1)TIMBAL,CECILIA

PROBLEM:Trowa Barton and Dorothy Catalonia were

married on June 1980. Although they did not have
common children, both have children from prior
marriages (Trowas daughter is Cagalli, while
Dorothys son is Yzak), noting however, that at the
time of the marriage, Dorothys prior marriage was
still subsisting, while Trowas marriage was
dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960.
According to Yzak, Trowa purchased a portion of
Vitas property sometime in 1968, the remaining
portion of which was purchased by Cagalli on her
fathers behalf in 1970. The property was covered
by TCT 141782 issued to Trowa Barton, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Dorothy Catalonia dated
December 1980. He also claimed that starting 1978,
the father and daughter of legal operated small
business establishments referred to as Delpan
property.
On Sept 6, 1997, Trowa sold the Vitas and Delpan
properties to Cagalli and her husband Athrun Zala.
Trowa and Dorothy respectively passed away on
Sept 11, 1997 and July 1999 respectively.
Sometime in 2000, Yzaks mother, Leonora,
discovered the sale. Thus, he, represented by
Leonora, filed for Petition for Annulment of Deeds of
Sale alleging that the sale of properties was
fraudulent because Trowas signatures on the deeds
of sale were forged. Spouses Zala on the other
hand, argued that because of Dorothys prior
marriage to Quatre, her subsequent marriage to
Trowa was null and void. Thus, neither Dorothy nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Trowa and spouses Zala.
During trial, Yzak argues that the certificate of title
covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Trowa and Dorothy because the
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued several
months after the parties were married, and the title
to the land was issued to "Trowa Barton, of legal
age, married to Dorothy Catalonia.

Question:Is Yzaks contention tenable?

ANSWER:No,Yzaks contention is not tenable.Article
148 of the Family Code, provides:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the

parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only
the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. xxx
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and
Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Trowa and Dorothy; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through
the parties actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry.
In the present case, the title itself shows that the

Vitas property is owned by Trowa alone. The phrase

"married to DorothyCatalonia" is merely descriptive of
his civil status, and does not show that Dorothy coowned the property. The facts also established that
Trowa acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Dorothy, even if the
certificate of title was issued after the celebration of
the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title
system merely confirms, and does not
vest title. Thus, co-ownership between Trowa and
Dorothy cannot be presumed.
Catalonia
Case citation: Edilberto Ventura vs Sps Paulino &
Evangeline Abuda - GR No. 202932. October 23,
2013. Name/Class: TIMBAL,MA.CECELIAExecutive
class
2) BARON, ALI 42
PROBLEM:AAA gave birth to a baby girl on April 24,
2002. She alleged to have been raped by her uncle
Abat on September 22, 2001. Abat argues that if it
were true that he raped AAA in September 2001,
then the baby girl AAA gave birth to in April 2002
would have been born prematurely. Since the baby
appeared to be healthy when she was born, she
could not have possibly been the result of the
alleged rape in September 2001. Is the baby girl a
child of Abat?
ANSWER:Yes. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family
Code, accused-appellant can overcome the
presumption that AAAs child was begotten as a
result of her having been raped in September 1991
only if he can show either that it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse
because of impotence or serious illness which
absolutely prevents him from having sexual
intercourse or that AAA had sexual intercourse with
another man. However, accused-appellant has not
shown either of these.
Case citation:
202704. April 2, 2014

G.R. No.

3)CORBITA, KEVIN 58
Effectofimprovementsonproperty
PROBLEM:Spouses Nangginansya Binay and Etomas
Binay are owners of a residential house which they
mortgaged with the GSIS to secure a loan (200k). It
is alleged that Gloria Macapal granted the spouses a
600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to
GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be
delivered by Macapal upon surrender of the title
over the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights
to be executed by the husband. While the spouses
were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was
signed by the husband. Consequently, Macapal
refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and
since the spouses could no longer return the 200k
Macapal kept the title over the property and
subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in
his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of
the purported sale of the property in favor of
Macapal. The RTC ruled that the property was the
wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she

inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is

valid even without the husbands consent.The CA
reversed and ruled that while the property was
originally exclusive paraphernal property of the
wife, it became conjugal property when it was used
as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid
through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void.
Questions:

Is the property (house) is conjugal?

Is the contract between petitioner and the spouses

is an equitable mortgage?

All property acquired during the marriage is

presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved. But in this case, since the residential lot was
inherited, it was the exclusive property of the
spouse. To find out whether the house is conjugal or
paraphernal, we have to look at the improvements
made on the separate property of the spouses.
When the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the
entire property shall belong to the conjugal.
Otherwise, it is paraphernal. In this case, the
improvements were less than the value of the
property, hence paraphernal. The written consent of
Eliseo is not necessary hence, whatever contract
entered into is valid.

It is an equitable mortgage because the vendor

remained in possession as the lessee, the purchaser
retained for himself a part of the purchase price, the
vendor bound himself to pay for the taxes, and
because the real intention was to secure the
payment of a debt. These instances, according to
the civil code gives rise to the presumption that it is
an equitable mortgage.
Case citation: Ramirez vs Munoz - G.R. No. 156125,
4) ACOSTA, GABBY
Oldbedlefttodrybythechangeofcourse
PROBLEM:In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged
that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision
project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision
(Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 185252, with
an area of 1,201 sq.m.; that the properties were
separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up
sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and
passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by
employing manipulation and fraud, were able to
obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek
bed from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), through its Provincial
Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was
denominated as Lot 5735, Cad 29 Ext., Case-1, with
an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928;
that they discovered the existence of the certificate
of title sometime in March 1997 when their
caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed
them that the subject property had been
fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that
in 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied
for the titling of the property, as he had been
occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on
it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue
the application because of financial constraints on
his part; that they continued the application, but
later learned that the application papers were lost in

the Assessors Office; and that as the owners of the

land where the new course of water passed, they
are entitled to the ownership of the property to
compensate them for the loss of the land being
occupied by the new creek.
The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land
subject of the complaint was part of a creek and
countered that OCT No. P- 928 was issued to them
after they had complied with the free patent
requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that
they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership
of the land for quite some time; that the property
described under TCT No. 185252 belonged to
Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest,
under OCT No. 3991; that the property was
transferred in the names of the Reyeses through
falsified document; that assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its
course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses
had already claimed for themselves the portion of
the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with
their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a
portion of their land by means of force, coercion,
machinations, and stealth in 1981; that such
unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion
Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo and that at the
time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was
still subject of an appeal before the CA, under CAG.R. CV No. 5350.
Question:Did the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in interpreting Article 420 in relation to
Article 461 of the Civil Code by substituting its own
opinion based on assumption of facts?
ANSWER:YES.The law in this regard is covered by
Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire
the same by paying the value thereof, which value
shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by
the new bed.
Pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old
bed left to dry by the change of course was
automatically acquired by the claimant. But before
such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of
natural abandonment of the old course must be
shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek
indeed changed its course without artificial or manmade intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case
the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by
clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the
old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the
creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek
from the old location to the new location by natural
occurrence.
In the case at bar, the Reyeses failed to adduce
indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its
natural abandonment and the new course. In the
face of a Torrens title issued by the government,
which is presumed to have been regularly issued,
the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice
to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of
the property to them. This failure did not escape the
observation of the Office of the Solicitor General.

Thus, it commented:

previous consent of all the interested parties be

obtained.

In the case at bar, it is notclearwhetherornotthe

MarigmanCreekdriedupnaturallybackin1980.Neither did
private respondents submit any findings or report
from the Bureau of Lands or the DENR Regional
Executive Director, who has the jurisdiction over the
subject lot, regarding the natureofchangeinthecourseof
thecreekswaters.Worse, what is even uncertainin the
present case is the exactlocationof the subject matter
of dispute. This is evident from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court which failed to specify which
portion of the land is actually being disputed by the
contending parties.
Case citation: Spouses Crispin Galang and Caridad
Galang vs. Spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe De
Kastro Reyes (As substituted by their legal heir:
Hermenigildo K. Reyes) - G.R. No. 184746. August 8,
2012.

5) TAYAO, IRISH
Interestofacoowner
PROBLEM:A, a co-owner, sold the entire property to
D without the consent of the other co-owners, B and
C. Is the sale of the entire property valid?
ANSWER:The sale of the entire property by one co
owner without the consent of the other coowners is
valid, not null and void. However, only the rights of
the coownerseller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a coowner of the property.
Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co
ownership (Article 493 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Therefore, the sale of the entire property by A to D,
without the consent of his co-owners, B and C, is not
null and void. However, only the right of the A, co
ownerseller, is transferred. Thereby making D, the
buyer, a coowner (of B and C) of the property.
Note:A coowner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, even if a coowner sells the whole property
as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other coowners who did not consent to
the sale. The sale or other disposition affects only
his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.
Consequently, by virtue of the sales which are valid
with respect to their proportionate shares and the
subsequent transfers thereby, the buyer became a
coowner of the property since the sales produced
the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof.
In addition, to be a coowner of a property does not
mean that one is deprived of every recognition of
the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right
within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial
status, nor is it necessary, for the use and
enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the

Case citation: Arambulo vs. Nolasco,

March 26, 2014
6) SAGARINO,
AccionPubliciana
PROBLEM:A, filed her complaint for Recovery of
Possession and /or Ownership with Damages against
B, C, D and E (petitioners) before the MTCC.A,
alleged, among others, that she was the registered
owner of two parcels of land with a total area of
approximately 2,000 square meters, described in,
and covered by, two (2) certificates of title.
Sometime in 2006, she discovered that B,C,D, and E
unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by
stealth, by force and without her prior consent and
knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon.
She went to the properties and verbally demanded
that B,C,D,and E vacate the premises and remove
their structures thereon. They begged and promised
to buy the said properties for P3,500.00 per square
meter. She gave them time to produce the said
amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy
them. They refused to vacate the subject properties
despite several demands.
On the other hand, B, C, D and E countered that the
titles of A were products of Civil Registration Case
No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the
Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos (G.R. No. L29675, September 30, 1969 , 29 SCRA 517), and
reiterated in Republic v. Marcos (152 Phil. 204,
1973); that the said case was later enacted into law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1271, entitled An Act
Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of
Title within the Baguio Townsite Reservation Case
No.1, GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No.
931, as amended, but Considering as Valid Certain
Titles of Lands that are Alienable and Disposable
Under Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes
which took effect on December 22, 1977; that A
failed to comply with the conditions provided in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation of said
titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners
B,C,D and E had been in open, actual, exclusive,
notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous possession
of the subject land, in good faith; and that A was
never in prior possession and had no valid title over
the subject land.
Both contending parties claim that they have a
superior possessory right over the disputed lands.

Questions:
a) Who between petitioners and respondent A have
a better right of possession over the subject parcels
of land?
b) What action is proper in this case?
ANSWER:
a) A has a better right of possession over the
subject parcels of land. As certificates of title give
her the better right to possess the subject parcels of
land It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive
evidence with respect to the ownership of the land

described therein. It is also settled that the

titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession.
Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab this Court declared
that the age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
b) The proper action is Accion Publiciana Also
known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion
publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding
todetermine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. The
objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
recover possessiononly,not ownership. When parties,
however, raise the issue of ownership, the court
may pass upon the issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.
7)SALISE,JR
Ownership
PROBLEM:Jejomar Blackie (Jejomar) being the only
son inherited 300 hectares of land in the City of
Kampeon ng Araw or Sunchamp City, Batangas from
his parents Don Allan Peters and Donya Miriam who
were both from prominent families Trillanes and
Cayetano in the said City. In 1950, while Jejomar
was still 5 years old his predecessors allowed a
portion of their land to be used as an access road in
going to and from the school by pupils and students
of Don Antonio T. Cayetano Elementary School
(DATCES) since it was nearest to the highway and
the most convenient (though not the only) pathway.
In January 1999, due to the increasing number of
students DATCES constructed a gymnasium on the
subject property which will be used for school
activities and as a makeshift classroom. In March
2000, upon discovering that a structure was being
constructed on the land, he demanded that the
DepED cease and desist and vacate the property.
The respondent, however, refused. Jejomar likewise
demanded payment for reasonable rent, but his
demand was also ignored. On October 8, 2002,
Jejomar, armed with certificate of title, supporting
documents and other pieces of evidence, filed an
action for recovery of possession and removal of
structure with damages against the Department of
Education (DepEd) with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Sunchamp City (MTCC). In its defense, the
DepEd denied the material allegations of the
complaint and averred that it did not state a cause
of action. Even if there was, the same was already
barred by prescription and/or laches. Its occupation
of the subject land was adverse, peaceful,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more
than fifty (50) years. Further, the DepEd presented
the testimony of Mrs. Graciana Poe a retired teacher
and has taught in DATCES for 32 years that the
subject land is owned by the school.

Question:Is the possession or occupation by DATCES

of the subject land adverse, peaceful, continuous,
and in the concept of an owner?
ANSWER:No, the possession or occupation by
DATCES of the subject land was not adverse,
peaceful, continuous, and in the concept of an
owner. In the case of DepEd vs. Tuliao, the Court
ruled that mere material possession of the land was
not adverse as against the owner and was
insufficient to vest title, unless such possession was
accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
Accordingly, the DepEd 's possession can only be
considered as adverse from the time the
gymnasium was being constructed in 1999 on the
subject portion of Jejomars property. In March 2000,
Jejomar discovered the construction and demanded
that the DepEd cease and desist from continuing
the same. When DepEd refused, Jejomar filed a
complaint for recovery of possession of the subject
lot in 2002. Thus, only two (2) years had elapsed
from the time the DepEd resisted Jejomar 's claims.
Clearly, he did not sleep on his rights. There was no
prolonged inaction that barred him from prosecuting
his claims.
8)OCBA,DEEJE
BuilderinGoodFaithunderArt448inrelationtoArt546
PROBLEM:Yolanda entered into a Contract of Lease
with Ruby involving a parcel of land which property
is covered by TCT No. 35788 in the name of Ruby. As
a consequence of the lease agreement, Yolanda
constructed a building worth at least
P200,000,000.00 on the said property.
Thereafter, Quenne filed a case for the recovery of
possession of property that is being occupied by
Yolanda by virtue of a contract of lease with Ruby.
Quenne proved its ownership and the identity of the
subject property, thus, the trial court granted her
petition. Since Yolanda constructed a building on the
subject parcel of land, she now claims
reimbursement from Quenne the cost of its
improvement on the land invoking Article 448 of the
Civil Code as builder in good faith.

Question:Can Yolandas claim against Quenne be

sustained considering that she unaware that the
property leased by he was owned by another person
other than Ruby
ANSWER:Article 448 covers only cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to
be owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of
title thereto, but not when the interest is merely
that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder
in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.
Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article
546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e.,
one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the
tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Hence, Uniwide cannot recover the cost of its

improvement on the land from VSD under Article

448 of the Civil Code.

Case citation: VSD Realty & Development

Corporation Vs. Uniwide Sale, Inc. and Dolores
Baello Tejada G.R. No. 170677. October 24, 2012

9)GABISAN,MIGUELA
WhomayfileforregistrationunderSec14(1)ofPD1529
PROBLEM:On February 28, 2003, A filed with the
RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title
over a parcel of land. In support of his application,
Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following
documents: (1) tax declarations for various years
from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the
property, with the annotation that the property is
classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical
description of the property, with a certification
issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance
certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate
dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject
property to A; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the
subject property to As mother.
A further claimed that the subject parcel of land is a
portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He
alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his
mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21,
1998, after his parents died he and his siblings
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over
the properties of their deceased parents and one of
the properties allocated to him was the subject
property; that the subject parcel of land is not part
of the reservation of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is,
in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Question:Did A comply with all the requirements for
original registration of title?ANSWER:No. In this case
the applicable provision is Section 14 of PD 1529,
which pertinently provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants
for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;

second, that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case.
The annotation in the survey plan presented by A is
not the kind of evidence required by law as proof
that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. A failed to
present a certification from the proper government
agency as to the classification of the subject
property. A likewise failed to present any evidence
showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed
classified the subject property as alienable and
disposable. Having failed to present any
incontrovertible evidence, Cortez claim that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court
finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the
same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to
prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. A was only able to
present oral and documentary evidence of his and
his mothers ownership and possession of the
subject property since 1946, the year in which his
mother supposedly inherited the same.
Further, Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529]
categorically provides that only private properties
may be acquired thru prescription and under
Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which arenotfor public use, public service
or intended for the development of national wealth,
are considered private."
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about
by Article 1113, which states that "all things which
are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription," and that property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription."
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must
be an official declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for
public use, public service, or for the development of
national wealth before it can be acquired by
prescription. The Court further stressed that the
period of acquisitive prescription would only begin
to run from the time that the State officially declares
that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth. Article 422 of the
Civil Code states that "property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State." It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth." Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion,

pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of

acquisition by prescription.
Therefore the application of A must be denied
because the property sought to be registered must
not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it
must also be declared by the State that it is no
longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth
Case citation: (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ G.R. No. 186639 February 5,
2014). Name/Class: GABISAN,MIGUELAExecutive
class
10)MENCHAVEZ, RAY LAMBERT
JudicialdeclarationofpresumptivedeathPROBLEM:On 24
April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate,
leaving several parcels of land with an estimated
value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,
herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.Teodorico was
the second husband of Marietta who had previously
been married to James William Bounds on 13
January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead. Questions:

1) Is the marriage of Teodorico and Marietta valid

even if it was entered into without securing a prior
judicial declaration of absence of the absentee
spouse?

2) How much would be Mariettas share in the

estate of the deceased Teodorico?
ANSWER:
1) YES, the marriage was valid. A judicial declaration
of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary
as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null
and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the
party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order
that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided
in Article 41 , in relation to Article 40, of the Family
Code.

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that

respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been
absent or had disappeared for more than eleven
years before she entered into a second marriage in
1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This
second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed
valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
2) The successional right in intestacy of a surviving
spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being
entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts;
alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces
can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces
except only in representation by the latter of their
parents who predecease or are incapacitated to
succeed.
Casecitation:Antonia Armas y Calisterio vs. Marietta
Calistero, G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.
11) ARENAJO, CHRISTIAN
PROBLEM:A deed of donation was executed by
Aurora Montinola. It named as donees her
grandchildren. Montinola expressed her wish that
the donation take effect only after ten (10) years
from her death, and that the deed include a
prohibition on the sale of the poperty for such
period. The deed also contained the signatures of
the donees in acknowledgment of their
acceptance of the donation. Subsequently, a new
proviso was inserted in the deed reading: however,
the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties
herein donated within 10 years after the death of
the donor.
Aurora drew up a deed of revocation and caused it
to be annotated as an adverse claim on the title.
She filed a petition in court for the cancellation of
the transfer on the ground that the transfer was
mortis causa - thus, void because it did not comply
with the formalities of a will. The donees opposed
the petition. The trial court judgment holding that
the donation was one inter vivos. She elevated the
case to the CA. Meanwhile, Aurora died. Shortly
after A's demise, a manifestation and motion was
filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Sicad alleged taht
they had become the owners of the prop by virtue
of a deed of definite sale. The CA affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Question:What is the character of the deed of
donation.
ANSWER:The donation is mortis causa. A donation
which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds
form the donee that right to dispose of the donated
property during the donors lifetime is in truth one
mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the right
of disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive.

In the present case, Montinola expressed her wish

that the donation take effect only after ten (10)
years from her death, and that the deed include a
prohibition on the sale of the property for such
period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in
the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not
sell or encumber the properties herein donated
within 10 years after the death of the donor." The
actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new
proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument:
the intercalation is easily perceived and identified it
was clearly typed on a different machine, and is
crammed into the space between the penultimate
paragraph of the deed and that immediately
preceding it. Not only did Aurora Montinola order
the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso,
but also, after the recording of the deed of donation,
she never stopped treating the property as her own.
She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed
itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying
the property taxes as they fell due all these she did
until she transferred the Property to the Sicad
Spouses on July 10, 1990. As already intimated, the
real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon
its execution.
Case citation: Ernesto Sicad vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125888. August 13, 1998.
12)COLIS,
Attestationandacknowledgment
PROBLEM:A was the absolute owner of several lots
in Cebu City. Sometime in 1990, A donated these
lots to B through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa
and B accepted the donation. In 1998, A executed a
Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of X
Corporation and in 2000, they executed two Deeds
of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered
by the previous Contract to Sell. In 2002 A died and
so B then filed a petition to approve As donation
mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the
contracts of sale A executed in favor of X
Corporation.
The court held that since the donation in favor of B
was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the
formalities for the validity of wills should have been
observed. The court found that the deed of donation
did not contain an attestation clause and was
therefore void. In appeal, B argues that the court
ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of
donation, which contains
the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause
required in the execution of wills. The
Acknowledgment reads:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of
September 1990 at Talisay, Cebu, personally
appeared A with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on
April 10, 1989 at Talisay, Cebu known to me to be
the same person who executed the foregoing
instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa
before the Notary Public and in the presence of the
foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this
instrument before and in the presence of each other
and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary
act and deed.

Moreover, B claims that the court should have

applied the rule on substantial compliance in the
construction of a will to As donation mortis causa.
He insists that the strict construction of a will was
not warranted in the absence of any indication of
bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of
the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Question:Is Bs contention correct? Explain.ANSWER:
No, the attestation clause and an acknowledgment
cannot be merged in one statement.
The requirements of attestation and
acknowledgment are embodied in two separate
provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates
two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before a competent officer or court that
the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the
attestation of a will refers to the act of the
instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to
the execution of the instrument before them and to
the manner of its execution.
Although the witnesses in the present case
acknowledged the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this
is not the avowal the law requires from the
instrumental witnesses to the execution of a
decedents will. An attestation must state all the
details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In
the absence of the required avowal by the
witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be
deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Case citation: MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, G.R.
No. 192916, October 11, 2010
13) LITUANAS, MARIZ
HolographicWillandPreterition
PROBLEM:SS died, survived by his 4 children, left a
document entirely written, signed and dated in his
own hand. However, it only provided for the
disinheritance of his eldest son, AS. The other three
children presented for probate the document as SS'
holographic will which was however contested by AS
on the ground of its invalidity due to preterition and
that the same did not provide a disposition of SS'
estate. The probate court ruled that to tolerate the
probate of the purported will when it appears to be
intrinsically void would've been an exercise in
futility. Can the document effected by SS be
considered a holographic will despite the fact that it
contains only AS' disinheritance?
ANSWER:Yes. A holographic will, as provided under
Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed. SS' document, although it may
initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It
is written, dated and signed by the hand of SS
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,

and while it does not make an affirmative

disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of AS, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator SS in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of AS.
Case citation: Dy. Yieng. Seangio et al v. Seangio et
al, GR Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
14) GEROMO, FELIX
PROBLEM:Samuel Bilibid contracted three marriages
in his lifetimethe first to Maximina, the second to
Amor, and the third to Dabiana. Samuel and his first
wife bore two off springs Nina and Debbie, and with
his second wife had six off springs namely Samuel
Jr, Inigo, Nestor, Torio, Ulysses and Ronaldo all
surnamed Bilibid. After having lived a long and
fruitful life of 45, Samuel succumbed to Tuberculosis
and died testate. Thereafter his will was probated.
An important provision in his will reads as follows:

Prohibitionofalienationinawill
" Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na
nasasaysay sa itaas ay ililipat at ilalagay sa
pangalan nila Nina at Debbie hindi bilang pamana
ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa
aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga
lunsod x x x.
Question:Is the provision in the will valid?
ANSWER:Yes, it is valid but for 20 years only. It is
clear from Samuels will that he intended the house
and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners
names for administration purposes only, and that
the property be owned by the heirs in common.
Art. 871. The institution of an heir may be made
conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause.Art.
870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or
part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty
years are
void.
Case citation: IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO,
G.R. No. 179859
15)CARTAJENAS,CLEO

CompulsoryHeirsPROBLEM:X, who was the appointed

Administratrix, signed an Extra-Judicial Settlement
and Deed of Partition, allotting the
estate to the heirs, however no share was assigned
to the wife of the deceased.
QUESTION:Is the settlement of the estate proper?
ANSWER:No. Elementary it is in succession law that
compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall
have a share in the estate by way of legitimes and

no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse

of said right except if she gives it up for lawful
consideration, but never when the spouse is not a
party to the said settlement. And the Civil Code
reminds us, that we must give every man his due.
Decedentscompulsoryheirsinwhosefavorthelawreservesa
partofthedecedentsestateareexclusivelytheperson
enumeratedinArticle887
PROBLEM:The land, situated in Sitio Guso, Barangay
Talaytay, Argao, Cebu planted with rice, corn and
coconuts was originally owned by the late Juana
Conte, who had two marriages. The first marriage
was to Ramon Bautista, by whom she bore Aileen
Bautista, whose husband was Joseph Alday
(JOSEPH). The second marriage was to Bryan
Bernad, by whom she bore Honey Bolongon
(HONEY), who married Bogs Go. Juana died without
a will and was survived by HONEY and Lauris Alday,
the son of Aileen Bautista (who had predeceased
Juana) and JOSEPH.
The Spouses Jaime Tor and Kurt Biscaylor (SPOUSES)
asserted their right in the subject property by virtue
of their purchase of it from Reuville Tubal, who had
supposedly acquired it by purchase from JOSEPH
who claimed to have acquired the said property by
inheritance from Juana. Kurt Biscaylor contended
that Joseph Alday had become automatically the
heir of Juana after the death of his wife, the wife
being the only daughter and he the only son-in-law.
This led to the commencement of the suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of real
property damages against HONEY.
Question:If you were the judge, how would you
decide the case?ANSWER:If I am the judge, I will
dismiss the case on the ground that the spouses
claim of ownership could not be legally
sustained.
Under the New Civil Code, a decedents compulsory
heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the
decedents estate are exclusively the persons
enumerated in Article 887; to wit, (1) Legitimate
children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of
the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4)
Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children
referred to in article 287.
In the instant case, only two compulsory heirs
survived Juana upon her death, namely: Honey, her
daughter, and Lauris Alday, her grandson. The latter
succeeded Juana by right of representation because
his mother, Aileen Baustista, had predeceased
Juana. Representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised
to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if she were living or if she could
have inherited. Herein, the representative (Lauris
Alday) was called to the succession by law and not
by the person represented (Aileen); he thus
succeeded Juana, not Aileen. Hence, from the
foregoing facts, the contention of Kurt Biscaylor that
Joseph Alday had become automatically the heir of
Juana is plainly irrelevant.
Wherefore, the suit filed by the spouses shall be

dismissed.
Case citation: Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon, et. al. vs.
Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum, G.R.
No. 153736, August 4, 2010
16)VILLAROJO,SUNNYRAY
PROBLEM:Mario (decedent) died intestate on June 3,
1995, leaving real and personal properties with an
estimated value of P200,000.00. He was survived by
his wife Dolor and their five children, namely Caloy,
Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon. Dolor was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate
of Mario.
During the probate, Dolor submitted an Inventory
Report listing the properties of the decedents
estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report,
alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429. The said Lot
829-B-4-B registered under the name of Sps. Mario
and Dolor.
Dolor excludes such property in the inventory
considering that they previously donated such
property to their son Vicente during the lifetime of
Mario. Vicente presented a copy of the Deed of
Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents
Dolor and Mario.
Questions:
1.) Istheomissiontoexcludesuchpropertyproper?2.)
Cantheprobatecourtdecidethequestionsoftitleandow
nership?
ANSWER:
1.) Theomissionisnotproper.Article 1061 of the Civil
Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds
with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir and in the account of partition.
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be
determined. Questions as to advancement made,
or alleged to have been made, by the deceasedto
any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and
the finalorderofthecourtthereonshallbebindingonthe
personraisingthequestionsandontheheir.
In the case at bar, the property was still under the
name of the decedent & Dolor. Moreover, assuming
that the donation was valid, still it is required to be
included in the inventory of property of the
deceased in determining the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs. Property received by an heir
during the lifetime of the deceased by donation or
gratuitous title are considered as advances to
his/her legitime.
2.) Yes, the probate court can make a provisional

determination of title and ownership but only for the

purpose of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of
properties of a decedent, without prejudice to a final
determination through a separate action in a court
of general jurisdiction.
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do
not call for the probate court to make a provisional
determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It
bears stress that the question is one of collation or
advancement by the decedent to an heir over which
the question of title and ownership can be passed
upon by a probate court.
Case citation: Corazon M. Gregorio, as
administratrix of the estate of Casimiro Madarang
et. Al. vs. Atty. Jose Madarang and Vicente
Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, Feb. 1 ,2010
17) LAPUT, RENA
RemovalofanAdministratormaybedoneatthediscretionof
ProbateCourt
PROBLEM:A certain Johny Cage died intestate
leaving some heirs. In the intestate proceeding, Liu
Kang was appointed as the administrator of the
deceased. While the Special Proceeding was
pending, the administrator was indicted and
convicted to a charge of estafa through falsification
of public document with respect to the subject will.
Thereafter, Raiden, the other co-administrator, sold
to subject property to LAW Corporation. Upon
learning this, Liu Kang on behalf of the estate filed a
civil case for Nullification of the sale, but the
probate court in the special proceeding removed
him. In this aspect, the co-administrator and LAW
Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on ground of
lack of legal capacity, thus, leading to the dismissal
of the case.
Liu Kang on the other hand argued such action is
premature for the criminal case is still on appeal.
QUESTION:Can the administrators civil case be
dismissed even if the special proceeding case is still
pending?
ANSWER:Yes, the civil case initiated by the
administrator may be dismissed because of the
removal by the probate court of his authority to act
on behalf of the estate of the deceased. An
administrator derives his power or authority to
represent the estate of deceased from his
appointment by the probate court.
A final conviction of the crime involving moral
turpitude is not necessary before an administrator
can be removed. He must raise that matter in his
appeal in the intestate proceeding.
Case Citation: OBANDO vs. FIGUERAS, G.R. No.
134854. January 18, 2000 Name/Class: FLORES,
LAWRENCEJOHN Regular Class
Oralpartition
PROBLEM:Spouses X and Y died intestate. They
were survived by the following heirs: A,B, C, D, E &
F. The estate located in Cagayan de Oro City was
equally divided among the heirs. At the time of the
actual partition, F had already died. His share was

given to his only son, G. Twenty two years later, A &

B found out that Lot 5872 was not included in the
inventory and project of partition. A & B claimed
that an oral partition was entered into by all heirs
soon after the death of their parents. To set things
right, A & B prepared a quitclaim to confirm the
alleged oral agreement. C, E and G signed a
notarized quitclaim in favor of A & B. Six years after
the execution of the quitclaim, C, E, G and H, who is
the son of D found out that Lot 5872 was still under
X & Ys name and demanded for the distribution and
delivery to the heirs. G & H disputed the
voluntariness of their consent or the consent of their
predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims that they
signed. Thus A & B filed an action for Quieting of
Title. As the judge , will you consider Lot 5872 still
common property?

convey and the buyers right toconveyance of the

property arise only upon full payment of the price.
Thus, a buyer who willfully contravenes this
fundamental object or purpose of the contract, by
covertly transferring the ownership of the property
in his name at a time when the full purchase price
has yet to be paid, commits a substantial and
fundamental breach which entitles the seller to
rescission of the contract.

ANSWER:No. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common

property of the heirs of the deceased. A & Bs
ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of
the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased
spouses heirs. That oral agreement was confirmed
by the notarized quitclaims executed by the said
heirs. An oral partition by the heirs is valid if no
creditors are affected. Moreover, even the
requirement of a written memorandum under the
statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are
involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of
ownership but merely a designation and segregation
of that part which belongs to each heir. Finally, said
notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of
petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence, they
are valid.

Default

Case citation: Josefa Maestrado, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, et al. - G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000.

ANSWER:The ruling was not proper. Article 1196 of

the Civil code provides that whenever in an
obligation with a period is designated, it is
presumed to have been established for the benefit
of both the creditor and the debtor. However, Article
1198 further provides that the debtor shall lose
every right to make use of the period when:

18)ALI,YASSER
PROBLEM:Mr. T agreed to buy a property owned by
Mr. P, a relative, for installments. Mr. T begins to pay
his obligations. After several years, Mr. T transferred
the subject property in his name despite nonpayment of the full price thereof, without Mr. Ps
consent. Can Mr. P rescind the contract?
ANSWER:Yes, Mr. P can rescind the contract. Under
Article 1191, the power to rescind obligations is
implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent
upon him.

Case citation: Sps. Delfin O. Tumibay and Aurora T.

Tumibay-deceased; Grace Julie Ann Tumibay Manuel,
Legal representative Vs. Sps. Melvin A. Lopez and
Rowena Gay T. Visitacion - G.R. No. 171692. June 3,
2013.
19)CRISTAL,

PROBLEM:Spouses Jose Go obtained a loan from

PBcom in the amount of P80million evidenced by
promissory note embodying his commitment to pay
within a ten year period. To secure the loan Go
executed a pledge agreement covering shares of
stock of Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, Inc.
The shares were valued at P70million. Two years
later, the value of such share plunged to less than
P0.04 per share. Thus PBcom notified Go in writing
that it was renouncing the pledge agreements and
later filed before the RTC a complaint for the sum of
money alleging that Spouses Go defaulted on the
promissory notes. Consequently, the entire balance
of the obligations of Go became immediately due
and demandable. The RTC ruled in favor of PBcom.
Was the ruling proper?

After the obligation has been contracted, he become

insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security for
the debt;
He does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or
securities which he promised;
By his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or
securities after their establishment, and when
through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he
immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory.

As a general rule, "rescission will not be permitted

for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only
for such breaches as are substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in
making the agreement.

The debtor violates any undertaking, in

consideration of which the creditor agreed to the
period.

In the case at bar, Mr. Ts act of transferring the title

to the subject land in his name, without the
knowledge and consent of Mr. P and despite nonpayment of the full price thereof, constitutes a
substantial and fundamental breach of the contract
to sell. The main object or purpose of a seller in
entering into a contract to sell is to protect himself
against a buyer who intends to buy the property in
installments by withholding ownership over the
property until the buyer effects full payment
therefor. As a result, the sellers obligation to

f.

The debtor attempts to abscond

The law further provides that those obliged to

deliver or to do something incur in delay from the
time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially
demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
In the instant case, absent of specific proof of
default and the existence of prior demand, Spouses
Go could not have lose the benefit of the period.

Thus, PBcom had no right to recover the entire

balance of the loan before the end of the stipulated
period.
Case citation: Philippine Bank of Communications
vs. Spouses Jose Go GR No. 175514 February 14,
2011
20) VILLARUBIA,
Ratificationofavoidablecontract
PROBLEM:Sometime in 1995, ECE Realty started a
construction of a condominium project called
Central Park Condominium Building located along
Jorge St., Pasay City. However, printed
advertisements were made indicating therein that
the said project was to be built in Makati City. IN
December 1995, Rachel, agreed to buy a unit from
the above project by paying reservation fee and,
thereafter, downpayment and monthly installments.
On June 18, 1996, Rachel and the representatives of
ECE Realty executed a Contract to Sell. In the said
contract, it was indicated that the condominium
project is located in Pasay City.
More than 2 years after the execution of the
Contract to Sell, Rachel, through her counsel, wrote
petitioner a letter dated October 30, 1998
demanding the return of P422,500.00, representing
the payments she made, on the ground that she
subsequently discovered that the condominium
project ws being built in Pasay City and not in
Makati City as indicated in its printed
advertisements. ECE Realty denied her letter,
hence, she filed a complaint with the HLURB seeking
the annulment of her contract with ECE Realty, the
return of her payments, and damages.
Questions:
Was there fraud in the execution of the
contract sufficient to nullify it?
Assuming that there was fraud sufficient to
annul the contract, can the contract be still
considered valid?
ANSWER:
No, there was no fraud in the execution of the
contract that was sufficient to nullify it. Article
1338 of the Civil Code provides that there is
fraud when through insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties,
the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed
to. Jurisprudence has shown that in order to
constitute fraud that provides basis to annul
contracts, it must fulfill two conditions. First, the
fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud
in obtaining the consent of the party. This is
referred to as causal fraud. The deceit must be
serious. The fraud is serious when it is sufficient
to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent
person into error; that which cannot deceive a
prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity.
Second, the fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and not merely by a
preponderance thereof. In the present case, the
petitioner is guilty of false representation of a
fact as evidence by its printed advertisements
indicating that its subject condominium project
is located in Makati City when in fact it is in
Pasay City. However, the misrepresentation

made by petitioner in its advertisements does

not constitute causal fraud which would have
been a valid basis in annulling the Contract to
Sell between them. Rachel failed to prove that
the location of the said project was a causal
consideration or the principal inducement which
led her into buying her unit in the said
condominium project.
Yes, the contract can still be considered as valid
due to an implied ratification by Rachel. Under
Article 1392 of the Civil Code, ratification
extinguished the action to annul a voidable
contract. In addition, Article 1396 of the same
Code provides that ratification cleanses the
contract from all its defects from the moment it
was constituted. Implied ratification may take
diverse forms, such as by silence or
acquiescence; by acts showing approval or
adoption of the contract; or by acceptance and
retention of benefits flowing therefrom. In the
instant case, even assuming that ECE Realtys
misrepresentation consists of fraud, which could
be a ground for annulling their Contract to Sell,
Rachels act of affixing her signature to the said
Contract, after having acquired knowledge of the
propertys actual location, can be construed as
an implied ratification thereof.
Case citation: ECE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC. vs. RACHEL G. MA
21)CAMINERO,
Natureofcontractofsale
PROBLEM:Bank foreclosed xs property upon nonpayment of loan. Despite the lapse of the
redemption period and consolidation of title in
respondent bank. petitioner expressed his
willingness to pay the balance of the repurchase
price, and requested respondent bank to release to
him the remaining parcels of land but bank
however, turned down his request prompting the
petitioner to cause the annotation on the said titles
and a complaint for specific performance.
Question:Was there a perfected contract for the
repurchase of the foreclosed properties?
ANSWER:NO. A contract of sale is consensual in
nature and is perfected upon mere meeting of the
minds. When there is merely an offer by one party
without acceptance of the other, there is no
contract. When the contract of sale is not perfected,
it cannot, as an independent source of obligation,
serve as a binding juridical relation between the
parties.
In the case at bar, the acceptance of the offer was
not absolute, such acceptance is insufficient to
generate consent that would perfect a contract.
Petitioner's claim of utmost accommodation by
respondent bank of his own terms for the
repurchase of his foreclosed properties are simply
contrary to normal business practice.
Case citation: Heirs of Fausto C. Ignacio vs. Home
Bankers Savings and Trust co., et al, G.R. No.
177783, January 23, 2013
23)CHATTO,RUBY
MedicalNegligence

PROBLEM:Patient X with cancer of sigmoid was

operated on by Doctor A. During the operation, it
was discovered that the cancer had spread to the
ovaries. Another doctor, Dr. B was called in to
perform the hysterectomy.
The record of operation showed sponge count
lacking 2.announced to surgeon. Search done but to
no avail. Continue for closure.
Patient X complained of pain after the operation but
was reassured that it was natural consequence of
surgery. More than 4 months later, X went back to
the country and still experiencing pain. A piece of
gauze was later seen protruding from her genital
area. The surgeon who operated on her was able to
extract a piece of gauze by hand and reassured a
piece of gauze by hand and reassured her that pain
would now go away.
The pain did not go away and upon consultation
with another physician, another gauze was found in
her vaginal vault as well as the presence of a rectovaginal fistula requiring second operation.
X sued Dr. A and PSI hospital for negligently leaving
2 pieces of gauze inside patients body and for
concealing their acts of negligence.PSI hospital
raised the following contentions:
a. that they cannot be held liable because there is
no employer-employee relationship between PSI
hospital and Dr. A; such that the principle of
respondent superior is unavailable;
b. that had the patient informed the hospital of her
discomfort and pain, the hospital would have been
obliged to act on it;

conform as a corporation. By its inaction, therefore,

hospital failed its own standard of hospital care. It
committed corporate negligence.
Case citation: Professional Services, Inc. vs. The
Court of Appeals, et al. / Natividad, G.R. No. 126297.
February 2, 2000.
Name/Class: CHATTO,RUBYJEANExecutive class
24)CAUMERAN,KRISTIAN

DamagesinbreachofcontractofcarriagePROBLEM:Gillego, a congr

keynote speaker in a conference to be held in Budapest, Hu

Budapest. When he arrived in Budapest, he was not able to
ups, he did not recover his luggage. It contained his person
prepared, including the notes and reference materials he ne
was ignored. He filed a case for breach of contract of carriag
after) he did not insist on his claim for actual damages so TC
Question:Are amounts awarded to respondent as
moral and exemplary damages are excessive,
unconscionable and unreasonable?ANSWER:
A) YES,ThemerefactthatGillegowasaCongressman
shouldnotresultinanautomaticincreaseinthemoraland
exemplarydamagesrecoverable.Thesocialandfinancial
standingofaclaimantmaybeconsideredonlyifheorshe
wassubjectedtocontemptuousconductdespitethe
offendersknowledgeofhisorhersocialandfinancial
standing.
B) NO, The mere fact that the luggage was not
return for a reasonable time (2 years) speaks of
bad faith on the part of the airlines and awards
should be commensurate to the social status of
the aggrieved.

Question:Are the contentions tenable?

ANSWER:No, both contentions are not tenable.
On the first contention, even when no employment
relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital
holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent,
the hospital may still be vicariously liable under
Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article
1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent
authority.
On the second contention, the hospital took no heed
of the record of operation and consequently did not
initiate a review of what transpired during patients
operation. Rather, it shirked its responsibility and
passed it on to others-to the doctor whom it
expected to inform patient, and to the patient
herself to complain before it took any meaningful
step. PSI may be held directly liable to the patient
for its own negligence for failure to follow
established standard of conduct to which it should

LESSON:In awarding moral damages for breach of

contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton
and deliberately injurious or the one responsible
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Not
every case of mental anguish, fright or serious
anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the
airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the
liability does not include moral and exemplary
damages.
Case citation: AIR FRANCE vs. GILLEGO G.R. No.
165266, Decem