Art. 916; Art.

810
Seangio v Reyes

Facts
There was a petition
for the probate of an
alleged
holographic
will
which
was
denominated
as
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis
ng mana. The private
respondents moved for
the dismissal of the
probate
proceedings
primarily
on
the
ground
that
the
document purporting
to be the holographic
will of Segundo did not
contain any disposition
of the estate of the
deceased and thus did
not meet the definition
of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code.
According to private
respondents, the will
only
showed
an
alleged
act
of
disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest
son,
Alfredo,
and
nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs
were not named nor
instituted
as
heir,
devisee or legatee,
hence
there
was
preterition
which
would
result
to
intestacy. Such being
the
case,
private
respondents
maintained that while
procedurally the court
is called upon to rule
only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is
not
barred
from
delving
into
the
intrinsic validity of the
same, and ordering the
dismissal
of
the
petition for probate
when on the face of

Issue
1.
Whether
the
document executed by
Segundo
can
be
considered
as
a
holographic will.
2.Won
there
preterition

is

Held
YES
1. A holographic will,
as
provided
under
Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and
signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It
is subject to no other
form, and may be
made in or out of the
Philippines, and need
not be witnessed.
Segundos document,
although
it
may
initially come across as
a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a
holographic
will
prescribed by law. It is
written,
dated
and
signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An
intent
to
dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly
deduced
from
the
terms
of
the
instrument, and while
it does not make an
affirmative disposition
of the latters property,
the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in
itself. In other words,
the
disinheritance
results
in
the
disposition
of
the
property
of
the
testator Segundo in
favor of those who
would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover,
it
is
a
fundamental principle
that the intent or the

the will it is clear that

it
contains
no
testamentary
disposition
of
the
property
of
the
decedent.
Petitioners
filed their opposition to
the motion to dismiss
contending that: (1)
generally,
the
authority
of
the
probate court is limited
only to a determination
of the extrinsic validity
of the will; (2) private
respondents question
the intrinsic and not
the extrinsic validity of
the
will;
(3)
disinheritance
constitutes
a
disposition
of
the
estate of a decedent;
and (4) the rule on
preterition
did
not
apply
because
Segundos will did not
constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or
more
compulsory
heirs.
The RTC issued
an order dismissing
the petition for probate
proceedings, hence, a
petition for certiorari
was
filed
where
petitioners argued as
follows:
First,
respondent judge did
not
comply
with
Sections 3 and 4 of the
Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court
which
respectively mandate
the court to: (a) fix the
time and place for
proving the will when

will of the testator,

expressed in the form
and within the limits
prescribed
by
law,
must be recognized as
the supreme law in
succession. All rules of
construction
are
designed to ascertain
and give effect to that
intention. It is only
when the intention of
the testator is contrary
to law, morals, or
public policy that it
cannot
be
given
effect.11
2.With regard to the
issue
on
preterition,15 the Court
believes
that
the
compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It
was, in the Courts
opinion, Segundos last
expression
to
bequeath his estate to
all
his
compulsory
heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo.
Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir16 to
the exclusion of his
other
compulsory
heirs.
The
mere
mention of the name
of
one
of
the
petitioners, Virginia, in
the document did not
operate to institute her
as the universal heir.
Her
name
was
included plainly as a
witness
to
the
altercation
between
Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.

all
concerned
may
appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and
cause notice of such
time and place to be
published three weeks
successively previous
to the appointed time
in a newspaper of
general
circulation;
and (b) cause the
mailing of said notice
to the heirs, legatee
and devisees of the
testator Segundo;
Second,
the
holographic will does
not
contain
any
institution of an heir,
but rather, as its title
clearly
states, Kasulatan
ng
Pag-alis
ng
Mana,
simply
contains
a
disinheritance
of
a
compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition
in the decedents will
and the holographic
will on its face is not
intrinsically void;
Third,
the
testator intended all
his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private
respondents alike, with
the sole exception of
Alfredo, to inherit his
estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in
the direct line of
Segundo
were
preterited
in
the
holographic will since
there
was
no
institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it
clearly appears from
the
face
of
the
holographic will that it
is both intrinsically and

extrinsically
valid,
respondent judge was
mandated to proceed
with the hearing of the
testate case; and,
Lastly,
continuation of
proceedings
in
intestate
case
work
injustice
petitioners, and
render nugatory
disinheritance
Alfredo.

the
the
the
will
to
will
the
of

Art. 1003, 1004; Collation; Donation

Arellano v Pascual

Facts
Angel N. Pascual Jr.
died
intestate
on
January
2,
1999
leaving as heirs his
siblings,
namely:
petitioner Amelia P.
Arellano
who
is
represented by her
daughters Agnes P.
Arellano (Agnes) and
Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel N.
Pascual.
In
a
petition
for
Judicial Settlement of
Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of
Administration, filed
by
respondents
on
April 28, 2000 before
the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)
of
Makati,
respondents
alleged,
inter alia, that a parcel
of land (the donated
property) located in
Teresa Village, Makati,
which was, by Deed of
Donation, transferred
by the decedent to
petitioner the validity
of
which
donation

Issue

Held

Whether the honorable

court of appeals is
correct in declaring:

The decision ordering

the
collation
of
property donated to
Amelia Arellano is set
aside.
Case
was
remanded to lower
court
for
further
proceedings.

That
the
property
donated to petitioner
is subject to collation
under article 1061 of
the new civil code.
That respondents are
compulsory heirs of
their deceased brother
angel n. pascual jr. and
are
entitled
to
legitimes.

The term collation has

two distinct concepts:
first, it is a mere
mathematical
operation
by
the
addition of the value of
donations made by the
testator to the value of
the hereditary estate;
and second, it is the
return
to
the
hereditary estate of
property disposed of
by lucrative title by the
testator
during
his
lifetime.The purposes
of collation are to
secure equality among
the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible,
and to determine the
free
portion,
after
finding the legitime, so

respondents assailed,
may be considered as
an advance legitime
of petitioner.
The trial court, acting
as probate court, held
that it was precluded
from determining the
validity
of
the
donation.
Provisionally passing,
however,
upon the
question of title to the
donated property only
for the purpose of
determining whether it
formed part of the
decedents estate, the
probate court found
the Deed of Donation
valid in light of the
presumption of validity
of
notarized
documents.
It thus
went on to hold that it
is subject to collation
following Article 1061
of the New Civil Code
which reads:
Every
compulsory
heir, who succeeds
with
other
compulsory
heirs,
must bring into the
mass of the estate
any
property
or
right which he may
have received from
the
decedent,
during the lifetime
of the latter, by way
of donation, or any
other
gratuitous
title in order that it
may be computed in
the
determination
of the legitime of
each heir, and in the
account
of
the
partition.

that
inofficious
donations
may
be
reduced.
Collation
takes place when there
are compulsory heirs,
one of its purposes
being to determine the
legitime and the free
portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there
is no legitime to be
safeguarded.
The records do not
show
that
the
decedent
left
any
primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory
heirs. He was only
survived
by
his
siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and,
therefore,
are
not
entitled to any legitime
that part of the
testators
property
which
he
cannot
dispose of because the
law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs
may be classified into
(1)
primary,
(2)
secondary, and (3)
concurring.
The
primary
compulsory
heirs are those who
have precedence over
and
exclude
other
compulsory
heirs;
legitimate children and
descendants
are
primary
compulsory
heirs. The secondary
compulsory heirs are
those who succeed
only in the absence of
the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and
ascendants
are
secondary compulsory
heirs. The concurring
compulsory heirs are

Appealed to the Court

of Appeals, the case
was remanded to the
lower court, motion for
reconsideration
was
denied.
Hence
the
petitioner
filed
a
petition for certiorari.

those who succeed

together
with
the
primary
or
the
secondary compulsory
heirs; the illegitimate
children,
and
the
surviving spouse are
concurring compulsory
heirs.The decedent not
having
left
any
compulsory heir who is
entitled
to
any
legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his
properties,
even
if
nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as
donation made to a
stranger, chargeable
against
the
free
portion of the estate.
There
being
no
compulsory
heir,
however, the donated
property is not subject
to
collation.
The
decedents remaining
estate should thus be
partitioned
equally
among
his
heirssiblings-collateral
relatives,
herein
petitioner
and
respondents, pursuant
to the provisions of
289
The Civil Code, viz:Art.
1003. If there are no
descendants,
ascendants,
illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the
collateral
relatives
shall succeed to the
entire estate of the
deceased
in
accordance with the

Vizconde v CA

Estrellita
purchased
form Rafael a 10,110
sq. m. lot located at
Valenzuela, Bulacan for
P100k. She sold the
Valenzuela property for
P3, 405, 612 and in
June of the same year,
she bought a house
and lot in BF Homes,
Paraaque
using
a
portion of the proceeds
of the sale of the
Valenzuela
lot.
Estrellita and her 2
children, Carmela and
Jennifer,
were
killed. Lauro was left
as the sole heir but he
entered
into
an
extrajudicial
settlement of his wifes
estate with Rafael and
Salud, her parents.
This
settlement
provided 50% of the
total amount of the
bank
deposits
of
Estrellita
and
her
daughters to Rafael
while the other 50%
was given to Lauro.
The
Paraaque
property and the car
were also given to
Lauro with Rafael and
Salud waiving all their
claims,
rights,
ownership
and
participation as heirs
in the said properties.
Rafael died. In the
intestate
proceeding
the
Valenzuela
lot
allegedly was given by
Rafael to Estrellita and
that the heirs legitime

Whether or not the

subject
Paranaque
Property is subject to
collation.

following articles. Art.

1004. Should the only
survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full
blood,
they
shall
inherit in equal shares.
The
order
of
collation
is
premature since the
proceeding is still in
its
initiatory
stage. There
is
nothing to indicate
that the legitime of
any of Rafaels heirs
has been impaired
to warrant collation.
Further, collation of the
Paraaque
property,
bought
using
the
proceeds of the sale of
the
Valenzuela
property which Rafael
transferred
to
Estrellita,
has
no
statutory
basis. The
Order of the probate
court presupposes that
the
Paraaque
property
was
gratuitously conveyed
by
Rafael
to
Estrellita. However,
Estrellita paid P900,
000 to Premier Homes,
Inc. for said property.
The
collation
is
improper for collation
covers only properties
gratuitously given by
decedent during his
lifetime
to
his
compulsory
heirs
which do not obtain to
the transfer of the
Paraaque
realty. Moreover,
Rafael already waived
his right to said realty.
Lastly, Estrellita died
ahead of Rafael. In
fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from her an

should
come
from
collation
of
all
properties distributed
to his children by
Rafael
during
his
lifetime. Ramon,
Rafaels son, further
claimed
that
the
petitioner is one of
Rafaels children by
right of representation
as Estrellitas widower.

amount more than the

value of the Valenzuela
lot. Thus,
even
assuming
that
the
latter property maybe
collated, collation may
not be allowed as the
value of the Valenzuela
lot has long been
returned to Rafaels
estate.

Partition; Art 1080; Art 867, 870, 1013

Alfonso v Andres

Facts
The present case stemmed
from a complaint for accion
publiciana with damages filed
by respondent spouses Henry
and Liwanag Andres against
Noli Alfonso and spouses
Reynaldo
and
Erlinda
Fundialan before the RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of
respondents.
The CA dismissed the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule
50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Issue
1.

2.

Whether
or
not
the
dismissal
of
petitioners'
appeal by the
honorable court
of appeals is
highly
unjustified,
iniquitous and
unconscionable
because
it
overlooked
and/or
disregarded the
merits
of
petitioners
case
which
involves
a
deprivation of
their property
rights.
Whether or not
publication
of
the deed of
extrajudicial
settlement
of
estate
is
required before
transfer
of
property.

Held
1. In the present civil
case
which
involves the failure
to
file
the
appellants' brief on
time, there is no
showing of any
public
interest
involved. Neither
is there a showing
that an injustice
will result due to
the application of
technical rules.
Petitioners beg us to
disregard technicalities
because they claim that
on the merits their case
is strong. A study of the
records fails to so
convince us.
2.
NO.
Petitioners theorize that
publication of the deed
of
extrajudicial
settlement of the estate
of Marcelino Alfonso is
required before their
father, Jose Alfonso
(Jose)
could
validly
transfer the subject
property. We are not
convinced. In Alejandri
no v. Court of Appeals,
[12]
the Court upheld the

effectivity of a deed of
extrajudicial settlement
that
was
neither
notarized
nor
published.
Significantly,
the title of the property
owned by a person who
dies intestate passes at
once to his heirs. Such
transmission is subject
to
the
claims
of
administration and the
property may be taken
from the heirs for the
purpose of paying debts
and expenses, but this
does not prevent an
immediate passage of
the title, upon the death
of the intestate, from
himself to his heirs.
[13]
The
deed
of
extrajudicial settlement
executed by Filomena
Santos Vda. de Alfonso
and Jose evidences their
intention to partition the
inherited property. It
delineated what portion
of the inherited property
would belong to whom.
The sale to
respondents was made
after the execution of
the deed of extrajudicial
settlement
of
the
estate. The extrajudicial
settlement of estate,
even
though
not
published,
being
deemed a partition[14] of
the inherited property,
Jose
could
validly
transfer ownership over
the specific portion of
the property that was
assigned to him.

Orendain

Jr.

On

July

19,

1960,

the

WON the trusteeship

The

petition

is

Rodriguez

decedent, Doa Margarita

Rodriguez, died in Manila,
leaving a last will and
testament. On September
23, 1960, the will was
admitted to probate by
virtue of the order of the
CFI
Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 3845. On
August 27, 1962, the CFI
Manila
approved
the
project
of
partition
presented by the executor
of
Doa
Margarita
Rodriguezs will. At the
time of her death, the
decedent
left
no
compulsory or forced heirs
and, consequently, was
completely free to dispose
of her properties, without
regard to legitimes,3 as
provided in her will. Some
of
Doa
Margarita
Rodriguezs testamentary
dispositions contemplated
the creation of a trust to
manage the income from
her
properties
for
distribution to beneficiaries
specified in the will.
As regards Clause 10 of the
will
which
explicitly
prohibits the alienation or
mortgage of the properties
specified therein, we had
occasion
to
hold,
in
Rodriguez, etc., et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al.,5
that the clause, insofar as
the first twenty-year period
is concerned, does not
violate Article 8706 of the
Civil Code. Almost four
decades
later,
herein
petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and
Enrico Orendain, heirs of
Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who
was mentioned in Clause
24 of the decedents will,
moved to dissolve the trust
on the decedents estate,
which they argued had

over the properties

left by the decedent
can
be
dissolved
applying Articles 867
and 870 of the Civil
Code.

impressed with merit.

Apparent from the
decedents last will
and testament is the
creation of a trust on
a specific set of
properties and the
income
accruing
therefrom. Nowhere in
the will can it be
ascertained that the
decedent
intended
any of the trusts
designated
beneficiaries to inherit
these properties. The
decedents will did not
institute
any
heir
thereto, as clearly
shown
by
the
following:
1. Clause
2
instructed the
creation
of
trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed
that the remaining
income from specified
properties, after the
necessary deductions
for
expenses,
including the estate
tax, be deposited in a
fund with a bank;
3.
Clause
10
enumerated
the
properties
to
be
placed in trust for
perpetual
administration
(pangasiwaan
sa
habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12
directed
how
the
income
from
the
properties ought to be
divided among, and
distributed
to
the
different beneficiaries;
and
5.
Clause
24
instructed
the
administrators
to

been in existence for more

than twenty years, in
violation of Articles 8678
and 870 of the Civil Code,
and inconsistent with our
ruling in Rodriguez v. Court
of Appeals.9On April 18,
2005, the RTC issued the
herein assailed Order that:
(a) only the perpetual
prohibition to alienate or
mortgage is declared void;
(b) the trust over her
properties stipulated by
the testatrix in Clauses 12,
13 and 24 of the will
remains valid; and (c) the
trustees may dispose of
these properties in order to
carry out the latters
testamentary disposition.

provide
medical
support
to
certain
beneficiaries, to be
deducted from the
fund deposits in the
bank mentioned in
Clauses 2 and 3.
1. Plainly,
the
RTC
was
mistaken
in
denying
petitioners
motion
to
dissolve and
ordering the
disposition of
the properties
in Clause 10
according to
the testatrixs
wishes.
As
regards these
properties,
intestacy
should apply
as
the
decedent did
not
institute
an
heir
therefor.
Article 782, in
relation
to
paragraph 2,
Article 960 of
the Civil Code,
provides:
Art. 782. An heir is a
person called to the
succession either by
the provision of a will
or by operation of law.
Art. 960. Legal or
intestate succession
takes place:
(2) When the will does
not institute an heir
to, or dispose of all
the
property
belonging
to
the
testator. In such case,
legal succession shall
take place only with
respect
to
the

property of which the

testator
has
not
disposed;
We find as erroneous
the RTCs holding that
paragraph 4,14 Article
1013 of the same
code
specifically
allows a perpetual
trust, because this
provision of law is
inapplicable. Suffice it
to state that the
article is among the
Civil Code provisions
on
intestate
succession,
specifically on the
State inheriting from a
decedent, in default
of persons entitled to
succeed. Under this
article, the allowance
for a permanent trust,
approved by a court
of
law,
covers
property
1. inherited
by
the State by
virtue
of
intestate
succession.
The
article
does not cure
a
void
testamentary
provision
which did not
institute
an
heir.
Accordingly,
the
article
cannot
be
applied
to
dispose
of
herein
decedents
properties.
The herein testatrixs
large
landholdings
cannot be subjected
indefinitely to a trust
because
the

Arrogante v Deliarte

Lot incontroversy
was
originally
conjugal property
of
spouses
Deliarte. They had
nine
children
including
herein
respondent
Beethoven Deliarte
and petitioner Fe
Deliarte
Arrogante.

whether or not
the
private
deed
of sale execut
ed in 1978 is a
valid
conveyance of
the entire lot
to petitioner,
beethoven
deliarte.

ownership
thereof
would then effectively
remain with her even
in the afterlife.
1. In light of the
foregoing,
therefore, the
trust on the
testatrixs
properties
must
be
dissolved and
this
case
remanded to
the
lower
court
to
determine the
following: (1)
The properties
listed
in
Clause 10 of
the
will,
constituting
the perpetual
trust,
which
are still within
reach
and
have not been
disposed of as
yet; and (2)
The intestate
heirs of the
decedent,
with
the
nearest
relative of the
deceased
entitled
to
inherit
the
remaining
properties.
NO. The 1978 private
deed of sale, insofar
as it disposed of
Bernabes share in the
conjugal partnership
prior to his death, is
void for being a
conveyance of the
Deliarte
siblings
future inheritance.
Article

1347,

The
other
petitioners, Lordito,
Johnston,
and
Arme,
Jr.,
all
surnamed
Arrogante,
children of Fe and,
thus, nephews of
Beethoven. Respo
ndent
Leonora
Duenas is the wife
of Beethoven.
In between the
deaths of spouses
Deliarte (1st wife,
Gregoria
then
husband Bernabe) ,
The
Deliarte
siblings agreed to
waive and convey
in
favor
of
Beethoven all their
rights,
interests,
and claims to the
subject
lot
in
consideration
of P15,000.00.
Thus, from then
on,
Beethoven
occupied
and
possessed
the
subject lot openly,
peacefully, and in
the
concept
of
owner.
All of Beethovens
siblings, except Fe,
signed a deed of
confirmation
of
sale in favor of
Beethoven to ratify
the 1978 private
deed of sale.
petitioner
Lordito
Arrogante installed
placards on the
fence erected by
respondents,
claiming that the
subject lot was
illegally
acquired
by the latter.
respondents
filed

paragraph 2 of the
Civil
Code
characterizes
a
contract entered into
upon
future
inheritance as void.
[10]
The law applies
when the following
requisites concur: (1)
the succession has
not yet been opened;
(2) the object of the
contract forms part of
the inheritance; and
(3) the promissor has,
with respect to the
object, an expectancy
of a right which is
purely hereditary in
nature.[11]
In this case, at
the time the contract
was
entered
into,
succession
to
Bernabes estate had
yet to be opened, and
the
object
thereof, i.e., Bernabe
s share in the subject
lot, formed part of his
childrens inheritance,
and
the
children
merely
had
an
inchoate
hereditary
right thereto.
True,
the
prohibition
on
contracts respecting
future
inheritance
admits of exceptions,
as when a person
partitions his estate
by
an
act inter
vivos under
Article
1080 of the Civil
Code.[12] However, the
private deed of sale
does not purport to be
a
partition
of
Bernabes estate as
would exempt it from

an
action
for
quieting of title
and
damages
against
the
petitioners.
RTC rendered a
Decision quieting
title on the subject
lot in favor of
respondents.
CA affirmed the
trial
courts
decision

the
application
of
Article
1347. Nowhere in the
said document does
Bernabe
separate,
divide, and assign to
his children his share
in the subject lot
effective only upon
his death.[13] Indeed,
the document does
not even bear the
signature of Bernabe.
Neither
did
the
parties
demonstrate
that
Bernabe undertook an
oral partition of his
estate. Although we
have held on several
occasions that an oral
or parole partition is
valid, our holdings
thereon were confined
to instances wherein
the
partition
had
actually
been
consummated,
enforced,
and
recognized by the
parties.[14] Absent a
showing of an overt
act
by
Bernabe
indicative
of
an
unequivocal intent to
partition his estate
among his children,
his knowledge and
ostensible
acquiescence to the
private deed of sale
does not equate to an
oral partition by an
act inter
vivos. Besides,
partition of property
representing
future
inheritance cannot be
made effective during
the lifetime of its
owner.[15]

Considering
the
foregoing,
it
follows that the 1986
deed of confirmation
of sale which sought
to ratify the 1978 sale
likewise suffers from
the same infirmity.
[16]
In short, the 1986
deed is also void.
Nevertheless,
it is apparent that
Bernabe treated his
share[17] in the subject
lot as his childrens
present
inheritance,
and he relinquished
all his rights and claim
thereon in their favor
subject
to
Beethovens
compensation for the
expenses he initially
shouldered for the
family. The
records
reveal that Bernabe,
prior
to
his
hospitalization
and
death,
wanted
to
ensure
that
his
children attended to
the
expenditure
relating thereto, and
even articulated his
desire
that
such
surpass the provision
for both his son and
wife, Beethovens and
Fes
brother
and
mother, respectively.
[18]
Their arrangement
contemplated
the
Deliarte
siblings
equal
responsibility
for
the
familys
incurred expenses.
We
take
judicial notice of this
collective sense of
responsibility towards
family. As with most

nuclear
Filipino
families, the Deliarte
siblings
endeavored
to provide for their
parents
or
any
member
of
their
family in need. This
was
evident
in
Florenda
Deliarte
Nacuas, the youngest
Deliarte
siblings,
remittance
to
her
parents of her salary
for two years so they
could
redeem
the
subject lot.[19]
Florenda
corroborated
the
testimony
of
Beethoven that their
father was present
during,
and
was
aware
of,
the
transaction that took
place
among
his
children.[20] The 1978
deed of sale, albeit
void, evidenced the
consent
and
acquiescence of each
Deliarte sibling to said
transaction. They
raised no objection
even after Beethoven
forthwith
possessed
and
occupied
the
subject lot.
The foregoing
arrangement, vaguely
reflected in the void
deed of sale, points to
a meeting of the
minds
among
the
parties constitutive of
an
innominate
contract, akin to both
an onerous and a
remuneratory
donation.[21] In
this
regard,
Bernabes
waiver
and

relinquishment of his
share in the subject
lot is effectively a
donation inter vivos to
his
children. However,
the gratuitous act is
coupled
with
an
onerous cause equal
accountability of the
Deliarte siblings for
the
hospitalization
and death expenses
of deceased family
members to be taken
from their shares in
the subject lot. In
turn,
the
remunerative
cause
pertains
to
Beethovens
recompense for the
family expenses he
initially shouldered.
During
his
lifetime,
Bernabe
remained the absolute
owner
of
his
undivided interest in
the
subject
lot. Accordingly,
he
could have validly
disposed
of
his
interest therein. His
consent
to
the
disposition
of
the
subject lot in favor of
Beethoven,
agreed
upon
among
his
children, is evident,
considering
his
presence
in,
knowledge of, and
acquiescence to the
transaction. Further,
the arrangement was
immediately effected
by the parties with no
objection
from
Bernabe or any of the
Deliarte
siblings,
including
herein

petitioner
Fe. Ineluctably,
the
actual
arrangement
between the parties
included Bernabe, and
the object thereof did
not constitute future
inheritance.
Noceda v CA

Avelino v CA

Directo together with her

nephew
and
another,
extrajudicially partitioned
the land donated to them.
On the same date, she
donated in favor of Noceda
a part of her land. On her
share of the land, she
fenced it and constructed
three huts therein. On a
later
date,
Noceda
removed
the
fence,
entered the premises and
used
the
three
lots.
Despite demands for him
to vacate, he refused to do
so, prompting Directo to
file a case against him and
revoke the donation made
by her.
In 1989, Antonio Avelino,
Sr. died intestate. In 1991,
his
daughter,
Maria
Socorro Avelino filed a
petition for the issuance of
letters of administration of
the estate of his deceased
father. All the other heirs
however
opposed
the
petition and they moved
that
the
petition
be
converted into an action
for judicial partition of the
said estate. The trial court
granted the oppositions
motion and so Socorros
petition
was
converted
accordingly.
Socorros
motion for reconsideration
was denied. Socorro then
filed
a
petition
for certiorari,
prohibition,
and mandamus alleging
grave abuse of discretion

Whether
or
not
Socorros petition for
the issuance of letters
of administration may
be converted into an
action
for
judicial
partition.

Yes. This can be based

on Section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of
Court.
Where
the
more
expeditious
remedy of partition is
available to the heirs,
then the heirs or the
majority of them may
not be compelled to
submit
to
administration
proceedings. In
this
case, all the heirs,
with the exception of
Socorro, agreed to
judicial partition as
they see it to be the
more
convenient
method. There is no
merit
to
the
contention of Socorro
that a partition cannot
be had because the

Zaragoza v CA

amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court in
granting the other heirs
motion. The Court of
Appeals
found
no
reversible error. Socorro
elevated the petition to the
Supreme Court. She insists
that a partition cannot be
had because the extent of
the estate is not yet
determined
hence
an
administration proceeding
is still needed. She also
insists that the Rules of
Court does not provide for
a conversion of a petition
for administration to an
action for partition.

Flavio
Zaragoza
Cano
was
the
registered owner of
certain parcels of
land

He
had
four
children:
Gloria,
Zacariaz,
Florentino
and
Alberta,
all
surnamed
Zaragoza.

He died without a
will
and
was
survived by his
four children.

rivate respondent
Alberta ZaragozaMorgan
filed
a
complaint against
Spouses Florentino
and Erlinda, herein
petitioners,
for
delivery
of
her
inheritance share.
She further alleged
that her father, in
his
lifetime,
partitioned
the
aforecited
properties among
his
four
children. The

extent of the estate is

not yet determined.
The extent of the
estate can actually be
determined during the
partition proceedings.
Therefore, the trial
court made no error in
converting Socorros
petition to an action
for judicial partition.

(1)
whether
the
partition inter vivos by
Flavio Zaragoza Cano
of
his
properties,
which include Lots 871
and 943, is valid; and
(2)
whether
the
validity of the Deed of
Sale
and
consequently,
the
Transfer Certificate of
Title over Lot 943
registered in the name
of the petitioners, can
be a valid subject
matter of the entire
proceeding for the
delivery of inheritance
share.

1. YES.t is basic
in
the
law
of
succession
that
a
partition inter
vivos may be done for
as long as legitimes
are
not
prejudiced. Art. 1080
of the Civil Code is
clear on this.[13] The
legitime
of
compulsory heirs is
determined
after
collation, as provided
for in Article 1061:
Every
compulsory
heir, who succeeds
with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate
any property or right
which he may have
received
from
the
decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous
title in order that it
may be computed in
the determination of
the legitime of each

shares
of
her
brothers and sister
were given to them
in advance by way
of deed of sale, but
without
valid
consideration,
while her share,
which consists of
lots no. 871 and
943,
was
not
conveyed by way
of deed of sale
then.
She claims that
she is a natural
born Filipino citizen
and the youngest
child of the late
Flavio.
She averred that
because
of
her
marriage,
she
became
an
American
citizen
and was prohibited
to acquire lands in
the
Philippines
except
by
hereditary
succession.
For this reason, no
formal
deed
of
conveyance
was
executed in her
favor
covering
these lots during
her
father's
lifetime.
petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss,
on the ground that
the complaint did
not state a cause
of action and it
failed to implead
indispensable
parties.

heir,
and
in
account
of
partition.
2.

the
the

NO. The petition

is a collateral
attack. It is not
allowed by Sec.
48
of
the
Presidential
Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known
as the Property
Registration
Decree,
which
provides:

Sec.
48. Certificate
not
subject
to
collateral attack. - A
certificate of title shall
not be subject to
collateral
attack. It
can not be altered,
modified, or cancelled
except in a direct
proceeding
in
accordance with law.
We have reiterated
this rule in the case
of Halili vs. Court of
Industrial
Relations,
[14]
citing the earlier
cases of Constantino
vs. Espiritu[15] and Co
vs. Court of Appeals.
[16]
In Halili, we held
that a certificate of
title accumulates in
one
document
a
precise and correct
statement
of
the
exact status of the fee
held by its owner. The
certificate,
in
the
absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title
and shows exactly the
real interest of its
owner. The title once
registered, with very

few
exceptions,
should not thereafter
be impugned, altered,
changed,
modified,
enlarged
or
diminished, except in
some
direct
proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise, all
security in registered
titles
would
be
lost. In Constantino,
the Court decided that
the certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title
and shows exactly the
real interest of its
owner. The title once
registered, with very
few
exceptions,
should not thereafter
be impugned, altered,
changed,
modified,
enlarged
or
diminished, except in
some
direct
proceeding permitted
by law. Otherwise all
security in registered
titles
would
be
lost. And in Co, we
stated that a Torrens
title
cannot
be
collaterally
attacked. The issue on
the validity of title,
i.e., whether or not it
was
fraudulently
issued, can only be
raised in an action
expressly
instituted
for that purpose.

Reyes
Datu

Baretto-

Trusts and Succession

Ty v Ty

Alexander Ty, son of

Alejandro B. Ty and
Bella Torres, died of
cancer at the age of
34. He was survived
by his wife, Sylvia Ty,
and his only daughter,
Krizia Katrina Ty.
A few months after
his death, a petition
for the settlement of
his intestate estate
was filed by Sylvia Ty
in the RTC of Quezon
City.
Upon petition of Sylvia
Ty, as Administratrix,
for settlement and
distribution
of
the
intestate estate of
Alexander
in
the
County of Los Angeles,
the Superior Court of
California ordered the
distribution
of
the
Hollywood
condominium unit, the
Montebello lot, and
the 1986 Toyota pickup truck to Sylvia Ty
and Krizia Katrina Ty.
Thereafter, Sylvia Ty
submitted
to
the
intestate
Court
in
Quezon
City
an
inventory of the assets
of Alexanders estate,
consisting of shares of
stocks and a schedule
of
real
estate
properties,
which
included the following:
1. Edsa property
2. Meridien
Condominium
3. Wack-Wack
property
Sylvia Ty asked
intestate Court to
or
mortgage
properties
of
estate in order to

the
sell
the
the
pay

Whether an implied
trust under Art 1448
was constituted over
the
subject
properties.

Negative.
Petitioner contends that
the EDSA property, while
registered in the name of
his son Alexander Ty, is
covered by an implied
trust in his favor under
Article 1448 of the Civil
Code. This is because he
paid the price when the
property was purchased
and did so for the purpose
of having the beneficial
interest of the property.
Article 1448 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1448. There is an
implied
trust
when
property is sold, and the
legal estate is granted to
one party but the price is
paid by another for the
purpose of having the
beneficial interest of the
property. The former is the
trustee, while the latter is
the beneficiary. However,
if the person to whom the
title is conveyed is a child,
legitimate or illegitimate,
of one paying the price of
the sale, no trust is
implied by law, it being
disputably presumed that
there is a gift in favor of
the child.
The CA conceded that at
least part of the purchase
price of the EDSA property
came
from
petitioner.
However, it ruled out the
existence of an implied
trust because of the last
sentence of Article 1448: x
x x However, if the person
to whom the title is
conveyed
is
a
child,
legitimate or illegitimate,
of the one paying the
price of the sale, no trust
is implied by law, it being
disputably presumed that

the additional estate

tax of P4,714,560.02
assessed by the BIR.
Apparently, this action
did not sit well with
her father-in-law, the
plaintiff-appellee,
Alejandro Ty, father of
the
deceased
Alexander Ty, filed a
complaint for recovery
of
properties
with
prayer for preliminary
injunction
and/or
temporary restraining
order against Sylvia Ty
as defendant in her
capacity
as
[Administratrix] of the
Intestate Estate of
Alexander Ty.
the RTC granted the
application for a writ
of
preliminary
injunction.
Plaintiff added that
defendant acted in
bad faith in including
the subject properties
in the inventory of
Alexander Tys estate,
for she was well aware
that Alexander was
simply holding the
said properties in trust
for his siblings.
the RTC rendered its
decision in favor of
plaintiff.
CA
reversed
the
decision of the RTC

there is a gift in favor of

the child.
Petitioner now claims that
in so ruling, the CA
departed
from
jurisprudence in that such
was not the theory of the
parties.
Petitioner,
however,
forgets that it was he who
invoked Article 1448 of
the Civil Code to claim the
existence of an implied
trust. But Article 1448
itself, in providing for the
so-called purchase money
resulting
trust,
also
provides the parameters
of such trust and adds, in
the same breath, the
proviso: "However, if the
person to whom the title is
conveyed
is
a
child,
legitimate or illegitimate,
of the one paying the
price of the sale, NO
TRUST IS
IMPLIED BY LAW, it being
disputably presumed that
there is a gift in favor of
the
child."
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Stated
otherwise,
the
outcome is the necessary
consequence
of
petitioners theory and
argument
and
is
inextricably linked to it by
the law itself.
The CA, therefore, did not
err in simply applying the
law.
Article 1448 of the Civil
Code is clear. If the person
to whom the title is
conveyed is the child of
the one paying the price
of the sale, and in this
case this is undisputed,
NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY
LAW.
The
law,
instead,
disputably presumes a

donation in favor of the

child.
The net effect of all the
foregoing
is
that
respondent is obliged to
collate into the mass of
the estate of petitioner, in
the event of his death, the
EDSA property as an
advance of Alexanders
share in the estate of his
father, to the extent that
petitioner provided a part
of its purchase price.
The
Meridien
Condominium and the
Wack-Wack property.
Petitioner would have this
Court overturn the finding
of the CA that as regards
the
Meridien
Condominium
and
the
Wack-Wack
property,
petitioner failed to show
that the money used to
purchase the same came
from him.
Again, this is clearly a
factual
finding
and
petitioner has advanced
no convincing argument
for this Court to alter the
findings reached by the
CA.
Among the facts cited by
the CA are the sources of
income of Alexander Ty
who had been working for
nine
years
when
he
purchased
these
two
properties, who had a car
care business, and was
actively engaged in the
business
dealings
of
several
family
corporations, from which
he received emoluments
and other benefits.
The CA, therefore, ruled
that with respect to the

Meridien
Condominium
and
the
Wack-Wack
property, no implied trust
was
created
because
there was no showing that
part of the purchase price
was paid by petitioner
and, on the contrary, the
evidence
showed
that
Alexander Ty had the
means to pay for the
same.
Petition
is
PARTLY
GRANTED, the Decision
of the CA is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION
that
respondent
is
obliged to collate into
the mass of the estate
of petitioner, in the
event of his death, the
EDSA property as an
advance of Alexander
Tys share in the estate
of his father, to the
extent that petitioner
provided a part of its
purchase price.
Nazareno v CA

Maximino
Sr.
and
Aurea Poblete were
husband and wife. In
order to avoid paying
inheritance tax, they
executed
several
Deeds of Sale in favor
of their children. The
sale was proven to be
without consideration.

1.Whether
or
not
there is an implied
trust
2. Whether or not the
subject properties are
subject to collation

1.

Yes. It cannot be
denied
that
Maximino,
Sr.
intended to give
the six Quezon
City
lots
to
Natividad(daughte
r). As Romeo(son)
testified,
their
parents executed
the Deed of Sale
in
favor
of
Natividad because
the latter was the
only female and
the
only
unmarried
member of the
family.[34] She was
thus
entrusted
with
the
real
properties
in
behalf
of
her
siblings. As she

herself admitted,
she intended to
convey Lots 10
and 11 to Jose in
the
event
the
latter
returned
from
abroad. There was
thus an implied
trust constituted
in her favor. Art.
1449 of the Civil
Code states:
There is also an implied
trust when a donation is
made to a person but it
appears that although the
legal estate is transmitted
to
the
donee,
he
nevertheless is either to
have no beneficial interest
or only a part thereof.
2.

There being an
implied trust, the
lots in question
are
therefore
subject
to
collation
in
accordance
with
Art. 1061 which
states:

Every compulsory heir,

who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the
estate any property or
right which he may have
received
from
the
decedent,
during
the
lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be
computed
in
the
determination
of
the
legitime of each heir, and
in the account of the
partition.

As held by the trial

court, the sale of Lots 13
and
14
to
Ros-Alva
Marketing, Corp. on April
20, 1979[35] will have to be
upheld
for
Ros-Alva
Marketing is an innocent
purchaser for value which
relied on the title of
Natividad. The
rule
is
settled that every person
dealing with registered
land may safely rely on
the correctness of the
certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in
no way oblige him to go
behind the certificate to
determine the condition of
the property