Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Pending the decision of the LA, Margarito died. His cause of death was "CVA" or Cardiovascular
Accident.
LA found no merit in the respondents complaint for the reason that Margaritos illness is not
work-related,
The NLRC affirmed the LAs ruling.
On appeal, CA reversed the findings of the labor tribunals. CA held that Margarito was exempt
from complying with the 3-day mandatory reporting requirement because when he arrived in the
Philippines, his physical condition was already deteriorating and was in need of urgent medical
attention. Thus, it could not be expected of him to prioritize the reporting requirement before
attending to his medical needs.
The CA further ruled that Margaritos cause of death is actually listed as an occupational
disease under the POEA-SEC. His employment contributed to the development and
exacerbation of his illness considering that he was on board the vessel for 14months during
which he was exposed to stress, different climates and erratic time zones.
Issue:
Whether or not the 3-day mandatory reporting requirement can be dispensed with.
Ruling:
Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that at the core of the foregoing arguments are factual
questions which, generally, are outside the Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction under
Rule 45.
The Court is not a Trier of facts hence, only questions of law, may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. It is not the Courts function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again in
view of the corollary legal precept that findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
this Court. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to probe and resolve factual issues when any of
these exceptional circumstances are present, viz: when there is insufficient or insubstantial
evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is
concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties
or, where the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the LA and the NLRC. Observably,
the third exception is attendant in the present case hence, it is imperative to review the records
to determine which finding is more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
As a general rule, a medically repatriated seafarer is required to submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by the companys designated physicians within 3 working
days upon his return. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the benefits.
A single instance which exempts a medically repatriated seafarer from complying with the 3-day
mandatory reporting rule is when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a
written notice of such fact to the employer within the same period shall be deemed as sufficient
compliance.
In this case, Margarito is disqualified from receiving compensation benefits for knowingly
concealing his pre-existing illness of diabetes. Notwithstanding that his failure to report within 3days is excusable, Margarito is still disqualified from receiving any compensation or benefits for
his illness because he did not disclose during his PEME that he was suffering from diabetes.
It is evident from the foregoing medical reports Vicaldo that when Margarito applied and was
given employment by the petitioners, he was already afflicted with diabetes. This means that he
did not acquire his illness while working in the petitioners vessel and thus his diabetes is not
work-related.
It is incumbent upon him to prove, by substantial evidence, as to how and why the nature of his
work and working conditions contributed to and/or aggravated his illness. The respondents
failed to discharge this burden of proof. The respondents failed to particularly describe his
working conditions while on sea duty. Also, no expert medical opinion was presented regarding
the causes of his diabetes.
In sum, the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the
latter affirmed the LA's dismissal of Margarito's complaint for permanent disability benefits and
sickness allowance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Case No 46
G.R. No. 180892
April 7, 2009
USTFU complained of as ULP were the following: (1) allegedly calling for convocation of faculty
members which turned out to be an election of officers for the faculty union; (2) subsequently
dealing with the Gamilla Group in establishing a new CBA; and (3) the assistance to the Gamilla
Group in padlocking the USTFU office.
As to the CBA, the labor arbiter ruled that when the new CBA was entered into, (1) the Gamilla
Group presented more than sufficient evidence to establish that they had been duly elected as
officers of the USTFU; and (2) the ruling of the med-arbiter that the election of the Gamilla
Group was null and void was not yet final and executory. Thus, UST was justified in dealing with
and entering into a CBA with the Gamilla Group, including helping the Gamilla Group in securing
the USTFU office.
The USTFU appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC which rendered a Resolution
which affirmed the Decision of the labor arbiter. USTFUs Motion for Recon of the NLRCs
Resolution was denied.
The case was then elevated to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA also denied the Motion for Reconsideration of USTFU in the
assailed resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari and sustained the NLRCs ruling that the herein respondents are not guilty of ULP.
Ruling:
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence
is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\
In other words, whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it
is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such
principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal
sanctions.
The three tribunals correctly ruled that there was no evidence to support such allegation.
In the instant case, there was no reason to believe that the members of the Gamilla Group were
not the validly elected officers and directors of USTFU. More important is the fact that the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that the Mario Group informed the UST of their
objections to the election of the Gamilla Group. In fact, there is even no evidence to show that
the scheduled elections that was supposed to be presided over by the Mario Group ever
pushed through. Instead, petitioner filed a complaint with the med-arbiter praying for the
nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group.
It is not the duty or obligation of respondents to inquire into the validity of the election of the
Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of
the med-arbiter of the DOLE. Respondents could not have been expected to stop dealing with
the Gamilla Group on the mere accusation of the Mario Group that the former was not validly
elected into office.
Petitioner failed to present evidence to support its contention that UST committed acts
amounting to ULP.
In any event, it bears stressing that at the time of these events, the legitimacy of the Gamilla
Group as the valid officers and directors of the USTFU was already submitted to the med-arbiter
and no decision had yet been reached on the matter. Having been shown evidence to support
the legitimacy of the Gamilla Group with no counter-evidence from the Mario Group, UST had
to recognize the Gamilla Group and negotiate with it. Thus, the acts of UST in support of the
USTFU as the legitimate representative of the bargaining unit, albeit through the Gamilla Group,
cannot be considered as ULP.
In sum, petitioner makes several allegations that UST committed ULP. The onus probandi falls
on the shoulders of petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the requisite quantum
of evidence. In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is
required. In the petition at bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence as
basis for the grant of relief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.