Agra1 - Digest

DAVID JOHN D.
PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

CASE DIGESTS | Atty. ULYSSES ROSAL
Daez (P) v. CA, et al. (R) | GR No. 133507 | 2.17.00 | Agrarian Reform | De
Leon, J p:
Facts
1. Daez, petitioner, is the owner of several parcel of lands totalling to 4.1685 hectares
in Bulacan that was subjected to PD 27, as amended by LOI No. 474 Land Transfer
Programs Operation of Land Transfer (OLT)
2. Private Respondents (PR) were the recipients, issued with certificate of land
transfers (CLT) by DAR.
3. Petitioner applied for exemption, which was denied by DAR, CA, and SC.
4. In the advent of R.A. 6657 (CARL), Petitioner, petitioned for retention, which was
denied by DAR.
5. On appeal to the Office of the president, the petition was granted; however the CA
reversed the appealed decision and ruled that the adverse decision denying
exemption from the coverage foreclosed the right of retention. Hence this
Issue
6. Whether or not, Petitioner may retain the aforementioned land in lieu of CARL.
Held
7. Petition Granted. The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from
coverage of the OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a
landowner's right of retention are different.
8. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner.
9. The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No.
2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found
to be part of the landowner's retained area.
10. Issued titles cannot confer title where the landowner failed to exercise the right
of choice as to what to retain among her landholdings.
DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Sison, petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, DAR, &
the Heirs of Dr. Sison | GR No. 93045 | 6.29.92 | Agrarian Reform | GrioAquino, J p:
Facts
1. Under PD 27s OLT program, petitioners received CLTs as tenant of Dr. Jose Sison
(Owner), issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
2. Upon knowledge, the heirs of petitioner protested, which apparently were extra
judicially partitioned amongst them.
3. After a several investigations conducted by the ministry, the protested land was
ordered to be subjected to OLT.
4. After the change of regime, the heirs requested for reconsideration with DAR,
stressing the fact that their individual inheritances, not exceeding 7 hectares, were
too small to be covered by OLT. Which DAR Granted.
5. Tenants appealing to the CA, Heirs opposing, CA dismissed the Tenants petition.
Issue
6. Whether or Not the heirs were entitled to retention.
Held
7. The petition has no merit. In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in
estoppel when it reconsidered the previous ruling of his predecessor, because the
latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the law. As the order of September 7,
1988, stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to a
retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the
office had no discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded by
law to the landowners.
8. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice, can deprive or
deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has
reserved for them.
9. The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares
each of their agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of
their respective right of retention. The omission was cured by their timely protest
against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the petitioners.
10. The concerned Heirs of Sison do not have to cultivate the retained and
exempted areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily
relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the
Heirs.
11. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the
secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27.

Lucia & Prudencia Rodrigues, petitioners, v. Salvador, respondent | GR No.
171972 | 6.8.11 | Agrarian Reform | Del Castillo, J p:
Facts
1. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for unlawful detainer, after
repeated demands to leave;
2. Respondent claims to be the Absolute owner of the land were Respondents were
residing, proved by an OCT, issued by virtue of free patent. And that petitioners
were there because they were allowed by Respondents predecessor;
3. Petitioners claim that they were allowed by the respondents predecessor, under
the agreement that they shall cultivate the land for agricultural production, and
since that is the case (tenancy relationship), petitioners claims that only DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction over the case;
4. MTC dismissed the case, lacking jurisdiction. Court of Appeals favoured
Respondent, for petitioners failed to prove the relationship. Hence this.
Issues
5. Whether or Not an Implied consent constitutes tenancy relationship under RA 3844
(Agricultural Land Reform Code)
Held
6. Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.
7. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.
8. Even though statement affidavits of Petitioners neighbours supplement the latters
contention, it is not enough. Self-serving statements will not suffice.
9. Petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest, for not having shown any
receipts and an agreed system of sharing.
10. Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make
the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an
agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural
tenancy.

Sta. Rosa Realty Devt Co., petitioner v. CA et al., respondents | GR No.
112526 | 10.12.11 | Agrarian Reform | Pardo, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioner has in its name 254.6 hectares of land which was declared as a Water
Shed area by the DENR.
2. DAR ordered subject land to compulsory acquisition. DAR offered compensation,
w/c petitioner declined; hence DAR opened a trust fund for it.
3. Petitioner objected, claiming that said land is not suitable for agricultural purpose,
proved by a survey that it was 18% sloped and has a rugged terrain.
4. DARAB dismissed the protest of petitioner. Appealing to the CA, which affirmed the
latters decision. DAR then issued CLOAs to beneficiaries.
5. Pendente Lite, a TRO was issued for the CLOAS.
Issue
6. Whether or Not the subject land was properly accorded by DARAB.
Held
7. To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at
bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
8. The fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile
property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage
of CARL. R. A. No. 6657.
9. CALR, Section 10, provides, Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly
and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves,
national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents
appurtenent thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act.
10. Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed
parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP
because of its very high slopes.

Roxas & Co., petitioner v. CA, DAR, et al., respondents | GR No. 127876 |
12.17.99 | Agrarian Reform | Puno, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioner is the owner of Haciendas Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway in Batangas.
Before CARL, petitioner offered Caylaway to the government, thru Voluntary Offer
of Sale (VOS);
2. Later (CARL implemente), Palico and Banilad was placed by DAR into compulsory
acquisition under CARL, in lieu of this, petitioner petitioned to withdrew its VOS of
Caylaway, and applying all three haciendas to be into non-agricultural under the
provisions of CARL. The municipality of Nasugbu, also, allegedly, authorized the
reclassification of the land, which was later denied by the municipal agrarian
reform;
3. CLOAS were issued by DAR, anent, petitioner went to DARAB questioning the
CLOAs. DARAB held that the issue was prejudicial whether the property was subject
to agrarian reform, holding that the issue should be subjected to DAR secretarys
decision.
4. Petitioner avers that he was denied of due process, that the acquisition done was
without improper, holding the provisions of RA 6657, specifically when DAR failed
to give due notice and the proper identification of the subject lands awarded in the
CLOAs;
5. CA also dismissed petitioners petition, hence this.
Issue
6. Whether or Not DAR due process was denied to petitioner.
Held
7. The Supreme Court found that in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent
DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Hence,
petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts.
8. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrative
remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
9. However, respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioners' landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the power to
adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from
agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to determine whether Hacienda Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempts from the coverage of
the CARL lies with the DAR, not with the Supreme Court.
10. As such, it does not give the Supreme Court the power to nullify the CLOAs
already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit
the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings.
5


Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste, petitioners, v. Land Bank (LBP), et al. | GR No.
169913 | 6.8.11 | Agrarian Reform | Velasco Jr., J p:
Facts
1. The Heirs of Deleste, and of Gregorio co-owns a parcel of land, which was decided
by the SC.
2. Pendente Lite of the civil case of the subject land, PD 27 was issued and OLT was
introduced However the OLT considered only the Heirs of Gergorio as the owner.
DAR then issued CLTs to beneficiaries to actual cultivators of the subject land.
Anent, EPs and OCTs were issued and Cash deposit was made in favour of
Gregorios heirs.
3. The heirs of Deleste, in 2002 filed with DARAB a petition seeking nullity of the EPs,
which, DARAB, ultimately denied the petition, declaring the EPs valid, as it should
have been the petitioners of Deleste who should have informed of the civil case;
and regardless of the re-classifications, which is vested to the adjudication of the
DAR only.
4. CA denied Petitioners motion due to technicalities, hence this.
Issue
5. Whether or Not, the rights of the petitioners to procedural due process were
violated.
Held
6. The petition is meritorious, EPs cancelled. Time and again, this Court has held that
a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice.
7. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian
reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod
with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. Heirs of
Jugalbot v. CA.
8. Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of
expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful
compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for
acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed.
9. And it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the
subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in
favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a
constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned
by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale.

Heirs of Jugalbot, petitioners v. CA & Heirs of Roa | GR No. 170346 | 3.12.07 |
Agrarian Reform | Ynares-Santiago, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioner alleges that he was the tenant of the subject property since 1950, and
DAR finding the same as agricultural, DAR awarded petitioner w/ an EP, then a TCT
was given.
2. Subject land was registered to the name of Respondent, which the same bought
before.
3. Hence respondent filed w/ DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (DARABPA) a complaint
and for the cancellation of the TCT. DARABPA dismissed the complaint and held the
validity of the EP.
4. DARAB main also affirmed DARABPAs decision, holding that the right of Petitioner
to contest had already prescribed, w/c is 1 year.
5. A favourable decision was achieved in the CA, holding that, there was no tenancy
relationship; lack of notice; the land was unsuitable for agricultural purpose; and
the land was classified as residential, making it outside PD 27s coverage. Hence
this.
Issue
6. Whether the award to the petitioner was valid.
Held
7. Affirmed. Petitioner ordered to vacate.
8. The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential
Decree No. 27 due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a
tenancy relationship between them. The taking of subject property was done in
violation of constitutional due process. Virginia A. Roa was denied due process
because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to
the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and
sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner (Virginia was only married
to), hence, not the proper party in the instant case.
9. The absence of an ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report
likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due
process.
10. Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is
residential property and not agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084
clearly shows that the subject property owned by Virginia A. Roa is located within
the Residential District in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV of
Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and
Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.

HLI, LIPCo & RCBC, petitioner v. PARC et al. respondent | GR No. 171101 |
7.5.11 |Agrarian Reform | Velasco Jr., J p:
Facts
1. Hacienda Luisita was acquired by TADECo thru the help of the Government, which
gave loan to the former subject to the condition that the land will then be
redistributed to its tenants-workers.
2. In the advent of Martial law, Hacienda Luisita was subjected to redistribution by
then Marcos administration, after that, and in the advent of CARL the owners of
Hacienda Luisita proposed a Stock Distribution Plan (SDP), instead of redistribution
(as it is provided in Sec. 31 of RA 6657 Corporate Landowners the presidential
agrarian reform council (PARC) agreed.
3. Hacienda Luisita Inc (HLI) was formed to facilitate the SDP which was distributed
properly thru a Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA)
4. In 1995 HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares into an industrial use
which was approved. Later on Luisita industrial Corporation and RCBC acquired
portions of said land.
5. In the latter part of 2003, Supervisory group of HLI sought to renegotiation or the
revocation of the SDOA, alleging that HLI had failed to give them shares in
dividends and shares on the sale of the land, further citing violations in the SDOAs
terms.
6. DAR constituted a task force to investigate. And found the allegations of the
respondents to be true, finding that HLI has not complied with its obligations under
RA 6657, and thus recommending to PARC that Hacienda Luisita be placed under
the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of CARP.
7. HLI went to the Supreme Court. On 5 July 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously to dismiss the petition of HLI and affirms PARCs recommendations.
8. The court, though, did not order the immediate redistribution of the land. Holding
that Operative Facts have already vested rights to other Farm Workers-Beneficiaries
(FWBs).
9. Thus holding, that these FWBs should be accorded the right to choose, thru voting.
10. Both parties filed their motion for reconsideration.
Issues
11.
Whether or not:
a. there is operative fact (LIPCO and RCBCs right)
b. should the right to choose of the FWBs be reconsidered
c. PARC had jurisdiction to recall or revoke the SDOA
d. the revocation of the SDOA is valid
e. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 Unconstitutional (Corporate Landowners)
Held
a. Yes, Operative Fact applies; the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also
9

applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that
have the force and effect of laws.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were
subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR
conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired.
However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted
to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the
CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally
and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows
conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land
acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to
be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes.
b. Yes, it should be reconsidered. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the
HLI capital stock is just 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will
never be in the hands of the FWBs.
Control means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares
and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares. The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially falls
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.
c. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the
plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to
petitioner HLIs posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it
previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive
issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to
revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed
possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate
that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the
conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or
recall the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce
it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure
compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without
authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.
d. YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. There was violation in the SDOA, basing
from DARs Administrative Order No. 10 (DAO 10): (1) the mechanics and timelines
10

of HLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual
allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the
use of man days and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes.
The revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of violations of] DAO
10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have
the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a
product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and
must be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP.
Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989
approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.
e. The court found it moot and academic to pursue the unconstitutionality of the
outright transfer since it is not the lis mota of the case and was neither raised at
the earliest opportunity. Also, since SDOA is no longer allowed, as it was repealed
by RA 9700, providing that: That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall
be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no
longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
11

Landbank, petitioner v. Dumlao(s) | GR No. 167809 | 7.23.09 | Agrarian
Reform | Nachura, J p:
Facts
1. SC formerly resolve a case with regards to the claims of the Parties herein.
2. Petitioner here cries foul, as according to it, the pronouncement in the Gabatin v.
Landbank case should guide the court in settling the issue to what constitutes just
compensation for lands covered by PD 27 for computing land value; Further,
petitioner herein avers that computation provided in the advent of CARL should be
applicable.
3. SC on the other hand, argues that petitioners reliance on the aforementioned case
is misplaced; the Gabatin case revolved in to 2 issues, absent in this case, which
are: (1) the amount applicable in determining govt support price (GSP) for palay;
and (2) whether such computation is applicable upon taking of the subject
property. However, petitioners in that case didnt raise any concern in said case;
hence it is not applicable in the present case.
4. Moreover, such computation is a Judicial Prerogative SC.
Issue
5. Whether or not, the Supreme Court erred in choosing the applicable law for
computation.
Held
6. Denied. As to the Gabatin Case, to repeat, the petitioners in that case didnt raise
any concern in said case; hence it is not applicable in the present case.
7. To stretch such point, the computation should be a Judicial Prerogative. Using the
pronouncement in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay: The determination of
"just compensation" in eminent domain case is a judicial function. he executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings.
8. The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the
passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law,
although the property was acquired under PD No. 27. At the risk of being repetitive,
we explain again that Section 17 of RA No. 6657 is made to apply only if the
amount of just compensation of lands acquired through PD No. 27 remains
unresolved despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a case, and to
such extent only, that this provision on the determination of just compensation in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 is made to apply
retrospectively.
12

Landbank, petitioner v. Soriano(s), respondents | GR No. 180772&76 | 5.6.19
| Agrarian Reform | Perez
Facts
1. Respondents herein, Domingo & Mamerto, owns several rice lands in Albay,
18.91has., in the advent of PD 27 and CARL, 18.28 was subjected to OLT and CARP.
2. Petitioner, pegged the value of 18.04has. at PhP. 482,363.95, (133.7K land value
and 348.6K for incremental interest), while the remainder was valued at PhP.
8,238.94.
3. Not satisfied, respondents asked for a judicial determination for the just
compensation in the CFI of Legazpi, claiming that they are entitled to PhP.
4,500,000.00 for the land.
4. Applying the formula provided in EO 288, to supplement PD 27, and the
supplemental DAR AO 2 s.2004, giving it a compound interest, as additional. CFI
ruled that PhP. 894,584.94 is proper. CA Affirmed, hence this.
Issue
5. Whether or Not the computation used was correct.
Held
6. Denied. Basic is the tenet that since respondents were deprived of their land, they
are entitled to just compensation which was provided by EO 228. In the advent of
CARL, new guidelines were set for the determination of just compensation (Sec.
17). Consequently, two divergent formulae arose which prompted the Court to
come up with a categorical pronouncement that, if just compensation is not settled
prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance
with the said law, although the property was acquired under Presidential Decree
No. 27.
7. The fixing of just compensation should therefore be based on the parameters set
out in Republic Act No. 6657, with Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228 having only suppletory effect.
8. The instant case was lodged in year 2000, therefore CARL is the applicable law,
pertinent to that, DAR already have issued the computation to be used, which is
provided in its Administrative Order No. 5, s.1998, although, this case is bereft of
adequate data, therefore we cannot compute basing from the aforementioned AO,
hence the SC upholds the computation from before.
9. At any rate, we cannot subscribe to the arguments of LBP regarding the interest.
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that the redistribution of
agricultural lands shall be subject to the payment of just compensation. The
deliberations expressly provided that it should not do violence to the Bill of Rights,
but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian
reform program. Hence, the landowner's right to just compensation should be
balanced with agrarian reform.
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14

Landbank, petitioner v. Sps. Orilla, respondents | GR No. 157206 | 6.27.08 |
Agrarian Reform | Nachura, J p:
Facts
1. Respondent Spouses owns 23.3has. of land in Bohol, in 1996 DAR Bohol notified
the spouses, informing them of the compulsory acquisition of 21.1has., pursuant to
CARL, and that they will be compensated for PhP. 371,154.99, per valuation
conducted by petitioner.
2. Respondents rejected, Bohols provincial DARAB then conducted summary hearing,
to wit, it affirmed said valuation.
3. Unsatisfied, respondents filed an action for the determination of just compensation
to CFI. CFI ruled in favour of petitioners, as prayed for: PhP. 7.00/sq.m, plus
interest, and the cost of suit and valuation fees by a third party.
4. Both LBP and DAR appealed, respondents on the other hand moved for execution
which was granted pendente lite of petitioners appeal.
5. Petitioners tried to move for reconsideration to no avail. The CA only affirmed the
decision of CFI (acting as SAC), hence this.
Issue
6. Whether or Not, pending appeal for compensation judgement, such judgment
maybe executed.
Held
7. Affirmed. Execution of a judgment pending appeal is governed by Section 2 (a) of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, simply stated: Execution of the judgment or final
order pending appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final
judgment may be executed, it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution pending
appeal should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances.
8. Are the circumstances in this case extraordinary? The answer is a resounding YES.
9. The expropriation of private property under R.A. 6657 is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation, being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the
farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an
exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation
where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation
is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property
taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the
hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation".
Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the
landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
15

Landbank, petitioner v. CA, Yap, Heirs of Santiago & Agricultural Mgmt. &
Devt Co., respondents | GR No. 118712&745 | 7.5.96 | Francisco R., J p:
Facts
1. The SC previously denied petitioner together with DAR, of their notion that, the
opening of trusts, in favour of the rejecting respondents is sufficient compliance w/
the mandate of CARL.
2. Petitioner also argues that there is no legal basis for respondents to withdraw
deposited amounts in the trusts pendent lite.
3. DAR maintains that what is contemplated in Sec. 16(e) of CARL is in General,
absent any specific indication. (Procedure for Acquisition of Lands and the
corresponding just compensation.
Issue
4. Whether or Not petitioners are correct.
Held
1. Denied.
2. To allow the taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them
empty handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government
speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government
to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner
when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. Unduly
burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of
the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly
unfair and unacceptable.
3. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the offered compensation
despite depriving the landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are
in effect penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived
of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
4. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit
to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners that is in "cash" or in
"LBP bonds". The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt
as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust
accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit".
16

Assoc. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform | GR No(s). 78742, 79310, 79744, & 79777 | 7.14.89 | Agrarian
Reform | Cruz, J p:
Fact
1. Consolidated Cases, involving the common legal questions, challenging the
constitutionality PD 27, EOs 228&229, & RA 6657; seeking prohibition of
Proclamation No. 131 and EO 229; Retention Issues; Questioning the Power of the
President to promulgate such laws; and the Immediate execution of the Rights
granted under Agrarian Reform.
Issues & Holding
2. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No 131 and EO
228&229.
a. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
3. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the measures
a. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress
was formally convened and took over legislative power.
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation
as specified in the Constitution.
a. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill should
only have one subject, to be expressed in its title
a. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from the title.
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.
a. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In
other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
action.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain
a. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of
just compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation
of property is not compensable.
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
a. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we
may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
17

examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
constitutional goal.
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
a. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but
also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see.
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
a. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment,
other modes of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court
accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion of
cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets,
tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the
rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes
even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent
and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation
a. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
12.
18

Heirs of Francisco Tantoco et al, petitioners v. CA, DARAB, ARBASF, ROD Gen.
Trias, Cavite, respondents | GR No. 149621 | 5.5.06 | Agrarian Reform |
Azcuna, J p:
Facts
1. The petitioners predecessors had a vast land in San Francisco, Gen. Trias, Cavite,
totalling to 106.5has., a portion of w/c was declared exempt from PD 27, hence
Certificate of Land Titles issued previously to several people were cancelled.
Afterwards the owners donated portions of the land leaving them 100has, subject
of the case.
2. In the advent of CARL, the owner offered said land to DAR, thru the Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS) provided in CARL, to the tune of 53.2M, w/c was never replied by DAR.
3. Petitioners later received a notice from DAR, indicating therein that valuation had
been conducted and subject land was valued at 4.8M. Petitioners rejected the offer,
they likewise withdrew their VOS, adding that HLURB already classified subject land
not suitable for agriculture. And if DAR would still insist on acquiring the land,
petitioners will be exercising their right of retention summing up to 79has divided
among the co-owners and to their children.
4. In lieu of petitioners rejection, DAR requested Landbank to open a Trust Account in
favour of petitioners for the offered amount, followed by the bonds.
5. DAR then issued CLOAS to ARBASF (recipients), followed by the TCT issued by the
ROD.
6. Immediately upon learning Petitioners filed an action for the cancellation of the TCT
to DARAB Regional, which favoured petitioners, both parties unsatisfied appealed
to DARAB main.
7. DARAB favoured petitioners as to the validity of the TCT awarded to ARBASF, CA
denied their petition, hence this.
Issue
8. Whether or Not there were lapses attributable to DAR in the acquisition.
Held
9. Granted. The failure of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA
that had been issued to ARBA. To assume the power is to short-circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. DAR must be given
a chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings.
10. It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the
Department of Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of petitioners since it is in
a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter and vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform controversies.
19

20

Central Mindanao University (Univ. Pres. Chua), petitioner v. DARAB, CA &
BUFFALO (PRs)
Facts
1. Petitioner has in its holding 400has. Being an Agricultural education institution in
Bukidnon. In 1984 CMU adopted a livelihood program, it was then superseded by
Agri-Business Management and Training Project, which granted beneficiaries
(School Teachers, Students, etc) the right to cultivate said land, with specific terms
and conditions.
2. Private Respondents were some of the beneficiaries of the schools program
(Teachers, Professors, Workers etc.), upon audit of CMU, finding private
respondents to have not complied with the terms, they were not renewed as
beneficiaries, loss of jobs, and separation from service, hence the complaint that
started this case w/c was filed to DARAB.
3. CARL was already implemented when the complaint was instituted, and DAR had
its eye on CMUs property.
4. DARAB found private respondents as not tenants and cannot therefore be
beneficiaries under CARP, at the same time ordered the segregation of CMUs land
(BUFFALO as CARP beneficiary), CA affirmed, hence this.
Issue
5. Whether or Not DARAB had Jurisdiction to declare such.
Held
6. No. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of
the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies. It
does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found
to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting
up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.
7. The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest
priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need
give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land
in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to
landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as
CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been
segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries
is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the
DARAB.
21

DAR v. DECS | GR No. 158228 | 3.23.04 | Agrarian Reform | Ynares-Santiago, J
p:
Facts
1. DECS was a recipient of Land Donation from Esteban Jalandoni in the aggregate
area of 189.2has. in Negros.
2. DECS subsequently leased said land to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, a
corporation dedicated to farmin DECS in turn used the lease payment as actually,
directly, exclusively for educational purposes such as school repairs and
renovations in the locality.
3. In the advent of CARL, certain Eugenio Alpar and several others claimed that they
are regular farm workers of the subject land, which DAR after investigation placed
said land under CARP.
4. DECS brought the Case to the CA praying for exemption of the land after the
Secretary of DAR affirmed the findings of DAR. The CA ruled in favour of DECS,
hence this.
Issue
5. Whether or Not, subject land maybe exempted.
Held
6. The Supreme Court granted the petition ruling that: Firstly, the subject lands fall
under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture. The records of the case show that from the time they were leased,
the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugar cane, albeit part of
the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.
7. Moreover, there was no legislative or presidential act, before and after the
enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, classifying the said
lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
8. In order to be exempt from the coverage of CARP: 1) the land must be actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and (2) the purpose is for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purpose. Here, the subject lands were not
actually, and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were
leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the
furtherance of its business.
9. It was the income from the Contract of Lease and not the subject lands that was
directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality.
22

Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc., [DAR] petitioner, v. EM
Ramos & Sons, respondent, | GR No. 131481 | 3.16.11 | Agrarian Reform |
Leonardo-De Castro, J p:
Facts
1. In 1965, respondent acquired a 372has of land in Cavite from Manila Golf and
Country Club. Respondent intended to develop said land into a residential
subdivision.
2. In 1971, the Dasmarias, Cavite council enacted Local Autonomy Act.
3. In May 1972, respondent applied to the municipal council for the conversion of the
subject lot into a residential subdivision. It was approved, July of that year.
4. Respondent though was unable to start the project immediately because part of
the land was mortgaged to a bank.
5. In the advent of CARL, the neighbouring lands were converted by the Government
into an Industrial Zone, tenants thereof was awarded of 3 has per recipient, the
problem though was that there wasnt enough land for the industrial development
and for awarding, thus the Government tasked DAR to look for other lands,
respondents land was subjected.
6. DAR then started the acquisition process by sending notices of acquisition.
Respondent strongly opposed, their opposition was forwarded to DAR Region IV.
The regional office, respondent then presented their conversion authority, after
which the legal department of DAR Region IV rendered a decision declaring Null
and Void the notices of acquisition, citing DOJ Opinion No. 44, wherein, said opinion
basically stated that lands converted are no longer to be subjected to CARP.
7. DAR Regional Director then elevated the case to the DAR Secretary, which reaffirmed said notices.
8. On appeal, the Office of the President dismissed respondents position.
9. Meanwhile apparently during the appeal in the Court of Appeals, DAR had already
issued CLOAs to beneficiaries, anent upon the decision, petitioner herein filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion, to be allowed to intervene.
10. CA nullified the decision of the Office of the President, hence this.
Issue
11.
Whether or Not a mere Municipal Ordinance could negate land reform.
Held
12. Affirmed. CARP coverage are limited to Agricultural Lands (Sec. 4 CARL)
13. CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, to be exempt, respondents land should be
converted prior to said date.
14. The local Autonomy Act of 1959, the precursor of the Local Government Code of
1991 provided that Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal
Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are
hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for
their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor
23

or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however,
consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and
zoning.
15. Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Municipal Council of Dasmarias
approved Ordinance No. 1 on July 13, 1971, which laid down the general
subdivision regulations for the municipality; and Resolution No. 29-A on July 9,
1972, which approved the application for subdivision of the subject property.
16. Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not
the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a
given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs.
17. Municipal governments exercise the police power under the general welfare
clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances
and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein."
18. Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on July 9,
1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of the subject property for
residential use.
24

Milestone Farms Inc., petitioner, v. Office of the President, respondent | GR
No. 182332 | 2.23.11 | Agrarian Reform | Nachura, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioner is engaged in the business of poultry and livestock, incidental to this is
the acquisition of lands.
2. On the advent of CARL, livestock and poultry business are included in the coverage
of CARP, but the Supreme Court in its decision in Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary,
opined that such should be excluded.
3. Thus In 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption of its 316has. Property in Baras,
Rizal, citing the aforementioned jurisprudence. DARs Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LULEC) then conducted an ocular inspection of petitioners
property, to which LULEC recommended the exemption after certifying that the
land is devoted to livestock and poultry, which DAR approved.
4. The southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Pupose Cooperative (PINUGAY) moved for the
reconsideration of DARs approval. On 4 June 1994, apparently PINUGAY forcibly
entered the farm, to which petitioner sued, it reached the Court of Appeals
favouring petitioner.
5. Upon CARLs amendment by RA 7881, DAR re conducted an inspection of the farm,
the findings indicated that only 240.97has only is to be exempted, the rest (75has.)
is to be covered by CARP. Applying the Animal-Land Ratio, DAR Secretary opined
such. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to no avail, aggrieved he
appealed to the Office of the President.
6. Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but
when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President
reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
7. CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the
coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA
as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued
DAR conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the
316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this
Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was
effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
8. CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the
coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA
as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued
DAR conversion order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the
316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
The portion converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this
Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was
effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
9. With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the
25

controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its
amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP
is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby
declared covered by the CARP.
Issue
10. Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of
CARP
Held
11. No.
12. When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely
abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then
subsisting and in full force and effect.
13. As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject
property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of
evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine,
and/or poultry raising.
14. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultryraising from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock
is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case, accorded respect to the CAs observation
that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually
contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were
actually pastured outside the subject property.
26

Luz Farms, petitioner, v. Hon. Secretary of DAR, respondent, | GR No. 86889 |
12.4.90 | Agrarian Reform | Paras, J p:
Facts
1. CARL was originally approved to include livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage, anent, DAR Secretary issued the guidelines and procedures
implementing production and profit sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of
CARL, followed by CARLS IRR.
2. Petitioner, as a corporation engaged in the said business stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of the law. Hence this petition assailing that pertinent
provisions of CARL are unconstitutional.
3. Public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is
proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954).
Issue
4. Whether or Not Sections 3(b), 11, 13, and 32, insofar as the said law includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the its IRG, are
unconstitutional.
Held
5. The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of constitutional
construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of
the Constitution.
6. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
7. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
8. The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind
of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the
word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the
Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
27

Otilia Sta. Ana, petitioner, v. Sps Carpo, respondent, | GR No. 164340 |
11.28.08 | Agrarian Reform | Nachura, J p:
Facts
1. Respondent owns a land in Sta. Rosa, Laguna to the size of 91.3sq.m, it was
dedicated to rice and corn production, tenanted by the Pastolero family which later
transferred the tenancy to petitioner herein, for a sum of money agreed by
respondent.
2. At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship. Unfortunately,
circumstances transpired which abraded the relationship. The Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) mediated in order to amicably settle the controversy, but no
settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, the instant case.
3. Respondents want to eject petitioner. Averring that they demanded increase in
rentals (rice cavans), and that petitioner refused to pay actual rentals, and that
said land had been declared to be suitable for commercial and industrial purposes,
per Sta. Rosa, Lagunas zoning ordinance.
4. Petitioner denies all allegations, and further claims that he is a farmer beneficiary
of the subject land pursuan to PD 27. Thereafter, trial in the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ensued.
5. PARAD ruled in favour of Respondent and declared that the land couldnt be
subjected to PD 27 because it lacks the area.
6. On appeal to The DARAB, it set-aside the ruling of PARAD and ordered that proper
accounting of lease-rental by the MARO be initiated, and that for respondent to
respect the peaceful possession and cultivation of petitioner. Aggrieved, on appeal,
the CA reinstated the order of PARAD. Hence this.
Issue
7. Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become
residential, commercial and/or industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our
laws on agrarian reform
Held
8. "Courts of justice have no power to decide a question not in issue." A judgment
that goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate something on which the
parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and invalid.
9. Thus, we cannot allow ourselves to fall into the same error as that committed by
the PARAD and the CA, and resolve the issue of the non-agricultural nature of the
subject land by receiving, at this stage, pieces of evidence and evaluating the
same, without the respondents having first introduced them in the proper forum.
The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the issues on
retention and exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, being the
agency lodged with such authority inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise
on the matter.
28

10. Likewise, we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents that
petitioner and her family are not landless tenants and are therefore not deserving
of any protection under our laws on agrarian reform, because fairness and due
process dictate that issues not raised in the proceedings below should not be
raised for the first time on appeal.
Napoleon Magno, petitioner, v. Gonzalo Francisco & Regina Vda. De Lazaro,
respondent | GR No. 168959 | 3.25.10 | Agrarian Reform | Carpio, Acting C.J
p:
Facts
1. Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3has. which is a portion of an agricultural land
identified as Lot No. 593 situated in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.
2. Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel
Lazaro on 5 October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7 August 1980. In the
leasehold contract, Lazaro and Francisco are to pay petitioner in more or less 50
cavans each.
3. On 1991, the wife of deceased Francisco stopped paying despite petitioners
demands, believing that they have fully paid the price of the lot under the Bgy.
Committee on Land Productions valuation (BCLP). Apparently, on 1990 Francisco
and Lazaro was issued with an Emancipation Patent.
4. Petitioner in 1993 filed with PARAD a complaint for ejectment and collection of
lease rentals.
5. Respondents argue that the OLT program pursuant to PD 27 made the leasehold
contracts without force, and they should now be considered as tenant-cultivators,
and that the lot value as approved by DAR has been paid by their regular
payments, the issue of payment is moot.
6. PARAD dismissed the case, but DARA set-aside the formers ruling, and ruled that
the leasehold relationship still subsists and they should pay. Aggrieved, appealing,
the CA reinstituted PARADs decision, hence this petition.
Issue
7. Whether or not the EPs issued, can defeat the landowners rights to leasehold
rentals.
Held
8. It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy
relationship, such that the complaint for collection of back rentals and ejectment is
classified as an agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view of the conflicting claims where
petitioner asserted ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized that the lot
is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the
agrarian reform program. Since the classification and identification of landholdings
for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian Law Implementation
29

cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue. In Sta. Ana v. Carpo, 52 we
held:
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals
is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD and
thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention rights of the
respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from
the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the
DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
9. Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision
declaring the lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the
DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order
dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended the case proceedings until the
submission of the result of the administrative determination of the lot and thus
submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves
admitted in their Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the result of its
administrative determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that
the DAR Secretary should first resolve the issue on the lot's inclusion or exclusion
from OLT coverage before a final determination of this case can be had.
30

Alangilan Realty & Devt. Co., petitioner, v. Office of the President & DAR |
GR No. 180471 | 3.26.10 | Agrarian Reform | Nachura, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioner is the owner of a 17.4has land in Batangas.
2. On 8.7.96, petitioner petitioned for the exemption of said land from CARP, with
MARO, averring that, Batangas City classified said land as reserved for residential
under a zoning declaration (1982), approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC), which was then supported by the City Zoning Map and
Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994).
3. On 6 May 1997 his application was denied by the DAR Secretary, declaring that as
of then the land remained agricultural, reserved for residential, as it is in the
advent of CARL, the qualifying phrase means its still agricultural. Moved for
reconsideration, to no avail, he appealed in the OP, to no avail, to the CA, still to no
avail, hence this.
Issue
4. Whether or not subject land may still be covered by CARP, even though there was
a classification before the advent of CARL.
Held
5. Dismissed. Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL.
6. It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural,
reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994.
However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the term reserved for residential does
not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly
explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects
the intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already been
reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land
classification category.
7. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject
landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the
landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been
earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have
been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. Petitioner cannot take
refuge in our ruling in Natalia. The case is not on all fours with the instant case. In
Natalia, the entire property was converted into residential use in 1979 and was
developed into a low-cost housing subdivision in 1982. Thus, the property was no
longer devoted to agricultural use at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
31

Romanita Concha et al., petitioner v. Palino Rubio et al., respondent | GR No.
162446 | 3.29.10 | Agrarian Reform | Peralta, J p:
Facts
1. Petitioners herein are the named beneficiaries of the CARP program over a parcel
of land in the size of 18.5has., as found by the MARO to be farmer-beneficiaries,
they were awarded with CLOAs.
2. Respondents filed a complaint, praying that they be disqualified alleging that they
are the actual tenants thereof, and have not relinquished their rights over the
same, as they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners application
for conversion, subject to the following conditions: The farmer-beneficiary, if any,
shall be paid disturbance compensation pursuant to R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A.
6389; the remaining 18.5006 hectares shall be covered by CARP under compulsory
acquisition and the same be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries, and
therefore questions the validity and legality of the institution of the petitioners as
beneficiaries to PARAD.
3. PARAD ruled that, it had no jurisdiction as to the issue, as it lies with the Secretary
of DAR. DARAB reversed PARADs order, and instead, ordered the issuance of new
Certificate of Land Ownership in favour of Respondents. Affirmed by the CA. Hence
this.
4. Petitioner argues that DARAB is not clothed with authority to resolve the issue, as
to who is qualified as farmer-beneficiaries.
Issue
5. Whether or Not, DARAB is clothed with the Jurisdiction to Rule on the Matter.
Held
6. Granted, Set-Aside. This Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and
selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
7. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power and authority to rule on the
selection of farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra vires act of said Board,
being administrative in character. Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers
(MARO) decision not to include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be
accorded respect in the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it is
the MARO or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who, together with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible agrarian
beneficiaries.
8. The Adjudicator found DAR to have legal and valid reasons in the exclusion of
plaintiffs as farmer-beneficiaries based on their sworn statement which waived and
renounced their rights as tenants and farmer- beneficiaries of the program. This
32

was based on the fact that plaintiffs were awarded individual homelots and paid
disturbance compensation by the landowner.
33

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DAVID JOHN D.

PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Whether or Not a mere Municipal Ordinance could negate land reform.

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

DAVID JOHN D. PONTIGA | AGRARIAN REFORM & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

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