Sapugay vs.

Court of Appeals (183 SCRA 464)

SPOUSES MARINO AND LINA JOEL SAPUGAY, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MOBIL PHILIPPINES,
INC. AND RICARDO CARDENAS, respondents.

Voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court

Facts: On September 27, 1982, plaintiff Mobil Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint for replevin with damages
against defendant Lina Joel Sapugay before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The complaint, which was duly amended on October 11, 1982 alleges the following: that upon the termination of
the Dealership Agreement between Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. and Nemar Marketing Corporation, defendant
applied to the plaintiff to become a dealer of the latter's products; that pending consideration of the dealership
application, plaintiff loaned to the defendant the properties installed in the premises of Nemar at Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, valued at P1,500,000.00; that for a period of three (3) months from the date of application, defendant
failed to secure and file the required surety bond, compelling plaintiff to reject defendant's application and the
return and redelivery of the aforementioned properties; that defendant refused to return said equipment, and
demanded instead that defendant be paid first the sum of P15,000.00 daily as rental and guard's fees from June
8, 1982 up to the day of actual pull-out. Thus, plaintiff prays for the return of said properties or its value including
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas
Held: Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cardenas.
It has been held that a counterclaim stands on the same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules as if it
were, an independent action. Hence, the same rules on jurisdiction in an independent action ordinarily apply
equally to a counterclaim.
It is noteworthy that Cardenas did not file a motion to dismiss the counterclaim against him on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. While it is a settled rule that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised even for the first time on
appeal, this does not obtain in the instant case. Although it was only Mobil which filed an opposition to the
motion to declare in default, the fact that the trial court denied said motion, both as to Mobil and Cardenas on the
ground that Mobil's complaint should be considered as the answer to petitioners' compulsory counterclaim, leads
us to the inescapable conclusion that the trial court treated the opposition as having been filed in behalf of both
Mobil and Cardenas and that the latter had adopted as his answer the allegations raised in the complaint of Mobil.
Obviously, it was this ratiocination which led the trial court to deny the motion to declare Mobil and Cardenas in
default. Furthermore, Cardenas was not unaware of said incidents and the proceedings therein as he testified and
was present during the trial, not to speak of the fact that as manager of Mobil he would necessarily be interested
in the case and could readily have access to the records and pleadings filed therein.
By adopting as his answer the allegations in the complaint which seeks affirmative relief, Cardenas is deemed to
have recognized the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person and submitted thereto. He may not now be
heard to repudiate or question that jurisdiction.
Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that respondents
Mobil Philippines, Inc. and Ricardo P. Cardenas are held jointly and severally liable to herein petitioners Marino
and Lina Joel Sapugay.

People vs. Sergio Lagarde (G.R. No. 182549, January 20, 2009)
Facts:
1) Accused-appellant was charged with rape in an information dated March 1, 2002 which reads: That on or
about the 27th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of San Miguel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent with lewd
designs and by use of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [AAA], 11 years old, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
2) For the defense, Lolita testified that on December 27, 2001, during the celebration of her mothers death
anniversary, accused-appellant was drinking tuba with other visitors on the ground floor of her house. On
cross-examination, Lolita stated that prior to the incident, there was no altercation between AAAs mother and
accused-appellant, and she did not know why they would file a case against her nephew.
3) Accused-appellant denied raping AAA. He testified that on the day the alleged offense occurred, he never left
the house of Lolita from the time he arrived at 12 noon until he went home at about 9:00 p.m. He admitted
having a drinking spree with other visitors, but disclaimed never talking to AAA who left with her mother at
4:30 p.m. He stated that there was no loonan or copra/kiln dryer near the house of Lolita.
Issue: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in imposing upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
Held: The Court agrees with the appellate court that the death penalty is not warranted by the alleged
aggravating circumstances, i.e., victims minority, use of bladed weapon, and uninhabited place. First, the death
penalty was abolished under Republic Act No. (RA) 9346. Second, the use of a bladed weapon and uninhibited
place cannot be appreciated here because these were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellants basic right to due process if he is charged with simple
rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances which were not alleged in the information.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the CAs March 7, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00069 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WARLITO TOLENTINO (G.R. No. 139351, February 23, 2004)

No right to counsel for police line up

Facts:
1) The accused WARLITO TOLENTINO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE with the use of
deadly weapon punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, the Court sentences him [to suffer] the penalty of DEATH and ordering [sic] him to pay the victim the
amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2) That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of February 06, 1996, at Barangay Namnama, Batal, City of
Santiago, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant MYLENE R. MENDOZA, a 7 year old girl against her will.
3) On February 7, 1996, Brgy. Capt. Joseph Colbongan, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that
his chief tanod reported that an unconscious child was found near the residence of the appellant. Colbongan
declared that when he heard the report, he then gave instructions to the barangay officials to bring the victim
to the hospital.
a. After the victim regained consciousness, she informed him that she could not name her assailant
because she did not know his name, but she stated that she could recall the face and appearance of
her assailant as well as the house where she was brought to.
b. The barangay officers then brought Mylene to Sitio Namnama, Batal, where the incident allegedly
happened. Upon reaching the vicinity of the Day Care Center in Namnama, and at a distance of 50
meters, Mylene pointed to appellants house.
c. Mylene was then brought to another place in Namnama, some 20 meters away from the appellants
residence, and again asked to point to the house where the incident took place. Again, Mylene
pointed to appellants house.
d. Colbongan then requested for police assistance. Colbongan likewise declared that after Tolentino was
taken into custody by the police and made to take part in a police line-up, Mylene unerringly pointed
to him as her molester.
Issue: Whether the appellants rights under Article III, Section 12 was violated when he was made to join the
police line-up
Held: In Gamboa v. Cruz, we held that a police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, inasmuch as the
accused therein was not yet being investigated and hence, the right to counsel had not yet attached. This ruling
was affirmed in People v. Loveria, and People v. De Guzman. Both held that where the accused was not being
investigated by the police, when the witness was in the process of identifying him, his right to counsel was not
violated. The reason is that at this stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked. Under the
circumstances of this case, we see no reason to depart from these cited precedents.
Appellant attaches great emphasis on his identification at the police line-up. Yet, there is no law requiring a police
line-up as essential to a proper identification. In this case, any doubt as to his identification at the police line-up
was dispelled by Mylene who identified in open court the appellant as the malefactor.
Ruling: The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, dated June 3, 1999, in
Criminal Case No. 35-2076, finding appellant WARLITO TOLENTINO guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua.

Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Ong (A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011 citing State Prosecutors vs. Muro, 251 SCRA
111)
Facts: The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an
affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the
Members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body
during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing
cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having
unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public documents
(grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it
appear as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they
were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave
misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandezs making the following intemperate and discriminatory
utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006).
Issue: Whether the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of
PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Held: The Court finds that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant
disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even
worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of
the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their
proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
It remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law
and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is
not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the
procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the
expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity.
They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial
trials. As the Court have reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that
speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more
important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before
ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a
good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
Ruling: The Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated September 15,
2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R.
Hernandez are denied for lack of merit.
(Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010, albeit on different grounds.
Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for simple misconduct, and disposed
against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of 15,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure
to be taken in proceedings before his court.)

People vs. Besonia (422 SCRA 210)

Besonia was charged with murder in two separate informations, Besonia entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
Pre-trial was then held, where the following facts were admitted by both the prosecution and the defense:
1. The identities of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano as well as that of the accused
Jonathan Besonia;
2. The date and time of the incident, which is June 27, 2000 at 3:30 oclock in the afternoon;
3. The place of the incident which is at Guzman Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City;
4. That the weapon used during the incident which resulted to the killing of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es
and Jerry Sampiano was an unlicensed firearm; and
5. That Jerry Sampiano was a construction worker of the aunt of the accused at the time of the incident. [
Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide after a medical operation on his gall bladder.
Besonia claims that his re-arraignment was notoriously flawed in that despite his endeavor to plead guilty to the
lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid no attention to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to make
such plea. Moreover, there is no basis for the recommendation of the OSG to hold Besonia guilty of the lesser
crime of homicide because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. The only support for such recommendation is the testimony of Besonia himself, which was obtained in
gross violation of his right not to be compelled to testify against himself. He then prays that the judgment in
these cases be set aside and that the cases be remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further
proceedings.
Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his confession, which is
inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
We cannot subscribe to Besonias claim that his confession and admissions during the searching inquiry were
elicited in violation of his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. The right against selfincrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect
testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his
own protection
It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of
culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accuseds guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be
conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered
Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonias plea of guilty and his admissions made
during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had
there been no plea of guilt on the part of Besonia. Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is
necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be accepted as being the
standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life. It has been held that where the plea
of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecutions case, the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals (24 SCRA 663, 1968)

Distinction of privilege claimed by accused and a witness

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together with
accessories). Information was filed against the accused together with other accused that they conspired, with
intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused
plead not guilty. During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness.
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary
witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the judge ruled
in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to warrant
writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to
remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in
his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot
stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege,
we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the
trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment
of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose
liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another
constitutional right, in this wise:

A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to
complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to
obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake.
If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder
may obtain release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule
102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.