
their
tenant
at
Forbes
Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which they depend for
their subsistence. She also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon
City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the
petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California,
U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his
legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect
the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. 5
Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the
complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share
(if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension
that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife
and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's
share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its
management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the
meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in
accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.
Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were
married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior
and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence,
petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed
beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action
and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest
in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Macadangdang vs CA

Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946
after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari
store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their
relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable
so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in
1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In
April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal
separation.
HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the
decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the
decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been
commenced nor terminated.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore,
upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate
succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the
deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code,
now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects

ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the
purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
De Ocampo vs Florenciano

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not
living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust
by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant
manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo
filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the
Family Code.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family
Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession.
The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Elvira Gozon Inter-Deimensional Realty, Inc; GR No. 169900;
March 18, 2010

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
HAD8J5EKCNKC
FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a
30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is
conjugal
partnership
of
gains.
Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5
million in earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not
receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in
Malabon
as
conjugal
property.
Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in
the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis
pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell
the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional
Realty.
Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale
to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale
by
Alfredo
and
Winifred
to
Inter-Dimensional.
However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into
without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos undivided share has been forfeited in favour
of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. (Note these reasons given by the CA.)

ISSUES:
(1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was
done without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by
the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elviras conduct showed
her
acquiescence
to
the
sale.
SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family
Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include
the power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other
spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however
said that the CA erred in saying that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As
regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras
acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to
Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property as a result of
the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2)
(Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his
share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not
Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership
property.
Thus,
as
regards
this
point,
the
CA
erred.
(2) Was the donation to Winifred valid? No, the donation was not valid. Elviras consent was absent.
(3) Was the sale to Inter-Dimensional valid? Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no.
Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the
wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised them to
return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no
longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of
the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go
said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their
wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they
only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but
were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and
wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the
video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering
the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in our culture is a
significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court
was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless
nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under
Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Wong vs. IAC Case Digest

Wong vs. IAC

200 SCRA 792
Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living
separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico
bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to
Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check,
however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the
case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature.

Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action
for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wongs. A writ of
execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson
married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of
execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court"
because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had
nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such
transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his
capital properties.
Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico.
Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the
money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance
considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of
the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the
husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence
only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
Ayala Investments vs CA

Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower
court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a
corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when
the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.

G.R. No. 75410 August 17, 1987

CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO D. DIAZ as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NORMA
DIAZ SARMIENTO, respondents.
No. 75409 August 17, 1987
CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, as the
Presiding Judge of Branch XXVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, NORMA SARMIENTO, LORNA SARMIENTO and LERMA SARMIENTO, respondents.

PARAS., J.:
This is a petition to review and reverse the decision * dated June 13, 1986 of respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 09159 and 09160 denying the petition for certiorari and
prohibition for lack of merit and correspondingly dismissing these cases.
The facts of the aforecited cases will be presented separately since they involve different proceedings heard
before different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
G.R. No. 75409
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
It appears that on May 10, 1977, the private respondent Norma Sarmiento sued her husband, the petitioner
Cesar Sarmiento, for support. The case was filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and later
assigned to Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVII, presided over by Judge Regina Ordoez-Benitez, after the
reorganization of the Judiciary in 1983. On March 1, 1984, Judge Ordoez-Benitez rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant, Cesar Sarmiento, to pay his plaintiff-wife,
Norma Sarmiento, the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) monthly as support commencing on May 10,
1977 up to March, 1984, which shall be paid thirty (30) days after the Decision shall have become final and
executory and the monthly support, starting April 1984, shall be deposited with the Cashier of the Regional
Trial Courts, City Hall, Manila within the first five (6) days of April 1984 and every month thereafter from
which plaintiff-wife or her duly authorized representative may withdraw the same. Support; shall be
Immediately payable, notwithstanding any appeal which may be interposed by defendant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Cashier of the Regional Trial Courts of City Hall, Manila, for his
information and guidance.
On April 9,1984 the private respondent moved for execution of the judgment pending appeal The petitioner
actually filed a notice of appeal four days later on April 13. On May 3, 1984, Judge Ordoez-Benitez issued the
following order:
Acting on the "Motion for Execution of Decision Pending Appeal dated April 9, 1984, and the Notice of Appeal
filed by the defendant on April 13, 1984, the Philippine National Bank is hereby directed that no amount due
the defendant be released without authority from this Court and until final disposition of said case.
Let a copy of this Order be directed to the Philippine National Bank for its guidance and information.
On May 29, 1985 the private respondent filed a motion to require the Philippine National Bank to deliver to the
private respondent the accrued support out of the retirement benefits due to the Petitioner as a former employee
of the PNB.
The petitioner prays
That a restraining order and/or writ of pre injunction forthwith issue, ENJOINING AND PROHIBITING the
respondent JUDGE REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ and all the respondents in Civil-Case No. E-02184,

their agents and employees, and all persons acting for them or on their behalf, from enforcing, executing or
otherwise giving force and effect to the Decision (Annex "A " hereof, and the Order Annex "B hereof). "
On June 13, 1966, the Court of Appeals found petitioner's appeal unmeritorious and thus dismissed the same.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence this petition.
G.R. No. 75410
The Court of Appeals sums up the facts as follows:
It appears that, on August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another action against the petitioner for a
declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner from the PNB were conjugal and that 50% thereof
belonged to the private respondent as her share. The case was assigned to Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila,
presided over by Judge Ricardo Diaz. The petitioner filed an answer in which he contended that the complaint
did not state a cause of action' that there was another action peding between him and the plaintiff and that the
plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the suit. However, the trial court refused to
dismiss the complaint because the grounds cited were not indubitable. The case was therefore set for pre-trial
conference. For failure of the petitioner to appear at the pretrial conference on December 19, 1985, the trial
court declared him as in default. Thereafter, on February 20, 1986, judgment was rendered as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering
defendant Philippine National Bank to desist and refrain from releasing to defendant Cesar Sarmiento all
monetary benefits and emoluments which may be due him by reason of his retirement from service, but instead,
to deliver one-half (1/2) thereof to the herein plaintiff; and if in the event that all such monetary benefits and
emoluments, for one reason or another, had already been paid to defendant Cesar Sarmiento, said defendant is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff one-half (1/2) of whatever monetary benefits, emoluments and pivileges he
received from defendant Philippine National Bank by reason of his retirement. Likewise, defendant Cesar
Sarmiento is hereby ordered the costs of suit.'
On April 21, 1986, the private respondent moved for the immediate execution of the judgment in her favor, on
the ground that any appeal that the petitioner might take would merely be dilatory in the light of the admission
in his answer. The petitioner filed an opposition to the motion wherein he manifested that he was not going to
appeal the decision of the trial court but that he would instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the trial coourt.
Petitioner appealed the February 20, 1986 decision of respondent Judge Diaz to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The assailed decision denied the above petition.
Hence, this joint petition.
Petitioner's averments can be narrowed down to the following:
1. The order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge Ordonez-Benitez, prohibiting the Philippine National Bank to
release any amount of the retirement gratuity due the petitioner without the trial court's approval is contrary to
law, because retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
2. Since the trial court had refused to give the course to his appeal, he was justified in resorting to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
3. The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz also ordering the PNB to desist
from releasing to petitioner any portion of his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to herein
private respondent is contrary to law.
From the foregoing, it can be gauged that what petitioner principally questions or protests against is respondent
appellate court's failure (actually refusal to resolve the issue on whether or not the retirement benefits due the
petitioner from the PNB are subject to attachment, execution or other legal process).
Private respondent, however, claims that the issues raised by petitioner before respondent Court of Appeals
were issues relating to the merits of the cases then pending with respondents Judge Ordonez-Benitez and Judge
Diaz and hence the said issues were proper subject of an appeal, which remedy was already availed of by
petitioner in both cases. She likewise submits that since no question of jurisdiciton or abuse of discretion had
been raised and substantiated in the petitions before the respondent Court of Appeals, said appellate court was
legally justified in dismissing the petition.

Just as We have dealt with the facts of these two cases, We now intend to resolve their issues and questions also
separately.
G.R. No. 75409
We do not find merit in petitioner's contention that simply because the trial court had refused to give due course
to his appeal, he was already justified in resorting to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. What the respondent Court of Appeals found in this regard need not be further elaborated upon.
Said appellate court ruled:
Under BP 129, sec. 39, no record on appeal is required to take an appeal. Nor is an appeal bond required.
(Interim Rules, sec. 18) A notice of appeal is sufficient. Unlike before, where approval of the record on appeal
and the appeal bond was required before the appeal was perfected, under the present rule, the appeal is
perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by a party by the mere filing of a notitce of appeal
(Interim Rules, sec. 23). The approval of the court is not required. This means that within 30 days after the
perfection of the appeal, the original record should be transmitted to the Intermediate Appellate Court. If the
clerk neglects the performance of this duty, the appellant should ask the court to order the clerk. It does not
seem that the petitioner has done this, and it may even be that he is liable for failure to prosecute his appeal.
(Rule 46, sec. 3; Rule 50, sec. 1 [c].
On the allegation of petitioner that it is not the appellant but the appellee's duty to make the clerk of court of the
trial court transmit the record on appeal to the appellate court, respondent Court of Appeals aptly points to the
rullings under Rule 46, sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It has been held that, while it is the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to immediately transmit to
the clerk of the Supreme Court a certified copy of the bill of exceptions, (now, record on appeal) it is also the
duty of the appellant to cause the same to be presented to the clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty days
after its approval. He cannot simply fold his arms and say that it is the duty of the Clerk of Court First Instance
under the provisions of section 11, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to transmit the record of appeal to the
appellate court. It is appellant's duty to make the clerk act and, if necessary, procure a court order to compel
him to act. He cannot idly sit by and wait till this is done. He cannot afterwards wash his hands and say that
delay in the transmittal of the record on appeal was not his fault. For, indeed, this duty imposed upon him was
precisely to spur on the slothful. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 480 [1979])."
Evidently, petitioner had no valid excuse to resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition when
appeal had been available to him and which he, in fact, already initiated but did not pursue.
Petitioner, in questioning the Order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge Ordoez-Benitez, claims that such
order contravenes the law exempting retirement gratuity from legal process and liens. We find merit in
petitioner's stand in the light of the explicit provisions of Sec. 26 of CA 186, as amended, which read as
follows:
Sec. 26. Exemption from legal process and liens. No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or the
proceeds thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act, shall be
liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal
or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such member, of his beneficiary, or any
other person who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof;
when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his
debt; Provided, however, That this section shall not apply when obligation, associated or bank or other financial
instituted, which is hereby authorized.
The aforecited freeze order of respondent Judge Benitez (directing PNB not to release any portion of the
retirement benefits due the petitioner) falls squarely within the restrictive provisions of the aforequoted section.
Notably, said section speaks of "any other benefit granted under this Act," or "other process" and "applied by
any legal or equitable process or operation of law." This assailed order clearly violates the aforestated provision
and is, therefore, illegal and improper.
G.R. No 75410
Re the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the appellate court in dismissing the same, said:
But in this case, the petitioner could have appealed from the decision of Judge Diaz. Instead, he announced he
was not going to appeal. He was going to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition as he in fact did in this
case. This certainly cannot be done, even under the most liberal view of practice and procedure. Especially can
this not be done when the questions raised do not relate either to errors of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of
discretion but, if at all, to errors of judgment.

The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz which ordered then defendant PNB to
desist and refrain from releasing to petitioner all monetary benefits and emoluments due him as retirement
benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent also comes within the prohibition imposed by Sec.
26, as amended, of the GSIS Charter. This, in effect, is also a freeze order.
The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private respondent makes the default
judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and
faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the
monetary benefits are given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the retirement pay of a
provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs.
Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art.
148, Civil Code).
In vie
Inter-Country Adoption in the
Philippines

By: Atty. Magdalena M. R. Lepiten, Cebu City, Philippines

Introduction
The law that governs inter-country adoption in the Philippines is Republic Act No. 8043 approved on June 7, 1995.
It is the policy of the Philippines to provide every neglected and abandoned child with a family with priorities to place the
child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However, this law recognize inter-country adoption to allow aliens to
adopt provided it shall be beneficial to the child's best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.
Thus, inter-country adoption shall be the last resort only if all possibilities under the Family Code have been exhausted.
Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of
adoption is issued outside the Philippines.
This law is in compliance with the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption1, to which the Philippines is a State Party and is denominated as a Sending Country.
The Inter-Country Adoption Board
The Inter-Country Adoption Board is the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the
policy-making body
The Board shall be composed of the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as ex
officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by the President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years.
There shall be appointed one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who shall have at least the qualifications of
a regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two (2) representatives from non-governmental
organizations engaged in child-caring and placement activities.

Who May Adopt

An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino
child if he/she:

(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time
of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:

(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has
undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his
children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a
similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine
laws.
Who May be Adopted
Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. Legally-free child means a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), in accordance
with the Philippine Child and Youth Welfare Code. Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner
emancipated by law.
Requirements to be submitted to the Inter-country Adoption Board in order the child may be considered for placement
(a) Child study;
(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d) Medical evaluation /history;
(e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f) Recent photo of the child.

Where to File Application?

There are two ways to file an application:

1.
filed before the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, in which case the Rules of
Court shall apply

2.
3.
with the Inter-country Adoption Board, through an intermediate agency in the country of the prospective adoptive
parents

4.

What are the documents needed together with the application for adoption?

The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated in English.

(a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);

(b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;

(c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement;
(d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and psychologist;
(e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s);
(f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
(g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a member of the immediate
community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and
(h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family;
What are the rules for Family Selection/Matching?

Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to promote a mutually satisfying parentchild relationship.

1.
No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be
adopted locally.

2.
3.
The clearance shall be issued by the Inter-country Adoption Board for the placement of the child.

4.
5.
The Board shall transmit the Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency.

6.
7.
The adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines once all the travel
documents of the child are ready.

8.
What are the Pre-adoptive Placement Costs?
The applicant(s) shall bear the following costs incidental to the placement of the child;

1.
The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the applicant(s) abroad, including all travel
expenses within the Philippines and abroad; and

2.

1.
The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and psychological evaluation required, and other related
expenses.

2.

Who shall be responsible for the Supervision of Trial Custody?

The governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the
application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child.

It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of six (6) months
from the time of placement.

Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption is issued in the said country a copy of which
shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited
agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report
shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.
What are the penalties provided for in this law?
(a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying out of an illegal adoption, in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and/or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is illegal if it is effected in any
manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or established State policies, its implementing rules and regulations,
executive agreements, and other laws pertaining to adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the following acts:
(1) consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud, improper material inducement;

(2) there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;

(3) the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not complied with; and
(4) the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents
and communications of adoption applications, cases and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not more
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.

A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under this Article shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein enumerated.
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two or more children shall be
considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more

persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this
Article. Penalties as are herein provided shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same
acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
What will happen to Public Officers who violates this law?
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act,
or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in
accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either
administrative or criminal, said government official, employee or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer
suspension until the resolution of the case.
How much are the fees for those interested in adopting Filipino children?

The applicants are to bear the following costs

a) Adoption Application Fee--$100.00 (non-refundable upon endorsement of the Adoption Application and Supporting
Documents)
b)
Processing
Fee--US$900.00--for
US$ 400.00--for Special Needs Children

relative

and

non-relative

adoption

c) Pre-travel Expenses-- The cost of the passport, visa, medical examination, psychological evaluation, travel expenses of
the child within the Philippines and for abroad ( the cost varies on a country to country basis)
d) US$500 Child Care Support Fund for the Child Caring Agencies
What is the required age for the Adoptive Applicants?
It is a requirement in the Philippine Inter-country Adoption Law that the adoptive applicants must at least be 16 years
older than the child to be adopted at the time of filing of the application or maintained a maximum age gap of

How long is the processing time?

Adoption applicants that have substantive Home Study Report (HSR) and complete supporting documents are reviewed
and approved within one month from receipt of the adoption applicant/s' dossier. On the other hand, adoption application
with lacking information and/or documents are reviewed and processed depending upon the submission/completion by
the Central Authority/Foreign Adoption Agency (CA/FAA) of the requested information and/or documents with the
corresponding delay in its approval.
The matching or child referral or allocation largely depends on the stated child preference (i.e. child's age, gender and
state of health or extent of known background) of the Prospective Adoptive Parents (PAPs). This usually takes nine (9)
months to one (1) year after the PAPs' approval. If one is willing to accept a special needs child then it generally shortens
the waiting period for child allocation.

Frequently Asked Questions from the ICAB2

(website: source: http://www.skyinet.net/~icaba/index.html)
1. Can a prospective adoptive parent choose the gender of the child to be adopted?
Yes, the adoptive applicants have the option to choose the gender and the age of their child preference.
2. If you adopt a sibling group, do you pay one processing fee, or one fee for each child?

The Prospective Adoptive Parents pay only one processing fee regardless of the number of siblings in the group to be
adopted. The ICAB estimates the pre-travel expenses (for the processing of travel documents e.g. passport, Birth
Certificates, Visa Medical Examination, Visa Pictures, etc.) for each child and is a separate payment from the processing
fee. The cost of the pre-travel expenses is for each child to be processed by the ICAB and to be paid by the PAPs.
3. Will a health certificate be issued to the adopted child? If so what diseases will he or she be tested for? Will the child be
subject to AIDS testing?
Generally, children cleared for inter-country adoption have been tested and also received immunizations against common
childhood ailments while under the care and custody of Child Caring/Child Placing Agencies (orphanages/Institutions for
children). However, children bound for inter-country adoption placement undergo visa medical examination or health
examination prior to the issuance of their entry visa if this is an immigration requirement of the Receiving Country. To
date, visa medical examinations include: blood testing, stool examination, urine test, skin test for allergies, Tuberculin test
for Primary Complex or pulmonary Tuberculosis, Hepatitis B (if requested) and HIV
Filipino children are not subjected to AIDS tests unless there are factors (e.g. child's birthmother is a prostituted woman
with multiple partners, drug user, etc.) that would logically require the AIDS test to be done because it will be in the
child's best interests.
4. Is the adoption process transparent?
Yes, very transparent! The Central Authority representatives can come and visit the ICAB, may request the observation of
the Matching Conference, have dialogues with the ICAB Secretariat Social Workers, may schedule visits to the different
Child Caring/Placing Agencies or write, fax, email or courier us to Inquire, among others, on matters pertaining to
Prospective adoptive Parents (PAPs) application, the child being proposed to the PAPs and other inter-country adoption
concerns they wish to be clarified.
5. What are the legal guarantees of PAPs in the event the biological parents of the adopted Filipino child changes their
mind about the adoption?
a) The children placed for inter-country adoption are those who are either involuntary committed by virtue of a Regional
Trial Court's/Family Court's Declaration of Abandonment (DA) or those who are voluntarily committed or relinquished by
their biological parent/s and legal guardian by virtue of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment (DVC) made out to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Philippine Competent Authority on adoption.
b) The Involuntary Commitment is a judicial process that terminates the parental authority of the biological parent/s or
legal guardians.
c) When a child has been voluntarily committed in writing by his/her biological parent/s or legal guardians to the custody
of the DSWD or any licensed Child Caring/Child Placing Agency, the rights of his/her biological parent/s guardians or
other custodian to exercise parental authority over him is severed. The biological parent/s guardian may petition for
the restoration of their parental rights and authority over the child within six months after the surrender (DVC) and
provided that the child has not left the country with the PAPs.
6. Is there a possibility that the Child will be taken away from the custody of the PAPs after the initial 6 months period?
The child may be taken away from the custody of the PAPs during the initial 6 months trial custody period if the CA/FAA
finds that the child or the PAPs or both find/s the pre-adoptive relationship to be unsatisfactory of if the CA/FA finds that
the continued placement of the child is not in the child's best interest. Said relationship is suspended by the Board.
7. Are there many children available in the waiting child program and what are the circumstances?
We have a number of Special Needs Children- Special Home Finding of either sex or
Older children whose age range is from 5 - 15 years old
Children belonging to a sibling group of 3 or more
Children found positive of Hepa B or HIV
Children with minor medical conditions (cleft lip/palate, half or total blindness, hearing impaired, mild cerebral palsy,
etc.) developmental delays (language/speech, motor skills, etc.)
8. How long is typical for waiting for this program?
Generally, all our waiting children have been cleared for inter-country adoption placement and once the FAA notifies the
ICAB that a possible family is interested in a specific child/ren in the Special Needs Children - Special Home Findings
program, such a case/s is/are put on hold. The ICAB allows the FAA to complete and endorse the dossier of the SHF
adoption applicants within a 4 month period. The ICAB Secretariat Social Worker in charge of the SNC-SHF program is
mandated by the Board to present the case within one week after receipt of the application if the endorsed dossier of the
family has thorough and substantial information in the Home Study Report (HSR) and supporting documents are complete

and likewise, the dossier of the child is complete and updated

References:

1. CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

2. Republic Act No. 8043 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.

The full text are provided hereunder:

CONVENTION ON PROTECTION
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

OF

CHILDREN

AND

CO-OPERATION

IN

RESPECT

OF

(Concluded 29 May 1993)

(Entered into force 1 May 1995)
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,
Recalling that each State should take, as a matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care
of his or her family of origin,
Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable
family cannot be found in his or her State of origin,
Convinced of the necessity to take measures to ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children,
Desiring to establish common provisions to this effect, taking into account the principles set forth in international
instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, of 20 November 1989, and the United
Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally (General Assembly Resolution 41/85, of 3
December 1986),
Have agreed upon the following provisions
CHAPTER I SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 1
The objects of the present Convention are
a) to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect
for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law;
b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that those safeguards are respected and
thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children;
c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance with the Convention.
Article 2
(1) The Convention shall apply where a child habitually resident in one Contracting State ("the State of origin") has been,
is being, or is to be moved to another Contracting State ("the receiving State") either after his or her adoption in the State
of origin by spouses or a person habitually resident in the receiving State, or for the purposes of such an adoption in the

receiving State or in the State of origin.

(2) The Convention covers only adoptions which create a permanent parent-child relationship.
Article 3
The Convention ceases to apply if the agreements mentioned in Article 17, sub-paragraph c, have not been given before
the child attains the age of eighteen years.
CHAPTER II REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS
Article 4
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin
a) have established that the child is adoptable;
b) have determined, after possibilities for placement of the child within the State of origin have been given due
consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child's best interests;
c) have ensured that
(1) the persons, institutions and authorities whose consent is necessary for adoption, have been counseled as may be
necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent, in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the
termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of origin,
(2) such persons, institutions and authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or
evidenced in writing,
(3) the consents have not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind and have not been withdrawn, and
(4) the consent of the mother, where required, has been given only after the birth of the child; and
d) have ensured, having regard to the age and degree of maturity of the child, that
(1) he or she has been counselled and duly informed of the effects of the adoption and of his or her consent to the
adoption, where such consent is required,
(2) consideration has been given to the child's wishes and opinions,
(3) the child's consent to the adoption, where such consent is required, has been given freely, in the required legal form,
and expressed or evidenced in writing, and
(4) such consent has not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind.
Article 5
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the receiving State
a) have determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to adopt;
b) have ensured that the prospective adoptive parents have been counselled as may be necessary; and
c) have determined that the child is or will be authorized to enter and reside permanently in that State.
CHAPTER III CENTRAL AUTHORITIES AND ACCREDITED BODIES
Article 6
(1) A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention
upon such authorities.
(2) Federal States, States with more than one system of law or States having autonomous territorial units shall be free to
appoint more than one Central Authority and to specify the territorial or personal extent of their functions. Where a State
has appointed more than one Central Authority, it shall designate the Central Authority to which any communication may
be addressed for transmission to the appropriate Central Authority within that State.
Article 7

(1) Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in
their States to protect children and to achieve the other objects of the Convention.
(2) They shall take directly all appropriate measures to
a) provide information as to the laws of their States concerning adoption and other general information, such as statistics
and standard forms;
b) keep one another informed about the operation of the Convention and, as far as possible, eliminate any obstacles to its
application.
Article 8
Central Authorities shall take, directly or through public authorities, all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial
or other gain in connection with an adoption and to deter all practices contrary to the objects of the Convention.
Article 9
Central Authorities shall take, directly or through public authorities or other bodies duly accredited in their State, all
appropriate measures, in particular to
a) collect, preserve and exchange information about the situation of the child and the prospective adoptive parents, so far
as is necessary to complete the adoption;
b) facilitate, follow and expedite proceedings with a view to obtaining the adoption;
c) promote the development of adoption counseling and post-adoption services in their States;
d) provide each other with general evaluation reports about experience with intercountry adoption;
e) reply, in so far as is permitted by the law of their State, to justified requests from other Central Authorities or public
authorities for information about a particular adoption situation.
Article 10
Accreditation shall only be granted to and maintained by bodies demonstrating their competence to carry out properly the
tasks with which they may be entrusted.
Article 11
An accredited body shall
a) pursue only non-profit objectives according to such conditions and within such limits as may be established by the
competent authorities of the State of accreditation;
b) be directed and staffed by persons qualified by their ethical standards and by training or experience to work in the field
of intercountry adoption; and
c) be subject to supervision by competent authorities of that State as to its composition, operation and financial situation.
Article 12
A body accredited in one Contracting State may act in another Contracting State only if the competent authorities of both
States have authorized it to do so.
Article 13
The designation of the Central Authorities and, where appropriate, the extent of their functions, as well as the names and
addresses of the accredited bodies shall be communicated by each Contracting State to the Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.
CHAPTER IV PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
Article 14
Persons habitually resident in a Contracting State, who wish to adopt a child habitually resident in another Contracting
State, shall apply to the Central Authority in the State of their habitual residence.

Article 15
(1) If the Central Authority of the receiving State is satisfied that the applicants are eligible and suited to adopt, it shall
prepare a report including information about their identity, eligibility and suitability to adopt, background, family and
medical history, social environment, reasons for adoption, ability to undertake an intercountry adoption, as well as the
characteristics of the children for whom they would be qualified to care.
(2) It shall transmit the report to the Central Authority of the State of origin.
Article 16
(1) If the Central Authority of the State of origin is satisfied that the child is adoptable, it shall
a) prepare a report including information about his or her identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family
history, medical history including that of the child's family, and any special needs of the child;
b) give due consideration to the child's upbringing and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural background;
c) ensure that consents have been obtained in accordance with Article 4; and
d) determine, on the basis in particular of the reports relating to the child and the prospective adoptive parents, whether the
envisaged placement is in the best interests of the child.
(2) It shall transmit to the Central Authority of the receiving State its report on the child, proof that the necessary consents
have been obtained and the reasons for its determination on the placement, taking care not to reveal the identity of the
mother and the father if, in the State of origin, these identities may not be disclosed.
Article 17
Any decision in the State of origin that a child should be entrusted to prospective adoptive parents may only be made if
a) the Central Authority of that State has ensured that the prospective adoptive parents agree;
b) the Central Authority of the receiving State has approved such decision, where such approval is required by the law of
that State or by the Central Authority of the State of origin;
c) the Central Authorities of both States have agreed that the adoption may proceed; and
d) it has been determined, in accordance with Article 5, that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to
adopt and that the child is or will be authorized to enter and reside permanently in the receiving State.
Article 18
The Central Authorities of both States shall take all necessary steps to obtain permission for the child to leave the State of
origin and to enter and reside permanently in the receiving State.
Article 19
(1) The transfer of the child to the receiving State may only be carried out if the requirements of Article 17 have been
satisfied.
(2) The Central Authorities of both States shall ensure that this transfer takes place in secure and appropriate
circumstances and, if possible, in the company of the adoptive or prospective adoptive parents.
(3) If the transfer of the child does not take place, the reports referred to in Articles 15 and 16 are to be sent back to the
authorities who forwarded them.
Article 20
The Central Authorities shall keep each other informed about the adoption process and the measures taken to complete it,
as well as about the progress of the placement if a probationary period is required.
Article 21
(1) Where the adoption is to take place after the transfer of the child to the receiving State and it appears to the Central
Authority of that State that the continued placement of the child with the prospective adoptive parents is not in the child's
best interests, such Central Authority shall take the measures necessary to protect the child, in particular

a) to cause the child to be withdrawn from the prospective adoptive parents and to arrange temporary care;
b) in consultation with the Central Authority of the State of origin, to arrange without delay a new placement of the child
with a view to adoption or, if this is not appropriate, to arrange alternative long-term care; an adoption shall not take place
until the Central Authority of the State of origin has been duly informed concerning the new prospective adoptive parents;
c) as a last resort, to arrange the return of the child, if his or her interests so require.
(2) Having regard in particular to the age and degree of maturity of the child, he or she shall be consulted and, where
appropriate, his or her consent obtained in relation to measures to be taken under this Article.
Article 22
(1) The functions of a Central Authority under this Chapter may be performed by public authorities or by bodies
accredited under Chapter III, to the extent permitted by the law of its State.
(2) Any Contracting State may declare to the depositary of the Convention that the functions of the Central Authority
under Articles 15 to 21 may be performed in that State, to the extent permitted by the law and subject to the supervision of
the competent authorities of that State, also by bodies or persons who
a) meet the requirements of integrity, professional competence, experience and accountability of that State; and
b) are qualified by their ethical standards and by training or experience to work in the field of intercountry adoption.
(3) A Contracting State which makes the declaration provided for in paragraph 2 shall keep the Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law informed of the names and addresses of these bodies and persons.
(4) Any Contracting State may declare to the depositary of the Convention that adoptions of children habitually resident in
its territory may only take place if the functions of the Central Authorities are performed in accordance with paragraph 1.
(5) Notwithstanding any declaration made under paragraph 2, the reports provided for in Articles 15 and 16 shall, in every
case, be prepared under the responsibility of the Central Authority or other authorities or bodies in accordance with
paragraph 1.
CHAPTER V RECOGNITION AND EFFECTS OF THE ADOPTION
Article 23
(1) An adoption certified by the competent authority of the State of the adoption as having been made in accordance with
the Convention shall be recognized by operation of law in the other Contracting States. The certificate shall specify when
and by whom the agreements under Article 17, sub-paragraph c), were given.
(2) Each Contracting State shall, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, notify the
depositary of the Convention of the identity and the functions of the authority or the authorities which, in that State, are
competent to make the certification. It shall also notify the depositary of any modification in the designation of these
authorities.
Article 24
The recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting State only if the adoption is manifestly contrary to its
public policy, taking into account the best interests of the child.
Article 25
Any Contracting State may declare to the depositary of the Convention that it will not be bound under this Convention to
recognize adoptions made in accordance with an agreement concluded by application of Article 39, paragraph 2.
Article 26
(1) The recognition of an adoption includes recognition of
a) the legal parent-child relationship between the child and his or her adoptive parents;
b) parental responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child;
c) the termination of a pre-existing legal relationship between the child and his or her mother and father, if the adoption
has this effect in the Contracting State where it was made.
(2) In the case of an adoption having the effect of terminating a pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, the child shall

enjoy in the receiving State, and in any other Contracting State where the adoption is recognized, rights equivalent to
those resulting from adoptions having this effect in each such State.
(3) The preceding paragraphs shall not prejudice the application of any provision more favorable for the child, in force in
the Contracting State which recognizes the adoption.
Article 27
(1) Where an adoption granted in the State of origin does not have the effect of terminating a pre-existing legal parentchild relationship, it may, in the receiving State which recognizes the adoption under the Convention, be converted into an
adoption having such an effect
a) if the law of the receiving State so permits; and
b) if the consents referred to in Article 4, sub-paragraphs c and d, have been or are given for the purpose of such an
adoption.
(2) Article 23 applies to the decision converting the adoption.
CHAPTER VI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 28
The Convention does not affect any law of a State of origin which requires that the adoption of a child habitually resident
within that State take place in that State or which prohibits the child's placement in, or transfer to, the receiving State prior
to adoption.
Article 29
There shall be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child's parents or any other person who has
care of the child until the requirements of Article 4, sub-paragraphs a) to c), and Article 5, sub-paragraph a), have been
met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or unless the contact is in compliance with the conditions established
by the competent authority of the State of origin.
Article 30
(1) The competent authorities of a Contracting State shall ensure that information held by them concerning the child's
origin, in particular information concerning the identity of his or her parents, as well as the medical history, is preserved.
(2) They shall ensure that the child or his or her representative has access to such information, under appropriate guidance,
in so far as is permitted by the law of that State.
Article 31
Without prejudice to Article 30, personal data gathered or transmitted under the Convention, especially data referred to in
Articles 15 and 16, shall be used only for the purposes for which they were gathered or transmitted.
Article 32
(1) No one shall derive improper financial or other gain from an activity related to an intercountry adoption.
(2) Only costs and expenses, including reasonable professional fees of persons involved in the adoption, may be charged
or paid.
(3) The directors, administrators and employees of bodies involved in an adoption shall not receive remuneration which is
unreasonably high in relation to services rendered.
Article 33
A competent authority which finds that any provision of the Convention has not been respected or that there is a serious
risk that it may not be respected, shall immediately inform the Central Authority of its State. This Central Authority shall
be responsible for ensuring that appropriate measures are taken.
Article 34
If the competent authority of the State of destination of a document so requests, a translation certified as being in
conformity with the original must be furnished. Unless otherwise provided, the costs of such translation are to be borne by
the prospective adoptive parents.

Article 35
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall act expeditiously in the process of adoption.
Article 36
In relation to a State which has two or more systems of law with regard to adoption applicable in different territorial units

a) any reference to habitual residence in that State shall be construed as referring to habitual residence in a territorial unit
of that State;
b) any reference to the law of that State shall be construed as referring to the law in force in the relevant territorial unit;
c) any reference to the competent authorities or to the public authorities of that State shall be construed as referring to
those authorized to act in the relevant territorial unit;
d) any reference to the accredited bodies of that State shall be construed as referring to bodies accredited in the relevant
territorial unit.
Article 37
In relation to a State which with regard to adoption has two or more systems of law applicable to different categories of
persons, any reference to the law of that State shall be construed as referring to the legal system specified by the law of
that State.
Article 38
A State within which different territorial units have their own rules of law in respect of adoption shall not be bound to
apply the Convention where a State with a unified system of law would not be bound to do so.
Article 39
(1) The Convention does not affect any international instrument to which Contracting States are Parties and which
contains provisions on matters governed by the Convention, unless a contrary declaration is made by the States Parties to
such instrument.
(2) Any Contracting State may enter into agreements with one or more other Contracting States, with a view to improving
the application of the Convention in their mutual relations. These agreements may derogate only from the provisions of
Articles 14 to 16 and 18 to 21. The States which have concluded such an agreement shall transmit a copy to the depositary
of the Convention.
Article 40
No reservation to the Convention shall be permitted.
Article 41
The Convention shall apply in every case where an application pursuant to Article 14 has been received after the
Convention has entered into force in the receiving State and the State of origin.
Article 42
The Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law shall at regular intervals convene a Special
Commission in order to review the practical operation of the Convention.
CHAPTER VII FINAL CLAUSES
Article 43
(1) The Convention shall be open for signature by the States which were Members of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law at the time of its Seventeenth Session and by the other States which participated in that Session.
(2) It shall be ratified, accepted or approved and the instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, depositary of the Convention.
Article 44
(1) Any other State may accede to the Convention after it has entered into force in accordance with Article 46, paragraph

1.
(2) The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the depositary.
(3) Such accession shall have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and those Contracting States
which have not raised an objection to its accession in the six months after the receipt of the notification referred to in subparagraph b) of Article 48. Such an objection may also be raised by States at the time when they ratify, accept or approve
the Convention after an accession. Any such objection shall be notified to the depositary.
Article 45
(1) If a State has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law are applicable in relation to matters dealt
with in the Convention, it may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that this
Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or more of them and may modify this declaration by
submitting another declaration at any time.
(2) Any such declaration shall be notified to the depositary and shall state expressly the territorial units to which the
Convention applies.
(3) If a State makes no declaration under this Article, the Convention is to extend to all territorial units of that State.
Article 46
(1) The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the
deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval referred to in Article 43.
(2) Thereafter the Convention shall enter into force
a) for each State ratifying, accepting or approving it subsequently, or acceding to it, on the first day of the month
following the expiration of three months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession;
b) for a territorial unit to which the Convention has been extended in conformity with Article 45, on the first day of the
month following the expiration of three months after the notification referred to in that Article.
Article 47
(1) A State Party to the Convention may denounce it by a notification in writing addressed to the depositary.
(2) The denunciation takes effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months after the
notification is received by the depositary. Where a longer period for the denunciation to take effect is specified in the
notification, the denunciation takes effect upon the expiration of such longer period after the notification is received by the
depositary.
Article 48
The depositary shall notify the States Members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the other States
which participated in the Seventeenth Session and the States which have acceded in accordance with Article 44, of the
following
a) the signatures, ratifications, acceptances and approvals referred to in Article 43;
b) the accessions and objections raised to accessions referred to in Article 44;
c) the date on which the Convention enters into force in accordance with Article 46;
d) the declarations and designations referred to in Articles 22, 23, 25 and 45;
e) the agreements referred to in Article 39;
f) the denunciations referred to in Article 47.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.
Done at The Hague, on the 29th day of May 1993, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally
authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
and of which a certified copy shall be sent, through diplomatic channels, to each of the States Members of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law at the date of its Seventeenth Session and to each of the other States which

participated in that Session.

Republic Act No. 8043 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.

ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every neglected and abandoned
child with a family that will provide such child with love and care as well as opportunities for growth and development.
Towards this end, efforts shall be exerted to place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However,
recognizing that inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens, not presently allowed by law to adopt
Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall take measures
to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the childs best interests and
shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken and decree of adoption
is issued outside the Philippines.

b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated by law.
c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the Republic of the Philippines.
d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State welfare agency or a licensed adoption agency in the country of the
adopting parents which provide comprehensive social services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance
with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to promote a mutually satisfying parentchild relationship.
h) Board refers to the Inter-Country Adoption Board.

w of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. Let the records be remanded to the trial courts of
origin for further proceedings.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO
CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child remains
under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the
full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate
placement or adoption within the child's extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration
in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration
on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster
Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and
assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned.
(c) It shall also be a State policy to:
(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her parental authority over his/her
child;
(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s);
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and custody over his/her adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared so as to
establish the status of the child as "legally available for adoption" and his/her custody transferred to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity
shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption;
(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to handle adoption inquiries,
process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent
preparation and post-adoption education and counseling; and
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in his/her native land, and only when
this is not available shall intercountry adoption be considered as a last resort.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of
his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes parental authority to the
Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been permanently and judicially
deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence
to discharge parental responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parent(s) has deserted
him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the adjustment and emotional
readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to provide comprehensive child
welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive
parents, and preparing the adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that provides twenty four (24)-hour
residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth records that a certain child was
born to a person who is not his/her biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
ARTICLE II
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES

Section 4. Counseling Service. The Department shall provide the services of licensed social workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the birth of his/her child. No
binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months
shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the
decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological parent(s) after
he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all alternatives for the child's
future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others, shall be provided to
prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she understands the nature and effects
of adoption and is able to express his/her views on adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring
agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts
fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be
declared abandoned.
Section 6. Support Services. The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program which shall include, among others,
the above mentioned services.
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee
may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three
(3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for
adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the
adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
months from the time of death of said parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right
to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
Section 10. Hurried Decisions. In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the biological
parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to
give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged
stay of the child in his/her own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Section 11. Case Study. No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the
Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a
case study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with the Civil Registry
the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry,
it shall be the responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that the documents to
support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions
and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the petition
should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption
shall be preserved by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been
given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to
adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary
parental authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best
interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must
complete the six (6)-month trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption
placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no
opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the
adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to
adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which
shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies

before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by
which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by
the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her
surname. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended
birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the
adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and
shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or
arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information
to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Section 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
Section 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if
a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on
any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s),
if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The
reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her
original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission.
Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal
Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following
acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other
similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.

(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is
not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its
medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall cooperate in the execution
of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed and also the penalty of permanent
disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents,
and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this Article shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when
committed by a syndicate or where it involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting
child trafficking and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this
Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same
acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and perpetually excluded
from entry to the country.
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act,
or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in
accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either
administrative or criminal, said government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer
suspension until the resolution of the case.
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth
of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the
child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5)
years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the
procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.
ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. There shall be established an Adoption Resources and Referral
Office under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the existence, number, and flow of children legally
available for adoption and prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information
and educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help
child-caring and child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in collaboration
with the Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned by adoption experts from
the public and private sectors.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Within six (6) months from the promulgation of this Act, the
Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of Justice,
Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing and child-caring agencies shall
formulate the necessary guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative.
Section 25. Appropriations. Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Act shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed,
modified, or amended accordingly.
Section 27. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not
affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in any
newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.