SC judgment details 18th, 21st amendments

Text of detailed SC judgment on 18th, 21st amendments
INTHESUPREMECOURTOFPAKISTAN
(Original/AppellateJurisdiction)
PRESENT:
MR.JUSTICENASIRULMULK,CJ
MR.JUSTICEJAWWADS.KHAWAJA
MR.JUSTICEANWARZAHEERJAMALI
MR.JUSTICEMIANSAQIBNISAR
MR.JUSTICEASIFSAEEDKHANKHOSA
MR.JUSTICESARMADJALALOSMANY
MR.JUSTICEAMIRHANIMUSLIM
MR.JUSTICEEJAZAFZALKHAN
MR.JUSTICEIJAZAHMEDCHAUDHRY
MR.JUSTICEGULZARAHMED
MR.JUSTICESH.AZMATSAEED
MR.JUSTICEIQBALHAMEEDURRAHMAN
MR.JUSTICEMUSHIRALAM
MR.JUSTICEDOSTMUHAMMADKHAN
MR.JUSTICEUMARATABANDIAL
MR.JUSTICEQAZIFAEZISA
MR.JUSTICEMAQBOOLBAQAR
CONSTITUTIONPETITIONNOS.12,13,18,2022,31,3536,39,40,4244OF2010
(PetitionsUnderArticle184(3)OfTheConstitutionOfIslamicRepublicOfPakistan1973)
AND
C.M.A.NO.1859OF2010INCONSTITUTIONPETITIONNO.40OF2010
(ApplicationForImpleadmentAsParty)
AND
CIVILPETITIONNO.1901OF2010
(OnappealfromthejudgementofthePeshawarHighCourt,Peshawar,dated16.6.2010passedinW.P.
No.1581of2010)
AND
H.R.C.NO.22753KOF2010
(PetitionUnderArticle184(3)OfTheConstitutionOfIslamicRepublicOfPakistan1973)
AND
CONSTITUTIONPETITIONNOS.99&100OF2014
AND
CONSTITUTIONPETITIONNOS.2,4TO13,2324OF2015
DistrictBarAssociation,Rawalpindi(inConst.P.12/10)
WatanPartythr.itsChairmanZafarUllahKhan(inConst.P.13/10)
LahoreHighCourtBarAssociation(inConst.P.18/10)
PakistanLawyersForumthroughits
PresidentMr.A.K.Dogar(inConst.P.20/10)
SardarKhanNiazi(inConst.P.21/10)
ShahidOrakzai(inConst.P.22/10)
AlJehadTrustthroughHabibulWahabulKhairi(inConst.P.31/10)
DistrictBarAssociation,Sangarhthrough
itsPresidentAnwarMehmoodNizamani(inConst.P.35/10)
DistrictBarAssociation,Gujrat(inConst.P.36/10)
ArshadMehmoodBagoetc(inConst.P.39/10)
Dr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,(inConst.P.40/10)
&
(inCMA1859/10)
ShamshadAhmadMangat(inConst.P.42/10)
JuliusSalak(inConst.P.43/10)
ConcernedCitizensofPakistanthroughits
PresidentHamidZamanandothers(inConst.P.44/10)
ShahidOrakzai(inCP.1901/10)
Petitioners
ApplicationbyBabaSardarHaiderZaman(HRC22753K
/10)Applicants
WatanPartythroughitsPresident(inConst.P.99/14)
AltafShakoor(inConst.P.100/14)
LahoreHighCourtBarAssociation,Lahore
throughitsSecretary(inConst.P.2/15)
MoulviIqbalHaider(inConst.P.4/15)
PakistanJusticePartythroughitsChairman(inConst.P.5/15)
CommunistPartythroughitsChairman(inConst.P.6/15)
TaufiqAsif,ASC(inConst.P.7/15)
SohailHameed,Advocate(inConst.P.8/15)
PakistanBarCouncilthroughitsViceChairman(inConst.P.9/15)
SupremeCourtBarAssociation
throughitsSecretary(inConst.P.10/15)
LahoreBarAssociation,throughitsSecretary(inConst.P.11/15)
SindhHighCourtBarAssociation,
KarachithroughitsSecretary(inConst.P.12/15)
AllamaZuhairAbbasAbidi(inConst.P.13/15)
PeshawarHighCourtBarAssociation,Peshawar
throughitsPresident(inConst.P.23/15)
Sh.AhsanudDin,ASC(inConst.P.24/15)
Petitioners
VERSUS
FederationofPakistanandothers(inallcases)

Respondents
ForthePetitioners:
Mr.MuhammadIkramCh,Sr.ASC(inConst.P.12/10)
Mr.ArshadAliCh,AOR
Mr.ZafarUllahKhan,ASC.(inConst.Ps.13/10)
Mr.HamidKhan,Sr.ASC(inConst.Ps.18,35,
Mr.Rashid,A.Rizvi,Sr.ASC36,39&44/10)
Assistedby
Mr.AjmalGhaffarToor,Advocate
Mr.A.K.Dogar,Sr.ASC(inConst.P.20/10)
Mr.SardarKhanNiazi,(Petitionerinperson)(inConst.P.21/10)
Mr.ShahidOrakzai,(Petitionerinperson)(inConst.P.22/10
&CP1901/10)
Mr.HabibulWahabul,Khairi,(inConst.P.31/10)
(Petitionerinperson)
Dr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,Sr.ASC(inConst.P.40/10)
MiangulHassanAurangzeb,ASC
Mr.M.S.Khattak,AOR
Mr.HashmatAliHabib,ASC(inConst.P.42/10)
Mr.M.S.Khattak,AOR.
Mr.ZulfiqarAhmedBhutta,ASC(inConst.P.43/10)
QariAbdulRasheed,ASC(inHRC.22753K/10)
Mr.ZafarUllahKhan,ASC(inConst.P.99/14)
RasheedA.Rizvi,Sr.ASC(inConst.P.100/14)
SyedRifaqatHussianShah,AOR
Mr.HamidKhan,Sr.ASC.(inConst.P.2/15)
Mr.ShafqatMehmoodChohan,ASC
Assistedby
MoulviIqbalHaider,PetitionerinPerson(inConst.P.4/15)
Mr.MuhammadIkramCh,Sr.ASC(inConst.P.5/15)
Nemo(inConst.P.6/15)
Mr.TaufiqAsif,ASC(inConst.P.7/15)
Mr.ArshadZamanKiyani,ASC(inConst.P.8/15)
ChaudhryAkhtarAliAOR

Mr.AbrarHasan,ASC(inConst.P.9/15)
Mr.AbdulLatifAfridiASC
Ms.AsmaJahangir,ASC(inConst.P.10/15)
Mr.KamranMurtazaASC
Mr.FazaliHaqAbbasi,ASCPresident(SCBA)
Ch.MuhammadMaqsoodAhmed,ASCSecretary(SCBA)
ChaudhryAkhtarAliAOR
Assistedby
Br.MansoorUsmanAwanAdvocate
Mr.HamidKhan,Sr.ASC.(inConst.P.11/15)
Mr.AhmedAwaisASC
Assistedby
Mr.AbidSZuberi,ASC
(inConst.P.12/15)
Mr.M.S.Khattak,AOR
Assistedby
HaseebJamaliAdvocateand
ShoaibElahiAdvocate
Nemo(inConst.P.13/15)
Mr.FidaGul,ASC(inConst.P.23/15)
Sh.AhsanudDinASCasPetitionerinPerson(inConst.P.24/15)
SalmanAkramRaja,ASC(inCMANo.1859/2010inConst.P.40/2010)
OnCourtsNotice:
Mr.SalmanAslamButt,AttorneyGeneral
Mr.M.WaqarRana,Addl.AttorneyGeneral
AssistedbyMr.DilnawazAhmedCheemaConsultanttoAGP.
MianAbdulRauf,A.G.,Islamabad
Mr.RazzaqA.Mirza,Addl.A.G.,Punjab
AbdulLatifYousafzaiA.G.,KPK
Mr.AyazSwati,Addl.A.G.,Balochistan
Mr.AdnanKarim,Addl.A.G.,Sindh
FortheFederation:
Mr.KhalidAnwarSr.ASC
Mr.MehmoodA.Sheikh,AOR
Assistedby
MuhammadAnasMakhdoomAdvocate(inConst.P.12,13,
18,20,21,22,31,35,
36,39,40,42&43/10)
Mr.KhalidAnwarSr.ASC
QariAbdulRasheed,AOR
Assistedby
MuhammadAnasMakhdoomAdvocate(inConst.P.2of2015)
ForGovernmentofKPK:
SyedIftikharHussainGillaniSr.ASC(inConst.P.13,20&21
AssistedbyMr.SaadButter,Adv.of2010:
ForGovernmentofSindh:
Mr.AdnanKarim,
Addl.AdvocateGeneral,Sindh.
RajaAbdulGhafoor,AOR(inConst.P.12,13,18,20,21,
22&40of2010:
DatesofHearing:16,22,27to29thApril,
04to07,12,13,18to21,25,26,28thofMay,01to04,16to18,22to26June2015
JUDGMENT
NASIRULMULK,C.J.BytheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act(ActXof
2010)theParliamentbroughtaboutextensiveamendmentsintheConstitution.Anumberofpetitions
underArticle184(3)oftheConstitutionwerefiledinthisCourtchallengingsomeoftheamendments,
mainly,Articles1(2)(a),17(4),51(6)(e),63A,226,267Aand175A.Argumentswereaddressedinallthese
mattersbeforetheFullCourtinthemonthsofJune,July,AugustandSeptember,2010.Theprimary
focusofthearguments,particularlyinthepetitionsfiledonbehalfofvariousBarAssociationswason
thechangeintroducedthroughArticle175Awherebyanentirelynewprocedurefortheappointmentof
JudgesoftheSupremeCourt,HighCourtsandFederalShariatCourtthroughJudicialCommissionwas
introduced.ThenamesforappointmentofJudgesandChiefJusticesoftheSupremeCourtofPakistan
weretobefirstconsideredbytheJudicialCommissioncomprisingoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan,two
seniormostjudgesoftheSupremeCourt,aretiredJudgeoftheSupremeCourt,FederalMinisterfor
LawandJustice,AttorneyGeneralforPakistanalongwithaseniorAdvocateoftheSupremeCourttobe
nominatedbythePakistanBarCouncilincaseofappointmenttotheSupremeCourt.Incaseof
appointmentofajudgeofFederalShariatCourt,theChiefJusticealongwithajudgeofthesaidcourt,in
theaforementionedcompositionoftheCommissionwastobeadded.ForappointmenttotheHigh
CourtthecompositionwouldincludetheChiefJusticealongwithaseniormostjudgeoftheconcerned
HighCourt,ProvincialLawministerandasenioradvocatenominatedbytheProvincialBarCouncil.
SimilarprocedurewasalsoprovidedfortheappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofandthejudgesof
IslamabadHighCourtandChiefJusticeofFederalShariatCourt.ThenominationbytheJudicial
CommissionwastobeplacedbeforeaParliamentaryCommitteecomprisingoffourmemberseachfrom
thetwohousesoftheParliament,withequalrepresentationfromtheTreasuryandOppositionBenches.
UponapprovaloftheParliamentaryCommitteethematterwastobeplacedbeforethePresidentof
Pakistanforappointment.
2.Aftertheconclusionofargumentsaddressedatthebaraninterimorderwaspassed,
nowreportedasNadeemAhmed,AdvocatevFederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC1165)wherebythe
matterofappointmentofjudgeswasreferredtotheParliamentforreexaminationwithproposals
statedinParagraph10readwithParagraph13oftheOrderwhichread:
10.MostofthepetitionerswhohadchallengedArticle175AoftheConstitutionraisedseriousissues
regardingthecompositionoftheJudicialCommissionandParliamentaryCommitteeandvetopower
giventothelatter.Itwascontendedthattherewasawellknownpractice,whentheunamended
provisionwasinvoguethatChiefJusticewouldconsultmostseniorJudgesoftheSupremeCourtbefore
finalizingtherecommendations.Insteadofbringinganydrasticchange,thesaidpracticeshouldhave
beenformalized.Itwas,therefore,suggestedduringargumentsthattoensurethattheappointment
processisinconsonancewiththeconceptofindependenceofjudiciary,separationofpowersandto
makeitworkable,Article175Amaybeamendedinfollowingterms:
(i)ThatinsteadoftwomostseniorJudgesoftheSupremeCourtbeingpartoftheJudicial
Commission,thenumbershouldbeincreasedtofourmostseniorJudges.
(ii)ThatwhenarecommendationhasbeenmadebytheJudicialCommissionfortheappointment
ofacandidateasaJudge,andsuchrecommendationisnotagreed/agreeablebytheCommitteeofthe
Parliamentariansasperthemajorityof3/4th,theCommitteeshallgiveverysoundreasonsandshall
referthematterbacktotheJudicialCommissionuponconsideringthereasonsifagainreiteratesthe
recommendation,itshallbefinalandthePresidentshallmaketheappointmentaccordingly.
(iii)ThattheproceedingsoftheParliamentaryCommitteeshallbeheldincamerabutadetailed
recordofitsproceedingsanddeliberationsshallbemaintained.
13.Inviewoftheargumentsaddressedbythelearnedcounsel,thecriticismmadewithregardtothe
effectofArticle175Aontheindependenceofjudiciaryandtheobservationsmadeinparagraphs8,9&
10asalsodeferringtotheparliamentarymandate,wewouldliketorefertotheParliamentforre
consideration,theissueofappointmentprocessofJudgestothesuperiorcourtsintroducedbyArticle
175AoftheConstitution,interalia,inthelightoftheconcerns/reservationsexpressedand
observations/suggestionsmadehereinabove.MakingreferencetotheParliamentforreconsiderationis
inaccordwiththelawandpracticeofthisCourtasheldinHakimKhanv.GovernmentofPakistan(PLD
1992SC595at621).
AfterreferringthemattertotheParliamentandtoenableittoreexamineitintermsoftheabove
observations,thepetitionswereadjourned.Article175AwasreconsideredbytheParliamentinthe
lightofthesaidinterimorderandchangesweremadethereinthroughConstitution(Nineteenth
Amendment)Act,2010.
3.ThroughthesaidConstitutionalAmendmentunderArticle175Ainsteadoftwosenior
mostjudgesoftheSupremeCourtfourweremadepartoftheJudicialCommission.TheParliamentary
Committeeisnowrequiredtorecorditsreasonsincaseofnotconfirmingthenominationbythree
fourthmajorityandthatthenonconfirmationdecisionwouldbeforwardedwithreasonssorecordedto
theCommissionthroughthePrimeMinister.Insucheventuality,theCommissionshallsendanother
nomination.
4.Theabovecasesofthe18thAmendmentwerestillpendingwhentwoother
amendmentsweremadeon7.01.2015,empoweringmilitarycourtstotryacertainclassofcivilians,by
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015(ActIIof2015)andtheConstitution(TwentyFirst)
AmendmentAct,2015(Act1of2015)addedthefollowingprovisotoArticle175oftheConstitution:
ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisArticleshallhavenoapplicationtothetrialofthepersonsunder
anyoftheActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofsubpartIIIorPartIoftheFirstSchedule,who
claims,orisknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligionorasect.
Explanation:Inthisproviso,theexpressionsectmeansasectofreligionanddoesnotincludeany
religiousorpoliticalpartyregulatedunderthePoliticalPartiesorder,2002.
BythesameActFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionwasamendedtoincludeinsubpartIIIofPartIafter
entrynumber5,thefollowingnewentriesnamely:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct(XXXXIXof1952)
7.ThePakistanAirForceAct,1953(VIof1953)
8.ThePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961(XXXVof1961)
9.TheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014).
5.Thesaidamendmentshavealsocomeunderchallengeinanumberofpetitions,mostly
filedbyBarAssociations.Thepetitionschallengingthe18thand21stAmendmentstotheConstitution
wereclubbedandheardtogetherasthetwosetsofcasesinvolvedacommonconstitutionalquestionas
towhetherthereareanylimitationsonthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionand
whethertheCourtspossessjurisdictiontostrikedownaconstitutionalamendment.
6.AsregardsArticle175A,notwithstandingtheamendmentmadethroughthe19th
Amendment,certainreservationswereexpressedonaccountofretentionofthesupervisoryrole
assignedtotheParliamentaryCommitteeovernominationsmadebytheJudicialCommission.The
argumentswerealsoaddressedonotherconstitutionalamendmentsmadeinArticle1(2)(a),changing
thenameofNWFPtoKhyberPakhtunkhwa;Article51(6)(e),introducingelectionsfornonMuslims
throughproportionalrepresentationsystem;Article63A,empoweringapartyheadtotakeaction
againstitsmembersfordefection;Article226,providingforelectionsofthePrimeMinisterandthe
ChiefMinisternotthroughsecretballot;Article267A,empoweringtheParliamenttoremovedifficulties
arisingoutof18thAmendmentbysimplemajorityinajointsession;thechangesmadeinArticle63(1)
(g)(h),reducingthelifetimebantofiveyearsandtheomissionofArticle17(4)whichhadmadeintra
partypollsforeverypoliticalpartymandatory.
7.Apartfromsubmissionsmadeoneachoftheaforesaidamendmentsandthechanges
broughtaboutbytheAct1andActIIof2015extendingthejurisdictionoftheMilitaryCourtstotry
certainclassofcivilians,thebasicquestionaddressedbythelearnedcounselappearinginbothsetof
caseswasthelimitation,ifany,onthepoweroftheparliamenttoamendtheConstitution.
8.Mr.HamidKhan,leadingtheargumentsonbehalfofthepetitionersinbothsetof
casesarguedthattherearecertainbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionwhichareunamendableandthat
notwithstandingostensibleconfermentofunlimitedpowerontheParliamentbyclause(6)ofArticle
239andousterofjurisdictionoftheCourtsbyclause(5)thereof,theParliamentisnotempoweredto
bringaboutchangesinthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Thesaidprovisionsarereproducedbelow
foreaseofreference:
(5)NoamendmentoftheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonanyground
whatsoever.
(6)Fortheremovalofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthepowerof
theMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.
9.Mr.HamidKhanSr.ASCsubmittedthatpursuanttotheorderofthisCourtdated
21.10.2010,JudicialCommissionhadbeenreconstitutedandanumberofchangeshadbeenmadein
Article175Athroughthe19thAmendmenttotheConstitution.Thatnotwithstandingtheamendments
madethroughthe19thAmendmenttheretentionofParliamentaryCommitteeasoversightoverthe
recommendationsoftheJudicialCommissionviolatedIndependenceoftheJudiciaryasitwasagainst
thedoctrineofseparationofpowersandthus,againstthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Similarly,
inthecontextofthe21stAmendmenthearguedthatthesaidamendmenthadsubvertedtheschemeof
theConstitutionbyviolatingthedoctrineoftheseparationofpowers,excludingdueprocessandall
normsoffairtrial.
10.InsupportofhisargumentconcerningbasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,he
contendedthattherewasnoabsolutepowergrantedtotheParliamenttoamendorchangebasic
featuresoftheoriginalConstitution.Thatclauses(5)(concerningnonjusticiabilityofanyamendment
madetotheConstitution)andclause(6)(providingfornolimitationsuponthepoweroftheParliament
toamendtheConstitution)ofArticle239werebroughtaboutbyamilitarydictatorthroughP.O.No.20
of1985,whichwaslateraffirmedbytheParliamentthroughtheConstitution(EighthAmendment)Act,
1985.HemadeacomparisonofthesaidAmendmentinArticle239withtheamendmentsmadethrough
the42ndAmendmentinArticle368oftheIndianConstitutionandcontendedthatthepurposeofthe
amendmentwasthesamei.e.tooustthepowersoftheSupremeCourttocallintoquestionany
amendmentsmadeintheConstitution;thatthesaid42ndAmendmentoftheConstitutionofIndiawas
introducedtonullifytheeffectsofannulmentofconstitutionalamendmentsonthegroundofthem
beingviolativeofthebasicstructureinthecasesofKesavanandaBharativ.StateofKerala(AIR1973
SC1641)andIndiraNehruGandhiv.ShriRajNarain(AIR1975SC2299).HereferredtotheReportbythe
ParliamentaryCommitteeonConstitutionalReform,particularlyparagraphs1to3,tocontendthateven
theParliamentaryCommitteewhichdraftedthe18thAmendmentrecognizedthatthereareBasic
FeaturesoftheConstitution.Itwasfurthercontendedthatinparagraphnumber3ofthesameReport
notedwithregardtothe8thAmendment,introducingArticle239oftheConstitutionthat:
Thenondemocraticregimesthattookpowersoughttocentralizeallauthorityandintroducevarious
provisionwhichalteredthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionfromaparliamentaryformtoaquasi
PresidentialformofGovernmentthroughthe8thand17thConstitutionalAmendments
RelyinguponthesaidReporthearguedthatIndependenceoftheJudiciaryasabasicfeatureofthe
ConstitutionofPakistanwasprovidedintheObjectivesResolution,whichhasbeenstatedtobethe
grundnormoftheConstitutionofPakistaninMissAsmaJilaniv.GovernmentofthePunjab(PLD1972
SC139).
11.LearnedCounselcontendedthatjudiciaryhasalwaysbeenembroiledinstrugglewith
otherarmsofthestateforensuringandprotectingitsindependence;thatthedoctrineofJudicial
Review,asdevelopedintheUSSupremeCourtcaseofMarburyv.Madison[5U.S.137(1803)],wasan
attemptbytheUSJudiciarytoasserttheirindependence;thattheJudiciaryofPakistaninthecaseofAl
JehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996SC324)asaffirmedinSindhHighCourtBarAssociation
throughitsSecretaryv.FederationOfPakistanthroughSecretary,MinistryofLawAndJustice,
Islamabad(PLD2009SC879)andIndianSupremeCourtinthecasesofAdvocatesOnRecord
Associationv.UnionofIndia(AIR1994SC268)andlaterinthecaseofInRe:PresidentialReference(AIR
1999SC1)declaredandaffirmedtheindependenceofJudiciaryfromExecutiveasnecessarytoensure
thatthetendencyofotherorgansofthestatetooversteptheirConstitutionallimitationsremainunder
check.
12.Relyinguponthebasicstructuretheory,asdevelopedandexpoundeduponbythe
IndianSupremeCourt,learnedCounselarguedthatthereisabasicstructuretotheConstitutionof
Pakistanaswell,whichhasbeenaffirmedbytheSuperiorJudiciaryofPakistaninvariouscases.Thatthe
ideaofbasicstructurepreventsthepowertoamendfromturningintopowertodestroythe
Constitution.HesubmittedthattheDoctrineofbasicstructurewasanacademicthesisintroducedby
ProfessorDietrichConrad,aGermanprofessorofLaw,whichwasadoptedbytheIndianSupremeCourt
inKesavanandaBharati(supra)andaffirmedinlaterjudgments.Thattheonlybasisgroundingitare
academicargumentsandIndiancaselaw.HereferredtothefollowingIndianSupremeCourtjudgments
inwhichProfessorConradstheoryofunamendablebasicstructureoftheConstitutionwasfollowedin
India:
SajjanSinghv.TheStateofRajasthan(AIR1965SC845)
I.C.GolakNathandothersv.StatethePunjabandother(AIR1967SC1643)
KesavanandaBharati(supra)
IndiraNehruGandhi(AIR1975SC2299)
MinervaMillsLtd.v.UnionofIndia(supra)
WamanRaov.UnionofIndia(AIR1981SC271)
I.R.Coelhov.StateofTamilNadu(AIR2007SC861)
LearnedCounselfurthersubmittedthatthebasicstructuredoctrinehasalsonowbeenrecognizedby
theSupremeCourtofBangladeshinAnwarHussainChawdhryv.GovernmentofthePeoplesRepublic
ofBangladesh[1989BLD(Supplement)1].FurtherbyrelyingoncomparativeConstitutionalanalysisof
Germany,Turkey,Austria,Romaniaandsomeotherjurisdictions,hecontendedthatpowertoamend
theConstitutionislimitedacrosstheglobe.ApplyingtheBasicStructureDoctrinetotheConstitutionof
PakistanhearguedthatthefirstinstanceofbasicstructureinPakistancanbefoundinthecaseofMr.
FazlulQuaderChowdhryandothersv.Mr.MuhammadAbdulHaque(PLD1963SC486);thatthesaid
judgmentwasalsoquotedbytheIndianSupremeCourtinthecaseofSajjanSinghv.TheStateof
Rajasthan(supra)acknowledgingthefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitution;thatinthecaseof
MahmoodKhanAchakzaiv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1997SC426)theCourtrecognizedthree
SalientFeaturesoftheConstitution,includingIslamicprovisions,federalismandparliamentaryformof
Governmentandfullysecuringindependenceofjudiciary.ReferringtoWukalaMahazBaraiThafaz
Dastoorv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1998SC1263)itwascontendedthatpowertoamendthe
ConstitutionislimitedandthattheCourtcannotsitsilentlyoverthechangeofPakistanfroman
IslamicIdeologicalstatetoasecularstate;thatinZafarAliShahv.PervezMusharrafChiefExecutiveof
Pakistan(PLD2000SC869)theCourthadheldthattheConstitutionofPakistanisthesupremelawof
thelandanditsbasicfeaturesi.e.independenceofJudiciary,federalismandparliamentaryformof
governmentblendedwithIslamicProvisioncannotbealteredevenbytheParliament;thatinthecase
ofPakistanLawyersForumv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2005SC719)andalsointheOrderofthis
Courtdated21.10.2010inNadeemAhmed,(supra)basicfeaturesoftheConstitutionhavebeen
recognized.Byplacingrelianceupontheaforementionedcaselaw,learnedCounselarguedthat
Constitutioncanbeamendedprovidedthatthebasicfeaturesofitarenotdisturbed;thatitisnot
correcttosaythattheCourtsinPakistanhaverejectedthebasicstructuredoctrineasthequestionis
stillopen.
13.Mr.IftikharGillani,Sr.ASC,representedtheGovernmentofKhyberPakhtunkhwain
ConstitutionPetitionNo.13,20and31of2010relatingtothe18thConstitutionalAmendment.Hisbasic
formulationwasthattheParliamentspowerofamendmentoftheConstitutionwasinthenatureof
ConstituentPower,onwhichnolimitationswhatsoevercouldbeplaced;thathadtheframersofthe
Constitutionintendedittobeso,theywouldhaveplacedsuchlimitationsthemselvesuponthepowers
oftheparliament.InthiscontexthealsoarguedthatwhenanActoftheParliamentamendingthe
Constitutionispassed,theActbecomespartoftheConstitution;thatallprovisionsoftheConstitution
areofequalimportanceandthatFundamentalRightshavenotbeengivenanyprimacyoverother
provisionsoftheConstitution.WhilecounteringthecontentionthatParliamentifleftuncheckedcould
gotoanyextremeinamendingtheConstitution,hearguedthatastheparliamentariansandpolitical
partieshavetoreturntothepeopleforseekingvotetheywillremainonguardnottomakeunpopular
amendments.Hefurtherarguedthatthereareabout32Constitutionsoftheworldwherebasic
structurehasbeendefinedandlaiddownwithprecisionandoutofthose32Constitutionsonly6have
provisionslimitingthepowerofparliamenttoamendtheConstitutionbeforethejudgmentin
KesavandaBharati(supra);thatlimitationsinrestoftheConstitutionswereintroducedafterthesaid
judgment.ReferringtoWuklaMahaz(supra)thelearnedCounselcontendedthatParliamenthasboth
constituentandlegislativepowers;thatthevalidityofaconstitutionalamendmentcannotbemadeon
thetouchstoneoffundamentalrights;thatconstitutionalamendmentisnotlawwithinthemeaningof
Article8oftheConstitution;thatthediscussioninthecaseofWuklaMahazwasinthenatureofobiter
dicta.ThatMahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra)alsoruledthattheFundamentalRightscouldnotbeusedas
atouchstoneforstrikingdownConstitutionalAmendmentsasalltheprovisionsoftheConstitutionare
equal.ThatinIslamicRepublicofPakistanv.AbdulWaliKhan(PLD1976SC57),afterdiscussingthe
judgmentofKevanandaBharati(supra),theCourtfollowedthecaseofStatev.ZiaurRahman(PLD1973
SC49)inholdingthatthejudiciarycannotdeclareanyprovisionoftheConstitutiontobeinvalid.
14.InrespectofthechallengesraisedtothechangeofthenameoftheNorthWest
FrontierprovincetoKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK),Mr.GillanicontendedthatthenameofKPK
manifestsidentityratherthananyraceorethnicity.InthishereadoutAnAccountoftheKingdomof
CaubalbyElphinstonMonstuart,whereinithasbeennotedthatthewordPookhtaunehispluralof
thenamebywhichpeopleinhabitingthelandrefertothemselves;thatSirOlafCaroerecordedinThe
PathanswithanEpilogueonRussiathatthereisadifferencebetweenAfghanandPathanandthat
peopleinhabitingthesaidareasrefertothemselvesasPathan.Healsotracedagenealogyofthename
PakhtunorPashtunfrommedievalliteratureasrecordedinthesamebook.HealsoreferredtoThe
WayofthePathansbyJamesW.SpaintodrawuponhistoryofthenamePakhtun.Thatthepolitical
partythenformingthegovernmentintheProvincehadcontestedtheelectionwithanexpressdesire
mentionedinitsmanifestotochangethenameoftheProvince;thattheProvincialLegislaturehadalso
passedaresolutiontothateffect.
15.Mr.A.K.DogarappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.20of2010(18thAmendment
Case)raisedobjectionsovertheamendmentinandomissionofArticle17(4),Article63(1)(g)and(h),
Article91andArticle175A.Hearguedthatthereisadifferencebetweenpowertoframethe
Constitutionwhichistheprimarypowerandthepowertoamendwhichispowerderivedfromthe
Constitution;thattheConstitutionmakingAssemblydraftstheConstitutioninaccordancewiththe
mandategiventoitbythepeople,whoaretherealsourceofpower;thatamendmentsmadetothe
ConstitutionbeingderivativepowerscannotgoagainsttheoriginalConstitution,thegrundnormof
whichhasbeendeclaredtobetheObjectivesResolutionbytheAsmaJillaniscase(supra);thatthe
ObjectivesResolutionasitexistedpriortoamendmentdeclaredIslamicIdeologytobethebasicconcept
underlyingtheConstitutionwhichwasdraftedinaccordancewithit.Hesubmittedthatthereisa
differencebetweenconstituentpowersandlegislativepowersashasbeenheldinWuklaMahaz
(supra);thatpowertoamendtheConstitutionbytheParliamentisinthenatureofconstituentpower;
thataftertheConstitutionwasmade,allthatwasleftwithParliamentarelegislativepowersbywhich
theycannotgoondraftinganewConstitutionthroughamendments.Hefurthercontendedthatthe
powertomaketheConstitutionliesoutsideoftheConstitution,whilethepowertoamendorchange
theConstitutionlieswithinit.HearguedthatthereexistswhathecalledStructuralBasisofthe
ConstitutionwhichisnottobecalledtheBasicStructureofit.Insupportofhisargumentinfavorof
theexistenceofstructuralbasisoftheConstitutionhearguedthatithasbeenstatedinthecaseof
BegumNusratBhuttov.ChiefofArmyStaffandFederationofPakistan(PLD1977SC657)thatthe
ideologyofPakistanembodyingthedoctrinethatsovereigntybelongstoAllahandistobeexercisedon
hisbehalfasasacredtrustbythechosenrepresentativesofthepeople;thatthishasalsobeen
reiteratedinthecaseofZaheeruddinv.State(1993SCMR1718)thatthechosenrepresentativesof
people,forthefirsttimeacceptedthesovereigntyofAllah,astheoperativepartoftheConstitution,to
bebindingonthemandvowedthattheywillexerciseonlythedelegatedpowers,withinthelimitsfixed
byAllah.HequestionedtheprocedureofappointmentofJudgesthroughnominationbytheJudicial
Commissionandtermeditasdiscriminatoryasitdoesnotgranteverylawyerequalopportunitytobe
consideredforappointment.
16.Dr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,Sr.ASC,appearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.40of2010
(EighteenthAmendment)structuredhisargumentsaroundthefollowingtwoquestions:
1.DoestheConstitutionofPakistanhaveabasicstructure?
2.DoestheamendingpoweroftheParliamentextendoverthebasicstructure?
HereferredtothecaseofJhamandasv.ChiefLandCommissioner(1966SC229),whereintheCourthad
declaredthattherewasaconstitutionalconscienceofPakistan;thattherewasadifferencebetween
thespiritoftheConstitutionandtheconscienceoftheConstitution;thatspiritissomethingwhich
encouragedonetodosomething,whileconscienceisarestrictingforcewhichboundsorlimits.Itwas
contendedthatconstitutionalconscienceofPakistanismuchstrongerthanthetheoryofbasic
structure;thatCourtscanstrikedownaconstitutionalamendmentifitisfoundtobeagainstthe
constitutionalconscience;thatthisCourthasthejurisdictionofJudicialReviewoverconstitutional
amendments.HearguedthatthewordlawasusedinArticle8clearlyincludesconstitutional
amendments.ThelearnedCounselthenreferredtothecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra)and
contendedthatwhiletheCourthadvalidatedthe8thAmendmenttotheConstitutionitalsopossessed
thepowernottovalidateanyConstitutionalamendment.
17.LearnedCounselreferredtothecaseofJusticeSajjadAliShahv.MalikAsadAli(1999
SCMR640)toarguethatithasbeenacceptedinthesaidjudgmentthatthereisnodifferencebetween
constitutionallawandestablishedconvention;thatiftheCourtwasofopinionthatconventionof
independenceofjudiciarywasbeingencroacheduponbythelegislaturethroughConstitutional
amendments,itcaninterfere.Inthiscontexthearguedthatamendmentbydefinitionhastobe
progressiveandtheCourtscaninterfereintheconstitutionalamendmentswhichareretrogressive;that
ifparliamentwantstoamendorchangethebasicstructureoftheConstitution,itshoulddissolveitself
andreturnwithaclearmandatefromthepeopleonthequestionofproposedamendmentstothe
Constitution.HereferredtotheObjectivesResolutionasprovidingthebasicstructureortheconscience
oftheConstitution.
18.LearnedCounselchallengedthechangesbroughtintotheprocessoftheappointment
ofjudgesbyArticle175Aasencroachmentupontheindependenceofjudiciary;thatArticle63Ahas
concentratedpowersintothehandsoftheheadofthepartyline.Itwascontendedthatontheone
handConcurrentLegislativeListhasbeenabolishedtoprovidemoreautonomytothefederatingunits
butelectricityandotheritems,whichwerepreviouslyintheconcurrentlist,havenowbeenincludedin
theFederalLegislativeListbythe18thAmendment.HeprayedfortheseprovisionsoftheConstitution
tobestruckdownonthetouchstoneofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
19.SardarKhanNiaziappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.21of2010challengedthe
changestotheConstitutionbythe18thamendmentinArticle17(4),63A,226and267A.Hecontended
thattheendtosecretballotingunderArticle226throughthesaidConstitutionalAmendmentwould
leadtodictatorship;thattherewasnodebateonthesaidamendment.Byreferringtoclause(4)of
Article17,hesubmittedthatithasbeendeleted,asaresultofwhichtherequirementofholdingintra
partyelectionshasbeendoneawaywith,whichisthebaseofanydemocraticsystem.Hechallenged
Article267A,insertedforremovalofdifficultieswhichmayariseingivingeffecttothe18thAmendment,
asconvertingtherequirementoftwothirdmajorityforamendmentoftheConstitutionintosimple
majority.
20.HabibulWahabulKhairiappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.31of2010submitted
thathehadchallengedalmostalltheamendmentsintroducedbythe18thAmendment.Hecontended
thatamendmentsmadeinArticle91werepersonspecifictobenefitcertainpoliticalleadersbyenabling
themtobecomePrimeMinistersformorethanthepreviouslystipulatedterms.
21.M.IkramChaudharySr.ASCappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.12of2010for
DistrictBarAssociation,RawalpindiadoptedtheargumentsofMr.HamidKhan,Sr.ASCandfurther
arguedthatJudiciaryhasbeenkeptoutofthedefinitionofArticle7becauseitwastobegranted
supervisoryroleoverotherorgansoftheState.ThattheoathoftheOfficeoftheParliamentarians
enjoinsuponthemtopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan;thatthedutyofprotectinganddefendingtheConstitutionmeansthattheParliamentarians
cannotviolatebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
22.QariAbdulRasheed,ASCinHRCNo.22753Kof2010arguedthatthechangeofthe
nameofNorthWestFrontierProvincehashurtthefeelingsofthepeopleoftheHazaraDivisionand
othernonPashtunpeopleoftheProvince.However,heconcededthatitisalmostadeadissue.
23.Mr.ZulfiqarAhmedBhutta,ASCappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.43of2010
questionedtheelectionofnonMuslimsonreservedseatsthroughproportionalrepresentationsystem
ofpoliticalpartiesintroducedbythe18thAmendment;thatArticle36oftheConstitutiongrants
protectiontotherightsoftheminoritiesincludingduerepresentationintheFederalandProvincial
legislature;thatsuchsystemofelectionwouldgrantpowertothepoliticalpartiestonominatepeople
oftheirlikingtothereservedseats.
24.ShahidOrakzaiappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.22of2010andCivilPetitionNo.
1901of2010submittedthattheConstitutiondoesnotplaceanylimitorbaronthepowersofthe
SupremeCourttostrikedownanyamendmenttotheConstitution;thatthephraseanycourtasused
inclause(5)ofArticle239doesnotincludeSupremeCourtwhichunderitsoriginalpowersprovidedin
Article184(3)canstrikedownConstitutionalamendments.Hefurtherraisedobjectionsoverthe
inclusionofseniorjudgesoftheSupremeCourtintheSupremeJudicialCouncilunderArticle209andin
JudicialCommissionunderArticle175A,asaccordingtohimthesamejudgeswhonominateother
judges,alsohavepowerovertheirremoval,whichgoesagainstthespiritoftheConstitution.The
petitionerwasalsoaggrievedofthechangeofthenameofNWFPbyusingthenameofoneofthetribal
agenciesi.e.KhyberAgencyinthenewnameasitcontravenesArticle33whereinStatehasto
discourageparochialism,racialbiasesandprovincialprejudicesamongthecitizens.
25.Mr.KhalidAnwar,Sr.ASC,representedtheFederationofPakistaninConstitution
PetitionNo.2of2015.Hepresentedargumentsonboththe18thand21stconstitutionalamendments
mainlyonthebasicstructuredoctrine.Hebeganbydividingbasicstructuredoctrineintotwomutually
exclusiveanddistinctiveparts:
a)BasicStructureasadescriptivedoctrine:Itidentifiesprovisionsconsideredtobeprimaryto
thebasicstructureoftheConstitution;
b)BasicStructureasaprescriptivedoctrine:ItgrantspowertotheJudiciarytostrikedown
constitutionalamendmentswhichmodifybasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.Basicstructureasa
prescriptivedoctrinecreatesunamendablepartsoftheConstitution,whicharetobeprotectedfrom
amendmentbytheCourts.
26.Hearguedthatthebasicstructureprescriptivedoctrineisatbestanacademic
exercise;thattheoriescannotbeequatedwithlawaslawhastwodistinctfeaturesi.e.clarityandits
presenceinthepublicdomainaspublicknowledge;thatbasicstructureoftheConstitutionhasneither
beenclearlylaiddownbytheCourtsnorisitclearlypresentinthepublicdomain.Hefurther
substantiatedthispointbyfirstdrawingadifferencebetweenJudicialPowerandJurisdiction,whereas
theformercannotbetakenawayasitstemsfromtheexistenceoftheCourtsandisinherentinthe
conceptofaCourt,thelattercanbeadded,repealedorlimited.
27.DilatinguponthecaselawfromtheIndianjurisdictionontheapplicationofthebasic
structuredoctrinetoconstitutionalamendments,Mr.KhalidAnwarsubmittedthatthecaseof
KesavanandaBharati(supra)introducedanewtypeofjudicialpower,wherebytheCourtsofIndiahave
assumedjurisdictionoverconstitutionamendingpoweroftheParliament.Thatthisjurisdiction,as
assumedinthesaidIndiancase,doesnotexistinConstitutionofIndiaorofPakistananditisaninstance
ofselfconferredpowerbythejudiciary.Thisselfconferredpowerinoperationandtheorydestroysthe
separationofpowersashasbeenordainedintheConstitution.Hecontendedthatthesearchforbasic
structurebytheCourtsisbasicallyanexerciseinmetaphysicswherebydeterminationoftheessenceof
theConstitutionisattempted;thatitisanindeterminateprocessandinthisregardhereferredto
paragraph668ofIndiraNehruGandhi(supra)whereintheCourtnotedthatThetheoryofBasic
Structurehastobeconsideredineachindividualcase,notintheabstract,butinthecontextofthe
concreteproblemThatevenIndianjudiciarycouldnotidentifybasicstructureoftheIndian
ConstitutionwithclarityanditcouldonlyidentifyvariousaspectsformingbasicstructureoftheIndian
Constitutioninvarioussucceedingjudgments.InthelightofvariousjudgmentsbyIndianSupremeCourt
learnedCounselformulatedthatthebasicstructureofanyConstitutionisneitherfixednorpermanent
andcannotbediscernedwithclarityorfullydiscovered;thatinordertokeeptheConstitutionrelevant
tothechangingtimesandasalivingdocumentitoughttobeallowedtochange;thatthereisalwaysan
elementofsubjectivityinvolvedindeterminingbasicstructureofanyConstitutionwhichdifferswhen
differentreadingsareputonitbydifferentjudges;thatsocietyandinstitutionsdevelopovertimeand
constitutionrequirechangestokeepupwiththechangingsocialandeconomicconditions.
28.HereferredtothecaseofDewanTextileMillsLtd.v.Pakistanandothers(PLD1976
Kar.1368)atpagenumber155tocontendthatPreambleoftheConstitutioncannotbereadasplacing
impliedlimitationsonthepowersoftheparliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Hethencomparedthe
originalConstitutionof1973totheConstitutionafteramendmentsasitexiststodayandcontendedthat
theoriginalConstitutionwassubstantivelyinferiortotheConstitutionasitexiststoday.Bytheinclusion
ofArticle10AintotheConstitution,aseachangehasbeenbroughtintotheFundamentalRights;that
theoriginalArticle177oftheConstitutiongrantedExecutivethepowerofappointmentofJudgeswhich
hasbeendoneawaywithoverthecourseoftime;thatanyattempttotaketheConstitutionbacktoits
basicstructurewouldbehighlyretrogressiveasitwouldputappointmentofjudgesbackintothehands
oftheExecutive.Itwascontendedthatthereisnoneedtoresorttothebasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionofPakistanaswhatSupremeCourtofIndiatriedtoachieveinthejudgmentof
KesavanandaBharati(supra),theSupremeCourtofPakistanhasbeenabletoachieveinaseriesof
judgmentsovertimesuchasAlJehadTrustcase(supra).
29.ThelearnedCounselreferredtothecaseofZiaurRahman(supra)tocontendthatthe
SupremeCourtdoesnothavethepowertostrikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitution;thatitwas
furtherstatedinthesaidjudgmentthatnopartoftheConstitutioncanbestruckdownonthe
touchstoneofObjectivesResolutionwhichcannotbegrantedsupraConstitutionalstatusofa
grundnorm.HecontendedthatinHakimKhanv.GovernmentofPakistan(PLD1992SC595)andMst.
KanizFatimav.WaliMuhammadandanother(PLD1993SC901)ithadbeenclearlyheldthatArticle2A
cannotbemadeatouchstoneforstrikingdownprovisionsoftheConstitution;thatinPakistanLawyers
Forum(supra)ithasbeenclearlyheldbytheCourtthatthetheoryofbasicstructureisonlyusedto
identifysalientorthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,whichcannotbestruckdownbytheCourts;
thatinZafarAliShah(supra)theCourthadnotstatedthattheCourtscanstrikedownamendmentsto
theConstitutionuponthetouchstoneofthebasicfeaturesidentified.ThelearnedCounselsubmitted
thatCourtsdonothavethejurisdictiontosubjectAmendmentstotheConstitutiontoJudicialReview.
30.Withregardstothe21stAmendmenthearguedthatthereisacleardifference
betweenlawofwarandlawofpeaceashasbeenheldbyvariouswritersincludingHugoGrotius,
theDutchJurist;thatthelawofwaronlyapplieswhentwonationstatesenterintodeclaredconflict
andwarwitheachother;thatPakistanisinastateofundeclaredwarwithbelligerentnonstatearmed
groups.Itwasinthecontextofundeclaredwaragainstsuchnonstateactorsoperatingasarmiesthat
21stAmendmenttotheConstitutionwasenacted.
31.HepointedoutthatthereisasunsetclauseinthesaidConstitutionalamendment
providingthattheprovisionsoftheamendmentactshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfrom
thedateofitscommencement,afterwhichtheyshallceasetoformpartoftheConstitutionandshall
standrepealed.ByreadingArticle175oftheConstitutionasitemergesafteramendment,hecontended
thatclause(1)ofArticle175providesforsuchothercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw;thatunder
clause(2)ofArticle175Courtsdonothaveanyjurisdictionexceptwhathasbeenconferreduponitby
theConstitutionoranyotherlaw;thattheMilitaryTribunalshavebeenestablishedunderthelawand
havebeenconferredjurisdictionbytheConstitutionthroughthe21stAmendment.Hearguedthatthis
hasbeendoneasanactofbalancingbetweenWarTimePowersandPeaceTimePowers,whereby
balancingrightsofthepeoplewiththeneedforsecurity.
32.Mr.AbidS.Zuberi,ASCappearingforSindhHighCourtBarAssociation,Karachi
throughitsSecretaryinConstitutionPetitionNo.12of2015prayedthatthemilitarycourtsareagainst
thebasicstructureorsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionandshouldhencebestruckdown.Learned
CounselarguedthatunderArticle239,Constitutionmaybeamendedbythe2/3oftheParliament
votingconsciously;thatunderArticle63A(1)(b)(iii)themembersoftheParliamentareobligatedto
votefortheconstitutionalamendmentinlinewiththedirectionsofthepoliticalpartyleadership;that
thisforcedanddictatedpoliticalpartydisciplinebindstheparliamentarianstothedecisionsoftheir
partyleadershipanddoesnotallowthemtoexerciseaconsciousdecisioninvotingfororagainsta
proposedconstitutionalamendment;thatthisforcedpolicydisciplinewasnotenvisagedunderArticle
239.
33.Withrespecttothemilitarycourtshearguedthattheextensionoftheirpowersover
theciviliansabridgesthefundamentalrightofaccesstojustice;thatindependentcourt,independent
procedureandrighttoengagecounselofchoicearetheessentialelementsofafairjudicialsystem,
whicharedeniedtothosetobetriedbythemilitarycourts.Withreferencetothebarcontainedin
Article199(3)overjudicialreviewofproceedingsunderthemilitarycourts,thelearnedCounselargued
thatthisbardoesnotoperatewhenactionsofthemilitarycourtsweremalafide,lackedjurisdictionor
werecorumnonjudice.InthiscontexthereliedonthecaseofRanaMuhammadNaveedv.Federation
ofPakistanthroughSecretaryM/oDefence(2013SCMR596).Inthealternateheprayedthatiflawsin
thecurrentformweretobeheldasvalid,thenprotectionhastobeextendedtotheaccusedfor
ensuringafairtrial.
34.Mr.AbrarHasan,ASC,appearingforPakistanBarCouncilthroughitsViceChairmanin
ConstitutionPetitionNo.9of2015arguedthatbytheinclusionofthemilitarylawsinPart1totheFirst
Schedulehasgrantedblanketprotectiontotheprovisionsoftheselaws.Hefurtherarguedthat
classificationgivenintheconstitutionalamendmentconflictswithArticle4and25asonlyterrorists
raisingarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameofreligionorasecthavebeenincludedandother
terroristorganizationswithothermotivesbutstillposingthreattothepeaceandsecurityofPakistan
havebeenexcluded.Hewashoweveragainsttheuseofthebasicstructureforstrikingdown
constitutionalamendment.HeinsteadprayedthatthematterbereferredbacktotheParliamentfor
reviewingtheamendments.
35.BarristerZafarullahKhan,ASCappearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.99of2014
arguedbycomparingthefrequencyofamendmentsintroducedintheConstitutionofPakistantoother
ConstitutionsoftheworldthatthereisacultureofamendmentsinPakistanastheprocessof
amendmenthasbecomeveryeasy.Thatthe21stAmendmentwouldgrantunrestrictedpowerstothe
executive.
36.Ms.AsmaJahangir,ASCrepresentingSupremeCourtBarAssociation(SCBA)through
SecretaryinConstitutionPetitionNo.10of2015submittedattheoutsetthatSCBAdoesnotsupport
thebasicstructuretheoryasagroundtostrikedownconstitutionalamendment.Thatshehasthesame
instructionsfromthecurrentPresidentoftheLahoreHighCourtBarAssociation.LearnedCounsel
contendedthatthesunsetclauseinthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentindicateshesitationofthe
legislatorsingrantinguncheckedpowerstothemilitary;thatthesunsetclausewasincludedinthe
constitutionalamendmentActbutnotintheConstitution;thatalltheBarAssociationsofthecountry
wereunanimousinopposingthesaidconstitutionalamendmentasitdeniedaccesstojustice.She
arguedthatthereweretwowaysofdoingawaywiththesaidAmendment:
1.ItcouldbestruckdownbytheCourtsonthetouchstoneofbasicstructure;
2.Amiddlegroundcouldbetakentodoawaywiththemilitarycourtssetupthroughthe
constitutionalamendmentongroundsotherthanthebasicstructuredoctrine.
37.ThelearnedCounselarguedthattheCourtsofPakistanhaveonlyidentifiedbasic
featuresoftheConstitutionbuthaveneverstruckdownanyconstitutionalamendmentbasedupon
suchfeaturesordevelopedatheoryofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.LearnedCounsel
cautionedthatlayingdownabasicstructuretotheConstitutionwouldopenfloodgatesasall
amendmentstotheConstitutionafterthe7thAmendmentcouldberevisited.ThatParliamentshould
beheldresponsibleforitsactionsinpoliticalforumsandthroughpoliticalactionsandnotbeforethe
judiciary;thatthetheoryoffearofwhatmighthappenshouldnotbetakenasabaseforrestrictingthe
powersoftheParliamentthroughidentificationofthebasicstructurebytheCourts,astheParliament
attheendofthedayispoliticallyresponsibletothepeople.WithreferencetotheIndiancaselawon
thebasicStructure,shearguedthatitshouldnotbefollowedblindlyinPakistanbecauseofthe
followingreasons:
EveninIndia,basicstructuretheoryisonthedecline;
ThatasIndianConstitutionwasgivenbytheirfoundingfathers,discerningtheideasforming
basicstructureoftheirRepublicanConstitutioniseasytosomeextent.However,asPakistan's
Constitutionof1973wasnotgivenbythefoundingfathers,itwillbedifficulttodiscernwithunanimity
basicstructureunderlyingit;
IndianConstitutionmakingprocessdifferedfromthatofPakistan.
38.WithreferencetotheargumentthatObjectivesResolutionoughttobeconsideredas
providingbasicstructureoftheConstitution,learnedCounselarguedthatconsideringitasa
unanimouslyagreeddocumentisamyth;thatitwaspresentedduringthebudgetdebatesofthe
ConstituentAssemblywhenattendancewasthinandinthisregardreferredtothedebatebyMr.Prem
HariBarmaintheConstituentAssemblyon7.03.1949whentheObjectivesResolutionwasmovedasa
motionintheAssembly;thatamendmentswereproposedtoitbutwereneverfollowedor
incorporated;thatnoheedwaspaidtotheoppositiontoitraisedintheAssembly,whichhasbeen
obliteratedfromhistory;thatrelianceuponObjectivesResolutioninsearchforbasicstructureofthe
Constitutionwouldcausedivisionsinthesociety.
39.LearnedCounselthensubmittedthatArticle8(3)protectedlawsbyplacingthemin
theFirstSchedule;thatthisprotectiononlyappliedtothoselawsexistingatthetimeofinclusionand
nottosubsequentamendmentsorchanges.WithregardstotheprotectiongiventothePakistanArmy
Act,1952undertheConstitutionalAmendment,learnedCounselarguedthatamendmenttothe
ConstitutionwasmadeunderActNo.1of2015,whereasamendmenttotheArmyActwasmadeunder
ActIIof2015andthatActIIof2015didnotexistatthetimewhentheArmyActwassoughttobe
protectedbyplacingitintheFirstSchedule.Baseduponthisreasoning,thelearnedCounselarguedthat
sinceamendmentintheArmyActthroughActIIwasmadesubsequenttothepassingofthe
ConstitutionalAmendmentthroughActI,theamendmentintheArmyActextendingthejurisdictionof
theMilitaryCourttociviliansdoesremainwithoutconstitutionalcover.Inthealternativeshemadean
argumentthatifmilitarycourtsareaccepted,thepoweroftheFederalGovernmenttotransfertrialof
certaincases,withoutanyclearschemeorformula,tomilitarycourtsshouldbesubjecttojudicial
review.ShefurtherarguedthatArticle8(3)readwithArticle199(3)didnotoustthejurisdictionofthe
Courtofjudicialreviewovertheoutcomeofthetrialbythemilitarycourts;thatevenotherwise,
jurisdictionoftheCourtshasnotbeenoustedunderArticle8(3).
40.Mr.SalmanAslamButt,AttorneyGeneralforPakistan,submittedthatMr.Khalid
Anwar,appearingfortheFederationhasmadeextensivesubmissionsonthebasicstructuretheoryand
hewouldconfinehisargumentstotheformalandlegaljustificationsfortheamendments.Thelearned
AttorneyGeneralbyreferencetoArticle175(2)arguedthatitiscouchedinnegativelanguagewhereby
thejurisdictionoftheCourtshasdefinedasonlythatconferreduponthembytheConstitutionandby
orunderanylaw;thattherewasnoprovisionparalleltoitintheConstitutionof1956,1962orthe
InterimConstitutionof1972;thatinthecaseofAdditionalChiefSecretary(FATA)v.PiayoNoor(2014
SCMR17)atparagraph9CourtalsonoticedthatfoundationofthejurisdictionofCourtiscouchedin
negativeterm;thatthesameisalsorecordedinparagraph6ofS.M.WaseemAshrafv.Federationof
PakistanthroughSecretary,M/OHousingandWorks,Islamabad(2013SCMR338).Relianceinthis
contextwasalsoplacedonthecaseofZiaurRehmaninwhichtheCourthadrecordedthattheCourts
beingacreatureoftheConstitutionderiveitspowerandjurisdictionfromitandlimitsofsuchpower
arealsosetbytheConstitution.ThattheCourtshaverecognizedthatitonlyhasthejurisdictionas
conferreduponitbytheConstitutionasinthecaseofFederationofPakistanv.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.
Karachi(PLD1977SC397),whereintheCourthadheldthatthecreationofCouncilofCommonInterest
(CCI)undertheConstitution,abridgestheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtunderArticle184
andcorrespondinglynewpoweressentiallyquasijudicialincharacterhasbeenconferredonthe
Parliamentinjointsitting;thattherewasnojurisdictionofCourtsoverCCIbutthejudicialpowerofthe
Courtsremained.ReferringtotheambiguitysurroundingthestatusandroleoftheObjectives
Resolution,hereadoutfromthespeechofMr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,theFederalLawMinisteratthe
timeoftheframingofthe1973Constitution,inParliamentandpointedoutthattheroleintendedfor
theObjectivesResolutionatthetimeofpassingoftheConstitutionwasonlythatofapreamble.
41.WithrespecttothemilitarycourtslearnedAttorneyGeneralsubmittedthatunder
Article245thearmedforcesaretoactinaidofcivilpowerincasesofthreatofwar;thattheoriginal
Article245onlycontainedtheprovisionwhichnowformsclause(1)ofitandtheotherclauseswere
addedthroughSeventhAmendmenttotheConstitution;thatifwarwasfearedordeclaredinPakistan
militaryforcescouldinaidofcivilpower,createandadministermilitarycourtswhichcantryanyperson
involvedinraisingthethreatoractualwaragainstthestate;thatArticle245isanindependentArticlein
theConstitution,underwhichthemilitarycourtscanbecreated.ItwasfurthercontendedthatArticle
245readwithEntry1andEntry55ofFederalLegislativeListgrantsFederalGovernmentthepowerto
legislateforcreatingmilitarycourtsforthedefenceofPakistanduringthetimesofwar.Infurtherance
ofhisargumentlearnedcounselrelieduponcaselawfordefiningthreatofwarandwar;thatinthe
caseofMuhammadUmarKhanv.TheCrown(PLD1953Lah.528)theCourthadheldthatwhereriots
haveassumedtheformofarmedinsurrectionoropenrebellionamountingtowar...Onsuchoccasions
theCivilCourtsmaystillfunction,thoughadelicatepositionmaydevelopwhere,whiletheCourtsare
functioning,themilitaryseektoousttheirjurisdictionbysettinguptheirparalleltribunalsandclaiming
paramountcyforthem;thatinthecaseofAungHlaandOrs.v.Emperor(AIR1931Rangoon235)
offenceofwagingwaragainstthestatedidnotpresumetrainedorregulararmyasinsurrectionhas
differentdynamicsfromregularwar;thatinthecaseofSarbanandaSonowalv.UnionofIndia(AIR2005
SC2920)itwasstatedthatmodernwarmayinvolvenotmerelythearmedforcesofbelligerentstate
buttheirentirepopulation;thatinthecaseofAbdulWaliKhan(supra)thetermsinsurgencyand
subversionhavebeendefined.Itwascontendedbyrelyinguponthestatedcaselawthatthe
contemporarydefinitionofwarhaschangedandincludesthethreatofwaraswell.
42.InrelationtotheMilitaryCourts,learnedAttorneyGeneralcontendedthattheCourt
cannotconferanyjurisdictionuponitselforanyotherCourttoquestionaConstitutionalAmendmenton
anytouchstonewhatsoever;thattheConstitutionofPakistanenvisagesthatapersonactingagainstthe
defenceofPakistanorisathreattothedefenceofPakistanoranypartthereofinthetimeofwar,can
besubjectedtoalawrelatingtotheArmedForcesandcanbeConstitutionallytriedunderArticle245
readwithEntry1and55ofFederallegislativeList;thatthecasesofSheikhLiaquatHussainv.Federation
ofPakistan(PLD1999SC504)andMehramAliv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1998SC1445)canbe
differentiatedonfacts,asatthattimetherewasnoorganizedinsurgencyorinsurrectionorwaror
threatofwar.ItwasfurtherarguedthatArticle245wasnotinterpretedinitstrueperspectiveinthe
twosaidcasesinthatArticle245hasthefollowingthreeparts:
i.Defenceagainstexternalaggression
ii.Defenceagainstthethreatofwar
iii.Subjecttolawactinginaidofcivilpower
Thatthefirsttwoaredefencepowersofthestate,exclusivelyfallingwithinthedomainoftheexecutive
andarenotjusticiableasprovidedunderArticle199(3)andArticle245(2).Inreferencetothe21st
ConstitutionalAmendment,itwascontendedthattheParliamenthasvalidlyplacedtheArmyActinthe
FirstSchedule.ThatthewordspecifiedasusedinArticle8(3)(b)(i)isapresentperfecttensewhich
wouldmeanthatitwouldincludebothpastandfuturelawsincludedintheSchedule;thatinthepast
FirstSchedulehadalsobeenamendedinitsentiretybytheFifthConstitutionalAmendment.Itwasin
thiscontextthathesubmittedthatjurisdictionofmilitarycourtscalledFieldGeneralCourtMartial
alreadyexistingunderthestructureoftheArmyActhavebeenvestedwithjurisdictionovercertain
sectionsoftheaccused;thattheamendmentintheActhadmerelyextendedthejurisdictionofthe
militarycourtstocertainpersons;thattheConstitutionalAmendmenthasmerelyincludedArmyActin
thefirstscheduleandhasnotmadeanyotheramendmenttotheConstitutiontouchingoraffectingthe
basicstructure.
43.InresponsetotheargumentraisedbyMs.AsmaJahangir,learnedASC,thatthe
ConstitutionalAmendmentBillwaspassedpriorintimetotheBillamendingtheArmyAct,learned
AttorneyGeneralsubmittedthatboththebillswereintroducedintheparliamentatthesametimeand
debatetookplaceonthemtogether;thattheywerepassedbytheNationalAssemblyinthesame
Sessionandonthesamedate.ThatwhenthebillsweresubmittedtotheSenate,theArmyAct
AmendmentBillwasintroducedearlierintimeandtheConstitutionalAmendmentwasintroduced
thereafter.ThatwhenthebillsweresenttothePresidenthisassentwasgrantedtoboththebillsatthe
sametime.ItwasalsoarguedthataccordingtotheRuleofstatutoryinterpretationtheamendmentin
theArmyActbeingordinarylegislationhadcomeintoeffectduringmidnightof6and7June,2015in
termsofGeneralClausesAct,1897;thatasGeneralClausesActisnotapplicabletointerpretationofthe
Constitutionthe21stAmendmenttotheConstitutionwouldcomeintoeffectwhenitwasassentedto
bythePresident;thatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015hadalreadycomeintoeffectwhenthe
assenttothe21stConstitutionalAmendmentwasgivenbythePresident.Itwasalsocontendedthat
matterofassentgiventoabillfallswithintheproceedingsoftheParliamentinviewofArticle66ad69
oftheConstitution;thatnoActofParliamentcanbeinvalidatedonthegroundsoflackofprevious
sanctionorconsentrequiredbytheConstitutionunderArticle75(4).
44.ThefundamentalissueinallthesemattersisthepoweroftheCourttostrikedowna
constitutionalamendmentandthegroundsorthebasisfortheexerciseofsuchpower.Thisquestion
hasremainedthesubjectmatterofcasesbeforeourCourtsaswellasinIndiaandamendmentstothe
Constitutionhavebeenchallengedonthetouchstoneofthebasicstructuretheory.Asmentionedabove
supportersofthetheoryhavebasedtheirargumentsmainlyontheIndiancaselaw.Ofgreater
relevanceforushoweverarethejudgmentsofthisCourtstartingfromFazlulQuaderChowdhry(supra).
ThisparticularcasedeservesdiscussioninsomedetailasitwascitedasthefirstjudgmentinPakistan
andIndiatohaverecognizedthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution.TheConstitutionofPakistan,1962
hadintroducedPresidentialformofgovernmentwherethePresidentwastoactontheadviceofthe
CouncilofMinisters,whowerenottobemembersoftheLegislature.However,someofthemembers
whoweresoughttobetakenintotheCouncilofMinisterswerereluctanttoaccepttheirnew
responsibilitiesunlesstheywereallowedtoretaintheirmembershipoftheLegislature.ThePresident
hadbeengrantedpowersforalimitedperiodunderArticle224(3)oftheConstitutionforthepurpose
ofremovinganydifficultiesthatmayariseinbringingthisConstitutionoranyprovisionofthis
Constitution,intooperationtodirectbyOrder,thattheprovisionsofthisConstitutionshall,during
suchperiodasisspecifiedintheOrder,haveeffectsubjecttosuchadaptations,whetherbywayof
modification,additionoromission,ashemaydeemtobenecessaryorexpedient.(Emphasishasbeen
added)
45.ThePresidentbyusinghispowersunderArticle224(3)promulgatedRemovalof
Difficulties(AppointmentofMinisters)President'sOrderNo.34of1962(hereinafterreferredtoasthe
Order).BytheOrder,anamendmentwasalsoeffectedinArticle224oftheConstitutionitselfbythe
additionofafourthclauseoustingthejurisdictionoftheCourtsasunder:
"ThevalidityofanyordermadeorpurportingtohavebeenmadeundertheArticleshallnotbecalledin
question."
ThesaidOrderwasimpugnedbeforetheHighCourtofEastPakistanbytherespondent,alsoamember
oftheNationalAssembly.Hesucceededandawritofquawarrantowasissuedagainsttheappellants,
whofiledacertifiedappealbeforethisCourt.
46.ThiscasewascitedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiainSajjanSingh(supra)observing
thattheSupremeCourtofPakistanhadheldthatfranchiseandformofgovernmentarefundamental
featuresofaConstitutionandthepowerconferreduponthePresidentbytheConstitutionofPakistan
toremovedifficultiesdoesnotextendtomakinganalterationinafundamentalfeatureofthe
Constitution.(Emphasishasbeenadded)ReliancehasnowbeenplacedonthecaseofFazlulQuader
Chowdhry(supra)onbehalfofthepetitionerstocontendthattheSupremeCourthadthenheldthat
therewereunamendablefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitutionofPakistan.Thisviewisnot
correct.Thesaidcase,asemphasizedabove,onlyheldthatthePresidentinexerciseofhisparticular
powersunderArticle224(3)couldnotchangefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitutionandnothing
wassaidtolimitthepoweroftheParliamenttochangethefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitution.
ThefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitutionwereenumeratedwhichcouldnotbeamendedbythe
PresidentthroughtheexerciseofArticle224(3)butnothingwassaidaboutthepoweroftheParliament
tochangethem.APresidentialOrderpassedunderArticle224(3)wasrestrictedtoremovedifficulties;
itcouldnotamendtheConstitution.TheCourtthusheld:
InexerciseofthepowercontainedinthisArticlethePresidenthasbroughtinfundamentalchangesby
amendingtheConstitution.Thequestionthereforeis:WhetherthisArticleempowersthePresidentto
makesuchamendmentsItisclearfromtheaboveprovisionsthattheamendmentoftheConstitution
beingataskofgreatresponsibilitytheConstitutionnotonlysetsupamachineryforsuchamendments
butalsoregulatesthemethodsbywhichamendmentshouldbemade.Theprimafaciepresumption,
therefore,mustbethattheintentionoftheConstitutionisthatthisdutyistobeperformedprimarilyby
thelegislativebodyitself.Exceptthisthereisnootherprovisionunderwhichtheamendmentofthe
Constitutionispermissible.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
Therefore,theCourtonlystruckdownthePresidentialOrderasitamountedtoamendmentofthe
Constitution,whichwasnotwithinthescopeofthepowersgrantedtothePresidentunderthe
Constitution.TheCourtexpresslyheldthisinthefollowingwords(perJusticeFazleAkbar):
Thepowerunder'thisArticle,therefore,canbeexercisedonlyforthelimitedpurposeofbringingthe
Constitutioninoperationanditshouldaccordinglyberestrictedtothosepurelymachinery
arrangementsvitallyrequisiteforthatpurpose.FromthelanguageoftheArticleitisabundantlyclear
thatthisArticlewasnevermeanttobestowpoweronthePresidenttochangethefundamentalsofthe
Constitution.OurConstitutionhasprovidedforaPresidentialformofGovernmentandthePresident
bytheimpugnedOrderhasintroducedasemiParliamentaryformofGovernment.Asalreadystated,
thisArticle224(3)wasnevermeanttobestowpoweronthePresidenttochangethefundamentalsof
theConstitution.Howeverwholesometheintentionandhowevernoblethemotivemaybetheextra
constitutionalactioncouldnotbesupportedbecausethePresidentwasnotentitledtogobeyondthe
ConstitutionandtouchanyofthefundamentalsoftheConstitution.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
JusticeHamoodurRahman,ashethenwas,writingatanotherpartofhisjudgment,notedthatthe
mainfabricorfundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitutioncouldnotbechangedbythePresidentby
callingitadaptation:
ThemainfeatureoftheConstitution,therefore,isthataMinistershouldnotbeamemberofthe
House,heshouldhavenorighttovotetherein,norshouldhistenureofofficebedependentuponthe
supportofthemajorityofthemembersoftheAssemblynorshouldheberesponsibletotheAssembly.
ThisisanessentialcharacteristicofaPresidentialformofgovernmentandMr.Brohiappearingon
behalfoftherespondenthascalleditthe"mainfabric"ofthesystemofgovernmentsoughttobeset
upbythepresentConstitution.Analterationofthis"mainfabric",therefore,soastodestroyit
altogethercannot,inmyview,becalledanadaptationoftheConstitutionforthepurposeof
implementingit.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
TheCourtfirstidentifiedadistinctionbetweenremovalofdifficultyandamendmentofthe
Constitution.ItwasonlyafterthattheCourtidentifiedfundamentalfeatureswhichcouldnotbe
changedinthegarbofremovingdifficultybythePresident.Nothingwassaidatanypartofthe
judgmenttoplacelimitationsonthepoweroftheParliamentasAmendingAuthoritytoamendthe
Constitution.
47.ComingbacktotheIndianjudgmentofSajjanSingh(supra)whereinitwasobserved
thattheSupremeCourtofPakistanhadidentifiedunamendablefeaturesoftheConstitution,even
thereitwasnotedthattheSupremeCourtofPakistanhadheldthatthePresidenthadnopowersto
amendtheConstitution.TheparagraphquotedintheIndianjudgmentwastakenfromthejudgmentof
ChiefJusticeCornelius,ashethenwas.Ifthesaidparagraph,inwhichfundamentalfeaturesofthe
Constitutionwereidentifiedisreadinitspropercontext,itbecomesclearthatnolimitations,either
expresslyorimpliedly,wereplacedonthepoweroftheParliamentasAmendingAuthoritytoamend
suchfeatures.Inthesaidparagraph,afterdeclaringthetrueintentandpurposeofArticle224(3),the
thenChiefJusticehadheldthePresidentialOrdertobeultravirestheConstitutionas:
theexpediencyandnecessitywereforproducinganeffectcontrarytothatclearlystatedinthe
Constitution,andnotforthepurposeofbringingtheConstitutionasitwasgrantedtothecountry,into
operationTheimpressionisclearandunavoidablethatthegroundofexpediencywasbasedona
desiretoaccedetothewishesofcertainpersons,probablyafairlysmallnumberofpersons,butthe
Constitutionwasnotintendedtobevariedaccordingtothewishesofanypersonorpersons.Anything
inthenatureof"respectingofpersons,"unlessprovidedbytheConstitutionitself,wouldbeaviolation
oftheConstitution,andiftheConstitutionwereitselfalteredforsomesuchreason,andthatina
substantial,andnotmerelyamachineryaspect,therewouldclearlybeanerosion,awhittlingawayof
itsprovisions,whichitwouldbethedutyofthesuperiorCourtstoresistindefenceoftheConstitution.
Theaspectofthefranchise,andoftheformofGovernmentarefundamentalfeaturesofaConstitution,
andtoalterthem,inlimineinordertoplacateorsecurethesupportofafewpersons,wouldappearto
beequivalentnottobringingthegivenConstitutionintoforce,buttobringingintoeffectanalteredor
differentConstitution.
ItisquiteclearfromthisdiscussionthatChiefJusticeCornelius,ashethenwas,onlyreferredtothe
fundamentalfeatureswhichcouldnotbeamendedbythePresidentbyexercisingpowersunder
Article224(3)tobringintoeffectanalteredordifferentConstitutioninordertofavourfew
persons.Thisjudgmentdidnotatanypointplaceoridentifyanylimitations,whetherimpliedor
express,onthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendeventheidentifiedfundamentalfeaturesofthe
Constitution.
ZiaurRehman(supra)wasthecaseinwhichthisCourtforthefirsttimeconsidered
thepoweroftheCourtstostrikedownaConstitutionalAmendment.Thepetitionersthereinhad
challengedthevalidityoftheInterimConstitutionof1972andthecompetenceoftheNational
AssemblytoframesuchaConstitution.ItwasarguedthattheSuperiorCourtswereentitledtostrike
downsuchoftheprovisionsoftheInterimConstitutionaswereviolativeofthefundamentalprinciples
acceptedbytheObjectivesResolutionofthe7.03.1949.ChiefJusticeHamoodurRehman,ashethen
was,writingfortheCourtheldthat:
Sofar,therefore,asthisCourtisconcernedithasneverclaimedtobeabovetheConstitutionnorto
havetherighttostrikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Ithasacceptedthepositionthatitisa
creatureoftheConstitution;thatitderivesitspowersandjurisdictionsfromtheConstitution;andthatit
willevenconfineitselfwithinthelimitssetbytheConstitutionwhichithastakenoathtoprotectand
preservebutitdoesclaimandhasalwaysclaimedthatithastherighttointerprettheConstitutionand
tosayastowhataparticularprovisionoftheConstitutionmeansordoesnotmean,evenifthat
particularprovisionisaprovisionseekingtooustthejurisdictionofthisCourt(Emphasishasbeen
provided)
RejectingtheargumentofthelearnedCounselforthepetitionersthathigherlawsofmorality,political
expediency,lawsofnatureetcshouldbeemployedtostrikedowntheprovisionsoftheConstitutional
amendment,theCourtheldthat:
ItisnownecessarytoexamineastowhetheranydocumentotherthantheConstitutionitselfcanbe
givenasimilarorhigherstatusorwhetherthejudiciarycan,intheexerciseofitsjudicialpower,strike
downanyprovisionoftheConstitutionitselfeither,because,itisinconflictwiththelawsofGodorof
natureorofmoralityorsomeothersolemndeclarationwhichthepeoplethemselvesmayhaveadopted
forindicatingtheformofGovernmentwishtobeestablished.Iformypartcannotconceiveasituation,
inwhich,afteraformalwrittenConstitutionhasbeenlawfullyadoptedbyacompetentbodyandhas
beengenerallyacceptedbythepeopleincludingthejudiciaryastheConstitutionofthecountry,the
judiciarycanclaimtodeclareanyofitsprovisionsultraviresorvoid.Thiswillbenopartofitsfunction
ofinterpretation.(Emphasishasbeenprovided)
TheCourthoweverlaiddownthatthejudicialreviewoverConstitutionalAmendmentswasonlylimited
toconsideringiftheproperprocedureforintroducingsuchamendmentwasfollowedanddidnot
extendoverthesubstantivepartsoftheamendment:
Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatthevalidityofnoConstitutionalmeasurecanbetestedinthe
Courts.IfaConstitutionalmeasureisadoptedinamannerdifferenttothatprescribedintheConsti
tutionitselforispassedbyalessernumberofvotesthanthosespecifiedintheConstitutionthenthe
validityofsuchameasuremaywellbequestionedandadjudicatedupon.This,however,willbepossible
onlyinthecaseofaConstitutionalamendment
TakinguptheargumentbasedontheObjectivesResolution,theCourtheldthat:
Therefore,inmyview,howeversolemnorsacrosanct&document,ifitisnotincorporatedinthe
ConstitutionordoesnotformapartthereofitcannotcontroltheConstitution.Atanyrate,theCourts
createdundertheConstitutionwillnothavethepowertodeclareanyProvisionoftheconstitutionitself
asbeinginviolationofsuchadocument.Ifinfactthatdocumentcontainstheexpressionofthewillof
thevastmajorityofthepeople,thentheremedyforcorrectingsuchaviolationwillliewiththepeople
andnotwiththejudiciary.ItfollowsfromthisthatunderourownsystemtootheObjectivesResolution
of1949,eventhoughitisadocumentwhichhasbeengenerallyacceptedandhasneverbeenrepealed
orrenounced,willnothavethesamestatusorauthorityastheConstitutionitselfuntilitisincorporated
withinitormadepartofit.IfitappearsonlyasapreambletotheConstitution,thenitwillservethe
samepurposeasanyotherpreambleserves,namely,thatinthecaseofanydoubtastotheintentof
thelawmaker,itmaybelookedattoascertainthetrueintent,butitcannotcontrolthesubstantive
provisionsthereof...(Emphasishasbeenadded)
TheObjectivesResolutionwaslatermadesubstantivepartoftheConstitutionthroughArticle2Ayetin
HakimKhan(supra)andKaneezFatima(supra)itwasheldthateventhentheCourtscannotstrikedown
anyprovisionoftheConstitutiononthetouchstoneofObjectivesResolution.
48.InAbdulWaliKhan(supra)thisCourtdidnotfollowtheargumentsbaseduponthe
IndianjudgmentsofGolakNath(supra)andKesavanandaBharati(supra)butfollowedandaffirmedthe
principleinZiaurRahmascase.InreferencetotheargumentsbasedupontheIndiancaselaw,itwas
heldthat:
WearetoldthattheSupremeCourtofaneighbouringcountrybyamajorityofsixtofiveactuallytook
suchaviewinthecaseofGolakNathv.StateofPunjab(AIR1967SC1943),butthisviewwasmodified
subsequentlybyalargerBenchbyamajorityofseventosixinthecaseofKesavanandav.Stateof
Kerala(AIR1973SC1461),totheextentthat"whilefundamentalrightscannotbeabrogated
reasonableabridgementsoffundamentalrightscanbeeffectedinthepublicinterest".Theminority,of
course,tooktheviewthatthepowertoamendis"wideandunlimited"andthatthepowertoamend
includesthepowertorepeal.Theminorityviewinthelastmentionedcaseisinlinewiththedecisions
ofthatCourtpriorto1967videShankariPrasadv.UnionofIndia(AIR1951SC458)andSajjanSinghv.
StateofRajasthan(AIR1965SC845),butitisunnecessaryforustoenterintothis.controversy,asthis
Courtiscommittedtotheviewthat"thejudiciarycannotdeclareanyprovisionoftheConstitutiontobe
invalidorrepugnant"tothatnationalaspirationsofthepeopleandthevalidityofaConstitutional
amendmentcanonlybechallengedifitisadoptedinamannerdifferenttotheprescribedbythe
ConstitutionorispassedbyalessernumberofvotesthanthosespecifiedintheConstitution,videState
v.ZiaurRahman(PLD1973SC49)(Emphasishasbeenadded)
ThebasicstructureargumentwasagainraisedinUnitedSugarMillsLtd.Karachi(supra).While
discussingthechallengesraisedtotheConstitutionalamendmentinthesaidcase,theCourtheldthat:
Learnedcounselhowever,didnotassailtheamendmentsonthelargergroundaswasdonein
Golaknath'scaseAIR1967SC1943decidedintheIndianJurisdiction.Inthatcaseanarrowlydivided
SupremeCourtruledthattheIndianParliamentlackedthepowertoamendPartIIIoftheIndian
ConstitutionwhichprovidesforFundamentalRights.However,themajorityviewinthatcasewas
modifiedlaterinthecaseofKasavananda(AIR1973SC1461)againbyanarrowmajority.InPakistan,
thisCourtinthecaseofZiaurRehmanPLD1973SC49hashoweverfirmlylaiddowntheprinciplethata
constitutionalprovisioncannotbechallengedonthegroundofbeingrepugnanttowhataresometimes
statedas"nationalinspirations"oran"abstractconcept"solongastheprovisionispassedbythe
competentLegislatureinaccordancewiththeprocedurelaiddownbytheConstitutionorasupra
constitutionalinstrument.Intheinstantcase,thetwoamendmentsareriotquestionedforwantof
competencyoranyotherformaldefect.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
ThisCourtinFaujiFoundationv.ShamimurRehman(PLD1983SC457)afterdiscussingseriesofIndian
caselawonthesubjectofbasicstructureinparagraphs190to192,heldthatnoprovisionofthe
Constitutioncanbeultravires,becausethereisnotouchstoneoutsidetheConstitutionbywhichthe
validityofaprovisionoftheConstitutioncanbejudged.(Emphasishasbeenadded)InthecaseofSabir
Shahv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1994SC738)PresidentialProclamationissuedunderArticle234of
theConstitutiondirectingtheGovernoroftheprovincetoassumefunctionsoftheprovinceofNorth
WestFrontierprovinceonbehalfofthePresidentwaschallengedbeforetheCourt.TheCounselforthe
governmentarguedthatthejurisdictionoftheCourtwasoustedinundertakingjudicialreviewofthe
PresidentialProclamation.Indiancaseswereagaincitedtocontendthatamendmentstothe
ConstitutionchangingthebasicstructurearejusticiablebeforetheCourts.ThisCourtdidnotacceptthe
saidargumentinthefollowingwords:
10.ThedistinctionmadebytheIndianSupremeCourtbetweenabarofthejurisdictionprovidedbythe
originalConstitutionofIndiaandabarofjurisdictionsubsequentlyincorporatedbyamendingthe
ConstitutionhighlightedbyMr.SharifuddinPirzadahasnotbeenpressedintoservicebytheSuperior
CourtsinPakistan.ItistruethatthisCourthasnotdeclaredanyamendmentintheConstitutionasultra
viresonthegroundthatitwasviolativeofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Inotherwordsin
Pakistantheabovetheoryhasnotbeenaccepted.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
49.Twoothercasesrequiresomediscussion,namely,MahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra)
andthatofWukalaMahaz(supra)asthecounselappearingforboththesideshaveinterpretedthe
judgmentsdifferentlyregardingbasicstructuretheory,insupportoftheirrespectivestandpoint.In
MahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra)theEighthAmendmenttotheConstitutioncameunderchallenge,
includingArticle58(2)(b)(whichnowstandsrepealed)onthetouchstoneofbasicstructureofthe
Constitution.ThesevenMemberBenchofthisCourthearingthecasedismissedthepetitionalongwith
otherconnectedpetitionsbyashortorder.Mr.JusticeSajjadAliShah,thethenChiefJusticeofPakistan,
inhisjudgmentwhileholdingthatclause(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionimposednolimitation
whatsoeveronthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendanyprovisionoftheConstitutionwentontoadd
thatamendmentstotheConstitutionremainsubjecttolimitationthatthesalientfeatureorbasic
characteristicoftheConstitutionprovidingforFederalism,ParliamentaryDemocracyandIslamic
provisionsasenvisagedintheObjectivesResolution/PreambletotheConstitutionof1973whichhave
becomesubstantivepartoftheConstitutionremainuntouched.Theothermainjudgmentwasrendered
byMr.JusticeSaleemAkhtar.WhereastheChiefJusticehadwithoutanydiscussiononthepointor
givingreasonshadsimplydeclaredthattherewerelimitationsonthepowersoftheParliamentto
deviatefromthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,Mr.JusticeSaleemAkhtarhadinparagraphs29to
43ofhisjudgmentreferredtothecaselawfromtheIndianjurisdiction,startingfromKesavandaBharati
caseuptoRaghonathraoGanpatraov.UnionofIndia(AIR1993SC1267)andtakingintoaccountthe
jurisprudenceonthequestiondevelopedinPakistansincethecaseofZiaurRehmansheld:
34.ItcanthusbesaidthatinPakistanthereisaconsistentviewfromtheverybeginning
thataprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownholdingthatitisviolativeofanyprominent
feature,characteristicorstructureoftheConstitution.Thetheoryofbasicstructurehasthuscompletely
beenrejected.However,asdiscussedhereundereveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristicand
featureswhichplayimportantroleinformulatingthelawsandinterpretingtheprovisionsofthe
Constitution.SuchprominentfeaturesarefoundwithintherealmoftheConstitution.Itdoesnotmean
thatIimpliedlyacceptthetheoryofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Ithasonlybeenreferredto
illustratethateveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristics.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
Referringtoclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutiontheHonbleJudgenotedthat
However,therearefactorswhichrestrictthepoweroftheLegislaturetoamendtheConstitution.Itis
themoralorpoliticalsentiment,whichbindsthebarriersofLegislatureandformsConstitutional
understanding.Thepressureofpublicopinionisanotherfactorwhichrestrictsandresiststheunlimited
powertoamendtheConstitution.InPakistanalthoughArticle239confersunlimitedpoweruponthe
Legislature,yetitcannotbysheerforceofmoralityandpublicopinionmakelawsamendingthe
ConstitutionincompleteviolationoftheprovisionsofIslam.Norcanitconvertdemocraticformin
completelyundemocraticone.LikewisebyamendmentCourtscannotbeabolishedwhichcanperish
onlywiththeConstitution.AnothersignificantpointtonoteinMahmoodKhanAchakzaiscaseisthe
shortorderwhichinfactisthejudgment.Itrecognizesthatthequestionofbasicstructureofthe
Constitutioncannotbeansweredauthoritatively.Para2oftheshortorderreads:
WhatisthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisaquestionofacademicnaturewhichcannot
beansweredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinalitybutitcanbesaidthattheprominentcharacteristics
oftheConstitutionareamplyreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionwhichisnowsubstantivepartofthe
ConstitutionasArticle2AinsertedbytheEighthAmendment.
Thus,itwasneverheldinMahmoodKhanAchakzaithatthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutioncanbe
madeagroundtotestthevalidityofaConstitutionalamendment.
50.BythefourteenthconstitutionalamendmentArticle63Awasintroducedprovidingfor
disqualificationofaMemberofNationalAssemblyorProvincialAssembliesuponhisdefectionfromthe
partyonwhosetickethegotelected.ThisamendmentwaschallengedbyWukalaMahazBaraiTahafuz
Dastoor,onwhosebehalfagainthebasicstructuretheorywasinvokedforthepurposeofstrikingdown
theamendment.Mr.JusticeAjmalMian,thethenChiefJusticeofPakistan,wrotetheleadingjudgment
whereinhediscussedthecaselawofIndiaandPakistanonthesubjectandconcludedthatfromthe
abovecaselaw,itisevidentthatinPakistanthebasicstructuretheoryconsistentlyhadnotbeen
accepted.
51.ThecaseZafarAliShah(supra)hasbeencitedinsupportofthepropositionthatthe
CourtcanannulconstitutionalamendmentonthetouchstoneofbasicfeatureoftheConstitution.In
thatcasewhileaccordinglegitimacytomilitarytakeoverbyGeneralPervezMusharrafhewasalso
grantedthepowertoamendtheConstitution.TheCourtwashowevermindfulthatsuchpowersmust
notbeunfettered.ItwasinthatcontextthattheCourtobservedthatsincetheParliamentcannotalter
basicfeatureoftheConstitutionaswasheldinMahmoodKhanAchakzaiscasethemilitaryrulercould
alsonotexercisesuchpowers.TheCourtwentontostatethattheindependenceofthejudiciary,
federalismandparliamentaryformofgovernmentblendedwithIslamicProvisionsbeingthebasic
featurecannotbealteredbytheParliament.WithrespectitwasneverheldinMahmoodKhan
AchakzaiscasethattheParliamentwasnotempoweredtobringaboutamendmentinviolationofthe
basicstructureoftheConstitution.Furthermore,theabovelimitationinZafarAliShahscaseistobe
consideredinthecontextofthegrantofamendingpowerstoamilitaryrulerandthelimitationswere
imposedontheexerciseofsuchpower.Inanycase,sincethequestionofstrikingdownaconstitutional
amendmentwasnotbeforetheCourt,theobservationatbestcouldbeconsideredasobiterdicta.
52.ZafarAliShahwasnotfollowedinPakistanLawyersForumwherethisCourt
unequivocallyrefusedtoaccepttheargumentofsettingasideconstitutionalamendmentsonthe
touchstoneofbasicstructure.ReferringtothecasesofMahmoodKhanAchakzaiandZafarAliShahit
washeldthat:
57.TheconclusionwhichemergesfromtheabovesurveyisthatpriortoSyedZafarAliShah'scase,
therewasalmostthreedecadesofsettledlawtotheeffectthateventhoughtherewerecertainsalient
featuresoftheConstitution,noConstitutionalamendmentcouldbestruckdownbythesuperior
judiciaryasbeingviolativeofthosefeatures.Theremedylayinthepoliticalandnotthejudicialprocess.
TheappealinsuchcaseswastobemadetothepeoplenottheCourts.AConstitutionalamendment
posedapoliticalquestion,whichcouldberesolvedonlythroughthenormalmechanismsof
parliamentarydemocracyandfreeelections.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
ReferringtoIndiancaselawonthesubjectandalsotheviewsexpressedinthejudgmentsofthisCourt
declaredthat:
58.Itmayfinallybenotedthatthebasicstructuretheory,particularlyasappliedbytheSupremeCourt
ofIndia,isnotanewconceptsofarasPakistanijurisprudenceisconcernedbuthasbeenalready
consideredandrejectedafterconsiderablereflectionasdiscussedinthecasesnotedhereinabove
59.ThepositionadoptedbytheIndianSupremeCourtinKesvavanandaBharaticaseisnotnecessarilya
doctrine,whichcanbeappliedunthinkinglytoPakistan.Pakistanhasitsownuniquepoliticalhistoryand
itsownuniquejudicialhistory.IthasbeentheconsistentpositionofthisCourteversinceitfirst
enunciatedthepointinZiaurRahman'scasethatthedebatewithrespecttothesubstantiveviresofan
amendmenttotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestiontobedeterminedbytheappropriatepolitical
forum,notbythejudiciary.ThatintheinstantpetitionsthisCourtcannotabandonitswellsettled
jurisprudence.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
53.TheabovediscussionleaveoneinnodoubtthatthisCourthasrightfromthe1973
caseofZiaurRahmantoWuklaMuhazandPakistanLawyersForum(supra)consistentlyheldthatthe
basicstructuretheoryhasbeenrecognizedonlytotheextentofidentifyingsalientorfundamental
featuresofourConstitution.However,thetheoryhasneverbeenacceptedorappliedasagroundfor
strikingdownamendmentintheConstitution.TheCourthasconsistentlyrefusedtofollowtheposition
takenbytheSupremeCourtofIndiaonthesubject.
54.EveninIndiathereisnounanimityontheapplicationofthisdoctrine.Adetailed
analysisofcaselawfromtheIndianjurisdictionisnotrequiredasthathasbeenextensivelyundertaken
bythisCourtinthecasesofFaujiFoundation,MahmoodKhanAchakzai,PakistanLawyersForumand
WuklaMuhaz(supra)beforeholdingthatthepeculiarConstitutionalhistoryandpoliticsofIndiacannot
beemulatedinPakistanunscrupulously.Abriefcriticalanalysiswillbemadeofthebroadtrends
introducedbyseminalIndianjudgmentsonthemattertoidentifytheparticularhistoryofthestruggle
andconflictbetweenthejudiciaryandparliamentinIndianecessitatingthedevelopmentofthebasic
structuredoctrine.
55.ThedoctrineofbasicstructuredevelopedinIndiaasaresultofthestrugglefor
supremacybetweenthejudiciaryandtheparliamentoverinterpretativefinalityovertheConstitution.
TheCongressledParliamentofIndiaduringthetimesofJawaharlalNehruandIndiraGandhibelieved
stronglyintheideaofstateledsocialisminwhichacentralized,parliamentariansystemofgovernment
wouldleadthenationinredistributingwealththroughstateledmodernizationthroughindustrialization
andlandreform.AnumberofamendmentswerebroughtintheConstitutiontofurtherthesocialist
agendaoflandreformsandtherighttopropertyinIndiasufferedasaresultofsuchschemes.These
amendmentswerechallengedbeforetheCourtswhichcommittedtoprotectingtherighttopropertyof
thepeople,afterinitialreluctance,finallystruckdowntheamendmentsinthecaseofGolakNath.Later,
inthecaseofKesavannadaBharatitheSupremeCourtofIndiaborrowedtheacademicdoctrineofbasic
structure,developedbyProfessorDietrichConrad,aGermanacademic,todevelopjurisprudentialbasis
forthesaiddoctrine.ThiscreatedthebasisforthestrugglebetweentheParliamentandtheCourtsover
finalityofsayovertheConstitution.Thishasbeendescribedbyahistorianasthestruggleoverthe
custodyoftheConstitution,withtheparliamentsassertionofabsolutepowertoamendbeing
counteredbythejudiciaryactingascustodianoftheunamendablebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.
(Referencecanbemadetofollowingtextsforacriticalcommentaryandhistoriographyofthestruggle
ofsupremacybetweentheParliamentandtheCourtsleadingtothedevelopmentofthebasicstructure
doctrineinIndia:WorkingaDemocraticConstitutionbyGranvilleAustin;TheSupremeCourtandthe
struggleforcustodyoftheConstitutionbyGranvilleAustininSupremebutnotinfallible:Essaysin
HonouroftheSupremeCourtofIndia;Courage,CraftandContention:TheIndianSupremeCourtin
theEightiesbyProfessorUpendraBaxi).SupremeCourtofIndiainGolakNath(supra)reversedthe
earlierviewinthecasesofShankariPrasadandSajjanSingh(supra)thatfundamentalrightscannotbe
amendedevenbyfollowingtheprocedurelaiddownunderArticle368.InGolakNath'scase,the
doctrineofanyimpliedlimitationsonParliament'spowertoamendtheConstitutionwasnotaccepted.
Themajorityfeltthat"thereisconsiderableforceinthisargument"butthoughtitunnecessaryto
pronounceonit."ThisquestionmayariseforconsiderationonlyifParliamentseekstodestroythe
structureoftheConstitutionembodiedinprovisionsotherthaninPartIIIoftheConstitution."
56.ItwaseventuallyinthecaseofKesavanandaBharatithatthistheoryofimplied
limitationsonthepowersofamendmentbytheParliamentwasacceptedwhenamendmentstothe
ConstitutionweakeningtherighttopropertywerechallengedbeforetheCourt.Thelaterjudgmentin
IndiraGandhiwaspronouncedduringaperiodofemergency,whenConstitutionalamendmenthad
beenpassedtohelpthethenincumbentPrimeMinisterinherappeal,pendingbeforetheSupreme
Court.ThesejudgmentshavebeencriticizedforintroducinguncertaintiesastheParliamentwhile
amendingtheConstitutionwouldnotknowastowhethertheamendmentwouldsurvivethetestof
basicfeaturesformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.KesavanandaBharatididnotlaydown
withprecisionanyofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionwhichwereidentifiedbytheCourtinthe
latercasesofIndiraGandhi,MinervaMillsLtd.,WamanRao,I.R.Coelho(supra)etcandhavebeenlisted
bycertaincommentatorsonIndianConstitutiontobe27innumberandgrowingincount.Eventhese
identifiedbasicfeaturesareverybroadinnatureandopentovariedinterpretationbythejudiciary.The
dissentinKesavanandaBharatiquestionsmanyoftheassumptionsformingthebasisoflayingdown
impliedlimitationsonParliamentspowerstoamend.Oneoftheargumentsforwardedwasthefear
theory,expressingdistrustintheParliamentsunbridledpowersofamendment,asitwascontended
thatitmayleadtocompleteabrogationorevenrepealoftheConstitutionbyit.Thisfeartheoryis
basedupontheappallingandsadhistoryoftheamendmentsintroducedbytheNazidictatorshipofthe
ThirdReichtotheConstitutionoftheGermanReich(WeimarConstitution)of1919throughtheEnabling
Actof1933(Referencecanbemadetothefollowingtextforatheoreticalaccountoftheconstitutional
andlegalhistoryofGermanyundertheNazitotalitarianship:StateofExceptionbyGiorgioAgamben).
JusticeChandrachud,wholaterbecametheChiefJusticeofIndia,inhisdissentarguedagainstthefear
theoryinthefollowingwords:
Counselpaintedaluridpictureoftheconsequenceswhichwillensueifawideanduntrammelled
powerisconcededtotheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Theseconsequencesdonotscareme.
Itistruethatourconfidenceinthemenofourchoicecannotcompletelysilenceourfearsforthesafety
ofourrights.Butinademocraticpolicy,peoplehavetherighttodecidewhattheywantandtheycan
onlyexpresstheirwillthroughtheirelectedrepresentativesinthehopeandbeliefthatthetrustwillnot
beabused.Trusteesarenotunknowntohavecommittedbreachesoftrustbutnooneforthatreason
hasabolishedtheinstitutionofTrusts...Thetruesanctionagainstsuchpoliticalcrimesliesinthehearts
andmindsofmen.Itistherethatthelibertyisinsured...Ifandwhentheyrealisethedisasterbroughtby
themuponthemselves,theywillsnatchtheCrownandscatteritsjewelstothewinds.
57.ThepositioninIndiaalsodifferedfromPakistanastherewasnojurisdictionousting
clauseintheConstitutionofIndiarestrictingthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution
underArticle368beforethejudgmentinKesavanandaBharati.Itwasonlylater,thattograntprotection
toconstitutionalamendments,thatclause(4)wasaddedtoArticle368throughtheFortySecond
ConstitutionalAmendment,tooustthejurisdictionoftheCourtsfromcallingintoquestionany
amendmenttotheConstitution.Thesaidclausewaslaterheldtobeunconstitutionalandvoidin
MinervaMillsLtd.whereassimilarprovisionsintheConstitutionofPakistani.e.clauses(5)and(6)of
Article239,introducedthroughtheEighthAmendment,remainedunchallenged.Rather,thesaid
AmendmentasawholehasbeenheldtobevalidinthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra).
58.Basicstructuretheory,developedbyProfessorConrad,inthewakeoftheharrowing
experienceoftheNaziGermany,wasadoptedbytheCourtsofIndiaasatooltocreatejurisprudencefor
ensuringtheirsupremacyovertheParliament.Thistheorydoesnothaveanyuniversalacceptancein
comparativeconstitutionalanalysisandalsohaslimitationsashighlightedindissentingnotesof
KesavnandaBharati.Ideascannotbeuncriticallyborrowedfromforeignjurisdiction,without
understandingtheparticularhistoriesoftheirdevelopmentorappreciatingtheirconsequencesinthe
hostjurisdiction,especiallywhenourownjurisprudenceonthesaidquestionhasalreadybeensettled
andforgoodreasons.
59.AnargumentwasraisedatthebarthattheObjectivesResolution,adoptedbythe
ConstituentAssemblyofPakistanon12.03.1949(ConstituentAssemblyofPakistanDebates,1949
VolumeVatpage101)andincorporatedinalltheConstitutions,beconsideredasexpressingand
containingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionofPakistan;itwasurgedthatitwasaconsensus
documentandthatitexpressedthedesiresofthefoundingfathersforalltimesonwhichtheRepublic
ofPakistanistobeformed;thattheObjectivesResolutionisbroadenoughtobeinterpretedbyeach
generationaccordingtoitstimeandspecificenoughtocontainallthebasicandessentialfeatures
formingtheframeworkoftheConstitutionofPakistan;thatafteritsinclusionintotheConstitutionof
PakistanbyPresidentialOrderNo.14of1985,ithasbecomeasubstantivepartoftheConstitution
whichshouldberecognizedassuchbytheCourt.Referencewasmadetocaselaw,whereObjectives
ResolutionhasbeendeclaredtocontainthegrundnormoftheConstitutionofPakistan.
60.BeforereferringtothecaselawregardingthestatusofObjectivesResolution
incorporatedassubstantivepartoftheConstitutionvideArticle2A,itwillbeworthwhiletorefertothe
historicalroleandstatusenvisagedfortheObjectivesResolutionaspreamblebythedraftersofthe
Constitution.
61.ObjectivesResolutionwasfirstmovedasthemotiontitledre:AimsandObjectsofthe
ConstitutionbythethenPrimeMinisterofPakistanLiaquatAliKhanon7.03.1949asembodyingthe
mainprinciplesonwhichtheConstitutionofPakistanistobebased.ItwasfurtherobservedbySardar
AbdurRabNishtar,theDeputyLeaderoftheHouse,inhisspeechthatthisResolutionitselfisnota
Constitution.ItisadirectiontotheCommitteethatwillhavetopreparethedraftkeepinginviewthese
mainfeatures.Ch.NazirAhmadKhan,MinisteroftheGovernment,alsoexpressedthenatureand
statusoftheObjectivesResolutioninthesewords:"ThisResolutionismerelyinthenatureofa
Preamble.Itis,sotosay,thetermsofreferencetothisAssemblyunderwhichtheyhavetoframetheir
futureConstitution.ItisneithertheofficiallegislationnoreventheConstitutionitself...(theseexcerpts
havebeenborrowedfromthehistoryoftheObjectivesResolutionasgivenbyChiefJusticeNasim
HassanShah,ashethenwas,inthejudgementofHakimKhan(supra).Itwasneitherintendedtobea
supraConstitutionaldocumentbythedraftersoftheConstitutionof1956norbythedraftersofthe
Constitutionof1973.Mr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,astheFederalMinisterforLawandParliamentary
Affairs,whopresentedthedraftBilloftheConstitutionbeforetheparliament,explainedtheposition
ofthePreamblevisavistheoperativepartsoftheConstitutioninthefollowingwords:
PreambleessentiallyisnotanoperativepartoftheConstitution.Preambleisapreamblewhichmakes
manifestationofintentiononthepartofLegislature.Inthepastsomepeoplehaveclaimedthe
preamblewhichreflectstheObjectivesResolutionofthefirstConstituentAssemblyofPakistanof1949
asthegrundnome(sic)makingthecrestoftheConstitutionsubservienttothepreamble.Thisisnotthe
correctposition.Preamblecannotberelieduponforthepurposesofinterpretationorenforcementof
theConstitutionwhereofthelanguageoftheConstitutionisabsolutelyclear.Thisviewwasalwaysthe
acceptedviewandonlylately,inacase,theSupremeCourtofPakistanhasreaffirmedthispositionthat
preambleisnotagrundnome(sic).Wehavealsogotsomecasesinwhichjudgementhasbeendelivered
byasuperiorcourtinPakistanwherebyitissaidthatbyvirtueofthepreamble,JudgesoftheHigh
Courts,withoutdisrespecttothem,derivedsomedivinepowerunderthepreambletosupersedethe
Constitution.Iwouldliketocategoricallystatethatnothingcouldbemorewrongthanthis...Therefore,
thepreambleatbestservesaswhatissupposedtobemanifestationofintention,nothingbeyondthat.
Andonlywherethelanguageisincapableofinterpretationcanthemanifestationofintentionbelooked
upon.Oncethatisdone,thatistheend.Preambledoesnotserveanypurposebeyondthis.Itcannotbe
overriding,itcannotbedominant,itcannotmakeConstitutionsubservienttothelanguageandthe
preamble.ItisnotasupraConstitutionaldocumentorinstrumentashasbeenstatedinthepastina
judgementwhichnowwehavereversedthroughajudgementoftheSupremeCourt.SoSir,thisIwould
liketogoonrecordthatpreamblealthoughcontainedinaConstitutionaldocument,isnotpartand
parceloftheoperativeportionoftheConstitutionsoastogoverntherulesofinterpretationwithregard
totheConstitution.
Thewillofthepeople,asisrepresentedthroughtheirrepresentativesintheConstituentAssemblywas
nottograntasupraConstitutionalstatustotheObjectivesResolution,dominatingrestoftheprovisions
andstructureoftheConstitution.ItwastoremainasthepreambletotheConstitution.Noobjectionto
itsstatusaspreambleoftheConstitutionwasraisedfromanysideintheConstitutionmakingprocessof
1973,ascanbeseenfromthearchiveoftheConstitutionMakingDebates.ThespeechbyMr.Pirzada,
whilepresentingthedraftoftheBilloftheConstitutionbeforetheparliament,showsthatpeople
throughtheirrepresentativesonlywantedtoretaintheObjectivesResolutionaspreambletothe
Constitution,aswasalsodoneintheprevioustwoConstitutions.
62.ItwasonlymadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionvidetheRevivalofthe
Constitutionof1973Order,1985(P.O.No.14of1985)throughtheinsertionofArticle2A.Itwas
throughamendmentoftheConstitutionbyamilitarydictator,whichhoweverdidreceiveapprovalfrom
theparliamentthroughtheEighthAmendmenttotheConstitution.
63.TheissueregardingtheroleandstatusofObjectivesResolutionassupra
ConstitutionalwasfirstraisedinthecaseofMissAsmaJilani(supra)inthatChiefJusticeHamoodur
Rehman,ashethenwas,notedthat:
Inanyevent,ifagrundnormisnecessary,PakistanneednothavetolooktotheWesternlegal
theoriststodiscoverit.Pakistan'sowngrundnormisenshrinedinitsowndoctrinethatthelegal
sovereigntyovertheentireuniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthorityexercisableby
thepeoplewithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust.Thisisanimmutableandunalterable
normwhichwasclearlyacceptedintheObjectivesResolutionpassedbytheConstituentAssemblyof
Pakistanonthe7thofMarch1949.
ThisstatementhasbeeninterpretedasapronouncementbytheCourtofObjectivesResolutiontobe
grundnormoftheConstitutionalandlegalstructureofPakistanandgrantingitasupraConstitutional
status.However,inthelatercaseofZiaurRehman(supra),ChiefJusticeHammodurRehman,ashe
thenwas,clearedtheambiguitysurroundingthestatusofObjectivesResolutionwhichhadcroppedup
inhisearlierpronouncement,inthesewords:
SofarastheObjectivesResolutionof1949isconcerned,thereisnodisputethatitisanimportant
documentwhichproclaimstheaimsandobjectivessoughttobeattainedbythepeopleofPakistan;but
itisnotasupraConstitutionaldocument,norisitenforceableassuch,for,havingbeenincorporatedas
apreambleitstandsonthesamefootingasapreamble.Itmaybelookedattoremovedoubtsifthe
languageofanyprovisionoftheConstitutionisnotclear,butitcannotoverrideorcontroltheclear
provisionsoftheConstitutionitself.
Evenotherwise,theambiguitycanbeclearedupiftheexcerptreferredtofromAsmaJilaniscaseis
readwithinthecontextinwhichitwaswritten.ChiefJusticeHamoodurRehmaninthesaidjudgment
wasconsideringthejurisprudentialerrorstheCourthadearlierfalleninto,inthecaseofStatev.Dosso
(PLD1958SC533),byusingtheconceptofgrundnormfromthewritingsofHansKelsen.ChiefJustice
HamoodurRehmanonlyreferredtotheObjectivesResolutiontoproveapointthattherewasnoneed
tohaverecoursetoWesternlegalthoughtforimportingideasofgrundnorm.ObjectivesResolutionwas
onlyreferredtointhiscontextasapossiblegrundnormwhichcouldhavebeenreferredtobytheCourt
inthecaseofDossoinsteadofrelyingonthewritingsofKelsen.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthesaid
excerptstartswithaconditionalstatement[i]nanyevent,ifagrundnormisnecessaryclearly
providingthatitwasonlyanargumentstatedtocountertheuseofWesternlegaltheoristinthesaid
caseandnottostateabindingopinionoftheCourt.
ChiefJusticeHamoodurRehman,inthecaseofZiaurRehmanthenwentontoaddthat:
ItfollowsfromthisthatunderourownsystemtootheObjectivesResolutionof1949,eventhoughitis
adocumentwhichhasbeengenerallyacceptedandhasneverbeenrepealedorrenounced,willnot
havethesamestatusorauthorityastheConstitutionitselfuntilitisincorporatedwithinitormadepart
ofit.IfitappearsonlyasapreambletotheConstitution,thenitwillservethesamepurposeasany
otherpreambleserves,namely,thatinthecaseofanydoubtastotheintentofthelawmaker,itmay
belookedattoascertainthetrueintent,butitcannotcontrolthesubstantiveprovisionsthereof...
(Emphasishasbeenadded)
ChiefJusticeHamoodurRehmansopinioninthesaidexcerptscouldbereadtoimplythatObjectives
ResolutionwillnothavethesamestatusorauthorityastheConstitutionorclaimtocontrolit,unless
anduntilitisincorporatedwithintheConstitution.Thiscouldbereadasconditionallegitimacyfor
ObjectivesResolutiontocontroltheConstitutionsubjecttoitbeingmadeapartoftheConstitution
insteadofbeingretainedmerelyaspreambleoftheConstitution.Theconfusionsurroundingitsstatus
wasexasperatedafterObjectivesResolutionwasmadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionthrough
Article2A,insertedthroughPresident'sOrderNo.14of1985whichreadsasunder:
"2A.TheprinciplesandprovisionssetoutintheObjectivesResolutionreproducedintheAnnexare
herebymadesubstantivepartoftheConstitutionandshallhaveeffectaccordingly."
JusticeNasimHassanShahwritingfortheCourtinthecaseofHakimKhan(supra)alsonoticed
ambiguitysurroundingthestatusandroleoftheObjectivesResolutionintheConstitutionofPakistan
duetotheobservationsofJusticeHamoodurRehmanandArticle2Abeingmadesubstantivepartof
theConstitutioninthefollowingwords:
TheseobservationsofthelearnedChiefJusticeareopentodifferinginterpretations:Thus,forsome
theymeanthattheObjectivesResolutionwasnotaSupraConstitutionaldocumentandthatCourts
beingthecreaturesoftheConstitutioncouldnotstrikedownanyofitsprovisionsand,therefore,itwas
notopentoaCourttocountenanceanyprayertothateffect.Whileothersunderstoodthese
observationstoimplythatincasetheObjectivesResolutiongotincorporatedintotheConstitutionand
becameitssubstantivepart,itthencouldcontroltheotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.
ItwasurgedinHakimKhanscasethataftertheinclusionofObjectivesResolutionassubstantivepartof
theConstitutionithasclearlyacquiredthestatusofasupraConstitutionaldocument.Resultantly,any
oftheexistingprovisionsoftheConstitutionwhichconflictswithitstermsandisinconsistentor
repugnanttoitsprinciplesandprovisionshasbecomeinoperativeandofnolegaleffectandcanbeso
declaredbytheCourts.TheCourtdisagreedwiththissubmissionholdingthatsincetheword
substantivemeansanessentialpartorconstituentorrelatingtowhatisessential,aftertheinclusion
ofArticle2AintotheConstitution,ObjectivesResolutionpossessthesameweightandstatusasother
ArticlesoftheConstitutionwhicharealreadyasubstantivepartthereof.Courtthenproceededto
considertheimplicationsofthescenariowhenArticle2AwouldbecomeincontroloftheConstitution.
Insuchasituation,mostoftheArticlesoftheConstitutionwouldbecomequestionableonthe
touchstoneoftheObjectivesResolution,whichinrelationtotheConstitutionwouldresultin
underminingitandpavethewayforitseventualdestructionoratleastitscontinuanceinitspresent
form.Thatthiscouldnotbeallowedtohappenasinconsistenciesbetweenprovisionsofthe
ConstitutionandObjectivesResolutionweretobeharmoniouslyinterpretedinsteadofannulling
existingprovisionsoftheConstitutionwhichcannotbeundertakenbyanyCourt.Further,theCourtheld
thattheroleoftheObjectivesResolutionhasnotchangeddespiteitsinsertionasArticle2A.Theoriginal
rolefortheObjectivesResolution,inthewordsoftheCourt,wasthatitshouldserveasbeaconoflight
fortheConstitutionmakersandguidethemtoformulatesuchprovisionsfortheConstitutionwhich
reflectidealsandobjectivessetforththerein.AftertheframingoftheConstitutiontheroleofthe
ObjectivesResolutionstillremainedthesame,despiteitsinclusionassubstantivepartofthe
Constitution,throughtheinsertionofArticle2A,inthatanyinconsistencybetweentheexisting
provisionsoftheConstitutionandObjectivesResolutionmustberesolvedbytheParliament.Itisonly
throughtheamendingprocessprovidedintheConstitutionthattheallegedinconsistencybetweenthe
ObjectivesResolutionandprovisionsoftheConstitutioncanberesolved.TheCourtwasfurtherofthe
opinionthatastheprinciplescontainedintheObjectivesResolutionarecapableofverywideand
differentinterpretationsfordifferenttimes,anyinterpretationsplacedontheseconceptsbyCourtsof
lawfromtimetotimepursuanttocontroversiesraisedaboutthemeverynowandthenwouldrender
theConstitutionunstableandmakeituncertain.Therefore,ifanyquestionwasraisedregardingthe
validityofanyConstitutionalprovision,itwasheldthat:
suchquestioncanonlyberesolvedbytheMajliseShoora(Parliament),whichcan,ifthepleaiswell
founded,takethenecessaryremedialactionbymakingsuitableamendmentsintheimpugnedprovision
inordertobringitwithinthelimitsprescribedbyAllahAlmighty.
JusticeShafiurRehman,alsonotedthattheCourtcouldnotstrikedownConstitutionalprovisionson
thetouchstoneofObjectivesResolution,inthefollowingwords:
TheprovisionsofArticle2Awereneverintendedatanystagetobeselfexecutoryortobeadoptedas
atestofrepugnancyorofcontrariety.ItwasbeyondthepoweroftheCourttohaveappliedthetestof
repugnancybyinvokingArticle2AoftheConstitutionforstrikingdownanyprovisionoftheConstitution
(Article45).
ThequestionalsocamebeforetheCourtinthecaseofKaneezFatimav.WaliMuhammad(PLD1993SC
901),whereinJusticeSaleemAkhtar,relyingontheearliercaseofHakimKhan,heldthat:
Asisobviousfromtheaforestatedweightyobservations,Article2Acannotbepressedintoservicefor
strikingdownanyprovisionoftheConstitutiononthegroundsthatitisnotselfexecutoryandalsothat
anotherprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownbeinginconflictwithanyotherprovisionof
theConstitution.
InJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinderv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC483)theCourtwasagain
confrontedwiththequestionoverthestatusandroleofObjectivesResolutionassubstantivepartofthe
Constitution.TheCourtheldthat:
TheObjectivesResolutionremainedasubjectofdiscussioninvariousjudgmentsandthejudicial
consensusseemstobethat"whileinterpretingtheConstitution,theObjectivesResolutionmustbe
presenttothemindoftheJudgeandwherethelanguageoftheConstitutionalprovisionpermits
exerciseofchoice,theCourtmustchoosethatinterpretationwhichisguidedbytheprinciples
embodiedtherein.Butthatdoesnotmean,thatObjectivesResolutionistobegivenastatushigherthan
thatofotherprovisionsandusedtodefeatsuchprovisions.OneprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbe
struckdownonthebasisofanotherprovision.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
64.AnotheraspectcanvassedonbehalfofthepetitionersisthattheObjectivesResolution
representsthewillofthepeopleandthattheParliamentisnotempoweredtogoagainstitbymaking
amendmentsintheConstitutionthatareinconflictwiththedeclarationsmadeintheObjectives
Resolution.Undoubtedlythewillofthepeopleisexpressedthroughtheirrepresentativesinthe
Parliament.Itmayhoweverbenotedthatitisinthepreambleofthe1973Constitutionthatthewillof
thepeopleisdeclaredinthesewords:
Now,therefore,we,thepeopleofPakistan
Dohereby,throughourrepresentativesintheNationalAssembly,adopt,enactandgivetoourselves,
thisConstitution.
Thisdeclarationofwe,thepeopleofPakistanwasneitherapartoftheObjectivesResolutionasitwas
passedin1949noraspreambletotheConstitutionof1956and1962.However,thewillofthepeoplein
enactingtheConstitutionof1973wasthattheObjectivesResolutionwasnothingmorethana
Preamble.TheObjectivesResolutionwhichwasmadesubstantivepartoftheConstitutionthrough
Article2AwasthatannexedtotheConstitution.Thetextoftheannexureisdifferentfromthepreamble
oftheConstitutioninthatthedeclarationmadebywe,thepeopleofPakistanhasbeenomitted,for
obviousreasonsastheAnnexwasintroducedbyamilitaryruler.Thisgoestoshowthattheoriginal
Constitutionof1973,representingthewillofthepeoplethroughtheirchosenrepresentatives,had
declaredtheObjectivesResolutiontobeonlyapreambletotheConstitutionandnotitssubstantive
part.Thisamendmentwastherefore,notexpressionofthewillofthepeople.Though,Article2Ahas
sincebeenacknowledgedandacceptedassubstantivepartoftheConstitution,itdoesnothowever,
representthewillofthepeople.
65.ItfollowsfromtheabovediscussionthatnotwithstandingtheinclusionofArticle2A
wherebytheObjectivesResolutionhasbeenmadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitution,itneither
controlsotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionnorcanotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionbestruckdown
onthegroundthattheycomeintoconflictwithit.TheObjectivesResolutionassubstantivepartofthe
ConstitutioncanbeusedininterpretationofotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionincaseofdoubt.
66.SomepetitionersbeforetheCourtarguedthattheParliamentdidnothavethe
politicalmandatetointroduceamendmentsaffectingbasicorsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionas
theyhavenotreceivedmandateforthesamefromthepeople.Itwasarguedthattheparliamentshould
dissolveitselfandapproachthepeoplewithaclearpoliticalagendaregardingtheamendmentstothe
Constitutioncontemplatedbythem.Inthealternateitwasarguedthatreferendumseekingpeoples
opinionoftheproposedamendmentsbesoughtbeforetheyaremadebytheParliament.Thisargument
isunfoundedastheprocedureforintroductionofabilltoamendtheConstitutionunderArticle239
doesnotlaydownanysuchrequirementorrestrictionupontheParliament.Further,thereisnodivide
betweenlegislativepowersandconstituentpowersintheConstitutionofPakistan.Parliamentunder
theConstitutionalstructureofPakistanhasbothlegislativeandconstitutivepowersashasbeenheldby
JusticeSaeeduzZamanSiddiquiinWuklaMuhazinthefollowingwords:
ParliamentinPakistanexercisesordinarylegislativeaswellasconstituentpower.TheParliamentin
exerciseofitsordinarylegislativepowerapprovesorpassesActsandLegislationsinrespectofitems
enumeratedinthetwolegislativelistsintheFourthScheduleoftheConstitution,whileinexerciseofits
constituentpoweritcanamendtheConstitution.
ThequestionalsocamebeforefullbenchoftheSindhHighCourtinDewanTextileMillsLtd(supra)
whicharticulatedthequestioninthefollowingwords:
thePreambledeclaresthatitwasthepeoplewhoframedtheConstitution,coulditbesaidafter
theConstitutionwasframedthatthepeoplestillretainandcanexercisetheirsovereignConstituent
powertoamendormodifythatdocumentbyvirtueoftheirlegalsovereignty?
AfterdiscussingthepositionfromcomparativeConstitutionalandpoliticalphilosophies,theCourt
answeredtheaboveposedquestioninthefollowingwords:
Itwasintheexerciseofthe'constituentpower'thatthe'people'framedtheConstitutionandinvested
theAmendingBodywiththepowertoamendtheveryinstrumenttheycreated.Theinstrument,so
created,bynecessaryimplication,limitsthefurtherexerciseofthepowerbythem,thoughnotthe
possessionofit.TheConstitution,whenitexists,issupremeoverthe'people',andasthe'people'have
voluntarilyexcludedthemselvesfromanydirectorimmediateparticipationintheprocessofmaking
amendmenttoitandhavedirectlyplacedthatpowerintherepresentativeswithoutreservation.Itis
difficulttounderstandhowthe'people'canjuridicallyresumethepowertocontinuetoexerciseit.(see
Dodgev.Woolsay((1856)18How.331).Itwouldbeabsurdtothinkthattherecanbetwobodiesfor
doingthesamethingundertheConstitution.Itwouldbemostincongruoustoincorporateinthe
Constitutionaprovisionforitsamendment,iftheconstituentpowertoamendcanalsobeexercisedat
thesametimebythemassofthepeople,apartfromthemachineryprovidedfortheamendment.In
otherwords,thepeoplehavingdelegatedthepowerofamendment,thatpowercannotbeexercisedin
anywayotherthanthatprescribed,norbyanyinstrumentalityotherthanthatdesignatedforthat
purposebytheConstitution.TherearemanyConstitutionswhichprovideforactiveparticipationofthe
peopleinthemechanismforamendmenteitherbywayofinitiativeorreferendumasinSwitzerland,
AustraliaandEire.ButinourConstitutionthereisnoprovisionforanysuchpopulardeviseandthe
powerofamendmentisvestedonlyintheAmendingBody.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
Theabovequotedexcerptquiteaptlycapturesandrepliesallthechallengesraisedoverthepolitical
mandateexercisedbytheParliamentasConstitutionAmendingBodyhavingabsoluteconstituent
powersunderclause(6)ofArticle239(Itmayhoweverbekeptinmindthatthesaidratiodecidendiof
theCourtwasborrowedfromthedissentingnotebyJusticeK.K.MathewinKesavanandaBharati).It
mayfurtherbeobservedthatanydeterminationoftheexistenceorotherwiseofthepoliticalmandate
bytheParliamentmakingamendmentstotheConstitutionbytheCourtswouldbeenteringthepolitical
thicketwhichwasproscribedbythisCourtinZiaurRehmaninthefollowingwords:
Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatthebodyhavingthepowerofframingaConstitutionis
"omnipotent"orthatitcandisregardthemandategiventoitbythepeopleforframingaConstitutionor
canframeaConstitutionwhichdoesnotfulfiltheaspirationsofthepeopleorachievetheircherished
objectivespolitical,socialoreconomic.Theselimitationsonitspower,however,arepoliticallimitations
andnotjusticiablebythejudiciary.IfaConstituentAssemblyorNationalAssemblysoactsindisregard
ofthewishesofthepeople,itisthepeoplewhohavetherighttocorrectit.Thejudiciarycannotdeclare
anyprovisionoftheConstitutiontobeinvalidorrepugnantonthegroundthatitgoesbeyondthe
mandategiventotheAssemblyconcernedorthatitdoesnotfulfiltheaspirationsorobjectivesofthe
people.Toendeavourtodosowouldamounttoenteringintothepoliticalarenawhichshouldbe
scrupulouslyavoidedbythejudiciary.Withpoliticaldecisionsordecisionsonquestionsofpolicy,the
judiciaryisnotconcerned
ItwouldbewisefortheCourttoleavethedeterminationofthequestionregardingpoliticalmandateto
thepeople,ratherthanengaginginitasitispurelyapoliticalquestion.ThisCourtinPakistanLawyers
Forum(supra)heldonsimilarlinesthat:
57noConstitutionalamendmentcouldbestruckdownbythesuperiorjudiciaryasbeingviolativeof
thosefeatures.Theremedylayinthepoliticalandnotthejudicialprocess.Theappealinsuchcaseswas
tobemadetothepeoplenottheCourts.AConstitutionalamendmentposedapoliticalquestion,which
couldberesolvedonlythroughthenormalmechanismsofparliamentarydemocracyandfreeelections.
(Emphasishasbeenadded)
67.HavingheldthatneitherthebasicstructuretheorynortheObjectivesResolutionof
theConstitutioncanbemadeagroundtoannulanyamendmentintheConstitution,theprimary
questionremainswhethertheCourthasjurisdictionatalltostrikedownanamendmentonanyground
whatsoever.InthisrespectreferencemaybemadetoConstitutionalprovisionembodiedinclause(2)of
Article175readinconjunctionwithclause(5)ofArticle239oftheConstitution.
68.TheCourtshaveonlysuchpowersthathavebeenconferreduponitbythe
Constitutionorthelawunderclause(2)ofArticle175whichprovidesthat:
(2)NocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionorunder
anylaw.
ConstitutionalamendmentsinthiscasewerechallengedunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitutionwhich
grantsoriginalpowertotheSupremeCourtoveraquestionofpublicimportancewithreferencetothe
enforcementofanyoftheFundamentalRightsconferredbyChapter1ofPartII.Clause(2)ofArticle8
inPartIIofChapter1oftheConstitutionprovidesthattheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichmay
takeawayorabridgetherightssoconferredandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,to
theextentofsuchcontravention,bevoid.CourtactingunderitsoriginaljurisdictionunderArticle184
(3)cannotstrikedownconstitutionalamendmentsastheyarenotlawwithinthemeaningofclause(2)
ofArticle8.ReferencemaybemadetoFazlulQuaderthatconstitutionalamendmentisnotinthe
natureofthemakingofordinarylawasadifferencehasbeenmaintainedintheConstitutionbetween
makingoflawandamendmentoftheConstitution.JusticeKaikus,writingfortheCourt,heldthat:
EvenordinarilywheninaparticulardocumentwearereferringtotheConstitutionaswellastoother
lawstheword"law"wouldhavereferencenottotheConstitutionbuttootherlaws.Inthepresent
ConstitutionacleardistinctionbetweenmakingoflawandamendmentoftheConstitutionhasbeen
maintained.TheamendmentoftheConstitutionappearsinaseparatepartoftheConstitution,i.e.in
Articles208to210.Thereisadistinct,procedureprovidedforamendmentoftheConstitutionandthe
expression"makinglaw"isnotusedwithrespecttosuchamendmenteitherattheplacewherethe
amendmentisprovidedforor,atanyotherplace.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
ChiefJusticeAjmanMian,ashethenwas,inthecaseofWuklaMahazdistinguishedbetweenlawand
constitutionalamendmentinthefollowingwords:
Iaminclinedtoholdthatthewords"anylaw"usedinclauses(1)and(2)ofArticle8oftheConstitution
donotincludeanyprovisionoftheConstitutionwhichisevidentfromtheabovereferredArticles,
whereintheword"law"andtheword"Constitution"havebeenusedincontradistinction.Thereisa
welldefineddistinctionbetween"Legislativepower"and"Constituentpower".TheaboveArticles
apparentlywereframedkeepinginviewtheabovedistinction.Inthisviewofthematter,thesame
cannotbetreatedassynonymousconnotingthesamemeaning.Asacorollary,itmustfollowthatthe
validityofaConstitutionalprovisioncannotbetestedonthetouchstoneofArticle8ofthe
Constitution.
JusticeSaeeduzZamanSiddiquiinWuklaMuhazclarifiedthepositionoftheCourtfurtheronthe
questionbynotingthat:
ThelegislativepoweroftheParliamentisinferiortoitsconstituentpower,therefore,Parliament
exercisesitslegislativepowersubjecttotheconstraintsmentionedinArticle8oftheConstitution.
Therefore,anEnactmentpassedbytheParliamentinexerciseofitslegislativepowercanbestruck
downongroundofitsinconsistencywiththeprovisioncontainedinChapter1ofPartIIofthe
Constitution.However,theconstituentpoweroftheParliament,whichisatahigherpedestal,isnot
subjecttotheseconstraints.ThepowertoamendtheConstitutionconferredontheParliamentunder
Articles238and239oftheConstitutionisinthenatureofaconstituentpoweroftheParliament.
Therefore,aBillpassedbytheParliamentinexerciseofitspowerunderArticles238and239ofthe
ConstitutionamendingtheConstitutionthoughdescribedasan"Act"wouldnotbesubjecttothesame
limitationsasareapplicabletoan"Act"passedbytheParliamentinexerciseofitsordinarylegislative
power.AssoonasanActamendingtheConstitutionispassedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
Article239oftheConstitutionandtheActreceivestheassentofthePresidentasprovidedinthe
Constitution,theamendmentbecomesanintegralpartoftheConstitution.Itisawellsettledruleof
interpretationthatallprovisionsintheConstitutionhaveequalstatusunlesstheConstitutionitself
providesthatsomeofitsprovisionswillhaveprecedenceorprimacyovertheother.Therefore,an
amendedoranewprovisioninsertedintheConstitutionasaresultofthe,processofamendment
prescribedintheConstitution,isnota"law"withinthecontemplationofArticle8oftheConstitution
andassuch.thevalidityoftheamendedornewlyintroducedprovisionintheConstitutioncannotbe
testedonthetouchstoneofFundamentalRightscontainedinPartII,Chapter1oftheConstitution.Itis
awellsettledlawthatthevalidityofaConstitutionalprovisioncannotbetestedonthebasisofanother
provisionintheConstitutionbothbeingequalinstatus.Thedoctrineofultraviresnecessarilyimplies
thatoneofthetwocompetingprovisionsorlegislationsisinferiorinstatustotheotherandthevalidity
oftheinferiorprovisionorlegislationistestedonthetouchstoneofthesuperiorone.Thereisnothingin
thelanguageofArticle8toindicatethattheFramersofConstitutiongaveprimacytoArticle8ofthe
ConstitutionoveranyotherprovisionoftheConstitution.(Emphasishasbeenadded)
69.ThusthepowersconferredonthisCourtunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitution
cannotbeexercisedtostrikedownanyamendmentintheConstitutionevenifitviolatesanyofthe
fundamentalrights.SuchpowerhasnotbeenconferredontheCourtsbyanyotherprovisionofthe
Constitution.Rather,clause(5)ofArticle239innoambiguoustermsouststhejurisdictionofallCourts
tocallintoquestionanyamendment.Itreads:
(5)NoamendmentoftheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestioninanyCourtonanyground
whatsoever.
Clause(6)againindifferentlanguagedeclaresthattherearenolimitationsonthepowersofthe
parliamenttoamendanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Clause(5)and(6)wereintroducedintothe
ConstitutionthroughPresidentialOrderNo.20of1985.ChallengetotheEighthAmendmentasawhole
hasbeenrejectedinthecaseofAchakzai.ItistheConstitutionaldutyofajudgeundertakenbyhimin
hisOathofOfficetopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan.
ThiswouldobviouslyincludeamendmentsintheConstitution.Nojudge,boundbyhisOath,can
arrogatetohimselfjurisdictionwhichhasnotbeengrantedorconferredbytheConstitution.Itisan
acceptedprincipleofconstructionofstatutoryandConstitutionallawthatincasethelanguageisclear,
nooutsideorextrinsicaidcanbebroughttodeterminetheirmeaning.Referenceinthiscontextmaybe
madetothecaseofFederationofPakistanv.DurraniCeramics(2014SCMR1630)andtherevieworder
inthesamecasereportedasFederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryMinistryofPetroleumand
NaturalResourcesv.DurraniCeramics(PLD2015SC354),whereinextrinsicaidwasnotallowedtobe
usedininterpretationoftheConstitutionasthelanguageoftheprovisionsinquestionwereclearand
unambiguous.Thelanguageofclause(5)and(6)ofArticle238isclearandengendersnoambiguityin
meaningorinterpretation.CourtscannotexercisejurisdictionnotvestedinitbytheConstitutionsoas
toplaceanylimitationuponthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Asjurisdictionof
theCourthasbeenclearlyoustedfromreviewinganyamendmentsmadebytheParliamenttothe
Constitution,Courtscannotassumesuchjurisdictionuponitselfbyrelyingonanyacademictheories,
doctrinesoranyothermeansofconstruingmeaningoftheConstitution.
70.AnargumentwasraisedatthebarthatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015did
notenjoyconstitutionalprotectionasitwasassentedtobythePresidentlaterintimethanthe21st
ConstitutionalAmendment.Relianceinthiscontextwasplaceduponthenumbersgiventothetwo
amendmentbillsastheArmyAmendmentActwasassignedActIIof2015andtheConstitution
AmendmentActwasgivenActIof2015;itwasarguedthatActIIdidnotexistatthetimewhenthe
ArmyActwassoughttobeprotectedbyplacingitintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.Reference
wasmadetoclause(3)ofArticle75whichprovidesthemachinerywherebyabillintroducedunder
Article70andMoneyBillunderArticle73becomeslaworanActofParliament.Thesamereads:
75(3)WhenthepresidenthasassentedorisdeemedtohaveassentedtoaBill,itshallbecomelawand
becalledanActofMajliseShoora(Parliament).
ItwasarguedthatboththebillsbecamelawsthemomenttheyreceivedassentofthePresident;that
theassentwasgiveninaccordancewiththesequenceofthenumbersassignedtotheActs.ActI
becamelawbeforethePresidentgavehisassenttoActII.
71.TakinguptheargumentregardingthesequenceofassentgivenbythePresidenttothe
ConstitutionAmendment(ActIof2015)andtotheamendmentintheArmyAct,1952(ActIIof2015),it
istobenotedthatafterabillhasbecomelaworanAct,unlessthelegislatureintendsotherwise,under
Section5(3)ofTheGeneralClausesAct,1897theActshallcomeintoforcefromthestartoftheday
whenPresidentialAssentwasgiventoit.InMst.Ummatullahv.ProvinceofSindh(PLD2010Kar.236),
generalrulesregardingthemomentwhenaparticularActcomesintoforcehasbeenlaiddowninthe
followingwords:
16.Examiningthefirstcontentionastoprospectivityorotherwiseoftheimpugnedamended
regulations,generalruleisthatwhereanystatutethatdoesnotsetoutadateonwhichitistocome
intoforcethandateofenforcementisthedayitreceivestheassentfromtheassentingauthority(i.e.
PresidentincaseofCentralenactment,andGovernorincaseofProvincialenactments)
TherulehasbeenmoreclearlydiscussedinKhalidM.Ishaquev.ChiefJusticeandTheJudgesoftheHigh
CourtofWestPakistan,Lahore(PLD1966SC628)inthefollowingwords:
Thus,ifthecommencementbedeclaredtotakeeffectonaparticularday,saythe6thJanuary1964the
Actwouldbedeemedtocomeintoforceimmediatelyafterthestrokeofmidnightofthe5thJanuary
1964.Equally,iftheActwereexpressedtocomeintoeffectonthegrantingofassentthereto,thenif
thatassentwasgivenonthe6thJanuary1964,theoperationoftheorderwouldstillcommencefrom
midnightonthe5thJanuary1964.
OntheotherhanditisawellsettledpositionoflawthattheprovisionsofGeneralClausesActcannotbe
appliedtoconstrueprovisionsoftheConstitution.InGovernmentofPunjabv.ZiaullahKhan(1992
SCMR692),JusticeAjmalMian,ashethenwas,writingforafivememberBench,notedthat:
10.Mr.IrfanQadirhasnotbeenabletopressintoservicetheabovesection6Ainthecaseinhand,as
itiswellsettledpropositionoflawthatGeneralClausesActcannotbeusedinaidwhileconstruinga
ConstitutionalprovisionintheabsenceofmakingthesameapplicablethroughaConstitutional
provision,asitwasprovidedinArticle219ofthelateConstitutionofIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1956,
whichprovidesasunder:
"219(1).UnlessthecontextotherwiserequirestheGeneralClausesAct,1897,shallapplyforthe
interpretationoftheConstitutionasitappliedfortheinterpretationofaCentralAct,asifthe
ConstitutionwereaCentralAct.
(2)FortheapplicationoftheGeneralClausesAct,1897,totheinterpretationoftheConstitution,the
ActsrepealedbytheConstitutionshallbedeemedtobeCentralActs."
11.ItmaybementionedthatsincethereisnocorrespondingprovisionintheConstitution,theGeneral
ClausesActcannotbepressedintoserviceintheinstantcase,ashasbeenrightlyconcededbyMr.Irfan
Qadir(Emphasishasbeenadded)
TheprinciplewasfollowedinMuhammadArifv.TheState(1993SCMR1589)inparagraph16whereofit
washeldthattheGeneralClausesActisnotapplicabletotheConstitutionSincegeneralrules
regardingcomingintoforceorenforcementofalaworAct(ascontainedintheGeneralClausesAct,
1897)donotapplytoConstitutionalAmendment,thelatterbecomespartoftheConstitutionand
comesintoforcethemomentPresidentialassentisgiventoit,unlessadifferentintentionhasbeen
clearlyexpressedbytheParliament.ReferenceinthiscontextcanbemadetoSaeeduzZamanSiddiqui
inWuklaMuhaz,whereinhenotedthat:
Therefore,aBillpassedbytheParliamentinexerciseofitspowerunderArticles238and239ofthe
ConstitutionamendingtheConstitutionthoughdescribedasan"Act"wouldnotbesubjecttothesame
limitationsasareapplicabletoan"Act"passedbytheParliamentinexerciseofitsordinarylegislative
power.AssoonasanActamendingtheConstitutionispassedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof
Article239oftheConstitutionandtheActreceivestheassentofthePresidentasprovidedinthe
Constitution,theamendmentbecomesanintegralpartoftheConstitution.
Thus,themomenttheBillamendingtheConstitutionreceivestheassentofthePresidentasprovided
undertheConstitution,theamendmentbecomesanintegralpartoftheConstitution.Applyingthese
principlestothetwoActsinquestion,itbecomesclearthatunderSection5oftheGeneralClausesAct,
theamendmentinPakistanArmyActintroducedthroughActNo.IIwouldbedeemedtohavecomeinto
effectfrom0:00hoursofthedaywhenassentwasgiventoitbythePresidenti.e.7.01.2015.Since,
GeneralClausesActdoesnotapplytotheconstructionoftheConstitutionActNo.Ibeinga
constitutionalamendmentcameintoeffect,themomentPresidentialassentwasgiventoitlaterinday
on7.01.2015.Therefore,theamendmentinthePakistanArmyAct,1952wouldbedeemedtohave
comeintoeffectbeforeconstitutionalamendmentbecamepartoftheConstitution.
72.ItshouldalsobenotedthataftertheirintroductionintoNationalAssemblythe
constitutionalamendmentbillwasnumberedasActNo.Iof2015whilethebillseekingamendmentin
thePakistanArmyAct,1952wasnumberedasActNo.IIof2015.BoththeActswerepassedbythe
NationalAssemblyaftertheirreadingandvotingonthemhadtakenplacesimultaneously.Thetwobills
werethentransmittedtotheSenatewheretheywerepassedinthesamesitting.LearnedAttorney
GeneralbyreferringtotherecordoftheproceedinginSenatesubmittedthatActNo.II(amendmentin
PakistanArmyAct)waspassedbytheParliamentat5:00pmwhileActNo.I(constitutionalamendment)
waspassedat5:40pm.SincethebillseekingamendmentintheArmyActwaspassedpriorintimeto
thebillforconstitutionalamendmentintheSenate,itcanbeassumedthattheywereplacedforassent
beforethePresidentinthesameorder.Evenotherwisetheparliamentarianswereconsciousthatthey
wereaccordingConstitutionalprotectiontotheamendmentsthatwerebeingmadeintheArmyAct.
ThePresidenthadsignedboththebillswhentheywerepresentedtohiminthesamesittingon
7.01.2015.Thereisnowaytodetermineastowhichbillwassignedbyhimfirst.Inanycase,itdoesnot
conclusivelyfollowfromthesequenceoftheassignmentofnumberstothebillsthatthePresidentgave
hisassenttothebillsinthesamesequence.ItfollowsthattheConstitutionAmendment(ActNo.Iof
2015)camewasmadeaftertheamendmentintheArmyAct(ActNo.IIof2015)hadcomeintoforce.
Thisargumentthusfails.
73.Toconclude,asheldabove,therearenolimitations,expressorimpliedonthepowers
oftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionandtheamendmentsbroughtaboutinexerciseofsuch
powerarenotliabletobechallengedonanygroundwhatsoeverbeforeanyCourt.AsthisCourtlacks
jurisdictiontostrikedownanyamendmentintheConstitutionitisnotnecessarytoexaminethe
groundsonwhichthe18thandthe21stAmendmentshavebeenchallenged.However,thedecisionto
selectandreferthecaseofanyaccusedfortrialunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952,asamended,and
anyorderpassedordecisiontakenorsentenceawardedinsuchtrialshallbesubjecttojudicialreview
onthegroundsofcorumnonjudice,beingwithoutjurisdictionorsufferingfrommalafide.Withthis
observationallthepetitionsaredismissed.
Sd/
ChiefJustice
Sd/
IqbalHameedurRahman
JawwadS.Khawaja,J.ThesethirtynineConstitutionPetitionsfiledunderArticle184(3)ofthe
ConstitutionhaveconfrontedtheCourtwithsomeofthemostfundamentalquestionsofconstitutional
lawthatcanpossiblyariseinanyjurisdiction.Someofthesepetitions,thosewhichpertaintothe
eighteenthConstitutionalAmendment,havebeenpendinginourdocketforoverfiveyears.Butwith
theenactmentofthetwentyfirstConstitutionalAmendmentandthenumberofpetitionschallengingit,
thisCourtiscalledupontoaddressfrontally,thequestionsarisinginthesecases,inaccordancewiththe
lawandtheConstitution.
2.Twentyfourofthesepetitionsrelatetoandchallengecertainpartsoftheeighteenth
ConstitutionalAmendmentwhichmadechangestomorethan97ArticlesoftheConstitutionandwas
passedon19.4.2010.TheremainingfifteenpetitionschallengethetwentyfirstConstitutional
Amendment,anamendmentmadeon7.1.2015whichpurportstoprovideconstitutionalbackingforthe
trialofcertaincategoriesofciviliansbymilitarytribunals.ThePetitionersbeforeuscomprisearangeof
persons,naturalandjuristic,fromvariousfieldsoflife.Theprincipalrespondentinallpetitionsisthe
Federation.
3.SincethePetitionershavesoughttoimpugntheviresoftwoconstitutionalamendments,the
Federationraisedathresholdquestionviz.aresuchamendmentsevensusceptibletojudicialreview?It
willfacilitateunderstandingofthecontroversyinthesepetitionsandwillenableustofocusonthe
pointsincontentionifthethresholdcontroversyisaddressedfirst.Thiscontroversymaybedividedinto
twopreliminaryquestionswhichmayconvenientlybeframedasunder:
i)IsParliamentsovereigninthesensethattherearenolimitationsonParliamentspowerto
amendtheConstitution?
ii)Ifthereareanylimitations,arethesepoliticalandnotsubjecttojudicialdetermination?orput
differently,doesthisCourthavethepowertojudiciallyreviewaConstitutionalamendmentpassedby
Parliamentandstrikeitdown?
4.Forreasonsstatedinthisopinion,IamoftheviewthatParliamentisnotsovereignasitspower
toamendtheConstitutionisconstrainedbylimitationswhichareclearfromthereadingofthe
Constitutionasawhole.Secondly,theselimitationsarenotonlypoliticalbutaresubjecttojudicial
reviewand,asaconsequence,thisCourthasthepowertostrikedownaConstitutionalamendment
whichtransgressestheselimits.
5.PartIofthisopinion,elaboratesmyreasonsforthusdecidingthesefundamentalthreshold
questionsastothejurisdictionofthisCourttohearthesepetitions.PartsIIandIII,embarkonthe
considerationastowhetherornottheeighteenthorthetwentyfirstAmendmentsoranypartsthereof
areliabletobestruckdownastransgressionsoftheConstitutionalmandategrantedtoParliamentby
theConstitution.
PARTI
LimitationsonParliamentandtheSusceptibilityofConstitutionalAmendmentstoJudicialReview
6.TheFederationcontendsthatthepowersofParliamentareunlimitedandanyconstitutional
amendmentspassedbyitinaccordancewithArticle239oftheconstitutionarecompletelyimmune
fromjudicialreview.Itscaseappearstorelyuponfourprimaryarguments:firstly,adecontexualized
readingofPartXIoftheConstitutionprovidingforParliamentspowertomakeamendmentstothe
Constitution;secondly,adogmaticinvocationofaconcept,inmyviewalien,representedbyA.V.Diceys
notionofparliamentarysovereignty;thirdly,relianceuponthecaseofDewanTextileMillsLtd.vs.
Pakistan(PLD1976Karachi1368);andfourthly,anunlimitedfaithinthecapacityofthepoliticalprocess
forselfcorrectionwhichsupposedlyobviatestheneedforjudicialreview.ThePetitioners,ontheother
hand,relyprimarilyuponthebasicstructuretheoryaslaiddownintheprecedentsoftheIndian
SupremeCourt.
7.ThefirstsectionofthisPartbeginswithdescribingtheFederationscaseandwhyitisnot
constitutionallytenable.Thenextsectionundertakesanexaminationofthebasicstructuretheory
whichthepetitionershaverelieduponandexplainswhysuchrelianceisunnecessaryandinaptin
Pakistansuniqueconstitutionalcontext.ThethirdsectionofthisParthighlightshowtheuniquely
wordedPreambleoftheConstitutionprovidesuswithamuchmorerobustandtextuallygrounded
touchstonefordefiningthelimitsofthepowersofParliamentandforcarryingoutjudicialreviewof
constitutionalamendments.
Thelimitedusefulnessofforeigntheoriesandtheoriesofpoliticalphilosophy:
8.Ihave,inthisopinionadvertedtothedangersofrelyingontheoriesofpoliticalphilosophyand
theorieswhichhavedevelopedmostlyinforeigncountries,fromthehistory,socialandpoliticalcontext
offoreignnations.Ihavealsoconsideredthetheorywhichdevelopedincertainwesterncountriesand
was,inmyhumbleview,mindlesslyrelieduponbytheSindhHighCourtinDewanTextilesupra.Thirdly,
IhaveconsideredthebasicstructuretheoryasdevelopedinthejurisprudenceofIndia,bytheIndian
SupremeCourt.
9.Thisisnottosaythattheoriesofpoliticalphilosophydonotserveanyusefulpurpose.For
instance,thesocialcontracttheorycanbedatedbacktothetimesofSocrates(470BC399BC)butwas
seriouslypropoundedbyThomasHobbes,JohnLockeandJeanJacquesRousseauintheseventeenth
andeighteenthCenturies.Althoughthiswasaphilosophicaltheorythoughtupbytheaforesaid
philosophers,itwasenormouslyinfluentialinshapingthedestiniesofrepublican,postcolonial
constitutionmaking,whichisreflected,thoughsomewhatinadequately,inthepreamblesofcertain
colonisednationsaftertheyattainedfreedom.Thesocialcontracttheory,whileitwasconfinedtothe
realmofphilosophyandpoliticalscience,necessarilyremainedindeterminateinmanywaysasa
constitutionalprinciplewithoutdefinedcontours,aswouldbeapparentfromtheUSandIndian
preambles,consideredbelow.ItisinPakistan,however,thatthesocialcontracttheorywasreducedinto
awelldefineddocument,thePreambletoourConstitutionasconsideredbelowinthelightofdebates
in1949ontheObjectivesResolutionandthesignificantchanges(discussedbelow)madethereinwhile
adoptingthePreambleasitexitssince1973.ThisisevidentfromthecomparisonofthePakistani,Indian
andUSpreamblesmadeinalaterpartofthisopinion.
TheFederationsCase:
ADecontextualizedReadingofPartXIoftheConstitution:
10.TheargumentadvancedbytheFederationisthatonaccountoftheclearlanguageofArticle
239clauses(5)&(6)oftheConstitution,thetextofwhichpurportstooustthejurisdictionoftheCourt,
thesepetitionsshouldbedismissedbeingnotmaintainable.Tofacilitateourunderstandingoftheplea
advancedbylearnedcounselrepresentingtheFederation,wereproducebelow,therelevantextracts
fromPartXIoftheConstitution:
238.SubjecttothisPart,theConstitutionmaybeamendedbyActof[MajliseShoora(Parliament)].
239
whatsoever.
11.TheFederationcontendsthataplainreadingofclauses(5)and(6)ibidshouldalonebe
resortedtowhiledecidingthesepetitions.Itarguesthatsinceclause(6)ibidstipulatesthatthereisno
limitationwhateveronthepowerofParliamenttoamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution,it
followsthatParliamenthasbeeninvestedwiththeabsoluteandunfetteredauthoritytovaryany
provisionoftheConstitutioninanymannerofitschoosing.Implicitinthisargumentistheproposition
thatitisopentoParliamenteventoabrogatetheConstitution,tobringintoplaceadifferent
Constitutionandindoingso,todisregardtheninecommandsanddirectivesstatedinthePreambleto
theConstitution(reproducedbelow),expresslyissuingfromthepeopleandstatingtheirwill.The
FederationsreadingofPartXIoftheConstitutionisnottenablebecauseofthreereasonswhichnow
follow.
TheRuleofOrganicConstruction:
12.First,theFederationsreadingofclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239overlookstheestablishedrule
ofinterpretationthataprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbeinterpretedinisolation.Itistruethat
accordingtotheseclauses,[n]oamendmentoftheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestionandthere
isnolimitationwhateveronthepoweroftheMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamend.Butthatisbyno
meanstheendofthematter.TheseclauseshavetobereconciledwiththerestoftheConstitutional
provisionswhichprovidefor,amongstotherthings,guaranteesofdueprocess,fundamentalrights,
observanceoftheprinciplesofdemocracy,safeguardingthelegitimateinterestsoftheminoritiesand
independenceoftheJudiciarywhichhavebeenexpressedbythePeoplewithadegreeofclarity.
13Inourjurisprudence,itisbynowwellsettledthattheConstitutionhastobereadorganically
andholistically.IndividualArticlesorclausesoftheConstitution,ifreadinisolationfromtherestofthe
Constitution,maymisleadthereader.ThisissobecausethemeaningoftheConstitutionistobe
gatheredfromtheConstitutionasanintegratedwholenot,itmaybesaid,asamechanicaldeduction,
butbasedonreason.Itistheancientbutsimplewisdomofsagewisemenwhichhasbeendistilled
throughthelogicanddeductivereasoningofprecedent,leadingtotheruleofinterpretationrequiring
theConstitutiontobereadasanorganicwhole.
14.Therationalefortheruleisuniversallogicandtranscendsthedividebetweenthevarious
prevalentsystemsoflaw.ThuswehavecommonlawconstitutionalistssuchasLaurenceTribeand
MichaelDorfwarningusagainstapproachingtheConstitutioninwaysthatignorethesalientfactthat
itspartsarelinkedintoawholethatitisaConstitution,andnotmerelyanunconnectedbunchof
separateclausesandprovisionswithseparatehistoriesthatmustbeinterpreted.Itisthisverylogic
whichinformsthecommentofaCivilLawscholarlikeDr.Conradwhoremindslawyersthatthereis
nothinglikesafeexplicitwordsisolatedfromageneralbackgroundofunderstandingandlanguage.This
isparticularlysointheinterpretationoforganicinstrumentslikeaConstitutionwhereeveryprovision
hastoberelatedtothesystemicplan,becauseeverygrantandeverypowerconferredisbuta
contributiontothefunctioningofanintegratedmachineryitwillnotdotodiscusssuchconceptsas
[mere]politicaltheoryirrelevanttotextualconstruction(quotedinMunirBhattivs.theFederation
(PLD2011SC407).
15.ThesameundeniablelogiccomesfromthewisdomofsuchsavantsasMaulanaJalaluddinRumi
inhisparableoftheelephantinthedarkofnightortheGreekancientHippocrates.Thewisdomand
logicofthisshouldbeselfevident,butIcanadvertbrieflytothecaseofMunirHussainBhattisupra,
whereinwasrecountedthestoryoffivemenandanelephantonadarknightwho,gropingandtouching
differentpartsofanelephantsanatomy,constructanimageoftheanimalwhichisdisjointedand
whollyinaccurate.One,touchingitsearthinksitislikeafan,theotherlikensittoapipebyfeelingits
trunkandsoforth,dependingontheparteachhastouched.That[t]heinabilityofeachmantolookat
theelephantholisticallyisobvious.AstheMaulanasays,thesemeninthedarkdidnothavealampto
showthemthattheelephantwasonecompositeorganism,whoseconstituentcomponentsweretobe
seentogetherifthewholewastobeunderstood,withouterrorsofperception.TheGreekancient,
Hippocrates(quotedbyEduardoGaleanoinhisbookMirrors)inthesamevein,saidthatthenatureof
thepartsofthebodycannotbeunderstoodwithoutgraspingthenatureoftheorganismasawhole.It
is,therefore,crucialforus,consistentwithreason,tolookattheConstitutionasawholeifweareto
makesenseof[itsprovisions]organically.LookingattheConstitutionanyotherwaywouldleadthe
readerastray.
16.ThisindeedistheirrefutablelogicwhichimpelsmetotheviewthatArticle239ofthe
ConstitutionhastobereadasbeingonesmallcogintheConstitutionalmachineryandhaslittle
significanceasastandaloneprovision.BasedonprecedentwehaveobservedinthecaseofMunir
HussainBhattisuprathattheConstitutionhastobereadholisticallyasanorganicdocument.
TheDubiousProvenanceofclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239:
17.Secondly,itissignificanttorecalltheoftignoredfactthatclauses(5)and(6)asreproduced
abovewerenotpartoftheConstitutionasoriginallyframed.Theseprovisionswereinsertedinthe
ConstitutionbyGeneralZiaulHaqin1985throughaprocesswhichdoesnotinspirethesamekindof
legitimacyastheprocesswhichculminatedintheframingoftheoriginalConstitution.Thedubious
provenanceoftheseclausesmakesitdoublydifficultfortheCourttorelyuponthemforoverridingthe
letterandspiritoftheentireConstitution.Thisisapositionwithregardtoclauses(5)and(6)whichhas
alreadybeenadoptedinvariousprecedents.IthasbeenheldinthecasetitledMahmoodKhanAchakzai
vs.FderationofPakistan(PLD1997SC426)that[i]ntheConstitutionof1973initsoriginalformArticle
238providesforamendmentoftheConstitutionandArticle239laysdowntheprocedureforsuch
amendmentandiscomposedofsevenclauses[ofthe]amendmentsinArticle239,themajor
amendmentisinclause(6)whichissubstitutedbyfreshprovisionprovidingthatforremovalofdoubts,
itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthepowerofMajliseShoora(Parliament)
toamendanyprovisionoftheConstitution.[F]orthetimebeingitwouldsufficetosaythatfreedom
bestowedupontheParliamentinclause(6)ofArticle239afteramendmentdoesnotincludepowerto
amendthoseprovisionsoftheConstitutionbywhichwouldbealteredsalientfeaturesofthe
ConstitutionArticle239cannotbeinterpretedsoliberally[as]tosaythatitis[an]openended
provisionwithoutanylimitsunderwhichanyamendmentunderthesunofwhatevernaturecanbe
madetoprovideforanyothersystemofgovernance,forexample,monarchyorsecular,whichisnot
contemplatedbytheObjectivesResolution.
TheMeaningofAmendment:
18.WhattheFederationalsoseemstohaveoverlookedinitsreadingofclause(5)aswordedis
thatitonlypurportstooustthejurisdictionoftheCourttojudiciallyreviewaConstitutional
amendment;likewise,whatclause(6)signifiesistheParliamentsseeminglyopenendedpowerto
amendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.Bothprovisionsstilldonotoustthejurisdictionofthe
Courttodeterminewithprecisionwhatitisthatfallswithintheambitofthetermsamendand
amendmentandwhatdoesnt.Althoughtherearemultiplemeaningsgivenforthesetermsinvarious
dictionariessuchasWebstersandtheOxfordEnglishDictionary,onethreadwhichprominentlyruns
throughthemeaningsisthatitconnotescorrectionofanerrororomission;tomakebetterorchange
forthebetter.OneusefulextractfromthecasetitledRaghunathraoGanpatraovs.UnionofIndia(AIR
1993SC1267)canbecitedforitslogicalexpositionofthispoint.Whileconsideringthesewordsitwas
notedbytheIndianCourtthatthewordshadaLatinoriginemenderewhichmeanstocorrect.In
relyingonthetreatiseonConstitutions,ConstitutionalismandDemocracy,itwasobservedthatan
amendmentcorrectserrorsofcommissionsoromissionsanditmodifiesthesystemwithout
fundamentallychangingitsnaturei.e.anamendmentoperateswithinthetheoreticalparametersofthe
existingConstitution.Anotherreasonwhysuchreadingofclauses(5)and(6)commendsitselfisthat
theseclauseswerethrustintotheConstitutionbyadictator(asdiscussedbelow)andwerenot
consistentwiththeoriginalConstitution.
19.Itisalsohelpfultonotethatthewordingofclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitution
appearstohavebeenborrowedfromArticle368oftheIndianConstitutionbutwithsomevery
significantomissions.Article368ibidprovidesforanexpansivelywordedpowerofParliament,interalia,
tovarytheIndianConstitution.IthasbeenstatedthereinthatParliamentmayinexerciseofits
constituentpoweramendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealanyprovisionof[theIndian]
ConstitutioninaccordancewiththeprocedurelaiddowninthisArticle.Thiswordingwasintroducedin
theIndianConstitutionin1971andwaswithinthecontemplationoftheNationalAssemblyin197273
whenourConstitutionwasbeingdebated.ItwasinthiscontextthatquestionsaroseintheAssembly
andwereconsideredinrelationtotheamendingpowertobegrantedtoParliamentinPakistan.The
significanceofthisdivergenceiselaboratedlaterinthisopinion.
20.AnotherusefulpurposeisservedincomparingtheamendingprovisionsinArticle239ofour
Constitutionwithclauses(4)and(5)ofArticle368introducedintotheIndianConstitutionin1976.
Theselatterclausesprecedetheintroductionofclauses(5)and(6)ibidinourConstitutionbynineyears.
Duetotheveryclosesimilarityoftheaforesaidclauses(5)and(6)withclauses(4)ad(5)ofArticle368
oftheIndianConstitution,itisapparentthattheamendmentsintroducedintoArticle239ofour
Constitutionin1985wereborroweddirectlyfromthewordingofclauses(4)and(5)oftheIndian
Constitution.ThefactremainsthatourConstitutiondidnotcontainclauses(5)and(6)inArticle239.It
wasthoughundemocraticanddictatorialinterventionthatonthe17thofMarch1985PresidentsOrder
20of1985,misleadinglycalledtheConstitution(SecondAmendment)Order1985,wasissued.Isay
misleadinglybecausetherewasnopretenceatadheringtoprescribedConstitutionalnormsand
proceduresforamendingtheconstitution.ThesaidPresidentialOrder20of1985wassubsequently
givencoverbytheConstitution(EighthAmendment)Act1985.Itisnotnecessaryinthisopinionto
considerthevalidityofPresidentialOrder20of1985becausethesameisnotbeforeus.Howeverthe
historicalbackdropofclauses(5)and(6)andtheirundemocraticgenesiscanhelpusininterpreting
Article239andthewordsamendandamendmentusedtherein.Oneverysignificantdifference,
however,remainsbetweenourConstitutionandtheIndianConstitutioninrespectoftheamending
powersofParliament.ThisdifferenceisthattheIndianConstitutionconfersaconstituentamending
powerontheIndianParliament.SuchpowerhasnotbeenconferredonourParliamenteventhrough
theamendmentbroughtaboutthroughthePresidentialOrder20of1985bytheoriginatorand
draftsmanofthesaidOrder.Secondly,whiletheIndianConstitutionasamendedprovidesfora
seeminglyunlimitedpowerofamendment,thisisnotthecaseinPakistan.Toelaborate,clause(5)of
Article368oftheIndianConstitutionstipulatesthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveronthe
constituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealoftheprovisionsof
[theIndian]Constitution.OurConstitutioninstarkcontrastdoesnotusethewordconstituentorthe
wordsbywayofaddition,variationorrepeal.Thereasonforthisdifferencemaynotbehardtofind.
ThedictatorialproclivitiesofGen.ZiaulHaqareapartofourhistoricalrecordwhichcannotbeignored.
InfacthisnamewasvaingloriouslymentionedinArticle270Aoftheconstitutionuntilitwasremoved
therefromintheyear2010,throughtheeighteenthAmendment.Manychanges(suchasthenotorious
powerunderArticle58(2)(b)empoweringthePresidenttodissolvetheNationalAssembly)weremade
byhimintheConstitutionthroughthe(SecondAmendment)Order,1985whichhadtheeffectof
distortingtheConstitutioninmaterialways.Itappearstherewasanapprehensiononthepartof
GeneralZiathatgrantingtheconstituentamendingpowertoParliamentafteritsrevival,wouldhave
enabledittoexerciseunlimitedconstituentamendingpowersandthustorollbacktheamendmentsso
madebytheGeneral.Inthisbackdropitwastoprovideabackstoptosuchpossiblerollbackthatonlya
limitedpowerofamendmentratherthanaconstituentpowertoamendwasintroducedintothe
Constitution.ThewordingofArticle239(5)and(6)thushighlightsthelimitationswhichinherein
Parliamentspowertoamendasopposedtoanunlimitedconstituentpowerincludingthepowerto
repealvestedintheIndianParliament.
WhatistheDogmaofParliamentarySupremacyorSovereignty?
21.BesidesadecontextualizedreadingofPartXIoftheConstitution,thecaseoftheFederation
thatitiswithinthepowerofParliamenttobringaboutanychangeinthecontentoftheConstitution
andsuchchangemaynotbejudiciallyreviewed,appearstobebaseduponaconstitutionaltheory
(consideredbelow)propoundedbytheconstitutionalscholarA.V.DiceyinrelationtotheBritish
Parliament.Inmyview,thistheorycannotbereliedupontoanswertheseminalquestionsfacedbythe
Courttoday.AclearheadedexaminationofDiceystheorymakesitevidentthatitswasformulatedin
thehistoricallyandsociologicallypeculiarcontextofnineteenthcenturyBritain.EvenintheBritish
context,thistheoryislosingitssignificanceoverthelastcentury.Itiswhollyunwarrantedtoimportthis
theoryintotheconstitutionalcontextofPakistan,wherethetheoryhasneverbeforeheldswayand
whereithasinfactbeenrepudiatedthroughapeoplesstruggletranslatedintotheConstitution.Itisto
thisdiscussionthatwecannowturn.
WhatisParliamentarySovereignty:
22.ThenotionofParliamentarysovereigntyorsupremacyisaprincipleofconstitutionallawin
Britainwhich,onaccountofourcolonialhistory,hashadalastingimpactonourthinkingevenafter
independence,andhasattimes,dulledthesignificanceofourownpostindependenceaspirations.It
wastowardsthelaterpartofthe19thCenturyinBritainwhenA.V.Diceywho,inthewordsofLord
SteynwasBritainsgreatestconstitutionallawyer,propoundedhisconceptofParliamentary
sovereignty.Accordingtohim,ParliamenthadundertheEnglishConstitution,therighttomakeorun
makeanylawwhateverandfurther,thatnopersonorbodyisrecognizedbythelawofEnglandas
havingarighttooverrideorsetasidethelegislationofParliament.Toleavenodoubtastothe
unchallengableandunlimitedauthorityofParliament,Diceywentontostatethatanyactof
Parliament,oranypartofanactofParliament,whichmakesanewlaworrepealsormodifiesan
existinglaw,willbeobeyedbytheCourts.ThisnotionhashistoricallybeenacceptedbytheCourtsin
BritainasthedefiningfeatureofBritishconstitutionaljurisprudence.ItisthisconceptofParliamentary
sovereigntywhichcanjustifiablybeseenasprovidingforanobedientjudiciary,subservienttoa
supremeParliamentandwithoutthepowerofjudicialreviewoverlegislativeacts.Inourjurisprudence
itisbeyondquestionthatCourtsinPakistandohavethepowerand,inthepast,havestruckdown
legislationmadebyParliament,thoughtodate,aconstitutionalamendmenthasnotbeenstruckdown.
CritiquesofParliamentarySovereigntywithinBritain:
23.EvenwithinBritain,thisexpansiveconcepthaslatelybeenseenbysomescholarsandjudgesas
ananachronisticfiction,particularlyinthewakeoftheUKHumanRightsAct1998andthestrident,
everincreasingroleofEuropeanCommunitylawsandpoliciesinBritain.Whensuchoverridinglawsand
policiesareadoptedinBritain,thereisinevitablyanerosionofthesovereigntyoftheBritishParliament
asaConstitutionalprinciple.Again,LordSteyn(writingintheHouseofLords)canbequotedfromthe
relativelyrecentopinioninthecasetitledJacksonv.AttorneyGeneral([2005]UKHL56).Accordingto
him,theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsasincorporatedinto[UK]lawbytheHumanRights
Act,1998,createdanewlegalorderTheclassicaccountgivenbyDiceyofthedoctrineofthe
supremacyofParliament,pureandabsoluteasitwas,cannowbeseentobeoutofplaceinthemodern
UnitedKingdom.ThepointtobenotedisthattheFederationscasereliesuponaviewof
parliamentarysovereigntywhichislosingcurrencyeveninsideBritainwhereitoriginatedandwhereit
stillhasconstitutionalrelevance.
WhytheDoctrineofParliamentarySovereigntydoesnotapplyinPakistan:
24.InPakistanthereisnoroomfortheantiquatedviewsexpressedbyDiceyinthe19thCentury.
Thisisonaccountofatleasttworeasons:firstly,thisisduetothelongstandingdifferencebetweenour
differingconstitutionalcontextsandevenmoresignificantlythefactthatparliamentarysovereigntydid
notmatchwiththeaspirationsofourpeoplewhohave,throughtheirstruggle,replaceditwiththe
notionofthesupremacyofthewillofthePeopleascrystallizedinourwrittenConstitution.Wehave
observedinthecaseofMuhammadAzharSiddiquevs.FederationofPakistan(PLD2012SC774)that
thereisnojustificationinourdispensation,formuddyingthecrystalandundefiledwatersofour
constitutionalstreamwithalienandantiquated,19thCenturyDiceyanconceptsofParliamentary
supremacy.Theseconceptshavelostcurrencyevenintheirownnativelands.Intheaforecitedcase,we
haveheldthatitisabouttime,sixtyfiveyearsafterindependence,thatweunchainourselvesfromthe
shacklesofobsequiousintellectualservilitytocolonialparadigmsandstartadheringtoourownpeoples
Constitutionasthebasisofdecisionmakingonconstitutionalissues.
ThedifferencebetweenBritainsconstitutionalcontextandPakistans:
25.ItisimportanttorecallthatDiceyformulatedhistheoryintheconstitutionalcontextofthe
judiciaryinBritain.TheHouseofLords,theapexCourtinBritainhashistoricallybeenanintegralpartof
Parliamentandremainedsountilveryrecentlywhenin2009aSupremeCourtwasfinallycreated
separatefromParliament.Priortothat,theupperhouseoftheBritishParliament,apartfrombeinga
componentofthelegislaturewasalso,asasingularlyuniquefeatureoftheBritishConstitution,thelast
Courtofappealintherealm.Thelegislature,therefore,undertheBritishConstitutioncontainedwithin
itsfoldtheJudiciaryandtheExecutivealso.Thishappenedoveraperiodofeightcenturiesstartingwith
thesigningofthedocumentcalledMagnaCartain1215.Itisonaccountofstatuteandconstitutional
evolutionthatnonhereditaryLordsofAppealinOrdinary(LawLords)werecreatedaspartofthe
upperhouseofParliament[f]orthepurposeofaidingtheHouseofLordsinthehearingand
determinationofappeals.This,however,didnotdetractfromtheconstitutionalprinciplethatitwas
ParliamentwhichwassovereignandtheLawLordswereconstitutionallyobligedtoobeythecommand
ofParliamentexpressedinlegislation.Furthermoreabodyofpersonswhichisasubsetofoneofthe
housesoftheBritishParliament,byitsverynatureispartofParliamentandnotindependentofit.One
hasonlytounderstandthisfundamentalfeatureoftheBritishConstitution,toseeatoncetheradical
divergencefromtheBritishmodelrepresentedinthenotionthatinPakistantheindependenceofthe
Judiciaryistobefullysecured.
ThePakistaniContext:
26.Evenduringcolonialtimes,thejudiciaryinthesubcontinent,unliketheapexCourtinBritain,
remainedaseparatelegalorganofStatenotameresubsetofthelegislature.Thecourtswere,in
colonialtimescreatedunderstatutespassedbytheBritishParliamentandwere,legallyspeaking
separatefromtheIndianLegislatureortheIndianExecutive.InthewakeofPakistansindependence,
thisprinciplehasbeenadheredtoevenmoreemphatically.TheObjectivesResolutionof1949andevery
singleconstitutionaldocumentthatwassubsequentlyadoptedbytheframersofourConstitutionhas
givenvoicetotheaspirationofthePeoplethattheindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefully
secured.
27.Likewise,itisworthrecallingthatDiceystheorywasformulatedinthecontextofaBritain
whichdidnotand,toanextent,stilldoesnot,possessawrittencodeencapsulatingitsConstitution.The
BritishParliamentdoesnotderiveitslegislativeandconstituentpowersfromoneConstitutional
instrumentadoptedthroughanexerciseaimedexpresslyatdelineatingthepowersoftheorgansofthe
State.ItspoweristhatoftheallpowerfulKing(preMagnaCarta)whichhaspercolatedanddiffusedso
astobeexercisednowbytheKinginParliament.TheBritishParliament,inthelegalsense,isthusstill
seenasbeingabovetheConstitutionandnotunderit.Again,thiswasneverthecaseinPakistan.At
leastsincetheGovernmentofIndiaAct,1935,constitutionalarrangementshaveremaineddefinedin
codifiedlawsfromwhichallinstitutionsofthestate,includingParliament(atthetimecalledthe
CentralLegislativeAssembly)derivedtheirpowers.
28.Mainly,itistheseaspectsofthesystemofParliamentarysovereigntyinBritainwhich
differentiateitfromtheConstitutionaldispensationdefiningthepowersofParliamentinPakistan.The
pointthatneedstobeunderstoodisrathersimple:thesovereigntyoftheParliamentinBritain,as
describedbyDiceymaybeafundamentalfeatureoftheBritishConstitutionbutithasnoroomandlittle
relevanceinourjurisprudenceotherthantohighlightthecontrastbetweenthelegalsystemsprevalent
inthetwocountries.ThishasespeciallybeenthecaseinthepostIndependenceera,onaccountofthe
longsuppressedaspirationsofourpeople.Thehistoryofourconstitutionaldevelopmentsince1947isa
storyofradicaldeparturesfromtheBritishconstitutionalmodelincludingthedoctrineofParliamentary
Sovereignty.Itisthishistorywhichmustnowbeexamined.
PakistansPostIndependenceRejectionofDiceanParliamentarySovereignty:
29.Thisstorymustbeginwiththedaysofthepreindependencecolonialera.Theadministrationof
Indiaatthetimewasdriveninlinewiththetimes,bythecolonialimperative.ThepeopleofIndiadid
nothaveasayinchoosingthemodeoftheirowngovernance.Theywere,until1947,thesubjectsofthe
EmperorofIndia,theIndiaEmperator(droppedbyS.7(2)oftheIndianIndependenceAct,1947).
Theseimperiallegaltitleswerenotmerelysymbolicbutweremademanifestineveryexpressionand
facetofthegovernmentofIndia.Inthisconstitutionalarrangement,theKinginParliamentinBritain
wasattheapexofapyramidasthesourceofalllawsandpower,withthepeopleofIndiaatitsbase.
ThusitwasthatlawsforIndiaweremadebyahandfulofmensittinginWestministerandWhitehall
where,asaptlyputbyProf.RanjitGuha,thelawdidnotevenremotelyissuefromthewillofthe
people.Thepointhereisnottomakeanypoliticaljudgmentortocommentonwhatwasrightor
wrongwiththatsystem.Thepurposeistostateobjectivelytheprevailingrealityandtoidentifywhat
wasmeanttochangewiththeadventofindependence.Themostfundamentalchangewhich,
undeniablywasintendedtooccurwastheinversionofthepowerpyramidofthepreindependenceera.
Thegovernancemodeli.e.theConstitutionofindependentPakistanwastoissuefromthewillofthe
peopleofPakistanasexpresslystatedinthePreambleitself.Theclinicalproseofastaidlegalopinion
cannotcomeclosetodescribingtheanticipationofanorderwherethepeoplewouldreplacetheKingin
Parliament,asthesourceoftheConstitution.Imust,therefore,invokeFaizSahibwholaterarticulated
thehopeandbeliefofthepeoplethatthepromisedtomorrowhadarrivedandthoserejectedand
spurnedfromtheavenuesofpower,thesanctumsanctorum,weretobeenthroned.Thatthis
aspirationhas,todate,remainedconfinedtowordsonpaperisnotafaultoftheConstitution,butofits
implementationthroughgovernancewhichrecognisestheprimacyofthePeopleforwhosebenefitthe
organsoftheStatehavebeencreated.

Unnecessaryservilitytothecolonialmodel:
30.ItisessentialnottolosesightofthisbedrockofourConstitutionalfoundationbecauseitisthis
foremostpremisewhich,morethaneverythingelsemustdistinguishthecolonialerafrompost
independencePakistan.ItwasthiscentralissuewhichthemajorityofourFederalCourt,inmyhumble
view,overlookedwhiledecidingFederationofPakistanvs.MaulviTamizuddin(PLD1955FC240),acase
whichthensetbackourpolitybyholdingthatdespite1947,Pakistananditscitizensstillowedfealty
andallegiancetotheBritishmonarch.Themajorityfailedtorealizethesignificantparadigmshiftthe
inversionofthepowerpyramidofthepreindependenceerawhichnationalindependencewas
supposedtobringabout.ItwasonlytheiconicJusticeA.R.Cornelius,whocorrectlyappreciatedthe
legalsignificanceofthestruggleofthepeopleofPakistanforindependence,whichhadupturnedthe
establishedconstitutionalarrangement,bringingthewillofthepeopletothehelmofaffairsand
relegatingtheKingtothepositionofmeretitularheadofthenewDominionofPakistan.Theseminal
pointsCornelius,J.raisedinhisdissentintheTamizzudincaseremainofsignificancetous,eventoday
aswechartthefuturecourseofPakistansconstitutionallaw.
31.ItwasonthisfundamentalissuethatCornelius,J.differedwiththemajority.Heapprovingly
notedthereasoningoftheSindhHighCourtwhichhadheldthatthekeytotheIndianIndependence
Act,1947,istheindependenceofPakistan,andthepurposeofsection6ofthatActistoeffacethe
supremacyoftheBritishParliament.Laterinhisopinion,Cornelius,J.boldlyassertedthatthe
ConstituentAssemblyofPakistanwasnotacreationoftheBritishParliamentItwassimplyabody
representativeofthewillofthepeopleofPakistaninrelationtotheirfuturemodeofGovernment.The
willofthepeoplehad,uptothattime,beendeniedexpressioninthisrespect,throughthepresence,by
virtueofconquestandcession,oftheundisputedandplenaryexecutivepowerinIndiaoftheBritish
SovereignthatpowerdidnotoweitsexistencetoanylawCornelius,J.notedthatthisstateof
affairshadchangedin1947.After1947,[t]heautonomyofthecountry,itsindependentpowerto
controlitsownaffairs,bothinternalandexternal,wasembodiedinthethreegreatagenciesofthe
State,theConstituentAssembly,theExecutiveandtheJudicature.
32.Bythisremark,Cornelius,J.repelledtheobservationofJusticeAkramwhoconcurredwith
Munir,CJbyconcludingthat[i]twouldbeastrangesuppositiontomakethattheBritishParliament,
whileframinganinterimConstitutionalActforPakistan,actedinamannercontrarytoitsownprinciples
andtraditions[Therefore,]theassentoftheGovernorGeneralisnecessarybeforeanyconstitutional
measureframedundersection8(1)oftheIndianIndependenceAct,1947,canpassintolaw.Ineffect,
then,themajoritysentiredecisionrestedonthemisleadingnotionthatPakistanmustcontinuetodefer
totheprinciplesandtraditionsoftheBritishParliament,evenafterachievingindependencein1947.For
thereasonsdetailedinthisopinion,IfindmyselfunabletoagreewiththeviewsofAkram,J.AndI
wholeheartedlysubscribetotheviewsofCornelius,J.expressedinhisdissentwhichhavebeen
vindicatedbyhistoryandprecedent.
TakingonthereasoningoftheDewanTextilescase:
33.BothMr.KhalidAnwarSr.ASCandthelearnedAttorneyGeneralfortheFederationspecifically
reliedonandsubscribedtotheopinionexpressedinthecaseofDewanTextileMillsLtd.vs.Pakistan
(PLD1976Karachi1368).Itisforthisreasonthepostulatesinthiscasemustbenoted,examinedand
addressed.InthecitedcasethePreamblehasnotonlybeendisregarded,thewillofthePeoplehasbeen
denigratedasamythandafiction.Isaywithrespect,termingthewillofthePeopleamythorauseful
fictionfliesinthefaceofeveryruleofreasonandeverycanonofinterpretation.ThecaseofDewan
TextileMillsLtd.,(whichfortunatelyisnotaprecedentforus)andthedangerousimplicationsofits
tenorwillbeexaminedshortlybecausethereasoninginthesaidcaseappearedtobethemainstayof
theFederationsargumentbeforeusthatArticle239oftheConstitutioninvestedParliamentwith
unfetteredpowers,whichifexercised,couldnotbechallengedinCourt.
34.Tostartwith,afterconsideringtheviewsofanumberofphilosophersandpoliticaltheorists,
thelearnedJudgeAbdulKadirShaikhCJ(writingforathreememberBenchoftheSindhHighCourt)
cametotheconclusionthathistoricalfactsshowthatthepropositionthatthepeopleestablishthe
ConstitutionalfabricoftheGovernmentunderawrittenConstitution,isjustamythperhapsauseful
fictionaconvenientmetaphor.Atanotherpoint,swayedbytheviewsofsomethinkers,ithasbeen
remarkedthattheconceptthattheConstitutionproceedsfromthepeoplecanonlyberegardedasa
rhetoricalflourish.Inmakingtheseobservations,twoimportantcircumstancesappeartohaveescaped
theattentionofthelearnedJudge.Firstly,thatnoneofthetheoristsandpoliticalthinkersbywhomhe
wasimpressed,appeartohavehadtheslightestinterestin,orunderstandingofthePakistan
Constitutionorofthehistoricalcontextinwhichitwasadopted.Infactmost,ifnotall,ofthese
theoristspredatethePakistanConstitution;somebycenturies.Theirthinkingwastheproductofalien
circumstancesandthetheoriestheyexpounded,therefore,couldonlybeseenasabstractionsorflights
ofsurrealfancywhenappliedtothePakistanicontext.Secondly,theConstitutionitselfstipulatesthat
theOrderestablishedthereunderiscreatedbythewillofthePeople.Suchwillisalsoclearlystatedin
theThirdScheduletotheConstitutioninexpressterms,iffurthertextualsupportforthis
quintessentiallydemocraticandpeoplecentricconceptisconsiderednecessary.Icannot,therefore,see
howaJudgeofaCourtcreatedbytheConstitutioncouldrefertoexpresswordsintheConstitutionasa
mythoraconvenientmetaphor.Lastly,theimportantchange(consideredbelow)madeinthe
PreamblewhencomparedtotheObjectivesResolution,hasbeencompletelyoverlookedbythelearned
JudgewhiledemeaningthePeople.
35.WecanexaminesomefurtherobservationsandfindingsofthejudgmentinDewanTextileMills
Ltd.inthelightofourownConstitution.WhileconsideringthePreambletotheConstitution,ithasbeen
remarkedthatthereis[a]similarpreambletotheConstitutionoftheUSA.Thispremiseinsupportof
thejudgmentisinherentlyflawed.Itcouldnotbemoreremovedfromtherealitymadeobviousbythe
vastlydissimilarpreamblestotheUSandPakistanConstitutions.Likewise,thereferencetowhatChief
JusticeJohnMarshalloftheUSSupremeCourthadtosayinthecaseofMcCullochv.Maryland(17U.S.
316[1819])inrelationtothepreambletotheUSConstitutionortheprocessofratificationofthat
ConstitutioncanhardlyhaveanyrelevancetotheconstitutionalhistoryofPakistanortheeventsofthe
yearsprecedingtheadoptionofourConstitutionin1973whichhavebeenbrieflyadvertedtoabove.
WhatalsoappearstohavebeenmissedoutbythelearnedJudgewhileconsideringthecaseof
McCullochv.MarylandsupraisthatthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesdidensuretheircontinuedabilityto
exercisetheirconstituentpowerevensubsequenttotheadoptionoftheUSConstitutionin1787.This
endwasachievedbyintroducingrigidityintheUSConstitution.Asaconsequence,theamending
provisionsincorporatedinArticleVoftheUSConstitutioncanonlybeexercisedthrougha
constitutionallymandatedprocessactivelyinvolvingthePeople.ThehistoryofamendmentsintheUS
Constitution(proposedorpassed),willconfirmthisasafact.Asaresult,only17amendments(apart
fromtheBillofRights)havebeenmadeinover230yearsofUShistoryalthoughovertimeseveral
thousandhavebeenlegallyproposed.Asimilarobjectiveincertainimportantrespectshasbeen
achievedwithmuchgreaterforceinPakistanbecauseofprovisionsinthePreamblewhichclearly
demonstratethattheamendingpowerdelegatedasagranttothechosenrepresentativesiscoupled
withexpressdirectiveswhichcircumscribetheextentoftheParliamentarypowerunderArticles238
and239oftheConstitution.ThustheamendingpowerexercisablebyParliamentasgranteeunderthe
saidArticles,canonlybeinvokedinobediencetothewillofthePeopleandsubjecttotheircommandas
setoutintheConstitutionalpreamble.ThedebatesintheNationalAssemblyin197273,highlighting
thenatureoftheamendingpowerarediscussedlater.
36.WecannowreturntothereasoninginDewanTextile,whichbyadoptionformsthebasisofthe
Federationscaseindefenceofthecontentiousprovisionsoftheeighteenthandtwentyfirst
Amendments.Itmaybeaddedthatratherthanthemselveselaboratingonorexplainingflawsinthe
reasoningofDewanTextile,learnedcounselfortheFederation,bywholescaleadoption,makethesaid
caseapillaroftheirargument.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneral,inresponsetoaCourtquery,also
expresslymadetheDewanTextilecaseanimportantbasisforrefutingthebasicstructuretheoryrelied
uponbythepetitioners.AfterconsideringtheUSConstitutionbutwithoutnoticingthemarked
differencesbetweenthesaidconstitutionandtheabovenotedtextofourConstitution,thelearned
JudgeproceededtoexaminethehistoricalfactsleadingtotherevolutionaryConstitutionofFrance,
theConstitutionoftheFourthFrenchRepublicof1946,theWeimarConstitutionofGermanyandthe
SovietConstitution.Itisonthebasisofthesefiveforeignconstitutionswiththeirowntexts,whichwere
theoutcomeoftheirownlocalizedsocialandpoliticalconditionsthatthederisoryremarkhasbeen
madeaboutthewillofthepeoplebeingamythetc.Itwouldinmyhumbleopinion,constituteextreme
follytorelyonthesignificantlydifferentlanguageandonthealienhistoricalfactswhichcameabout
intheUSAandFranceinthelateeighteenthandmidtwentiethCenturiesorinGermanyandtheformer
SovietUnioninthefirsthalfofthetwentiethCentury,forthepurposeofinterpretingtheprovisionsof
ourownConstitution.Itwouldbeequallyirrationaltoexcludefromconsiderationthosesignificant
eventswhichledtotheadoptionofourConstitutionwiththewordingandclearlydefinedcontoursof
ourownSocialContractadvertedtoabove.ItmustbereiteratedthatanyreadingofourConstitution
mustbefirmlygroundedinourownhistoricalfactsandconstitutionaltextandnotontheirrelevant
historicalfactsofAmericaorofcountriesinEurope.
37.Aftertermingthewillofthepeopleaslegalfiction,thelearnedJudgeneverthelessproceeded
toposeforhimselfthequestionastowhetheraftertheConstitutionwasframedthePeoplewill
retainandcanexercisetheirsovereignconstituentpowertoamendormodifythatdocumentbyvirtue
oftheirlegalsovereignty?Ignoringforamoment,theinconsistencywithothercommentsofthe
learnedjudgenotedabove,thisquestion,inmyhumbleopinion,ispositedonanerroneouspremise.
TheissueisnotastowhetherthepeopleofPakistancanamendormodifytheConstitutionbutwhether
ParliamentcandosoinsuchmannerasisviolativeofthedirectivesestablishingthewillofthePeople.
ThelearnedJudgealsothenconsideredthewritingsofJohnAustin,Jameson,Williamson,Willoughby,
Carlyleandmanyothersand,basedontheirviews,observedthatitwasintheexerciseofthe
constituentpowerthatthepeopleframedtheConstitutionandinvestedtheamendingbodywith
powertoamendtheveryinstrumenttheycreated.Theinstrumentsocreated,bynecessaryimplication,
limitsthefurtherexerciseofthepower.Thisremarkalsomissesthecrucialpointthatinthepetitions
decidedbyDewanTextileasalsointhepetitionsbeforeusthepetitionerswere/areNOTassertinga
righttoamendtheConstitution.AlltheyseekistoensurethatParliament(whichevenaccordingtothe
learnedJudgeisadelegateofthepeople),mustremainobedienttoandabidebytheirwillwhichhas
beenexpresslysetoutinthewordsconsideredabove.
38.Itis,inthesecircumstancesthatwithutmostrespectIfindthequestionsframedinthecaseof
DewanTextiletobeoflittlerelevancetotherealcontroversybeforeusviz.thepowerofParliamentto
amendtheConstitutionandthelimitsonsuchpower.Thisquestionwasneitherposednoransweredin
thesaidcase,norhasitbeenaddressedintheargumentsadvancedbeforeus.Likewise,unnecessary
relianceonpoliticaltheoriesexpoundedbythethinkers(nonedealingwithPakistan)namedabove,
appearstohaveledtheCourtastray.Thefocusofthejudgmentwasnotwhatthetextofour
Constitutionsaysabouttheseissues,butratherwhattheJuristsacarefullyselectedlistofaliens,to
beprecise,oflikemindedjuristspreferredbythelearnedJudge,havesaidaboutthematter.Thereis
noreasonwhyweshouldfallintothesameerrorbyignoringthewordingoftheConstitution.
39.Imust,atthisstagepointoutmostrespectfullyanotherflawinreasoningwhichhascreptinto
thejudgmentinDewanTextileandhasresultedintheconclusionarrivedatbythelearnedJudge.He
hasproceededonthepremisethatthePeoplehaveplacedtheamendingpowerintheir
representativeswithoutreservation.Thismostcertainlyisnotthecase.Thereareinall,ninedirectives
ofthePeoplereproducedbelow.Eightoftheseimposeobligationsonthechosenrepresentativesofthe
People.Theobservationofthelearnedjudge,inexplicably,completelyignorestheobligationimposed
affirmativelyonParliament,interalia,toenforcetheprinciplesofdemocracyortosecurefullythe
independenceoftheJudiciary.Inherentinthisaffirmativeobligationistheduty,bynecessary
intendment,torefrainfromdoinganythingwhichimpairssuchindependenceorunderminessuch
principlesorviolatesanyoftheotherexpresscommandsbindingtheStateanditsorgans.Oneisled
tobelievethatthebasisoftheCourtsabovenotedremarkisnomorethantheviewofsomeother
juristsexpressedeitherasabstracttheoryorvalidatedbyreferencetohistoricalfactswhichhaveno
nexuswithPakistan.Todaywhenwearecalledupontoexaminethereasoningwhichdrivesthis
judgment,itshouldbeclearthatwehavenoobligationtoupholdtheseviews,particularlysinceno
effortwasmadetofoundthemontheConstitutionreadasanorganicinstrumentinaccordancewith
principlesexplainedearlierinthisopinion.Laterinthisopinion,Ihaveamplydemonstratedthe
soundnessoftheviewcontrarytothatofthelearnedJudge,fromthetextandcontextofourown
Constitution.
TheDoubtfulAssurancethatthecapacityofthePoliticalProcessforSelfCorrectionmakesJudicial
ReviewRedundant:
40.AmajorplankonwhichtheFederationseemstorestitscaseistheassurancethat,lefttoits
owndevices,Parliamentwillnever,intheexerciseofitsamendingpowerorotherwise,encroachonthe
domainofthejudiciarynorwilliteverinfringetherightsofthepeopleastoenforcementofthe
principlesofdemocracyandifitattemptstodosothepeoplewillcheckanysuchtransgression.Inother
words,theFederationwantsustoonlytrusttheconstraintsputonParliamentbythepoliticalprocess
which,intheFederationsview,makejudicialreviewoftheParliamentslegislativeactionlargely
redundant,ifnotaltogetherunjustified.ThisisaviewwhichisnotinlinewiththeConstitutionreadasa
whole.
41.Itneednotbedisputedthatinaresponsibledemocraticpolity,publicopinionandfree
electionswillactaschecksonParliament.This,however,doesnotmeanthattheConstitutionitself
doesnotprovidejudiciallyenforceablelimitsonthepowersofParliament.Toidentifytheselimitsisto
recognisethestatusoftheJudiciary.TodenytheexistenceofsuchlimitsandtoclotheParliamentwith
sovereigntyandabsolutesupremacyoverotherStateorgans,willamounttocreatingasupra
ConstitutionalParliamentcapableevenofdestroyingtheConstitutionwhichcreatedit.IfParliamentis
permittedtoactthus,itwouldnot,inmyview,fallundertheambitofanyjudicialprinciple;itwould
amounttoanabdicationofourconstitutionalduty.
42.InapolitywheretheCourtsarecreatedbyawrittenConstitutionandnotbyParliamentaryfiat,
itonlyfollowsthattheyoweallegiancetotheConstitutionandnottoParliament.Therefore,in
PakistansConstitutionaldispensation,thedutyofthejudiciaryistoprotecttheConstitutionasthe
embodimentofthewillofthePeople.FailingtodosowilldenytheroleforwhichCourtshavebeen
created.ThisimportantconsiderationmustbefactoredintotheroleofCourtsandJudgeswhile
interpretingtheConstitution.Thereisnoconstitutionalbasisforanyextraordinarydeference(inthe
modeofBritishCourts)beingshowntoParliamentifintheprocess,Parliamentistobemadefreeofany
checksandconstraintswhichtheConstitutionimposesonit.Iamawareoftheprincipleof
interpretationoflawsaccordingtowhichCourtstryandharmoniseconflictingprovisionsofalawinan
attempttosaveitfrombeingstruckdownthroughjudicialreview.Suchrule,however,cannotbetaken
tomeantheCourtshouldcontriveorinventaninterpretationforthepurposeofsavingalaw.Thisview
isconsistentwiththeexistenceofawrittenConstitutionandwasexpressedasfarbackas1958inthe
caseofAbdulAzizv.theProvinceofWestPakistanbyCorneliusJ.
43.AsaConstitutionalprincipleitmustalsobekeptinmindthatthepowersvestedinand
exercisablebyCourtsarenotamatterofparliamentarygraceorsufferance,butaregrantedforthe
purposenotedaboveviz.toprotectthepeopleagainstexcesses,interalia,ofStateorgansand
functionaries.Assuchthesepowersaretobeguardedvigilantlyagainsterosionandencroachment
becausethesameareagrantoftheConstitutionforanimportantfiduciarypurpose.ThePeoplewho
havegrantedthepowersretainprimacyinourConstitutionalscheme.However,acknowledgingthe
supremacyofthePeople,isverydifferentfromsayingthatParliamentisunfetteredandcanencroach
onorreducesuchpowersgrantedtoCourts,undertheguiseofamendingtheConstitution.Theremarks
ofBhagwati,J.oftheIndianSupremeCourt,sumupmostappropriatelytheroleofJudgesandCourtsin
thepostcolonialdispensation.Accordingtohim,itisnecessaryforeveryJudgetoremember
constantlythat[theIndian]Constitutionisadocumentwhichcastsobligationsonevery
instrumentalityincludingtheJudiciarytotransformthestatusquoanteintoanewhumanorder.
Cornelius,J.recognizedthischangeinhislonedissentinthecaseofMaulviTamizuddin.Thesaidcase
placedinhistoricalcontext(elaboratedelsewhereinthisopinion)hasamplydemonstratedthatalaw
madebyParliamentdoesnotnecessarilyrepresentthewillofthePeoplebutstillitisforParliament
(andnotforCourts)tomakelaws.Asconstitutionaladjudicators,wecannotpretendtobeobliviousof
thegrimrealitiesofourpoliticalprocessasalsonotedinthediscussionbelowonArticle63AinPartIIof
thisopinion.Giventhefactsbeforeusinthesepetitions,wehavenocausetoaccepttheFederations
assurancethatthepoliticalprocesscontainssuchinherentchecksandmechanismsforquickcourse
correctionwhichmakejudicialreviewofconstitutionalamendmentsredundant.
44.Beforepartingwiththisdiscussion,aquickresponsemaybemadetotheFederations
assurancethatParliament,whenfreedofjudicialreview,willbehaveonlyinabenignandrational
manner.JamesMadison,oneoftheframersoftheAmericanConstitutionandanacutepoliticalthinker
saysintheFederalistPapers{i}fmenwereangels,nogovernmentwouldbenecessary.Ifangelswere
togovernmen,neitherexternalnorinternalcontrolsongovernmentwouldbenecessary.Inframinga
governmentwhichistobeadministeredbymenovermen,thegreatdifficultyliesinthis:youmustfirst
enablethegovernmenttocontrolthegoverned;andinthenextplaceobligeittocontrolitself.A
dependenceonthepeopleis,nodoubt,theprimarycontrolonthegovernment;butexperiencehas
taughtmankindthenecessityofauxiliaryprecautions.Judicialreviewisoneoftheseauxiliary
precautionswhichactsasafoiltoaParliamentwhich,forallitsglory,maybeinthrallofahandfulof
partyheadswhomaynotevenbepartofParliament.ThishasbeenelaboratedinPartIIofthisopinion
whileexaminingArticle63A.
TheCaseofthePetitioners:TheBasicStructureTheory:
45.Themainstayofthecaseofthepetitionerswasthebasicstructuretheory,ajurisprudential
doctrinethatevolvedintheIndianjurisdiction.Forreasonsexplainedlaterinthissection,Iamnot
inclinedtoplaceunnecessaryrelianceonthisdoctrineeither.However,consideringtheamountoftime
whichwasspentinsupportingoropposingthesaidtheoryasabasisfordecisioninthesepetitions,I
consideritnecessarytodevotesomespacetotheconsiderationofthisIndiantheory.Verybrieflyitcan
besummarizedonthebasisofjudgmentsrenderedbytheIndianSupremeCourt.Itmaybethatinsome
superficialways,thistheorycouldresembleaspectsofourownConstitutionalscheme.Butonaccount
ofthehistoricaloverlaycarriedbythetheoryanditsconnotationsinourjurisprudence,itis
inappropriatetousethetermBasicStructureinthisopinionwhendiscussingourownConstitution.
WhatistheBasicStructureTheory:
46.Brieflyput,thebasicstructuretheoryholdsthatthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendthe
Constitutiondoesnotextendtoalteringsomefundamentalfeatures(thebasicstructure)ofthe
ConstitutionandifanAmendmentisinconflictwithsuchbasicstructure,itcanandmustbestruck
down.ItisinterestingtonotethatinitiallypostindependencejudgmentsinIndiadidnotsupportthe
basicstructuretheory.InthecaseofShankriPrasadvs.UnionofIndia(AIR[38]1951SC458),theIndian
SupremeCourtheldthatParliamentspowertoamendtheConstitutionwasnotsubjecttojudicial
review.ThisratiowasfollowedalsointhecaseofSajjanSinghvsStateofRajasthan(AIR1965SC845).
However,subsequentlythelineofreasoningadoptedinthesejudgmentswasdeviatedfrom.This
startedwiththecaseofKesavanandaBharativs.StateofKerala(AIR1973SC1461)whereinitwasheld
thatcertainessentialorbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionwerebeyondtheamendingpowervestedin
ParliamentunderArticle368oftheIndianConstitution.Inanumberofsubsequentjudgmentsthis
principlewasreiteratedandinatleastfourotherinstancestheIndianSupremeCourtinvalidated
constitutionalamendmentspassedbyParliament,onthebasisofthistheory.
CritiquesoftheBasicStructureTheorywithinIndia:
47.ThebasicstructuredoctrinehasbeensubjectedtowidespreadcritiquewithintheIndian
context.CriticsallegethatsincetheIndianConstitutionnowherespecifieswhatitsbasicstructure
reallyconsistsof,JudgesoftheIndianSupremeCourthavenothingbutsubjectiveopinionstorelyupon
inmakingthisdetermination.This,inturn,hastheeffectoftransformingtheCourtintoaconstituent
bodycapableofoverrulingtheelectedParliamentofIndiaonthebasisofnothingmorethanthe
personalsubjectiveopinionsofjudges.
48Thereisindeedagreatdegreeofuncertaintyattachedtothebasicstructuredoctrine,whichis
somethingthattheSupremeCourtofIndiaisstillgrapplingwith.Thereissomeblurringoflinesandlack
ofclaritywithrespecttothecontoursofthebasicstructureintheIndianConstitution;thuswhatare
theessentialorfundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitutionremainsaquestionwhichtheIndian
SupremeCourtdecidesonacasebycasebasis.AssuchParliamentinIndiaishandicappedinnot
knowingbeforehand,astowhatisorisnotpartofthebasicstructureoftheIndianConstitution.Even
intheKesavanandacase,therewasdisagreementamongstthejudgesastowhatconstitutedthebasic
structureoftheIndianConstitution.Shelat,J.andGrover,J.addedtwomorebasicfeaturestothe
somewhatelasticlist:thedignityoftheindividualsecuredbythevariousfreedomsandbasicrightsand
themandatetobuildawelfarestate;andtheunityandintegrityofthenation.Hegde,J.and
Mukherjea,J.identifiedanotherlistofbasicfeatures:sovereigntyofIndia;democraticcharacterofthe
polity;unityofthecountry;essentialfeaturesoftheindividualfreedomssecuredbythecitizens;
mandatetobuildawelfarestateandanegalitariansociety,whileReddy,J.,statedthatelementsofthe
basicfeaturesweretobefoundinthePreambletotheConstitutionandthesewereprimarily:a
sovereigndemocraticrepublic;social,economic,andpoliticaljustice;libertyofthought,expression,
belief,faithandworship;equalityofstatusandofopportunity;parliamentarydemocracy;and
separationofthethreeorgansofthestate.Interestinglythoughevenifallthebasicfeaturesidentified
intheseseparatejudgementswerecompiledinalist,thislistwouldnotbeexhaustive.Adetailedstudy
byDr.AshokDhamijashowsthatatotalof27differentbasicfeatureshavebeenidentifiedbyvarious
judgesoftheIndianSupremeCourtsofar,thoughtheremaynotbeaconsensusamongthemasregards
eachfeature.
49.TheSupremeCourtofIndiahasthusovertime,inoverthirtyninecases,identifiedmoreand
morebasicfeaturestotheconstitution;yettilldatenoexhaustivelistofbasicfeaturesisavailablefor
examinationintheIndianjurisdiction.Thusatthetimewhenaparticularprovisionissoughttobe
amended,thepeopleorParliamentinIndiahavenowayofknowingbeforehandwhetherthatprovision
wouldfallwithintheambitofthebasicstructure.AsDr.Dhamijamakesclear,itisonlywhenthe
amendmenthasalreadybeenmadeandtheamendedprovisionischallengedbeforetheSupremeCourt
thatonecanknowaboutthatfactandalsoaboutthevalidityoftheearlieramendment.Instatingthis
counterintuitivepositionDr.DhamijaarguesthatArticle368oftheIndianConstitutionshouldberead
asifthefollowinginsertionshavebeenmade(wheninfactnosuchclauseexists):
(6)NotwithstandinganythinginthisConstitution(includingthisarticle),nobasicfeatureofthis
Constitutioncanbeamendedsoastodamageordestroyit.
Explanation:ThequestionwhetheraparticularprovisionisabasicfeatureofthisConstitutionshallbe
decidedineachindividualcasebytheSupremeCourtandthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtthereupon
shallbefinal
50.ThoughsuchanArticledoesnotexistintheIndianConstitution,thisisthepracticaleffectof
adoptingthebasicstructuretheoryinIndia.TheSupremeCourtofIndiathushasbecomeasuper
constituentbodyratherthananequalorganofthestate.This,fortunatelyforus,isaresultwhichwe
cansafelyavoidbecauseofthePreambletoourConstitutionasexaminedbelow.Thereinwefindnine
expresslystateddirectives.WearenotrequiredtorelyonthesubjectiveopinionofJudges.Theonly
questionwhichwillremainwhiledecidingachallengetoaConstitutionalamendmentwouldbeasto
whethertheamendmentiscoveredbyacommandspeltoutinthePreamble.Ifanamendmentisnot
coveredbysuchcommand,itwillnotbeopentotheCourttostrikeitdown.So,insteadofanelasticand
everexpandinglistofbasicfeaturesoftheconstitutionidentifiedbyJudges,basedontheirown
proclivities,theonlyquestionwillbeiftheamendmentunderchallengeisorisnotcoveredbya
directiveofthePeople.Thisquestionisverydifferentqualitativelyfromtryingtofindoutifthereisin
factacommandatallwhichexists.This,inmyview,isthedefiningdifferencebetweenourConstitution
andthatofIndia.
WhytheBasicStructureTheoryislargelyIrrelevantinthe
ConstitutionalContextofPakistan:
51.Withgreatrespecttolearnedcounselwhoappearedforbothsides,itshouldbestatedthatjust
likethedoctrineofparliamentarysovereignty,thebasicstructuredoctrinewhichtookrootinanalien
soilunderadistinctlydifferentconstitution,needsseriouscriticalexaminationbeforebeingpressedinto
useinaidofConstitutionalinterpretationinPakistan.Thereisneedfordeepexaminationofthe
rationaleandspecifichistoricalbackgroundwhichunderpinsforeigndoctrines.Anygraftingofanalien
conceptontoourbodypoliticotherwise,isaslikelytoberejectedasanalienorgantransplantedina
humanbody.
ThePreambleintheContextofConstitutionalAmendmentsinPakistan:
WhatisthePreamble:
52.InthePakistanicontext,judgesdonotneedtomakesubjectivespeculationsaboutthebasic
structureoftheConstitutioninordertoexercisejudicialreviewoverconstitutionalamendments.We
possess,intheshapeofthePreambletotheConstitution,thesurestpossiblegroundsforexamining
constitutionalamendments.ThePreambleoftheConstitutionisachartercomprisingninecommands
ordainedbythepeopleofPakistanforallinstrumentalitiesoftheState,includingtheParliamentand
theJudiciary.ThePreamblesaysthatitisthewillofthepeopleofPakistantoestablishanorder.Here
itisofutmostimportancetonotethedebatewhichtookplaceintheConstituentAssemblyandthe
ConstitutionalpointexpressedbyProf.RajKumarChakraverty,examinedbelow.Hisspeechmakesit
clearthatthemembersoftheAssemblywerefullyawareoftheConstitutionalquestionbeforethem.It
isadifferentmatterthatin1949,thepointofviewofProf.Chakravertyviz.thatthePeoplebeplaced
abovetheStatewasnotaccepted.Whatisimportantisthattwentyfouryearslater,whileadoptingthe
Preamble,changesweremadeinthetextoftheObjectivesResolutionwhichrecognizedtheprimacyof
thePeopleandasaconsequence,thePeoplewereplacedabovetheStateandtheirchosen
representatives,asaconstitutionalprinciple.ThePreambledoes,therefore,actasthekeytoour
understandingoftheConstitutionintermsofdefiningthelegalrelationshipbetweenthePeople,the
StateandthechosenrepresentativesofthePeople.Thishasbeenelaboratedbelow.Forthepresent,
foreaseofreference,thedirectives/commandsofthePeopleasgiveninthePreamblearereproduced
asunder:
i.theStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthe
people;
ii.theprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjustice,asenunciatedby
Islam,shallbefullyobserved;
iii.theMuslimsshallbeenabledtoordertheirlivesintheindividualandcollectivespheresin
accordancewiththeteachingsandrequirementsofIslamassetoutintheHolyQuranandSunnah;
iv.adequateprovisionshallbemadefortheminoritiesfreelytoprofessandpracticetheirreligions
anddeveloptheircultures;
v.theterritoriesnowincludedinorinaccessionwithPakistanandsuchotherterritoriesasmay
hereafterbeincludedinoraccedetoPakistanshallformaFederationwhereintheunitswillbe
autonomouswithsuchboundariesandlimitationsontheirpowersandauthorityasmaybeprescribed;
vi.fundamentalrights,includingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbeforelaw,social,economic
andpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipandassociationshallbe
guaranteed,subjecttolawandpublicmorality;
vii.adequateprovisionshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesand
backwardanddepressedclasses;
viii.theindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured;and
ix.theintegrityoftheterritoriesoftheFederation,itsindependenceandallitsrights,includingits
sovereignrightsonland,seaandair,shallbesafeguarded.
53.ItisinviewofthewellstructuredandconsideredwordingofthePreamblethatithasvariously
beencalledthegrundnormorthebeaconlightandthekeytounderstandingtheConstitution.The
significantaspectofthePreambleisthatithastobereadforthepurposeofproperinterpretation[of
theConstitution]inordertofindoutastowhatschemeofgovernancehasbeencontemplatedfor
Pakistan.MahmoodKhanAchakzaivs.FderationofPakistan(PLD1997SC426).Suchschemeof
governanceisinfactourownSocialContractspeltoutinunderstandablelanguageandnotdependent
ontheorizingandphilosophizing.
54.ThelanguageofthePreamblemakesitclearthatParliamentbeingagranteeofauthorityisa
fiduciaryofthePeopleofPakistanwhoarethesourceoftemporalpowerinthiscountry,anditcan
exerciseonlysuchauthorityasisdelegatedtoit.SuchauthoritybeingagrantoftheConstitution,by
definition,cannotbeuntrammeled.ThePreamblerecordsandreflectstheextentofthatdelegationby
givingthecommandsnotedabove.ThepeoplehavegiventoParliamentthepowertomakelawsforthe
fulfillmentoftheirninedirectivesstatedinthePreamble.Justlikeanydelegatecannotexceedtheterms
ofhisgrant,ParliamentdoesnothavethepowertomakeanylawfulamendmentstotheConstitution
thatmanifestlydefyanyofthecommandscontainedinthePreamble.Ifsuchamendmentsareindeed
made,itwouldthenbethedutyofthejudiciarytostrikethemdownsoastoensurethatthewillofthe
peopleembodiedintheConstitutionprevailsoverthatofoneoftheinstrumentalitiesofthePeopleviz
Parliament.Theissueastowhetherornotanamendmentisviolativeofthesecommandsisaseparate
matterandwillbedealtwithinthesecondpartofthisopiniondealingwithreviewoftheeighteenth
andtwentyfirstAmendments.
55.AlthoughthePreamblehasfoundmentioninanumberofprecedentsofthisCourt,itmustbe
respectfullystatedthatnowherehasitreceivedtheinterpretationwhichitswordingcallsfor.Attimesa
lotofemphasishasbeenplacedontheObjectivesResolutionbutnoticehasnotbeentakenofthe
wordinginthePreamblewhichhasredefinedtherelationshipbetweenthePeopleandStateof
Pakistan.Perhapsonereasonforthisisthat,heretofore,matterssuchasthemeaningofcertainterms
andconceptsinthecontextofachallengetoaconstitutionalamendmenthaveignoredthecrucial
changeofwordingadvertedtoabove,andfurtherdiscussedbelow.Anotherreason,Ibelieve,appears
tobeourunnecessaryinfatuationwithBritishnotionsofParliamentarysupremacy.Suchnotionshave
servedBritainverywell,butforPakistan,itistimeweareweanedofthecolonialbosomandadhereto
ourConstitution,byfactoringintoourcontextthetime,honoureddifferencesoftime,placeand
community,thatiszamaan,makaanandikwwan.
TheUniquefeaturesofourPreamble:
56.Tostartwith,theuniquenatureofthePreambletoourConstitutionmaybetakennoteof.I
haveexaminedthePreamblestotheConstitutionsofvariouscountriesoftheworld.Twelvecountries
donotdisplayatranslationoftheirpreamblesinEnglishontheirwebsites.Oftheremaining162
Constitutionsonlyin10(notincludingPakistan)doesthepreamblerefertoanindependentjudiciary.It
isofrelevancethatnoneofthesepreamblescontainswordingbywayofcommand,comparabletoour
Preamblewhichrequiresinteralia,thattheprinciplesofdemocracyshallbefullyobservedorthatthe
independenceoftheJudiciaryshallbefullysecured.Thecommandisaddressedtothe
instrumentalitiesandfunctionariesoftheState.ThisremarkablefeatureofourPreamblemakesit
unparalleledinthepresentdayworld.Cansuchuniquenessbedisregarded?Surelynot.Ithas,onthe
contrary,tobegivenameaningcommensuratewithitsunparalleleduniqueness.Addedtothisaspectof
thePreambleistheconsciousselectionoflanguageusedtherein.Howarethewordsprinciplesof
democracy,independenceofthejudiciaryandothercommandstoberead.Guidancemustbetaken
firstlyfromtheexpresswordingofthePreambleitself.Thedebates,whichtookplacewithinandoutside
theNationalAssemblybetweenDecember1972whentheConstitutionBillwasintroducedinthe
NationalAssemblyandApril1973whenitwasadoptedafteranumberofamendmentshadbeenmade
therein,mayalsothrowlightonthis.
57.InthecasesofAljehadTrustvs.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996SC324),Governmentof
Sindhvs.SharafFaridi(PLD1994SC105)andSh.LiaquatHussainvs.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996
SC504).ThetermindependenceoftheJudiciaryhasbeenadequatelydefined.Asfortheprinciplesof
democracywhicharetobefullyobserved,thereisnocontroversyastothesystemofelectionsand
governanceinplaceinPakistanalthoughthetermdemocracycanhavevariousmeaningsdepending
uponlocalcontextsuchasthedefinitionofthetermintheUK,intheDemocraticPeoplesRepublicof
Korea(DPRK)orasusedinthecantonsofSwitzerland.Forinstance,runoffelectionsorasystemof
proportionalrepresentationasopposedtofirstpastthepost(FPTP)couldconstituteobservanceof
theprinciplesofdemocracyasconsideredinPartIIofthisopinion.
WhatthePreambleisNot:
58.WhilediscussingthePreamble,itwillbeusefultoexaminesomegeneralisationsfromother
CommonLawjurisdictionsastothepurposeandutilityofapreambleasanaidtostatutory(asopposed
toconstitutional)interpretation.Thiswillenableustoexamineandexposesomemisconceptionswhich,
Isaywithrespect,haveunthinkinglybeenimportedintoourlegalcorpusfromforeignjurisdictionsasa
resultofunexaminedassumptions.Thereafter,IwillexamineourownPreambleandConstitution,
whichwehavealreadydetermined,containsexceptionalwording.
59.Englishprecedent,andattimestheopinionsofprominentauthorslikeCrawford,Craiesand
othersareoftencitedinourjurisdictionasauthoritiesontherulesofstatutoryinterpretation.In
determiningtheroleofthepreamble,asanaidtointerpretation,thesecommentatorshaveheldittobe
oflimitedimportance.Thus,inEnglandforinstanceifthemeaningoftheenactmentsisclearand
unequivocalwithoutthepreamble,thepreamblecanhavenoeffectwhatever.(Crawford);furthermore,
[t]hepreamblemustnotinfluencethemeaningotherwiseascribabletotheenactingpartunlessthereis
acompellingreasonforit:andacompellingreasonisnottobefoundmerelyinthefactthatthe
enactingwordsgofurtherthanthepreamblehasindicated(Crawford).
60.Theseviews,however,arenotrelevantwhendeterminingtherolethatthePreambletoour
Constitutionismeanttoplayinconstitutionalinterpretation.Thisissobecause,asmentionedearlier,
ourConstitutionandthehistoricaloriginsofitsPreamblearemateriallydifferentfromthatofthe
cursorypreambleswhicharemerelypointerstothesubjectmatterofBritishstatutes.Itisimportantto
notethatwhentheEnglishjudgestalkofpreambles,theyaretalkingaboutpreamblesofavery
differentsort.Forone,theyareconcernedexclusivelywithstatutorypreambles,notconstitutional
preambles;asnotedearlier,theybeingobligedtobeobedienttoParliamenthaveneverhadany
occasiontoconsideraconstitutionalPreamble,asnoneexistsinBritain.Thestatutorypreamblethat
theEnglisharetheorizingaboutisgenerallyjustaprefatorystatementexplainingordeclaringthe
reasonsandmotivesfor,andtheobjectssoughttobeaccomplishedbytheenactmentofthestatute.
(Crawford).Thisprefatorystatementisgenerallyaddedbydraftsmentaskedwithputtingtogetherthe
wordsofthestatuteitself.ThePreambleinastatutefollowsafterthedraftStatutehasbeenframedor
evenifitprecedestheframing,itismerelyaprefatorystatement.Thecaseofaconstitutionalpreamble
whichemanatesfromthePeopleandtheiraspirationsforafutureorder,particularlyourunique
Preamblewithitsexaltedgeneology,isaltogetherdifferentandapplyingtoit,mindlesslyor
dogmatically,therulesdevisedbyEnglishCourtsforstatutorypreambleswouldbetofall,asProf.Hart
notes,intothetrapofalternativesofblindarbitrarychoice,ormechanicaldeductionfromruleswith
predeterminedmeanings.Suchapproachwouldbewhollyunwarrantedasitwouldbelittleour
Preamblewhichhasbeenvariouslyreferredtoasthegrundnorm,thebeaconlight,andthekeyto
understandingourConstitution.Inmyhumbleviewitwouldbequiteinappropriatetousesuch
exquisiteadjectivesforthePreambleandthen,atthesametimetosayitistohavenorelevancewhile
interpretingprovisionsoftheConstitutionsuchasArticles175,175A,63Aand51orthechangesmade
thereinbytheeighteenthandtwentyfirstAmendments.
61.ThepreambletoourConstitution,itshouldbenoted,wasnotframedbymereparliamentary
draftsmenaftertheyhadcompletedthetextoftheconstitution,nordoesitjustdeclarethereasonfor
theenactmentofourConstitution.AdetailedlookatthehistoricalgenesisofourConstitutionshows
thatthechronologyhereisquitetheopposite.TheoriginsofthePreambletotheConstitutioncanbe
tracedbacktotheObjectivesResolutionpassedbyPakistansfirstConstituentAssemblyin1949.The
debatesintheConstituentAssemblyatthetimeshowveryclearlythattheResolutionwastofurnishthe
frameworktobefollowedbytheConstituentAssemblyinsettingoutthesystemofgovernanceforthe
country.Itisthefirstkeyconstitutionaldocumentwhichemergedafterindependenceandits
emergencepredatesthatofthe1973Constitutionbyalmostaquartercentury.Itwasframedin1949by
abodycomprisingpersonagesnolessthanthefoundingfathers.ItwastabledbyMr.LiaqatAliKhanand
passedbytheConstituentAssembly.ThePreambletothe1973Constitutionfollowscloselythewording
oftheObjectivesResolutionbutwithsomematerialchangestherein,consideredearlierandelaborated
below.
62.Weweretakenthroughthehistoricalparliamentaryrecordof1949,bylearnedcounsel
representingtheSupremeCourtBarAssociation.ShehasshownthattheObjectivesResolutionwas
contentiousandwasnotaconsensusdocument.Idonotthinkthissubmissionhasmuchrelevancein
thesemattersbeforeusbecauseIamnotrequiredtoconsidertheObjectivesResolutionsexceptfor
limitedthoughimportanthistoricalpurposes.IampresentlyconcernedonlywiththePreambletothe
1973ConstitutionwhichafterdebateontheDraftConstitutionBillandmaterialchangestherein,was
adoptedunanimouslybyallincludingtherepresentativesoftheFederatingUnits.Therefore,anylackof
consensusontheObjectivesResolutionscanhavelittlebearingontheimportanceofthePreambleas
adoptedunanimouslyandasitremainstodate.
63.Onehistoricalfactmay,however,benoted.Prof.RajKumarChakraverty,amemberofthe
oppositionfromEastBengalwasquitepreparedtoconsiderasolutiontobreaktheimpassewhichhad
emergedin1949creatingcleavagebetweenmembersoftheConstituentAssembly.Aladymemberof
theAssemblywasinagreementwithProf.Chakraverty.Theminoritymembershadexpressed
reservationsastothecontentoftheObjectivesResolutionwhenProf.Chakravertyinhisspeech
proposedanamendmentthatforthewordsStateofPakistanthroughitspeoplethewordspeopleof
Pakistanbesubstituted.Hissuggestion,however,wasnotaccepted.Itisofgreatsignificancethatwhen
theObjectivesResolutionwasproposedasaPreambletothefutureConstitutionandwaspresentedas
partoftheDraftConstitutionBillintheNationalAssemblyinDecember,1972,itwasmodifiedalongthe
linessoughtbyProf.Chakravertyin1949and,Imayadd,forthesamereasonswhichhadmotivated
Prof.Chakraverty.Itwasexplainedbyhimin1949thataccordingtohisproposedamendment,itwould
meanthatAllahAlmightyhaddelegatedHisauthoritytothepeopleofPakistan.Inotherwords,the
peoplearesupremeandtheStatecomesnext.Hewentontogivehisreasoningbehindthe
amendmentproposedbyhim.HesaidFirstcomepeopleandthentheStateaStateisformedbythe
peopleguidedbythepeopleandcontrolledbythepeoplebutasthe[unamended]wordsstandin
thePreamble,itmeansthatonceaStatecomesintoexistenceitbecomesallinall.Itissupreme,quite
supremeoverthepeoplethatismyobjection.AStateisthemouthpieceofthepeopleandnotits
master.TheStateisresponsivetothepublicopinionandtothepublicdemand.ButasthePreamble
standsitneednotberesponsivetothepublicdemandandpublicopinion.ThatisthedangerandIwant
toeliminatethatdanger.ThoughProf.Chakravertywasunsuccessfulin1949,ourConstitutionmakers
in197273whowerefullyawareofthedivisivedebatesof1949,acceptedwhathadbeenproposedby
Prof.ChakravertyasafundamentalConstitutionalprinciple.Asaconsequence,thePeopleofPakistan
weregivenduestatusandrecognitionandtheywerespecificallymentionedinourConstitutional
Preambleasrecipientsoftemporalauthoritytobeexercisedby[them]asasacredtrust.Thiswasa
remarkableandfundamentalchangefromthetextoftheObjectivesResolutionwhereauthorityhad
beenproposedtobedelegatedbyAllahAlmightytotheStateofPakistanandNOTitspeople.The
secondfundamental,andinmyviewcrucial,differencewasthatin1949itwastheConstituent
AssemblywhichhadresolvedtoframetheConstitutionfortheStateofPakistan.In1973asexpressly
statedinthePreambleitwasthePeoplewhowerebytheirwill,creatingtheConstitutionalOrderasper
theircommands.TheseareremarkablefeaturesoftheConstitutionwhichappeartohaveescapedthe
attentionofCourts.Inthenumerousprecedentscitedbeforeus,itwasworthnotingthatnonedeals
withthesecrucialandmeaningfuldifferences;insteadtheObjectivesResolutionandthePreambleare
consideredasbeinginterchangeable.Inmyopinionthisclearlyisimpermissibleinviewoftheabove
discussion.Notheoryorphilosophyorunexaminedassumptioncanbeusedforthepurposeof
disregardingwhattheConstitutionhassaid.Inmyhumbleopinion,theimportanceofthischangewas
soobvioustoProf.ChakravertyandmaywellhaveledtoaconsensusandthussavedtheObjectives
Resolutionfrombecomingdivisiveandfromcausingmisgivingsamongstsomemembersofthe
ConstituentAssemblyrepresentingtheminorities.Thiscrucialchange,however,wasnotcommented
uponbythelearnedAttorneyGeneraleventhoughhewasinvitedtodoso.Imayaddthatthequalityof
thedebateintheConstituentAssemblyin1949reflectsandhighlightstworelevantaspectsofour
Constitution;firstly,thatthedelicateissuesofConstitutionallawwerefullyunderstoodand
comprehensivelydebatedbythemembersoftheConstituentAssemblyin1949andtheNational
Assemblyin1973.Secondly,thesedebatesshouldleavenodoubtatallastotheimportanceofthe
PreambleanditsrelevanceforunderstandingwhattheConstitutionsaysabouttherelationship
betweenthePeople,theStateandStateorgansandalsothatitisnotmerelyanintroductionorpreface
andnothingmore.
64.ThePreamblecan,initsexistingform,beseenastheembodimentofthenationssocial
contractinoutline.ThearchitecturalplanandmouldwhichthePeopleofPakistangavetotheir
representativesintheNationalAssemblyfortheorderwhichtheyhadchosentoconstructfor
themselves,theStateanditsinstitutions.TherelationshipofthePeoplewiththeirinstrumentalitiesis
clearlycontainedinthePreamble.ItistheConstitutionwhichwascreatedtomatchthisplanandtofit
thismouldandnottheotherwayround.ThejoboftherepresentativesofthePeople,asfiduciaries,was
toadhereloyallytosucharchitecturalplanandthereby,tofulfilthefiduciaryobligationowedbythem
tothePeopleofPakistan.ItmustnotbeforgottenthatthesaidplandictatedbythePeoplecontained,
andstilldoes,theninecommandsreproducedabove,includingtherequirementofajudiciarywhose
independencetheStateanditsinstrumentalitiesarerequiredtofullysecureandtheprinciplesof
democracywhichhavetobefullyobserved.Itwould,inthesecircumstances,constitutegraveerrorto
applythereasoningofEnglishcaselawonstatutorypreamblestoourConstitutionalPreambleorto
applyphilosophicaltheories(examinedbelow)tocasessuchasthesepetitionswhichrequireresolution
inaccordancewiththeConstitutionaltextandnotonthebasisofchoosingonetheoryovertheother
becauseitmatchestheideologicalleaningsoftheJudge.AsJudgeswemustleaveourpersonal
inclinationsbehindwhenwesitinCourtasinterpretersoftheConstitution,andstayclosetothe
ConstitutionwhichweareobligedbyourOathtopreserve,protectanddefend.
65.ThereisanotherreasonwhycaselawfromtheBritishjurisdiction,relatingtotherelevanceof
preambles,isoflimitedsignificanceforus.Ihavenotcomeacrossanypreambleformingpartofa
statuteenactedbytheBritishParliament,whichcontainsanycommandletalonecommands
comparabletotheonescontainedinourPreamble.ItisanecessaryaspectoftheBritishConstitution,
anditsfundamentalfeatureofParliamentarysovereignty,thatpreamblescanatbestserveasaidsto
theconstructionofstatutesandnopersonorbodycangiveacommandtoParliament.Thisisclear
fromastudyofBritishstatutes;eventhosewhichareconsideredtohavegreatConstitutional
significance.Forinstance,thewholepreambletotheGovernmentofIndiaAct1935,whichwastobe
theConstitutionofIndia,isallofelevenwordsstatingthatitis[a]nActtomakefurtherprovisionfor
theGovernmentofIndia.Thispreambleisnotverydifferentfromthepreambletosomestatutory
PreamblesofActspassedin2015includingtheControlofHorsesAct2015andtheRecallofMPsAct
2015.ThepreambletotheControlofHorsesAct2015simplystatesitisAnActtomakeprovisionfor
thetakingofactioninrelationtohorseswhichareonlandinEnglandwithoutlawfulauthority,andfor
connectedpurposes.And,thepreambletotheRecallofMPsAct2015alsosimplyinformsthereader
thatitisanAnActtomakeprovisionabouttherecallofmembersoftheHouseofCommons;andfor
connectedpurposesThesePreambles,respectively,totheGovernmentofIndiaAct1935andthe
ControlofHorsesAct2015andtheRecallofMPsAct2015sayitallaboutpreamblescomingupfor
considerationbeforeBritishCourts.InfairnesstothelearnedAttorneyGeneral,hedidadverttothe
relativelylongerpreambletotheGovernmentofIndiaAct1919;butthatpreambleisalsodescriptiveof
thecontentsofthesaidstatuteandhas,intheusualmode,beencraftedfornootherpurpose,and
certainlynotwiththeobjectofdescribingthescopeorlimitsofthestatuteortherelationshipofthe
peopleofIndiawiththeircolonialmasters.
66.Itisnowonder,therefore,thatCourtsinBritainhaveaccordedsuchaninsignificant,andalmost
irrelevant,statustopreamblesgenerally.Thisgeneralisationappearsattimestohavebeenstatedin
somejudgementscitedbeforeus,asaruleofuniversalapplication.However,forreasonsexplainedin
thisopinion,thisgeneralisationcannotbeextendedtothePreambletoourConstitution.Theoriginsand
historicalvalueofthePreambledoesnotpermitrelegatingittothestatusofanyordinarystatutory
preamblesimilartothetypicalpreamblesmerelyprefatorytoenactmentsoftheBritishParliament.
ThevalueofourownPreambleinsettingouttherelationshipbetweenthePeopleofPakistanandtheir
instrumentalities,hasalreadybeendiscussedaboveandthePreambleshould,therefore,beseenassui
generis,bearingnocomparisontothosestatutorypreambleswhichhaveresultedintheimpression
reflectedintheworksoftextbookwriterssuchasCraiesandCrawford,quotedabove.Bearinginmind
theextraordinarydifferenceinthestatusofourPreamblecomparedtotheusualstatutorypreamble,it
is,Isaywithgreatrespect,notpossibletoagreewiththeremarkthatthePreambletoourConstitution
willservethesamepurposeasanyotherpreamble.Statevs.ZiaurRehman(PLD1973SC49).Applying
thisdictumdogmaticallywouldamounttocomparingtheproverbialapplesandorangesandconcluding
thatthereisnodifferencebetweenthetwobecausebotharefruits.
67.ThecompleteabsenceofanymeaningfuldebateonstatutorypreamblesintheBritish
Parliamentoverthepasttwohundredyears,willdemonstrateirrefutablytheinsignificanceof
preamblesinthelawsmadebytheBritishParliament.Thisundeniabletruthisclearlyestablishedfroma
reviewofHansard,theauthorisedrecordoftranscriptsofdebatesintheBritishParliament.By
comparisontheintenseandextensivedebateontheObjectivesResolutionspreadovermanydaysin
1949intheConstituentAssemblyshowstheexactopposite.Itisthisremarkabledifferencewhichhas
beenoverlookedbythelearnedjudge(aBarristertrainedintheEnglishlegaltradition)whilemakingthe
abovequotedremarkaboutourPreamble.Itisinthisbackground,withrespecttothelearnedJudge,I
donotfinditpossibletoagreewiththeremarkthatourPreamblewillservethesamepurposeasany
otherpreamble.
ComparisonwithotherConstitutionalPreambles:
68.Havingestablishedthekeydifferencesbetweentheunderstandingofstatutorypreamblesin
England,andourownConstitutionalPreamble,itisimportanttoconsiderforcomparativeanalysis,the
roleofconstitutionalpreamblesinothercountriesnotablythoseintheU.SConstitutionandtheIndian
Constitutionreferredtoduringargumentsandincaselaw.ThePreambletotheUnitedStates
Constitutionall52wordsofitisquotedbelowinfullforreference:
WethePeopleoftheUnitedStates,inOrdertoformamoreperfectUnion,establishJustice,insure
domesticTranquility,provideforthecommondefense,promotethegeneralWelfare,andsecurethe
BlessingsofLibertytoourselvesandourPosterity,doordainandestablishthisConstitutionforthe
UnitedStatesofAmerica.
69.DespitethebrevityandindeterminatefluidityoftheUSpreamble,constitutionaltheoristsinthe
USsuchasLawrenceTribeandMichaelDorfarequiteclearthatitisimpropertorefertothepreamble
inconstitutionalargumentonthetheorythatitisonlyanintroduction,apreface,andnopartofthe
Constitutionasenacted.TheCourtsintheUnitedStateshavethusfrequentlyadvertedtoandplaced
relianceontheirpreambledespiteitsamorphousnature.Thetwolearnedauthorsareequallyclearthat
aruleofconstructionwillhavetobeinventedwithoutapparentgroundingintheConstitutionitselfto
disregardthepreambleortorelegateitsstatustothatofamereintroduction,orpreface,ortotreatit
asnotbeingpartoftheConstitution.TheentirenatureandschemeofourConstitutionrequirethe
sameapproach,havingamuchstrongerfootingthanthatintheUS.
70.TheIndianConstitutionandcaselawrelatingtoabasicstructuretheorydevisedbytheIndian
SupremeCourtwerealsoreferredtobylearnedcounselforbothsides.Whileexaminingthesamethe
IndianCourtisseentohaveadvertedtotheIndianPreamble,soitwouldbeappropriatetoalso
reproducethesameinextenso.Itsays:
We,thepeopleofIndia,havingsolemnlyresolvedtoconstituteIndiaintoaSOVEREIGNSOCIALIST
SECULARDEMOCRATICREPUBLICandtosecuretoallitscitizens:
Justice,social,economicandpolitical;
Libertyofthought,expression,belief,faithandworship;
Equalityofstatusandofopportunity;andtopromoteamongthemall
FraternityassuringthedignityoftheindividualandtheunityandintegrityoftheNation;
INOURCONSTITUENTASSEMBLYthistwentysixthdayofNovember,1949,doHEREBYADOPT,ENACT
ANDGIVETOOURSELVESTHISCONSTITUTION
71.TheIndianSupremeCourthasaccordedmuchimportancetothepreambletotheIndian
Constitution.Inaseriesofcases,themostfamousofwhichisthecaseofKesavanandaBharatiandmore
recentlyAshokaKumarThakur,theCourtheldthatwhenaconstitutionalprovisionisinterpreted,the
cardinalruleistolooktothePreambletotheConstitutionastheguidingstarThepreambleembodies
thehopesandaspirationsofthePeopleAshokaKumarThakurvs.UnionofIndia(2008[6]SCC1).
ThewordingoftheIndianpreamble,anditsrecognitionbyCourtsinIndiaastheguidingstar,does
attempttoprovidethesourceoftheIndianConstitution,indicatingitsbasisinsocialcontract.
Significantly,however,theIndianpreambledoesnotcontainlanguagecomparabletoornearlyas
explicitasthatofourConstitution.Inparticular,itisimportanttonotethatthestructuralelementsof
ourConstitutionandtherepresentativefiduciaryrelationshipdoesnotfindexpressionintheIndian
preamble,nordowefindanycommandssimilartotheexpressdirectivesfromthePeoplewhicharethe
hallmarkofourConstitution.TheseareverysignificantdifferencesbetweentheIndianandPakistani
ConstitutionswhichpointtoinadequatetextualsupportforthebasicstructuretheoryinIndiaand
whichhighlighttheoppositeinPakistan.Moreonthiswillbesaidbelow.
72.Thereisampleprecedent,notjustfromourjurisdiction,whichestablishestheuniquerolethe
preambletoaConstitutionplaysinconstitutionalinterpretation.Nevertheless,bothU.SandIndian
Courtsfacearealproblemwhileexpoundingtheprecisevaluesoutlinedintheirconstitutional
preambles.Thisissobecause,unlikeourPreamble,theUSandIndianpreamblesarenebulousand
impreciseintermsofidentifyingwithexactnessboth,thevaluesoftheConstitutionandtherelationship
betweenthepeopleandtheirrepresentatives.Itisasenseoffrustrationwiththisnoticeablevagueness
oflanguageintheIndianpreamblethatrecentlycompelledtheIndianSupremeCourttodeclarethatit
isimpossibletospinoutanyconcreteconceptofbasicstructureoutofthegossamerconceptssetoutin
thepreamble[totheIndianConstitution]AshokaKumarThakur.Facedwithanotveryhelpful
preamble,theIndianSupremeCourtwasforcedtorelyontheindividualinclinationsofitsJudgesto
comeupwithvaryingdefinitionsofwhatconstitutedabasicstructureoftheIndianConstitutionwhich
thenwasheldtobebeyondthepowersofParliamenttoamend.Therefore,whileImayadmirethe
lyricalandrevolutionarytoneoftheIndianpreamble,borrowedmainlyfromRevolutionaryFrance,I
mustsympathizewiththeIndianSupremeCourtjudgeswhohavehadtoexpoundawholebasic
structuretheoryonthebasisofthesefewuncertainwords.
73.WefortunatelydonotencounterthisdifficultyinPakistanbecausetheNationalAssemblyin
1973hadtheforesighttorecognizethePeopleofPakistanastherepositoriesoftemporalauthorityand
tolimittheStateandtheirinstrumentalitiesbyimposingonthemtheconstraintsspeltoutinthe
Preamble,wherebythePeopleinteralia,instructedtheirrepresentativesthataConstitutionalorderwas
tobeestablishedbythewillofthePeoplewhereintheStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthority
throughthechosenrepresentativesofthePeopletheprinciplesofdemocracyshallbefully
observedtheterritoriesshallformaFederationwhereinunitswillbeautonomouswherein
provisionsshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritieswhereintheindependence
ofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured.TheseextractsfromthePreamblearebeingspecificallyreferred
tobecauseoftheirrelevancetothoseprovisionsintheeighteenthandtwentyfirstConstitutional
amendmentswhichwillneedtobeexaminedforthepurposeofdeterminingifthesameareinbreach
ofthefiduciarydutyoftherepresentativestoremainboundbythewillofthePeoplesoexpressed.
74.Hereitmayalsoberemarkedthatwhiletherearenocommandsorevenreferencestothe
judiciaryinthepreamblesrespectively,oftheU.SortheIndianConstitutions,ourConstitutional
preambleemploysexpresswords,includingwellunderstoodlegaltermsexaminedaboveandcontains
alsothespecificdirectivesnotedabove.Therearethus,clearcommandsinourpreamblewhichhave
theeffectofcircumscribingthepowersoftheStateorgansandfunctionariesand,inparticular,dictating
theirrelationshipandresponsibilitytowardsthepeoplegenerally,minoritiesspecially,andthejudiciary.
Itisonaccountofthesecommandsitmustbeheldthatthepeople,minoritiesamongothers,andthe
JudiciaryrespectivelyderivetheirrightsandindependencedirectlyfromtheConstitutionandnotfrom
Parliament.Asnotedearlier,theseexpressdirectives,inunamendedform,remainfirmlyimbeddedin
theConstitutioneventoday.
75.ItisinthisbackgroundthatwecannowappreciatethereasonwhyCourtsinPakistan,with
someexceptions,haveaccordedsuchextraordinaryimportancetothePreamblenotmerelyasanaid
toconstruingtheConstitutionbutalsoasthegrundnormandbeaconlightdefiningtheConstitutional
OrderordainedbythePeopleofPakistan.InAsmaJilaniscase,HamoodurRahmanCJapprovingly
describeditasthecornerstoneofPakistanslegaledificeandasthebondwhichbindsthenationand
asadocumentfromwhichtheConstitutionofPakistanmustdrawitsinspiration.Recentlyinthecaseof
Dr.MubasharHassanv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC265),Ch.IjazAhmed,J.hasmostaccurately
summedupthepositionofthePreamble.HenotedthatthePreambleshowsthewillofthepeople
andisthekeytounderstand[ing]theconstitution.Thesearenotidlewordsmeanttopaylipserviceor
tosingvacuouspaeanstothePreamblewithouttheintentionofgivingmeaningtoitsexceptional
natureandcontent.IfindeedthePreambleisthecornerstoneofPakistanslegaledificeorthekeytoits
understandingthenitcannotbereducedtothestatusofmeaninglessverbiagewhichiswhatnecessarily
willhappenifitisheldthatParliamenthasanabsolute,unfetteredandlimitlesspowertochangethe
Constitution,regardlessofthecommandsinthePreamble.
76.TheargumentsonbehalfoftheFederationimplythatthePreamble,farfrombeingthe
cornerstoneorkeytotheunderstandingoftheConstitution,hasnomeaningwhenitcomesto
definingthescopeofParliamentspowertoamendtheConstitution.ItmaywellbepossibleforCourts
inIndiaortheUStobenonplussedbythenebulousidealsexpressedintheirConstitutionalpreambles.
AsProf.Tribesays[o]nebasicproblemisthatthetext[oftheUSPreamble]leavessomuchroomfor
theimagination[it]speaksoffurtheringsuchconceptsasJusticeandtheBlessingsofLiberty.
AccordingtoTribe,however,[i]tisnothard,intermsofconceptsthatfluidandthatplastic,tomakea
linguisticallyplausibleargumentinsupportofmorethanafewsurelyincorrectsolutions.However,we
asJudgesandCourtscreatedbyourownConstitutiondonotfindmuchdifficultyinidentifyingthe
commandswhichlimittheParliamentarypowertochangetheConstitution,nordowefaceanyproblem
innotingthatmembersofParliamentarebutrepresentativesofthePeoplehavinglimitationsand
operatingunderconstraintsasnextconsidered.
Representatives:Whatdoesitsignify:
77.TheexpressionrepresentativesasusedinthePreambleisverywellunderstoodinthe
jurisprudenceofPakistan.However,inordertoexplainthesignificanceofthewordinthecontextofthe
presentdiscussion,itwillhelptostartbylookingatthedictionarymeaningofthisword.
i)BlacksLawDictionary(8thEdition)definesarepresentativeasonewhostandsfororactson
behalfofanother.
ii)TheShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary(3rdEdition)definesarepresentativeasoneholdingthe
placeof,actingfor,alargebodyofpersons(esp.thewholepeople)intheworkingofgoverningor
legislating;pertainingto,orbasedupon,asystembywhichthepeopleisthusrepresented.
iii)WebstersUnabridgedDictionary(2ndEdition)definesarepresentativeasapersonduly
authorizedtoactorspeakforanotherorothers.
78.Theseandcountlessotherdictionaries,precedentsandlegaltextsfromcommonlaw
jurisdictionstheworldover,spelloutthesamemeaning.Thewordrepresentative,therefore,
connotesonethingaboveallelse;thattheonewhoactsinarepresentativecapacityisapersonwho
hasnopowerorauthorityofhisownbutderiveshispowerorauthorityfromadifferentrepositoryand
sourceofauthority.Inthepresentcontext,lookingatthewordingofthePreamble,therepositoryand
sourceofauthorityareobviouslythePeopleofPakistanwhilethememberselectedtotheNational
Assemblywhowereentrustedin197273withthetaskofframingtheConstitutioninconformitywith
thedirectivesofthePeopleweretobeseenaswhattheywereviz.representativesofthePeopleof
Pakistanforthepurpose.ThespeechofProf.Chakravertyin1949intheConstituentAssembly
(reproducedabove)spellsouttheConstitutionalprinciplewhichwasacceptedin1973bytheNational
Assembly.
TheLimitsofaFiduciarysPowers:
79.Ashasbeenstatedabove,thelanguageofthePreamblerelevantforourpresentpurposeis
welldefinedinlaw.TheformofthePreamble,isdistinctanditsuniquenesshasbeenconsideredabove.
TheimportantfeaturethatemergesfromtheconstitutionallanguageisthatthemembersofParliament
holdtheirofficeinarepresentativecapacityonly,withallthelimitationswhichinhereinsuch
representativecapacity.Forinstancearepresentativewhoisagranteeofcertainpowerscannot
disobeythegrantorordislodgethegrantor.Whatevertheydointhecapacityofchosenrepresentatives,
effectstherightsandinterestsofthepeopletheyrepresent,inmattersrelatingtogovernance.Itiswell
establishedinourjurisdictionthatwhereverapersonisplacedinapositionwhereheexercisespowers
onbehalfofothers,andwherebytheinterestsofsuchothersarerepresented,theformerissaidtobe
actingasafiduciaryforsuchothers.Itisnotnecessaryatthisstagetomentionthevastseaofauthority
andprecedentdefiningwhatitmeanstobeafiduciaryactinginarepresentativecapacity,becausethe
basicmeaningoftheworddoesnotadmitofmuchdebateorambiguity.Itwillbesufficienttoreferto
SuoMotucaseNo.10of2009wherethisCourthasheldthatStatefunctionariesarefiduciaries,
ultimatelyresponsibletotheirpaymastersi.e.thePeopleofPakistan[2010SCMR885].Moreover,the
samebasicmeaningpermeatesthelegalcorpusofallcommonlawjurisdictions.Thusagooddefinition
ofthewordfiduciaryisgiveninarelativelyrecentEnglishcasetitledBristolandWestBSvs.Mothew
[1996(4)AER698]whereafiduciaryisdefinedassomeonewhohasundertakentoactfororonbehalf
ofanotherinaparticularmatterincircumstanceswhichgiverisetoarelationshipoftrustand
confidence.Thedistinguishingobligationofafiduciaryistheobligationofloyalty.Inthecontextwhich
ispresentlybeingexamined,itshouldbeevidentthattherepresentativesofthePeopleofPakistanare
meanttobesinglemindedlyloyaltothePeopleofPakistan.Thisloyalty,asdiscussedbelow,canonlybe
manifestedif,inobediencetothecommandofthePeople,theserepresentativesofthePeople,fully
abidebyandensurefulfillmentofsuchcommand.Thisisanecessaryandinextricableincidentofbeinga
representativeofthePeopleofPakistan.ThisalsohighlightsthereservationsofProf.Chakraverty,
referredtoaboveandacceptedbytheNationalAssemblytwentyfiveyearslaterin1973.
80.It,therefore,logicallyfollowsthatasthecommandofthePeopleforinstance,requiresan
independentJudiciarywhoseindependenceistobefullysecuredorthattheprinciplesofdemocracyare
fullyobservedorthatthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesaresafeguarded,therepresentativesofthe
PeoplecomprisingParliament,cannotviolatethesedictateswithoutbreachingthefiduciaryobligation
owedbythemtothePeople.Itisthisaspectofthepresentpetitionswhichdefinesthelimitsofthe
powerandauthorityofParliamenttomakelawsincludingactsofParliamentunderArticle239for
amendingtheConstitution.ThisessentialaspectofourConstitutionimposesabaronParliamentand
ParliamentariansfromactingasfreeagentsunconstrainedbytheirConstitutionalstatusasfiduciariesof
thePeoplelimitedbythetermsoftheirgrant.
81.ThespeechofMr.LiaqatAliKhaninthefirstpostindependenceConstituentAssemblyin1949
sumsupthelegalandConstitutionalpositionmostaptly.Heproclaimedthatthepeoplehavebeen
recognizedastherecipientsofallauthorityanditisinthemthatthepowertowieldithasbeenvested.
Mr.SirishChandraChatopadhyaya,anothermemberoftheConstituentAssemblyechoedthesame
opinionbutwithevengreaterhumilitywhenhesaidthatthecitizensofourcountryareourmasters.
Wearetheirservants.Thesameethosofhumilityandservilitypervades[the]timelessandprophetic
principleofgovernance,encapsulatedinthewellknownsaying:(Theleaderofapeopleistheir
servant).InthecasetitledBazMuhammadKakarvs.FederationofPakistan(PLD2012SC923),itwas
heldthat[o]urconstitutionmanifeststheembodimentofthisveryprinciplewhenitobligesthehighest
executivefunctionarytocarryoutthecommandmentsexpressedbythepeopleintheformofthe
constitutionandthelaw.Deviationsbyfiduciariesfromthesecommandmentsmustremainofthe
gravestconcerntocitizensandcourtsalike.Forfurtherhistoricalcontextandrelevance,itmaybe
notedthatthePresidentin1973waslateMr.ZulfiqarAliBhutto,andthecommitteetaskedwith
proposingthedraftConstitutionwasastarstuddedgalaxyoflegalluminaries(bothtreasuryand
opposition)withdistinctlypeoplecentricorientationsandmust,therefore,betakentohavebeen
particularlyconsciousofthenuancesandconnotationsofthelanguagewhichfounditswayintothe
Preambleasfinallyadopted.ThePeopleofPakistanwerenolongertobetreatedassubjectsoras
riyaya.Theywere,thenceforthtobethefountainheadofallpowerinPakistanreplacingtheKingin
Parliament.ItwasthispoliticalcreedwhichwasthenarticulatedinthestartinglinesoftheConstitution
thatitwasindeedthePeopleofPakistanwhoweretherepositoriesofauthorityandthatthe
ConstitutionalOrderwhichwasbeingestablishedbytheirwillhadtohavethewelldefined
characteristicsgiveninthePreambleasnotedabove.InthelightoftheConstitutionalhierarchy
mentionedabovethereisnolegalprinciplewhichcanjustifydisobediencetotheConstitution,which
embodiesthewillofthePeople.ThisinterpretationoftheConstitutionisnotonlyconsistentwiththe
letteroftheConstitution,itisinmyopinion,theonlylegallysoundwayofreadingtheConstitutionto
reflectthemeaningtobegatheredfromthewordsofthehistoriccharter.
82.The1973Constitutionwasadoptedwithconsensusoftherepresentativesofthefederating
provinces.ThisisaremarkablefeatureoftheConstitutionandcanbeacknowledgedasthemainreason
whyithaswithstoodtheonslaughtsofmilitarydictators,andpoliticalpartieselectedwith
overwhelmingmajoritiesandhassurvived,althoughwithsomemajordistortions.Atthisstage,itis
importanttoexaminethehistoricaldebateswhichledtotheadoptionofthe1973Constitutionon
12.4.1973.TheUnitedDemocraticFront(UDF)whichwasthecombinedoppositionintheNational
AssemblyhadbalkedatgivingitsconcurrencetotheConstitution.ThestanceofUDFismostimportant
andwasissuedon9.4.1973asarejoindertoPresidentZ.A.BhuttosAideMemoirewhichwasissued
fivedaysearlier.Itmaybenotedasanhistoricalfactthattwofederatingunitsnamely,Balochistanand
NorthWestFrontierProvince(nowKhyberPakhtunkhwa)hadseriousreservationswhichUDFspeltout
intherejoinder.InthesetwoProvincestheNationalAwamiPartyandtheJamiatUlemaeIslamwerein
apositiontoformtheprovincialgovernments.TherepresentativesfromtheseProvinceswerealso
importantcomponentsoftheUDF.ItisinthisbackdropthattheUDFrejoinderstatedincategorical
termsthatinanycountrywhichhasawrittenConstitution,theConstitutionmustbesupreme.Thereis
noquestionofanyInstitutionoftheStatecreatedbythewrittenConstitutionbeinginapositionto
overridetheConstitutionortonullifyit.Mostimportantly,twoaspectsoftheConstitutionwere
highlighted.Firstly,itwasstatedthatsomeInstitutionsmayhavethepowerundertheConstitutionto
amenditbutthatisnotaninherentpowerofthoseorgansbutisagrantoftheConstitution.Ignoring
thisfundamentalprincipleistounderminetheConstitutionitself.Secondly,itwasrightlynotedthatit
isimpossibletoconceiveafederalsysteminthecontextofabsolutepoweroverallstateorgansvesting
intheNationallegislature.Itwasalsostatedintherejoinderthatafederalsystemcannotwork
withoutanindependentjudiciary.Togivecontexttotherejoinder,itmaybenotedthattheprecise
wordinginChapterVII(Judicature)oftheConstitutionforensuringtheindependenceofthejudiciary
wasastickingpointofdifferencebetweenthemajorityintheNationalAssemblyandtheUDF.The
differencewasresolvedwhenPartVIIwasdraftedaftermaterialchangesweremadeintheDraft
ConstitutionBillandmoreoverinPartXItherewasnoprovisionoustingtheCourtsjurisdiction.
83.ItiswiththesematerialprovisionsoftheConstitutionthatweareconcernedbecauseofthe
Courtsroleastheprotectoranddefender,asfiduciaryofthePeopleandasguardianofthe
Constitution.TheseconstitutionalprovisionshavenoparallelintheIndianConstitution.Inthe
circumstances,aswillbediscussedshortly,thedoctrinedevelopedbytheIndianSupremeCourtholding
thattheIndianConstitutionhasanunamendablebasicstructure,haslittlerelevanceforus,
notwithstandingtheemphasisplacedthereonduringargumentsbybothsides,forandagainstthe
adoptionofsuchdoctrineinPakistan.ThesimplefactwhichemergesfromareadingofourConstitution
remainsthatasaconstitutionalprinciple,thestipulationscommandedbythePeoplehavetobesecured
bytheorgansandfunctionariesoftheStateasaboundenduty.Itisthisfiduciaryobligationwhich
operatesasaconstraintonParliament.Thelanguageusedinclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239ofthe
Constitutioncanonlybereadinamannerwhichrecognizesthefiduciary(and,therefore,subordinate)
statusofParliamenthavingderivativepowersonly,grantedbythePeopleofPakistan.Itisrelevantthat
membersofParliamentandJudgesofthisCourtundertakethroughtheirrespectiveOathsthatthey
shallpreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionandnotjustoneprovisionthereof.
FiduciaryObligations:
84.Theobligationofrepresentativesasdelegatesandfiduciariesneedstobefurtherelaboratedat
thispoint.Wealreadyhaveawellentrenchedunderstandingofthelimitswhichthelawattachestoa
representativefiduciaryposition.RepresentativeswithpowerssuchasthosementionedinArticle239
willneverthelesshavetoremainobedientandloyaltothosebywhomtheyarechosenandforwhom
theyactasrepresentatives/fiduciaries.Fromamongsttheextensivecaselawonfiduciary
representatives,whichexistsincommonlawjurisdictions,thereisoneparticularlyarticulateexposition
ofthefiduciaryprinciplebyFrankfurterJ.oftheU.S.SupremeCourt.{SECv.ChenaryCorpn.[518US80
(1943)].Accordingtohim,tosayamanisafiduciaryonlybeginsanalysis;itgivesdirectiontofurther
inquiry.Towhomisheafiduciary?Whatobligationsdoesheoweasafiduciary?Inwhatrespecthehas
failedtodischargetheseobligations?AndWhataretheconsequencesofhisdeviationfromduty?We
canposethesequestionsinthecontextofthepresentpetitions.Ithasalreadybeendemonstrated
throughexpressprovisionsintheConstitutionalPreamblethatthePeopleselectedmembersin
ParliamentareonlytheirrepresentativesandactinafiduciarycapacitytowardsthePeopleofPakistan.
Astothesecondquestion,itisequallyclearthatthefiduciaryobligationswhichareowedbythe
representativesofthePeopleincludetheobligationtoloyallyobeythecommandofthePeople.The
commandhasbeenexpressedinthePreambletotheConstitutionrequiringadherencetothesame.The
answerstothethirdandfourthquestionsarticulatedbyFrankfurterJwillbefoundinthesectionsof
thisopinionwhichfollow.
85.Atthispoint,Iwishtorecordthatwerepeatedlyaskedlearnedcounselrepresentingthe
FederationbuttheydidnotanswerthequestionsputtothemfromtheBenchandtosayifitwaswithin
theamendingpowerofParliamenttodoawaywiththeprinciplesofdemocracybydoingawaywith
electionsaltogether,ortoextendthelifeofParliament;ortoabolishfundamentalrights;orto
emasculatetheJudiciarybyinterferingwithitsindependenceortoinstallahereditarymonarchy.Itis
thesequestionswhicharisemostprominentlyfromthestanceadoptedbytheFederation.Thelearned
AttorneyGeneralwasalsoaskedtostatehispositiononthesequestionsbuthedidnotdoso.What
musttheCourtinferfromthissilenceandlackofresponseotherthantoconcludethattheFederation
anditsprincipalLawOfficercannotsaythatParliamenthassuchpower.ItappearstheFederationhas
nobasis,otherthanthedecontextualisedwordingofArticle239orthefaultyreasoningoftheHigh
CourtinDewanTextile,,toarguethatParliamentmaydoawaywithanyprovisionoftheConstitution
includingdemocracyandfundamentalrightsorthatitcaninterferewiththeindependenceofthe
Judiciary.Itmaybeaddedthatthesequerieswerenotmerelyrhetorical,butwerebasedonthetext
fromtheConstitutionreproducedabove.TheConstitutiondoesnotstatethatParliamentenjoys
supremacyovertheConstitutionitself.Infactquitethecontraryisestablishedinourjurisdiction
whereinthesupremacyoftheConstitutionoverallStateorganshastoberecognized.Itisinthiscontext
theforegoingquestionswereraisedasameansofidentifyingthelimitationsofParliamentandto
emphasizeitsstatusasasubordinateinstrumentalityofthePeople,createdbythemtosubserveand
implementtheirwill.ItisthiswordingintheConstitutionwhichhasbeenignoredbylearnedcounsel
representingtheFederation.
86.ThestanceoftheFederationis,ineffect,thatParliamentiscapableofdoinganythingwiththe
ConstitutionincludingtheabilitytodistortanddisfiguretheConstitutioninsuchmannerthatitno
longerremainstheConstitutionwilledandadoptedbythePeople.Itwillbesuchdistortionand
disobediencetothewillofthepeoplewhichmayleadtooverthrowandrevolution.Inthecaseof
MobashirHassanvs.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC265),Ihadtheopportunityofwritingan
additionalnoteinsupportoftheunanimousdecisionoftheCourt.Ireaffirmwhatwasnotedthat
stabilityandruleoflawaretheresponsibilityofandmustbeassumedbytheexecutiveorganofthe
Statewhichalsocommandsthemajorityinthelegislature.ThisistherequirementoftheParliamentary
democraticdispensationordainedbyourConstitution.Itwasheldthatpoliticalstabilityandtheruleof
lawwillflowasanaturalconsequenceofgivingsanctityandrespecttotheConstitutionbothinletter
andinspirit.ItwasalsonotedthatadherencetotheConstitutioncanneverleadtodestabilizationof
thelaw.Onthecontraryanybreachofconstitutionalnormsislikelytodestabilizetheruleoflaw.
87.WhileexpressinganopinioninthecaseofSindhHighCourtBarAssociationvs.Federationof
Pakistan(PLD2009SC879),itwasstatedandIreiteratethatthepeopleofPakistanhaveconsciously
chosenthemethodfortheirowngovernance.TheConstitutionisadocumentwhichataconsciouslevel
records,inclassicalterms,thesocialcontractbetweenthepeopleandthosewhotheychoosetoentrust
withthegovernanceoftheState.ImustnotallowmyselftoforgetitwasdeviationfromConstitutional
principleswhichbroughtthenationtogriefintheconstitutionallysignificantcasesofMaulviTamizuddin
Khan,theGovernorGeneralsReferenceandDossowhentheCourtwentbeyondtheConstitutionand
foundeditsjudgmentsonnotionssuchassaluspopulisupremalexandadistortedversionofHans
Kelsensdoctrineofrevolutionarylegality.Relianceontheories,countertheoriesandvariantsofthe
samethushighlightanotherhazardintheadjudicationofConstitutionalcasesassuchreliancemaystray
fromtheConstitution.
TheplaceandrelevanceoftheoriesandphilosophyinConstitutionaladjudication:
88.Wehaveseenduringthecourseoftheabovediscussionthatpoliticalphilosophyandtheories
havebeenreferredtoandrelieduponbyvariouscounselrepresentingbothsides.Inparticular,
referencemaybemadetothesocialcontracttheory,thebasicstructuretheoryandthetheoryof
Parliamentarysovereigntyandsupremacyadvertedtoabove.
89.Asstatedearlier,Ihaveoftenfoundthatagreatdealofemphasisisplacedbycounselonlegal
theoriesanddoctrinesofconstitutionallaw.Suchdoctrineswhichmostlytookrootintheforeignsoilsof
theUnitedStates,BritainandotherCommonwealthcountriesrequireseriouscriticalexamination
beforebeingpressedintouseinPakistan.Thisisnecessarilysobecauselegaltheoryandconstitutional
constructionmustspringfromourownexperienceandhistoricalcontext.Thedangerofadheringto
theorydivorcedfromcontextcanbeillustratedthroughasimplebutinstructivetaletoldoftheTurk
MullaNasruddin.Mullahasbeenfictionalizedasadidacticcharacterintheteachingtraditionofthesufi
savantsoftheEastonaccountofhisabilitytohighlightlogicalfallaciesresultingfromuncriticaland
fragmentedthinking.ThuswehavethestoryofMulladroppingagolddirhaminhishouseatnight.He
goesintothebazaarandstartssearchingforitunderastreetlight.Thepeoplewhogatheraroundhim
askwherehelostthedirham.Whentold,theyadviseMullatogoandsearchforitathomewherehe
hadlostit.Mulla,withhissingularlogic,says:ButIcant.Thereisnolightinmyhouseandthenightis
dark.Thus,assurelyasMullawillnotfindhisdirhaminthebazaarwearelikelytokeepgropingand
flounderingifwecontinuesearchingforanswerstoourConstitutionalconundrumsinmodels
constructedindifferentpoliticalclimesbyphilosophersandpoliticalscientistswhoareproductsoftheir
owntimesandsocialconditions.AstheknowerofReality,theaarifrealized:
[Withwaterinflask,parched,Iroamalloverinsearchofit.]
90Thereisanotherseriousproblemwithdecontextualizedtheoriesofpoliticalandlegal
philosophy.Whileacademicscanphilosophizeonissuesofjurisprudence,sociology,politicsetc.,andin
doingsoavailprofessoriallicense,suchspaceisnotavailabletoCourtsandJudgeswhomustremain
withinthedisciplineofthelawandprecedentanddealwithconcretecontroversiesandwithoutbasing
judgmentonunexaminedassumptions.Thus,intherealmofConstitutionalphilosophywefindthat
eachtheoryiscritiquedbyanequalorevenmorerationalvariantorcountertheory.Forexample,we
havethepresentdayversionofSocialContracttheoryarticulatedbyJohnRawlswhichhasbeen
forcefullycritiquedbysomeonelikeAmartyaSeninhisrecenttreatiseTheIdeaofJustice.Senhasa
muchbroaderworldviewwhichalsotakesintoconsiderationtheeclectictraditionofthesubContinent
anddrawsonteachingsoftheGita,thesufimasters,andotherswhohavecontributedtowardsthe
creationofamultihuedcollage,differentfromthemonochromaticvisionofsomephilosopherswho
havenothadtheoccasionortheabilitytodrawfrommultiplestreamsofwisdom.(Extractfromthe
ForewordtoThePoliticsandJurisprudenceoftheChaudhryCourt).
91.Inmyhumbleview,theabovediscussionrepresentstheonlylegallysoundwayinwhichour
Constitutionalschemecanbeunderstood.ThePeople,whoaretheoriginatorsoftheConstitution,must
remainitsowners.Itwouldnotbejustifiableiftheirrepresentativeswhoareentrustedwiththe
Constitutionandaredeputedtopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitution,areallowedwithout
restrainttomakeanyandallchangesintheConstitution.HavingthusconcludedthatthisCourthasthe
powertojudiciallyreviewaconstitutionalamendmentpassedbyParliament,thesecondpartofthis
opinionbecomessimple.Theaboveprinciplecannowbeappliedtoseeiftheeighteenthortwentyfirst
amendmentsoranypartsthereofchallengedbeforeuscanbestruckdownforbeingviolativeofthe
ParliamentarymandateallowingittoamendtheConstitution.
PARTII.
ReviewingtheEighteenthAmendment
92.Forreasonsappearingbelowitismyhumbleviewthatapplyingtheprinciplesenunciatedin
PartIabove,theeighteenthAmendment,asfurtheramendedbythenineteenthAmendmenttothe
extentofArticle175A,doesnotrequireinterferenceinexerciseoftheCourtspowerofjudicialreview.
However,aspectsoftheeighteenthAmendmentwhichhaveamendedpartsofArticle63Aandwhich
havesubstitutedandreplacedpartsofArticle51oftheConstitutionareliabletobesetasidetothe
extentdiscussedbelow.
Article175A:
93.TheeighteenthAmendmentwaspassedon19.4.2010.Itpurportedtobringaboutchangesin
97ArticlesoftheConstitution.Ofthese,thechallengetoArticle175Acanfirstbetakenup.Themain
contentionoflearnedcounselforthepetitionersisfoundedontheprinciplethattheindependenceof
theJudiciaryconstitutesabasicfeatureoftheConstitutionandthatArticle175Abeingviolativeofsuch
feature,isbeyondthecompetenceandscopeoftheamendingpowerofParliament.ItwasMr.Hamid
KhanSr.ASCwhowasforcefulinhissubmissionthattheParliamentaryCommitteeconstitutedunder
Article175Aibidwasinbreachoftheprincipleoftrichotomyofpowersandinfringedtheindependence
oftheJudiciaryandthereforeshouldbestruckdown.Accordingtohim,theinclusionofeightmembers
oftheParliamentaryCommittee(separatefromtheJudicialCommission)intheprocessofappointment
ofJudgesoftheHighCourtandthisCourtwaspersecontrarytothenotionoftheindependenceofthe
judiciary.ThemainthrustofhisargumentwasthatanyinvolvementofpersonsoutsidetheJudicial
Commission,intheprocessofappointmentofJudgeswas,therefore,contrarytotheindependenceof
thejudiciarywasthusnotwithinthepermissiblescopeoftheparliamentarypowertoamendthe
Constitution.
94.Wehavecarefullyconsideredthisargumentandfindthesametobeuntenableforreasons
whichhavebeennotedinthejudgmentsrenderedinthetwocasestitledMunirHussainBhattivs.
FederationofPakistan(PLD2011SC407)andFederationofPakistanvs.MunirHussainBhatti(PLD2011
SC752).Inthesetwojudgments,theeighteenthamendmentasamendedbythenineteenth
amendment,hasbeenconsidered.Wehavenotedthatthereareadequatesafeguardsintheamended
Article175Awhichensurethattheindependenceofthejudiciaryisfullysecured.Thecontentionof
learnedcounselisnottenablefortwofundamentalreasons.Firstly,thattheelementsoftheprevious
systeminvolvingtheChiefJusticeofPakistanandtheexecutiveappointingauthoritynamely,the
PresidentontheadviceofthePrimeMinisterinappointingjudgeshavenowbeenretainedbutin
expandedform.Thedecisionmakingprocesshasbeendiffusedoveracollegiumcomprisingofthe
personsformingpartoftheJudicialCommission.Thesepersonsnowinclude,apartfromthemembers
ofthejudiciary,theLawMinistersoftheFederationandtheProvinceconcernedaswellasthemembers
nominatedbythePakistanBarCouncilandtheBarCounciloftheProvinceconcerned.
95.Secondly,Mr.HamidKhansconcernthataseparatebodysuchastheParliamentaryCommittee
constitutedinterferenceintheindependenceofthejudiciaryismisconceived.Itistobenotedthatthe
ParliamentaryCommittee,asperratiointheabovecitedcasesofMunirBhattihasensuredthatittakes
decisionsobjectivelywhicharejusticeableandhavetostandthetestofjudicialreview.Forthese
reasons,inmyhumbleopinion,Article175A,asamended,doesnotadverselyeffecttheindependence
ofthejudiciaryandisnotviolativeofthePeoplesdirectivethatsuchindependenceshallbefully
secured.
96.Inviewoftheabove,althoughtheeighteenthamendmentasitwasoriginallypassed,may
haveconflictedwiththeindependenceofthejudiciaryandmay,therefore,havebeenliabletobestruck
down,thenineteenthamendmentpassedbyParliamentbroughtaboutsubstantialchangesinthe
eighteenthamendmentandasaconsequence,theamendedArticle175Aasinterpretedinthetwo
casesofMunirHussainBhattisupraarenotopentojudicialreviewonthegroundthatthe
ParliamentaryCommitteeunderminestheindependenceofthejudiciary.
Article63A:
97.TheeighteenthamendmentpurportstomakeaverysignificantchangetoArticle63Aofthe
Constitution,whichcannowbeconsidered.ThisArticledealswithpartydisciplineandstipulatesthat
membersofParliamentcanbeunseatedfromParliamentiffoundguiltyofdefectionfromtheir
respectiveparties.Article63AdefinesdefectionandwasfirstintroducedintotheConstitutionthrough
theConstitution(FourteenthAmendment)Act,1997,inviewoftherampantallegationsofillmotivated
floorcrossing,andinordertopreventinstabilityinrelationtotheformationandfunctioningof
Government.(Preamble,to14thAmendment).Upuntil2010,defectionwastobeattractedonlyby,a
memberwho,interalia:
(b)votesorabstainsfromvotingintheHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbytheParliamentary
Partytowhichhebelongs,inrelationto
(i)electionofthePrimeMinisterortheChiefMinister;or
(ii)avoteofconfidenceoravoteofnoconfidence;or
(iii)aMoneyBill.
98.TherewasaneedforintroducinganantidefectionprovisionintheConstitutionanditwas
considerednecessarytodosobecauseofadesiretostrengthenandbringaboutstabilityinour
parliamentarydemocracy.Membersofpoliticalpartiesindividuallyorcollectivelyhadtofacethevery
realpossibilityofbeingunseatediftheydefected.Thisobjectivewasachievedthroughtwomeans;
firstly,bygivingtotheleaderoftheparliamentarypartytheabilitytoinitiateaprocesswherebyaparty
memberwhohaddefectedbyvotingagainstpartylinesonthethreeissuesnotedinclause(1)(b)of
Article63A;secondly,parliamentarianswereleftfreetoexercisetheirvotingrightsinParliamentin
accordancewiththeirconscienceandtheOathtakenbythemtopreserve,protectanddefendthe
Constitution,exceptinthethreeinstancesnotedabove.Article63Awasverycarefullycraftedtodrawa
balancebetweentherightofparliamentarianstobetruechosenrepresentativesofthePeopleandat
thesametimeachievingtheobjectiveoflendingstabilitytoparliamentarydemocracy.
99.Article63AwassubjectmatterofcontentionbeforethisCourtinthecaseofWukalaMahaz
BaraiTahafazeDastoorvs.FederationofPakistansupra.ItwasheldinthecitedcasethatArticle63A
wasnotviolativeofanyconstitutionalprovision.IneednotgointoadiscussiononthisaspectofArticle
63AbecausethesaidArticle(asitexistedpriortotheeighteenthAmendment)addressedaprevalent
malaiseandwas,therefore,helpfulinfurtheringtheprinciplesofdemocracy.
100.TheissuewhichhasnowarisenonaccountofchangesbroughtaboutinArticle63Abythe
eighteenthAmendmentcanbehighlightedatthispoint.Firstly,inclause(1)(b)(iii),thewordsora
Constitutional(Amendment)BillhavebeenaddedafterthewordsaMoneyBill.Secondly,aparty
headhasbeeninvestedwiththepowertomakeadeclarationthataparliamentarianhasdefected.A
partyheadhasbeendescribedinArticle63Aasanyperson,bywhatevernamecalled,declaredassuch
bytheparty.TheeffectofthesechangesinArticle63Aaresignificantandcannowbeexamined.
101AftertheadoptionoftheConstitutionin1973andinlinewiththeaspirationsreflectedinthe
Preamble,itisthechosenrepresentativesofthePeoplesittinginParliamentwhoaretopreserve,
protectanddefendtheConstitution.Itistheserepresentativeswhohavetoperformthefunctionof
amendingtheConstitutionandindoingsotheyhavetoriseabovepersonalinterestsandinclinationsin
linewiththeirOath,toprotect,preserveanddefendtheConstitution.Aparliamentarian,inmattersof
constitutionalamendmentsisthechosenrepresentativeofthePeopleandnotarepresentativeofa
politicalpartyorapartyhead.Asnotedabove,Article63Aasitpreviouslyexistedwasnarrowlyframed
toensurethataparliamentarianwasfreetovoteonanyissueinParliamentinaccordancewithhis
understandingofhowtheConstitutionwastobepreservedetc.,exceptforthethreemattersnotedin
clause(1)(b)ofArticle63A.Thestabilityofgovernmentwasthusensuredbecausethethreetypesof
votesmentionedinclause(1)(b)hadthepotentialofbringingdownthegovernmentasaresultof
defection.TheadditionofthewordsoraConstitution(Amendment)BillinArticle63Adonotadvance
theprinciplesofdemocracyandinfactconstituteaconstitutionallymandatedpressureona
parliamentariantovoteonanamendmentbillinaccordancewithpartylinesandnotinaccordancewith
hisOathandhisfiduciarydutyasachosenrepresentativeofthePeople.Thefiduciaryobligation,as
explainedinPartIofthisopiniondemandstotalloyaltytotheConstitution,whichaccordingtothe
expresswordsintheThirdScheduletotheConstitution,embodiesthewillofthePeople.
Furthermore,thereisnopossibilityatallofanydestabilizationofagovernmentonthebasisofavote
onewayortheotheronaConstitution(Amendment)Bill.
102AnotherimportantaspectofthechangesinArticle63Aisthatapartyheadwhonowwields
influenceoveraparliamentarianmaynotbeamemberofParliamentorhemayinfactbeineligibleto
beelectedtoParliamentbyvirtueofArticles62and63oftheConstitution;yethemaybeabletoexert
influenceonthecontentoftheConstitution.Theadditionofthesefourwordsinclause(1)(b)hasno
nexuswithfurtheringtheprinciplesofdemocracy.Suchasituationisnottenableinthelightofthe
Constitutionforanumberofreasons.
103.Firstly,itmaybementionedthatitistheindividualelectedmembersofParliament,andin
particularthoseoftheNationalAssembly,whohavethebestclaimtobeingconsideredthechosen
representativesofthepeopleofPakistan.ThePreambleassertsthatitistheserepresentativewho
shallpossessthepowertoamendtheConstitutionandnoneelse.Leadersofpoliticalparties,itmaybe
recalled,neednotbeelectedorchosenbythepeople.Itfollowsthatanamendmentwhichputsthe
directlychosenrepresentativesofthepeopleunderconstitutionallypermittedinfluenceofpersons
outside(oreveninside)ParliamentcannotbeseenasfurtheringtheprinciplesofParliamentary
democracy.
104.Secondly,weneedtocomparethedemocraticlegitimacyoftheelectoralprocessesthrough
whichpartyheadsandparliamentariansrespectivelyareelectedtooffice.Parliamentaryelectionsare
governedthrougharigorousprocedurelaiddownintheRepresentationofPeoplesAct,1976,
conductedandoverseenbyaconstitutionallyprotectedElectionCommission.Theelectionofparty
heads,ontheotherhand,aremuchlessrigorouslydemocraticortransparentasthesearenot
conductedoroverseenbytheElectionCommissionorbyanyindependentbodyoutsidetheparty.Even
ifthereisanelectionoversightbodywithinthepartystructure,itmayberenderedineffectiveorits
decisionsignored.
105.Atthisjuncture,itisimportanttonotethatpriortotheeighteenthamendment,byvirtueof
clause(4)toArticle17everypoliticalpartywasobligedtoholdintrapartyelectionstoelectitsoffice
bearersandpartyleadersasaConstitutionalobligation.Thisrequirementhasbeendoneawaywithand
asaresultintrapartyelectionsarenolongerrequiredbytheConstitution.Theerosionofpopular
legitimacyofapartyleaderhas,therefore,beenmadeevenmorequestionablethanbefore.Grantingto
suchpoliticalleadertheabilitytocastashadowontheConstitution,fliesinthefaceofthecommand
thattheStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthe
People.Inthisbackground,partyheadscannotbeallowedsuchinfluenceoverindividual
parliamentarianswhosedemocraticcredentialsaschosenrepresentativesofthePeoplearesomuch
strongerthantheirown.Moreover,theindividualstandingofanelectedmemberandthefactheisnot
necessarilydependentonthepopularsupportoftheparty,isamplydemonstratedbythefactthatin
thelastgeneralelectionsin2013,inmanyconstituencies,theverysamevotershaveelectedtheticket
holderofonepoliticalpartytotheNationalAssembly,buthavechosentheticketholderofanother
partyfortheprovincialconstituenciesinthesamearea.
106.Finally,itmustbereiteratedthatenablingaperson,whetherwithinoroutsideParliament,to
influenceMembersofParliamenttoadheretopartylineswhenvotingonConstitutionalAmendmentsis
inviolationofthetermsoftheiroathofoffice.TheConstitutionitselfstipulatesthatbeforeassuming
office,everyMemberofParliamentmusttakeanoathtopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitution
oftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan.(Article65readwithThirdSchedule).Itisanecessaryincidentof
thisoaththat,whenvotingonaConstitutionalAmendment,everyParliamentarianmustsearchdeeply
intohisownconscienceandensurethathedoesnotbecomeapartytoitserosionordestruction.Thisis
afiduciaryobligationofaParliamentarianinadditiontobeingatermofhisOathofOffice.Under
acknowledgedandwellsettledlegalprinciplesestablishedinourjurisprudence,suchdiscretionary
responsibilitycannotbedelegatedbyafiduciarynorcanitbeallowedtobecloudedbyanyexternal
influence.Thus,inmakinghisdecision,partyconsiderationscannotbeallowedtobearinfluenceonhim.
TherequirementoftheParliamentariansOathcannotbereconciledwiththeinsertionintosubclause
(iii)ofclause(1)(b)ofArticle63AmadebytheeighteenthAmendment.TheConstitutionitmaybe
emphasized,envisagestheconscienceofindividualparliamentariansasitsownfirstlineofdefence,a
defencewhichcomesintooperationevenbeforejudicialreviewcansetin.
107.LearnedcounselrepresentingtheBarAssociationsoftheSupremeCourtandtheSindhHigh
Courtrespectively,drewtheCourtsattentiontothechillingeffectArticle63Acanhaveonmembersof
Parliament,thuspreventingthemfromvotingtheirconscience.Bothlearnedcounselreferredtoa
reportappearinginthePressonthedayafterthetwentyfirstAmendmentBillwaspassed.On7.1.2015
itwasreportedbythedailyDawnthatPPPSenatorRazaRabbanistatedinchokedvoicethatduring
histimeintheSenatehe,neverfeltsoashamedastodayinvotingformilitarycourts.Mr.Raza
Rabbani,itmaybenotediscurrentlytheChairmanoftheSenate.HeisaParliamentarianofhigh
standingandmoralintegrity.Hehasalsoconsistentlydemonstratedhiscommitmenttoadvancingthe
causeofconstitutionalruleandParliamentarydemocracy.ItisonthisbasisthatMr.AbidZubairi
representingSHCBAarguedthatthetwentyfirstAmendmentcouldnotbepermittedtostandbecause
thevoteonthisamendmentcouldnotbetreatedasanindependentlycastvotebytherequisitetwo
thirdsofthetwoHousesofParliament.Hereitisimportanttobearinmindthatitisnotnecessaryto
determineifaParliamentarianwasorwasnot,infact,influencedbyhispartyhead.Whatisrelevantis
whetherapartyheadcanbeallowedConstitutional(asopposedtopoliticalormoral)authorityfor
pressinghisviewsonmembersofParliamentwhiletheyvoteonaConstitutionalamendment?Inmy
humbleview,thisplainlyisimpermissibleforreasonsnotedabove.
108.ItmayalsobenotedthattheConstitutionamendingfunctionisqualitativelyverydifferentfrom
thefunctionwhichaParliamentarianperformswhilevotingonaMoneyBill,orwhenhevotestoelect
thePrimeMinisterorwhenhevotesonanoconfidence(orconfidence)motionbecausedefectionon
thesematterscandestabilisedemocracybybringingdownagovernment.Itwassuggestedthatthe
Parliamentarianwasnotdebarredfromvotingaccordingtohisconscienceontheaforesaidmatters.
That,however,isnottheissuebecauseoftherealpossibilitythathecouldbeunseatedbyvotingin
accordancewithhisconscienceandhisOathonaConstitution(Amendment)Bill.Inmyviewthis
AmendmentrepresentstheextraordinarydangerthatamemberofParliamentismadesusceptibleto
externalpressureonanissuewhichhasnonexuswithstabilityofparliamentarydemocracy.Atthis
pointwemayusefullyadverttothePreambletotheConstitution(FourteenthAmendment)Act,1997
whichstatesthatitisexpedientfurthertoamendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicofPakistaninorderto
preventinstabilityinrelationtotheformationorfunctioningofgovernment.Thewordsaddedto
Article63Ainclause(1)(b)bytheeighteenthAmendment,havenoconnectionwiththisobjective.
109Fortheforegoingreasons,theadditionofthewordsoraConstitution(Amendment)Bill,in
myview,constitutesabreachofthedutycastonaParliamentarianasthechosenrepresentativeofthe
peopleasexplainedinPartIofthisopinion.I,therefore,holdthatthesewordsoraConstitution
(Amendment)Billareliabletobestruckdown.
Article51oftheConstitution:
110.Article51oftheConstitutionwassubstantiallyamendedbytheeighteenthAmendmentin
respectofseatsreservedforminorities.Theseamendments(reproducedbelow)havebeenchallenged
byJuliusSalak,amemberoftheminorityChristiancommunity,inConstitutionPetitionNo.43of2010.
Heraisedobjectionstosubclauses6(c)and(e)ofArticle51oftheConstitutionasamendedbythe
eighteenthAmendment.Theseprovisions,foreaseofreference,arereproducedasunder:
Article51.(1)ThereshallbethreehundredandfortytwoseatsformembersintheNationalAssembly,
includingseatsreservedforwomenandnonMuslims.
..
(6)
(c)theconstituencyforallseatsreservedfornonMuslimsshallbethewholecountry;
(e)memberstotheseatsreservedfornonMuslimsshallbeelectedinaccordancewithlawthrough
proportionalrepresentationsystemofpoliticalpartieslistsofcandidatesonthebasisoftotalnumber
ofgeneralseatswonbyeachpoliticalpartyintheNationalAssembly:
111.Accordingtolearnedcounsel,theprovisionsreferredtoaboveareliabletobestruckdown
becausethesameareviolativeofthreeoftheexpresscommandsofthepeople,firstly,thatadequate
provisionsshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiessecondly,thattheState
shallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthepeopleandthirdly,
thattheprinciplesofdemocracyshallbefullyobserved.Inthenewarrangementbroughtaboutinthe
ConstitutionthroughArticle51ibiditwascontendedfirstly,thatmembersoftheminoritieswereleft
withnoabilityeithertoparticipateinsuchelectionsoreventoofferthemselvesforelectionbecause
therewasinfactnoelectionatall.ThechallengedprovisionsoftheaboveArticlearesuchthatatthe
timeofelection,amemberofaminoritywhosenameappearsontheelectoralrollwillhavenochoice
tofilltheseatsreservedfornonMuslimsortoofferhimselfforelection.Thereismeritinthe
submissionoflearnedcounselthatthisschemeintroducedintheConstitutiondoesnotconformtoany
oftheprinciplesofdemocracywhichwouldallowtheminoritiestochoosetheirownrepresentatives.
Insteadthemajorpartieswillchoosetheminoritymembersandtherewouldbenoelectiontotheseats
reservedforminorities;therewouldbeaselectionofmembersinstead,andthattoowhichisnotmade
bytheminoritycommunity.
112.ThelearnedcounselrepresentingtheFederationandthelearnedAttorneyGeneraldidnot
respondtotheaforesaidobjections.Itwas,however,suggestedinpassingbycounselinsomeother
petitionthatminoritymemberscouldalwayscontestelectionsongeneralseatsandthatArticle51ibid
providestothemadditionalrepresentation.Onthisbasisitwascontendedthattheminoritiesshouldbe
contentwiththeabovereferredprovisionsofArticle51.Thiscontentionismisconceivedbecause
additionalseatsforminoritiesarenotamatterofgraceandbenevolenceofpoliticalpartiesbutarea
requirementoftheabovecommandswhicharemadeinthePreamblerequiringthatthelegitimate
interestsoftheminoritiesareprovidedfor.Thesecommandsaretobeloyallyobeyedforthereasons
whichhavebeenexplainedinPartIabove.
113.ThecaseofJuliusSalakillustratesviolationofsomeofthebasicConstitutionaltenets.Twoof
thesetenetsrelatetominorities.OneoftheseasstatedinthePreambleinexpresswordsrequiresthat
adequateprovisionshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestofminorities.Itisherethat
theamendmenttoArticle51introducedthroughtheeighteenthAmendmentisopentochallenge.
114.Inadditiontotheabovenotedcommands,itwouldalsoappearthattheprinciplesof
democracyrequiredbythewillofthepeople,havealsobeenviolated.Mr.Salakhasstatedinhis
petition,withsomejustification,thatthevaluablerightoftheminoritiestoelecttheirrepresentatives
directly,hasbeentakenawayandthatthissystemcanbeusedbythepoliticalpartiestointroduce
suchpeopleintheNationalAssemblywhowillworkunderthecommandofthepoliticalpartiesandwill
havenoconcernwiththebettermentoftheminorities.Thepetitioner,hasstatedinhispetitionthathe
waselectedthricetotheNationalAssemblyonaseatreservedfornonMuslims.Thiswasaresultof
electionswheremembersoftheminoritycommunitycouldofferthemselvestotheirowncommunity
forelectionandtobechosenthroughademocraticelectoralprocesstobetherepresentativesoftheir
community.
115.Inthepostamendmentdispensationaccordingtothepetitionerapersonlikehimcannotbe
electedtotheNationalAssemblyunlesshecompromiseswithorkowtowstotheleader(s)ofapolitical
partywhichmaythenselecthim.Therewillbenoopportunityforsuchminoritymembertohavehis
nameputonaballotbyhimselfandthustherewillbenopossibilityatallofhimbeingchosenasa
representativeofhiscommunityeventhough(likeJuliusSalak)hecouldhavewonanelectiononthe
basisofhispopularityamongsthiscommunity.
116.Itwassuggested,notbythelearnedAttorneyGeneral,butbysomeothercounselthatthepre
amendmentprocedurewasveryburdensomebecausethewholecountrywasasinglemember
constituencyand,therefore,onlyveryrichmembersofminoritiescouldcontesttheelectionandget
themselveselected.IhavenotfoundanydebateinParliamentinrelationtotheabovenoted
amendmentsinArticle51ibid.Variousproposedamendmentsappeartohavebeenconsideredbythe
ParliamentaryCommitteeonConstitutionalReforms(PCCR).ThisCommitteeheldasmanyas77
meetingswitheachmeetingonaveragelastingfivehours,thustheCommitteespent385hoursonits
deliberations.Amendmentsto97Articleswereproposed.Itdoesnotappearfromthereportofthe
PCCRthatanyconsiderationwasgiventoArticle51althoughthroughaseparatenoteofreiteration
SenatorProf.KhursheedAhmeddidcommentonthesaidArticleandincertainrespectsagreedwiththe
petitioner,althoughheotherwisedidnotsupportthecreationofreservedseatsfornonMulsims.The
reportofthePCCRdoesnotrefertoanydiscussionontheproposedamendmenttoArticle51.
Furthermore,adisconcertingaspectofthereportisthatoutof27membersofthePCCRtherewasnota
singlememberbelongingtoanyminoritycommunityandnordoesitappearthatviewsoftheminorities
weresolicitedbyPCCRatanystage,foritsconsideration.It,therefore,appearsthatthecommand
containedinthePreambledirectingtheStatetoensurethatadequateprovisionismadetosafeguard
thelegitimateinterestsoftheminorities,wasnotwithinthecontemplationofthetwoHousesof
ParliamentwhentheeighteenthAmendmentBillwasadopted.Suchabsenceofdebatelendssupportto
thecontentsoftheConstitutionPetitionfiledbythepetitionerJuliusSalak.
117.Nooneappearstohaveconsideredthepossibility(consistentwiththeprinciplesofdemocracy)
ofnumerousalternativeswherebytheStatecould,forinstance,fundthetravelandelectioncampaigns
ofaselectedfewcontestantsonthereservedseats.Suchhandfulcouldeasilybeidentifiedthrougha
thresholdrequiringthemtobeproposedbyasmallyetsubstantialnumberofvotersoftheminority
communityborneontheelectoralrolls.OtheralternativescouldhaveincludedfreeairtimeonStateTV
andRadiotosuchcandidateswhocrossthethreshold.Thiswouldhaveensuredtheprinciplesof
democracybeingfullyobservedwhileallowingnonMuslimstochoosetheirownrepresentatives.Itis
however,forParliamenttodecideonthecontentofaConstitutionAmendmentBill.Icanonlyhighlight
thedeviationofsuchBillfromtheConstitutionalprinciplesdiscussedabove.
118.Inviewofthetotalabsenceofanydebateontheforegoingissue,itmaynotbeunreasonable
toacceptthecontentsofConstitutionPetitionNo.43of2010whichinsiststhatthenewarrangement
canbeusedbythepoliticalpartiestointroducesuchpeopleintheNationalAssemblywhowillwork
underthecommandofpoliticalpartiesInfact[thenewsystem]willopenfloodgatesofexploitation
[of]suchrepresentativesandtheultimateeffectwillbenonrepresentationoftheminoritiesinthe
NationalAssembly.Itwouldindeedbeunfortunateiftheminoritiesweretojustifiablyperceivethenew
arrangementasacynicalployorcondescensiononthepartofthemajoritywhichdoesnottakeinto
accountthelegitimateinterestsoftheminorities.Itwouldbeequallytragiciftheminorities(inspiteof
thehistoricpromisesoftheQuaideAzamandeveryotherleader)cometoregardthemselves,on
accountofthenewArticle51assecondclasscitizensorthechildrenofalessergod,forevertoremain
subservienttothemajoritysgoodwillandunrepresentedbytheirownchosenrepresentatives.
119.Fortheforegoingreasons,IwouldagreewithlearnedcounselforthepetitionerJuliusSalak
thattheaforesaidprovisionsareliabletobestruckdown.Parliamentmaysubstitutetheseprovisionsif
itsochooses,bysuchprovisionswhichrecognizethehighdegreeofimportancegiventominoritiesand
totheprinciplesofdemocracyasexplainedinPartIofthisopinion.Similarconsiderationswouldbe
relevantforArticle106oftheConstitutionalsowhichdealswithreservedseatsforminoritiesin
provincialAssemblies.
PARTIII.
ReviewingthetwentyfirstAmendment
Article175andScheduleItotheConstitution:
120.Ihavehadtheprivilegeofgoingthroughthejudgmentproposedtoberenderedbymylearned
brotherQaziFaezIsa,J.,inrespectofthetwentyfirstamendment.Iaminfullagreementwiththe
reasoningandconclusionsofmylearnedbrotherand,therefore,concurinthesame,byholdingthatthe
saidAmendmentisliabletobestruckdown.Iwouldliketoaddthattheobjectivesofthetwentyfirst
amendmentcouldhavebeenachievedwhilestayingwithintheConstitution,butapparentlysuch
possibilitydidnotreceivetheattentionofParliament.
121IwishtoaddthatonaccountofthefindingrecordedbymeonArticle63A,thetwentyfirst
Amendmentisliabletobestruckdownasanecessaryconsequenceofmyopinionthatthewordsora
Constitution(Amendment)Billareliabletostruckdown.
SummaryofConclusions:
122.TheconclusionsofPartsI,IIandIIIaboveareasunder:
a)ThatParliamentisnotsovereignorsupremeinthesensethattherearenolimitationsonits
powertoamendtheConstitution;
b)ThelimitationsonParliamentarenotonlypoliticalbutareborneoutfromtheConstitution
itself:
c)ThisCourthasthepowertojudiciallyreviewaConstitutionalAmendmentpassedbyParliament
andtostrikeitdownwhereappropriate;
d)Article175AasamendedbythenineteenthAmendmentisnotliabletobestruckdownasit
doesnottransgressthelimitationsofparliamentarypowertoamendtheConstitution;
e)ThewordsoraConstitution(Amendment)Billaddedinclause(1)(b)ofArticle63Aareliable
tobestruckdown;
f)Theprovisionsofsubclauses6(c)and(e)ofArticle51oftheConstitutionareliabletobestruck
down;
g)ThetwentyfirstAmendmentisliabletobestruckdown.
EndingObservations:
123.Ourlegalandconstitutionalhistoryhasamplydemonstratedthatlawscanbemadeby
Parliamentwhichdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheaspirationsofthepeopleinthemannerdiscussed
earlierinthisopinion.InthecaseofMubasharHassanvs.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC265),it
wasremarkedthatevensoitisforParliament(nottheJudiciary)tomakesuchlawsregardlessof
whetherthesameareunpopularorarebasedonexpediency.Thispowertomakelaws(including
ConstitutionalAmendments),however,isnotabsoluteanduntrammelled.Ihaveexpressedmyopinion
inthesaidcasethatwhatisgoodorbadforthepeoplemustbelefttotheelectedrepresentativesof
thepeople,subjectonlytothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution.Theobjectofthepresent
opinionispreciselytodefinesuchlimitswhichconstrainParliamentwhenitdecidestoamendthe
Constitution.
124.InourtroubledconstitutionalhistorystartingwiththecaseofMaulviTamizuddinsuprain1954
thepresentConstitutionPetitionsareofequalifnotevenmoreimportance.InthecaseofMuhammad
AzharSiddiquev.FederationofPakistan(PLD2012SC774),itwasobserveditisimportantto
rememberthatallorgansoftheStatehavetoactinharmonyandwithduehumilityasinstrumentalities
andservantsofthepeople.Thereisnoquestionofanyoneorganclaimingsupremacyovertheotherin
ourconstitutionalschemewhichprovidesforchecksandbalances.InthecaseofMunirHussainBhatti
supra,itwasalsoobservedthatthereisnothingunusualorexceptionalaboutdifferencesasto
constitutionalquestionscroppingupbetweenconstitutionalbodiesorStatefunctionariesina
democraticdispensation.Suchdifferencesmayariseparticularlywhennewprovisionsareincorporated
intheConstitution.However,asnationsmatureandpolitiesevolve,theirmaturityisreflectedinthe
mannerinwhichsuchdifferencesareresolvedinaccordancewiththegoverningcompact,whichisthe
Constitution.DifferencesofopinionbetweentheconstitutionalbodiesororgansofStatecannotbe
seenasadversarialturfwarsbetweenthetwobodies.Allconstitutionalbodiesandfunctionariesmust
havethecommonaimthattheConstitutionwhichembodiesthewillofthePeople(asdiscussedin
PartIofthisopinion)isenforcedbecausethisisanobligationsetoutintheConstitutionitself.It,
therefore,mustbeacceptedandimplementedbothinletterandinspiritwithsinceritybyeveryorgan
andfunctionaryoftheState.
125.Finally,asCourtsandJudges,weareobligedtoadherecloselytotheConstitutionandmust
avoidbeingswayedbyunexaminedassumptionsorgettrappedintomechanicaldeductionfromrules
withpredeterminedmeanings.Itisequallyimportanttoavoidbasingourlegaljudgmentonalien
theoriesandphilosophies,divorcedfromourownhistoricalandConstitutionalcontext.Oursearchfor
answerstoconstitutionalissuescannotaffordtoignorethekernelwithin.Wemayalsousefullyheed
thewisdomofHafez,thepeerlesssageofShiraz,whosaid:
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Sd/
(JawwadS.Khawaja)
NOTE:TomeettherequirementofArticle251oftheConstitution,theUrduversionofthisjudgmentis
alsoissued.InviewofArticle251(3),theProvincesmayissuetranslationsinprovinciallanguages.
Sd/
(JawwadS.Khawaja)
SH.AZMAT
SAEED,J.TheseConstitutionalPetitionsunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublic
ofPakistan,1973,havebeenvariouslyfiledtocallintoquestiontheviresoftheConstitution(18th
Amendment)Act,2010,Constitution(21stAmendment)Act,2015,andthePakistanArmy(Amendment)
Act,2015.Afterhearingthelearnedcounselfortheparties,theissuesrequiringadjudicationbythis
Courthaveconcretized.Theelementalquestionswhichhavefloatedtothesurfacearewhetherthere
areanyimpliedlimitationsonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution,ifso,whether
suchlimitationscanbeinvokedbythisCourttostrikedownaConstitutionalAmendment.Such
limitations,ifany,wouldalsoneedtobeidentifiedandinthisbehalfwhetheritcanbeinferredthatthe
amendatorypoweroftheParliamentquatheConstitutioniscircumscribedsoastoplacecertain
fundamentalprovisionsoftheConstitutionbeyondthepaleoftheexerciseofsuchpowersbythe
Parliament.
2.Inthecontextofthethresholdquestionpertainingtotheimpliedlimitationuponthe
ParliamentandthejurisdictionoftheCourtinrespectthereof,itwascontendedbyMr.HamidKhan,
learnedSr.ASConbehalfofthePetitionersthatallConstitutionshaveabasicstructureconsistingofits
SalientFeatures,whichinthecontextoftheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,
wouldincludeDemocracy,Federalism,FundamentalRights,IndependenceofJudiciaryandtheIslamic
Provisions,etc.TheParliament,beingacreatureoftheConstitutionandnotbeingaConstituent
AssemblycannotdestroyorfundamentallychangesuchSalientFeaturesandtherefore,thereisan
impliedrestrictionontheamendatorypowersoftheParliamentinthisbehalf.Thisdoctrine,itwas
urged,isnotunknowntoJurisprudencehavingbeenacceptedandappliedinvariousCountries,
includingGermany,Turkey,India,Bangladeshandmayalsobeacknowledged,acceptedandenforcedin
Pakistan.CounselsforsomeofthePetitionersalsocanvassedthepointofviewthattheObjectives
ResolutionpassedbytheFirstConstituentAssemblyinMarch,1949,isthefoundationaldocumentof
ourConstitutionalLawandwas,therefore,adoptedasapreambletotheConstitutionsof1956,
Constitutionof1962,andnowisnotonlythepreambleofthecurrentConstitutionbutalsoformsa
substantivepartthereofbyvirtueofArticle2A.ItwastheircasethattheObjectives
Resolution/PreamblesetsforthinagreatdetailandwithprecisiontheSalientFeaturesofthe
ConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,andtherebyprovidesthetouchstoneagainst
whichtheConstitutionalAmendmentscanbetested.Itwasfurthermaintainedthatanoverviewofthe
variouspronouncementsoftheCourtsinPakistan,includingthisCourtrevealthatthedoctrineof
ImpliedRestrictionofthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionsoastodestroyits
SalientFeatureshasslowlyevolvedinourJurisprudencereachingtowardsthelogicalconclusionofits
acceptanceandenforcementandthisCourtshouldnowreturnadefinitivefindinginitsfavour.
ItwasalsourgedatthebarthattheConstitutionalAmendmentsinquestionhavebeenpassed
byaParliamentwhoseMemberswerenotfreetoexercisetheirrighttovoteinaccordancewiththeir
conscienceorasperthewillofthepeoplewhoelectedthem.ItwascontendedthatbyvirtueofArticle
63AoftheConstitution,therightoftheMembersoftheParliamenttovote,interalia,ona
ConstitutionalAmendmenthasbeenmadesubservienttothecommandofthepartyheadwhomaynot
evenbetheMemberoftheParliament,therefore,infact,theConstitutionalAmendmentsinquestion
reflectneitherthewillofthepeoplenoroftheMembersoftheParliamentbutrepresentthewishesof
thepartyleadersonly.TheprovisionsofArticle63AoftheConstitutionwerealsoseparatelysubjected
tochallenge.
3.Ms.AsmaJehangir,learnedASCappearingforoneofthePetitionersdidnotsubscribe
totheaforesaidviewandlimitedhergrievancetothe21stConstitutionalAmendment.Themainthrust
oftheargumentofthelearnedcounselwasthatitisamyththattheObjectivesResolutionwasa
documentofconsensus.ShedrewtheattentionoftheCourttotheParliamentaryDebatesinthe
AssemblyonthesaidResolution.ShehighlightedtheoppositionbyvariousMembersoftheHouse
especiallythoserepresentingtheminorities.Inthecircumstances,itwascontended,undueemphasison
theObjectivesResolutioninourConstitutionalLawisnotwarranted.SheaddedthatPakistanhasits
ownConstitutionforgedinitsownhistoricalperspective,therefore,relianceuponjudgmentsfrom
foreignjurisdictionwouldnotbeadvisable.Shefurthercontendedthat21stConstitutionalAmendment
cameintoforcepriortothePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,hencethelatterwasnotprotected
undertheConstitution.
4.Mr.HamidKhan,learnedSr.ASCwithregardtovalidityandviresofthe18th
ConstitutionalAmendmentandthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentcontendedwithreferencetoArticle
175Aincorporatedbythe18thConstitutionalAmendmentthattwonewInstitutionshavebeen
introducedintotheprocessofappointmentofJudgesi.e.(a)JudicialCommission,and(b)The
ParliamentaryCommittee.ThelearnedcounselstatedonlythevalidityandviresoftheParliamentary
Committeeisbeingquestionedbyhim.
5.Inpithandsubstance,itwasthecaseofthelearnedcounselthattheIndependenceof
theJudiciaryisaSalientFeatureoftheConstitutionbasedontheTrichotomyofpowers.Themodeof
appointmentofJudgesandChiefJusticesisgermanetotheIndependenceoftheJudiciary,ashasbeen
heldbythisCourtinthecase,reportedasAlJehadTrustthroughRaeesulMujahideenHabibul
WahabbulKhairiandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC324)andisevidencedby
Articles175,203and209.Inthisbehalf,referencewasalsomadetothejudgments,reportedas(1)Haji
SyedAbdulHaleemShahv.WaliDadand6others(PLD1993SC391)and(2)GovernmentofSindh
throughChiefSecretarytoGovernmentofSindh,Karachiandothersv.SharafFaridiandothers(PLD
1994SC105).Furthermore,themattersdealingwiththejudiciaryfindmentioninPARTVIIofthe
Constitution,titledTheJudicatureandtheprovisionsthereofmustbereadasanorganicwholeto
whichtheconceptofaParliamentaryCommitteeisalien.Inthisbehalf,thelearnedcounselreferredto
thecaseofArshadMahmoodandothersv.TheGovernmentofPunjabthroughSecretary,Transport
CivilSecretariat,Lahoreandothers(PLD2005SC193).Itwasaddedthattheprocedureprescribed
undernewlyaddedArticle175Awillleadtopoliticizationofthejudiciary,underminingitsindependence
andimpairingitsabilitytorenderindependentverdicts.Hence,theprovisionsofArticle175Apertaining
totheParliamentaryCommitteeareultravirestheConstitution.
6.Withregardtothe21stConstitutionalAmendmentandthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,itwascontendedthatthesameoffendsagainsttheArticles2A,8(1)and(2),9,
10,10A,23,75(3),184(3),185,190,199(3),245,FirstSchedulePartI(3)andtheFourthScheduleItem
55.ItwasthecaseofthelearnedcounselthattheprincipleofSeparationofPowershasbeenviolatedas
judicialpowerwillbeexercisedbyanExecutiveAuthority.Suchacourseofactionisnotpermittedby
lawortheConstitution,asisobviousfromthecases,reportedas(1)Sh.LiaquatHussainandothersv.
FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers
(PLD1999SC504)and(2)MehramAliandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1998SC
1445)whereinitwasheldthattheMilitaryCourtsareultravirestheConstitution.Itwasaddedthatthe
rightsconferredunderArticles4and10Atoensureafairtrialarenotcateredforintheproceduretobe
adoptedbytheMilitaryCourts.Intheabovecontext,thelearnedcounselstressedthatthe21st
ConstitutionalAmendmentisinvalid,asitoffendsagainsttheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionand
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015isultravirestheConstitution.
7.Mr.A.K.Dogar,learnedSr.ASC,additionallytookexceptiontoArticles63(g)&(h)and
175A(8)oftheConstitution.ThelearnedcounselcontendedthattheIslamicIdeologyisemphasizedby
Article2AandthevariousjudicialpronouncementsofthisCourt,including(1)Miss.AsmaJilaniv.The
GovernmentofthePunjabandanother(PLD1972SC139),(2)MahmoodKhanAchakzaiandothersv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1997SC426)and(3)BegumNusratBhuttov.ChiefofArmyStaff
andFederationofPakistan(PLD1977SC657).ThelearnedcounselsubmittedthattheremovalofArticle
17(4)bythe18thConstitutionalAmendmentisantidemocratic.Furthermore,politicaljusticeisaright
guaranteedbyArticle2Aandeverypoliticalworkerhastherighttobecomeanofficebearerorparty
leader.TheremovalofArticle17(4)deprivesthemofsuchright.HechallengedthevalidityofArticle
63(g)and(h)onaccountoftheirleniency.HealsocontendedthatbyvirtueofamendmenttoArticle
91(5),therestrictiononthetermsofthePrimeMinisterwasremoved,whichwaspreviouslylimitedto
twoterms.Hecontendedthattheessenceofdemocracyischangeinleadership.Toallowonepersonto
continueadinfinitumwouldamounttodenialofsuchrightofotheraspiringleaders.Thelearned
counselalsochallengedArticle175A(8)wherebyitisstatedthattheJudicialCommissionshallnominate
acandidateagainstavacancytotheParliamentaryCommittee.Hesubmittedthatsuchprocessof
nominationviolatesArticles2A,9and25.Hemaintainedthatinfactapplicationsshouldbeinvitedfrom
personsdesirousofbeingappointedasJudgesandselectionmadethroughatransparentandobjective
process.
8.Mr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,learnedSr.ASC,appearingforhimselftracedthe
ConstitutionalhistoryofPakistanandshedlightontheprocessofConstitutionmaking,which
culminatedintheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973.Thelearnedcounselsubmitted
thatsubclauses(5)and(6)toArticle239wereaddedtocurbthepowerofthisCourt.Furthermore,
Article199(2)wasintendedtokeepFundamentalRightsunabridged,andithasdirectnexuswith
Articles8and184.Hefurthersubmittedthatsomeprovisionsaremandatory,whileothersare
directory,soallprovisionscannotbetreatedatpar.Thelearnedcounseldidnotcontesttheviresand
validityofthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentorthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015.
9.OthercounselsforthevariousPetitionersalsochallengedthevalidityofthe18thand
21stConstitutionalAmendments.ItwasalsoarguedthatinthepresenceofArticle63A,theMembersof
theParliamentcouldnotvoteinaccordancewiththeirconscienceandinpithandsubstance,the
decisioninthisbehalfwastakenbythepartyheadswhomayneitherbeorevenqualifiedtobe
MembersofParliament.Hence,boththeConstitutionalAmendmentsandtheAmendingLawarenot
valid,astheydonotreflectthewillofthepeople.ThechangeofnameoftheProvinceformerlyknown
asNorthWestFortierProvince(NWFP)toKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)wasalsochallenged.
10.TheRespondentsledbyMr.KhalidAnwar,learnedSr.ASCfortheFederal
Government,respondedwithablisteringcritiqueoftheIndianjudgments,moreparticularly,the
judgmentinthecase,reportedasKesavanandaBharativ.StateofKerala(AIR1973SC1461).Itwas
contendedthatthereisnotextualbasisforthedoctrineofImpliedRestrictionintheConstitution.The
Parliamentissovereignandvestedwithconstituentpowers,whichcanbeexercisedunderArticle239
withoutanyfetters.ThescopeofthesaidArticleissingularinitsamplitudewithaspecificousterof
jurisdictionoftheCourtstoexaminethevalidityandviresofanyAmendmentonanyground
whatsoever.Thus,itwasmaintained,thattheParliamentcanevenrepealtheConstitution.Itwas
furthercontendedthatthedoctrineofImpliedRestrictionontheParliamenttoamendtheSalient
FeaturesoftheConstitutionhasneverbeenacceptedinPakistan.Atbest,suchSalientFeaturesorbasic
structuremaybedescriptivebutnotprescriptive.Itmaybeusedasatoolforinterpretationonly.Itwas
urgedthattheConstitution,asoriginallyframedhasundergonechangesthroughinnumerous
amendments,whichhaveimprovedtheConstitutionbyenhancingitseffectiveworking.The
Constitution,itwascontended,wasalivingdocument,whichmustnecessarilyevolvewithandadaptto
thechangingtime.RigidityisnotconclusivetothehealthoftheConstitutionortothewellbeingofthe
people,whocannotbemadeprisonersofthepast.ItwasfurthercontendedthattheConstitutionof
1973wasnotframedbytheFoundingFathersoftheStatebutwasadoptedagenerationlater,hence,
doesnotcommandanyspecialreverenceonthisaccount.ItwasaddedthattheSalientFeaturesofthe
ConstitutionhaveneverbeensettledwithcertaintyeveninIndialetalonePakistan.Greatstresswas
alsolaidontheargumentthatthisCourtitselfhasbeencreatedbytheConstitutionandonlyhassuch
powersandjurisdictionsasarevestedinitbytheConstitutionortheLawandthepowertostrikedown
aprovisionoftheConstitutionhasneitherbeengrantedtothisCourtbyanyprovisionofthe
Constitutionorthelawnorcanbeinferredtherefrom.Itwasalsocontendedthatithasbeen
consistentlyheldbythisCourtinitspreviousjudgments,thatthejurisdictiontostrikedownaprovision
oftheConstitutionoranamendmentthereofisnotavailabletothisCourt.
11.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanaswellastheAdvocatesGeneralofthe
ProvincesadoptedtheargumentsofthelearnedSr.ASCappearingonbehalfoftheFederal
Government.However,thelearnedSr.ASCappearingonbehalfoftheGovernmentofKhyber
Pakhtunkhwa,drewourattentiontotheConstitutionsofvariousCountriestocontendthatsomeof
suchConstitutionscontainsubstantiveprovisionstotheeffectthatspecifiedArticlesoftheConstitution
cannotbeamended.Intheabovebackdrop,itwasurgedthatiftheintentionoftheframersofthe
originalConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,hasbeentomakesomeArticlesimmune
totheamendatorypowersoftheParliament,appropriateprovisionsinthisbehalfwouldhavebeen
madeintheConstitution.
12.Withregardtothe18thConstitutionalAmendment,Mr.KhalidAnwar,learnedSr.ASC
appearingfortheFederalGovernmentcontendedthatintermsoftheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,1973,asoriginallyframed,theappointmentofJudgeswasanExecutiveActand
theappointmentofJudgesoftheSuperiorCourtsbytheJudiciaryitselfwasnotenvisaged.The
judgmentinthecase,reportedasAlJehadTrustthroughRaeesulMujahideenHabibiulWahabulKhairi
andothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC324)madetheconsultationwiththeChief
Justicebinding.ByArticle175Atheprocessforsuchappointmentshasbeenenlargedsoastoformally
includetheinputofNonJudicialMembersoftheCommissionandtheParliamentaryCommitteemaking
theprocessbroadbasedandmoreinclusive.ThelearnedcounselsubmittedthatunderArticle175A,in
theJudicialCommission,themajorityofMembersarefromtheJudiciary.Withtheintroductionofthe
18thAmendment,theexclusivepowerofappointmentwastakenawayfromtheChiefJusticetobe
sharedwithhisseniormostcolleagues,andthis,itwascontended,isanimprovementinthe
appointmentprocess.TherelationshipbetweentheJudiciaryandLegislaturemustbeoneofmutual
respect,whiletherelationshipbetweentheJudiciaryandtheExecutivemayhavesometensionand
frictionsoastoenabletheJudiciarytooverseeactsoftheExecutive.Hereferredtotheprocessof
appointmentoftheJudgesinAustralia,Bangladesh,Canada,Germany,France,India,NewZealand,
SouthAfrica,UKandtheUStoshowthattheinvolvementandtheinputoftheExecutiveandLegislature
intheprocessofappointmentoftheJudgesisaninternationallyrecognizednorm.
13.SyedIftikharHussainGillani,learnedSr.ASCappearingonbehalfoftheGovernmentof
KPK,contendedthattheParliamentisfreetoamendtheConstitution,subjecttotheexplicitrestrictions
andproceduralrequirementssetforthinArticles238and239.Thelearnedcounselfurthercontended
thatthechangingofthenameofNorthWestFrontierProvince(NWFP)asKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KPK)is
inaccordancewiththewishesofthepeopleoftheProvincemanifestedintheResolutionstothiseffect
passedbytheProvincialAssembly.Hereferredtovariousacademicworkstomaintainthatthename
nowchosenisrootedinhistoryandgivesidentitytotheProvinceanditspeople.
14.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanwithregardtothe18thConstitutional
AmendmentprefacedhisargumentswiththereiterationofhiscontentionthatthisCourthasonlythe
jurisdictionasisconferreduponitbytheConstitutionintermsofArticle175(2)andsuchjurisdiction
doesnotincludethepowertostrikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitutionandinthisbehalfreference
wasmadetothejudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasTheStatev.ZiaurRehmanandothers(PLD1973
SC49).ItwasthecaseofthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanthattheprovisionsofArticle175A,
moreparticularly,theprovisionschallengedi.e.theconstitutionandtheRoleoftheParliamentary
CommitteedoesnotoffendtheIndependenceoftheJudiciaryespeciallyafterthejudgmentinthecase
ofMunirHussainBhatti,Advocateandothersv.FederationofPakistanandanother(PLD2011SC308
andPLD2011SC407).Evenotherwise,duringthecourseoftheproceedingsoftheinstantPetitions
pertainingtothe18thConstitutionalAmendment,aninterimOrderwaspassedandpositively
respondedtobytheParliamentbyadoptingthe19thConstitutionalAmendmentandthisissuehasnow
cometopass.
15.Withregardtothe21stConstitutionalAmendment,itwascontendedbytheAttorney
GeneralforPakistanthattheConstitutionenvisagesthatanypersonactingagainsttheDefenseof
PakistanorwhoisathreattotheCountry,intimesofwarorpeace,canbesubjectedtoalawrelatingto
theArmedForcesandcanbelegallytriedbytheCourtsestablishedunderthePakistanArmyAct.This,it
wascontended,evidencedbyareadingofArticles5,12,148(3),175,199,232,237and245.Underthe
Constitution,theParliamentisvestedwiththepowertosubjectanypersontothejurisdictionofany
Courtwithrespecttoanymatter.Hesubmittedthatinthepreviousjudgments,Article245hasbeen
incorrectlyinterpreted.Itsprovisionscanbeinvokedtodealwiththreetypesofsituations:fordefense
againstexternalaggression,threatofwar,oractinaidofcivilpower.Actioncanbetakenonthe
directionoftheFederalGovernmentunderArticle245,whichmanifeststheDefensepoweroftheState
andfallswithintheExecutivefunctionandisnotjusticiableunderArticle199.
16.Hefurthersubmittedthatwherethereisathreatofwarorinsurgency,offenderscan
betriedunderthePakistanArmyAct,fortheDefenseoftheCountry,andthiscourseofactionis
permittedunderArticle245.HenextsubmittedthatthePakistanArmyActwasamendedonlyto
includecertainspecifiedpersonswithinthepurviewthereof.
17.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanreferredtothecaseofSh.LiaquatHussain
(supra)relieduponbythePetitionerstocontendthattrialbytheMilitaryCourtsofciviliansforsuchcivil
offencesthathavenonexuswiththeArmedForcesorDefenseofPakistanisnotpermissibleunderthe
Constitution.HoweverwithregardtooffencesrelatingtotheDefenseoftheCountrytheexisting
MilitaryCourtscantrycivilians.
18.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistancontendedthataclassofpersonswaging
waragainstPakistanhasbeenplacedunderthePakistanArmyActandArticle245readwithFederal
LegislatureList,items1and55authorizetheFederalLegislaturetolegislateonthissubject.
19.Herelieduponthecase,reportedasBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliandanotherv.TheState(PLD
1975SC506),tocontendthatdifferentlawscanbemadefordifferentclassesofpersons.Almostall
legislationinvolvessomelevelofclassification,whichispermissible.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneral
submittedthatthereisnodiscriminationundertheActbecausethereisavalidandpermissible
classification.ItwasfurthercontendedthatinthecaseofBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase(supra)whereinit
hasbeenheldthattherighttofairtrialincludingtherighttoframingofcharges,righttopresent
evidence,righttorepresentationbyCounsel,righttodefenseandrighttoappealareclearlyavailable
andprotectedintrialbyaCourtMartial.ThePakistanArmyActdoespermittrialofciviliansbythe
MilitaryCourtsintimeofpeace.Insupportofhiscontention,healsorelieduponthecasesof(1)Mrs.
ShahidaZaheerAbbasiand4othersv.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC632)and(2)Col.
(R)MuhammadAkramv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryMinistryofDefence,Rawalpindiand
another(PLD2009FSC36).
20.Withregardtothecontentionthatthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentcameintoan
effectpriortothePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,hencethelatterwasnotprotectedfromthe
rigorsofArticle8oftheConstitution,hesubmittedthatbothBillsweremovedbytheMinistryofLawon
thesamedayandwereintroducedintheNationalAssemblyanddebatedonatthesametime.He
furthersubmittedthatnumberingoftheBillswasdonebytheNationalAssembly,whereinthePakistan
Army(Amendment)ActisBill1of2015andthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentisBill2of2015.Henext
submittedthattheSenatepassedthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Actat1700hourswhereasthe21st
ConstitutionalAmendmentwaspassedat1740hours,andthePresidentsubsequentlyassentedtothe
Acts.ItisimpossibletodeterminewhattimethePresidentsignedthetwoAmendmentActs.He
contendedthataccordingtotheGeneralClausesAct,1897,aFederalActcomesintoforceat0000
hoursonthesaiddaybutthisprovisiondoesnotapplytoaConstitutionalAmendment.Therefore,he
submittedthatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,wasalreadyinforcewhenthe21st
ConstitutionalAmendmentcameintoforce.HenextcontendedthatinviewofArticles50,66and69,
theCourtcannotlookintoParliamentaryproceedings.HealsosubmittedthatinthecaseofA.M.Khan
Leghari,C.S.P.,MemberBoardofRevenue,WestPakistanv.GovernmentofPakistanthroughSecretary
toGovernmentofPakistan,EstablishmentDivision,Rawalpindiandothers(PLD1967Lahore227),itwas
heldthatsincetheprocessofmakinganamendmentintheNationalAssemblyisproceedingin
Parliament,thesamecannotbequestionedintheCourt.
21.Torounduphisarguments,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistancontendedthat
thereisabaronthejurisdictionofHighCourtunderArticle199(3)inrelationtotheMembersofthe
ArmedForcesofPakistan,orthepersonssubjecttothislaw,andinsupportofhiscontention,herelied
uponthecases,reportedas(1)ExCapt.MuhammadAkramKhanv.IslamicRepublicofPakistanthrough
theSecretarytotheGovernmentofPakistan,MinistryofLawandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadand
another(PLD1969SC174),(2)Mrs.NaheedMaqsoodv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,
MinistryofInterior,GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabadand4others(1999SCMR2078)and(3)Brig.(R)
F.B.Aliscase(supra).ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanmaintainedthatterrorismisa
worldwidephenomenaandmanycountrieshaveoptedfortrialofterroristsbytheMilitaryCourts.Such
courseofactionhasbeenheldtobevalidbytheirCourts.ReferenceinthisbehalfismadetotheUnited
StatesofAmerica.
22.Heardandavailablerecordperused.
23.Duringthepreceding65oddyears,thequestionoftheimpliedlimitationonthePower
oftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionhascomeupbeforetheCourtsofvariousCountries.It
appearsthattheconceptofimpliedlimitationuponthepowertoamendtheConstitutionmayhaveits
genesisinGermanywheresuchrestrictionswereidentifiedandenforcedbytheFederalConstitutional
Court.IntheSubcontinent,thisissuewasfirstraisedbeforetheSupremeCourtofIndiaasfarbackas
1951whenaConstitutionalAmendmentwaschallengedprimarilyonthegroundthatitviolatedthe
FundamentalRights.Thechallengewasrepelledinthejudgment,reportedasSankariPrasadv.Unionof
India(AIR1951SC458).Subsequently,the17thAmendmenttotheIndianConstitutionwascalledinto
questionagainonthegroundofviolatingtheFundamentalRights.ThoughthePetitionwasdismissed
videjudgment,reportedasSajjanSinghv.StateofRajasthan(AIR1965SC845),however,twoofthefive
JudgesontheBenchexpressedsomereservationsinthisbehalf.However,videjudgment,reportedas
GolakNathv.StateofPunjab(AIR1967SC1643)throughavarietyofopinionandwithanarrow
majority,itwasheldthattherewasanimpliedrestrictionupontheamendatorypowersofthe
ParliamentwithrespecttoabridgementofFundamentalRights.Thematterfurthercrystallizedwhen
the24thAmendmentwaschallengedandtheSupremeCourtofIndiainitsjudgment,reportedas
KesavanandaBharati(supra)heldthattheIndianConstitutionwasbestowedwithcertainspecified
EssentialFeatures,whichcouldnotbealteredordestroyedbytheParliamentthroughaConstitutional
Amendment.TheParliamentwasacreationoftheConstitutionandcouldonlyexercisesuchConstituent
powers,aswereconferredbythepeopleandcouldnotamplifyitsownpowersattheexpenseofthe
FundamentalRightsofthepeople.ThesaidjudgmentwasreaffirmedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiain
thecases,reportedas(1)IndiraNehruGandhiv.RajNarain(AIR1975SC2299)and(2)MinervaMills
Limitedv.UnionofIndia(AIR1980SC1789).TheessentialconceptoftheConstitutionhavingabasic
structureandthesamebeinginalterablethroughaConstitutionalAmendmentwasreiteratedinthe
cases,reportedas(1)SanjeevCokeMfg.Co.v.BharatCokingCoalLtd.(AIR1983SC239)and(2)Shri
RaghunathraoGanpatraov.UnionofIndia(AIR1993SC1267).Theaforesaidviewhasnotbeendeviated
frombytheSupremeCourtofIndia,asisapparentfromthejudgments,reportedas(1)ARKeluv.State
ofTamilNadu(AIR2007SC861)and(2)StateofWestBengalv.CommitteeforProtectionofDemocratic
Rights(AIR2010SC1467).Thus,itmaybestatedwithoutfearofcontradictionthatthedoctrineof
BasicStructurei.e.theConstitutionhasSalientFeatures,whichcannotbealteredordestroyed
throughaConstitutionalAmendment,isfirmlyentrenchedinthejurisprudenceofthesaidcountry.
24.TheIndianviewreferredtoabovehasalsobeenacceptedinBangladesh.Reference,in
thisbehalf,maybemadetothecase,reportedasAnwarHussainChaudhryv.Bangladesh(1989BLDSp.
1p.1).KesavanandaBharatiSripadagalvaruandothers(Supra)castsaverylongshadowbycrossingthe
oceansandfindingapprovalinthe
CaribbeanwhereitwasfollowedinBelize.However,nearerhomethesaiddoctrinewasrejectedinSri
LankabytheSupremeCourt[See(1990)LRC(Const.)1].InSingapore,KesavanandaBharati(supra)was
consideredandheldnotapplicable.TheCourtsinMalaysiaalsorefusedtoapplysuchdoctrine.
Referenceinthisbehalfmaybemadetothecases,reportedas(1)GovernmentofSateofKelantanv.
GovernmentoftheFederationofMalaysia[(1977)2MLJ187]and(2)PhangChinHockv.Public
Prosecutor[(1980)1ML.J70].
25.Therecanbenodenyingofthefactthatthedoctrineofimpliedrestrictiononthe
powertoamendtheConstitutionsoastodestroyitsSalientFeatures,ifany,isneitheruniversally
acceptednorisuniversallyrejected.EachStatehasauniquehistoryandeachConstitutionisworded
differentlyattractingdifferentinterpretations.Thoughwisdommaynotrecognizeanynationalborders,
yetitmaynotbesafetorelytoomuchontheConstitutionalJurisprudenceofotherCountries,
especiallyasCountriespracticingingenericterms,thesameLegalSystemandhavingawritten
Constitutions,whenconfrontedwiththequestionofimpliedrestrictionsonpowertoamendthe
Constitutionhavecometodiametricallyoppositeconclusions.IntheCommonLawJurisdictionwitha
writtenConstitution,India,BelizeandBangladeshhaveacceptedandenforcedthedoctrine,whileSri
Lanka,MalaysiaandSingaporehaverejectedthesame.Inthecircumstances,wemustprimarilydraw
fromourownConstitutionalhistoryandJurisprudencetoanswerthequestionsthatwearecurrently
confrontedwith.Thejudicialpronouncementsinthefieldneedtobecontextualizedandexaminedso
thattheirtruemeaningandimportcanbediscovered.
26.ThematterinissuehasbeendilateduponbythisCourt,includinginthejudgments,
reportedas(1)TheStatev.ZiaurRehmanandothers(PLD1973SC49),(2)TheFederationofPakistan
throughtheSecretary,EstablishmentDivision,GovernmentofPakistan,Rawalpindiv.SaeedAhmed
Khanandothers(PLD1974SC151),(3)IslamicRepublicofPakistanthroughSecretary,Ministryof
InteriorandKashmirAffairs,Islamabadv.AbdulWaliKhan,M.N.A.,formerPresidentofDefunct
NationalAwamiParty(PLD1976SC57),(4)FederationofPakistanthroughtheSecretary,Ministryof
Finance,GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabad,etc.v.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.,Karachi(PLD1977SC397),
(5)FaujiFoundationandanotherv.ShamimurRehman(PLD1983SC457),(6)KhawajaMuhammad
Sharifv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,CabinetDivision,GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabad
and18others(PLD1988Lah.725),(7)SharafFaridiand3othersv.TheFederationofIslamicRepublicof
PakistanthroughPrimeMinisterofPakistanandanother(PLD1989Kar.404),(8)PirSabirShahv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1994SC738)and(9)FederationofPakistanandanotherv.Malik
GhulamMustafaKhar(PLD1989SC26).
27.The8thAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,
cameupforconsiderationbeforethisCourtandthevariousjudgments,bothfromthedomesticaswell
asforeignjurisdictions,wereconsideredandthePetitionsinthisbehalfadjudicateduponvide
judgment,reportedasMahmoodKhanAchakzaiandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD
1997SC426).UpontheinsertionthroughAmendmentofArticle63AoftheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,1973,thesamewaschallengedbeforethisCourtandthematteradjudicatedupon
videjudgment,reportedasWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanotherv.FederationofPakistan
andothers(PLD1998SC1263).The17thAmendmenttotheConstitutionwascalledintoquestionand
thematterwasdecidedvidejudgment,reportedasPakistanLawyersForumandothersv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(PLD2005SC719).
28.Thethresholdquestionsreferredtoaboveinvolvedintheinstantlisalsofinds
referenceinthejudgmentsofthisCourt,reportedas(1)SyedZafarAliShahandothersv.General
PervezMusharraf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothers(PLD2000SC869)and(2)SindhHighCourtBar
AssociationthroughitsSecretaryandanotherv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,Ministryof
LawandJustice,Islamabadandothers(PLD2009SC879).
29.Asfarbackas1966,thisCourtinitsjudgment,reportedasR.S.Jhamandasandothers
v.TheChiefLandCommissioner,WestPakistanandothers(PLD1966SC229)referredtothe
conscienceoftheConstitution.Inthecase,reportedasMr.FazlulQuaderChowdhryandothersv.Mr.
MuhammadAbdulHaque(PLD1963SC486)areferencewasmadethattheConstitutioncontainsa
Schemefordistributionofpowersbetweenthedifferentorgansandtheauthorities.Itwasalsoheld
asfollows:
ThemajordutyuponallconcernedincludingthePresidentwastobringthesefundamental
provisionsintooperation.Whathasactuallybeendoneisthatinsteadofimplementingthesebasic
provisions,theyhavebeenalteredinafundamentalwaysoastochangetheformofGovernmentfrom
thepurePresidentialformtoananomalousParliamentaryform.Itisquiteimpossibletoregardthe
operationasoneinaidofbringingtheintegralprovisionsoftheConstitutionintooperation.(emphasis
aresupplied)
BoththeaforesaidjudgmentsperhapsalludetotheconceptthattheConstitutionmayhaveameaning
thoughderivedfromtheinterpretationofitstextbutnotnecessarilystatedinasmanywords.
30.Inthecelebratedjudgment,reportedasMiss.AsmaJilani(supra),theconceptof
grundnormwasintroducedintoourJurisprudencebyHamoodurRehman,CJ.(ashethenwas).The
relevantextractofthejudgmentisreproducedhereinbelow:
Inanyevent,ifagrundnormisnecessaryforus.IdonothavetolooktotheWesternlegal
theoriststodiscoverone.Ourowngrundnormisenshrinedinourowndoctrinethatthelegal
sovereigntyovertheentireuniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthorityexerciseableby
thepeoplewithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust.Thisisanimmutableandunalterable
normwhichwasclearlyacceptedintheObjectiveResolutionpassedbytheConstituentAssemblyof
Pakistanonthe7thofMarch1949.ThisResolutionhasbeendescribedbyMr.Brohiasthecornerstone
ofPakistanslegaledificeandrecognizedevenbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralhimselfasthebond
whichbindsthenationandasadocumentfromwhichtheConstitutionofPakistanmustdrawits
inspiration.Thishasnotbeenabrogatedbyanyonesofar,norhasthisbeendepartedordeviatedfrom
byanyregime,militaryorCivil.Indeed,itcannotbe,for,itisoneofthefundamentalprinciples
enshrinedintheHolyQuran.(emphasisaresupplied)
SomeJudgesofthelearnedLahoreHighCourt,inacase,variouslyconcludedthattheObjectives
ResolutionwastobeatranscendentalpartoftheConstitutionandsupraConstitutionalInstrument
whichisunalterableandimmutable.Thoughtheobservationsreferredtoaboveformedpartofthe
minorityviewoftheCourt,AppealswerefiledbeforethisCourtwiththemainobjecttohavethelaw
settledwithregardtotheConstitutionalposition,asismentionedinthejudgment,passedinthatsaid
Appeal,reportedasTheStatev.ZiaurRehmanandothers(PLD1973SC49).Theobservationsinthe
judgmentofMiss.AsmaJilani(supra)reproducedabove,asinterpretedbythelearnedLahoreHigh
Courtintermsmentionedabovecameunderscrutinyalongwithseveralotherfundamental
Constitutionalquestions,thoughprimarilywithreferencetotheObjectivesResolution.
31.WithregardtotheconclusiondrawnbythelearnedLahoreHighCourtfromthe
observationsmadeinthecase,reportedasZiaurRahman(supra)itwasheldasfollows:
ItwillbeobservedthatthisdoesnotsaythattheObjectivesResolutionisthegrundnorm,but
thatthegrundnormisthedoctrineoflegalsovereigntyacceptedbythepeopleofPakistanandthe
consequencesthatflowfromit.IdidnotdescribetheObjectivesResolutionasthecornerstoneof
Pakistanslegaledificebutmerelypointedoutthatoneofthelearnedcounselappearinginthecase
haddescribeditassuch.Itisnotcorrect,therefore,tosaythatIhadheldit,asJusticeAtaullahSajjad
hassaidinhisjudgment,tobeatranscendentalpartoftheConstitutionor,asJusticeMuhammad
AfzalZullahhassaid,tobeasupraConstitutionalInstrumentwhichisunalterableandimmutable.
(emphasisaresupplied)
Inthesamecontext,itwasheldasunder:
HavingsaidthismuchabouttheconstitutionalpositionoftheCourtsandtheir
relationshipwiththeotherequallyimportantorganoftheState,namely;theLegislature.Itisnow
necessarytoexamineastowhetheranydocumentotherthantheConstitutionitselfcanbegivena
similarorhigherstatusorwhetherthejudiciarycan,intheexerciseofitsjudicialpower,strikedownany
provisionoftheConstitutionitselfeither,because,itisinconflictwiththelawsofGodorofnatureorof
moralityorsomeothersolemndeclarationwhichthepeoplethemselvesmayhaveadoptedfor
indicatingtheformofGovernmenttheywishtobeestablished.Iformypartcannotconceivea
situation,inwhich,afteraformalwrittenConstitutionhasbeenlawfullyadoptedbyacompetentbody
andhasbeengenerallyacceptedbythepeopleincludingthejudiciaryastheConstitutionofthecountry,
thejudiciarycanclaimtodeclareanyofitsprovisionsultraviresorvoid.Thiswillbenopartofits
functionofinterpretation.Therefore,inmyview,howeversolemnorsacrosanctadocument,ifitisnot
incorporatedintheConstitutionordoesnotformapartthereofitcannotcontroltheConstitution.At
anyrate,theCourtscreatedundertheConstitutionwillnothavethepowertodeclareanyprovisionof
theconstitutionitselfasbeinginviolationofsuchadocument.Ifinfactthatdocumentcontainsthe
expressionofthewillthevastmajorityofthepeople,thentheremedyforcorrectingsuchaviolation
willliewiththepeopleandnotwiththejudiciary.Itfollowsfromthisthatunderourownsystemtoothe
ObjectivesResolutionof1949,eventhoughitisadocumentwhichhasbeengenerallyacceptedandhas
neverbeenrepealedorrenounced,willnothavethesamestatusorauthorityastheConstitutionitself
untilitisincorporatedwithinitormadepartofit.IfitappearsonlyasapreambletotheConstitution,
thenitwillservethesamepurposeasanyotherpreambleserves,namely,thatinthecaseofanydoubt
astotheintentofthelawmaker,itmaybelookedattoascertainthetrueintent,butitcannotcontrol
thesubstantiveprovisionsthereof..(emphasisaresupplied)
TheaforequotedobservationsechoedinthefutureJurisprudenceofPakistanforaverylongtime.
Inthesamejudgment,followingobservationswerealsomade,whichareasunder:
Itcannot,therefore,besaidthataLegislature,underawrittenConstitution,possessesthe
samepowersofomnipotenceastheBritishParliament.Itspowershavenecessarilytobederived
from,andtobecircumscribedwithin,thefourcornersofthewrittenConstitution.
32.Itmaybenoticedthatontheonehand,theconceptofanallpowerful,completely
sovereignandomnipotentParliamentsakintotheBritishParliamentwasrejected.Itwasalsoheldthat
theObjectivesResolutionpersewasnotasupraConstitutionalDocumentand,therefore,bynecessary
implicationtheprovisionsofasubsequentwrittenConstitutioncouldnotbestruckdownontheground
thatitwasinconflicttherewith.Itwasalsoobservedthatatouchstoneforexaminingthevalidityor
virescannotbefoundeduponanyamorphousconceptofahigherlaworoutsidetheConstitutionitself.
However,thoughtheobservationswithregardtothegrundnormmadeinthecaseofMiss.Asma
Jilaniscase(supra)wereclarifiedyetthatsomeaspectsoftheConstitutionalLawmaybeinalterable
wasnotrefuted.
33.Theaforesaidviewwasreiteratedinthecase,reportedasBrig.(Retd)F.B.Ali(supra)
inthefollowingterms:
theCourtscannotstrikedownalawonanysuchhigherethicalnotionsnorcanCourtacton
thebasisofphilosophicalconceptsoflawaspointedoutbymeinthecaseofAsmaJillani.
ThesameviewwasfollowedinthejudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasFederationofPakistanthrough
theSecretary,MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabad,etc.v.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.,
Karachi(PLD1977SC397).Inthesaidjudgment,theinsertionofsubclause4AinArticle199ofthe
Constitutionwascalledintoquestion.However,nospecificchallengeonthegroundthatthesaid
amendmentviolatedtheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionwasmade,asiscategoricallymentionedin
thejudgmentitself.
34.InApril,1977,inviewofthecivildisturbances,Article245(1)oftheConstitutionwas
invokedbytheFederalGovernmentandtheArmedForceswerecalledintorestoreorder.Theaforesaid
actionwascalledintoquestionbeforethelearnedLahoreHighCourt.TheConstitutionPetitions,inthis
behalf,weredecidedthroughajudgment,reportedasDarweshM.Arbey,Advocatev.Federationof
PakistanthroughtheLawSecretaryand2others(PLD1980Lahore206).Inthesaidjudgment,itwas
observedthat:
theParliamentisnotsovereigntoamendtheConstitutionaccordingtoitslikesanddislikesmuch
lessthanchangingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution..
35.Apparently,theopinionexpressedinthecaseofKesavanandaBharati(supra)was
adoptedthoughnoreferencewasmadethereto.Timeandeventsovertookthesaidjudgmentand
MarshalLawwasimposedbyGen.MuhammadZiaulHaqonthe5thJuly,1977,andtheConstitution
wassuspendedandheldinabeyance.Thus,therewasnooccasiontochallengethesaidjudgment.
However,theaforesaidjudgmentcouldnotwithstandthescrutinyofthisCourtwhenexaminedinthe
judgment,reportedasFoujiFoundationandanotherv.ShamimurRehman(PLD1983SC457)whereinit
washeldasfollows:
202.MoreovertheeffectofthedecisioninSmt.IndiraNehruGandhi'scasewasdoneawaywithby
clauses4and5insertedinArticle368bytheConstitution(FortySecondAmendment)Act,1976,Clause
(4)debarstheCourtofthejurisdictiontocallinquestionanyoftheamendmentsmadeinthe
Constitution.Clause(5)declaresthatthereshallbenolimitationwhatsoeverontheconstituentpower
oftheParliamenttoamendanyprovisionoftheConstitutioneitherbywayofaddition,variationor
repeal.SowhatisnowleftisonlyatheoryofbasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitutionevolved
bytheConstitutionalinterpretationoftheprovisionshavingnolegalcompulsionasaConstitutional
principle.ReliancewasplacedbythelearnedcounselfortherespondentonDarveshM.Arbeyv.
FederationofPakistanPLD1980Lahore206.ShamimHussianKadri,J.said:theParliamentisnot
sovereigntoamendtheConstitutionaccordingtoitslikesanddislikesmuchlessthanchangingthebasic
structureoftheConstitution.ThisopinionofthelearnedJudgeisbasedonKesavanandaBharati'scase
(AIR1973SC1461)whichagainissubjecttothesamecriticismasIventuredtohighlightwhilereviewing
Sint.IndiraNehru,Gandhi'scase:Itdoesnotadvancethecaseoftherespondentanyfurtherasthe
learnedJudgefailedtonoticethattheamendingpowerunlessitisrestricted,canamend,vary,modify
orrepealanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Thestatementinmyopinion,istoobroadlystatedaswhat
thelearnedJudgereferstoisapoliticalquestionandamatterofpolicyfortheParliament.Sucha
questionisalsonotjusticiable.
Inthesaidcase,achallengewasthrowntoalegislativemeasureonthegroundofmalafides.Thiswas
theprimaryissuebeforetheCourt.TheprincipleenunciatedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiainthecase,
reportedasIndiraNehruGandhiscase(supra)wasnotfollowedforbeinginconsistentwiththeprevious
judgmentsofthesameCourt.However,inthesubsequentjudgments,theprincipleofimplied
restrictiononthelegislativepowertoamendtheConstitutionwasrepeatedlyreiteratedbytheSupreme
CourtofIndiainitsvariousjudgments,someofwhichhavebeenreferredtohereinaboveandthesaid
doctrineisnowfirmlyentrenchedintheIndianJurisprudence.
36.TheimpositionofMartialLawonthe5thJuly,1977,andviolationoftheConstitution
waschallengedbeforethisCourtbutunfortunately,theactionsofGen.MuhammadZiaulHaqwere
validatedinthejudgment,reportedasBegumNusratBhuttoov.ChiefofArmyStaffandFederationof
Pakistan(PLD1977SC657).Bywayoftheaforesaidjudgment,theChiefMartialLawAdministratorwas
alsoclothedwiththeAuthoritytoamendtheConstitution.Intheabovebackground,PresidentialOrder
No.14of1985wasissuedbyGen.MuhammadZiaulHaq,purportingtomakewidespreadchangesin
theConstitution.Inthemeanwhile,theelectionswereheldonanonpartybasisandtheParliament
passedthe8thAmendmenttotheConstitution,incorporatingmostoftheAmendmentseffected
throughthePresidentialOrderNo.14of1985.TheConstitutionwasrevivedvideRevivalofthe
ConstitutionOrder1985.ThemostsignificantAmendmentsintheConstitutioneffectedthroughthe8th
ConstitutionalAmendment,includedincorporationofArticle2AwherebytheObjectivesResolutionwas
madeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionandArticle58(2)(b)oftheConstitutionwasalsoinserted
empoweringthePresidenttodissolvetheNationalAssembly.
37.AtthepointoftimeofthepronouncementwithregardtotheObjectivesResolutionin
ZiaurRehmanscase(supra)thesamewasnotasubstantivepartoftheConstitution.Afterthe
insertionofArticle2A,anattemptwasmadetocontrolandrestrictthepowersofthePresidentunder
Article45oftheConstitutiontograntpardonstoconvictedprisoners.Thecontentionraisedwasthat
exerciseofsuchpowersbythePresidentoffendedagainstArticle2AoftheConstitution.However,this
Courtrepelledthecontentionsinitsjudgment,reportedasHakimKhanv.GovernmentofPakistan(PLD
1992SC395).
38.ThequestionoftheimpliedlimitationonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendthe
Constitutioninthecontextofthe8thConstitutionalAmendmentandArticle58(2)(b)includingwith
referencetoArticle2AandtheObjectivesResolutioncameupbeforethisCourtinthecase,reportedas
MahmoodKhanAchakzaiandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1997SC426),wherein
thefollowingShortOrderwaspassed:
Forreasonstoberecordedlater,wepassfollowingshortorder.
2.WhatisthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisaquestionofacademicnaturewhichcannot
beansweredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinalitybutitcanbesaidthattheprominentcharacteristics
oftheConstitutionareamplyreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionwhichisnowsubstantivepartofthe
3.TheObjectivesResolutionwasPreambleoftheConstitutionsmadeandpromulgatedinour
countryin1956,1962and1973.PerusaloftheObjectivesResolutionshowsthatforschemeof
governancethemainfeaturesenvisagedareFederalismandParliamentaryFormofGovernment
blendedwithIslamicprovisions.TheEighthAmendmentwasinsertedintheConstitutionin1985,after
whichthreeelectionswereheldonpartybasisandtheresultantParliamentsdidnottouchthis
Amendment,whichdemonstratesamplythatthisAmendmentisratifiedbyimplicationandhascometo
sayintheConstitutionunlessamendedinthemannerprescribedintheConstitutionascontemplated
underArticle239.Article58(2)(b)broughtintheConstitutionbytheEighthAmendment,which
maintainsParliamentaryFormofGovernmenthasprovidedchecksandbalancesbetweenthepowersof
thePresidentandthePrimeMinistertoletthesystemworkwithoutletorhindrancetoforestalla
situationinwhichmartiallawcouldbeimposed.(emphasisaresupplied)
However,inthesaidjudgment,SajjadAliShah,CJ.(ashethenwas)madethefollowingobservations:
WearegoingintotierquestionofvalidityoftheConstitution(EighthAmendment)Act,
1985,laterbutforthetimebeingitwouldsufficetosaythatfreedom,bestowedupontheparliamentin
clause,(6)ofArticle239afteramendmentdoesnotincludepowertoamendthoseprovisionsofthe
ConstitutionbywhichwouldbealteredsalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,namelyfederalism,
ParliamentaryFormofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Aslongasthesesalientfeatures
reflectedintheObjectivesResolutionareretainedandnotalteredinsubstance,amendmentscanbe
madeasperprocedureprescribedinArticle239oftheConstitution.(emphasisaresupplied)
Itwasfurtherobservedasfollows:
TheObjectivesResolutionandthespeechofQuaideAzamquotedaboveclearlyshowthat
theConstitutionwastobebasedonIslamicprinciplesofdemocracy,equality,freedom,justiceand
fairplay.TheseweretheguidingprincipleswhichweretobemouldedintheformofConstitution.These
wereinteraliathebasicfeaturesonwhichtheConstitutionwastobeframed.
SaleemAkhtar,J.(ashethenwas)inhisjudgmentsignedbyfourotherJudges,madethefollowing
observation:
34.ItcanthusbesaidthatinPakistanthereisaconsistentviewfromtheverybeginningthata
provisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownholdingthatitisviolativeofanyprominentfeature,
characteristicorstructureoftheConstitution.Thetheoryofbasicstructurehasthuscompletelybeen
rejected.However,asdiscussedhereundereveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristicandfeatures
whichplayimportantroleinformulatingthelawsandinterpretingtheprovisionsoftheConstitution.
SuchprominentfeaturesarefoundwithintherealmoftheConstitution.ItdoesnotmeanthatI
impliedlyacceptthetheoryofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Ithasonlybeenreferredto
illustratethateveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristics.(emphasisaresupplied)
ItwasfurtherobservedbythelearnedJudge,asfollows:
42.HowevertherearefactorswhichrestrictthepoweroftheLegislaturetoamendtheConstitution.
Itisthemoralorpoliticalsentiment,whichbindsthebarriersofLegislatureandformstheConstitutional
understandings.Thepressureofpublicopinionisanotherfactorwhichrestrictsandresiststheunlimited
powertoamendtheConstitution.InPakistanalthoughArticle239confersunlimitedpowertothe
Legislature,yetitcannotbysheerforceofmoralityandpublicopinionmakeandamendingthe
onlywiththeConstitution.ItseemstobeanemerginglegaltheorythateveniftheConstitutionis
suspendedorabrogated,thejudiciarycontinuestoholditspositiontoimpartjusticeandprotectthe
rightsofthepeoplewhichareviolatedandimpingedbytheactionsofthepowersandauthoritieswhich
saddlethemselvesbyunconstitutionalmeans.AsheldinAsmaJillani'scase,suchactorsareusurpers
andtheCourtshadonlycondonedtheiractionwithoutapprovingit.TheprovisionsoftheConstitution
cannotbesuspendedexceptasprovidedbytheConstitutionitself.Theconceptofabrogationofthe
ConstitutionisalientotheConstitution.ThefactthatwheneverthereoccurredConstitutionaldeviation,
itwaslegalisedbycondonationorvalidationgrantedbytheSupremeCourt,clearlydemonstratesthat
suchdeviationsandactionswerevoidabinitioandunconstitutional.Thevalidationorcondonationwas
grantedmerelytoavoidanydisruptionofcivilandpersonalrights,tomaintaincontinuityof
administrationandgovernanceandtobringthepolityandsystemofgovernmentondemocraticand
constitutionalrails.Butsuchsituation,withreferencetoArticle6oftheConstitutionhastobeviewed
withgreaterseriousness.(emphasisaresupplied)
Itwasaddedthat:
Asobservedearlier,therearesomecharacteristicfeaturesineveryConstitutionwhichareembedded
inthehistorical,religiousandsocialbackgroundofthepeopleforwhomitisframed.Itcannotbe
deniedthateveryConstitutionhasprominentfeatures,characteristicsandpictureframestuddedwith
publicaspiration,historicalinspiration,geographicalrecognition,politicalformulationsandpeoples
expectation..(emphasisaresupplied)
TheHonbleJudgealsoobservedthat:
43.ItisawellrecognizedprincipleofinterpretationofConstitutionthatiftwoprovisions
conflictwitheachothertheCourtsshouldfirstresolvethesamebyreconcilingthem.Butif
reconciliationseemsdifficult,thensuchinterpretationshouldbeadoptedwhichismoreinconsonance
ornearertotheprovisionsofConstitutionguaranteeingfundamentalrights,independenceofjudiciary
anddemocraticprinciplesblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Thusitisthelesserrightwhichmustyieldin
favourofhigherrights.ReferencemaybemadetoShahidNabiMalik,v.ChiefElectionCommissioner
PLD1997SC32,HalsburyLawsofEngland,4thEdition,Vol.44,page532andpara.872andCorpusJuris
Secundum,Vol.16,page97.AjmalMian,J,whileexplaininghisobservationinthecaseofAlJehadTrust
PLD1996SC324,relatingtoconflictbetweenArticle209(7)andArticle203CheldthatArticle209(7)
carriedhigherrightpreservingtheindependenceofjudiciaryandshouldprevailoverArticle203Cwhich
negatedthesame.(emphasisaresupplied)
39.InthejudgmentauthoredbySajjadAliShah,C.J.(ashethenwas)signedbyoneother
Judge,itwasstatedinnouncertaintermsthattheConstitutionhasSalientFeatures(whichwere
identified)andthepowertoamendtheConstitutiondoesnotextendtoaltersubstantivelyordestroy
suchSalientFeatures.
40.SaleemAkhtar,J.(ashethenwas)inhisjudgment,endorsedbythemajorityofthe
CourtacknowledgedthattheConstitutionhasSalientFeaturesandinsubstantialtermsdidnotdiffer
withthejudgmentauthoredbySajjadAliShah,C.J.(ashethenwas)inthisbehalf.Itwasalsostatedthat
theParliamentisnotasomnipotent,astheBritishParliamentandfurtherthatabrogationisaconcept
alientotheConstitution.ThelimitationontheLegislaturetoamendtheSalientFeatureswas
acknowledgedhowever,onlyapioushopewasexpressedthatpoliticalsentiment,moralityandthe
forceofpublicopinionwouldrestraintheParliamentfromalteringthesame.
41.IntheunanimousorderoftheCourt,itwasheldthatthequestionofBasicStructure
isacademicinnature.However,theConstitutiondoeshaveBasicSalientFeatures,whichcanbe
gatheredfromtheObjectivesResolutionandtheamendmentintheConstitutiononexaminationwas
foundonlytoprovideChecksandBalancesintheParliamentaryFormofGovernment,aSalientFeature
oftheConstitution.
42.InJuly,1997,byvirtueof14thConstitutionalAmendment,Article63Awasinserted
pertainingtodisqualificationoftheMembersoftheParliamentonthegroundofdefection.Thesaid
AmendmentwascalledintoquestionbeforethisCourt,whichwasadjudicateduponvidejudgment,
reportedasWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanother(supra).Intheminorityopinionof
MamoonQazi,J.(ashethenwas)theimpliedlimitationonthepowersoftheParliamentwerefully
endorsedandthesaidArticlei.e.Article63AwasheldtobeultravirestheConstitution.Thelearned
Judgemadethefollowingobservations:
ButthepowerbestowedupontheParliamentbytheConstitutiondoesnotincludethepowerto
destroyorabrogatetheConstitutionortoalterwhathasbeenreferredtoasitsbasicstructureor
essentialfeatures.(emphasisaresupplied)
Itwasaddedthat:
Therefore,ithastopassthroughthesametestasanordinarylaw.Onlytheamendmentsmadebya
ConstituentAssemblycanclaimthestatusofConstitutionalprovisionsandcanclaimimmunityfrom
suchexamination.Therefore,onlyanamendmentthatdoesnotviolateordestroyanyessentialfeature
oftheConstitutionordoesnotabrogateafundamentalrightcanacquirethestatusofaConstitutional
provision.Butuntilitacquiressuchstatus,itmaybesubjectedtothesametestasanordinary
amendmentinthelaw.ThepowertomakeConstitutionvestsinthepeoplealone.Itisdoubtfulifthe
ParliamentcanmakeamendmentsintheConstitutionifsuchamendmentsviolateanyessentialfeature
intheConstitutionorafundamentalrightguaranteedbyit.Theprovisionsofclauses(5)and(6)in
Article239are,therefore,tobereadinharmonywiththeotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.
43.However,inthemajorityjudgments,adifferentviewwastaken.AjmalMian,C.J.(as
hethenwas)observedasfollows:
12.Fromtheabovecaselaw,itisevidentthatinPakistanthebasicstructuretheory
consistentlyhadnotbeenaccepted.However,itmaybepointedoutthatinnoneoftheabovereports
theimpugnedArticlewassuchwhichcouldhavebeentreatedasalteringthebasicfeature/structureof
theConstitution.IftheParliamentbyaConstitutionalAmendmentmakesPakistanasasecularState,
thoughPakistanisfoundedasanIslamicIdeologicalState,canitbearguedthatthisCourtwillhaveno
powertoexaminetheviresofsuchanamendment.(emphasisaresupplied)
SaiduzzamanSiddique,J.(ashethenwas)observedasfollowed:
Fromtheprecedingdiscussion,itemergesthatfinallytheSupremeCourtbothin
IndiaandPakistanhavetakentheviewthatpowertoamendtheConstitutionvestingintheParliament
doesnotincludepowertorepealorabrogatetheConstitution.(emphasisaresupplied)
44.ThoughitwasheldthatunderArticle239oftheConstitution,theParliamentexercises
notjustLegislativePowersbutalsoConstituentPowersbutitwasobservedthat:
This,however,wouldnotmeanthatthepowertoamendtheConstitutionvestingintheParliament
underArticle239oftheConstitutionisunlimitedandunbridled.(emphasisaresupplied)
45.WithregardtothedictumlaiddowninthecaseofWukalaMahaz(supra),thelearned
Judgeobservedasfollows:
TheshortorderwhichwassignedbyallthelearnedsevenlearnedJudgesoftheBench,shows
thatthequestionrelatingtobasicstructureoftheConstitutionwasnotansweredauthoritativelyand
finallyasitwasconsideredtobeacademicinnaturebutsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionreflectedin
Article2AwerepointedoutasFederalismandParliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamic
provisions.
Intheaforesaidcase,theorderhandeddownbytheCourtisreproducedhereinbelow:
Bymajorityof6to1itisheldthatArticle63AoftheConstitutionisintravariesbutby4to2subjectto
thefollowingclarifications:
(i)Thatparagraph(a)tobereadinconjunctionwithparagraphs(b)and(c)toExplanation
toclause(1)ofArticle63AoftheConstitution.Itmust,therefore,followasacorollarythatamemberof
aHousecanbedisqualifiedforabreachofpartydisciplineintermsoftheaboveparagraph(a)whenthe
allegedbreachrelatestothematterscoveredbyaforesaidparagraphs(b)and(c)totheabove
Explanationtoclause(1)oftheaforementionedArticleandthatthebreachcomplainedofoccurred
withintheHouse.
(ii)Thattheaboveparagraph(a)toExplanationtoclause(1)ofArticle63Aistobeconstruedin
suchawaythatitshouldpreservetherightoffreedomofspeechofamemberintheHousesubjectto
reasonablerestrictionsasareenvisagedinArticle66readwithArticle19oftheConstitution.
Whereasbyminorityviewparagraph(a)intheExplanationtoclause(1)ofArticle63Aandclause(6)in
thesaidArticleoftheConstitutionareviolativeofthefundamentalrightsandaretobetreatedasvoid
andunenforceable.
46.InthemajorityjudgmentauthoredbyAjmalMian,CJ.(ashethenwas)itwasheld,
thoughinrhetoricaltermsthatimpliedlimitationexistsintheConstitutionregardingthepowerofthe
ParliamenttoamendthesameandtheCourthasthejurisdictiontoexaminetheviresofsuch
amendments,ifforexample,theParliamentthroughaConstitutionalAmendmentwastomakePakistan
asecularState.SaeeduzzamanSiddiqui,J.(ashethenwas)whileagreeingwiththemajorityview
observedthatthepowertoamendtheConstitutiondoesnotincludethepowertorepealorabrogate.
TheminorityjudgmentauthoredbyMamoonQazi,J.(ashethenwas)fullyendorsedtheinherit
limitationontheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionsoastoalterordestroyitsSalientFeatures.
47.Theamendmenti.e.insertionofArticle63AwassubjectedtoJudicialReviewand
examinedbytheCourt,whiletheminorityoftheJudgesfoundthesaidArticleviolativeoftheSalient
FeaturesoftheConstitution,themajorityonexaminationcametotheconclusionthatthesaidArticleis
intravirestheConstitution,subjecttoclarifications,asisevidentfromtheOrderoftheCourtinthesaid
case.
48.ThedoctrinethattheConstitutionhasSalientFeatures,whichcannotbealtered,
abrogatedordestroyedthroughanAmendmentmadebytheParliamentandthisCourtisvestedwith
thejurisdictiontoexaminetheviresofsuchAmendmentonthisaccountappearstohavebeen
endorsedintheOrderoftheCourt.
49.ItmayalsobepertinenttorefertheobservationsmadebythisCourtinthejudgment,
reportedasDr.M.AslamKhakietc.v.SyedMuhammadHashimandothers(PLD2000SC225),which
readsasfollows:
AllitsArticleshavetobeinterpretedinamannerthatitssoulorspiritisgiveneffecttoby
harmonizingvariousprovisions.AgaininTheStatev.SyedQaimAliShah(1992SCMR2192)itwas
observedthattheCourtswhileconstruingtheprovisionsofstatuteshouldmakeeffortsthatthe
interpretationoftherelevantprovisionofthestatuteshouldbeinconsonancewithArticle2Aofthe
Constitutionandthegrundnormsofhumanrights.

50.Historyrepeateditselfonthe12thofOctober,1999,andadulyelectedGovernment
wasoverthrownbyGen.PervezMusharaf.SaidactionwasyetagainchallengedbeforethisCourtbut
unfortunately,theConstitutionPetitionfiled,inthisbehalf,wasdismissedinthecase,reportedasSyed
ZafarAliShahandothersv.GeneralPervezMusharraf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothers(PLD2000
SC869).YetagainthepowertoamendtheConstitutionwasgivenonthisoccasiontoGen.Pervez
Musharafbutwithratherinterestinglimitations,asisevidentfromthejudgment,therelevantportion
thereofisreproducedhereunder:
281.WeareoftheconsideredviewthatiftheParliamentcannotalterthebasicfeaturesofthe
Constitution,asheldbythisCourtinAchakzai'scase(supra),powertoamendtheConstitutioncannot
beconferredontheChiefExecutiveofthemeasurelargerthanthatwhichcouldbeexercisedbythe
Parliament.Clearly,unbridledpowerstoamendtheConstitutioncannotbegiventotheChiefExecutive
evenduringthetransitionalperiodevenonthetouchstoneofStatenecessity.Wehavestatedin
unambiguoustermsintheShortOrderthattheConstitutionofPakistanisthesupremelawoftheland
anditsbasicfeaturesi.e.independenceofJudiciary,federalismandparliamentaryformofgovernment
blendedwithIslamicProvisioncannotbealteredevenbytheParliament.Resultantly,thepowerofthe
ChiefExecutivetoamendtheConstitutionisstrictlycircumscribedbythelimitationslaiddowninthe
ShortOrdervidesubparagraphs(i)to(vii)ofparagraph6.(emphasisaresupplied)
TheaforesaidisacleardeclarationoflawthattheBasicFeaturesoftheConstitutioni.e.Independence
ofJudiciary,FederalismandParliamentaryFormofGovernmentblendedwiththeIslamicProvisions,
cannotbealtered,evenbytheParliament.
51.Aftersomeyearsofdictatorship,theprocessoftransitiontodemocracycommenced.
AsusualagainamendmentswereeffectedintheConstitutionthroughLegalFrameworkOrder(LFO)and
followedbythe17thConstitutionalAmendmentpassedbythenewlyelectedParliament.Thesaid
AmendmentswerecalledintoquestionandtheConstitutionPetitions,inthisbehalf,weredismissedby
thisCourtinthejudgment,reportedasPakistanLawyersForumandothersv.FederationofPakistan
andothers(PLD2005SC719).However,itwasheldinpara56ofthisjudgment,asfollows:
56.ThereisasignificantdifferencebetweentakingthepositionthatParliamentmaynotamendsalient
featuresoftheConstitutionandbetweenthepositionthatifParliamentdoesamendthesesalient
features,itwillthenbethedutyofthesuperiorjudiciarytostrikedownsuchamendments.Thesuperior
Courtsofthis,countryhaveconsistentlyacknowledgedthatwhiletheremaybeabasicstructuretothe
Constitution,andwhiletheremayalsobelimitationsonthepowerofParliamenttomakeamendments
tosuchbasicstructure,suchlimitationsaretobeexercisedandenforcednotbythejudiciary(asinthe
caseofconflictbetweenastatuteandArticle8),butbythebodypolitic,i.e.,thepeopleofPakistan.In
thiscontext,itmaybenotedthatwhileSajjadAliShah,C.J.observedthat"thereisabasicstructureof
theConstitutionwhichmaynotbeamendedbyParliament",henowhereobservesthatthepowerto
strikedownoffendingamendmentstotheConstitutioncanbeexercisedbythesuperiorjudiciary.The
theoryofbasicstructureorsalientfeatures,insofarasPakistanisconcerned,hasbeenusedonlyasa
doctrinetoidentifysuchfeatures.(emphasisaresupplied)
Theprovisionsof17thConstitutionalAmendmentwerescrutinizedandfoundnottooffendagainstany
oftheSalientFeatures.
TheobservationoftheHonbleJudgeinparas38to40oftheReportarealsoveryilluminating,
thesamearealsoreproducedhereunderforeaseofreference:
38.ThepresentConstitutionalstructurerestsonthefoundationofthe17thAmendment.Without
it,thecivilianrulemaynothavebeenpossible.Insimilarcircumstances,whileexaminingthevalidityof
the8thAmendmentinAbdulMujeebPirzadascase,AjmalMian,J.(ashethenwas),observedas
follows:
Imayobservethattheelectionsof1988onpartybasiswereheldonthebasisoftheamended
Constitution,everyonehastakenoathincludingtheJudgestoprotecttheConstitutionaswasinforce
onthedayoftakingofoath.ThesaidoathwastakenbyeveryoneaftertheMartialLawwasliftedand
theFundamentalRightswererestored.IncidentallyImaymentionthatIandallothersittingJudgesof
thisCourt,wereappointedduringtheMartialLawand,therefore,thefirstoath,whichwehadtakenon
111986undertheConstitution,wasoftheamendedConstitution.IfIweretodeclarecertainamended
provisionsoftheConstitutionasviolativeoftheObjectivesResolutionorofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution,itwoulddisturbthebasisonwhichthepresentstructureofthedemocracyisgrounded.It
willbedifficulttodemarcatealine,wheretostop.Thepresentlegaledificeisbasedontheamended
Constitution.Ifwetakeoutsomeamendedprovisions,thesuperstructureofdemocracybuiltonitmay
collapse.Forexample,underArticle41(3)readwithSecondScheduletotheConstitutionelectoral
collegeforelectionofthePresidenthasbeenmademorerepresentativebyP.O.No.14of1985by
providingthattheProvincialAssemblieswillalsoformpartoftheelectoralcollege.IfIweretoholdthe
aboveamendmentasillegal,itwillaffecttheincumbentoftheofficeofthePresident,whichinturnwill
affecttheincumbentoftheofficeofthePrimeMinisterasthePresidenthadnominatedthePrime
MinisterunderamendedArticle91(2).ItistruethatthePrimeMinisterhadobtainedavoteof
confidencebutthechallengetotheNationalAssemblycanbethrownonthegroundsthatitsseatsby
directandindirectelectionhavebeenincreasedandthequalifyingageforavoterhasbeenraisedfrom
18yearsto21years,byP.O.No.14of1985,whichdeprivedrightoffranchisetoasizeablenumber
votersbetweentheageof18to21years.Anumberofotherincumbentsofotherofficesandanumber
ofotherinstitutions,whoarenotbeforeus,willalsobeaffected.Thiswillbeanunendingprocess.Inmy
view,thereisnomanageablestandardortheobjectivestandardavailablewiththisCourttodecide,
whichoftheamendmentsshouldbestuckdownandwhichofthemshouldberetained.Thisisahighly
sensitiveandpoliticizedcontroversy,whichhasunfortunatelyassumedgreatsignificanceinviewof
polarizedandchargedpoliticalclimateobtaininginthecountry.
39.GeneralElectionshavenowbeenheldhereand18yearoldshavevoted.Thisenlargedelectorate
hascastitsvotesforanexpendedParliamentandfourProvincialAssemblies.Theelectedmembershave
takenoathoftheirrespectiveoffices.TheSpeakersandDeputySpeakersoftheNationalAssemblyand
ProvincialAssemblieshavebeenelected.TheChairmanandDeputyChairmanSenatehavebeen
elected.ThePrimeMinisterandthefourChiefMinistershavebeenelected.Governorshavebeen
appointedinthefourprovinces.ThePresidenthastakenaVoteofConfidenceasrequiredbyclause(8)
ofArticle41oftheConstitution.AlltheseConstitutionalfunctionarieshavemadeoathunderthe
Constitutionandareoccupyingtheirrespectiveoffices.Appointmentstocivilservicesandarmedforces
havebeenmade.ServiceChiefshavebeenappointed.JudgesandtheChiefJusticesofthesuperior
CourtshavebeenappointedandhavetakenoathundertheConstitution.
40.TheGovernmentisfunctioninginaccordancewiththeConstitution.Ifthepetitionis
acceptedandthe17thAmendmentstruckdown,thisentireConstitutionaledificewillcollapse.The
President,thePrimeMinister,theGovernors,theChiefMinisters,theParliamentarians,theMembersof
theProvincialAssemblies,3ServicesChiefsandJudgesofsuperiorjudiciaryappointedbythePresident,
allwillceasetoholdofficeatonce.TheGovernmentofthecountrywillceasetofunctionandtotal
anarchywillprevail.TheGovernmentundertheConstitutionwillbeundoneandavacuumwillbe
created.Thisisnotthefunctionofthejudiciary.Inshort,acceptingthepetitionsandstrikingdownthe
17thAmendmentwouldinvitechaosandcreateaConstitutionalcrisis.ThisCourtmustallowthe
Governmenttofunctionandtheinstitutionstogainstrengthandmaturewithtime.Thealternative
routeleadsstraighttothepoliticalthicketandsincethedecisioninZiaurRehman'scasethisCourthas
alwaysavoidedsuchacourse.Ifthepetitionershaveagrievance,theirremedylieswiththeParliament
andfailingthatintheCourtofthepeopleandnotwiththeCourt.(emphasisaresupplied)
Intheaforesaidjudgment,theexistenceoftheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionwasnotdisputed.It
wasalsoacceptedthatthereareimpliedlimitationsonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendsuch
SalientFeatures.However,itwasopinedthattheenforcementofsuchlimitationlayinrealmofpolitics
andnotthroughtheCourt.
52.Theentirejudgmentappearstobeunderpinnedbytheawkwardnessofthepointof
timeinhistorywhenthejudgmentwasdelivered.Theexerciseofjurisdictionintheopinionofthe
Court,wouldhaveresultedinthecollapseofrecentlyreviveddemocraticsystemandleadtolegal
anarchy.ThefallingoftheproverbialHeavenwasavoidedbutperhapsprudencetrumped
jurisprudence.
53.Anexaminationandanalysisofthelawonthesubject,asitdevelopedandevolved
throughthejudicialpronouncementsoftheCourtsrevealthatithasbeensettledconclusivelythatthe
ConstitutionhasSalientFeatures.Itisnottoodifficulttotracethecrystallizationofthisconceptinour
JurisprudenceemerginginitiallyasareferencetotheschemeoftheConstitutionwithits
FundamentalandIntegralFeaturesinFazlulQuaderscase(supra).Theconceptofgrundnormwas
introducedintoourConstitutionalJurisprudencethroughZiaurRehmanscase(supra).InMahmood
KhanAchakzaiscase(supra)thoughitwasheldthatanacademicexercisewouldberequiredtoidentify
thebasicstructureoftheConstitutionandtogaugeitsamplitudeyetitwasheldthattheConstitution
hasprominentCharacteristicswhichwereenumeratedtherein.ItwasalsoheldthattheConstitution
hasSalientFeatures.Inthemajorityjudgment,itwasobservedthatsomeSalientFeatureswere
embodiedintheConstitution.TheexistenceofabasicstructurewithitsSalientFeatureswas
acknowledgedinboththemajorityandminorityviewsinWukalaMahazcase(supra).InthePakistan
LawyersForumscase(supra)theexistenceofabasicstructureconsistingofSalientFeaturesofthe
Constitutionwasacknowledgedandenforced.
54.Inviewoftheaforesaid,itisclearandobviousinourJurisprudenceasithasevolved
throughthepronouncementsoftheCourts,ithasbeenfirmlyestablishedandacknowledgedthatthe
Constitutionisnotabunchofrandomprovisionscobbledtogetherbutthereisaninherentintegrityand
schemetotheConstitutionevidencedbycertainfundamentalprovisions,whichareitsSalientand
DefiningFeatures.
55.ThisaspectofthematterwasnotevenseriouslydisputedbythelearnedSenior
CounselappearingonbehalfoftheFederalGovernment,whohadnocavilwiththeassertionofthe
PetitionersthattheConstitutionhasSalientFeaturesbutcontendedthatthesamewereonly
descriptive.
56.Duringthecourseofourjourneythroughthevariousjudicialpronouncementsofour
CourtstodiscovertheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution,aconstantreferencetotheObjectives
Resolutionwasnoticed.ThesaidResolutionwasadoptedbytheFirstConstituentAssemblyinMarch,
1949,butnotwithoutcontroversy.AlotofmisgivingswereexpressedbysomeoftheMembers,
especiallythosefromtheminorities,asisobviousfromtheParliamentaryDebates.Concernswere
voicedthatsomeofthedeclarationsthereinwerecouchedingeneraltermssusceptibletoawide
varietyofsubjectiveinterpretationswhichmayleadtounexpectedandunacceptableresults.Sensitivity
tosuchconcernswasexpressedbythemajorityparty,asisobviousfromthesaidDebates.The
ObjectivesResolutionwasamilestoneorevenasignboardonthelongroadtotheConstitutionmaking
butitwasnotthedestinationwhichasitturnedoutwastheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan,1973,wherebythedeclarationsofguidingaspirationsoftheConstitutionmakingwere
eventuallyactualized.
57.Initially,theObjectivesResolutioninsubstancewasincorporatedasapreambletothe
Constitution.AtthatstageofourConstitutionalhistoryanotionwascanvassedthattheObjectives
ResolutionwassupraConstitutionalortranscendentalpartoftheConstitution.Thisargumentwas
rejectedbythisCourtinZiaurRehmanscase(supra).Therelevantpartofthejudgmenthasbeen
reproducedhereinabove.
58.AftertheinsertionofArticle2AoftheConstitutionwherebyObjectivesResolutionwas
madeasubstantivepartoftheConstitution,itagainbecamesubjectmatterofalisbeforethisCourtin
HakimKhanscase(supra)whereinitwasheldthattheObjectivesResolutionisapartofthe
Constitution,whichmustbereadasawholetodeterminethetruemeaningandimportofanyparticular
provision(includingArticle2AoftheConstitution)andeveryeffortmustbemadetoharmonizethe
variousprovisions.Theprincipleofinterpretation,asstatedabove,isinaccordancewiththesettledlaw.
IntheConstructionofStatutesbyEarlT.Crawford,itisobservedasfollows:
StatutesasaWhole:Inasmuchasthelanguageofastatuteconstitutesthedepositoryorreservoirof
thelegislativeintent,inordertoascertainordiscoverthatintent,thestatutemustbeconsideredasa
whole,justasitisnecessarytoconsiderasentenceinitsentiretyinordertograspitstruemeaning.
InAlJehadTrustscase(supra),itwasobservedasunder:
TheConstitutionistobereadasawholeasanorganicdocument.
InFazalDadv.Col.(Retd)GhulamMuhammadMalikandothers(PLD2007SC571),itwasheldasunder:
Itisasettledlawthatprovisionsoflawmustbereadasawholeinordertodetermineitstrue,
nature,importandscopeaslawlaiddownbythisCourtinMianMuhammadNawazSharifscasePLD
1993SC473.
InthecaseofKamaluddinQureshi,etc.v.AliInternationalCo.,etc.(PLD2009SC367),itwasobserved
asfollows:
10.Whileinterpretingthestatutesaninterpretationleadingtoconflictingjudgmentsistobe
avoidedasheldinHafizAbdulWaheedv.Mrs.AsmaJehangirandanotherPLD2004SC219.The
intentionofthelawmakerisalwaysgatheredbyreadingthestatutesasawholeandmeaningsaregiven
toeachandeverywordofthewholestatutebyadoptingaharmoniousconstruction.Inthisregard,the
principlesforinterpretationhavebeensettledbythisCourtinthecasesofMessrsMehboobIndustries
Ltd.v.PakistanIndustrialCreditandInvestmentCorporationLtd.1988CLC866,ShahidNabiMalikand
anotherv.ChiefElectionCommissionerand7othersPLD1997SC32,M.AslamKhakiv.Muhammad
HashimPLD2000SC225,MysoreMineralsLimitedv.CommissionerofIncomeTax2000PTD1486,
Hafeezullahv.AbdulLatifPLD2002Kar.457,HafizAbdulWaheedv.Mrs.AsmaJehangirPLD2004SC
219,ZafarAliKhanandanotherv.GovernmentofN.W.F.PthroughChiefSecretaryandothersPLD2004
Peshawar263,D.G.KhanCementCompanyLimitedandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers
2004SCMR456,MuhammadAbbasGujjarv.DistrictReturningOfficer/DistrictJudgeSheikhupuraand2
others2004CLC1559andShoukatBaigv.ShahidJamilPLD2005SC530.
InthecaseRegardingPensionaryBenefitsoftheJudgesofSuperiorCourtsfromthedateoftheir
RespectiveRetirements,IrrespectiveoftheirLengthofServiceassuchJudges(PLD2013SC829),itwas
heldasunder:
a.ThattheentireConstitutionhastobereadasanintegratedwhole.
b.Nooneparticularprovisionshouldbesoconstruedastodestroyingtheother,buteach
sustainingtheotherprovision.Thisistheruleofharmony,ruleofcompletenessandexhaustiveness.

InthecaseofReferencebythePresidentofPakistanunderArticle186oftheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,1973(PLD2013SC279),itwasheldasunder:
33.TheConstitution,beingalivingorganforalltimesistobeinterpreteddynamically,asawhole,
togiveharmoniousmeaningtoeveryArticleoftheConstitution.
Inthecasesof(1)ReferencebythePresidentofPakistanunderArticle162oftheConstitution
oftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan(PLD1957SC219),(2)AftabShahbanMiraniandothersv.
MuhammadIbrahimandothers(PLD2008SC779),(3)MumtazHussainandDr.NasirKhanandothers
(2010SCMR1254)MahmoodKhanAchakzaiscase(supra)andWukalaMahazcase(supra)asimilar
viewhasbeentaken.Inthisbehalf,referencemayalsobemadetothejudgmentofthisCourt,reported
asMunirHussainBhatti,Advocateandothersv.FederationofPakistanandanother(PLD2011SC308
andPLD2011SC407),therelevantparaofthejudgmentisreproducedhereunder:
22.Therationaleforthisruleisalsouniversalandtranscendsthedividebetweenthevariousprevalent
systemsoflaw.ThusitisthatwehavecommonlawconstitutionalistssuchasLaurenceTribeand
MichaelDorfwarningusagainstapproachingtheConstitutioninwaysthatignorethesalientfactthat
itspartsarelinkedintoawholethatitisaConstitution,andnotmerelyanunconnectedbunchof
separateclausesandprovisionswithseparatehistoriesthatmustbeinterpreted."(Tribe,LawrenceH.;
Dorf,MichealC.,"Chapter1:hownottoreadtheConstitutiononreadingtheConstitution,Harvard
UniversityPress,Cambridge,1991).ThisverysamelogicalsoinformsthecommentofascholarlikeDr.
ConradfromtheEuropeanCivilLawtradition,whoremindsjudgesandlawyersthatthereisnothing
likesafeexplicitwordsisolatedfromageneralbackgroundofunderstandingandlanguage.Thisis
particularlysointheinterpretationoforganicinstrumentslikeaConstitutionwhereeveryprovisionhas
toberelatedtothesystemicplan,becauseeverygrantandeverypowerconferredisbutacontribution
tothefunctioningofanintegratedmachinery...itwillnotdotodiscusssuchconceptsas[mere]political
theoryirrelevanttotextualconstruction.("LimitationofAmendmentProceduresandtheConstituent
Power;"theIndianYearbookofInternationalAffairs,1967.P.375)
59.ThecontroversywasfinallylaidtorestbyajudgmentofafourteenMembersBench
ofthisCourt,reportedasJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinderandothersv.FederationofPakistanand
another(PLD2010SC483),whereinitwasheldasfollows:
48.TheObjectivesResolutionremainedasubjectofdiscussioninvariousjudgmentsandthejudicial
consensusseemstobethat"whileinterpretingtheConstitution,theObjectivesResolutionmustbe
embodiedtherein.Butthatdoesnotmean,thatObjectivesResolutionistobegivenastatushigherthan
struckdownonthebasisofanotherprovision.TheObjectivesResolutionmadesubstantivepartofthe
Constitutionprovidesanewapproachtotheconstitutionalinterpretationsincetheprinciplesand
provisionsoftheObjectivesResolutionhavebeenplacedinthebodyoftheConstitutionandhavenow
tobereadalongwiththeotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.(emphasisaresupplied)
Inviewoftheaforesaidjudgments,itisclearthattheharmoniousandwholisticinterpretationofthe
ConstitutionisnecessaryevenfordiscardingitsSalientFeatures.
60.Anoverviewofthejudgmentsreproducedorcitedhereinabove,moreparticularly,
MahmoodKhanAchakzaiscase(supra),WukalaMahazcase(supra),ZafarAliShahscase(supra)and
PakistanLawyersForumscase(supra),revealthatthisCourthasreferredtotheProminent
Characteristics,whichdefinetheConstitutionandareitsSalientFeatures.SomeofsuchCharacteristics
mentionedintheaforesaidjudgments,includingDemocracy,Federalism,ParliamentaryFormof
GovernmentblendedwiththeIslamicProvisions,IndependenceofJudiciary,FundamentalRights,
Equality,JusticeandFairPlay.
61.ItmaynotbenecessarytoconclusivelydeterminetheSalientFeaturesofthe
Constitution,however,Democracy,ParliamentaryFormofGovernmentandIndependenceofJudiciary
arecertainlyincludedintheProminentCharacteristics,formingtheSalientFeatures,whichareprimarily
relevantfortheadjudicationofthelisathand.
62.ThepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionisembodiedinArticles238
and239oftheConstitution.Abareperusaloftheaforesaidprovisionsrevealsthepresenceofsome
explicitlimitationsonsuchpowers.ThenumberofMembersrequiredandthemandatoryprocedureto
befollowed,inthisbehalf,obviouslyimposesrestrictions.Similarly,additionalrequirementswithregard
toalteringtheboundariesofaProvincehavealsobeenmentioned,whichtooimposeexplicit
restrictions.However,itisthecaseofthePetitionersthatinadditiontotheabovethereareimplied
restrictionsonthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionsoasnottosubstantivelyalter,
repealorabrogatetheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.Itisthesaidquestion,whichneedstobe
dealtwith.
63.TheParliamentinPakistanunliketheBritishParliamentisnotcompletelysovereign.A
contraryviewwascanvassedbeforethisCourtbutwasresoundlyrepelledinZiaurRehmanscase
(supra)byholdinginnouncertaintermsthattheLegislaturedoesnotpossessthepowersof
omnipotence,asdidtheBritishParliament.TheParliamenttooisacreatureoftheConstitutionandhas
onlysuchpowersasmaybeconferreduponitbythesaidInstrument.Suchviewhasbeenconsistently
reiteratedbythisCourtincludingthejudgmentsmentionedabove.Acontraryviewhasneverbeen
expressed.
64.Beforeproceedingfurtheritmaybenecessarytocontexturiseandanalyzetwobasic
judgmentsofthisCourt,whicharethemainstayofthecase,aspresentedbytheRespondentsi.e.Ziaur
Rehmanscase(supra)andHakimKhanscase(supra).
65.Asithasbeenmentionedhereinabove,inaminorityjudgment,thelearnedLahore
HighCourtbyrelyingupontheobservationsmadeinthejudgmentofthisCourtinthecaseofMiss.
AsmaJilanis(supra)withregardtogrundnormandtheObjectivesResolutionconcludedthatthe
ObjectivesResolutionwasatranscendentalpartoftheConstitutionandsupraConstitutional.Upon
challenge,theobservationsmadeinMiss.AsmaJilaniscase(supra)wereclarifiedbytheauthorJudge
himselfandinthecontextofthestatusofObjectivesResolution,whichhadsincebecomethepreamble
oftheConstitution,itwasobservedthatinthepresenceoftheformalwrittenConstitution,no
documentotherthantheConstitutioncanbegivenasimilarorhigherstatusonthebasiswhereofthe
provisionsoftheConstitutionmaybestruckdownbytheCourt.Itisthesaidstatementoflaw,which
hasbeenreiteratedbythisCourtinBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase(supra),whereinitisheldthatsome
higherethicalnotionsonaphilosophicalconceptoflawcannotbethetouchstonefordeterminingthe
validityorviresofalaw.SimilarviewswereechoedinWaliMuhammadKhanscase(supra),United
SugarMillscase(supra)andFoujiFoundationscase(supra).InZiaurRehmanscase(supra),the
questionofimpliedlimitationonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionwasnot
directlyinissue.PrimarilythejudgmentrelatedtothestatusofObjectivesResolution.
66.TheObjectivesResolutionwasmadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionby
incorporationofArticle2AintheConstitutionthroughanAmendment.InHakimKhanscase(supra)the
validityofsuchAmendmentwasnotchallenged.ThematterbeforetheCourtwastheeffectofsuch
AmendmentuponthepreexistingprovisionsoftheConstitution,includingArticle45anditwasheld
thattheConstitutionmustbeinterpretedasawhole.
67.However,whatcanbesafelyderivedfromtheaforesaidtwojudgmentsinrespectof
thelisathandisthatfordeterringtheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionwhich,ascanvassedbythe
Petitioners,limitthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution,wecannotandshouldnotlook
outsidetheConstitutiontoabstract,political,philosophical,moralandethicaltheories.Nodoubt,the
debatesprecedingtheenactmentofalegislativeinstrumentmaybereferredtoinordertodiscoverthe
intentoftheLegislaturewherethewordsoftheenactmentarenotopentoaplainmeaning.However,
enteringtherealmofpolemicsshouldbeavoided.
68.InthebackdropoftheobservationsmadeinZiaurRehmanscase(supra),Hakim
Khanscase(supra)andthevalidityandviresoftheConstitutionalAmendmentswererepeatedlycalled
intoquestionbeforethelearnedHighCourtsaswellasthisCourt.Inthemeanwhile,theBasic
StructuretheoryhadbeenadoptedandenunciatedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiaandchallengeswere
thrownattheConstitutionalAmendmentsinPakistan,primarilyonthebasisofsuchjudgmentsfrom
acrossourEasternboarders.TheBasicStructuretheoryaspatentedinIndiadidnotfindtoomany
admirersespeciallyinviewofitsinitiallackofclarityaswasevidentfromthedifferenceofopinionsof
severalJudgesinthesamejudgment.Therewasanobviousdifferenceinthetextoftherelevant
provisionsofthetwoConstitutions.Inrespectofsomeofthejurisprudentialprinciples,whichformed
thebuildingblocksoftheBasicStructuretheory,theviewoftheSuperiorCourtsofthetwoCountries
wasnotcongruent.InPakistan,muchemphasiswasplacedonArticle2A,whichforobviousreasonshad
itsdifficultieswhichhavebeendealtwithhereinabove.ThejudgmentsoftheSupremeCourtofIndia
weresubjectedtoaratherharshcriticismbytheRespondents.Itisnotnecessarytocomment
thereuponaswearenotsittinginAppealoverthesaidjudgments.Bethatasitmay,existenceof
impliedrestrictionsonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionwascanvassedbefore
thisCourtandwasdealtwithbyinterpretingtheConstitutionasawhole.
69.InMahmoodKhanAchakzaiscase(supra),relevantportionswhereofhavebeen
reproducedhereinabove,SajjadAliShah,J.(ashethenwas)innouncertaintermsheldthatthe
ParliamentintermsofArticle239isnotvestedwiththepowerstoamendtheConstitutionsoasto
substantivelyalter,repealorabrogateitsSalientFeatures.SalimAkhtar,J.(ashethenwas)inthesame
judgment,whichisperhapstherealmajorityviewafterreferringtothelimitationtothepowerof
JudicialReviewoftheConstitutionalprovisionssoastodeterminetheirviresconcededthatthereare
impliedlimitationsonthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionbyholdingthatthe
ParliamentcannotconverttheDemocraticFormofGovernmentintoacompletelyUndemocraticForm
ofGovernmentnorcantheParliamentamendtheConstitutionsoastoabolishtheCourts,etc.
However,itwasheldthatsuchrestrictionsbelongtothepoliticalrealmtobeenforcedbytheforceof
publicopinionandmorality.However,theConstitutionalAmendmentinquestionwasscrutinizedand
foundnottooffendagainsttheSalientFeatures.IntheWukalaMahazcase(supra)intheminority
judgmentMamoonQazi,J.(ashethenwas)categoricallyheldthattheConstitutioncannotbeamended
soastodestroyorabrogateitsSalientFeaturesandinhisopinioncertainprovisionsoftheAmendment
underchallengewereinfactultravirestheConstitution.Inthemajorityjudgments,thoughitwasheld
thattheParliamentunderArticle239isvestedwithConstituentpowersyetitwasclarifiedby
SaeeduzzamanSiddiqui,J.(ashethenwas)thatthepowertoamendtheConstitutionisnotunlimited
andunbridled.SuchlimitationswereevenacknowledgedbyAjmalMian,J(ashethenwas)inhis
judgmentthoughinrhetoricaltermsIntheaforesaidcase,intheOrderoftheCourtwithoutany
reservationthepowerofJudicialReviewwasexercisedandbymajorityitwasheldthatArticle63A
insertedthroughAmendmentwasintravirestheConstitution,subjecttoclarifications.Thus,inthesaid
case,thisCourtunanimously,intheultimateanalysis,asisreflectedintheOrderoftheCourt
conclusivelyheldthatthepowersoftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionarenotunlimitedandthe
JudicialReviewwasexercisedwithoutanycaveattoexaminewhethertheConstitutionalAmendments
impugnedsubstantivelyaltered,repealedorabrogatedanyoftheprominentCharacteristicsorSalient
Featuresthereof.InZafarAliShahscase(Supra),itwasdeclaredinnouncertaintermsthatParliament
isnotvestedwiththepowerstoamendtheConstitutionsoastoaltertheSalientFeaturesthereof.In
PakistanLawyersForumscase(supra)afterreviewingthecaselawonthesubjecttheclearcutviewof
thisCourtunanimouslytakeninWukalaMahazcase(supra)andZafarAliShah(Supra)waswatered
down.ThoughthegeneralprinciplethatthereareimpliedrestrictionsontheParliamenttoamendthe
Constitutionsoastosubstantivelyalter,repealorabrogatetheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionwas
acceptedandtheobservationsinthisbehalfofSajjadAliShah,J.(ashethenwas)referredtoandnot
refutedthoughitwasheldthatsuchlimitationsinvolvedbelonginthepoliticalrealmandtheCourt
shouldnotexerciseitsjurisdictioninthisbehalf.However,theprovisionsofthechallengedamendment
wereexaminedandfoundnottooffendagainsttheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.
70.Atthisjuncture,itmaybeappropriatetocontextualizetheaforesaidjudgmentin
termsofthecontemporaneousgroundrealitiesmentionedinthejudgmentitselfespeciallyin
paragraphs38to40reproducedhereinabove.TheCountryafterMartialLawwasslowlylimpingbackto
civilrulewiththeMilitaryDictatorsurrenderingsomepowerstotheciviliansetupwhileretainingsome
criticalpowersastheHeadoftheStatewhilestillinuniform.Togiveeffecttothisnewschemeof
things,theConstitutionwasamendedthroughanExecutiveOrder,whichthenewlyelectedParliament
substantiallyendorsedthroughtheAmendmentinquestion.Itwasobservedthatthecountrywasbeing
governedunderthenewlyamendedConstitutionwhereundertheArmyChiefsaswellastheJudgesof
theSupremeCourthadbeenappointedandtakenoathandstrikingdownsuchAmendmentwould
resultinpoliticalandlegalanarchy,whichmayforcethecountrybackintotheabyssofadictatorship.
Weareleftwonderingastohowmuchofthelawlaiddowninthesaidjudgmentisplainprudenceas
opposedtojurisprudence.
71.Bethatasitmay,fromanoverviewoftheaforesaidjudgments,itisclearandobvious
thatthereinithasbeenheldbothintheminorityandmajorityopinionsthatthereareimplied
restrictionsupontheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionsoastosubstantivelyalter,repealor
abrogateitsSalientFeatures.ItisasettledlawthattheShortOrder/OrderoftheCourtisinfactthe
JudgmentoftheCourtandisvalidevenintheabsenceofsupportingreasons[TheStatev.AsifAdiland
others(1997SCMR209),AccountantGeneralSindhandothersv.AhmedAliU.Qureshi(PLD2008SC
522)andChiefJusticeofPakistanIftikharMuhammadChaudhryv.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD
2010SC61)].InthecasesofMahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra),WukalaMahaz(supra)andPakistan
LawyersForums(supra)intheOrderoftheCourtspecificfindingswererecordedinrespectofviresand
validityoftheConstitutionalAmendmentquestionedthereinincludingwithregardtoitsconformityor
otherwisewiththeSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.ThusinfactthepowerofJudicialReviewwas
exercisedbythisCourt.However,aviewalsoemergedthatperhapstheCourtshouldnotenterintothis
controversyasitmayinvolveapoliticalquestion.Needlesstosaydespitealotofreluctanceand
hesitationineachandeveryoneoftheaforesaidcasesinfacttheAmendmentsinquestionwere
examinedandthepowerofJudicialReviewwasexercisedandthereafterheldthattheAmendmentsdid
notsubstantiallyaltertheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.
72.Inthecircumstances,thecontentionsofthelearnedcounselfortheRespondentsas
wellasthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanthattherearenoimpliedlimitationsontheParliament
toamendtheConstitutioninourJurisprudence,asevidencedbythejudicialpronouncementsofthis
Courtiswhollyunfounded.
73.TherelianceuponArticle239,inthisbehalf,tosetupacontraryviewismisconceived.
Intheaforementionedjudgment,suchlimitationshavebeenexaminedinthecontextofArticle239.
Referencetheretohasbeenspeciallymade,thattoointhecontextofthepurportedexpanseofthe
powertoamendtheConstitutioninArticle239anditsprotectionfromchallenge.Bethatasitmay,
AmendmentisatermderivedfromtheLatinwordemendere,whichmeanstocorrectorimprove.In
CorpusJurisSecundum,AcompleteRestatementoftheEntireAmericanLaw,Volume3AAmendment
isdefinedasfollows:
Ingeneraluse,thewordamendmenthasdifferentmeaningswhicharedetermined
bytheconnectioninwhichitisemployed.
Thetermnecessarilyconnotesachargeofsomekind,ordinarilyforthebetter,butalwaysachangeor
alteration,andindicatesachangeorcorrectionofthethingsoughttobeamended.Byverydefinition,it
connotesalteration,improvement,orcorrection.
Itisgenerallyrecognizedthatthewordimpliessomethinguponwhichthecorrection,alteration,
improvement,orreformationcanoperate,somethingtobereformed,corrected,rectified,alteredor
improved.
Thewordamendmentisdefinedasmeaningachangeofsomething;analterationor
change;achangeoralterationforthebetter;acontinuanceinachangedform;anameliorationofthe
thingwithoutinvolvingtheideaofanychangeinsubstanceoressence;acorrectionofdetail;not
alteringtheessentialformornatureofthemattersamended;norresultingincompletedestruction,
abandonment,orelimination,oftheoriginal.
InPRamanathaAiyarsConciseLawDictionarywithLegalMaxims,LatinTerms,andWords&Phrases,
FourthEdition2012LexisNexis,ButterworthsWadhwaNagpur,itisexplainedasfollows:
Amendment.
Inlegislation:Amodificationoralterationtobemadeinabillonitspassageorinanenacted
law;modificationorchangeinanexistingactorstatute.
InBlacksLawDictionary,NinthEdition,itisdefined,asfollows:
amendment.(17c)1.Aformalrevisionoradditionproposedormadetoastatute,
constitution,pleading,order,orotherinstrument;specif.,achangemadebyaddition,deletion,or
correction;esp.,analterationinwording.[Cases:ConstitutionalLaw515527;FederationCivil
Procedure821;Pleading229;Statutes131.]2.Theprocessofmakingsucharevision.
InthejudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasAbdulMuktadarandanotherv.DistrictandSessionsJudge,
Jhangand2others(2010SCMR194)inrespectofthewordamendment,itwasobservedasfollows:
Letwemakeitclearattheoutsetthatamendmentmeansaddition,deletion,insertionor
substitution.
Inviewoftheaforesaid,theexpressionamendmentissusceptibletoaninterpretationthatitmeansto
correctandimprovebutdoesnotextendtodestroyorabrogate.Nodoubt,theexpressionamendment
mayalsohaveawiderconnotationbutwithreferencetothecontextinwhichithasbeenemployedin
thepresenceofimpliedlimitationsontheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution,therefore,theterm
AmendmentasusedinArticles238and239hasarestrictedmeaning.Thereforeaslongasthe
AmendmenthastheeffectofcorrectingorimprovingtheConstitutionandnotofrepealingor
abrogatingtheConstitutionoranyofitsSalientFeatureorsubstantivelyalteringthesame,itcannotbe
calledintoquestion.
74.ReservationsasexpressedregardingtheexerciseofJudicialReviewinrespectof
ConstitutionalAmendmentsarebasedonthenotionthatsuchanexerciseinvolvesapoliticalquestion
mustnowbeexamined.InBallentinesLawDictionarypoliticalquestionhasbeendefinedasfollows:
Aquestion,thedeterminationofwhichisaprerogativeofthelegislativeorexecutivebranch
oftheGovernment,soasnotbeappreciateforjudicialinquiryoradjudication.
InCorpusJurisSecundum,Vol.16,ithasbeenstatedthat:
Itisnoteasytodefinethephrase'politicalquestion',nortodeterminewhatmattersfallwithin
itsscope.Itisfrequentlyusedtodesignateallquestionsthatlieoutsidethescopeofthejudicialpower.
Moreproperly,however,itmeansthosequestionswhich,undertheConstitution,aretobedecidedby
thepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,ortoregardtowhichfulldiscretionary,authorityhasbeen
delegatedtothelegislativeorexecutivebranchoftheGovernment.Apoliticalquestionencompasses
morethanaquestionaboutpolitics,butthemerefactthatlitigationseeksprotectionofapoliticalright
ormighthavepoliticalconsequencesdoesnotmeanitpresentsapoliticalquestion.
[[[[Itwasfurtherobserved:
ThedoctrineisbasedonConstitutionalprovisionsrelatingtothedistributionofpowersamongthe
branchesofGovernment,anditisasafunctionoftheseparationofpowersthatpoliticalquestionsare,
notdeterminablebythejudiciary.Thus,thelimitationsonjudicialreviewimposedbythepolitical
questiondoctrineapplyonlywhentheCourtisfacedwithachallengetoactionbyacoordinatebranch
oftheGovernment,andnotwheretheissueinvolvedfallswithinthetraditionalroleaccordedtoCourts
tointerpretthelawortheConstitution.
ThisCourtinthecase,reportedasFederationofPakistanandothersv.HajiMuhammad
SaifullahKhanandothers(PLD1989SC166),observedasfollows:
ThecircumstancethattheimpugnedactionhaspoliticalovertonecannotpreventtheCourt
frominterferingtherewith,ifitisshownthattheactiontakenisviolativeoftheConstitution.The
superiorCourthaveaninherentduty,togetherwiththeappurtenantpowerinanycasecomingbefore
them,toascertainandenforcetheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandasthisdutyisderivablefromthe
expressprovisionsoftheConstitutionitselftheCourtwillnotbedeterredfromperformingits
Constitutionalduty,merelybecausetheactionimpugnedhaspoliticalimplications.
InthecaseofWatanPartyandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2012SC292),itwas
heldasfollows:
7.WearecognizantthattheremaybesituationswheretheGovernmentmaywanttojustifynon
disclosureofinformationonamatterofpublicimportance.Thatplea,however,doesnotariseandnor
hasitbeentakeninthesecases.Itis,therefore,notnecessarytocommentonthesameasamere
speculativeexercise.LearnedASCforMr.Haqqanicontendedthatthesepetitionsraiseapolitical
questionandtheCourtshould,therefore,avoiddecidingthesame.Thisargumenthasbeenadequately
discussedinthereasoningofHon'bletheChiefJustice.Iwouldonlyaddthattheconductofa
government'sforeignpolicyisindeed,byandlarge,apoliticalquestion.Butthefactisthatthepresent
petitionsdonotrequireustodevisethecountry'sforeignpolicyortodirectthegovernmentinthat
regard.ThesepetitionsonlyseektoenforcethePeople'srighttoknowthetruthaboutwhattheir
government,anditsfunctionaries,areupto.Andthatisbynomeans,apoliticalquestion.Itisafully
jusiticiablefundamentalrightenumeratedinChapterII,oftheConstitutionnoless.Weneednotlook
anyfurtherthanArticle19A,forthisconclusion.
InthecasereportedasStateofRajasthanandothersv.UnionofIndia(AIR1977SC1361),itwasheldas
under:
Ofcourse,itistruethatifaquestionbroughtbeforetheCourtispurelyapoliticalquestion
notinvolvingdeterminationofanylegalorconstitutionalrightorobligation,theCourtwouldnot
entertainit,sincetheCourtisconcernedonlywithadjudicationoflegalrightsandliabilities.Butmerely
becauseaquestionhasapoliticalcomplexion,thatbyitselfisnogroundwhytheCourtshouldshrink
fromperformingitsdutyundertheConstitutionifitraisesanissueofconstitutionaldetermination.
Everyconstitutionalquestionconcernstheallocationandexerciseofgovernmentalpowerandno
constitutionalquestioncan,therefore,failtobepolitical.(emphasisaresupplied)
Inthecase,reportedasMuhammadNawazSharifv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1993SC433),this
Courtheldasfollows:
Itisnoteasytodrawlineofdemarcationbetweenpoliticalandnonpoliticalquestions.Thishastobe
determinedbytheCourtonthefactsofeachcase.TheCourts'functionistoenforce,preserve,protect
anddefendtheConstitution.Anyactiontaken,actdoneorpolicyframedwhichviolatestheprovisions
oftheConstitutionorisnotpermissibleundertheConstitutionorlaw,theCourtirrespectiveofthefact
thatitisapoliticalquestion,mustexercisepowerofjudicialreview.Theabuse,excessornon
observanceoftheprovision;oftheConstitutionhastobecheckedbytheCourtsunlessitsjurisdictionis
barredbytheConstitutionorlaw.(emphasisaresupplied)
Afterconsideringtheaforesaidjudgments,thisCourtinthejudgment,reportedasIshaqKhanKhakwani
andothersv.MianMuhammadNawazSharifandothers(PLD2015SC275),heldfollows:
ThustheconsistentviewoftheCourtshasbeenthatifthedeterminationofanyquestion
raisedbeforetheCourtrequiresinterpretationorapplicationofanyprovisionoftheConstitutionthe
Courtisobligedtoadjudicateuponthesamenotwithstandingthattheactionimpugnedorthequestions
raisedhaspoliticalovertones.(emphasisaresupplied)
75.ThedoctrineofPoliticalQuestionisbasedonthetrichutomyofpowers,as
integratedintotheprovisionsoftheConstitution.AmatterpertainingtotheJudicialPowerof
InterpretingtheConstitution,identifyingthelimitsoftheExecutiveandtheLegislaturethereunderand
enforcingsuchlimitsisthesoleandexclusivejurisdictionoftheCourts.Whileexercisingsuchpowers,
theCourtwillnotabdicateitsjurisdictionmerelybecausetheissueraised,hasapoliticalcomplexionor
politicalimplication.OncetheauthorityoftheLegislaturehasbeendelineatedthroughinterpretation,
howsuchauthorityisexercisedandwhatpoliciesaretobeframedandenactedthroughthelegislation
istheprerogativeoftheLegislatureandaslongassuchlegislativeactionisconsistentwiththe
provisionsoftheConstitutiontheCourtwillnotinterfereandthiswouldinvolveaPoliticalQuestion.It
cannotbedisputedthatthisCourthasthejurisdictiontointerprettheConstitution,identifyitsSalient
FeaturesandexamineifthereareimpliedrestrictionsontheamendatorypowersoftheLegislaturequa
theConstitutionandtoensureastheGuardianoftheConstitutionthattheLegislatureremainswithin
suchlimitsascanbegatheredfromtheConstitution.Therefore,therecanbenooccasiontodeclineto
undertakesuchanexercise.
76.Inviewoftheaforesaid,itisclearandobviousthatthisCourtisvestedwiththe
jurisdictiontoscrutinizetheAmendmentsmadebytheParliamentintheConstitutioninorderto
determinewhethertheimpliedlimitationsuponsuchamendatorypowershavebeentransgressed.We
dosoasTheConstitutioncontainsaschemeforthedistributionofpowersbetweenvariousorgansand
authoritiesoftheState,andtothesuperiorjudiciaryisallottedtheveryresponsiblethoughdelicate
dutyofcontainingallotherauthoritieswithintheirjurisdiction,byinvestingtheformerwithpowersto
intervenewheneveranypersonexceedshislawfulauthority.TheJudgesoftheHighCourtandof
thisCourtareunderasolemnoathtopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionandinthe
performanceofthisonerousdutytheymaybeconstrainedtopassupontheactionsofotherauthorities
oftheStatewithinthelimitssetdownintheConstitution,notbecausetheyarrogatetothemselvesany
claimofinfallibilitybutbecausetheConstitutionitselfchargesthemwiththisnecessaryfunction,inthe
interestsofcollectivesecurityandstability..(FazlulQuaderChowdhryv.ShahNawaz(PLD1996SC
105).
77.Statesevolvethroughtimesandaretheproductofhistorywithitsinhabitants
subjectedtodiversehistoricalexperiences.AllpeoplepoliticallyorganizedwithinaState,atsomepoint
oftimeintheirhistoryareconfrontedwithelementalquestionsregardingtheinternalOrganizationof
theStateandtheSocialContractbetweenthecitizensandtheState.Incountrieswithlongstanding
politicalcontinuity,suchdecisionsaremadethroughanevolutionaryprocesspunctuatedwith
watershedhistoricevents.Wherecontinuityisinterruptedordisruptedbyforeignoccupationand
colonization,thepeoplearesubjugatedandtherebydeprivedofthepowerandtheresponsibilityto
expressandenforcetheirrightsinthisbehalf.UponthedemiseofcolonialrulewhenanewState
emerges,itspeopleareconfrontedwithataskofformulatingaCharterincorporatingtheSocial
ContractbetweentheCitizensandtheStateanddeterminingandidentifyingthebasicnormsforthe
organizationoftheStatethroughtheframingofaConstitution.Incompactcountrieswithethnically,
culturally,religiouslyandhistoricallyhomogeneouspopulation,thistaskmaynotbetoodifficult.
However,countrieswithethnic,linguistic,cultural,religioussectarianandhistoricaldiversity,thetaskof
Constitutionmakingcanbemuchmorearduousbutdesperatelyurgent.Thepriceofneglectindecision
orincorrectandinsensitivedecisionswithouttherequisiteconsentofthepeopleispaidinbloodbythe
futuregenerationsandsometimeevenbytheStateitself.
78.TheFirstConstituentAssemblyofPakistan,afterthedeathoftheFatheroftheNation,
provedunequaltothetaskofConstitutionmaking.Itdidnotactwithduedispatchanddiligenceand
merelyperpetuateditsownexistence.Timedoesnotstandstill.Groundrealitieschangedresultingin
seriouserosionoftheconfidenceofthepeopleintheConstituentAssembly.Themerepassingofthe
ObjectivesResolutionintheabsenceofanactualformalConstitutionacceptabletothepeopledidnot
fillthepoliticalvacuum.ThefeebleattemptofframingtheConstitutionin1956wasofnoavail.
Consequently,PakistanaState,whichwasaculminationofalengthydemocraticstruggle,wasplunged
intoamilitarydictatorshipfollowedbyaforcedarrangementdictatedbyanIndividual(Constitutionof
1962)withatbestacontrolled,ifnotperverteddemocracy.HistoricallyestablishedProvinceswere
doneawaywithandpowersofdecisionmakingconcentratedattheCentreleavingthepeoplewithno
senseofparticipationorownershipintheStateanditsInstitutions.Thiswasfollowedbyanother
militarydictatorship,wherebyasituationwascreatedwhichledtothedismembermentoftheState
withitsattendingbloodlettingin1971.
79.Itisintheshadowoftheaforesaidtragicandtraumaticeventsthatthechosen
representativesofthepeoplegatheredtogethertoframeaConstitution.Alltheunresolvedissueswhich
hadpoisonedthebodypoliticoftheCountrywereconfrontedandsolutionsfoundthroughnegotiations
andconsensus.Competinginterestsandpoliticalviewsweresynthesizedeventuallyculminatinginthe
framingoftheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973.
80.IntheTreatiseonConstitutionalLimitations,Cooley,definestheConstitutionasthe
FundamentallawofaState,containingtheprinciplesuponwhichtheGovernmentisfounded,
regulatingthedivisionofthesovereignpowers,anddirectingtowhatpersonseachofthesepowersisto
beconferred,andthemannerinwhichitistobeexercised.TheConstitutioninessenceisasocial
contractamongstthepeopletopoliticallyorganizethemselvesintoaStateidentifyingtherelationship
betweentheCitizensandtheStateandtherightsretainedbythepeopleandguaranteeduntothem.It
createsandidentifiestheStateInstitutionsuponwhichtheStatesovereigntyisdistributedandthe
modeandlimitationfortheexercisethereof.
81.AtthetimeofenactmentofaConstitution,theframersthereofhavetoanswersome
fundamentalquestionsrelatingtotheState,itsGovernmentandtheInstitutions.Thestatusandthe
rightsofitscitizens.Itneedstobedeterminedwhetherthecountrywillbeademocracyora
dictatorship,whetheritwillhaveaPresidentialoraParliamentaryFormofGovernment,andwhetherit
willbeaFederationorbeaUnitaryState.ThequestionofSovereigntyneedstobeaddressedaswellas
howsuchsovereignpowersaretobedistributedamongitsfundamentalInstitutionsi.e.theLegislature,
theExecutiveandtheJudiciaryalongwiththeirinterserelationshipandtheextentandmannerinwhich
suchpowersaretobeexercised.InDemocraticStatessovereigntyvestsinthepeopleandthe
InstitutionsaredelegatesthereofthroughandintermsoftheConstitutionwhichalsoidentifies
conditionsandlimitationsofsuchdelegationsandthepowersretainedbythepeopleintheformof
rightswhichareguaranteedandprotracted.Theanswerstotheaforesaidquestionsasreflectedinthe
ConstitutionandareitsprominentCharacteristicsandSalientFeatures.Alltheaforesaidquestionsare
answeredintheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973.
82.AbirdseyeviewoftheConstitutionrevealsthatitisselfevidentthatthePakistanisa
DemocracywiththeultimatesovereigntyvestinginAlmightyAllahanddelegatedtothepeopleof
Pakistan(andnottoanyindividualorgroupofpersonswhomayseizepowerbyforceofarms).Ithasa
ParliamentaryFormofGovernment.TheFundamentalRightsareguaranteedtoallCitizens,including
minorities.ThereisaTrichotomyofPowerwithajudiciarywithitsindependencefullysecured.Ruleof
Law,EqualityandSocial&EconomicJusticeareembodiedinnouncertainterms.Theaforesaidarethe
prominentCharacteristicswhichdefinesourConstitution.
83.ReferenceinthisbehalfmaybemadetotheStatementofObjectsandReasonstothe
18thConstitutionalAmendmentitself,whereinitisstatedthat:
3.ThepeopleofPakistanhaverelentlesslystruggledfordemocracyandforattainingtheidealsof
aFederal,Islamic,democratic,parliamentaryandmodemprogressivewelfareStatewhereintherights
ofcitizensaresecured,andtheProvinceshaveequitableshareintheFederation.
84.Ifdemocracyisreplacedbydictatorship,FundamentalRightsofthepeopleare
suppressedordestroyed,FederalismisreplacedbyaUnitaryFormofGovernmentandIndependenceof
Judiciaryiscompromisedtoanextentthatitisnolongerinapositiontoexerciseitsjurisdictionto
protecttheFundamentalRightsofthepeople,canitbesaidthattheCountryisbeingrunandgoverned
undertheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973?Thisisnotahypotheticalquestionas
evenaftertheframingofthe1973Constitution,ithashappenedonmorethanoneoccasion,including
on5thofJuly1977,andthe12thofOctober,1999.Democraticallyelectedgovernmentsweretoppled,
theLegislativePowerwasnolongerexercisedbytheParliamentwhichwasdisbanded,theFundamental
Rightsofthepeopledestroyed,FederalisminactualpracticewasreplacedbyaUnityofCommandwith
allpowersconcentratedinonehand.TheJudiciarywassubjugated,deprivedofitsjurisdictionsandfor
allintentsandpurposesrestrainedfromenforcingtheChecksandBalancesagainstarbitraryexerciseof
Executivepowers.InsuchaneventualitytosaythattheCountrywasbeingrunintermsofthe
ConstitutionwouldrequireaHerculeanfeatofsuspensionofdisbelief.Perhapsitwouldbemore
appropriatetosaythattheConstitutioninfactdidnotexistwhichfactisusuallydisguisedthroughuse
ofeuphemismofsuspensionoftheConstitution,theConstitutionbeingheldinabeyance,a
deviationfromtheConstitution.SalientFeaturesinessencearetheConstitutionoratleastitssoul
andsubstance.IfsuchSalientFeaturesaredestroyedwhatremainsisnottheConstitutionratherits
cadaver.ItistheConstitutionwhichistobeprotectedandpreservednotitsremains.
85.AnoverviewoftheConstitutionalJurisprudenceofvariouscountriesrevealsagrowing
trendandimpetustoimposeandacknowledgeexplicitandimplicitrestrictionsonthepowerofthe
ParliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Itisnoticedthatatleast32countries,includingAlgeria,Angola,
Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,BosniaandHerzegovina,Brazil,Cambodia,Congo,Cyprus,CzechRepublic,
France,Germany,Greece,Haiti,HongKong,Iran,Italy,Kuwait,Madagascar,Mauritania,Morocco,
Namibia,Nepal,Norway,Portugal,Romania,Rwanda,Switzerland,Thailand,TunisiaandTurkeyhave
incorporatedspecificrestrictionsintheirConstitutionssoastoplacecertainprovisionsthereofbeyond
thepaleoftheamendatorypoweroftheParliament.Impliedrestrictionshavebeenacknowledgedand
enforcedinothercountries,includingTurkey,India,BangladeshandBelize.Oncloserscrutiny,such
substantiveprovisionsoftheConstitutionpertainingtotheideologicalbasisforthecreationofthe
State,thecorevalueswhichdefinethepeopleareusuallyincludedinsuchprovisions.Whatisalso
obviouswherecountriesandpeoplehaveabitterandtragicpastofoppression,dictatorship,fascism,
civilwarorethniccleansingthereisatendencytosayneveragainandtherelevantprovisionsofthe
Constitution,inthisbehalf,areplacedoutsidethepowertoamend.Similarly,wherecorevaluesor
substantiveprovisionspertainingtotherightsofthepeopleorinternalarchitectureoftheConstitution
arevulnerabletheprovisions,inthisbehalf,alsotendtobeexcludedfromthepurviewofthe
amendatorypower.InthePakistanicontextbywayofthe1973Constitution,unresolvedPoliticalIssues,
whichhadresultedindiscord,disputesandeventhedismembermentofthecountryweredealtwith
andresolvedthroughconsensus.Thereopeningofsuchbasicsettledissueswouldresultintheopening
ofaPandorasBox,unleashingpoliticaltempestsofunparallelfurywhichmaybedifficulttocontrol.
Furthermore,theprinciplesofDemocracy,IndependenceofJudiciary,RuleofLawandFederalism,were
repeatedlytrampleduponandcontinuetobevulnerableandthereforeneedtobeprotected,if
necessary,evenfromtheParliament.LetusnotforgetthatFascisminNaziGermanywasusheredinby
theParliamentitself.Suchtendenciestendtosurfaceindifficulttimesorintheeventofpressurefrom
antidemocraticforcesandwhenpassionprevails,resultinginhastyreactiveandexpedientdecisions
withfarreachingandoftendisastrousconsequence.Pakistanisnoexception.Referenceinthisbehalf
maybemadetostrangeResolutionsandabortedAmendmentsbytheParliament.
86.OthercountriesincludingUnitedStatesofAmericaandUnitedKingdomhavehadthe
luxuryoflongstandingpoliticalstabilityandconstitutionalcontinuitywithviolentturmoilrelegatedto
thedistantpast.TheInstitutionshavetakenrootandarefirmlysettledintheirrespectedspheres.The
corevaluesofDemocracyandRuleofLawareuniversallyaccepted.TheConstitutionalJurisprudencein
suchcountries,intheprecedingcenturyandahalfhasevolvedwithoutanyrealsenseofvulnerability.
Juristsofsuchcountriestakeforgrantedthepreexistenceoftheirbasiccorevalues,whichmaybe
underconstantthreatincountrieslikePakistan,necessitatingconstantvigilancefortheprotection
thereof.TheopinionofJuristsofsuchcountriesmaybeacademicallysoundandintellectually
stimulatingbutaretheyreallyrelevanttotheharshrealityfacedbyusinthecontextofthematterin
issueinthelisathand?
87.AConstitutionhasawideexpanseandscope,andallthatismentionedtherein,isnot
necessarilyitsprominentCharacteristics.Itisonlythesubstantiveprovisionswhichdefinethe
ConstitutionthatcanbetermedtobetheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.
ItneedstobeclarifiedthattheimpliedlimitationuponthepoweroftheParliamentto
amendtheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutiondoesnotimplythatsuchSalientFeatures,areforbidden
fruitinrespectwhereoftheParliamentcannotexerciseitsamendatorypowers.Whatinfactandinlaw
isprohibited,isfortheParliamenttorepealorabrogatetheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionor
substantivelyalteri.e.tosignificantlyeffectitsessentialnature.Furthermore,itisnotthecorrectnessof
theAmendmentoritsutility,whichcanberuleduponbythisCourtbutonlyitsConstitutionality.
88.Beforeproceedingfurther,itmaybeappropriatetodilateupontheconceptofthe
IndependenceofJudiciaryperhaps,themostrelevantSalientFeatureforadjudicationofthelisathand,
inthecontextofourConstitutionaldispensation.Itisnotsomemeaninglessmantraormerelegal
philosophicalorpoliticalmotiontobeinferredfromtheTreatisesorTextBooksbutisapragmatic
matterofimmensepracticalimportance.
89.WeliveinanimperfectWorldrifewithcompetinginterests.Crimesarecommitted
anddisputesarisebetweenindividualswithregardtotheircivilrights.Suchissuesneedtoberesolved
justlyandinaccordancewiththelaw.Intheabsenceofresolutionthroughnegotiationorprivatesocial
intervention,thematterhastobefinallydecidedbyaneutralArbiter,whichattheendofdayistobe
providedbytheStateinexerciseofitsJudicialFunctionsthroughCourts.Itisnowwellsettledthat
AccesstoJusticeisabasicFundamentalRightforalltheCitizens,ashasbeenrepeatedlyheldbythis
Court,includinginthecases,reportedas(1)SaiyyidAbulAlaMaudoodiandotherv.TheGovernmentof
WestPakistanandothers(PLD1964SC673),(2)MehramAliandothersv.FederationofPakistanand
others(PLD1998SC1445)and(3)AlJehadTrustcase(supra).IntheabsenceofsuchForums
establishedbytheStatetoresolvedisputes,mightwillalwaysoverpowerright.IftheArbiterrepository
oftheJudicialPowersoftheStateisnotneutral,itwilllooseitsfunctionalefficacyandtheverypurpose
ofitsexistenceshallbedefeated.TheIndependenceoftheJudiciary,inpithandsubstanceimpliesthat
theCourts,whileadjudicatinguponthedisputes,interseindividualpartiesorbetweentheCitizensand
theState,mustbeabletomaintaintheirneutralityandtherebydispensejusticetoallmannerofpeople
withoutfearorfavour.SuchindependenceiscompromisediftheJudiciaryissubjugatedoractsasan
instrumentforprotectingandpromotingtheclaimofoneofthepartiestothedisputeorlitigation.In
suchaneventuality,itisuniversallyacknowledgedandacceptedtherightstoAccesstoJusticebecomes
amoreillusion.
90.Furthermore,inourConstitution,theFundamentalRightshavebeenguaranteedto
thecitizens,whichrequireprotectionfromencroachmentbytheExecutiveandtheLegislature.Specific
provisionshavebeeninsertedintheConstitutiontoreinforcesuchprotection,includingArticle4
prohibitinganyactionbytheExecutivedeprivinganypersonofhislife,libertyandpropertyexceptin
accordancewiththelawandArticle8restrainstheLegislaturefrommakinganylawinviolationofthe
FundamentalRightssetforthinthesubsequentArticles.Wherethereisaviolationinthisbehalfbythe
ExecutiveortheLegislature,theremedyavailabletoanaggrievedpersonistoapproachtheCourtsfor
theredressalofhisgrievanceandenforcementofhisFundamentalRights,asisevidentfromArticles
184and199oftheConstitution.However,iftheJudiciaryispoliticizedorundertheinfluenceofthe
ExecutiveortheLegislature,itwillnotbeinapositiontoprovideanyremedytosuchaggrieved
persons,reducingtheFundamentalRightstoameremeaninglessineffectivedecorativedeclarationsof
nopracticalvalue.ItcanbestatedwithoutfearorcontradictionthatintheabsenceofanIndependent
Judiciary,thepeopleinfactstanddenudedoftheirFundamentalRights.
91.PakistanisademocraticState.Intheabsenceoffree,fairandimpartialelections,the
conceptofdemocracyisblightedbeyondrecognition.Thoughnodoubt,itisthedutyoftheElection
Commissiontoensuretheholdingoffree,fairandimpartialelections,yet,electiondisputesdoarise,
whichneedtobeadjudicateduponbytheElectionTribunalsestablishedpursuanttoArticle225ofthe
ConstitutionandeventuallythematterendsupbeforethisCourtinAppeal.TheJudgesofthisCourt
cannotbeallowedtobepoliticizedorbemembers/supportersofanypoliticalpartyorbebeholden
theretoiftheyaretoresolvesuchelectiondisputesfairly.
92.PakistanisaFederation.IncaseofdisputesbetweentwoormoreFederatingUnitsor
betweenFederatingUnitsandtheFederation,thematterneedstoberesolved.Ifthepolitical
negotiationsfail,suchdisputesalsoendsupbeforethisCourtintermsofArticle184(1)andthe
neutralityoftheCourt,inthisbehalf,isofvitalimportanceforthehealthoftheFederationandtoavoid
suchdisputesbeingsettledinthestreets.
93.Intheabovecircumstances,itcansafelybeconcludedthatintheabsenceofan
IndependentJudiciary,notonlythecitizensaredeprivedoftheirrightstoAccesstoJusticebutalsotheir
FundamentalRightsarerenderedmeaningless.Freeandfairelectionsmaynotbepossibleand
Federalismmayalsobeprejudiced.
94.ThematterhasbeensummedupbythisCourtinthecase,reportedasGovernmentof
SindhthroughChiefSecretarytoGovernmentofSindh,Karachiandothersv.SharafFaridiandothers
(PLD1994SC105)inthefollowingterms:
(a)thateveryJudgeisfreetodecidemattersbeforehiminaccordancewiththe
assessmentofthefactsandhisunderstandingofthelawwithinimproperinfluences,inducementsand
pressures,directorindirect,fromanyquartertoanyreasons;and
(b)thattheJudiciaryisindependentoftheExecutiveandLegislative;andhasjurisdiction,directly
orbywayofreview;ourallissuesofajudicialnature.
95.Toachievetheaforesaidpurpose,overtheages,basedonhumanexperience,a
methodhasevolvedi.e.SeparationofJudiciaryfromtheExecutiveandLegislaturethroughthe
TrichotomyofPowerswhereuponourConstitutionisalsobased.Thisisreflected,interalia,inArticle
175.SuchSeparationofthePowersisnotanendinitselfbutameanstoanendoftheIndependenceof
theJudiciary.
96.ItissettledlawthatthemannerofappointmentoftheJudgesisgermanetothe
IndependenceoftheJudiciary.ThisCourtwasconfrontedwiththeissueofappointmentofJudges,
includinginthecontextofIndependenceofJudiciary,moreparticularly,withregardtotheparttobe
playedbytheJudiciaryandtheExecutiveinsuchprocess.Thematterwasalsoexaminedwithreference
totheconsultativeprocedure.InthecaseofAlJehadTrust(Supra),thisCourtinteralia,heldasfollows:
7.Ourconclusionsanddirectionsinnutshellareasunder:
(i)Thewords"afterconsultation"employedinteraliainArticles177and193oftheConstitution
connotethattheconsultationshouldbeeffective,meaningful,purposive,consensusoriented,leaving
noroomforcomplaintofarbitrarinessorunfairplay.TheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistanandthe
ChiefJusticeofaHighCourtastothefitnessandsuitabilityofacandidateforJudgeshipisentitledtobe
acceptedintheabsenceofverysoundreasonstoberecordedbythePresident/Executive.
Intheaforesaidjudgment,AjmalMian,J,(ashethenwas)observedasfollows:
TheobjectofprovidingconsultationinteraliainArticles177and193fortheappointmentofJudgesin
theSupremeCourtandintheHighCourtswastoaccordConstitutionalrecognitiontothe
practice/conventionofconsultingtheChiefJusticeoftheHighCourtconcernedandtheChiefJusticeof
theFederalCourt,whichwasobtainingpriortotheindependenceofIndiaandpostindependence
period,inordertoensurethatcompetentandcapablepeopleofknownintegrityshouldbeinductedin
thesuperiorjudiciarywhichhasbeenassignedverydifficultanddelicatetaskofactingaswatchdogsfor
ensuringthatallthefunctionariesoftheStateactwithinthelimitsdelineatedbytheConstitutionand
alsotoeliminatepoliticalconsiderations.MohtarmaBenazirBhutto,asthethenLeaderofthe
Opposition,whilemakingaspeechon1451991onShari'ahBillintheNationalAssembly,hadrightly
pointedoutthatthepowerofappointmentofJudgesinthesuperiorCourtshaddirect/nexuswiththe
independenceofjudiciary.SincetheChiefJusticeoftheHighCourtconcernedandtheChiefJusticeof
Pakistanhaveexpertiseknowledgeabouttheabilityandcompetencyofacandidateforjudgeship,their
recommendations,aspointedouthereinabove,havebeenconsistentlyacceptedduringprepartition
daysaswellaspostpartitionperiodinIndiaandPakistan.Iam,therefore,oftheviewthatthewords
"afterconsultation"referredtointeraliainArticles177and193oftheConstitutioninvolveparticipatory
consultativeprocessbetweentheconsulteesandalsowiththeExecutive.Itshouldbeeffective,
meaningful,purposive,consensusoriented,leavingnoroomforcomplaintorarbitrarinessorunfair
play.TheChiefJusticeofaHighCourtandtheChiefJusticeofPakistanarewellequippedtoassessasto
theknowledgeandsuitabilityofacandidateforJudgeshipinthesuperiorCourts,whereastheGovernor
ofaProvinceandtheFederalGovernmentarebetterequippedtofindoutabouttheantecedentsofa
candidateandtoacquireotherinformationastohischaracter/conduct.Iwillnotsaythatanyoneofthe
aboveconsultees/functionariesislessimportantorinferiortotheother.Allareimportantintheir
respectivespheres.TheChiefJusticeofPakistan,beingPaterfamiliasi.e.headofthejudiciary,having
expertiseknowledgeabouttheabilityandsuitabilityofacandidate,definitely,hisviewsdeservedue
deference.Theobjectoftheaboveparticipatoryconsultativeprocessshouldbetoarriveataconsensus
toselectbestpersonsfortheJudgeshipofasuperiorCourtkeepinginviewtheobjectenshrinedinthe
PreambleoftheConstitution,whichispartoftheConstitutionbyvirtueofArticle2Athereof,and
ordainedbyourreligionIslamtoensureindependenceofjudiciary.QuaideAzam,theFounderof
Pakistan,immediatelyafterestablishmentofPakistan,on1421948,whileaddressingthegatheringof
CivilOfficersofBalochistan,madethefollowingobservationwhich,interaliaincludedastotheimport
ofdiscussionsandconsultations,copyofwhichisfurnishedbyMr.YahyaBakhtiar:
97.Morethan2000yearsago,oneofhispupils,askedAristotlewhyisjusticeso
complex?Herepliedbecausemaniscomplex.Muchwaterhasflownunderthebridgesincetheday
ofAristotle.Societyhasevolved.Thecomplexityoftherelationshipspersonal,commercialandbetween
thecitizensandtheStatehavefurtherintensified.Consequently,diverseandcomplexlawsarerequired.
Thereforetoadministerjusticeinaccordancewithlawrequiresalevelofexpertiseanddexterityinits
practitionersbothLawyersandJudges.
98.Itisintheabovebackgroundbyrelyingupontheconsistentpractices,whichhad
evolvedintoConstitutionalConventions,itwasalsoheldinAlJehadTrustcase(supra)thatinprocessof
appointmentofJudges,theopinionoftheChiefJusticeoftheCourtconcernedandtheChiefJusticeof
Pakistanhaveprimacy.TheAdvocates,whoaretobeconsideredforappointment,appearbeforethe
HighCourtandtheSupremeCourtandtheirlegalacumenandexpertiseaswellastheirgeneral
demeanorandreputationisbeforetheCourtandwithinitsknowledge.WithregardtotheMembersof
theDistrictJudiciary,theirjudgmentscomeupforscrutinybeforetheCourtinAppealsandRevisions,
hence,theirknowledgeoflawisalsoevidenttotheCourt.TheirACRsarealsoavailableforexamination
bytheChiefJustices.Furthermore,inviewoftheirownlegalexperienceChiefJusticesarebetter
qualifiedtodeterminethesuitabilityoftheAdvocatesandtheMembersoftheDistrictJudiciaryfor
appointmentsasJudgesmoresothanlaymen.Therefore,thisaspectofthematterwastobewithin
theirdomain,whilethematterofantecedentsofthecandidateswaslefttotheGovernor.Theprimacy
oftheChiefJusticehasfurtherfortifiedinthecase,reportedasSindHighCourtBarAssociation(Supra).
99.SuchwasthesituationofthelawpriortotheintroductionofArticle175Aincorporated
throughthe18thConstitutionalAmendmentwherebytwonewInstitutionsi.e.theJudicialCommission
andtheParliamentaryCommitteewereintroduced.Article175A,asoriginallyenacted,readasfollows:
175A.AppointmentofJudgestotheSupremeCourt,HighCourtsandtheFederalShariatCourt.(1)
ThereshallbeaJudicialCommissionofPakistan,hereinafterinthisArticlereferredtoasthe
Commission,forappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,HighCourtandtheFederalShariatCourt,
ashereinafterprovided.
(2)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,theCommissionshallconsistsof
(i)ChiefJusticeofPakistan;Chairman
(ii)twomostseniorJudgesoftheMember
SupremeCourt
(iii)aformerChiefJusticeoraMember
formerJudgeoftheSupreme
CourtofPakistantobe
nominatedbytheChief
JusticeofPakistan,in
consultationwiththemember
Judges,foratermoftwoyears;
(iv)FederalMinisterforLawandMember
Justice;
(v)AttorneyGeneralforPakistan;andMember
(vi)aSeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeMember
CourtofPakistannominatedbythe
PakistanBarCouncilforatermof
twoyears.
(3)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinclause(1)orclause(2),thePresidentshallappointedthe
mostseniorJudgeoftheSupremeCourtastheChiefJusticeofPakistan.
(4)TheCommissionmaymakerulesregulatingitsprocedure.
(5)ForappointmentofJudgesofaHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalsoincludethe
following,namely:
(i)ChiefJusticeoftheHighCourttoMember
whichtheappointmentisbeing
made;
(ii)themostseniorJudgeofthatMember
HighCourt;
(iii)ProvincialMinisterforLaw;andMember
(iv)asenioradvocatetobenominatedMember
bytheProvincialBarCouncilfor
atermoftwoyear;
ProvidedthatforappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofaHighCourt,themostSenior
JudgeoftheCourtshallbesubstitutedbyaformerChiefJusticeorformerJudgeoftheCourt,tobe
nominatedbytheChiefJusticeofPakistaninconsultationwithtwomemberJudgesoftheCommission
mentionedinclause(2);
ProvidedfurtherthatifforanyreasontheChiefJusticeofHighCourtisnotavailable,
heshallalsobesubstitutedinthemannerasprovidedintheforegoingproviso.
(6)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheIslamabadHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalso
includethefollowing,namely:
(i)ChiefJusticeoftheIslamabadMember
HighCourt;and
(ii)themostseniorJudgeofthatHighMember
Court:
ProvidedthatforinitialappointmentoftheJudgesoftheIslamabadHighCourt,the
ChiefJusticesofthefourProvincialHighCourtsshallalsobemembersoftheCommission:
Providedfurtherthatsubjecttotheforegoingproviso,incaseofappointmentofChief
JusticeofIslamabadHighCourt,theprovisostoclause(5)shall,mutatismutandis,apply.
(7)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheFederalShariatCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalso
includetheChiefJusticeoftheFederalShariatCourtandthemostseniorJudgeofthatCourtasits
members:
ProvidedthatforappointmentofChiefJusticeofFederalShariatCourt,theprovisoto
clause(5)shall,mutatismutandis,apply.
(8)TheCommissionbymajorityofitstotalmembershipshallnominatetotheParliamentary
Committeeoneperson,foreachvacancyofaJudgeintheSupremeCourt,aHighCourtortheFederal
ShariatCourt,asthecasemaybe;
(9)TheParliamentaryCommittee,hereinafterinthisArticlereferredtoastheCommittee,shall
consistofthefollowingeightmembers,namely:
(i)fourmembersfromtheSenate;and
(ii)fourmembersfromtheNationalAssembly.
(10)OutoftheeightmembersoftheCommittee,fourshallbefromtheTreasuryBenches,twofrom
eachHouseandfourfromtheOppositionBenches,twofromeachHouse.Thenominationofmembers
fromtheTreasuryBenchesshallbemadebytheLeaderoftheHouseandfromtheOppositionBenches
bytheLeaderoftheOpposition.
(11)Secretary,SenateshallactastheSecretaryoftheCommittee.
(12)TheCommitteeonreceiptofanominationfromtheCommissionmayconfirmthenomineeby
majorityofitstotalmembershipwithinfourteendays,failingwhichthenominationshallbedeemedto
havebeenconfirmed:
ProvidedthattheCommitteemaynotconfirmthenominationbythreefourth
majorityofitstotalmembershipwithinthesaidperiod,inwhichcasetheCommissionshallsend
anothernomination.
(13)TheCommitteeshallforwardthenameofthenomineeconfirmedbyitordeemedtohavebeen
confirmedtothePresidentforappointment.
(14)NoactionordecisiontakenbytheCommissionoraCommitteeshallbeinvalidorcalledin
questiononlyonthegroundoftheexistenceofavacancythereinoroftheabsenceofanymember
fromanymeetingthereof.
(15)TheCommitteemaymakerulesforregulatingitsprocedure.
100.SuchprovisionwaschallengedthroughsomeoftheinstantConstitutionalPetitions
andduringthependencyaninterimorderwaspassedon30.9.2010,whereafter,the19thConstitutional
AmendmentwaspassedbytheParliament,asaconsequencewhereoftheconstitutionoftheJudicial
CommissionwaschangedsotoowastheconstitutionoftheParliamentaryCommittee.Atimeframewas
fixedfordecisionoftheParliamentaryCommittee,whichwasrequiredtoassignreasonincaseitdidnot
confirmthenominationbytheJudicialCommission.Intheeventnodecisionwastakenwithinthe
prescribedperiod,itwasprovidedthatnominationsweredeemedtobeconfirmed.
101.Article175Aasamendedbythe19thConstitutionalAmendmentreadsasunder:
175A.(1)ThereshallbeaJudicialCommissionofPakistanhereinafterinthisArticlereferredtoas
theCommission,forappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,HighCourtandtheFederalShariat
Court,ashereinafterprovided.
(2)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,theCommissionshallconsistsof
(i)ChiefJusticeofPakistan;Chairman
(ii)[four]mostseniorJudgesoftheMember
SupremeCourt
(iii)aformerChiefJusticeoraMember
formerJudgeoftheSupreme
CourtofPakistantobe
nominatedbytheChief
JusticeofPakistan,in
consultationwiththemember
Judges,foratermoftwoyears;
(iv)FederalMinisterforLawandMember
Justice;
(v)AttorneyGeneralforPakistan;andMember
(vi)aSeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeMember
CourtofPakistannominatedbythe
PakistanBarCouncilforatermof
twoyears.
(3)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinclause(1)orclause(2),thePresidentshallappointthe

(4)TheCommissionmaymakerulesregulatingitsprocedure.
(5)ForappointmentofJudgesofaHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalsoincludethe
following,namely:
(i)ChiefJusticeoftheHighCourttoMember
whichtheappointmentisbeingmade;
Court;
(iii)ProvincialMinisterforLaw;andMember
[(iv)anadvocatehavingnotlessthanMember
fifteenyearspracticeintheHigh
Courttobenominatedbythe
concernedBarCouncilfora
termoftwoyears:
ProvidedthatforappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofaHighCourtthemostSenior
Judgementionedinparagraph(ii)shallnotbememberoftheCommission:
ProvidedfurtherthatifforanyreasontheChiefJusticeofHighCourtisnotavailable,
heshallbesubstitutedbyaformerChiefJusticeorformerJudgeofthatCourt,tobenominatedbythe
ChiefJusticeofPakistaninconsultationwiththefourmemberJudgesoftheCommissionmentionedin
paragraph(ii)ofclause(2).]
(6)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheIslamabadHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalso
includethefollowing,namely:
(i)ChiefJusticeoftheIslamabadHighMember
Court;and
Court:
ProvidedthatforinitialappointmentoftheChiefJusticeandtheJudgesofthe
IslamabadHighCourt,theChiefJusticesofthefourProvincialHighCourtsshallalsobemembersofthe
Commission:
Providedfurtherthatsubjecttotheforegoingproviso,incaseofappointmentofChief
JusticeofIslamabadHighCourt,theprovisostoclause(5)shall,mutatismutandis,apply.
(7)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheFederalShariatCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalso
includetheChiefJusticeoftheFederalShariatCourtandthemostseniorJudgeofthatCourtasits
members:
ProvidedthatforappointmentofChiefJusticeofFederalShariatCourt,theprovisos,toclause
(5)shall,mutatismutandis,apply.
ShariatCourt,asthecasemaybe.
(ii)fourmembersfromtheNationalAssembly
ProvidedthatwhentheNationalAssemblyisdissolved,thetotalmembershipofthe
ParliamentaryCommitteeshallconsistofthemembersfromtheSenateonlymentionedinparagraph(i)
andtheprovisionsofthisarticleshall,mutatismutandis,apply.
(10)OutoftheeightmembersoftheCommittee,fourshallbefromtheTreasuryBenches,twofrom
eachHouseandfourfromtheOppositionBenches,twofromeachHouse.Thenominationofmembers
fromtheTreasuryBenchesshallbemadebytheLeaderoftheHouseandfromtheOppositionBenches
bytheLeaderoftheOpposition.
havebeenconfirmed:
ProvidedthattheCommittee,forreasonstoberecorded,maynotconfirmthe
nominationbythreefourthmajorityofitstotalmembershipwithinthesaidperiod:
ProvidedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmedbytheCommitteeitshall
forwarditsdecisionwithreasonssorecordedtotheCommissionthroughthePrimeMinister:
Providedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmed,theCommissionshallsend
anothernomination.
(13)TheCommitteeshallsendthenameofthenomineeconfirmedbyitordeemedtohavebeen
confirmedtothePrimeMinisterwhoshallforwardthesametothePresidentforappointment.
(15)ThemeetingsoftheCommitteeshallbeheldincameraandtherecordofitsproceedingsshall
bemaintained.
(16)TheprovisionsofArticle68shallnotapplytotheproceedingsoftheCommittee.
102.Intheabovebackdrop,thedecisionoftheJudicialCommissionwithregardtosomeof
theJudgesoftheLahoreHighCourtandHighCourtofSindhwereoverruledbytheParliamentary
Committee,whichactwaschallengedbeforethisCourtandthematterwasadjudicateduponvide
judgment,reportedasMunirHussainBhatti,Advocateandanotherv.FederationofPakistanandothers
(PLD2011SC407).Inthesaidjudgment,besidesholdingthatsuchdecisionoftheParliamentary
CommitteewasjusticeableandtheConstitutionPetitionthereagainstmaintainable,theprovisionsof
Article175AoftheConstitutionwereinterpretedand,inthisbehalf,itwasobservedasfollows:
57.Therolewhichtheywereperforminginthepreviouslegalsetup,asexaminedabove,isnow,
logically,tobeperformedbytheCommittee.Itis,therefore,evidentthatthepurposetheraisond'etre
oftheCommissionandtheCommitteeistheappointmentofJudgesalbeitinaccordancewiththe
procedurelaiddowninArticle175A.
Itwasfurtherobservedasunder:
58.Giventhisdispensationandtheabovereferredhistoricalcontext,theCommitteecannot(without
erodingjudicial,independence)beseenasasuperiorbodysittinginappealovertherecommendations
oftheCommissionwiththeabilitytosetasideorreversethewellconsideredopinionofthemembersof
theCommission.
Itwasalsoobservedasfollows:
71.TheCommittee,however,isnotameaninglessorredundantbody.Ithastheabilitytoaddvalue
totheprocessofmakingjudicialappointmentsbytakingintoaccountinformationwhichisdifferent
fromandmaynothavebeenavailablewiththeCommission.
Itwasalsonotedasunder:
72.ItcannotbeseenastheintentionoftheConstitutionasamended,thatthethirteenmembersof
theCommissionwhoamongstthemincludethefiveseniormostmembersoftheJudiciaryinthe
countrytogetherwithaformerJudgeofthisCourtandtheChiefJusticeoftheHighCourtconcerned,
shouldbetrumpedintheirviewsaboutthecompetenceandsuitabilityofanominee,bysixmembersof
Parliamentwho,itmaybestatedwithgreatrespect,arenotsupposedtobeequippedwiththecore
abilityforevaluating,interalia,legalacumenandcompetence.
103.Inviewoftheabove,itappearsthatpriortotheintroductionofArticle175A,the
matterofascertainingexpertise,professionalcompetence,legalacumenandgeneralsuitabilityofa
persontobeappointedasaJudgewasforallintentsandpurposesintheexclusivedomainoftheChief
Justices.ItwaspresumedthattheChiefJusticesconcernedwouldtaketheirrespectivecolleaguesinto
confidenceaswasandcontinuestobethepractice.Thismatterhasbeenformulizedbymakingsenior
JudgesapartoftheJudicialCommission.IthasalwaysbeenacommonpracticefortheChiefJusticesto
solicittheopinionfromthebarandsuchpracticestillcontinuesandthisaspectofthemattertoohas
beenformalizedbyaddingtherepresentativesoftheBarCouncilstotheJudicialCommission.The
questionofexpertise,legalacumenandgeneralsuitabilityofacandidatetobeappointedasaJudgeis
withintheexclusivedomainoftheJudicialCommissionwiththepowersofinitiationvestingintheChief
Justiceconcerned.Originally,thequestionofantecedentsofsuchcandidateswaswiththeExecutivebut
thisisnolongerwhollytrueastheAttorneyGeneralandtheFederalLawMinisterandtheProvincial
LawMinisterasthecasemaybearetheMembersoftheJudicialCommission,therefore,allrelevant
information,inthisbehalf,withtheExecutiveisnowavailabletotheJudicialCommission.The
ParliamentaryCommitteecannotsitinappealoverthedecisionsoftheJudicialCommissionandincase
ofanydisagreementthematterisjusticiablebytheCourt.Bethatasitmay,thechallengetothe
constitutionoftheJudicialCommissionhasnotbeenpressedatthebar.
104.ThelitmustestfortheIndependenceofJudiciaryquatheappointmentoftheJudges
appearstobethatthepowertoinitiateandtheprimacyordecisivenesswithregardtothefinal
outcomeoftheprocessmustvestintheChiefJusticesandtheMembersoftheJudiciary.Article175Aas
amendedbythe19thAmendmentandinterpretedbythisCourt,inthecaseofMunirHussainBhatti
(supra)perhapswithsomedifficultypassesthetest.However,ifArticle175Awastobeamendedor
reinterpreted,compromisingeitheroftwolimbsofthetestmentionedabove,itmaynotbepossibleto
holdthattheprovisionssoamendedorinterpretedarenotinconflictwiththeIndependenceof
Judiciary,whichisaSalientFeatureoftheConstitution.
105.TheprovisionsofArticle63Ahavebeenchallengedontheallegationthatitrestrictsa
MemberoftheParliamentfromvotinginaccordancewithhisconscienceandthewillofthepeopleof
theConstituencythatelectedhim.ItisthecaseofthePetitionersthattheMembersoftheParliament
havebeensubjugatedtothewillsandwishesofthepartyheadwhomaynotbeaMemberofthe
Parliamentorevenqualifiedtobewon.Article63Areadsasunder:
63A.(1)IfamemberofaParliamentaryPartycomposedofasinglepoliticalpartyina
House
(a)resignsfrommembershipofhispoliticalpartyorjoinsanotherParliamentaryParty;or
(b)votesorabstainsfromvotingintheHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbythe
ParliamentaryPartytowhichhebelongs,inrelationto
(iii)aMoneyBilloraConstitution(Amendment)Bill;
hemaybedeclaredinwritingbythePartyHeadtohavedefectedfromthepoliticalparty,andtheParty
HeadmayforwardacopyofthedeclarationtothePresidingOfficerandtheChiefElection
Commissionerandshallsimilarlyforwardacopythereoftothememberconcerned:
Providedthatbeforemakingthedeclaration,thePartyHeadshallprovidesuchmemberwith
anopportunitytoshowcauseastowhysuchdeclarationmaynotbemadeagainsthim.
Explanation.PartyHeadmeansanyperson,bywhatevernamecalled,declaredassuchby
theParty.
(2)AmemberofaHouseshallbedeemedtobeamemberofaParliamentaryPartyifhe,
havingbeenelectedasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalpartywhichconstitutestheParliamentary
PartyintheHouseor,havingbeenelectedotherwisethanasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalparty,
hasbecomeamemberofsuchParliamentaryPartyaftersuchelectionbymeansofadeclarationin
writing.
(3)Uponreceiptofthedeclarationunderclause(1),thePresidingOfficeroftheHouseshallwithin
twodaysrefer,andincasehefailstodosoitshallbedeemedthathehasreferred,thedeclarationto
theChiefElectionCommissionerwhoshalllaythedeclarationbeforetheElectionCommissionforits
decisionthereonconfirmingthedeclarationorotherwisewithinthirtydaysofitsreceiptbytheChief
ElectionCommissioner.
(4)WheretheElectionCommissionconfirmsthedeclaration,thememberreferredtoinclause(1)
shallceasetobeamemberoftheHouseandhisseatshallbecomevacant.
(5)AnypartyaggrievedbythedecisionoftheElectionCommissionmay,withinthirtydays,prefer
anappealtotheSupremeCourtwhichshalldecidethematterwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthe
filingoftheappeal.
(6)NothingcontainedinthisArticleshallapplytotheChairmanorSpeakerofaHouse.
(7)ForthepurposeofthisArticle,
(a)HousemeanstheNationalAssemblyortheSenate,inrelationtotheFederation;anda
ProvincialAssemblyinrelationtotheProvince,asthecasemaybe;and
(b)PresidingOfficermeanstheSpeakeroftheNationalAssembly,theChairmanoftheSenateor
theSpeakeroftheProvincialAssembly,asthecasemaybe.
(8)Article63Asubstitutedasaforesaidshallcomeintoeffectfromthenextgeneralelectionstobe
heldafterthecommencementoftheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,2010:
ProvidedthattillArticle63AsubstitutedasaforesaidcomesintoeffecttheprovisionsofexistingArticle
63Ashallremainoperative.
106.Inordertounderstanditstrueimportitmaybenecessarytocontextualizethesaid
Article.Thedictatorshipimposedonthe5thofJuly,1977,eventuallyledtoanelectionin1985.Asa
transitiontodemocracythesaidelectionswereheldonanonpartybasiswiththeobviouspurposeof
facilitatingtheformationofaGovernmenttothelikingofthePresidentwhostillretaineddecisive
power.Eventually,ontheinsistenceofthepoliticalpartiesandperhapsthepeopleofPakistanand
pursuanttoajudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasMrs.BenazirBhuttoandanotherv.Federationof
Pakistanandanother(PLD1989SC66)holdingthattherighttoformapoliticalpartyandcontestthe
electiononthebasisthereofwasaFundamentalRight,electionsonpartybasiswerereintroducedin
PakistanasisthenorminalmostallDemocraticcountries.
107.PoliticalPartiescontesttheelectionsonthebasisoftheirmanifestosandinthethird
worldcountries,moreso,onthestrengthofthenameandcharismaoftheirleaderandthetrustand
confidencethatheinvokes.Itisdifficulttodeterminewithrespecttoeachindividualconstituencyasto
whatpercentageofvoteshavebeenpolledbyawinningcandidateonthebasisofhisrelationshipwith
thepeopleandwhatpercentagehasbeenreceivedinthenameofthepartyanditsleaderwithwhich
thecandidateisaffiliated.
108.ItisalsonoticedthatpriortotheintroductionofArticle63A,theMembersofthe
Parliamentwereinducedorcoercedintochangingloyalties.TheRestHousesinChangaManagecame
aliveastootheRestHousesandHotelsinSwat.TheMembersofaProvincialAssemblyweredeposited
inaHotelatIslamabad.Instabilitywasthenaturalresult.SittingGovernmentswereunderaconstant
threatofoverthrow.SuchastateofaffairsalsobroughttheParliamentandtheProvincialAssemblies
alongwiththeirmembersingreatdisfavourwiththepeople.Itisintheabovecontext,andtosuppress
themischiefasidentifiedabove,themembersofParliamentimposeduponthemselvesthe
restrictions,asenumeratedinArticle63A.SuchArticlehasbroughtstabilitytothePoliticalSystemandis
exfacieconducivetoDemocracy.
109.AsimilarantidefectionprovisionwasintroducedinIndiathroughthe52Amendment
byintroducingpara2ofthe10thSchedule,whichreadsasfollows:
2.Disqualificationongroundofdefection(1)Subjecttotheprovisionsofparagraphs3,4
and5,amemberofaHousebelongingtoanypoliticalpartyshallbedisqualifiedforbeingamemberof
theHouse
ifhehasvoluntarilygivenuphismembershipofsuchpoliticalparty;or
ifhevotesorabstainsfromvotinginsuchHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbythepoliticalpartyto
whichhebelongsorbyanypersonorauthorityauthorizedbyitinthisbehalf,withoutobtaining,in
eithercase,thepriorpermissionofsuchpoliticalparty,personorauthorityandsuchvotingor
abstentionhasnotbeencondonedbysuchpoliticalparty,personorauthoritywithinfifteendaysfrom
thedateofsuchvotingorabstention.
110.Achallengewasthrowntotheaforesaid,whichwasrejectedbytheSupremeCourtof
Indianinthecase,reportedasKihotoHollohanv.Zachillhuandothers[(1992)1SCC309],whereinit
washeldasfollows:
ThecontentionthattheprovisionsoftheTenthSchedule,evenwiththeexclusionof
Paragraph7,violatethebasicstructureoftheConstitutioninthattheyaffectthedemocraticrightsof
electedmembersand,therefore,oftheprinciplesofParliamentarydemocracyisunsoundandis
rejected.
ItmaybenotedthatthebasicstructuretheorywasapplicableinfullforceinIndia.
111.Article63Aasoriginallyinsertedby14thConstitutionalAmendmentwasalso
questionedintheWukalaMahazcase(supra)asbeingviolativeoftheSalientFeaturesofthe
Constitution,However,byamajoritydecisionArticle63AwasheldtobetheintravirestheConstitution
subjecttotheclarificationsmentionedinthesaidjudgment.Nothinghasbeenstatedatthebarto
persuadeustorevisitthesaidjudgment.
112.Throughthe18thConstitutionalAmendment,Article63Ahasonlybeenamendedto
theextentthatthedecisionofthepartyashowtovotehasbeenconferreduponthePartyHeadand
themattersinwhichsuchinstructionswillapplynowincludesanAmendmenttotheConstitutionin
additiontoMoneyBillandvoteofconfidenceornoconfidence.Suchchangesdonoteffectinsubstance
theimportandeffectoftheProvisionwithregardtothemischiefsoughttobesuppressedasalready
heldtobevalidbythisCourt.
113.TheshiftingoftheemphasisfromtheParliamentaryLeadertothePartyHeadisin
consonancewiththegroundrealitiesofPakistaniPoliticswhichareselfevidentandneednotbeset
forthintoomuchdetail.Sufficeittosay,aPoliticalLeaderwhosepersonalpopularitytranslatesinto
votesmayhaveoutgrowntheParliamentorbeaMemberofaProvincialAssemblyincaseofaregional
partyormayotherwisechoosenottocontesttheelection.
114.ConstitutionalAmendmentsarenolessimportantthanaVoteofConfidenceora
MoneyBillforthepartythatpilotssuchAmendment,therefore,theinclusionthereofinArticle63A
doesnotupsettheschemeofthesaidprovision.
WhenDemocracyinPakistanisstabilizedthroughcontinuity,theParliamentcan
alwaysrevisitArticle63AtobringitinconfermitywiththepracticeinmaturedDemocraticCountries.
115.TheprovisionsofArticle51wasalsocalledintoquestiontotheextentthatthe
electionfortheseatsreservedfortheminoritiesistobeheldonthebasisofproportional
representationonpartybasis.Itwasassertedthattheminoritiesshouldbeallowedtodirectlyelect
theirrepresentativesandinabsencethereofrightsofminoritiesarecompromisedastotheDemocracy.
116.Thereisnodenyingthefactthattheprotectionandpreservationoftherightsofthe
minorities,bothasequalcitizensofPakistanandasminoritiesiscertainlyoneoftheSalientFeaturesof
theConstitution.Itwouldbeagreattragedy,ifinacountrywhosegenesislayinthegrievanceofthe
minority,thereisafailuretobesensitivetotherightsoftheminorities.Throughthe8thConstitutional
Amendmentseparateelectoratewasintroducedwherebytheminoritiescouldnotvoteforthe
MembersoftheParliamentelectedfromtheGeneralSeatwhowouldbeinoverwhelmingmajorityand
wouldbeaneffectivepartoftheGovernmentortheOpposition.Thedirectrelationshipbetweenthe
minoritycitizensandtheGovernmentwasdisconnectedastheMembersoftheCabinetandother
influentialmembersoftheParliamentdidnotneedminorityvotesintheirrespectiveConstituencies,
hence,becomeinsensitivetotheirneeds.Theminoritiesbecameseparatebutequalpartytothe
DemocraticProcess.Anelectoralapartheidwasputintoplace.Furthermore,theminority
ConstituenciesbecamehugespreadingoverseveralDistrictsandinsomecasesthewholeofPakistan
makingthemunmanageableandimpossibleforaneffectiveelectioncampaignwithoutexpendinghuge
sumsofmoney.Itisinthisperspectivethattheseparateelectoratesystemwasabolishedandthe
minoritiesincorporatedintothemainstreamofPakistanirepresentativespoliticstotheiradvantage.
ObviouslythroughaGeneralElectiontheminoritiesmaynotfindduerepresentationintheParliament,
therefore,seatsarereservedforthemtobefilledthroughproportionalrepresentationonpartybasis
whichisnotundemocraticandisinvogueinseveralcountrieswithaParliamentaryFormof
Government.Intermsoftheprovisionsunderquestion,theprincipleofonemanonevoteisnot
violated.AnymemberoftheminoritiescancontestonanygeneralseatofParliamentfromany
Constituency.Thereisajointelectorate.MinorityMembersoftheParliamentareincludedinthe
CabinetandformpartofthepowerstructuretherebynotonlyservingtheirCountrybutalsotheir
communities.BynostretchoftheimaginationcanitbesaidthattheprovisionsoftheConstitution,in
thisbehalf,offendagainstorcompromiseDemocracyand/ortheprotectionofrightsofminorities.Can
therebeamoreefficientmodeforensuringthattheminoritiesareintegratedintothepolitical
mainstreamandthedemocraticprocess?Perhaps,butsuchmodewouldlieinthedomainofthe
Parliament.Asalreadynoted,itistheConstitutionalityoftheConstitutionalAmendmentwhichcanbe
examinedbythisCourtbutnotitscorrectnessorefficiency.
117.WithregardtothewithdrawaloftherestrictionsonthetermsofthePrimeMinister
andthenecessitytoholdIntrapartyElectionsbythePoliticalParties,sufficeittosaythatboththe
aforesaidProvisionsdidnotformpartoftheConstitution,asoriginallyframedtherebydilutingtheir
relevancefordeterminingtheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.Evenotherwise,inaParliamentary
FormofGovernmentusuallynorestrictiononthenumberoftenuresofthePrimeMinisterisimposed
andtheholdingofIntrapartyElectionsisnotasinequanonforademocraticsetup.
118.ThequestionofrenamingoftheNorthWestFrontierProvince(NWFP)asKhyber
Pakhtunkhwa(KPK),thoughraised,wasnotreallypressed.Bethatasitmay,therenamingofthe
ProvinceinaccordancewiththewishesofthepeopleasexpressedinaResolutionoftheProvincial
AssemblyinnomannereffectstheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.
119.Someotherrandomprovisionswerealsomentionedatthebarbutgrievancewas
raisedprimarilyonasubjectiveopinionratherthanongroundsofbeingultravirestheConstitution.
120.ThereisnodoubtthatthelegislativepoweroftheStateisvestedintheParliament.It
isclothedwiththeauthoritytomakelawsandtoamendtheConstitutionsubjecttolimitation
mentionedhereinabove.ThisroleoftheParliamentiscritical,asitisthesoulofdemocracyand
essentialattributeoftheTrichotomyofpowers.Ithasbeennoticedwithregretthatthedestructionof
theParliamentandDemocracythroughextraConstitutionalmeasureshasbeenvalidatedbythisCourt
inthepastandDictatorsheldentitledeventoamendtheConstitution.Suchmaybeourlegalhistory
butnotnecessarilyourJurisprudence.Itisimperativethatwedistinguishbetweenthetwo.
121.Wemaynowadverttothe21stConstitutionalAmendmentAct,2015,andthe
PakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015.
Bywayofthe21stConstitutionalAmendment,thefollowingprovisowasaddedtoArticle175,
whichnowreadsasunder:
175.(1)ThereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,aHighCourtforeachProvinceandaHigh
CourtfortheIslamabadCapitalTerritoryandsuchothercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.
Explanation.Unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,thewordsHighCourt
whereveroccurringintheConstitutionshallincludeIslamabadHighCourt.
(2)Nocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbythe
Constitutionorbyorunderanylaw.
(3)TheJudiciaryshallbeseparatedprogressivelyfromtheExecutivewithin
fourteenyearsfromthecommencingday:
ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisArticleshallhavenoapplicationtothetrialof
personsunderanyoftheActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofsubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirst
Schedule,whoclaims,orisknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameof
religionorasect.
122.Furthermore,theScheduletoArticle8wasamendedandthePakistanArmyAct,1952,
PakistanAirForceAct,1953andPakistanNavyOrdinance,1961,wereincorporatedtherein.Bywayof
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,thefollowingwasincorporatedtherein:
(l)insubsection(1),inclause(d),aftersubclause(ii),thefollowingnewsubclauses,shallbe
inserted,namely:
(iii)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameof
religionorasect;and
(a)raisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,orattacktheArmedForcesofPakistanorlaw
enforcementagencies,orattackanycivilormilitaryinstallationsinPakistan;or
(b)abductanypersonforransom,orcausedeathofanypersonorinjury;or
(c)possess,store,fabricateortransporttheexplosives,firearms,instruments,articles,suicide
jackets;or
(d)useordesignvehiclesforterroristacts;or
(e)provideorreceivefundingfromanyforeignorlocalsourcefortheillegalactivitiesunderthis
clause;or
(f)acttooverawethestateoranysectionofthepublicorsectorreligiousminority;or
(g)createterrororinsecurityinPakistanorattempttocommitanyofthesaidactswithinor
outsidePakistan,
shallbepunishedunderthisAct;and
(iv)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameof
religionorasectandraisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,commitanoffencementionedatserial
Nos.(i),(ii),(iii),(v),(vi),(vii),(viii),(ix),(x),(xi),(xii),(xiii),(xv),(xvi),(xvii)and(xx)intheScheduletothe
ProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014):
Providedthatanypersonwhoisallegedtohaveabetted,aidedorconspiredinthecommissionofany
offencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)shallbetriedunderthisActwhereverhemayhave
committedthatoffence:
Providedfurtherthatnopersonaccusedofanoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)
shallbeprosecutedwithoutthepriorsanctionoftheFederalGovernment.
Explanation:Inthisclause,theexpressionsectmeansasectofreligionanddoesnotincludeany
religiousorpoliticalpartyregulatedunderthePoliticalPartiesOrder,2002.
(2)aftersubsection(3),thefollowingnewsubsectionsshallbeadded,namely:
(4)TheFederalGovernmentshallhavethepowertotransferanyproceedingsinrespectofany
personwhoisaccusedofanyoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)ofclause(d)ofsub
section(1),pendinginanycourtforatrialunderthisAct.
(5)Anyproceedingstransferredundersubsection(4)shallbedeemedtohavebeeninstituted
underthisAct.
(6)Whereacaseistransferredundersubsection(4)itshallnotbenecessarytorecallanywitness
oragainrecordanyevidencethatmayhavebeenrecorded..
3.Amendmentofsection60,ActXXXIXof1952.InthesaidAct,insection60,inclause(k),after
thewordlawoccurringattheend,thewordsandanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforce,shallbe
added.
4.Overridingeffect.(1)TheprovisionsofthisActshallhaveeffectnotwithstandinganything
containedinanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforce.
(2)IncasethereisanyconflictbetweentheprovisionsofthisActandanyotherlawforthetime
beinginforce,theprovisionsofthisActshallprevailtotheextentofinconsistency.
123.InessenceitwasthecaseofthePetitionersthatanattempthasbeenmadetosetupa
paralleljudiciary,notenvisagedbytheConstitution,providingfortrialofciviliansbyaCourtMartial.
SuchacourseofactionnotonlyoffendsagainsttheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution,including
IndependenceofJudiciaryandFundamentalRightsbutalsothesubconstitutionallegislationiseven
otherwise,ultravirestheConstitution.
124.Ontheotherhand,itwasthecaseofthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanthat
theForumsconstitutedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952,areacknowledgedbytheConstitution.The
ParliamentisauthorizedtomakelawsonthesubjectsidentifiedinthevariousitemsoftheFederal
LegislativeListandItemNo.1thereofincludestheDefenceofPakistan.Inexerciseofsuchpowersthe
PakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015hasbeenpromulgatedwhichdoesnotoffendagainstthe
provisionsoftheConstitution.Withregardstotheenlargementofjurisdictionreferencewasmadeto
itemNo.55oftheFederalLegislativeListpertainingtojurisdictionoftheCourts.Itwasaddedthatthe
confermentofjurisdictionupontheCourtMartialconstitutedunderthePakistanArmyAct,soastotry
terroristswagingwaragainstPakistanisconsistentwiththeschemeoftheConstitutionanddoesnot
offendagainstanyofitsSalientFeatures.
125.TherecanbenocavilwiththecontentionofthePetitionersthatourConstitutionis
basedontheTrichotomyofPowerswiththeJudiciaryasanindependententityseparatefromthe
Executive,primarilyconsistingoftheSupremeCourtofPakistan,HighCourtsandotherCourts
establishedbylaw,whichareunderthesupervisionandcontroloftheHighCourts.Suchconclusions
havebeendrawnbythisCourtbyinterpretingArticles175and203inahostofcases,includingthe
casesof(1)GovernmentofBalochistanthroughAdditionalChiefSecretaryv.AzizullahMemonand16
others(PLD1993SC341)and(2)MehramAliscase(supra).ThereareotherCourtsandTribunalswhich
exercisejudicialpowersoftheStateandareclearlycontemplatedintheConstitution,includingFederal
ShariatCourtunderArticle203A,ServiceTribunalsconstitutedunderArticle212andtheElection
TribunalsenvisagedbyArticle225.NeedlesstosaythataverylargenumberofotherCourtsand
Tribunalsarealsoestablishedbylaw.
126.ItmayalsobecorrecttosuggestthattheConstitutionasoriginallyframedenvisageda
progressiveSeparationoftheJudiciaryfromtheExecutiveaswasstatedintheunamendedArticle175.
Thetimeframeasoriginallystipulated,inthisbehalf,wasextendedthroughConstitutionalAmendment.
However,ontheexpiryoftheextendedperiod,theneedfulwasnotdonenecessitatingthepassingof
appropriatedirections,inthisbehalf,bytheCourtinSharafFaridiscase(supra).
127.However,priortotheenactmentandenforcementoftheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,1973,thePakistanArmyAct,1952,wasalreadyinforceandoperational.Thesaid
Actof1952,asoriginallyframedpertained,asitstitlesuggests,tothepersonnelofPakistanArmyand
suchotherpersonsaswerementionedthereinwhoweresubjecttothesaidAct.Provisionsweremade
formaintainingthedisciplineintheArmy,includingbywayofawardingpunishmentsandsentences
throughForumsreferredtoasCourtMartial,tobeconstitutedundertheAct,foroffencesspecified,
includingsomewhichwerealsooffencesunderthePakistanPenalCode.Thefactumoftheexistenceof
suchForumsestablishedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952includingCourtMartialandpowers
exercisedbythemappearstohavebeenacknowledgedandprotectedbytheConstitutioninsofarasit
pertainedtothedischargeofdutiesandmaintenanceofthedisciplineamongsttheOfficersandsoldiers
oftheArmy,asisobviousfromArticles8(3)(a)and199(3),therelevantportionsthereofarereproduced
asunder:
8(3)TheProvisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(a)anylawrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForces,orofthepoliceorofsuchother
forcesasarechargedwiththemaintenanceofpublicorder,forthepurposeofensuringtheproper
dischargeoftheirdutiesorthemaintenanceofdisciplineamongthem;or

199(3)Anordershallnotbemadeunderclause(1)onapplicationmadebyorinrelationtoa
personwhoisamemberoftheArmedForcesofPakistan,orwhoisforthetimebeingsubjecttoany
lawrelatingtoanyofthoseForces,inrespectofhistermsandconditionsofservice,inrespectofany
matterarisingoutofhisservice,orinrespectofanyactiontakeninrelationtohimasamemberofthe
ArmedForcesofPakistanorasapersonsubjecttosuchlaw.(emphasisaresupplied)
AperusaloftheaforesaidprovisionsrevealsthattotheextentthePakistanArmyActpertainstothe
dischargeofdutiesbyandmaintenanceofdisciplineamongstthepersons,subjecttheretothe
provisionsoftheActhavebeenplacedoutsidetheambitoftherestrictionscontainedinArticle8for
protectionandenforcementofFundamentalRightsandanattempthasbeenmadetoexcludethe
ConstitutionaljurisdictionoftheHighCourtsinrespectofanyactiontakenunderthesaidAct.The
constitutionofandtheconfermentofjurisdictionupontheCourts,Tribunals,andotherForumswith
adjudicatorypowersisprovidedeitherbytheConstitutionitselforbyanylaw.TheCourtMartialare
constitutedandestablishedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952,andjurisdictionthereuponisalso
conferredbythesaidAct.TheirexistenceandvalidityisacknowledgedandacceptedbytheConstitution
insofarastheydealwiththemembersoftheArmedForcesorotherpersonssubjecttothesaidAct.
Thishasnotbeendisputedbeforeus.
128.Subsequently,AmendmentswereincorporatedinthePakistanArmyActsoasto
extenditsapplicationtociviliansfortrialbyCourtMartialforoffencesspecified.Themattercameup
beforethisCourtinBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase(supra)wheretheaccusedtriedbyCourtMartialwereat
thatpointoftimecivilianshavingceasedtobeOfficersofthePakistanArmy.Thequestionofthevalidity
ofthetrialofciviliansbyaCourtMartialandviresoftheamendinglawextendingtheambitofthe
PakistanArmyActtoincludesuchcivilianswerebroughtunderscrutiny.ThisCourtheldasfollows:
Thepositioninourcountryis,however,different.ItseemsthatiftheArmyActisavalidpieceof
legislation,thenitdoespermitthetrialofcivilians,incertaincircumstances,byamilitaryCourtevenin
timesofPeace.
Nowithasbeencontendedthatsincetheoffenceofseducingorattemptingtoseduceapersonsubject
totheArmyActfromhisdutyorallegiancetoGovernmentisalreadyanoffenceundersection131of
thePenalCode,triablebytheordinaryCriminalCourts,thisisinsubstanceandinrealityanamendment
oftheCriminalProcedureCode.
Itdoes,therefore,appearfromthesedecisionsthatthesuperiorCourtsaredebarredfromquestioning
thevalidityofalawonlyonthegroundofthelackofcompetencyoftheLegislaturebutitisunnecessary
inthiscasetogointothismatterinanygreaterdetail,sincetheviewthatIhavetakenisthatthe
impugnedOrdinancesarewithintheexclusivelegislativecompetenceoftheCentralLegislatureandfall
directlywithinitems1,48and49oftheThirdSchedule.(emphasisaresupplied)
ThetrialofciviliansunderthePakistanArmyActinthecircumstancesofthecasewasheldtobevalid.
129.In1998,theArmywascalledinaidofcivilpowerintheProvinceofSindhwhereafter
anOrdinancei.e.OrdinanceNo.XIIof1998wasissuedcontemplatingtrialofciviliansbytheMilitary
Courts.TheviresofthesaidOrdinancewerechallengedandthematterwasadjudicateduponvide
judgment,reportedasSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)andtheOrdinancewasstruckdown.Itwas
heldbythisCourtthatwhentheArmywascalledinaidofcivilpower,itnotonlyactsunderthe
directionoftheFederalGovernmentthattoosubjecttolawasisspecificallymentionedinArticle
245(1).Furthermore,inpursuanceoftheaforesaidprovisionsatbesttheArmedForcesmayexercise
theExecutiveorPolicepowersbutthecivilauthoritiesarenotsupplanted.Itwasalsoheldthatinsuch
aneventualityitisnotcontemplatedthattheestablishedJudicialSystemwillbesubstitutedbythe
MilitaryCourts.Otheraspectsofthelaw,aslaiddownbythesaidjudgments,shallbedealtwith
separately.
130.Thedictumlaiddownintheaforesaidjudgmenttotheextentmentionedabovemay
notbeapplicablestrictosensuintheinstantcase,astheArmedForceshavenotbeencalledinaidof
civilpowerintermsofArticle245(1).Beforeproceedingfurther,itmaybeappropriate,atthisjuncture,
tohaveanoverviewoftheprovisionsofArticle245,whicharereproducedasunder:
245.(1)TheArmedForcesshall,underthedirectionsoftheFederalGovernment
defendPakistanagainstexternalaggressionorthreatofwar,and,subjecttolaw,actinaidofcivilpower
whencalledupontodoso.
(2)ThevalidityofanydirectionissuedbytheFederalGovernmentunderclause
(1)shallnotbecalledinquestioninanycourt.
(3)AHighCourtshallnotexerciseanyjurisdictionunderArticle199inrelationto
anyareainwhichtheArmedForcesofPakistanare,forthetimebeing,actinginaidofcivilpowerin
pursuanceofArticle245:
ProvidedthatthisclauseshallnotbedeemedtoaffectthejurisdictionoftheHigh
CourtinrespectofanyproceedingpendingimmediatelybeforethedayonwhichtheArmedForcesstart
actinginaidofcivilpower.
(4)Anyproceedinginrelationtoanareareferredtoinclause(3)institutedonor
afterthedaytheArmedForcesstartactinginaidofcivilpowerandpendinginanyHighCourtshall
remainsuspendedfortheperiodduringwhichtheArmedForcesaresoacting.(emphasisaresupplied)
131.WhenthemattercameupbeforethisCourtinBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase(supra)asin
theinstantcaseArmedForceshadnotbeencalledinaidofcivilpower.Intheaboveperspective,
whileholdingthetrialsofciviliansbytheCourtMartial,asvalid,thisCourtalsoheldasindicatedand
reproducedhereinabovethatsuchlegislationwascompetentundertheConstitution.
132.InSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)whileinterpretingBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase
(supra)thisCourt,interalia,observedasfollows:
(i)Thateven,acivilianwhoismadesubjecttotheArmyAct,canbetriedbytheMilitary
CourtsunderthesaidAct,providedthattheoffenceofwhichsuchpersonischargedwithhasnexus
withtheArmedForcesorDefenceofPakistan.
(ii)Thatthetwoaccusedintheabovecasewerepickeduponthebasisofvalidclassification
foundedonarationalbasisnamely,thosewhoseduceorattempttoseduceamemberoftheArmed
Forcesfromhisallegianceorhisduty,andthattherewasnopossibilityofanyonepickingandchoosinga
particularpersonsoaccusedfortrialinonemannerandleavingotherstobetriedunderthegeneral
lawsbyreasonofamendmentintroducedbyclause(d)ofsubsection(1)ofsection2oftheArmyAct;
and
(iii)ThatthetrialundertheArmyActforthepersonsliabletobetriedisnotviolativeof
anyoftheprinciplesoffairtrial.(emphasisaresupplied)
Furthermore,itwasalsoheldasunder:
therefore,anylawwhichmakesaciviliantriableforaciviloffence,whichhasnonexuswith
theArmedForcesordefenceofthecountry,byaforumwhichdoesnotqualifyasaCourtintermsof
thelawenunciatedparticularlyinMehramAliscase(supra)willbeviolativeofArticles9,25,175and
203oftheConstitution.(emphasisaresupplied)
ThisCourtalsoobservedasfollows:
TheabovecontentionisnottenableasconveningofMilitaryCourtsfortrialof
civiliansforciviloffenceshavingnonexuswiththeArmedForcesordefenceofPakistancannotbe
treatedasanactincidentalandancillaryunderclause(1)ofArticle245oftheConstitution.Itmayagain
beobservedthatthescopeofclause(1)ofArticle245istocalltheArmedForcestoactinaidofthecivil
power.Thescopeoftheaboveaidtocivilpowerhasbeendiscussedhereinaboveindetail.Itmayagain
beobservedthattheaboveaidtothecivilpoweristoberenderedbytheArmyasacoerciveapparatus
tosuppresstheactsofterrorisminteraliabyapprehendingoffendersandbypatrollingonthe
roads/streets,wherethereiscivildisorderordisturbancesofthemagnitudewhichthecivilpoweris
unabletocontrol.
InmyviewthepowertolegislatetheimpugnedOrdinanceforestablishing/conveningMilitaryCourts
cannotbespeltoutfromclause(1)ofArticle245noritcanbederivedfromEntryNo.1readwithEntry
No.59ofPartIoftheFourthSchedulecontainedintheFederalLegislativeListrelieduponbythe
learnedAttorneyGeneral.
133.ItemNo.1oftheFederalLegislativeListreadsasfollows:
1.ThedefenceoftheFederationoranypartthereofinpeaceorwar;themilitary,navalandair
forcesoftheFederationandanyotherarmedforcesraisedormaintainedbytheFederation;anyarmed
forceswhicharenotforcesoftheFederationbutareattachedtooroperatingwithanyoftheArmed
ForcesoftheFederationincludingcivilArmedForces;FederalIntelligenceBureau;preventivedetention
forreasonsofStateconnectedwithdefence,externalaffairs,orthesecurityofPakistanoranypart
thereof;personssubjectedtosuchdetention;industriesdeclaredbyFederallawtobenecessaryforthe
purposeofdefenceorfortheprosecutionofwar:
Article70oftheConstitutionempowerstheParliamenttolegislateonallmatters
enumeratedintheFederalLegislativeList.Item1ofthesaidListreproducedhereinaboveclearly
includestheDefenceofPakistanandtheArmedForces.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952isobviously
coveredbythesaidItem,asexfacieitdealswiththeDefenceofPakistanandtheArmedForcesand
includesthetrialofpersonssubjecttothatActbytheForumsestablishedthereunderi.e.CourtMartial.
WhereanyLegislativeMeasurepurportstoincludethetrialofCiviliansnototherwisesubjectto
PakistanArmyActbytheForumsthereunderbyAmendmentornewlegislation,itneedstobeexamined
whethertheParliamentwascompetentunderItem1oftheFederalLegislativeListtodoso.InBrig.
(Retd)F.BAliscase(supra)andSh.LiaqatHussainscase(supra),ithasbeenheldbythisCourtthatif
theoffencehasadirectnexuswiththeDefenceofPakistanortheArmedForcesthensuchLegislative
MeasurewouldcomewithintheambitofItem1oftheFederalLegislativeListandwouldhavebeen
competentlyandvalidlymadebytheParliament.Obviously,aslongas,suchlawdoesnototherwise
offendagainstanyotherprovisionoftheConstitution.SuchistheschemeoftheConstitution.Thereal
matterinissueboilsdownastowhetherthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentandthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,hasadirectnexuswiththeArmedForcesortheDefenceofPakistan.Ifthe
answerisinthenegativethentheAmendmentintheConstitutionwouldbeopposedtotheschemeof
theConstitutionanditsSalientFeatureswhilethePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,wouldbe
ultravirestheConstitution.
134.Article148(3)enjoinstheFederationtodefendtheProvincesagainstexternal
aggressionandinternaldisorder.Tocarryoutthisdutytheultimateinstrumentavailablewiththe
FederationistheArmedForces.ThemannerofuseofsuchArmedForcesbytheFederationcanbe
gatheredfromtheprovisionsofArticle245.Thelegislativepower,ifsorequired,istobeexercisedin
termsofItemNo.1oftheFederalLegislativeList.
135.Article245whenexaminedinthecontextoftheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionandas
interpretedbythisCourtinthecasesof(1)Brig.(Retd)F.B.Alicase(supra)and(2)Sh.LiaquatHussains
case(supra)withreferencetothetrialofciviliansbytheCourtMartial,theschemeoftheConstitution
canbedeciphered.OriginallyintheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,onits
commencingday,theentireArticle245waslimitedtoArticle245(1)asitexiststoday.Theremaining
subarticleshavebeenaddedthroughsubsequentConstitutionalAmendments.AperusalofArticle
245(1)revealsthattheArmedForcesofPakistan,toachievetheendsmentionedthereini.e.the
DefenceofPakistanshallactonthedirectionsoftheFederalGovernment.Broadlyspeakingtwosetsof
eventualitieshavebeencateredforinthesaidArticle.First,theeventofexternalaggressionor
threatofwarandthesecondeventualitytoactinaidofcivilpower.Exfaciethetwosetsof
eventualities,referredtoabove,areseparateanddistinctandsubarticles3and4pertaintothesecond
eventualityoftheArmedForcesactingintheaidofcivilpower,asisobviousfromtheplainlanguage
thereofandconsequently,notrelatabletosituationinvolvingexternalaggressionorathreatofwar.
136.IncasetheArmedForcesuponthedirectionoftheFederalGovernmentarerequired
toactinaidofcivilpowerthelegalimplicationsareratherobviousinviewoftheratioofthecase,
reportedasSh.LiaquatHussain(supra).TheArmedForceswouldacttoassistthecivilpowerbutcannot
replaceit.Theirrolewouldbeprimarilywithregardtosupportingandinvigoratingtheexecutive
functions,moreparticular,pertainingtolawenforcementandthepolicepower.TheArmedForces
cannotsupplanttheentirecivilpower.Moreparticularly,thisappliestothejudicialpoweroftheState,
whichisexercisedthroughthefunctioningoftheCourtsunderanIndependentJudiciary.Inotherwords
theArmedForcesmayquelldisturbanceandapprehendoffenderswhowillbebroughtbeforethe
regularCourtsfortrial.TheArmedForcesmaynotbeauthorizedtoconstitutetheirowncourtsfortrial
aslongastheregularcourtsarefunctioningintheareawheretheArmedForceshavebeencalledinto
actinaidofcivilpower.Thenaturalcorollarythereofisthatthecivilians,nototherwisesubjectofthe
PakistanArmyAct,arenottobetriedbyMilitaryCourtsorCourtMartial.Suchisthelawlaiddownin
Sh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra).SuchdictumasstatedthereinisonlyapplicablewhentheArmed
Forceshavecalledinaidofcivilpower.
137.Intheeventofanexternalaggressionorthethreatofwar,theaforesaidrestrictions
andlimitationspersemaynotbeapplicable,inviewofthetextofArticle245,asinterpretedbythis
Courtinthecase,reportedasSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra).
138.ThesituationswithregardtoanexternalaggressionagainstPakistanmaynotpresent
muchdifficultyspeciallywithregardtotheactualtheatreofwarassubstantialbodyofcaselawis
availablespellingoutthejurisprudenceonthesubjectwhichneednottobegoneintoasthesameisnot
relevantfortheadjudicationofthelisathand.
139.Article245isnotlimited,inthisbehalf,onlytoExternalAggressionortheArmed
Forcesactinginaidofcivilpower.Thephrasethreatofwarusedthereinisnotsuperfluousand
mustbeattributedpropermeaningandeffect.Itobviouslyincludesasituationwhereexternal
aggressionisthreatenedandappearstobeimminentbutactualhostilitieshavenotcommenced.
140.Thereisyetanothereventuality,wherethelawandordersituationdegenerates
beyondmerecivildisorderandriotingtoinsurrection,mutinyoropenarmedrebellionagainsttheState
wherebyterritoriesarelosttothemiscreantsandtheInstitutionsoftheStatenolongerexistinsuch
areas.Insuchaneventuality,adutyiscastunderArticle148(3)upontheFederalGovernmenttodefend
theFederation,theProvinceandeverypartthereof.Appropriatedirections,inthisbehalf,canonlybe
givenintermsofArticle245.Mereactinginaidofcivilpowermaynotbesufficient,adequateor
efficaciousinsuchasituation.TheprovisionsofArticle245withregardtoactinginaidofcivilpower
withitsrestrictionsandconditionaltiesmaynotbeapplicable.Inthecircumstances,unlessasituationis
heldtobecoveredbythephrasethreatofwartheFederalGovernmentmaybehelplesstomakeits
DefencePoweroftheStateandunabletofulfillitsobligationsintermsofArticle148(3).Thenatureof
warchangeswitharmedconflictswithinaState;thesecanleadtoawarlikesituationnecessitating
appropriateresponses.ToborrowthewordsfromtheAustralianJurisdictionofDixon,J.notedasunder:
Nodistinctioncanbedrawnbetweendefenceagainstexternalattackanddefenceagainstinternal
attack,whichismoreinsidiousthandirectexternalattackandinsomerespects,becauseitisoften
secret,moredifficulttocombat.
141.TheConstitutionmustbeinterpretedsoastokeepupwiththechangingtimes,ashas
beenconsistentlyheldbythisCourtincludingthejudgmentreportedasSardarFarooqAhmedKhan
Leghariandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1999SC57),whereinitwasobservedas
under:
ImighthaveoptedfortheformerviewifIweretooverlooktwoimportantaspects,firstlythata
Constitutionisanorganicdocumentdesignedandintendedtocatertheneedsforalltimestocome.Itis
likealivingtree,itgrowsandblossomswiththepassageoftimeinordertokeeppacewiththegrowth
ofthecountryanditspeople.Thus,theapproach,whileinterpretingaConstitutionalprovisionshould
bedynamic,progressiveandorientedwiththedesiretomeetthesituation,whichhasarisen,
effectively.Theinterpretationcannotbenarrowandpedantic.ButtheCourtseffortsshouldbeto
construethesamebroadly,sothatitmaybeabletomeettherequirementsofeverchangingsociety.
Acontemporaneousinterpretationofthreatofwarwouldincludesuchastateofaffairsandall
actionstakenbytheArmedForcestocounterthethreatofsucharmedrebellionwithinthecountry
wouldobviouslybefortheDefenceoftheStateandtheoffencescommittedbysucharmedinsurgent
actingasenmityoftheStatewouldhaveadirectnexuswiththeDefenceofPakistan.
142.InthecontextofthelawasalreadylaiddownbythisCourtinBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliscase
(supra)andSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)civilianscannotbetriedbyCourtMartialorotherMilitary
Courts,intheeventuality,theArmedForcesarecalledinaidofcivilpowerbutwheretheArmed
Forcesaredirectedtodealwithexternalaggressionorthreatofwarsuchcivilianscanbetried
wheretheoffenceinquestionhasadirectnexuswiththeArmedForcesortheDefenceofPakistan,asis
obviousfromtheextractsfromtheabovejudgments,reproducedhereinabove.
143.Intheabovecircumstances,itisrequiredtobedeterminedwhetherthegravityofthe
currentsituationandtheintensityofthearmedconflict,warrantsitsdescriptionasathreatofwar
permittingtrialofciviliansbyCourtMartial.Inthisbehalf,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistan
madeavailableFactualDataandonthebasisthereofcontendedthatsince2002morethansixteen
thousandincidentsofterroristsattackshaveoccurredwhichincludeattacksonthemostsensitiveof
defenceinstallations,includingtheGHQ,RawalpindiandAirBasesatKamrainthevicinityofIslamabad
andatKarachi.CiviliansAirportshavealsobeenattacked.Mosques,Imambargahs,Churchesandother
placesofworshiphavebeensubjecttoattacksandbombblasts.Publictransporthavebeenambushed
andafteridentifyingthepassengersonthebasisofsectorreligionkilledincoldblood.Somuchso
schoolshavenotbeensparedandsmallchildrenmassacred.Atvariouspointsoftime,controlofState
ontheterritorieshavebeenperiodicallylost.,asinthecaseofSwatandpriortothecommencementof
themilitaryoperationlaunchedaboutoneyearago,partsofNorthWaziristan,KhyberandotherTribal
Agencies,whichwereinthetotalcontrolofthearmedenemiesoftheStatewheretheflagofPakistan
nolongerflewnoritsInstitutionfunctioned.Sincetheyear2002,morethan56,000Pakistanshave
beenkilledorwounded,includingbothciviliansandMembersoftheLawEnforcementAgencies.Itwas
furthercontended,thatthenervecenterofthearmedenemiesofPakistanmaybelocatedinthe
territoryheldbythembuttheirtentaclesarespreadalloverPakistaninthegarbofabettorsand
facilitatorswhereatattacksarelaunchedandfromwherefundingisreceived.Itwasfurthercontended
thatthepersonsinvolvedinthearmedconflictagainsttheStatenotonlyincludeforeignersbutthere
arealsoindicationsofforeignfundingandinstigation.Tocounterthesituation,largescalemilitary
operationswererequiredtobeundertakenandarebeingcurrentlyconductedinvolvingnotonlythe
PakistanArmybutalsothePakistanAirForce.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralalsomaintainedthatthe
armedpersonswagingwaragainstPakistanarewellorganizedandwelltrainedwithdeclaredforeign
affiliationsandthecoordinationandintensityoftheiraggressionhascreatedasituation,thegravity
whereofcannotbesqueezedintothenarrowconfinesofastateofaffairswheremereactinginaidof
civilpowerbytheArmedForceswouldsuffice.Itisintheabovebackdrop,inordertodealwiththe
currentsituation,anadditionaltooltocounterthesituationhasbeenprovidedbywayofthe
questionedAmendmentsintheConstitutionandthePakistanArmyAct.
144.ThecontentionsraisedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanappeartobe
quitecompelling.SomeofthefactsbroughttothenoticeofthisCourtarealreadyinthepublicdomain.
Wearenotpersuadedtoholdthatthegravityofthesituationissuchthatcanbemetbymerely
directingtheArmedForcestoactinaidofcivilpower.Weappeartobecurrentlyconfrontedwitha
warlikesituationandconsequentlytheFederationisdutyboundbytheConstitutiontoDefendPakistan.
Inthecircumstances,theFederationmustactinaccordancewiththefirstpartofArticle245(1),by
categorizingthecurrentsituationasathreatofwarrequiringextraordinarymeasuresintermsofuseof
theArmedForcesinaccordancewithArticle245.Onthebasisoftheinformationavailabletoit,avalue
judgmenthasbeenmadeinthisbehalfbytheFederalGovernmenti.e.theExecutivebydirectingthe
ArmedForcesintermsofArticle245todealwiththeterrorists.TheParliament(Legislature)toohas
madeajudgmentcallbyenactingthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentandthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015.
145.WehaveexaminedtheprovisionsofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,inthis
behalf.Thereisaspecificreferencethattheoffencemustbecommittedbyapersonknownorclaiming
tobeamemberofaterroristgroupororganization,usingthenameofreligionorsect,whoin
furtheranceofhisterroristdesignwageswaragainstPakistanorcommitsanyotheroffencementioned
therein.ItistheactivitiesofsuchterroriststhathavecreatedthewarlikesituationagainsttheState
necessitatingitsdefencebytheArmedForces.Thus,theoffencescommittedbysaidterroristsappearto
havedirectnexuswiththeDefenceofPakistan.Consequently,theParliamenthadthelegislative
competencetotakeappropriatelegislativemeasuretoenabletheFederationtofulfillitsobligationto
actinDefenceoftheStateofPakistantoprovideforthetrialandpunishmentofoffenceswhichhavea
directnexuswiththeDefenceofPakistancommittedbyciviliansbyCourtMartialunderthePakistan
ArmyAct,1952.SuchlegislativemeasureappearstobeinaccordancewiththeConstitutioninviewof
thelawlaiddownbythisCourtinthecases,reportedas(1)Brig.(Retd)F.B.Alis(supra)and(2)Sh.
LiaquatHussains(supra)inthisbehalf.
146.Article245createsanexceptiontoanormalsituationwheretheArmedForceseither
remainintheirbarracksoratthenationalborders.Article245canbeinvokedinanextraordinary
situationbutonlyasatemporarymeasure.Suchameasureneithercontemplatesnorprovidesa
permanentsolution.Intheinstantcasei.e.the21stConstitutionalAmendmentaswellasPakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,bothcontainsunsetclausesbeingonlyeffectiveforaperiodoftwoyears.
147.ThePetitionersalsocontendedthatdiscretionhasbeenconferredupontheExecutive
topickandchooseastowhichcasesaretobesentortransferredfortrialbytheCourtMartial,while
othercasesshallbetriedbytheordinarycourtse.g.AntiTerrorismCourtstherebyoffendingagainst
Article25.Atthisjuncture,weneedtoexaminewhethertheprovisionsofthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,canbetestedonthetouchstoneofFundamentalRights,asitisthecaseofthe
RespondentsthatupontheincorporationthroughtheAmendment,thePakistanArmyActinthe
SchedulereferredtoinArticle8,theFundamentalRightsarenotattracted.Thisassertionhasbeen
contestedbythePetitionersonthefollowingbasis:
(a)thatnonewlawcanbeaddedtotheScheduleofArticle8whichinitsapplicationand
scopeislimitedtothelawsoriginallymentionedoratbestasontheeveofthe21stAmendment;
(b)thatregardlessoftheeffortinthisbehalfbytheParliament,thePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,inlaw,hasnotbeenincorporatedintotheScheduletoArticle8,asthe
AmendmenttotheConstitutionprecededtheAmendmentofthePakistanArmyActconsequently,the
PakistanArmyAct,1952,unamendedbythePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,alonestood
incorporatedintheSchedule.Inthisbehalf,itwaspointedoutthatthoughthe21stConstitutional
AmendmentAct,2015,andthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,areofthesamedaybutthe
formerisidentifiedasActNo.1andthelaterasActNo.2.
(c)thatalternativelysuchadditiontotheScheduletoArticle8isacceptedsuchanAmendmentas
hasbeendoneoffendsagainsttheSalientFeaturesandschemeoftheConstitution.
148.Withregardtoissueraisedin(a)above,referenceneedstobemadetotherelevant
provisioni.e.Article8subarticle3asoriginallyframed,whichreadasfollows:
8.(3)TheprovisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(a)anylawrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForces,orofthepoliceorofsuchother
forcesasarechargedwiththemaintenanceofpublicorder,forthepurposeofensuringtheproper
dischargeoftheirdutiesorthemaintenanceofdisciplineamongthem;or
(b)anyofthelawsspecifiedintheFirstScheduleasinforceimmediatelybeforethe
commencingday;
andnosuchlaworanyprovisionthereofshallbevoidonthegroundthatsuchlaworprovision
isinconsistentwith,orrepugnantto,anyprovisionofthisChapter.
TheabovesaidArticlewasamendedbytheFirstConstitutionalAmendmentAct,1974,wherebythe
followingphrasewasincorporatedinArticle8(3)(b):
orasamendedbyanyofthelawsspecifiedinthatSchedule;.
Bythe4thConstitutionalAmendmentAct,thefollowingclause(ii)wasaddedtoArticle8(3)(b):
(ii)otherlawsspecifiedinPartIoftheFirstSchedule;.
Byvirtueof5thConstitutionalAmendmentAct,theScheduletoArticle8wasamendedand
furtherlawsincludingRegulationswereaddedthereto.
149.Article8(3)(b)nowreadsasfollows:
8.(3)TheProvisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(b)anyofthe
(i)lawsspecifiedintheFirstScheduleasinforceimmediatelybeforethecommencing
dayorasamendedbyanyofthelawsspecifiedinthatSchedule;
(ii)otherlawsspecifiedinPartIoftheFirstSchedule;
150.TheFirst,FourthandFifthConstitutionalAmendmentshavenotbeenchallengedand
theviresthereofarenotthesubjectmatterofthelisbeforeus.Oncloseandlogicalexaminationofthe
plainwordsofArticle8(3)(b)revealsthatitcatersforthreeseparatecategoriesoflaws,firstlylawsthat
wereoriginallymentionedintheScheduleastheystoodonthedatewhentheConstitutionwas
enforced.Itissettledlawthatthephraseasinforcerelatestothepointoftimewhentherelevant
statuesbecomeslawasonthecommencingdayoftheConstitutionin1973.Thesecondcategory
pertainstosubsequentamendmentsinthelawsalreadymentionedintheSchedule,whichwere
effectedaftertheincorporationofsuchlawsintheSchedule.SuchAmendingActstothelawsarenot
automaticallyprotecteduntiltheseAmendingLawsareaddedtotheSchedulethroughaConstitutional
AmendmentseparatelymentioningsuchAmendingActs.TheintentionoftheLegislatureisapparent
thateveryAmendmentinthelawsmentionedintheScheduleafteritsincorporationthereinmustbe
separatelyconsideredandthroughaconsciousdecisionbytheParliamentbegrantedimmunityfrom
challengeunderArticle8byAmendingtheConstitution.Thethirdcategoryislaws,whichwereneither
mentionedoriginallyintheSchedulenorareAmendmentsthereofbutareseparateanddistinctlaws
thatmaybeaddedintheSchedulebyAmendingtheConstitution.Thisisthetrueimportandthe
intentionbehindArticle8(3)(b)(ii).Suchinterpretationisnotonlylogical,supportedbythetextbutalso
actuallyreflectstheobviousintentionoftheLegislature.ToconstrueArticle8(3)(b)(ii)asaddedby4th
ConstitutionalAmendmentinanyothermannerbyrelyingonsomeunclearandobscuregrammatical
ruleswouldoffendagainsttheprincipleoflogicalinterpretationandmoreimportantlymakethesaid
Article8(3)(b)(ii)redundantandmeaningless.AslawsspecifiedintheScheduleonthecommencingday
arealreadycoveredbyArticle8(3)(b)(i)and,therefore,Article8(3)(b)(ii)cannotyetagainbeconfinedto
thesamelaws.ItmaybeappropriatetoheedthewarningofPollackC.B.issuedahundredandfifty
yearsagothatGrammaticalandphilologicaldisputes(infactallthatbelongstothishistoryoflanguage)
areasobscureandleadtoasmanydoubtsandcontentionsasanyquestionoflaw.[Waughv.
Middleton(1853)8Ex352,356].Thepurposeoftheexerciseofinterpretationoflegislativeenactments
isprimarilytodiscovertheintentionoftheLegislatureandventuringintothefringesoftheintricate
mazeofobscurerulesofgrammarisnotadvisableasobscurantismandStatutoryconstructiondonotgo
handinhand.
151.ItisanancientandconsistentlyappliedprincipleofInterpretationofStatutesthat
whereobjectandintentionofstatuteisclearitmustnotbereducedtoanullitybythedraftsmanis
unskillfulnessorignorance(TheInterpretationofStatutes7thEditionbySirPeterMexwer).
Redundancyorsurplusageisnormallynoteasilyattributedtosubconstitutionallegislationletalonethe
Constitution,asisbeingcanvassed.IthasbeenconsistentlysoheldbythisCourt,includinginthecaseof
EastandWestSteamshipCo.v.QueenslandInsuranceCo.(PLD1963SC663),whereinthisCourt
observedasunder:
Butitisnotpermissibleforuswhilstinterpretingastatutetoholdthatanypartthereofor
anywordthereinissurplusage.Everywordhastobetakenintoaccountandameaninggiventoit.
InthecaseofMuhammadiSteamshipCo.Ltdv.TheCommissionerorIncomeTax(Central)Karachi(PLD
1966SC828),thisCourtheldasunder:
..Butsinceitisawellestablishedruleofinterpretationofstatutesthatnowordsinastatute
aretobetreatedassurplusageorredundantwecannotignorethesewords.
InthecaseofSyedMasroorAhsanandothersv.ArdeshirCowasjeeandothers(PLD1998SC
823),itisobservedasunder:
I,afterreferringtothecaselawoftheEnglish,IndianandPakistanijurisdictions,concludedas
follows:
13.Weareinclinedtoholdthatwecannotattributeanyredundancytoanyprovisionof
theConstitutionoranypartthereof.TheprovisionsoftheConstitutionaretobeconstruedastogive
effecttoeachandeverywordthereof.
Inthiscase,ithasalsoobservedthat:
37.Itmaybeobservedthatoneofthesettledprinciplesofconstructionofprovisionsofa
Constitution/statuteisthattheyaretobeconstruedinamannerwhichmaygiveeffecttoeachand
everywordofthesameandwhichmayharmonizetheworkingofthesameandwhichmayachievethe
objectunderlinedintherelevantprovisions.
152.Intheaforesaidcircumstances,therecanbenomannerofdoubtthattheParliament
onthestrengthofArticle8(3)(b)(ii)canaddnewlawstotheSchedulebutonlythroughtheprocessof
AmendingtheConstitution.
153.AdvertingnowtothesecondlimboftheargumentsthatthePakistanArmyAct,1952,
mayhavebeenincorporatedinScheduleIofArticle8oftheConstitutionbutwithoutthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015.ThesolebasisofsuchcontentionisthattheConstitutionalAmendmentis
mentionedasActNo.1of2015,whilethesubConstitutionalAmendmentisnotedasActNo.2of2015.
ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralhasplacedonrecordtheproceedingsoftheNationalAssemblyandthe
Senateinthisbehalf,whichrevealthatintheNationalAssemblyandtheSenaterespectively,boththe
Amendmentsweredebatedtogether.debatedtogetherandincidentallythePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,waspassedfirstfollowedbythe21stConstitutionalAmendmentAct.Both
enactmentsbecomelawbyvirtueofArticle75(3)whengrantedtheassentbythePresident.Itisa
matterofrecordthatsuchassentwasgrantedtoboththePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,and
21stConstitutionalAmendmentsAct,2015,onthesamedayi.e.7thofJanuary,2015.Thereisnothing
ontherecordtoshowastowhichofthetwoAmendingActswereformallyassentedtofirstbythe
President.
154.ThequestionastothepointoftimewhenaCentralEnactmentcomesintoforceis
cateredforbytheGeneralClausesAct,1897.Section5subsection3,therefore,readsasfollows:
5.(3)Unlessthecontraryisexpressed,a(CentralAct)orRegulationshallbeconstruedas
comingintooperationimmediatelyontheexpirationofthedayprecedingitscommencement.
155.Inthisbehalf,referencecanbemadetothejudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasKhalid
M.Ishaque,ExAdvocateGeneral,Lahorev.TheHonbleChiefJusticeandtheJudgesoftheHighCourt
ofWestPakistan,Lahore(PLD1966SC628),whereinitwasheldthat:
section5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897,whichprovidesthatunlessthecontrarybe
expressed,aCentralActshallbeconstruedascomingintooperationimmediatelyontheexpirationof
thedayprecedingitscommencement.Thus,ifthecommencementbedeclaredtotakeeffectona
particularday,saythe6thJanuary1964theActwouldbedeemedtocomeintoforceimmediatelyafter
thestrokeofmidnightofthe5thJanuary1964.Equally,iftheActwereexpressedtocomeintoeffecton
thegrantingofassentthereto,thenifthatassentwasgivenonthe6thJanuary,1964,.
156.Referencewasmadetosomeunlikelyhypotheticalsituationinanefforttoshowthat
theapplicabilityofSection5(3)ibidastothepointoftimeacentralActcameintoforcemayresultin
awkwardnessorinjustice.TheprovisionsoftheGeneralClausesActhavebeenenactedtoensure
certaintyandclarityandthepurposeofSection5(3)thereofistoavoidtheabundantlyofawildgoose
chaseoftrackingdownclerksandtheirfilessoastodetermineastowhatpointoftimeeachlawcame
intoeffect.
LawsmoreparticularlythoseinthenatureoftheGeneralClausesActtendtodealwith
situationsthatarefrequentandgenerallyoccurasisobviousfromtheancientmaximADEAQUAE
FREQUENTIUSACCIDUNTJURAADAPTANTUR(2Inst.137.)Thelawsareadaptedtothosecaseswhich
morefrequentlyoccur.
157.Rulesofconstructioncaterforanddealwiththerareaccidental,unforeseenand
unusualevents.TheprinciplesinthisbehalfareenunciatedinthemaximCESSANTERATIONELEGIS
CESSATIPSALEX.(Co.Litt.70b.)Reasonisthesoulofthelaw,andwhenthereasonofanyparticular
lawceases,sodoesthelawitself.Suchisancientandsettledlaw.Thereisnoneedtoreinventthe
wheel.
158.ThusbyoperationoflawthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,becameeffective
onthemidnightof6thand7thofJanuary,2015,asaconsequencewhereoftheAmendments
mentionedthereinstoodincorporatedinandformedpartofthePakistanArmyAct,1952.Ifthe21st
ConstitutionalAmendmentActdidnotcomeintoeffectatthetimewhentheassentwasgiventhereto
bythePresidenti.e.laterinthedaybutalsoonthemidnightof6thand7thJanuaryof2015,the
PakistanArmyAct,1952,wasincorporatedintotheSchedulealongwiththeAmendmentseffectedby
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015.
159.ThenumbergiventoActsofParliamentandthenumbermentionedtoNotifications
arebothministerialacts,whichcertainlyarenotperformedbythePresidentofPakistanbutbysome
minorofficialslater.IfthecontentionsofthePetitionersareacceptedthentheConstitution,
Amendmentsthereto,LawspassedandAmendmentstheretoandtheParliamentitselfwouldbecome
hostagetothewhimsofsomenamelessandfacelessclerkinthebureaucracyThatwouldmakea
mockeryofthelaw.
160.Thereisyetanotheraspectofthematter.ByvirtueofArticle8(3)(a),thePakistan
ArmyAct,1952,asitstoodpriortotheAmendment,wasalreadyexcludedfromtheoperationofArticle
8,reproducedabove.Fromaplainreadingoftheaforesaidprovision,itisclearandobviousthatlaws
relatingtotheArmedForcesandforthemaintenanceofdisciplinethereofareclearlyandunequivocally
referredtoasbeingimmunefromtherigorsofArticle8andfromtheirvaliditybeingscrutinizedagainst
thetouchstoneofFundamentalRights.SuchlawswouldobviouslyincludethePakistanArmyAct,1952,
thePakistanAirForceAct,1953andPakistanNavyOrdinance,1961.Ifthecontentionsofthelearned
counselareacceptedthatunamendedinPakistanArmyAct,1952,onlyhasbeenincorporatedinthe
Scheduledespitethefactthatforallintentsandpurposesitwasalreadyimmunefromtheoperationof
thesaidArticletheresultwouldbethatsuchportionofthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentActisa
redundancyandtheentireexercise,inthisbehalf,isanabsurdity.Thereisagreatbodyofprecedent
lawaswellasopinionasexpressedintheclassicalandacceptedTreatisesonthesubjectthatthelaw
requiresthatabsurdityshouldnotbeattributedtotheLegislature.
InMaxwellsInterpretationofStatutestheruleisthusstatedonp.229,1953Edition,whichreadsas
under:
Wherethelanguageofthestatuteinitsmeaningandgrammaticalconstructions,leadstoamanifest
contradictionoftheapparentpurposeoftheenactment,ortosomeinconvenienceorabsurdity,
hardshiporinjustice,presumablynotintended,aconstructionmaybeputuponitwhichmodifiesthe
meaningofthewords,andeventhestructuresofthesentence.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofKhalidQureshiand5othersv.UnitedBankLimitedIIChundrigarRoad,Karachi(2001
SCMR103),thisCourtobservedasunder:
Itispertinenttomentionherethattheinitialpresumptionisthatanabsurdityisnotintendedby
thelawmaker.(PLD1964Dacca756,PLD1962Lah.878).Incaseofdoubtastotheintentionof
Legislature,aninterpretationwhichleadstomanifestabsurdityshould,ifpossible,beavoided.(PLD
1964Lah.101+PLD1966AzadJ&K38).(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofSyedMehmoodAkhtarNaqviv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryLawandothers
(PLD2012SC1089),thisCourtheldasunder:
29.Itisacardinalprincipleofconstructionthatthewordsofastatutearefirstunderstoodintheir
natural,ordinaryorpopularsenseandphrasesandsentencesareconstruedaccordingtotheir
grammaticalmeaningunlessthatleadstosomeabsurdity.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofFederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryM/oPetroleumandNaturalResourcesand
anotherv.DurraniCeramicsandothers(2014SCMR1630),thisCourtobservedasunder:
29.suchconstructionispermissibleifitreflectsthetrueintentionoftheLegislatureandiftohold
otherwisewouldrenderparticularwordsinthestatuteeithermeaninglessorleadtoabsurdity.
161.TheintentionoftheParliamentisclearlyvisible.ByvirtueofArticle8(3)(a)the
PakistanArmyAct,1952,andforthatmatterthePakistanAirForceAct,1953andPakistanNavy
Ordinance,1961,alreadystoodprotectedandexemptedfromtheapplicationofArticle8interaliato
theextentthattheydealwithmaintenanceofdisciplineamongthemembersofArmedForcesandfor
theproperdischargeoftheirduties.AsaconsequenceofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,
mattersotherthanthosepertainingtodisciplineamongstanddischargeofdutiesbythemembersof
theArmedForceswereincludedintheambitofthePakistanArmyAct,hence,inordertoprotectsuch
amendmentsalsofromtherigorsofArticle8,itwasnecessarytoplacePakistanArmyAct,1952,(as
amended)intheSchedule.SuchwastheclearandobviousintentionoftheLawmakerswhichmustbe
giveneffectto.Itwouldneitherbepropernorlawfultonullifysuchintentionbyattributingabsurdityto
theParliamentandredundancytothe21stConstitutionalAmendment.
162.Thus,therecanbenohesitationinholdingthatthePakistanArmyAct,1952,as
amendedbythePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,hasbeenvalidlyandeffectivelyincorporatedin
theScheduletotheConstitutionaswastheclearintentionoftheLegislature.
163.DuringthecourseofproceedingsbeforethisCourtsomemisgivingswereexpressed
withregardtotheprocedureadoptedbyaCourtMartial.Theprocessandprocedurefollowedbythe
Forums,establishedunderthePakistanArmyAct,havecomeupforscrutinybeforethisCourtand
foundtobesatisfactoryandconsistentwiththerecognizedprinciplesofcriminaljustice.InBrig.(Retd)
F.B.Aliscase(supra)theproceduretobefollowedfortrialsunderthePakistanArmyActwasdilated
uponingreatlengthspeciallyintheconcurringopinionofYaqoobAli,J.(ashethenwas)andfoundto
beinconformitywiththegenerallyacceptedandrecognizedprinciplesofcriminaljustice.Asimilarview
wasalsoexpressedbythisCourtinthejudgment,reportedasMrs.ShahidaZahirAbbasiand4othersv.
PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC632).TheprovisionsofthePakistanArmyActwere
scrutinizedbytheFederalShariatCourtinthecase,reportedasCol.(R)MuhammadAkram(supra)and
generallypassedmuster.Theprocedurewhichwasfoundacceptableforofficersandmenofthe
PakistanArmycanhardlybetermedasunacceptablefortrialofterrorists,whoactsasenemiesofthe
State.
164.ThequestionofdiscriminationhasbeenraisedbythePetitioners.Inthisbehalf,
referencemaybemadetothejudgmentofthisCourt,reportedasBrig.(Retd)F.B.Aliandanother
(Supra),whereinitwasheldasfollows:
Equalprotectionofthelawsdoesnotmeanthateverycitizen,nomatterwhathiscondition,mustbe
treatedinthesamemanner.Thephrase`equalprotection'ofthelawsmeansthatnopersonorclassof
personsshallbedeniedthesameprotectionoflawswhichisenjoyedbyotherpersonsortheclassof
persons.
Itwasalsoheld:
Tojustifythevalidityofaclassification,itmustbeshownthatitisbasedonreasonabledistinctions
orthatitisonreasonablebasisandrestsonarealorsubstantialdifferenceofdistinction.
Itwasfurtherobserved:
Thus,inthefieldofcriminaljustice,aclassificationmaywellbemadeonthebasisoftheheinousness
ofthecrimecommittedorthenecessityofpreventingcertainantisocialeffectsofaparticularcrime.
ChangesinproceduremayequallywellbeeffectedonthegroundofthesecurityoftheState,
maintenanceofpublicorder,removalofcorruptionfromamongstpublicservantsorformeetingan
emergency..
andalsoobservedthat:
TheprincipleiswellrecognizedthataStatemayclassifypersonsand,objectsforthepurposeof
legislationandmakelawsapplicableonlytopersonsorobjectswithinaclass.
InthecaseofI.A.Shirwaniandothersv.GovernmentofPakistanthroughSecretaryFinanceDivision,
Islamabadandothers(1991SCMR1041),thisCourtheldasfollows
thatinordertomakeaclassificationreasonable,itshouldbebased
(a)onanintelligibledifferentiawhichdistinguishespersonsorthingsthataregroupedtogetherfrom
thosewhohavebeenleftout;
b)thatthedifferentiamusthaverationalnexustotheobjectsoughttobeachievedbysuch
classification.
Theaforesaidviewhasbeenreiteratedinthenumerouscasesincluding(1)JahanghirSarwarandothers
v.LahoreHighCourtandanother(2011SCMR363),(2)PakcomLimitedandothersv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(PLD2011SC44),(3)AllPakistanNewspapersSocietyandothersv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(PLD2012SC1)(4)Dr.ShahnazWajidv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary
EstablishmentDivision,GovernmentofPakistan(2012PLC(CS)1052),(5)RegardingPensionaryBenefits
oftheJudgesofSuperiorCourtsfromthedateoftheirrespectiveretirementsirrespectiveoftheir
lengthofserviceassuchJudges(PLD2013SC829)(6)SecretaryEconomicAffairsDivision,Islamabadv.
AnwarulhaqAhmedandothers(2013SCMR1687).
165.ThecasesthatcanbetriedunderthePakistanArmyActhavebeenclearlyidentifiedin
termsofoffencesenumeratedthereinwhencommittedbyaterroristknownorclaimingtobea
memberofagroupororganizationorinthenameofareligionorasect.Thisisanascertainableand
clearlydefinedcriteriabasedonanintelligibledifferentiaandconstituteavalidclassification.
166.Section4ofPakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,clearlystatesthattheprovisions
thereofshallhaveeffectnotwithstandinganylawforthetimebeinginforceandincaseofanyconflict
theprovisionsofthesaidActshallprevail.Itisalsoclearthatnonewoffencehasbeencreatedonlya
newforumfortrialhasbeenprovidedfor.Asapurequestionoflaweveniftheoffencesinquestionor
incorporatedintwoseparateStatutesorprovisionsprovidingfortrialsbytwoseparateForumsthe
mattercanbereferredtofortrialtoanyofthetwoForumsbyvirtueofSection25oftheGeneral
ClausesAct,1897.Bethatasitmay,theprovisionsofPakistanArmyAct,1952,asamendedbyPakistan
Army(Amendment)Act,2015,hasbeenincorporatedintheSchedulereferredtoinArticle8therefore,
itsprovisioncannotbeinvalidatedforoffendingagainstFundamentalRights,includingArticle25.
Similarly,Article10AalsocannotbepressedintoservicetochallengetheprovisionsofPakistanArmy
Act,1952asamended.IncidentallytheOrdinanceinvalidatedinSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)was
notincorporatedintheScheduletoArticle8.
167.Duringthecourseofproceedings,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistan
attemptedtoindicatethattheselectionandthetransferofcasefortrialbytheCourtMartialandthe
eventualorderspassedandsentenceawardedmaybebeyondthepowersofJudicialReviewoftheHigh
CourtsandthisCourt.Inthisbehalf,referencewasmadetothebarofjurisdictioncontainedinArticle
199(3)oftheConstitution.Weareafraidthatsuchiscontrarytothesettledlawofthelandas
repeatedlyannunciatedbythisCourt.
168.InthecaseofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Aliscase(supra),thisCourtobservedasunder:
Howeverwidetheconnotationofthesewordsmaybetheycannotpossiblyactasabarwherethe
actionimpugnedisitselfwithoutjurisdictionorcoramnonjudiceorhasbeentakenmalafideasheldby
thisCourtinStatev.ZiaurRahman.(2)Ontheotherhandiftheactioniswithjurisdictionandbonafide
thenIampreparedtoconcedethatthebarwillbeoperativeinrespectofalmostanythingifitisin
relationtoapersonwhoisevenonlyforthetimebeingsubjecttoalawrelatingtotheArmedForce.
InthecaseofMrs.ShahidaZahirAbbasand4othersv.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC
632),thisCourtobservedasunder:
ItisquiteclearfromtheabovequotedpassagethatthebarcontainedinArticle199(3)ofthe
ConstitutiononthepowersoftheHighCourtisnotabsoluteinnature.Atleastinrespectofthree
categoriesofcases,namely,wheretheimpugnedactionismalafide,orwithoutjurisdictionorcoram
nonjudicetheBarofArticle199(3)isnotapplicable.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofEx.Lt.Col.AnwarAziz(PA7122)v.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,
MinistryofDefence,Rawalpindiand2others(PLD2001SC549),thisCourtheldasunder:
9.BynowitiswellsettledprincipleoflawthattheHighCourtunderArticle199(3)ofthe
Constitutioncanexaminethecasesfallingwithinthreecategories,namely,whereimpugned
order/judgment,ismalafide;orwithoutjurisdictionorcoramnonjudice.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofFederationofPakistanandothersv.RajaMuhammadIshaqueQamarand
another(PLD2007SC498),thisCourtheldasunder:
thatthebarcontainedinArticle199(3)oftheConstitutiononthepowersoftheHighCourtisnot
absoluteinnature,atleastinrespectofthreecategoriesofcaseswhereimpugnedjudgmentismala
fide,orwithout,jurisdictionorcoramnonjudicetowhichbarofArticle199(3)oftheConstitutionisnot
applicable.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofGhulamAbbasNiaziv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2009SC866),this
Courtalsoheldasfollows:
9.TheviewaforesaidwasreaffirmedbyafullBenchjudgmentinMrs.ShahidaZahirAbbasiv.
PresidentofPakistanPLD1996SC632(e)andMst.TahiraAlmasv.IslamicRepublicofPakistanPLD2002
SC830(a).Thisbringsustotheonlyconclusion,havingattainedtheforceoflawoftheland,thatthebar
underArticle199(3)oftheConstitutionisnotattractedtoacase,wheretheauthorityinvolvedhas
actedwithoutjurisdiction,malafideandcoramnonjudice.Havingsodetermined,wewouldnowadvert
tothefactsandcircumstancesofthepresentcaseinordertoseeifthetrialandconvictionofthe
appellantsbyFieldGeneralCourtMartialwaswithoutjurisdiction,coramnonjudiceandmalafide.
InthecaseofFederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryDefenceandothersv.AbdulBasit(2012
SCMR1229),thisCourtobservedasfollows:
8.ThequestionastowhethertheHighCourtwascompetenttotakecognizanceofthematterin
viewofthebarcontainedinArticle199(3)oftheConstitutionhasbeendealtwithbythisCourtinCivil
AppealsNos.1274and1275of2005(FederationofPakistanandothersv.RajaMuhammadIshaque
Qamar),whereinithasbeenheldthatnotwithstandingthebarcontainedinArticle199(3)ofthe
Constitution,whereanyactionhasbeenfoundtobewithoutjurisdictionorcoramnonjudiceormala
fide,extraordinaryjurisdictionoftheHighCourtunderArticle199couldcompetentlybeinvokedbyan
aggrievedperson.Therespondentsintheabovereferredcasehavechallengedtheactionofthe
appellants,interalia,onthegroundthatpara5ofthecircular/notificationdated13121992oftheAir
Headquarterswasoverlookedwhileremovingtherespondentsfromservice.TheHighCourtfoundthe
saidimpugnedactionoftheappellantstobeunfairandunjustandidenticalpleawasraisedbeforethis
CourtthattheHighCourtwasinerrorinentertainingthepetitionsinviewofthebarcontainedin
Article199(3).ThisCourtinitsjudgmentreferredtohereinabovehasheldthattheHighCourthad
rightlyentertainedthepetitions.Thenonobstanteclausehastobestrictlyconstrued.Ifanactionofthe
authorityisincolourfulexerciseofpowerandoristaintedwithmalice,nonobstanteclausewillnot
comeinthewayoftheHighCourttoentertainsuchapetition.Thenonobstanteclausedoesnot
provideblanketcovertotheappellantsandissubjecttojudicialreviewiftheactiononthepartofthe
appellantsiscoramnonjudice,withoutjurisdictionormalafide.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofRanaMuhammadNaveedandanotherv.FederationofPakistanthrough
SecretaryM/oDefence(2013SCMR596),thisCourtheldasunder:
9.Yes,Article199(3)oftheConstitutionprohibitstheHighCourtfrommakinganorderinrelation
toapersonwhoisamemberofArmedForcesofPakistanorwhoisforthetimebeingsubjecttoanylaw
relatingtoanyofthoseforcesorinrespectofanyactiontakeninrelationtohimasamemberofthe
ArmedForcesofPakistanorasapersonsubjecttosuchlawbutnotwhenacts,actionsorproceedings
whichsufferfromdefectofjurisdictionandarethuscoramnonjudice.ThecasesofFederationof
Pakistanandanotherv.MalikGhulamMustafaKhar(PLD1989SC26),Secretary,MinistryofReligious
AffairsandMinoritiesand2othersv.SyedAbdulMajid(1993SCMR1171)andGhulamAbbasNiaziv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2009SC866)maywellbereferredtointhisbehalf.
InthecaseofEx.PJO162510RisaldarGhulamAbbasv.FederationofPakistanthrough
Secretary,MinistryofDefence,GovernmentofPakistan,Rawalpindiandothers(PLJ2013SC876),this
Courtobservedasfollows:
5.Thereisnodoubtthat(as)persettledLawwhereanyactionororderofanyauthorityrelating
totheArmedForcesofPakistan,whichiseithercoramnonjudice,malafide,orwithoutjurisdiction,the
samecanbechallengedbeforetheHighCourtandthebarcontainedArticle199(3)oftheConstitution
wouldceasetooperate.AsmuchhasbeenheldinalonglineofcasessuchasBrig(R)FBAliandanother
vs.TheState(PLD1975SC506),FederationofPakistanandanothervs.MalikGhulamMustafaKhar
(PLD1989SC26),ShahidaZahirAbbasiand4othersvs.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC
632),SardarFarooqAhmedKhanLaghariandothersvs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1999SC
57)andMushtaqAhmedvs.SecretaryMinistryofDefence(PLD2007SC405).(emphasisaresupplied)
169.ReferenceinthisbehalfmayalsobemadetothejudgmentofthisCourtinthecase,
reportedasTheStatev.ZiaurRahmanandothers(PLD1973SC49),whereinthisCourt,observedas
follows:
Itwillthusbeseenthat,sofarasthisCourtisconcerned,ithasconsistentlyheldtheviewthatamala
fideactstandsinthesamepositionasanactdonewithoutjurisdiction,because,noLegislaturewhen
grantingapowertodoanactcanpossiblycontemplatetheperpetrationofinjusticebypermittingthe
doingofthatactmalafide.(emphasisaresupplied)
InthecaseofFederationofPakistanandanotherv.MalikGhulamMustafaKhar(PLD1989SC
26),thisCourtalsoheldasfollows:
DuringtheMartialLawwhenthefundamentalrightsstoodsuspended,Article4furnishedtheonly
guaranteeorassurancetothecitizensthatnoactiondetrimentaltothelife,liberty,body,reputationor
propertyofanypersonwouldbetakenexceptinaccordancewithlawActsactionsorproceedings
whichsufferedfromexcessorlackofjurisdictionorwerecoramnonjudiceormalafide(beitmalicein
factorinlaw)couldhardlybetreatedasthoseinaccordancewithlaw.(emphasisaresupplied)
170.ThisCourthasalsofollowedasimilarviewinthejudgments,reportedas(1)Karamat
Aliv.State(PLJ1976SC341),(2)Secretary,MinistryofReligiousAffairsandMinoritiesand2othersv.
SyedAbdulMajid(1993SCMR1171),(3)Mst.TahiraAlamsandanotherv.IslamicRepublicofPakistan
throughSecretary,MinistryofInterior,Islamabadandanother(PLD2002SC830),(4)BegumSyedAzra
Masoodv.BegumNoshabaMoeenandothers(2007SCMR914)(5),SyedRashidAliandothersv.
PakistanTelecommunicationCompanyLtdandothers(2008SCMR314)and(6)ChiefJusticeofPakistan
IftikharMuhammadChaudhryv.PresidentofPakistanthroughSecretaryandothers(PLD2010SC61).
171.Inviewoftheabove,therecanbenomannerofdoubtthatitisasettledlawthatany
orderpassedorsentenceawardedbyaCourtMartialorotherForumsunderthePakistanArmyAct,
1952,includedasamendedbythePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,issubjecttotheJudicial
ReviewbothbytheHighCourtsandthisCourt,interalia,onthegroundofcoramnonjudice,without
jurisdictionorsufferingfrommalafidesincludingmaliceinlaw.Thiswouldalsoholdtrueforany
decisionselectingortransferringacasefortrialbeforeaCourtMartial.Furthermore,suchdecision
requirestheexerciseofdiscretionbytheExecutiveAuthority,whichmustnecessarilybeexercised
reasonably,fairly,justlyandfortheadvancementofthepurposeoftheenactment,asprovidedby
Section24AoftheGeneralClausesAct,1897,whichisreproducedhereunderforeaseofreference:
24A.Exerciseofpowerunderenactments.(1)Wherebyorunderanyenactmentapowertomake
anyorderorgiveanydirectionisconferredonanyauthority,officeorpersonsuchpowershallbe
exercisedreasonably,fairly,justlyandfortheadvertisementofthepurposesoftheenactment.
(2)Theauthority,officeorpersonmakinganyorderorissuinganydirectionunderthepowers
conferredbyorunderanyenactmentshall,sofarasnecessaryorappropriate,givereasonsformaking
theorderor,asthecasemaybeforissuingthedirectionandshallprovideacopyoftheorderorasthe
casemaybe,thedirectiontothepersonaffectedprejudicially.
172.AdvertingnowtothecontentionofthePetitionersthatthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015,isultravirestheConstitutioninasmuchasitcontemplatestheexerciseof
JudicialPowerbyanExecutiveAuthorityandfurthertheForum(CourtMartial)investedwithsuch
jurisdictionisnotunderthecontrolandsupervisionoftheHighCourt,asistherequirementofArticles
175and203oftheConstitution.Undoubtedly,theConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,
1973,byvirtueofArticle175enjoinstheexerciseofJudicialPowerbytheSupremeCourt,HighCourts
andsuchotherCourts,establishedbyLawandbyvirtueofArticle203suchotherCourtsmust
necessarilybewithinthecontrolandsupervisionoftheHighCourts.InadditiontheretotheotherCourts
andtheTribunals,whichcanexercisetheJudicialPower,arespecifiedintheConstitution(Federal
ShariatCourt,ServiceTribunalsandElectionTribunals)orasmaybeestablishedbylaw.TheJudicial
PowercannotbeexercisedbytheExecutive,whichwasrequiredtobeseparatedfromtheJudiciaryand
suchexercisebyandlargehasbeencarriedout.Suchisthelaw,asconsistentlylaiddownbythisCourt,
includingthecasesofAzizullahMemon(supra)andMehramAli(supra).Itisnoteventhecaseofthe
RespondentsthattheofficerspresidingovertheCourtMartialarenotfromtheExecutiveorthattheir
appointmentsaretobeeffectedinconsultationwiththeHighCourtconcerned,anaturalattributeof
supervisionandcontrol.ThesimilarargumentfoundfavourwiththisCourtinSh.LiaqatHussainscase
(supra)wherethelawi.e.theOrdinanceNo.XIIof1998,whichprovidedbylegislationthroughreference
fortrialofoffencesmentionedthereinbytheForumsunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952,washeldtobe
ultravires.However,thelegalsituationhasundergoneadecisivechangebyincorporationoftheproviso
toArticle175throughthe21stConstitutionalAmendment.Attheveryoutset,itmaybenoticedthat
theprovisoisapplicabletothesaidArticleandnottoanysubArticleorclausethereof.Anexceptionhas
beencreatedwithregardtotheexerciseofJudicialPowerbyaForum(CourtMartial)otherthanaCourt
orTribunalcontemplatedunderArticle175andthereofbynecessaryimplicationunderArticle203.
Similarly,anexceptionhasalsobeencreatedtothegeneralprinciplelaiddownunderArticle175
regardingtheprohibitionoftheexerciseofJudicialPowerbyanExecutiveAuthorityinasmuchas,ithas
specificallyexcludedthetrialofpersons,whoclaimtobe,orareknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroup
ororganizationusingthenameofreligionorasectfromtheapplicationofArticle175.Inthisviewof
thematter,theprovisionsofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,cannotbeinvalidatedforbeing
inconsistentwithArticle175orthatitcontemplatestheexerciseofJudicialPowerbyanExecutive
Authority.
173.HavingidentifiedandcircumscribedtheeffectofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,
2015asaconsequenceofthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentinthisbehalf,itmaynowbeappropriate
toexaminewhethersuchactionofamendingtheConstitutionoffendsagainsttheSalientFeatures
thereof.Thatasnotedabove,theimpliedlimitationupontheParliamentquatheamendmentofthe
ConstitutionwithregardtotheSalientFeaturesthereofdoesnotplacesuchSalientFeaturesentirely
outofreachoftheamendatorypowersoftheParliament,whichmayexercisesuchpowersinrespectof
suchSalientFeaturesbutcannotabrogate,repealorsubstantivelyalteri.e.significantlyeffectthe
essentialnatureofthesame.The21stConstitutionalAmendment,nodoubt,pertainstotheSalient
Featuresi.e.theFundamentalRightsandtheIndependenceofJudiciary.Whatisrequiredtobe
adjudicateduponisastowhetherthesamehasbeensubstantivelyaltered?
174.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952,asitexistedpriortotheenactmentof21st
ConstitutionalAmendmentandthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,alongwith,PakistanAir
ForceAct,1953andPakistanNavyOrdinance,1961,werealreadyexcludedfromtherequirementsof
conformingwiththeFundamentalRightsbyvirtueofArticle8(3)(a).Throughthe21stConstitutional
Amendment,infact,theamendmentsmadethroughthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,have
alsobeenexcludedfromsuchscrutiny.Theamendedprovisionstemporarilyextendtheprotection
conferreduponthePakistanArmyAct,1952,toincludethetrialofTerroristswagingwaragainst
Pakistan.TheFundamentalRightsoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepeopleofPakistan,including
thoseaccusedofcriminaloffencesremainsunaffected.Atemporarymeasuretargetingaverysmall
specifiedclearlyascertainableclassofaccusedhasbeenbroughtintothenettobetriedunderthe
PakistanArmyActinaccordancewithprocedurewhichhasbeenheldbythisCourttobeconsistentwith
recognizedprinciplesofCriminalJustice.Evenotherwise,theimperativetoactfairlyandjustlyas
reinforcedbySection24AoftheGeneralClausesAct,1897,isapplicable.Neithertheselectionandthe
transferofcasesnortheeventualorderorsentenceareimmunefromthesanctityofJudicialReviewby
theHighCourtsandthisCourt.Inthecircumstances,itisdifficulttoholdthattheessentialnatureofthe
SalientFeaturesofFundamentalRightsasapplicableintheCountryhasbeenrepealed,abrogatedor
substantivelyaltered.
175.However,itmaybeclarifiedthatifmorelawsareaddedtotheScheduletoArticle8,
eachsuchadditionwouldneedtobescrutinizedsoastoensurethattheFundamentalRightsarenot
substantivelyaltered.Aquantitativechangecanalwaysresultinaqualitativechangebringingthe
matterwithintheprohibitionoftheimpliedrestrictionuponthepowertoamendtheConstitution.
176.Similarly,withregardtotheprovisotoArticle175,itmaybenotedthatthevast
expanseoftheJudicialPoweroftheStateintermsofArticle175remainsunaffected.Asnotedabove,a
smallclearlyascertainableclassofoffencesandpersonsaretobetriedbyForumsunderthePakistan
ArmyAct.SuchForumsareestablishedbyLawandpreexistandtheircreationhasConstitutional
recognition.TheselectionofcasesfortrialbyCourtMartialandtheeventualdecisionspassedand
sentencesawardedthereinaresubjecttoJudicialReview,ashasbeenheldhereinabove.Consequently,
theIndependenceofJudiciarythroughSeparationofPowersasaSalientFeaturedoesnotappearto
havebeensignificantlyaffectedinrespectofitsessentialnaturesoastoentailthepenaltyof
invalidation,especiallyinviewofthetemporarynatureoftheamendment.
177.However,thetrialsofciviliansbyCourtMartialareanexceptionandcanneverbethe
rule.AmplificationofthejurisdictionoftheForumsunderthePakistanArmyAct,inthisbehalf,may
stepoutoftheboundsofConstitutionality.
178.TheresponseoftheStateappearstobeproportionateandtargetedfocusingon
terroristsknownorclaimingtobemembersofagroupwagingwaragainstPakistaninthenameof
religionorsect,ratherthanlookingtowardsArticle232,whichwouldhaveadverselyimpactedthe
FundamentalRightstoalargeexpanseofthepopulationandseriouslycurtailedthejurisdictionofthe
Courts.
179.Duringthecourseofarguments,somereferencewasmadetothePublicInternational
LawandInternationalcommitmentsmadebythePakistan.ItisfortheFederalGovernmenttoensure
thatthecourseofactionundertakenbythemdoesnotoffendagainstthePublicInternationalLawor
anyInternationalCommitmentmadebytheState,whichmayhaveadverserepercussionsforPakistan.
180.Inviewoftheaforesaid,itisheldthat:
(a)TheConstitutioncontainsaschemereflectingitsSalientFeatureswhichdefinethe
Constitution.SuchSalientFeaturesareobviousandselfevidentuponaharmoniousandwholistic
interpretationoftheConstitution.InanefforttodiscoversuchSalientFeaturesmaterialoutsidethe
Constitutioncannotbesafelyreliedupon.
(b)TheSalientFeaturesasareascertainablefromtheConstitutionincludingDemocracy,
ParliamentaryFormofGovernmentandIndependenceoftheJudiciary.
(c)TheamendatorypowersoftheParliamentaresubjecttoimpliedlimitations.The
Parliament,inviewofArticles238and239isvestedwiththepowertoamendtheConstitutionaslong
astheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitutionarenotrepealed,abrogatedorsubstantivelyaltered.
(d)ThisCourtisvestedwiththejurisdictiontointerprettheConstitutioninorderto
ascertainandidentifyitsdefiningSalientFeatures.Itisequallyvestedwithjurisdictiontoexaminethe
viresofanyConstitutionalAmendmentsoastodeterminewhetheranyoftheSalientFeaturesofthe
Constitutionhasbeenrepealed,abrogatedorsubstantivelyalteredasaconsequencethereof.
(e)Article175Aasinsertedbythe18thConstitutionalAmendment,inviewofthe
provisionsofthe19thConstitutionalAmendmentandthedictumlaiddownbythisCourtinthecase,
reportedasMunirHussainBhatti,Advocateandothersv.FederationofPakistanandanother(PLD2011
SC308andPLD2011SC407)donotoffendagainsttheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.Theother
questionedprovisionsthererofarealsonotultravirestheConstitution.
(f)The21stConstitutionalAmendmentandthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015
accumulativelyprovide,atemporarymeasureforthetrialofterroristsaccusedofoffencesincluding
wagingwaragainstPakistanbyaforumalreadyconstitutedunderthelawandconsistentwitha
recognizedprocedurealreadyavailableforandapplicabletopersonnelofthePakistanArmy.The
enlargementofthejurisdictionofsuchforumissubjecttoduecompliancewithanascertainablecriteria
constitutingavalidclassificationhavingnexuswiththedefenceofPakistananddoesnotabrogate,
repeal,orsubstantivelyaltertheSalientFeaturesoftheConstitution.
Theprovisionsofthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentassuchareintraviresthe
Constitution.
TheprovisionsofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,arenotultraviresthe
Constitution.
(g)Thedecisiontoselect,referortransferthecaseofanyaccusedpersonfortrialunderthe
PakistanArmyAct,1952,asAmendedissubjecttoJudicialReviewbothbytheHighCourtsandbythis
Courtinteraliaonthegroundsofcoramnonjudice,beingwithoutjurisdictionorsufferingfrommala
fidesincludingmaliceinlaw.
(h)Anyorderpassed,decisiontakenorsentenceawardedunderthePakistanArmyAct,
1952,asamendedbythePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015,arealsosubjecttoJudicialReviewby
theHighCourtsandthisCourt,interalia,onthegroundsofbeingcoramnonjudice,withoutjurisdiction
orsufferingfrommalafidesincludingmaliceinlaw.
181.Inviewoftheabove,alltheinstantConstitutionPetitionsareliabletobedismissedin
theaboveterms.
Sd/Sd/
AnwarZaheerJamaliSarmadJalalOsmany
Sd/Sd/
AmirHaniMuslimGulzarAhmed
Sd/Sd/
Sh.AzmatSaeedMushirAlam
Sd/Sd/
UmarAtaBandialMaqboolBaqar
MianSaqibNisar,j.
(1)IhavehadthepleasureandprivilegeofgoingthroughtheopinionrecordedbytheHonble
ChiefJusticeofPakistantowhichIsubscribeinprinciplebutbecauseofthegreatimportanceofthe
constitutionalissuesthathavearisen,havedecidedtoexpressinmyownwordsmyopiniononthe
same.IalsohadthebenefitofreadingtheproposedjudgmentauthoredbymybrotherSh.Azmat
Saeed,J.Induedeferencetohisviews,IamnotpersuadedthatthisCourthasthejurisdictionto
interfereandexaminetheviresofanAmendmentmadeintheConstitutiononthetouchstone(s)laid
downinthesaidjudgment.Iwillconfinemyselftoaconsiderationofthemostfundamentalissues
involved,includinginparticularthedoctrineofthebasicstructure,asdevelopedbytheIndian
SupremeCourt.Thisdoctrineisnowwellentrenchedintheconstitutionallawofthatcountry.Itison
suchbasisthattheIndianSupremeCourthasasserted,andexercised,ajurisdictiontoreview
amendmentstotheIndianConstitution,andtostrikedownanyamendmentthatsoughttoalteror
amendthebasicstructureofthatConstitutioninamannerthatoffendedjudicialsensibilities.This
Courthasconsideredthisdoctrineinthepast,buthasalwayssofarrefusedtoincorporateitintothe
constitutionallawofPakistan.Wehave,inthesepetitions,beeninvitedyetagaintoadoptthedoctrine.
Forthereasonshereinaftersetout,formypart,Iwouldrefusethisinvitation.
(2)Itwouldonlyunnecessarilyburdentherecordformetoreproduce,eveninsummaryform,the
submissionsthathavebeenmadebythelearnedcounselwhohaveappearedbeforeus,bothforthe
petitionersaswellastherespondents.Thesubmissionshavebeenfullynotedinthejudgmentofthe
HonbleChiefJustice.
(3)Notwithstandingthatthequestionsraisedinthecontextofthedoctrineofbasicstructureare
difficult,complexandinteresting,theyarecertainlynotnovel.Asnoted,thedoctrinehasbeen
consideredbythisCourtinseveraljudgmentsinthe
past.Initsessence,thequestionthatthedoctrinepurportstoaddressissimplythis:isanamendment
oftheConstitutionamenabletojudicialreview?Inmyview,therealpointinissueinsuchcasesis
always,whereliestheconstituentpoweroftheState(forthatisthepowerbywhichtheConstitutionis
amended):withanunelectedjudiciary,althoughcertainlyactingwiththeutmostgoodfaithandinthe
nationalinterest,orwiththechosenrepresentativesofthepeople,eventhoughtheymaynotalways
comeuptotheexpectationsofthepublic?Iwouldrespectfullyanswer:withthelatterratherthanthe
former.
(4)Asiswellknown,andisindeedtritelaw,thelegalityofordinarylegislationistestedontheanvil
oftheConstitution.IfthelegislationisfoundtoviolateanyprovisionoftheConstitution(e.g.,iscontrary
tofundamentalrights),thenthelawisstruckdownasbeingultravires.Thereasonissimple:ordinary
legislationissubordinatetotheConstitution,anddependsonthelatterforitsexistence,eitherbecause
(ifitisexistinglaw)theConstitutionhasmandatedthatitwillcontinuetohavelegalforceandeffect
(seeArticle268),or(ifitisalawmadeafterthecommencingday)ithasbeenmadebyanorgancreated
byorundertheConstitution.IfthereisaconflictbetweentheConstitutionandordinarylegislation,
thenitisobviousthatitistheformerthatmustprevail.Whathowever,isthebasisforchallengingan
amendmenttotheConstitutionitself?What,asitwere,istheanvil,ifany,onwhichthelegalityofthe
amendmentcanbetested?Tothis,therecanbeeitheroneoutoftwoanswers.Theanvilcanbe
somethingthattranscendstheConstitutionitself,i.e.,somethingwhichisonahigherlegalpedestal
thantheConstitution.Legallyspeaking,thisisgenerallyregardedasimpossible.TheConstitutionisthe
legalsourcefromwhichallelseflowsincluding,specifically,thepowersofthejudiciary:ifnosanctity
attachestotheConstitution,thereisnosuchthingasanindependentjudiciary.(Ileavetoonesidethe
pastmistakesmadebytheCourtinthisregardstemmingfromthefundamentallyflawedsocalled
doctrineofstatenecessityandothersimilartheories,andtheblindalleysdownwhich,unfortunately,
thelawhaspreviouslyrepeatedlystumbled.)
(5)ThesecondpossibleansweristhatthereissomethingintheConstitutionitselfwhichis,
constitutionallyspeaking,immutableandthuscannotbealtered,anditisthisargumentwhichwas
urgedbylearnedcounselappearingonbehalfofthePetitioners.Theargumentwasframedindifferent
forms:referencewasmadetothebasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution,ortoits
salientfeatures,ortotheObjectivesResolution,asembodiedinthepreambletotheConstitutionand
givensubstantiveeffectbyArticle2A.Insubstancehowever,thepointwasthesame:theConstitution
hadcertaincorefeaturesorcharacteristicswhichwerefixedandunalterable.Inotherwords,thereare,
accordingtothelearnedcounselforthePetitioners,certainaspectsoftheConstitutionthatareso
fundamentalandbasicthattheyconstitutetheveryfabricoftheConstitution.Toattempttoalteror
removethesefeatures,ortotamperwiththem,istotearintotheveryheartoftheConstitution,sothat
whatwouldbeleftbehindwouldnotbetheConstitution,butsomethingelsealtogether.Thesefeatures
oraspectscouldnot,therefore,betouchedbyanyamendment.Thisthen,wastheproposedanvil:ifthe
amendmentsoughttoalterortamperwith,orwascontraryto,thebasicstructureorsalient
featuresoftheConstitution,thenitwasinvalid.And,itwasfurthersubmitted,andthisistheheartof
thematter,thatthiswassomethingthatwasamenabletojudicialreview,i.e.,itwasforthecourtsto
determinewhethertheimpugnedamendmenthadbreachedthebasicstructureorthesalient
featuresoftheConstitution.Inotherwords,ifthelearnedcounselforthePetitionersarecorrect,this
criticallyimportantissue,whichisdeterminativeofthenatureoftheConstitutionandthemodein
whichthepeopleofPakistanaretobegoverned,is,ineffect,outsidetheframeworkofdemocracy.It
wassomethingwhichwasnotconceivedofbytheframersoftheConstitution.Itisnotsomethingfor
thepeopleofPakistantodeterminethroughtheirelectedrepresentativesbutbythejudiciary,which,in
thefinalanalysis,isabodyofappointeesirrespectiveofthequestionastowhomakesthe
appointments.Imustbluntlystatewhatisatstakehere:ifthispropositionistrue,thentrulythe
theoreticalfoundationsofdemocracyinPakistanarecalledintoquestion.Theimportanceofthis
questioncannot,therefore,beoveremphasized.
(6)ThequestionbeforetheCourtcanthereforebereformulatedasfollows:shouldtheCourt
acceptthatanamendmenttotheConstitutioncanbejudiciallyreviewedonthebasisofthebasic
featuresorbasicstructureorsalientfeaturesdoctrine?(note:onthetouchstoneofobjective
resolution,thepreambletotheConstitution,Article2Athereto,thetricotomyofpower,asperthe
schemeoftheConstitution,and/orthelawenunciatedbythisCourtoranyothervariantinthiscontext)
Andifso,canoroughtArticle175AandthesubstitutedArticle63A,andthedeletionoftheprovision
relatingtointrapartyelectionsfromArticle17,allasbroughtaboutbythe18thAmendment,be
nullifiedonthebasisofsuchadoctrine?Similarly,canthechangesintroducedbythe21stAmendment
bereexamined,andifnecessary,bestruckdowninpartorwhole?
(7)Ofcourse,thedoctrineputforwardbylearnedcounselforthePetitionersisnotsomething
new.Asnotedabove,itisapartoftheconstitutionallawofIndia.Thebasicfeaturesdoctrinehas
beenpropoundedatlengthandappliedbytheIndianSupremeCourtinanumberofcases,includingin
particular,thefoundationalcaseofKesavanandaBharativStateofKeralaAIR1973SC1461.Thiscase
wasdecidedbytheslenderestofmajorities,7:6,sothat,ineffect,oneJudgesviewwasdecisiveofthis
criticallyimportantconstitutionalissue.TheGovernmentofIndiaindeedmadeanunsuccessfulattempt
tohavethematterreviewed.Areviewbenchwasconstitutedandthemattertakenupbutwasnot
allowedtocontinuetillfruition.Thusthejudgmentremainsintact.Allsubsequentdecisionsofthe
IndianSupreme
Court,reaffirmingand(aswillbeseen)expandingthedoctrineweregivenbybenchescomprisingofa
lessernumberofJudges(usuallynotmorethan5)whowereboundbythepreviousdecisionofthe13
memberbench,leadingtothesomewhatparadoxicalresultthatoneJudgesopinion(which
incidentally,aswillbeseenlater,differedinalmostallimportantrespectswiththejudgmentsofthe
othersixjudgesinthemajority)hasreshapedtheconstitutionalmapofIndiainadecisivemanner.This
simplefactshouldmakeusthinkveryhardbeforeventuringdownthatthornypath.
(8)UptonowthebasicstructuredoctrinehasnotfoundfavorwiththisCourt.Inmorethana
fewcases,theCourtwasinvitedtoinvalidateamendmentstotheConstitutiononthisbasis.Inthepast,
suchinvitationswerefirmlyrejected.TheentirecaselawwasextensivelyreviewedbythisCourtin
PakistanLawyersForumandothersvFederationofPakistanandothersPLD2005SC719,wherethe
17thAmendmenttotheConstitutionwasunderchallenge.Thepetitionswereunanimouslydismissed,
andIwillhaveoccasion,laterinthisjudgment,tocitetherelevantobservationsoftheCourtfromthat
decision.Atthispoint,itissufficienttonotethatthecaselawgoesbacktotheearlyseventies,i.e.,is
virtuallycoextensivewiththeConstitutionitself.Thus,thisCourthad,foraperiodofseveraldecades,
resolutelysetitsfaceagainstacceptinganydoctrineorbasisonwhichanamendmenttothe
Constitutioncouldbesubjectedtojudicialreview.
(9)Beforeproceedingfurther,itwouldbeconvenienttorefertoPartXIoftheConstitution,which
providesforitsamendment.ThisPartcomprisesofonlytwoArticles.Article238statesthatthe
ConstitutionmaybeamendedbyActofParliament.Themannerinwhichthismaybedoneissetforth
inArticle239.Initsoriginalform,thisArticlereadasfollows:
(1)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionshalloriginateintheNationalAssemblyandwhentheBillhasbeen
passedbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheAssemblyitshallbe
transmittedtotheSenate.
(2)IftheBillispassedbytheSenatebyamajorityofthetotalmembershipoftheSenateitshallbe
presentedtothePresidentforassent.
(3)IftheBillispassedbytheSenatewithamendments,itshallbereconsideredbytheNational
Assembly;andiftheBillasamendedbytheSenateispassedbytheAssemblybythevotesofnotless
thantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheAssembly,itshallbepresentedtothePresidentfor
assent.
(4)IftheBillisnotpassedbytheSenatewithinninetydaysfromthedayofitsreceipttheBillshallbe
deemedtohavebeenrejectedbytheSenate.
(5)ThePresidentshallassenttotheBillwithinsevendaysofthepresentationoftheBilltohim,andifhe
failstodosoheshallbedeemedtohaveassentedtheretoattheexpirationofthatperiod.
(6)WhenthePresidenthasassentedtoorisdeemedtohaveassentedtotheBill,theBillshallbecome
ActofParliamentandtheConstitutionshallstandamendedinaccordancewiththetermsthereof.
(7)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionwhichwouldhavetheeffectofalteringthelimitsofaProvinceshall
notbepassedbytheNationalAssemblyunlessithasbeenapprovedbyaresolutionoftheProvincial
AssemblyofthatProvincepassedbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipof
thatAssembly.
(10)TwopointsmaybemadewithregardtotheoriginalformofArticle239.Firstly,itwasrelatively
easiertoamendtheConstitutionintermsthereof,sincealthoughabillamendingtheConstitution
requiredatwothirdsmajorityofthetotalmembershipoftheNationalAssembly,itonlyrequireda
simplemajorityofthetotalmembershipoftheSenate.Secondly,theArticledidnotexpresslyprovide
thataconstitutionalamendmentcouldnotbechallengedincourt,nordiditexpresslyassertthatthe
powerofthelegislaturetoamendtheConstitutionwaswithoutlimitation.
(11)Article239wassubstitutedbyGeneralZiaulHaqbymeansofPresidentialOrder14of1985
(witheffectfrom02.03.1985).However,thissubstitutionwasswiftlydiscarded,andbymeansofthe
Constitution(SecondAmendment)Order,1985(P.O.20of1985),Article239wassubstituted(with
effectfrom17.03.1985)yetagain,andtookitspresentshape,whichisasunder:
(1)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionmayoriginateineitherHouseand,whentheBillhasbeenpassed
bythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheHouse,itshallbetransmittedto
theotherHouse.
(2)IftheBillispassedwithoutamendmentbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotal
membershipoftheHousetowhichitistransmittedunderclause(1),itshall,subjecttotheprovisionsof
clause(4),bepresentedtothePresidentforassent.
(3)IftheBillispassedwithamendmentbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotalmembership
oftheHousetowhichitistransmittedunderclause(1),itshallbereconsideredbytheHouseinwhichit
hadoriginated,andiftheBillasamendedbytheformerHouseispassedbythelatterbythevotesofnot
lessthantwothirdsofitstotalmembershipitshall,subjecttotheprovisionsofclause(4),bepresented
tothePresidentforassent.
(4)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionwhichwouldhavetheeffectofalteringthelimitsofaProvinceshall
notbepresentedtothePresidentforassentunlessithasbeenpassedbytheProvincialAssemblyof
thatProvincebythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofitstotalmembership.
whatsoever.
(12)Article239nowprovidesthatabilltoamendtheConstitutionmustbepassedbybothHouses
ofParliamentbyatwothirdsmajorityofthetotalmembershipofeachHouse.Clause(5)expresslybars
thejurisdictionofthecourtswithregardtoconstitutionalamendments,andclause(6)clarifiesthatthe
powerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitutioniswithoutlimitation.Article239,asitstandstoday,was
ratifiedbythe8thAmendment(whichwasupheldinMahmoodKhanAchakzaivFederationofPakistan
PLD1997SC426),andhasnotbeencalledinquestionsincethen,norhaveanyofitsprovisionsbeen
specificallychallengedbythePetitionersinthepresentPetitions.
(13)ItmaybenotedthatmuchofthecaselawwherebythisCourt(andtheHighCourts)refusedto
countenanceanyjudicialreviewofanamendmenttotheConstitutionrelatestotheperiodwhenArticle
239stoodinitsoriginalform,i.e.,priortothe1985substitution.InsuchleadingcasesasTheStatevZia
urRahmanPLD1973SC49,FederationofPakistanvSaeedAhmedKhanandothersPLD1974SC151,
IslamicRepublicofPakistanvAbdulWaliKhanPLD1976SC57andFederationofPakistanvUnited
SugarMillsLtd.PLD1977SC397thisCourtrepeatedlyheldthatitdidnothavethepowertostrikedown
anyprovisionoftheConstitution,includinganyamendmentmadethereinonanybasis,whetherthatbe
thenationalaspirationsofthepeople,orKelsensoftenmisunderstoodtheoryoftheGrundnormor
theObjectivesResolutionoranyhigherethicalnotionsorphilosophicalconceptsoflaworonthebasis
ofthebasicstructure.TheHighCourtswereequallyemphaticonthepoint.InDewanTextileMillsLtd.
vFederationPLD1976Kar1368(expresslyapprovedbythisCourtinthePakistanLawyersForumcase),
theSindhHighCourtdismissedpetitionschallengingthe4thAmendmenttotheConstitution.TheHigh
CourtcorrectlynotedthatundertheConstitution,boththelegislativeandtheconstituentpowersofthe
Stateweretobeexercisedbythelegislature,butthattherewasaqualitativedifferencewhenthe
legislaturewasexercisingordinarylegislativepower,andwhenitwasexercisingconstituentpowerto
amendtheConstitution.TheHighCourtobservedasfollows:
Ifthen,itispermissibleunderArticle239toamendtheConstitution,thequestiontheniswhether
thereareanyimpliedrestrictionsthatcanbespelledoutfromtheConstitutionitself.
ItwouldbeatoncenoticedthattheprovisionsforamendmentoftheConstitutionhasbeen
incorporatedinaseparatelyenactedPartofConstitutionexclusivelyreservedforthispurpose,under
theheadingAmendmentoftheConstitution.ThisPartconsistsofonlytwoArticles238and239,
whereastheformertakescareoftheexclusivenessfromanyothermodebywhichthepowercontained
inthisPartcanbeexercised,thelatterArticleprovidesforthemannerinwhichActofParliamentto
amendtheConstitutionistobepassedanditspatenteffect,namely,thattheConstitutionshallstand
amendedinaccordancewiththetermthereof.
ItisinthisbasicdistinctionthatanActofParliamentpassedinexerciseofthepowerscontainedinPart
XIoftheConstitutionthatitdiffersfromanyotherActofParliamentwhichispassedinexerciseof
powerstoenactlawonthetopicsenumeratedinthelegislativelistscontainedintheFourthScheduleof
theConstitutionorembodiedspecificallyincertainprovisionsoftheConstitution.Itisalsobythisbasic
distinctionthatdifferenceliesbetweenconstitutionallawandordinarylaw.Anordinarylaw,when
questionedmustbejustifiedbyreferencetothehigherlawi.e.theConstitution;butinthecaseofa
Constitution,itsvalidityis,generallyspeaking,inherentandlieswithinitself.
OnceitisrealisedthataConstitutiondiffersfromlaw,inthataConstitutionisalwaysvalid,whereasthe
lawisvalidonlyifitisinconformitywiththeConstitutionandthatbodywhichmakestheordinarylawis
notsovereign,butitderivesitspowerfromtheConstitution;itbecomesobviousthatanamendmentto
theConstitutionhassamevalidityastheConstitutionitself,althoughthequestionwhetherthe
amendmenthasbeenmadeinthemannerandformandeventhepowerconferredbytheConstitution
isalwaysjusticiable.JustasanordinarylawderivesitsvalidityfromitsconformitywiththeConstitution,
soalsoanamendmentoftheConstitutionderivesitsvalidityfromtheConstitution.
WhenalegislativebodyisalsothesovereignConstitutionmakingbody,naturallythedistinctioninthe
Constitutionandanordinarylawbecomesconceptual,andinfactdisappears,asthebodyhasboththe
Constituentpowerofthesovereignaswellasthelegislativepower.If,therefore,thepowertoamendis
tobefoundwithinPartXIandnottheotherpartsoftheConstitution,asthefactreallyisthenitstands
toreasontoholdthatconstituentpowerofamendmentoftheConstitutionisdistinctfromalegislative
power.
Thedistinctionbetweenlegislativepowerandconstituentpowerisvitalinarigidorcontrolled
Constitution,becauseitisthatdistinctionwhichbringsinthedoctrinethatalawultraviresofthe
Constitutionisvoid,sincetheConstitution,atouchstoneorvalidityandnoprovisionofthe
Constitutioncanbeultravires.
InthedistinctioncontainedinArticle239thattheBillshallbecometheActoftheParliamentandthe
Constitutionshallstandamendedinaccordancewiththetermsthereof,therefore,liesthevital
distinctionwhichmakesthatActofParliamentdifferentfromanyotherActofParliamentpassedin
exerciseofpowerscontainedintherestportionoftheConstitution.Thedistinctionliesinthecriterion
ofvalidity.Thevalidityofanordinarylaw,assaidearlier,canbequestionedandwhenquestioned,it
mustbejustifiedbyreferencetoahigherlaw.TheLegislaturesconstitutedundereachConstitution
havethepowertoenactlawsundertheAuthoritygrantedbytheConstitutioninpartsotherthanPart
XI.Thepowertoenactlawscarrieswithitthepowertoamendorrepealthem.Butthesepowersof
LegislaturedonotincludeanypowertoamendtheConstitution.WhenParliamentisengagedinthe
amendingprocessoftheConstitution,itisnotlegislating.ItisexercisingaparticularPowerwhichissui
generis.ThusanamendmentoftheConstitutionunderArticle239isConstituentlaw,andnotan
ordinarylegislativeproduct.Therefore,apowertoamendtheConstitutionisdifferentfromthepower
toamendordinarylaw.
AssoonasanamendmentismadeintheConstitutionbyvirtueofthepowerexercisedbythe
ParliamentunderPartXIoftheConstitution,theamendmentprevailsovertheArticleorArticles
amended.Thenatureofthispoweritself,therefore,connotesthatitistheConstituentpower,a
definiteformalprocessbywhichtheConstitutionisamended.
(14)ItispertinenttonotethattheforegoingcasesweredecidedwhenArticle239didnotcontain
anyexpressbarregardingthejurisdictionofthecourts.Nonetheless,thefirmviewwasthat
amendmentstotheConstitutionwerenotjusticiable.IfthereforeanamendmenttotheConstitution
couldnotbesubjectedtojudicialreviewwhentherewasnoexpressbar,howcanitbesoreviewed
today,whenclause(5)doescontainsuchabar?Therefore,unlessclause(5)itselfisdeclaredinvalid,it
presentsabarriertotheinvalidationbythecourtsofanyamendmentoftheConstitution.Asnoted
above,clause(5)ofArticle239hasnotbeenchallengedbythePetitioners.
(15)AsnotedbytheSindhHighCourtintheDewanTextilecase,whileamendingtheConstitution,
thelegislatureisexercisingaconstituentpower,andnotamerelegislativepower.Thecheckonthe
latterpowerisofcoursetheConstitutionitself,whichlimitsandcontrolsbothitsscopeandextentand
themannerinwhichitistobeexercised.Ifadisputeariseswhetherthelegislativepowerhasbeen
exceeded,themattercomestothecourtsbecauseinanysystembasedontheruleoflaw,disputesare
(andshouldbe)resolvedbeforeajudicialforum.Andthereasonwhycourtshavethefinalsayinthe
matterisbecausetheremustbesomefinalitytoalldisputes.Inthiscontext,itwouldbeusefulto
remindourselvesofthewellknownwordsofJusticeRobertJacksoninhisconcurringopinioninBrownv
Allen344US443(1953)whenhesaidoftheUSSupremeCourtthatThereisnodoubtthat,ifthere
wereasuperSupremeCourt,asubstantialproportionofourreversalsofstatecourtswouldalsobe
reversed.Wearenotfinalbecauseweareinfallible,butweareinfallibleonlybecausewearefinal.
(16)WhenthelegislatureisexercisingtheconstituentpowerunderArticle239however,the
positionisquitedifferent.TheConstitutiondoesnotcontainanyexpresslimitontheexerciseofthe
constituentpower.Indeed,Article239expresslyclarifiesinclause(6)thatthereisnolimitationtothis
power.Andunlikethesituationwhenordinarylegislativepowerisexercised(andthematterismade
justiciableunderspecificprovisionsoftheConstitution,i.e.,Articles184(3)and199),theexerciseof
constituentpowerisexpresslymadenonjusticiablebyclause(5)ofArticle239.Indeed,evenwithout
clause(5),asnotedabove,thecourtsofPakistanhadcometothesameconclusion.Despitethis,
learnedcounselforthePetitionerscontendthatthebasicfeaturesdoctrine(bywhatevernamecalled)
placescertaininherentlimitationsontheexerciseoftheconstituentpower,whichlimitationsare
impliedinArticle239,anditisforthecourtstodeterminewhetherthoselimitationshavebeen
breachedorexceededbyParliament.Itisthereforenecessarytoexaminethebasicfeaturesdoctrine
insomedetail,inordertoproperlyunderstanditsbasisandscope,andtheconsequencesthatflowfrom
it.ItisalsonecessarytoanalyzethePakistanvariantofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,i.e.,thesalient
featurestheory,sincetheCourthasinthepastrejectedtheformerwhileespousingthelatter,atleast
forsomeperiodoftime,priortodecisivelyrejectingitalsointhePakistanLawyersForumcasein2005.
Itisonlythenthatitwillbepossibletodeterminewhetherthisisadoctrinethatshouldnowbeadopted
aspartofourjurisprudence.
(17)TheIndianSupremeCourtdevelopedthedoctrineofbasicstructureagainstthebackgroundof
itsownconstitutionalhistory.ItwillberecollectedthattheIndianConstitutionwasframedasfarback
as1949andtheframersoftheConstitutionweremenwhohadbeenengagedinthefreedomstruggle.
PriortotheframingoftheIndianConstitutionanObjectivesResolutionwaspassedintheyear1947.
SincetheframersoftheIndianConstitutionhadbeenappointedbytheleadersofthefreedom
movement,itisunderstandablethattheirstatuswouldbesuchaswouldcommandgreatrespectwithin
thecountry.Dr.AmbedkarwasthechairmanoftheDraftingCommitteeandthustheprincipal
draftsman.TheConstitution,initsoriginalform,hasaspecialsanctityinIndianconstitutionallaw.
(18)ThepositioninPakistancouldnotbemoredifferent.ThepresentConstitutionwasframedin
1973,thecountryhavingalreadygonethroughtwopreviousconstitutions,namelythe1956
Constitutionandthe1962Constitution.The1973Constitutionreflectedtheviews,notofthefounders
ofPakistan,butofthethencurrentgenerationofpoliticalleaders.Itwasframedbyaparliamentthe
majorityofwhichconsistedofmembersofaparticularpartywhohadbeenelectedonamanifestlyand
openlysocialistmanifesto.Thisisapointofsomeimportance.Itwillberecollectedthattheoriginal
impulseforfreedomandindependencewaspostulatedonacompletelydifferentfoundation,namely,
thevisionarticulatedbytheQuaideAzamthattheMuslimsofthesubcontinentwere,inevery
meaningfulsense,anationandwereentitledtoformandcreateanationstate.Historicallyspeaking,
therefore,IslamwastheraisondetreforthecreationoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan.However,the
factisthatthepartieswhichcontestedtheelectionimmediatelypriortotheframingofthe1973
Constitutiononaspecificallyreligiousplatform,byandlarge,singularlyfailedtoobtainasizeable
presenceinparliament.Thisagainisahistoricalfact.
(19)Inowturntotheallimportantquestion,namely,what,ifanything,isthebasicstructureofthe
1973Constitution?Thisquestionisframedonthehypothesisthattheconceptofbasicstructureisa
meaningfulconcept,andcanbeappliedinrelationtoaconstitution.Thequestionastowhetherthe
phrasebasicstructureistobeusedinadescriptivesense,oraprescriptivesense,iskeptasidefora
momentalthoughitisoneofseminalimportance.Iwillconsiderandaddressitinduecourse.The
questionis,ineithereventuality,whatistheunderlyingstructureofthe1973Constitution?The
importanceofthisquestionarisesinasmuchasitisnotmeaningfullypossibletodiscussthejuristic
conceptofbasicstructureinavacuum.Ithastobecontextualizedagainstthecircumstancesgiving
risetoitsbirth.
(20)WhenweexaminetheConstitution,asoriginallydrafted,wefindboththereligiousprincipleas
wellasthesocialistideologyreflectedinit.Article2oftheConstitution,whichstatesthatIslamistobe
thestatereligion,isimmediatelyfollowedbyArticle3,whichstatesthattheStateshallensurethe
eliminationofallformsofexploitationandthegradualfulfillmentofthefundamentalprinciplefrom
eachaccordingtohisability,toeachaccordingtohiswork.Article3,therefore,isreflectiveofthe
socialistoriginsoftheConstitution.Theprinciple,fromeachaccordingtohisability,toeachaccording
tohisworkisofcourseafoundationalprincipleofMarxismLeninism.(Infactthislanguagehasbeen
copiedoutfromArticle12oftheConstitutionoftheUSSR(asitthenwas),whichisofcoursebasedon
thewritingsofKarlMarx.)TheconceptofexploitationhasatechnicalmeaningasusedinKarlMarxs
theoreticalworkoneconomics.Itrefersnottoanyoreveryformofexploitationbutthatformof
exploitationwhichthecapitalistclassengagesinagainsttheinterestoftheworkingclass.The
interestingquestionwhicharisesofcourseishowArticles2and3aretobereconciledbecausebothare
cardinalprinciplesonthebasisofthedoctrineofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Clearlythere
isafundamentaldichotomyhere.Marxismrigidlyrejectsallformsofreligionsincetheyreflectpatience
andsufferingascardinalvirtueswhileespousingaviolentandrevolutionarystrugglebytheworking
class(inthevanguardofwhichistobethecommunistparty)whichistooverthrowthebourgeoisieand
thecapitalistclass.InafamousMarxistsaying,religionhasbeendescribedastheopiateofthemasses.
However,theuncomfortablefactremainsthatifwearetoproceedonthebasisofthedoctrineofthe
basicstructurebothIslamandMarxismLeninismareverymuchpresentrightattheinceptionofthe
Constitution.Thedilemmaismademoreacutewhenwecometothequestionofthelawitself.The
followingpassagefromDiasonJurisprudencebringsouttheessentialpointwithgreatclarity(pg.457)
(emphasissupplied):
ThereasonwhyneitherMarxnorEngelselaboratedatheoryoflawshouldnowbeobvious.Law,in
theirview,wasaninstrumentofdomination,tobedoneawaywith,notdevelopedandelaborated.
AlthoughtheyregardedLawasreflectingeconomicconditions,itwouldnotbefairtosuggestthatthey
therebydepriveditofallitscreativeforce.Itcanplay,andhasplayed,acreativepart,butalways
conditionedbyitseconomicsubstrate.Intheproletariandictatorshiplawshouldbeameanstoanend,
namely,topreparethewayfortheclasslesssociety.Itisthusaninstrumentofgovernmentpolicy.
Reverenceofthelawforitsownsakeisabourgeoisfetish.Sincelawisbutameanstoanend,it
shouldonnoaccounthampertheworkoftheproletarianstate.Thereshouldbenodivisionbetween
publicandprivatelaw,because(a)lawbeinganInstrumentofdomination,onlytheproletarian
governmentwilldominateandthereisthusonlygovernmentallaw.Norwilltherebeanysuchthingas
theseparationofpowers.Judicialindependence,too,astraditionallyunderstoodmustgo.Judgesare
instrumentsofpolicyandmustgiveeffecttothis,towhichendtheyhavetobestronglyindoctrinated
beforetheycanbefitforoffice.Thus,intheearlydaysoftheproletariandictatorshipinRussiatheonly
writtenlawconsistedofthedecreesoftheSovietgovernment.ItwaslaiddownintheStatuteofthe
PeoplesCourt,November30,1918,Article122,thatiftherewasnolaw,socialistconsciousnessof
justicehadtobereliedon.Incriminalcasessevererpenaltiesweretobeinflictedonenemiesofthe
regimethanonthosewhointerferedwiththeirfellowcitizensfrompurelypersonalmotives.Itwasleft
originallytothejudgetodecidewhetheragivenactwasprejudicialtotheregimeorwaspurely
personalincharacter.Finally,althoughitwouldnotbetruetoaverthatindividualsshouldenjoyno
libertiesotherthanthoseexpresslyconferreduponthem,therehastobeneverthelessastrict
regulationofthese,especiallyinregardtoproperty,accordingtogovernmentalpolicy.
(21)Ifthereforewearetotakethebasicstructuredoctrineseriously,andapplyittothe
ConstitutioninrelationtoArticles2and3whatwillremainoftheconceptofindependenceofthe
judiciary?Mr.KhalidAnwer,appearingonbehalfoftheFederalGovernment,describedthisasan
uneasymarriageofconvenience.Ifso,itseemsboundtoendinadivorce.Irreconcilablescanneitherbe
married,noryokedtogetherindefinitely.Oneortheothermostinevitablyyield,soonerorlater.But
wheredoesthisleavethebasicstructuredoctrine?Hanginginmidairperhaps?
(22)IfoneproceedsfurtherwiththeenquiryintothestructureoftheConstitution,wefindthat
immediatelyaftertheintroductoryPartIthereisPartIIwhichdealswithfundamentalrightsand
principlesofpolicy.Fundamentalrights,asenvisagedintheoriginalConstitution,are,unfortunatelyin
atleastonesense,theleastfundamentalpartoftheConstitutionsince,unlikeotherarticlesofthe
ConstitutiontheycanbesuspendedbythePresidentundertheemergencyprovisionssetoutinPartX.
Thequestionwhichprimarilyconcernsusiswhetherthefundamentalrights,ascontainedintheoriginal
Constitution,aresuperiororinherentlybetterthanthosewhicharepresentlyinthetextafterthe
passageofhalfacentury?ForpurposesofanalyticalconvenienceIwilltermtheoriginalfundamental
rightsthebasicstructurefundamentalrights.Therecanbelittledoubtastotheanswertothisquery.
Theirscopeandambithasbeenqualitativelyimprovedwiththepassageoftime.
(23)Article10AoftheConstitutionwasintroducedbythe18thAmendmentandisindubitablyone
ofthemostimportantofthefundamentalrights.Itisoneofthelynchpinsonwhichthestructureof
humanrightsrests.Itlaysdown,bothinrelationtodeterminationofcivilrightsandobligationsaswell
ascriminalchargesthatapersonshallbeentitlednotmerelytoafairtrialbutalsotodueprocess.
Theconceptofdueprocessoflawisofcourseoneoftheseminalconceptsoflawwhichappearsinthe
5thAmendmenttoUSConstitutionandtracesitsoriginsbacktotheMagnaCarta(1215).
(24)AnothermajorimprovementwasintroducedbymeansofasubstitutionofArticle17.Thesaid
Article,itwillberecollected,confersuponcitizenstherighttoformandbemembersofpoliticalparties.
However,facedwiththeharshrealitythatapoliticalpartycouldbebannedbytheGovernment,the
18thAmendmentbroughtaboutaradicalchangebyprescribingthatiftheFederalGovernmentwereto
declare,intermsofanylaw,thatapoliticalpartywasoperatinginamannerprejudicialtothe
sovereigntyorintegrityofPakistanthenitwasmandated,withinaspanof15daysofsuchadeclaration,
toreferthemattertotheSupremeCourtandthedecisionofthecourtonareferencewouldbefinal.
Thiswasaveryimportantsafeguardforthefreedomandfunctioningofpoliticalpartieswithoutwhich
nodemocraticsystemcanoperateeffectively.
(25)Anotherimportantfundamentalrightwasconferredoncitizensintermsofarticle19Awhich
conferredtherighttoaccesstoinformationinallmattersofpublicimportance.Thiswasfollowedby
theintroductionofArticle25Abymeansofthe18thAmendmentintermswhereofthestatewas
obligatedtoprovidefreeandcompulsoryeducationtoallchildrenfromtheagesof5to16years.Both
thesefundamentalrightsareofgreatimportance.
(26)ItcanbeseenthereforethatthefundamentalrightsasoriginallyenvisagedbytheConstitution
havebeengreatlyimprovedforthebenefitofthepeopleofPakistan.Ifthereistobeachoicebetween
thebasicstructurefundamentalrightsandthoseexistingtoday,therecanbenodoubtastowhich
wouldbepreferable.
(27)ProceedingfurtherwiththeenquiryintothebasicstructureoftheoriginalConstitutiononecan
turntothethornyissueoflegalsafeguardsfortheelectoralprocess.Asiswellknownthecriticaltestfor
afunctionaldemocracyarisesatthetimeofelections.Withoutfairandfreeelectionstherecanbeno
democracy.ThisisanissuethathasbedeviledthehistoryofPakistanandrepeatedlyeruptedfromtime
totime.Complaintsthatelectionshave,inpartorinwhole,beenrigged,stillresoundinthecountry.
Leavingthepoliticaldimensionsofthematteraside,therecanbenodenialofthefactthatthe
mechanismforholdingelectionshasbeengreatlyenhancedandimprovedwiththepassageoftime.
ThistopiciscoveredbyPartVIIIoftheConstitution.Astrikinglacunaexistedintheoriginalstructureof
theConstitution,namely,thattheElectionCommissiondidnotexistasapermanentbody.Ithadtobe
createdfromtimetotimeasanadhocbodyintermsofArticle218atthetimeofelectionsonlythe
postofChiefElectionCommissionerwasapermanentappointment.However,eventhere,theChief
ElectionCommissioner,whowasandisapivotalfigure,wastobeappointedbythePresidentinhissole
discretion.ThisnecessarilyimpliedthatsincethePresidentwoulddecidethematteronthebasisofthe
adviceofthePrimeMinister,therewasgreatscopeforpossibleappointmentsbeingmadeinapartisan
manner.BothquestionswereaddressedbyanamendmenttoArticle213oftheConstitution.Thesaid
amendment,whichwaseffectedbythe18thAmendment,madeitmandatoryfortheleaderofthe
oppositiontobeincludedintheappointmentprocess.ThiswasdonebyrequiringthePrimeMinisterto
forwardthreenamesforappointmentofChiefElectionCommissionertoaparliamentarycommitteebut
onlyafterconsultationwiththeleaderoftheopposition.Furthermore,theparliamentarycommittee
wastobeconstitutedby50%membersofthetreasurybenchesand50%fromoppositionbenches.It
canbeseenthatthiswasamajorsteptowardstransparency,fairnessandobjectivityinrelationtothe
electoralprocess.
(28)Theothergreatimponderableinrelationtotheholdingoffairandfreeelectionswasthefact
thatintermsoftheoriginalstructureoftheConstitutiontheincumbentgovernmentwouldbeinthe
saddleatthetimetheelectionswereheldandthushaveunrivaledopportunitiestotryandinfluence
theelectoralprocess.Thisproblemwasresolvedbyprovidingfortheappointmentofacaretaker
governmentunderArticle224AintermsofwhichboththePrimeMinisterandleaderoftheopposition
weretobeinvolvedintheprocessofappointmentofacaretakerprimeminister.Onceagainthe
mechanisminvolvednamesofnomineesbeingforwardedtoacommitteeconstitutedbytheSpeakerof
theNationalAssemblyhavingequalrepresentationfromthetreasuryaswellastheoppositionbenches.
Thesocalledbasicstructurehasonceagainbeenradicallyremodeledandreplacedbyafarsuperior
structure.
(29)Whenoneturnstoexaminethelegislativeprocessonefinds,onceagain,thatsignificant
improvementshavebeenmade.BywayofillustrationreferencemaybemadetoArticle89ofthe
ConstitutionwhichconferredonthePresidentthepowerofmakingandpromulgatinganOrdinanceat
anytimewhentheNationalAssemblywasnotinsession.The18thAmendmenthasnowalteredclause
(1)toprovidethatanOrdinancecanonlybepromulgatedifbothHousesofParliamentarenotin
session.Asisobvious,theordinancemakingpowerisaclearcutusurpationoflegislativepowerbythe
Executive.Clause(2)ofArticle89providedthatanOrdinancepromulgatedunderthisArticlewould
havethesameforceandeffectasanActofParliamentsubjecttothecaveatthatitwouldstand
repealedontheexpirationofaspecifiednumberofdaysfromitspromulgationor,ifbeforethe
expirationofthatperiod,aresolutiondisapprovingitwaspassedbyeitherHouseofParliament(or,in
certaincases,theAssembly).TherewasnorestrictionimposedonthePresidenttorepeatedlyre
promulgateOrdinanceswhichhadexpiredontheexpirationoftheprescribedperiod.Therewerecases
inwhichOrdinanceswererenewedrepeatedly,includinginsomecasesasmanyasadozentimesor
thereabout.Thislacunawasalsoaddressedbytheadditionofanexplicitprovisionstatingthatonlyone
extensionwaspossible.
(30)ThemechanismfortheremovalofaPrimeMinisterfromofficebypassingaresolutionofno
confidenceagainsthim,assetoutintheoriginalConstitution,wasseriouslydefective.Article96
originallyprovidedthataresolutionforavoteofnoconfidencecouldnotbepassedagainstthePrime
MinisterbytheNationalAssembly,andcouldnotbeevenmovedunless,bythesameresolution,the
nameofanothermemberofAssemblywasputforwardasasuccessor.Inotherwords,itbecame
mandatoryfortheoppositionpartiestoagree,inadvance,onanotherprimeministerbeforetheycould
evenmovearesolutionforavoteofnoconfidenceagainstasittingprimeminister.Obviouslythere
oughtnottobeanylinkagebetweenthesetwosteps.Ifaprimeministerhaslosttheconfidenceofthe
House,universalparliamentarypracticeindicatesthatheshouldresignforthwith.Thesecondstepofhis
replacementisessentiallyanindependentalthoughconsequentialstep.Oncetheoriginalprime
ministerhaslostavoteofnoconfidencetheoppositionpartiesarethenentitledtoconsulteachother
andeventuallyarriveatanagreementastohissuccessor.
(31)YetanotherstrikinglyunusualprovisionrelatingtotheofficeofthePrimeMinisterinthe
originalConstitutionwasthecompletesubordinationoftheofficeofthePresidenttohimwhichwas
carriedtosuchanextentthatintermsofArticle48eventhesignatureofthePresidentwasnotvalid
unlessanduntilitwascountersignedbythePrimeMinister,whichishardlybecomingthestatusofa
headofstate.Thistoowassubsequentlyrepealed.Thissurelywasauniqueprovisioninthe
parliamentaryhistoryofanycountry.NotsurprisinglyitgaverisetocriticismthattheConstitution,inits
originalform,contemplatednotaparliamentaryformofgovernmentbutaprimeministerialformof
government.So,wasthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionparliamentaryorprimeministerial?Surely,
aninterestingconundrum!
(32)Comingtothejudiciary,itmaynotedthatArticle175oftheConstitutionbymeansofclause(2)
thereofspecificallystatesthatnocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasis,ormaybe,conferredonit
bytheConstitutionorbyanylaw.Inotherwordsthetotalityofjudicialpowerhasnotbeenconferred
onthejudiciary.Thiswasaconsciousdecisionbytheframersofthe1973Constitution.Atthatpointof
timetherewasnoshortageofotherconstitutionsintheworldwhichexplicitlyconferredthetotalityof
judicialpoweronthejudiciary.ThemoststrikingexampleofcourseisthatoftheUSConstitution.
UnderArticleIalllegislativepowerisrestedinCongress.ArticleIIsimilarlyconfersexecutivepowerson
thePresident.ArticleIII,section1statesasunder:
ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt,andinsuchinferior
courtsastheCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish.Thejudges,bothofthesupremeand
inferiorcourts,shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour,andshall,atstatedtimes,receivefortheir
services,acompensation,whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice.
(33)TheUSConstitutioninfactreflectsthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,orthetrichotomyof
powers,initsstrictestandpurestform.ThismodelwasfollowedintheAustralianConstitutionwhich
wasenactedin1900,andsection71thereofconfersjudicialpowerontheHighCourtofAustralia(which
is,ofcourse,nowtheequivalentoftheSupremeCourt).Section71readsasfollows:
ThejudicialpoweroftheCommonwealthshallbevestedinaFederalSupremeCourt,tobecalledthe
HighCourtofAustralia,andinsuchotherfederalcourtsastheParliamentcreates,andinsuchother
courtsasitinvestswithfederaljurisdiction.TheHighCourtshallconsistofaChiefJustice,andsomany
otherJustices,notlessthantwo,astheParliamentprescribes.
(34)AsagainsttheabovestructuretheConstitutionofPakistan,initsoriginalform,isveryclearthat
itreflectsaconsciousdecisionnottoconferthetotalityofjudicialpoweronthejudiciary.Thisismade
furtherclearbynumerousprovisionswhichexcludethejurisdictionoftheHighCourtortheSupreme
Court.Similarly,theentiretyofthelegislativepowerhasnotbeenconferredonParliamentasisbrought
outbytheearlierreferencehereinabovetothepowersofthePresidenttopromulgateOrdinances.
NeedlesstosaytheconceptofanordinanceassuchisunknowntotheUnitedStatesConstitution.
AlthoughthespiritoftheseparationofpowersinheresintheConstitutionofPakistantherecanbelittle
doubtthatarigiddemarcationhasnotbeenprescribedtherein.Forexample,inrelationtothejudiciary,
whenwerefertoArticle212oftheConstitution,whichstillretainsitsoriginalshape,itwillbeseenthat
itcontemplatesoneormoreadministrativecourtsortribunalswhichareauthorizedtoexercise
exclusivejurisdiction.Thusanenclavehasbeencarvedoutinwhichtheconstitutionalcourtshavea
highlyrestrictedrole.Itreadsasunder:
212AdministrativeCourtsandTribunals.
(1)Notwithstandinganythinghereinbeforecontained,theappropriateLegislaturemaybyAct
providefortheestablishmentofoneormoreAdministrativeCourtsorTribunalstoexerciseexclusive
jurisdictioninrespectof
(a)mattersrelatingtothetermsandconditionsofpersonswhoareorhavebeenintheserviceof
Pakistan,includingdisciplinarymatters;
(b)mattersrelatingtoclaimsarisingfromtortiousactsofGovernment,oranypersonintheservice
ofPakistan,orofanylocalorotherauthorityempoweredbylawtolevyanytaxorcessandanyservant
ofsuchauthorityactinginthedischargeofhisdutiesassuchservant;or
(c)mattersrelatingtotheacquisition,administrationanddisposalofanypropertywhichis
deemedtobeenemypropertyunderanylaw.
(2)Notwithstandinganythinghereinbeforecontained,whereanyAdministrativeCourtorTribunal
isestablishedunderclause(1),noothercourtshallgrantaninjunction,makeanyorderorentertainany
proceedingsinrespectofanymattertowhichthejurisdictionofsuchAdministrativeCourtorTribunal
extendsandallproceedingsinrespectofanysuchmatterwhichmaybependingbeforesuchother
courtimmediatelybeforetheestablishmentoftheAdministrativeCourtorTribunalotherthanan
appealpendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,shallabateonsuchestablishment:
ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisclauseshallnotapplytoanAdministrativeCourtorTribunal
establishedunderanActofaProvincialAssemblyunless,attherequestofthatAssemblymadeinthe
formofaresolution,MajliseShoora(Parliament)bylawextendstheprovisionstosuchaCourtor
Tribunal.
(3)AnappealtotheSupremeCourtfromajudgment,decree,orderorsentenceofan
AdministrativeCourtorTribunalshalllieonlyiftheSupremeCourt,beingsatisfiedthatthecaseinvolves
asubstantialquestionoflawofpublicimportance,grantsleavetoappeal.
Clause(2)ofArticle212expresslyexcludesthejurisdictionofthesuperiorcourtstogrant
injunctions,ormakeanyorderorentertainanyproceedingsinrelationtoamattertowhichthe
jurisdictionofanadministrativecourtandtribunalextends.Althoughclause(3)providesforanappeal,
nottotheHighCourtbuttotheSupremeCourt,againstajudgmentofanadministrativecourtor
tribunalthatrighthasbeenseverelyhemmedinbyprescribingthepriorsatisfactionoftheSupreme
Courtthatthecaseinvolvesasubstantialquestionoflawofpublicimportancewhengrantingleaveto
appeal.Inotherwords,althoughitmaybeafirstappealitisstillnotanappealasofright.Thusthemere
factthatadecisionofanadministrativecourtortribunalmaybedemonstrativelyincorrectonthe
meritsstilldoesnotconferontheaggrievedpartyarightofappeal.Thequestiononwhichanappeal
maybeheardiscontingentontwopriorfindings:firstly,thatitisnotaquestionoffact,andsecondly,
thatitisaquestionofpublicimportance.
(35)Afterthisreviewofwhatwouldbeindubitablyregardedassomeofthebasicfeaturesofthe
Constitutionasoriginallybroughtintoforce,andthemanysalutarychangesthathavebeenbrought
aboutthereinsince1973,Iturntoananalysisoftheconceptualunderpinningsandframework(suchas
theyare)ofthebasicstructuredoctrine.Thefirstpointtonoteinthisregard,andthisisofcrucial
importance,isthataphrasesuchasbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureorsalientfeaturesis
normallyusedinapurelydescriptivesense,andthisisthesenseinwhichthisCourthashithertoused
andunderstoodit.(Thatisofcourse,thesenseinwhichIhave,intheforegoingparas,describedcertain
importantfeaturesoftheConstitutionasoriginallybroughtintoeffectandthechangesmade
thereafter.)Evenordinarylegislationcanhavesomebasicstructureorsalientfeatures.Forexample,
thesalientfeaturesoftheContractAct,1872ortheCompaniesOrdinance,1984ortheIncomeTax
Ordinance,2001canbereadilyidentifiedbyanyseasonedlegalpractitioner.Inthesamemanner,every
constitutionhasabasicstructureorsalientfeatureswhichcanbereadilyidentified.Isthe
constitutionwrittenorunwritten?Doesitestablishaunitarystateorafederation?Isitademocracyor
someotherformofpolity?Doesithaveapresidentialformofgovernmentoraparliamentary
democracy?Thesequestionscanofcourse,bemultiplied,butthebasicpointisthatthisismerelya
descriptionofwhatthestateoftheconstitutionisatthetimewhenitisbeingdescribed.What,for
example,arethebasicfeaturesoftheBritishconstitution?Firstly,itisanunwrittenconstitutionand
secondly,theQueeninParliamentissovereign.AfamousobservationaboutthepoweroftheBritish
Parliament,whichhasbeenrepeatedoftendowntheages,isthatParliamentcandoanythingbut
makeawomanaman,andamanawoman.ButdoesthismeanthattheEnglishcourtshaveaccepted
orapplyadoctrineakintothebasicfeaturesdoctrine?Obviously,andcertainly,not.Themerefact
thattheBritishconstitutionhascertainbasicfeaturesdoesnot,therefore,meanthatthosefeatures
areunalterable.Thatwouldbeacompletenonsequitur.Theycancertainlybealtered.Infact,not
merelycantheybealtered,buttheycanbealteredbyasimplemajorityvoteofParliament.Indeed,the
accessionoftheUnitedKingdomtotheEuropeanUnion(sanctifiedbytheEuropeanCommunitiesAct,
1972),thepassageoftheHumanRightsActin1998,thedevolutionoflegislativepowerstotheScottish
ParliamentandtheWelshandtheNorthernIrelandAssemblies(thelatterundertheGoodFriday
Agreement)andeventhecreationoftheUKSupremeCourthavealreadyalteredthem.Thisprocessof
changemayormaynotbereversibleasisamplydemonstratedbyrecentpolitical,democraticandsocial
developmentsintheUnitedKingdom.Thus,theprocessofdevolutionisinmanywaysacceleratingand,
given,e.g.,therecent(andapparentlycontinuing)attemptsbyScotlandtosecede(orgain
independence)fromtheUnitedKingdom,maywellbepoliticallyanddemocraticallyirreversible
althoughfromastrictlylegalperspectivethismaynotbeimpossible.OntheotherhandtheUnited
KingdomsaccessiontotheEuropeanUnionmaywellbereversedifthepeople,exercisingtheir
sovereignpowerthroughthereferendumpromisedbythepresentBritishGovernment,sodecide.For
presentpurposes,whatisofimportanceisthatthesechanges,whichareobviouslyandselfevidentlyof
constitutionalimportancehavealteredandmaycontinuetoalterthebasicstructureoftheBritish
constitutionand,fromthenarrowlylegalperspective,havebeenandwillbebroughtaboutbyordinary
ActsoftheBritishParliament.Thus,inthedescriptivesense,theBritishconstitutionhasforthelast
severalyearsbeeninastateofchange,ifnotflux,andthismaywellremaintrueintheyearsahead.

(36)TheIndianSupremeCourtontheotherhandhasusedthephrasebasicfeaturesorbasic
structureinanentirelydifferentsense,namelyinaprescriptivesenseofestablishingwhatisalegally
enforceableruleofconstitutionallaw.Theruleisessentiallynegative,inthatitpurportstoplacea
limitationonthepoweroftheIndianParliamenttoamendtheIndianConstitution.Inotherwords,it
doesnotrequireanybodyororgantodosomething,butplacesaboundarybeyondwhichParliament
cannotgo.Andsincetheruleislegallyenforceable,itsetsthecourts(andinparticular,theSupreme
Court)astheguardiansoftheboundary.However,theconsequencesofthebasicfeaturesdoctrinego
farbeyondthis.Aswillbeseen,intheIndianjurisprudence,theruleactuallygoesmuchfurtherinthat
theIndianSupremeCourtisnotsimplytheguardianoftheboundarybutisalsoitsarchitect,its
developer,itsbuilderanditsenforcer,andasitscaselawshows,ithasbeenprogressivelypushingthe
boundaryinwards,i.e.,limitingthescopeofParliamentsamendingpower.Inbrief,theIndianSupreme
CourtmodifiesthelanguageoftheIndianConstitutionfromtimetotimeoratanytime,thenre
interpretsitandfinallyenforcesorexecutesitwhilethedirectlyelectedrepresentativesofthepeople
playtheroleofhelplessobservers.Thisisofcourseacompletelyunprecedenteddisplayofjudicial
powerpowerinitsmostnakedform.Notmerelyunchecked,butuncheckable,sincethereareno
meansofcheckingitknowntothelawsofanycivilizedsystemofjurisprudence.Thisisamaladyfor
whichthereisnoremedyandanailmentforwhichthereisnocureshortofacompleteuprootingofthe
judicialanddemocraticsystem.IfallmembersofParliamentweretoagreeinunisonwitheachother
thataconstitutionalamendmentwasrequiredinthenationalinterest,itcouldbestruckdown,inpart
orinwhole,byahandfulofappointedjudicialofficersintheexerciseoftheirowndiscretion.Apower
sovast,soallembracing,canhardlybeconceivedbyanydemocraticsystemofgovernancerestingon
thebasicprincipleofchecksandbalances.TheIndianSupremeCourt,whilepurportingtoactin
furtheranceoftheprinciplesofseparationofpowers,hassignallyfailedtoaddressthequestion:whatis
thecheckontheexerciseofthispowerontheCourtitself?Whereisthebalance?Thisisapower,
moreover,whichhasmostcertainlynotbeenconsciouslyconferredbytheframersoftheIndian
ConstitutionontheSupremeCourt,butwhichhasbeeninferredbythatCourttohavebeenconferred
onit,andeveryendeavorbytheIndianlegislature,whichhastheoreticallyostensiblyconferredthe
poweronitbyusinganyformoflanguageintheplainestofwords,issimplydisregardedoroverruled.If
weweretointroducesuchadoctrineintoPakistanwouldnotcriticsbeentitledtospeculatewhether
thenationhaschangedamilitaryautocracyforajudicialautocracy,withbutabriefintervalforan
improperlyfunctioningdemocracy.
(37)Thecrucialquestionisthis:onwhatbasisdoesonemovefrommeredescriptiontolegal
prescription?Howdoesasimpledescriptionofwhatisassumeprescriptiveforceasaruleoflawof
whatmustalwaysbe?Thisistheconundrumthatliesattheheartofthebasicfeaturesdoctrineand
tothis,inmyrespectfulview,thereisnoconvincinganswerforthcoming,eitherintheIndian
jurisprudence,orinthesubmissionsmadebeforetheCourtbylearnedcounselforthePetitioners.It
alsoneedstobeemphasizedthattheIndianSupremeCourthasneverbeenabletoagreeonan
authoritativedecisionastowhatexactlyarethebasicfeatures.Originally,thediscussionfocusedon
fundamentalrightsandthisconsiderationhadcommencedevenpriortotheKesavanandaBharaticase,
in(e.g.)L.C.GolakNathandothersvStateofPunjabandothersAIR1967SC1643,whichwasalso
decidedbyabaremajorityofone(6:5).Sincethen,therehasbeenafluidandopenendeddiscussionof
whatistobeincludedinthebasicfeaturesdoctrine.Butsurely,ifaconstitutionhascertain
immutableandunalterablebasicfeatures,theyshouldbereadilyandclearlydiscoverable.They
shouldnotbehiddenfromplainview.Theyshouldbeclearlyvisibleevenfromadistance.(Onedoes
notneedtobeageologisttorealizethatthebasicfeaturesoftheHimalayasarethattheyconstitutea
rangeofmountainswiththehighestpeaksintheworld.)Whythenshouldthebasicfeaturesofthe
IndianconstitutionbeshroudedinsuchdeepmysterythateventheSupremeCourtofthatcountry
cannotidentifythemonceandforall?ThesearequestionsthatIwillreverttointhesubsequentparas
ofthisjudgment.
(38)Beforemovingforwardwiththeanalysisofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,twoaspectsofhow
thatdoctrinehasdevelopedinIndianconstitutionallawmustbebrieflyexamined.Asnotedabove,the
foundationalcaseinIndiaisKesavanandaBharativStateofKeralaAIR1973SC1461.Shortlyafterthis
decision,democracyinIndiafaceditsgravestchallengeandthreat.On12.06.1975,theAllahabadHigh
Courtnullified(forelectoralmalpractice)theelectionofMrs.IndiraGandhiinthe1971general
elections.Reactingtothisannulment,whichwouldhaveledtoMrs.Gandhilosingherseat,andthus
officeasprimeminister,theIndianParliament(or,rather,theCongressParty,whichhadwona
landslidevictoryin1971andcontrolledthenecessarymajoritiesintheIndianandstateparliaments)
passed(on07.08.1975)the39thAmendmenttotheIndianConstitution.Thisamendmentvoidedthe
decisionoftheAllahabadHighCourtandplacedthematteroftheprimeministerselection(and,asafig
leaf,thatofcertainotherdignitaries)beyondthescopeofjudicialreview.ItistobenotedthatMrs.
GandhididchallengetheHighCourtdecisionbeforetheIndianSupremeCourt,butwasonlygranteda
conditionalstaybythelattercourton24.06.1975:shewasallowedtoremainamemberofParliament,
butwasbarredfromparticipatinginLokSabhaproceedings.Thiscould,ineffect,havehadveryfar
reachingconsequences.Thisjudicialverdicttriggeredtheworstconstitutionalcrisisinthehistoryof
IndiaandalmostdestroyedIndiandemocracy.Theverynextday,25.06.1975,emergencywasdeclared
inIndia,andthenthe39thAmendmentpushedthroughParliament.Therewasthusagraveand
immediatedangerthatdemocracyinIndiawasslippingintoanautocracy.Thevalidityofthe39th
AmendmentobviouslycameupforconsiderationwhentheIndianSupremeCourtheardMrs.Gandhis
appeal(IndiraNehruGandhivRajNarainAIR1975SC2299).TheSupremeCourtdeclaredthe
amendmentunconstitutionalasbeingviolativeofthebasicfeaturesoftheIndianConstitution.Itwas
heldthatdemocracyrequiredfreeandfairelections,whichwasnotpossibleiftheelectionoftheprime
ministerwasplacedbeyondjudicialreview.However,cruciallyitleftMrs.Gandhiinthesaddle.Onthe
meritsthedecisionwasinherfavorwhichwasforherthevitalfactoralthoughitisbynomeans
clearthatshehadnotresortedtoelectoralmalpractices.ClearlytheSupremeCourthadstaredintothe
abyssandrealizedthatprudencewasthebetterpartofvalor.Ifshehadbeengrantedanunconditional
stayrightatthebeginningperhapstheentirecrisismightneverhaveoccurred.Leftunansweredbythe
CourtwasthequestionthatifonthemeritsthePrimeMinisterhadsostrongacasewhatwastheneed
forallthetheatrics?(Itmaybenotedthatthe39thAmendmentwassubsequentlyformallydoneaway
withbythe44thAmendment.)
(39)Itisimportanttopauseandreflectforamomentonwhathadhappened.Whatevermaybe(as
Irespectfullyconcludelaterinthisjudgment)theintellectualfrailtiesofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,it
hasatleastthismuchtoitscredit:itwaswieldedasashieldwiththeutmostprudencesoasnotto
antagonizeahugelypopularandpowerfulsittingprimeminister.ThesituationinPakistancannot
possiblybemoredifferent.ThisCourthas(andthismustbestatedopenlyandfranklyifthereisatallto
beanyatonementforpastmistakes)ontheonehandrecognizedapowerinamilitarydictatortosingle
handedlyamendtheConstitutioninhisabsolutediscretion,butontheotherhand,todayisbeingasked
tocutdowntheamendingpowerofthedemocraticallyelectedrepresentatives(i.e.,Parliament),vested
inthembytheexpressprovisionsoftheConstitution.OneneedonlyrefertoZafarAliShahandothers
vs.ParvezMusharrafChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothersPLD2000SC869/2000SCMR1137forthis
undeniablefact,howeverunpalatableitmaynowappear.Thematteris,effectively,beingstoodonits
head.Whatamilitarydictator(answerabletonoonebuthimself)cando,anelectedParliament
(answerableandaccountabletothepeople)cannot.Doesthishelporadvancethecauseofdemocracy?
Areparliamentaryinstitutionsstrengthenedorweakened?And,inanycase,isdemocracyinPakistan
underthreattoday,thewayitwasinIndiain1975?Whatexactlyisitthatrequiresbeingshielded,and
fromwhom?
(40)ThesecondaspectregardingtheIndianjurisprudencethatneedstobeexaminedisthe42nd
AmendmentoftheIndianConstitution.BymeansofthisAmendment,theIndianParliamentamended
Article368oftheIndianConstitution(whichrelatestotheamendingpower)byaddingtwoclauses,(4)
and(5),thereto.Theseclauseswereasfollows:
(4)NoamendmentofthisConstitution(includingtheprovisionsofPartIII)madeorpurportingtohave
beenmadeunderthisarticlewhetherbeforeorafterthecommencementofsection55ofthe
Constitution(FortysecondAmendment)Act,1976shallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonany
ground.
(5)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveronthe
constituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealtheprovisionsofthis
Constitutionunderthisarticle.
(41)Asisclear,theseclausesareparimateriawithclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239.Thevalidityof
theaforesaidclauseswaschallengedbeforetheIndianSupremeCourtinMinervaMillsLtd.vUnionof
IndiaAIR1980SC1789,adecisionofa5memberbench(whichwasthereforeboundbythedecisionin
KesavanandaBharati).Itwasheldthatthesaidclauseswereinvalid.Thelimitednatureoftheamending
poweroftheIndianParliament,declaredtobesuchonthebasisofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,was
itselfdeclaredtobeabasicfeatureoftheIndianConstitutiononthebasisofcircularreasoning.Whyis
thebasicstructuretheorypartofthebasicstructure?Becauseitispartofthebasicstructure.Onthis
basis,clause(5)washeldinvalid.Clause(4)wasinvalidatedonthegroundthatthepowerofjudicial
reviewwasalsopartofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,sincethatdoctrinecalledforacontrolled
constitutionandwithoutthecourtshavingan(untrammeled)powerofjudicialreview,theconstitution
wouldsupposedlybecomeuncontrolled,andthebalanceamongthethreeorgansofthestatewould
becomeunbalanced.
(42)Withtheutmostrespect,thereasoningoftheIndianSupremeCourtintheMinervaMillscase
seemstobearemarkablecaseofpullingoneselfupbyonesbootstraps.Obviously,ifclauses(4)and(5)
ofArticle368hadnotbeendoneawaywiththatwould,ineffect,havesoundedthedeathknellforthe
basicfeaturesdoctrine.AndtheonlybasisthattheIndianSupremeCourthadforinvalidatingclauses
(4)and(5)wasthebasicfeaturesdoctrineitself.Bethatasitmay,andwhatevermaybetheposition
inIndianconstitutionallaw,forpresentpurposes,itisimportanttonotethatneitherofclauses(5)and
(6)ofArticle239hasbeenchallengedbythePetitioners.Thus,evenifthebasicfeaturesdoctrine
werenowtoberegardedaspartofourconstitutionallaw,itsactualapplicationandenforceability
wouldatoncerunupagainstthehurdleofclause(6)ofArticle239.IntheIndiancontext,itwasatleast
arguablythecasethatwhenthebasicfeaturesdoctrinewasfirstenunciated(intheKesvavanda
Bharaticase),Article368oftheIndianConstitutiondidnothaveanyprovisionequivalenttothe
subsequentlyaddedclause(5).Thus,awaynomatterhowfrailwasatleasttheoreticallyopenforthe
IndianSupremeCourttoadoptthelineofreasoningtakenbyitintheMinervaMillscase,regardlessof
whatever,withtheutmostrespect,maybethesomewhatdoubtfulpersuasivenessofsuchreasoning.In
ourcasehowever,asalreadynotedabove,thisCourthasrepeatedlyrepudiatedthepowertostrike
downanyprovisionoftheConstitution,includinganamendment,evenwhenArticle239didnothave
anyequivalenttothepresentclause(6).Itisalsotritelawthatanimpliedprovisioncannotbereadinif
itisinconsistentwithanexpressprovision.Thebasicfeaturesdoctrine,evenatitsbroadest,is,and
canonlybe,animpliedlimitationoftheamendingpower.Howthencansuchanimpliedlimitationbe
readintoArticle239inthefaceoftheexpressprovisiontothecontrarycontainedinclause(6),
especiallywhen(i)theexistenceofanysuchlimitationhasbeenexpresslydeniedbythisCourteven
whentherewasnoclause(6),and(ii)clause(6)itselfisnotchallengedorinvalidated?Andfurthermore,
onwhatbasiscouldclause(6)beinvalidatedinthecontextofourConstitutionandtheprinciplesofour
constitutionallaw?Surely,thisbyitselfconstitutesaninsurmountablehurdleinthewayofthe
Petitionerscontentionforadoptingorenunciatingabasicfeaturesdoctrineoritsequivalent.
(43)Revertingtotheanalysisofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,itisobviousthatthestartingpointfor
anysuchdoctrinemustalways,andnecessarily,bedescriptive.Thebasicfeaturesoftheconstitution
mustfirstbeidentified.Itisonlyoncethebasicfeatureshavebeendescribedthattheycanbe
declaredtobeprescriptive,i.e.,heldtoformthebasisforalegallyenforceableruleoflaw.Onewould
ordinarilyassumethatitwouldbeasimpleenoughexercisetodescribethebasicfeaturesofa
constitution.Itisofcoursepossiblethattworeasonablepersonsmaydisagreeastowhethera
particularfeatureought,oroughtnot,toberegardedasabasicfeature.However,itwouldbe
regardedassomewhatmorethanstrangeifitwereheldthatthebasicfeaturesofaconstitutioncould
neverbefullydescribed,buthadtobedecidedonacasebycasebasisbyacourtoflaw.Yet,amazingly,
thatispreciselythepositioninIndianjurisprudence.TheKesavanandaBharaticasewasheardby13
Judges(and,asnotedabove,decidedonlybyabaremajorityof7:6)anddifferentJudgeslisteddifferent
featureswhichtheyregardedasbeingbasictotheIndianConstitution.Butitwasheldthatinany
case,anysuchlistingwasmerelyillustrative,andnotexhaustive.TheIndianSupremeCourtreservedto
itselftherighttodetermine,onacasebycasebasisandfromtimetotime,whetheranyotherfeatures
weretoberegardedasbasic,andindeed,itscaselawshowsasteadyincreaseinthenumberofsuch
features.Thus,therighttomovetheSupremeCourtforenforcementoffundamentalrights(ShriKumar
PadmaPrasadvUnionofIndiaAIR1992SC1213),theindependenceofthejudiciary(SupremeCourt
AdvocatesonRecordAssociationvUnionofIndiaAIR1994SC268),secularism(R.C.PoudyalvUnionof
Indiaandothers[1994]Supp.1SCC324),andthedemocraticstructureandprincipleoffreeandfair
elections(ShriKihotaHollohanvZachilhuandothersAIR1993SC412)haveallgraduallybeenheldtobe
basicfeaturesoftheIndianConstitution.Theresulthasofcoursebeenthatthescopeofthe
amendingpoweroftheIndianParliamenthasbeencorrespondinglyandprogressivelyreduced,and
becomesincreasinglymarginalizedandirrelevant.Indeed,ithasbeennotedinanIndiantreatiseonthe
subject(NeedtoAmendaConstitutionandDoctrineofBasicFeaturesbyDr.AshokDhamija(2007))that
theeffectofthejurisprudenceoftheIndianSupremeCourtisasthoughArticle368oftheIndian
Constitutionhasbeenrewrittenwiththeadditionofanewclause(6)(pg.341):
NotwithstandinganythinginthisConstitution(includingthisarticle),nobasicfeatureofthis
Constitutioncanbeamendedsoastodamageordestroyit.
Explanation:ThequestionwhetheraparticularprovisionisabasicfeatureofthisConstitutionshallbe
decidedineachindividualcasebytheSupremeCourtandthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtthereupon
shallbefinal.
(44)Withtheutmostrespect,Iamunabletoacceptaprescriptiveruleofsuchanature.Itiswholly
unprecedentedinthejurisprudenceofanyothercountry.Countrieswhichhavehadsolidlyentrenched
democraciesforcenturiesandinwhichnoonehaseverclaimedthatthereisnoindependenceofthe
judiciaryarecompletestrangerstosuchadoctrine.Itwouldcertainlybehighlyparadoxicalifthe
conclusionarrivedatisthattrueindependenceofthejudiciaryexistsonlyinthesubcontinentbecause
itisonlythesecountrieswhichhaveembracedabasicfeaturesdoctrine.Surelysuchastartling
conclusioncallsfortheclosestpossibleexaminationofthedoctrine.Weknowasamatterofhistorical
factthatdemocracyhasalwaysbeenahighlyendangeredspeciesinPakistan.Ithasoftenfallentothe
groundunderassaultslaunchedbyantidemocraticforceswavingthebannerofbasicdemocracyor
truedemocracy.Theseassaultshaveinthepastbeenmadebymilitarydictators.Butitshouldnever
beforgottenthattheforcesofauthoritarianismneednotalwaysbeinuniform.Democracy,morethan
anythingelse,isacastofmind,arespectfortheopinionsanddecisionsofapluralityofordinary
citizens,i.e.,thosenotwieldingofficialpower.Itsenemieshavebeennumerousoverthecenturies.The
opponentsofanopensociety,overtheyears,includeintellectualsofhighreputeincludingphilosophers
ofthefirstordersuchasPlato.Itisthereforeimportantthatthemattershouldbekeptinhistorical
perspectivewhiledecidingthisvitallyimportantcase.Ifthecourtsarrogatetothemselvesthepowerto
specifywhatare,fromtimetotime,toberegardedasthebasicfeaturesofaconstitution,anddeny
thatsuchfeaturescanbedefinitivelyascertainedbytheelectedrepresentativeofthepublic,or
everyoneelseforthatmatter,thenthebasicfeaturesceasetobesomethingthatare,orcanbe,
objectivelydetermined.Toputitbluntly,theprescriptiveruleisthensimplytantamounttothis:therule
iswhatthejudiciary,fromtimetotime,saysitis,subjecttoanychangesthatmaybeintroducedbyitat
asubsequentstage.Butwiththeutmostrespect,anysuchrulecannot,andoughtnot,toberegardedas
afundamentalanddecisiveruleoflaw,andthisisespeciallysowhentheruleisonewhichisofthe
highestconstitutionalsignificance.Itisoffundamentalimportancetokeepinmindthatthequestion
herecannotbeofjudicialdiscretionbeingexercised(which,aseveryoneknows,isalwayssupposedto
beexercisedjudiciouslyandinrelationtoanobjectivereality).Thecourtsdonot,andoughtnotto,have
anydiscretionastowhatarethebasicfeaturesofaconstitution.Thebasicfeaturesarewhatthey
are,sincetheyare,bydefinition,builtintotheconstitution.Theyarenottobesubsequently
incorporatedbymeansoflaterchangesofopinion.(Thebasicstructureofabuildingliesinits
foundationandnotinanychangeswhichmaybemadetoitfromtimetotime.)Thebasicfeatures
exist,andmustexist,independentlyofanyjudicialdetermination.Yet,theprescriptiveruleframedby
theIndianSupremeCourtreversesthisposition.Afeatureisbasiconlybecause,andwhen,the
SupremeCourtsaysthatitisabasicfeature,andnotbeforeorotherwise.Itisrespectfullysubmitted
thatthisisnot,andcannotberegardedas,anobjectivelydetermined,ordeterminable,constitutional
principleandnorisittobefoundinanyauthoritativejurisprudentialtreatise.
(45)Aprescriptiveruleoftheforegoingnaturealsohasanecessarycorollary.Ifthebasicfeatures
oftheconstitutioncannotbedefinitivelyandexhaustivelydetermined,andcanbeaddedtothelist
fromtimetotime,thenitfollowsthat,inprinciple,afeaturecanberemovedfromthelistaswell.
Thereis,inprinciple,nothingthatwould,orcould,preventthecourtfromdeclaringatafuturetime
thatagivenfeatureoftheconstitutionisnolongertoberegardedasbasic.Allcourts,including
supremecourts,reversethemselvesfromtimetotime,andwhenconstitutionalprinciplesareinvolved,
thetimecanbemeasuredindecades.Legalideasandtheoriescomeintoandgooutoffashion,and
whatisoffundamentalimportancetoonegenerationmaynotbethatimportant(orevenimportantat
all)tothenext.Ifonesetofjudgesissatisfiedthatafeatureoftheconstitutionoughttoberegardedas
basic,adifferentlyconstitutedcourtmayinthefuturetakeadifferentview.Thereisnoreason,in
principle,whyinrespectofanyparticularpartofthebasicstructure,thecourtmaynot,infuture,
reverseitself.Thus,overtimethebasicstructureorbasicfeaturesoftheconstitutionmaygrowand
shrinkasfeaturesareaddedto,orremovedfrom,thelist.Itthusbecomesahighlyelasticconcept
ratherlikearubberband,whichcaneitherbestretchedorcontracted.Inmyrespectfulview,thisis
hardlyconsistentwiththeideaoftheConstitutionhavingbasicfeaturesorabasicstructure,which
constituteitsfixedandunalterablecore,andwhichare(asitwere)surroundedbylessfundamental
principlesorprovisionswhichmayundergochanges,largeorsmall,overtime,eventotheextentof
beingremovedfromtheConstitutionaltogether.Thereisthus,inprinciple,nothingotherthanthesay
soofthecourtsthatwouldpreserveanyfeatureoftheConstitutionasbeingbasictoit.Afeatureplaced
onthelisttodaybyjudicialdeterminationmaybelikewiseremovedfromthelisttomorrow,andonceso
removed,mayberemovedaltogetherfromtheConstitutionintheexerciseoftheamendingpower.
TheConstitutionthusceasestobetheplatform,orframework,withinwhichthecountryfunctions,but
akintoathemeparkinwhichridesareaddedfromtimetotime.
(46)Inadditiontotheforegoing,thereisanotherconsequenceofthebasicfeaturesdoctrinethat
mustbekeptinmind.Ifthereisabasicfeaturesdoctrine,thenanyfeaturedeterminedtobebasic
wouldbeimmutable.Fromthis,itshouldnecessarilyfollowthatnoneoftheorgansofthestate,
includingthejudiciary,mayalteranyfeaturedeclaredtobebasic.Yetthatispatentlynotthecase.
Thejudicialbranchhasaltered,andcontinuestoalter,thecontentofthebasicfeatures.Takethe
exampleofthepresentpetitions.ThesehaveallbeenfiledunderArticle184(3),invokingtheoriginal
jurisdictionconferredonthisCourtbytheConstitution.Butthatjurisdictioncanonlybeinvokedifthere
isanyviolationofthefundamentalrightsconferredbyChapter1ofPartIIoftheConstitution.The
fundamentalrightallegedtobeunderthreatinthepresentcaseistherightofaccesstojustice.Itis
submittedbythePetitionersthatthisrightcanhavemeaningonlyifthereisanindependentjudiciary,
anditistheindependenceofthejudiciarythatisallegedtobeunderthreatbythenewlyaddedArticle
175A.ForthejurisdictionalpurposesofArticle184(3),itmustbeshownthattherightofaccessto
justiceisafundamentalright,andthat,thatrightisbeingviolated.Now,therightofaccesstojustice,as
anindependentfundamentalright,isnowheretobefoundinChapter1ofPartII.Itisentirelyarightof
thisCourtsownmakinganditisacceptedassuch.Yet,fundamentalrightsarepartofthebasic
featuresdoctrineandaresupposedlyunalterablebyanyorganofthestate.Notwithstandingthat,this
CourthasalteredthecontentofabasicfeatureoftheConstitution.Thus,itwouldfollowinasimilar
mannerthattheCourtcan,inexerciseofitspowerofinterpretingandapplyingtheConstitution,bring
aboutfundamentalchangesin,oralterationsto,otherfeaturesdeclaredtobebasic.Wherethen,
doesthisleavethestructureoftheConstitution?Cananyonebecertainwhatitis,orwillbe?Atime
honoredcomplaintagainstuncertaintyinthelawisthatthelawshouldnotvarywiththelengthofthe
LordChancellorsfoot.Isthisuncertaintynowtoinfectthesupposedlybasicandunalterablestructure
oftheConstitutionitself?WhatremainsoftheprincipleofthesanctityoftheConstitution?
(47)Ahypotheticalreplytotheaboveisthattherecognition(orcreation)ofafundamentalright
suchasaccesstojusticedoesnotconflictwiththebasicfeaturesdoctrinebecause,whileitcertainly
altersthecontentofthebasicfeatures,itdoesnotdamageordestroyanyoftheotherbasic
features.Inotherwords,sothereplywouldgo,whatthebasicfeaturesdoctrineprohibitsareonly
undesirablechanges,whichadverselyaffectabasicfeature;itdoesnotdisallowalterationswhichare
desirable.Anobviousexampleofadesirable(andthereforepermissible)changewouldbetheinclusion
ofArticle19A(righttoinformation)tothelistoffundamentalrightsbythe18thAmendment.Analleged
exampleofanundesirable(andhenceimpermissible)changecouldbethedeletionoftherequirement
ofintrapartyelectionsfromArticle17.Iwouldrespectfullyrespondwithaquestion:whoisto
determinewhatchangestothebasicfeaturesareundesirable,andwhatarethedesirablechanges?
Theobviousansweris:thecourts,withtheSupremeCourthavingthefinalsayinthematter.Theresult
wouldbethatanychangebroughtabouttothebasicfeaturesbythelegislature,evenwhileacting
unanimously,intheexerciseoftheamendingpowerwouldbesubjecttochallengebeforethejudiciary.
Thejudiciary,ontheotherhand,wouldhaveanuntrammeledpowerinthisregard,sincebydefinition,a
changeoralterationmadetothebasicfeaturesbythejudicialbranchwouldhavetobedeemedas
desirable.Thus,themostbasicandfoundationalofallrights,whichliesattheheartofdemocracy,
namelythepowertodeterminehowandbywhom,andinwhatmanner,astateistobegoverned,
whichvestswiththepeople,andistobeexercisedthroughtheirelected(andnotappointed)
representatives,willhavebeenfatallyeroded.Whateverthepeoplechoosetodothroughtheirelected
representativeswould,asitwere,requireanNOCfromthejudiciary,butwhateverthejudicialbranch
maydo,wouldbebeyondallscrutiny.Thisisobviouslyasomewhatsurprisingdefinitionofdemocracy
andiscertainlyunknowntocountrieswhichhaveenjoyedtheblessingsofdemocracyandan
independentjudiciaryforcenturies.Iwouldagainrespectfullydrawattentiontothepointmadeby
JusticeRobertJackson.
(48)Theforegoinganalysisisnotmerelyatheoreticalconsideration,buthasseriouspractical
consequences,asisshown(e.g.)bythetusslebetweentheIndianParliamentandtheIndianSupreme
CourtoverArticle368oftheIndianConstitution.Ifthecourtsarrogatetothemselvestherightofnot
merelydeterminingwhatfeaturesaretoberegardedasbasic,butalsotherighttoalterthecontent
ofthebasicfeaturesfromtimetotimeoratanytime,thestagemay,Ifear,besetforapossible
confrontationbetweenthelegislativeandjudicialbranches.Asimpleexamplewillillustratethepoint.
Supposethelegislaturealtersaprovisionthatisregardedaspartofthebasicfeaturesofthe
Constitutionandachallengetothischangefailsbecausethecourtsconcludethatthechangeor
alterationisacceptableordesirable.Supposethatsubsequently,thelegislaturewishestoremovethe
changefromtheConstitution,i.e.,restoretherelevantprovisiontoitsoriginalform.Wouldthisbe
possible?Wouldnotthecourtsdisallowthesubsequentattempttorestoretheoriginalpositionasan
impermissiblealterationofabasicfeature?Toputthematterinconcreteterms,canthelegislature,
havinginsertedArticle19AintotheConstitution,subsequentlyremoveitbyanamendment?Isthisnot
apatentflawinthedoctrine?Or,totakeanotherexample,supposethecourts,intheexerciseofjudicial
power,alterabasicfeatureoftheConstitution.Supposethelegislatureattemptstoamendthe
Constitutioninamannerthatimpingesonthisalteration.Wouldthecourtspermitthis?Wouldnotthe
courts,ineffect,besayingtothelegislature:anythingwedoisdesirableandbeyondyourcontrol,but
anythingthatyoudoisalwayssubjecttoourdeterminationandcertificationastowhetheritisdesirable
orundesirable?Youmaybetheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople,wemaybeonlyappointees,but
itiswe,notyou,whowilldecidewhatistostayandwhatistoberemovedfromtheConstitution.The
questionarises,whyisitthatweopposeautocracy,whetherintheshapeofamilitarydictatorshipor
otherwise?Isitnotbecauseunelectedpersonsclaimtobewiserthanordinarypeopleandhencemore
entitledtoexercisesupremepower?
(49)Aswillbeseenfromtheforegoing,thebasicfeaturesdoctrineisnotmerelythecreationof
thecourts;itisentirelyatthecourtsmercy.Thecourtswouldnotsimplybetheguardiansofaprinciple
thatbindsallorgansofthestate.Theywouldbecomethesoleandfinalarbitersofarulethatappliesto
all,savethem.Theyaloneareabovethelaw.ThepowertoamendtheConstitution,i.e.,theconstituent
power,wouldbeentirelyundertheircontrol,exercisableonlyontheirsayso.Theirpowerandrightto
mouldandshapetheConstitution(whichtheyonlypossesswithintheirlimitedscopeofjudicialreview)
wouldballoonintoanuntrammeledandunquestionablerighttocontroltheconstituentpowerinits
entirety.Iwould,withtheutmostrespect,denythatthecourtscan,orshould,havesuchpower,no
matterhowwellintentionedindividualjudgesmaybe,orhowwellversedtheyareinthelaw.Rather
thanpreservingorprotectingthebalancebetweentheorgansofthestate,abasicfeaturesdoctrine
actuallyunbalancestheconstitution.Anditisaparticularlyinsidiousdoctrine,becauseitlullsthejudicial
branchintobelievingthatallthatthejudgesaredoingislivinguptotheiroathtopreserve,protectand
defendtheConstitution.SurelythisoathpresupposesthattheConstitutionisanindependent
documentwhichhastobepreservedandprotected,andnotonewhichwillbemadeupormodifiedby
courtsfromtimetotime,oratanytime,intheirsolediscretion.However,onthisview,theoath
virtuallybecomestopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitution,asamendedfromtimetotimeor
atanytimebyjudicialfiat.Thepoint,itmustbestressed,isnotwhethertheviewofthecourtsisright
orwrongitismorebasicthanthat,andisthis:whohastherighttoamendtheConstitution,the
electedrepresentativesofthepeople,ortheappointedjudges?Doesthisapproachnotentaila
fundamentalencroachmentontheunderlyingprinciplesofdemocracy?Theultimatepowershouldflow
notfromthepensofjudicialappointees,butfromtheelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleofPakistan.
AndwhatiftheseelectedrepresentativesbetraythetrustthatthepeopleofPakistanhavereposedin
them?Shouldtheynotberemovedorreviled?Yesindeed,butbythepeopleofPakistanthroughthe
democraticprocess.ThefavoritecontentionofmilitaryautocratsinPakistanovermorethanfiftyyears
hasbeenthattheelectedrepresentativesarecorruptandincompetentandhencecannotbetrusted.I
confessithasnotimpressedme.Iftheelectedrepresentativesdofailonthisscore(andthatisoften
true,notmerelyinPakistanbutalsoinsocietiesregardedasmoreadvancedormature),thatismost
emphaticallynotanargumentwhichjustifiesadilutionofthedemocraticprinciple.Aconstitutional
principleshouldnotdependonitsvalidityonthecaliberofanygivenparliament.Wehavebeenledto
thebrinkoftheprecipicetooofteninthepasttoacceptsuchacontentionatthislatedate.Itis
importanttorememberthattheprincipleofindependenceofjudiciaryistobefound,andfoundonly,in
democraticpolities.Itisnotfoundinmonarchies,oligarchies,communiststatesordictatorialstates.Itis
vitallyimportanttorealizethatstrengtheningdemocracystrengthensjudicialindependence.Thesetwo
conceptsarenotantitheticalrathertheirconfluencecreatesnewsynergies.
(50)Anecessaryconsequenceofthebasicfeaturesdoctrineisthatthewordamend(andany
cognateexpression)usedinthearticleoftheConstitutionrelatingtotheamendingpowermusthavean
artificiallynarrowandrestrictedmeaning.Thisissobecausethedoctrineisanimpliedlimitationonthe
amendingpower.Asalreadynotedabove,clause(6)ofArticle239expresslystatesthatthereisno
limitationtotheamendingpowerofParliament,andthisisaninsuperableobstacleinimplyingany
limitationontheamendingpower.EvenifIleavethispointasideforthemoment,andfocussimplyon
whatthedoctrinepostulatesregardingthewordamend,thereare,inmyview,anumberof
difficultiestowhichtherearenoreadyanswersavailable.Firstly,itisclearthatthenarrowmeaningthat
thebasicfeaturesdoctrineascribestothewordamendnecessarilyinvolvescircularreasoning,asis
demonstratedbythefollowing:
ThewordamendasusedintheamendingarticleoftheConstitutionhasanarrowandrestricted
meaning.
Why?
Becausethepowertoamendisofalimitednature.
Why?
BecausethewordamendasusedintheamendingarticleoftheConstitutionhasanarrowand
restrictedmeaning.
Evenifthereasoningisreversed,theresultisstillcircular:
Theamendingpowerisofalimitednature.
Why?
BecausethewordamendasusedintheamendingarticleoftheConstitutionhasanarrowand
restrictedmeaning.
Why?
Becausetheamendingpowerisofalimitednature.
Sowhatcomesfirst,thenarrowandrestrictedmeaningofthewordamendorthelimited
natureoftheamendingpower?
(51)Thesecondproblemisthatthewordamendmustsimultaneouslybeartwodistinctmeanings
underthebasicfeaturesdoctrine.Whenusedinrelationtoaprovisionthatisnotabasicfeature,it
meanswhatitsays,namely,thatthepowercanbeusedtochangethatprovisionoftheconstitutionin
anymanner,whetherbywayofaddition,variationorevenrepeal.However,whenusedinrelationtoa
basicfeature,itcanonlymeanachangethatdoesnottamperwith,ordamageordestroyit.Itisclear
thatthisapproachfliesinthefaceofsettledprinciplesofinterpretation.Itisquitepossiblethataword
usedintheConstitutionhas,onitsproperinterpretation,awiderorbroadermeaningthantheapparent
one,oranarrowerormorerestrictedmeaningthantheapparentone.Butsuchaninterpretationmust
beappliedconsistently.
(52)Beforeproceedingfurther,Iwouldliketopauseinordertotakeacloserlookatthejudgments
oftheIndianSupremeCourtonthebasicstructuredoctrine.Ofcourse,manyofthosejudgmentshave
alreadybeenalludedtoabove.Thelawlaiddownthereinhasbeensetoutand,inrespectofsome
cases,abriefdescriptionhasalsobeengivenofthecircumstancesinwhichthejudgmentswere
deliveredandtheconsequencesemanatingfromthesame.Theconceptualweaknessesthatinmyview,
withrespect,underminetheIndiandecisionshavebeenhighlighted.ThecloserlookthatIproposeto
takewillnodoubtcomeattheexpenseofsomerepetition,astosomeextentIwillhavetotraverse
groundalreadycrossed.Itisnonethelesstroubleworthtakingsince,withtheutmostrespect,the
frailtiesofthereasoningandconceptualthinkingunderlyingthedoctrineaspropoundedanddeveloped
bytheIndianSupremeCourtcannototherwisebefullyappreciated.Iwouldonlyaddthatmyviewson
thebasicstructuredoctrineareofcoursebynowabundantlyclear,anditshouldbeclearly
understoodthatIcertainlydonotcarryouttheexercisenowproposedwithanyintentofshowingup
theIndianSupremeCourt.Indiandecisions,likethoseoftheEnglishandUKcourts,areofcourse
frequentlycitedbeforeusandwewelcometheassistancethatisrenderedbythejudicialdevelopments
thattakeplaceinthosejurisdictions(andofcourse,inothercommonlawjurisdictionsaroundthe
world).
(53)IstartwithShankariPrasadSinghDeoandothersv.UnionofIndiaandothersAIR1951SC458.
TheIndianConstitutioncameintoforceon26.01.1950;bythenextyearthequestionoftheextentof
theParliamentspowertoamendtheConstitutionwasalreadybeforetheSupremeCourt.The
backgroundtothecasewasthechallengetothelandreformsinitiatedbytheCongressgovernmentled
byNehru,whichhadaprofessedlysocialisttilt.Thegovernmentslandreformagendawasunderthreat
ofdisruptionasitwaschallengedasbeingviolativeoffundamentalrights,andinatleastsomeHigh
Courtssuchchallengesweresustained.Parliamentsoughttoputthematterbeyondjudicialreach
throughthe1stAmendmenttotheConstitution(whichcameintoeffecton18.06.1951).Itisinteresting
tonotethatthestatementofobjectsandreasonsthataccompaniedtheBillexpresslystatedthatthe
needforthesamearosebecause[d]uringthelastfifteenmonthsoftheworkingoftheConstitution,
certaindifficultieshavebeenbroughttolightbyjudicialdecisionsandpronouncementsspeciallyin
regardtothechapteronfundamentalrights.Thestatementreferredtothefundamentalrightsthat
weresocausingdifficulty,andaspresentlyrelevant,stated,onesuspectssomewhatdisingenuously:
ThevalidityofagrarianreformmeasurespassedbytheStateLegislaturesinthelastthreeyearshas,in
spiteoftheprovisionsofclauses(4)and(6)ofarticle31,formedthesubjectmatterofdilatorylitigation,
asaresultofwhichtheimplementationoftheseimportantmeasures,affectinglargenumbersof
people,hasbeenheldup.
(54)The1stAmendmentsoughttodealwiththeobstaclespresentedbyjudicialpronouncements
byinsertingtwonewArticles,31Aand31B,inthechapterrelatingtofundamentalrights,andalso
placedthelandreformlegislationinthe9thScheduletotheIndianConstitution,whichitselfwasadded
bymeansofthisAmendment.ThisschedulewasforpurposessimilartotheFirstScheduleofour
Constitution,i.e.,soughttoplacecertainlawsbeyondchallengeonthebasisoffundamentalrights.It
wasinthesecircumstancesthatthe1stAmendmentwaschallengedbeforetheIndianSupremeCourt.
ThebasisoftheattackwasthatArticle13(whichissimilartoourArticle8)prohibitedthemakingofany
lawinderogationoffundamentalrights,andthe1stAmendmentwassuchalaw.TheIndianSupreme
Courthadnohesitationinunanimouslydismissingthechallenge.Itwasheldthattherewasaclear
distinctionbetweenordinarylegislationintheexerciseofthelegislativepowersconferredon
Parliament,andconstitutionalamendments,whichwasanexerciseofconstituentpower.Thelaw
referredtoinArticle13meantonlytheformerandnotthelatter.Sincetherewasnoexpresslimitation
intheIndianConstitutionontheexerciseofconstituent(i.e.,amending)power,thismeant,effectively,
thattheCourtheldsuchpowertobeunfettered.
(55)ThenextcasethatrequiresconsiderationisSajjanSinghv.StateofRajasthanAIR1965SC845.
Atissuewasthe17thAmendment,whichcameintoeffecton20.06.1964.Tosomeextent,thiswas
simplySankariPrasadredux.ParliamentmadecertainchangestoArticle31Aandplacedyetmorelaws
relatingtolandreformsintheNinthSchedule.ThepetitionersprayedthattheSupremeCourt
reconsideritsdecisioninSankariPrasad.Thiswasontheground,interalia,thattheeffectofthe17th
AmendmentwouldbetocurtailthepowersoftheHighCourtunderArticle226(theequivalentofour
Article199),inasmuchasthelawsplacedinthe9thSchedulecouldnotbechallenged.Theamendment
oughtthereforetohavecompliedwiththeprovisotoArticle368,whichwhenengagedrequiredthat
theproposedconstitutionalamendmentberatifiedbythelegislaturesofatleastonehalfoftheStates.I
mayexplainthatatthattimethestructureofArticle368wasslightlydifferentfromthatsubsequently
adopted.AconstitutionalamendmentneededtobepassedbyParliament(ofcourse,bythespecial
majoritiesasthereinspecified).TheprovisolistedcertainspecificpartsandarticlesoftheConstitution,
andiftheamendmentwasinrelationtoanysuchmatter,thentheamendmenthadalsotoberatifiedas
justnoted.Article226camewithinthescopeoftheproviso,anditsrequirementswerenotfollowedin
thepassingofthe17thAmendment.(TheserequirementsarestilltobefoundintheIndian
Constitution.Article368hasbeenamendedinotherways.)TheSupremeCourtunanimouslydismissed
thechallengetothe17thAmendment.Itwasheldthatthenatureofthechangesmadethroughthe
17thAmendmentdidnotengageorrequireresorttotheproviso.ThepowertoamendtheConstitution
wasreiteratedasbeingplenaryandinclusive,ifnecessary,alsoofthepowertoamendthefundamental
rights.SankariPrasadwasthereforeaffirmedandfollowed.(ImaynotethatSajjanSinghwasdecidedby
aBenchcomprisingoffiveJudges,andtheviewsjustnotedwerethoseexpressedbyamajorityofthree,
inajudgmentauthoredbytheChiefJustice.Theothertwojudgeswrotetheirownjudgmentsandeach
expresslyagreedwiththeChiefJustice.However,therearealsocertainobservationsinthetwo
judgmentsthatsuggestthatthoselearnedJudgesmaynothavefullyacceptedtheforegoingviews.)
(56)ThisbringsmetoL.C.GolakNathv.StateofPunjabAIR1967SC1643.Thestagewasstillsetby
landreformlegislation.Certainamendmentsweremadeintherelevantlegislationinthisregardinthe
StatesofPunjabandMysore.Theseamendmentswerechallengedonthebasisofviolatingfundamental
rights.However,thelawswerealreadyintheNinthScheduleandtherefore,onthefaceofit,beyond
judicialreach.Thepetitionerschallengednotmerelytheamendmentsinthelawsbutalsothe1st,4th
and17thAmendments.ThisthereforerequiredtheSupremeCourttoreconsiderbothShankariPrasad
andSajjanSingh.AnelevenmemberBenchwasconstituted(apparentlythelargestBenchtosituptill
thattimeintheIndianSupremeCourt).Byabaremajority(6:5),thechallengewasupheld.Shankari
PrasadandSajjanSinghwereoverruled.Itwasheldthataconstitutionalamendmentwaslawwithin
themeaningofArticle13andhence,ifitsoughttocurtail,abridgeorotherwiseaffectanyfundamental
rights,couldbestruckdownontheanvilofthatArticle.However,ratherinterestingly,noreliefwas,as
such,given.Theeffectwasthatintheendthepetitionsweredismissed.Toreachtheforegoing
conclusionsandyetdenyreliefthemajority(whospokethroughtheChiefJustice)invokedthedoctrine
ofprospectiveoverruling.SubbaRoa,CJ.,observedasfollows:
52.Wehavearrivedattwoconclusions,namely,(1)TheParliamenthasnopowertoamendPartIIIof
theConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrights;and(2)thisisafitcasetoinvoke
andapplythedoctrineofprospectiveoverruling.Whatthenistheeffectofourconclusiononthe
instantcase?Havingregardtothehistoryoftheamendments,theirimpactonthesocialandeconomic
affairsofourcountryandthechaoticsituationthatmaybebroughtaboutbythesuddenwithdrawalat
thisstageoftheamendmentsfromtheConstitution,wethinkthatconsiderablejudicialrestraintis
calledfor.We,therefore,declarethatourdecisionswillnotaffectthevalidityoftheConstitution
(SeventeenthAmendment)Act,1964,orotheramendmentsmadetotheConstitutiontakingawayor
abridgingthefundamentalrights.WefurtherdeclarethatinfuturetheParliamentwillhavenopowerto
amendPartIIIoftheConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrights.Inthiscasewe
donotproposetoexpressouropiniononthequestionofthescopeoftheamendabilityofthe
provisionsoftheConstitutionotherthanthefundamentalrights,asitdoesnotariseforconsideration
beforeus.Norarewecalledupontoexpressouropiniononthequestionregardingthescopeofthe
amendabilityofPartIIIoftheConstitutionotherwisethanbytakingawayorabridgingthefundamental
rights.WewillnotalsoindicateourviewonewayorotherwhetheranyoftheActsquestionedcanbe
sustainedundertheprovisionsoftheConstitutionwithouttheaidofArts.31A,31Bandthe9th
Schedule.
53.Theaforesaiddiscussionleadstothefollowingresults:
(1)ThepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionisderivedfromArts.245,246and248ofthe
Constitution[which,broadly,correspondtoArticles141and142ofourConstitutionandprovideforthe
respectivelegislativecompetencesoftheParliamentandtheProvincialAssemblies]andnotfromArt.
368thereofwhichonlydealswithprocedure.Amendmentisalegislativeprocess.
(2)Amendmentis'law'withinthemeaningofArt.13oftheConstitution[whichcorrespondstoArticle8
ofourConstitution]and,therefore,ifittakesawayorabridgestherightsconferredbyPartIIIthereof,it
isvoid.
(3)TheConstitution(FirstAmendment)Act,1951,Constitution(FourthAmendment)Act,1955,andthe
Constitution(SeventeenthAmendment)Act,1964,abridgethescopeofthefundamentalrights.But,on
thebasisofearlierdecisionsofthisCourt,theywerevalid.
(4)Ontheapplicationofthedoctrineof'prospectiveoverruling',asexplainedbyusearlier,ourdecision
willhaveonlyprospectiveoperationand,therefore,thesaidamendmentswillcontinuetobevalid.
(5)WedeclarethattheParliamentwillhavenopowerfromthedateofthisdecisiontoamendanyof
theprovisionsofPartIIIoftheConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrights
enshrinedtherein.
(6)AstheConstitution(SeventeenthAmendment)Actholdsthefield,thevalidityofthetwoimpugned
Acts,namely,ThePunjabSecurityofLandTenuresActXof1953,andtheMysoreLandReformsActXof
1962,asamendedbyActXIVof1965,cannotbequestionedonthegroundthattheyoffendArts.13,14
or31oftheConstitution.
(57)Asisclearfromtheforegoing,themajorityconcludedthatArticle368onlydealtwiththe
procedureofamendment,andnotthepowertoamenditself.Wherethenwassuchpowertobefound?
TheanswergivenwasthatsuchpowerwastobefoundinArticles245,246and248.Asnoted,these
correspondtoArticles141and142ofourConstitution,whichrelatetothelegislativelists.(Unlikeour
Constitution,theIndianConstitutionveststheresiduarylegislativepowersinParliament.)Inother
words,thepowertoamendtheConstitutionwasnomorethanordifferentfromtheordinarylaw
makingcompetenceofParliament.AndsincethelegislativelistsgivenintheSeventhScheduletothe
IndianConstitution(whichcorrespondstotheFourthScheduleofours)didnotcontainanentry
containingthepowertoamendtheConstitution,thatmeantthatsuchpowerhadtobesearchedoutin
theresiduarypowersoflegislation!
(58)Ican,withtheutmostrespect,onlyexpressastonishmentatthereasoningdeployedbythe
learnedChiefJustice.Notmerelywasthewellestablished(andentirelyproper)distinctionbetween
constituentpowerandlegislativepowerobliterated,theamendingpowerwasreducedtoa
constitutionalafterthought,tobefoundonlyintheobscurerecessesoftheresiduarypower.Whata
demotion!Itappeared,onthisreasoning,thatwhiletheframersoftheIndianConstitution,who
includedsomeofthefinestlegalluminariesofthesubcontinent,hadhadthecommonsenseto
elaboratelysetouttheprocedureforamendingtheConstitutionbymeansofArticle368,they
consciouslydidnotconferthepowertoamendtheConstitution.AbareperusalofArticle368(asit
stoodattherelevanttime)makesobviouswhatanextraordinaryfindingthiswas:
368.ProcedurefortheamendmentoftheConstitution.AnamendmentofthisConstitutionmaybe
initiatedonlybytheintroductionofaBillforthepurposeineitherHouseofParliament,andwhenthe
BillispassedineachHousebyamajorityofthetotalmembershipofthatHouseandbyamajorityofnot
lessthantwothirdsofthemembersofthatHousepresentandvoting,itshallbepresentedtothe
PresidentforhisassentanduponsuchassentbeinggiventotheBilltheConstitutionshallstand
amendedinaccordancewiththetermsoftheBill:
Providedthatifsuchamendmentseekstomakeanychangein
(a)article54,article55,article73,article162orarticle241,or
(b)ChapterIVofPartV,ChapterVofPartVI,orChapterIofPartXI,or
(c)anyoftheListsintheSeventhSchedule,or
(d)therepresentationofStatesinParliament,or
(e)theprovisionsofthisarticle,
theamendmentshallalsorequiretoberatifiedbytheLegislaturesofnotlessthanonehalfoftheStates
specifiedinPartsAandBoftheFirstSchedulebyresolutionstothateffectpassedbythoseLegislatures
beforetheBillmakingprovisionforsuchamendmentispresentedtothePresidentforassent.
ItwillbewelltorecallthatthelegislativelistsusedintheIndianConstitutionaretakenfrom,
andlargelyfaithfullyfollow,the(equallydetailed)legislativeliststobefoundinthe7thScheduletothe
GovernmentofIndiaAct,1935(GOIA).(The1956Constitutionhadfollowedthesamepattern:seeits
FifthSchedule.)Now,s.104oftheGOIA,whichdealtwithresiduarypowers,hadprovidedthatthe
GovernorGeneral(actinginhisdiscretion)couldempowereithertheFederallegislatureorthe
Provinciallegislaturesinrespectofaresiduarymatter.Asisobvious,anysuchresiduarypower
couldnothaveincludedthepowertoamendtheGOIA.ThereasonisthatitwasanActoftheImperial
(i.e.,British)Parliament.ItalonecouldamendtheconstitutiongrantedtoIndia.Anysuchpowerwas
beyondthecompetenceoftheIndianlegislatures,unlessofcourseexpresslygrantedbytheImperial
Parliamentitself.(Bywayofcomparison,onemayrecallthesituationinCanadaandAustralia,bothof
whoseconstitutionswerealsoActsoftheImperialParliament.WhentheirlasttiesfromtheUKwere
beingcut,in1982and1986respectively,separateActshadtobepassedbytheUKParliament.)Thus,an
amendingpowercouldnever,everhavebeenfoundintheresiduaryprovision(s.104)ofGOIA.The
framersoftheIndianConstitutionadoptedandtookoverthesamelegislativescheme.However,itwas
nottheybutonlytheIndianSupremeCourtthat,almostserendipitously,discoveredtheamending
powerlurkingthereinGolakNath.Article248oftheIndianConstitutionhasdepartedfromthescheme
ofs.104ofGOIAonlytotheextentthattheresiduarypowersareexpresslyvestedinParliamentalone.
OnewonderswhatthemajorityinGolakNathwouldhavedoneif,perchance,theframershad,likeour
Constitution,placedtheresiduarypowerswiththeStates?Couldthelogicofthereasoningusedby
thelearnedChiefJusticethenhavebeensustained?Inmyrespectfulview,thereasoningisfragile,to
saytheleast,andperhapsforthatreasondidnotsurvivethenextcasethatImustconsider.Thefirst
seriousattempttocurtailthepowersofParliamentandenhancethoseoftheSupremeCourtthuswas
recognizedbytheCourtitselfsubsequentlyasbeingfatallyflawed.
(59)ThatcaseisKesavanandaBharativ.StateofKeralaAIR1973SC1461,theleviathan(inmore
waysthanone,andnotleastbywayoflength)intheseriesofIndiancaseswithwhichwehavebeen
concernedwhilehearingthesepetitions.However,beforeItakeupthecaseitself,certainfactsbyway
ofbackgroundmustbesetout.GolakNathwasclearlyunpalatabletotheIndianParliament.Itseriously
threatenedandjeopardizedthe(Congress)governmentsongoinglegislativeagenda,ofadeterminedly
socialistbent,inanumberofways.Indeed,suchlegislationandothermeasureswereimmediately,and
successfully,challenged.ThesnapgeneralelectionscalledbyMrs.IndiraGandhiin1971hadthe
supremacyofParliamentattheforefrontoftheelectioncampaign.TheCongresspartywasreturned
withatwothirdsmajorityandswiftlysetabouttryingtoundotheeffectofGolakNath.Two
constitutionalamendments,the24thandthe25th,whichcameintoeffecton05.11.1971and
20.04.1972respectively,arerelevantforpresentpurposes.The24thAmendmentwasdirectsolely
towardstheamendingpower.AnewclausewasinsertedinArticle13,whichexpresslystatedthat
nothingthereinwouldapplytoanamendmentmadetotheConstitutionpursuanttoArticle368.The
latterArticleitselfwasamendedinthefollowingmanner:(a)themarginalheading(i.e.,title),which
hithertohadreadProcedureforamendmentoftheConstitutionwassubstitutedtobecomePowerof
ParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionandproceduretherefor;(b)theexistingArticlewasrenumbered
asclause(2)andanewclause(1)wasadded,whichreadasfollows:
NotwithstandinganythinginthisConstitution,Parliamentmayinexerciseofitsconstituentpower
amendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealanyprovisionofthisConstitutioninaccordancewiththe
procedurelaiddowninthisarticle.
Finally,(c)theinsertionmadeinArticle13wasduplicatedinasmuchasanewclause(3)was
added,whichalsostatedthatnothinginArticle13wastoapplytoanamendmentmadeintermsof
Article368.The25thAmendmentmadeasubstitutioninArticle31(whichrelatedtocompulsory
acquisitionofproperty)andsoughttoplacethequestionoftheadequacyofthecompensationbeyond
legalchallenge.ItalsoaddedanewArticle31C.Thisstatedthatanylawmadeintermsofapolicy
directiveunderArticle39(equivalenttothepolicydirectivesofourConstitution)couldnotbedeclared
asviolativeofthefundamentalrightsenshrinedinArticles14,19and31.ItisthisArticlethatsetthe
stageforthenextconstitutionalbattleand,asshallbeseen,forfurtherbattlesyettocome.
(60)The24thandthe25thAmendmentswerechallengedintheSupremeCourtinKesavananda
Bharati,asalsothe26thandthe29thAmendments.Thelattertwocameintoeffecton28.12.1971and
09.06.1972respectively.The26thAmendmentwas,asperthestatementofreasonsandobjects,
concernedwiththeabolitionoftheprivypursesandspecialprivilegesoftherulersoftheformer
PrincelyStatesonthegroundthatthesamewereincompatiblewithanegalitariansocialorder.Anew
Article363AwasinsertedintheConstitution,whichsoughttoterminateexpresslytherecognition
alreadygrantedtosuchRulersandtoabolishprivypursesandextinguishallrights,liabilitiesand
obligationsinrespectofprivypurses.(Imaynotethatanearlierattempttoachievethisresultby
executivefiathadfailed;theSupremeCourtinthePrivyPursescaseAIR1971SC530hadorderedthe
Rulerswereentitledtoalltheirpreexistingrightsandprivilegesincluding[the]righttoprivypurses.)
The29thAmendmentwasconcernedwithensuringthatcertainlandreformlegislationundertakenin
Kerala,beingamendmentstolawsthatwerealreadyinthe9thSchedule,wasexpresslybeyond
challenge.TheamendingActswerealsoaddedtothe9thSchedule.
(61)IhavealreadyconsideredaspectsofKesavanandaBharatiintheearlierpartofthisjudgment
and,withtheutmostrespect,havefoundtheviewsofthemajority(atleastasgenerallyunderstood)to
bewanting.However,sincethedecisionisthegenesisofthebasicstructuredoctrine,itwillnotbe
inappropriatetorevisitthosepointsandalsotodilateuponotheraspectsofthejudgment.Kesavananda
BharatiwasdecidedbythelargestofBenches(13learnedJudges)buttheslenderestofmargins(7:6).
Thiswasnotjustabaremajority:twelveofthelearnedJudgeswerefirmlyarrayed,sixeach,oneither
sideofthedivide.ItwasthelastlearnedJudge(Khanna,J.)whosedecisionwascrucial.Hewas,inother
words,theswingvote(toborrowatermfromUSconstitutionalparlance).Itisthereforeofsome
importancetoestablishwhatexactlywasitthatKhanna,J.decided.Butbeforethat,onemaylookatthe
broaderpicture.
(62)Byamajority,theSupremeCourtoverruledGolakNath.Theconclusionarrivedatinthat
judgment,thataconstitutionalamendmentwaslawwithinthemeaningofArticle13andtherefore
couldbesetasideiffoundtobeinviolation,abridgementorcurtailmentoffundamentalrights,was
sweptaway.Atthesametime,thechangebroughtaboutbythe24thAmendment,wherebythenew
clause(1)wasinsertedintoArticle368,wasacceptedasnowplacingtheamendingpoweritselfinthat
Article.So,theimpactofthestrange(ifImayrespectfullyputitso)reasoningadoptedinGolakNath,
thattheamendingpowerlayintheresiduarylegislativepowersofParliament,wasrendered
ineffective.ButtheoverrulingofGolakNathdidnotresult,aswouldotherwisehavebeenexpected,ina
revivalofthelawlaiddowninShankariPrasadandSajjanSingh.Itwillberecalledthosecaseshadbeen
concernedwiththequestionwhetheranamendmenttotheConstitutionthataffectedfundamental
rightscouldbejudiciallyreviewedandstruckdown,ontheanvilofArticle13.Inthosecasesthescope
ofthelimitationsoughttobeplacedontheamendingpowerwasnarrowlyclaimed,i.e.,limitedonlyto
whethertherewasaconflictwithArticle13.Now,themajoritystatedthelimitationontheamending
powermorebroadly,andmuchmorediffuselybyresorttoanewlyconceivedtheoryofinterpretation.
Itwasthattheamendingpowercouldnotbeexercisedinamannerthatsoughttoviolate,curtail,alter
orabridgethebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
(63)Inonesensetherewasnoneedtoreachthisconclusion.Itisusuallyoverlookedthatallthe
constitutionalamendmentschallengedinKesavanandaBharatiwereinfactupheld,saveoneaspectof
the25thAmendmentandthattooonlyinaminorsense.Itwillberecalledthatthe25thAmendment
hadinsertedanewArticle31CintotheConstitution.Thiswasasfollows(emphasissupplied):
Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinarticle13,nolawgivingeffecttothepolicyoftheStatetowards
securingtheprinciplesspecifiedinclause(b)orclause(c)ofarticle39shallbedeemedtobevoidonthe
groundthatitisinconsistentwith,ortakesawayorabridgesanyoftherightsconferredbyarticle14,
article19orarticle31;andnolawcontainingadeclarationthatitisforgivingeffecttosuchpolicyshall
becalledinquestioninanycourtonthegroundthatitdoesnotgiveeffecttosuchpolicy:
ProvidedthatwheresuchlawismadebytheLegislatureofaState,theprovisionsofthisarticleshallnot
applytheretounlesssuchlaw,havingbeenreservedfortheconsiderationofthePresident,hasreceived
hisassent.
(64)ThesixlearnedJudgeswhoconstitutedpartofthemajoritystruckdownArticle31Cinits
entirety.ThesixlearnedJudgesintheminorityupheldtheArticleinitsentiretysavethattheyread
downtheportionhighlighted,andheldthatthevalidityofthedeclarationwasnotbeyondjudicial
review.Thus,everythingturnedonKhanna,J.,whoupheldArticle31Cbutstruckdowntheportion
highlighted.Now,beforetheSupremeCourtitwasexpresslyconcededbytherespondents(i.e.,the
government)thatthevalidityofthedeclarationcouldbejudiciallyreviewed.Withthisconcessionthe
entirecontroversycouldhavebeeninstantlyresolved:theconstitutionalamendmentsunderchallenge
wouldhavebeenupheldandthelatterportionofArticle31Cwouldhavebeentreatedexactlyasthis
Courthastreatednonobstanteclausesovertheyears.Thehighlycontroversialbasicstructuretheory
wouldneverhavebeenborn.Thathowever,didnothappenwiththeresultthat,withrespect,wehave
beenlefttograpplewithseveralhundredpagesofthejudgmentshandeddowninordertotryand
resolvewhatisthelegalstatusofthebasicstructuredoctrine.
(65)Ihavealready,intheearlierpartofthisjudgment,commentedonthefactthateventhesix
learnedjudgeswhowerepartofthemajoritywereunabletoagreeonwhatwerethebasicfeatures
oftheIndianConstitutionandhaverespectfullycommentedontheadverseconsequencesofthislackof
coherenceorunanimityforthedoctrinesaidtohavebeencollectivelypropoundedbythem.Iwould
nowliketorefertothejudgmentstogiveaflavorofthedivergenceanddiversityofopinionsthatwere
expressedbythelearnedJudges,bothinthemajorityandintheminority.Istartwiththejudgmentof
thelearnedChiefJustice.Sikri,CJwhoobservedasfollows(para214):
Inmyviewthatmeaningwouldbeappropriatewhichwouldenablethecountrytoachieveasocialand
economicrevolutionwithoutdestroyingthedemocraticstructureoftheConstitutionandthebasic
inalienablerightsguaranteedinPartIIIandwithoutgoingoutsidethecontoursdelineatedinthe
Preamble.
Healsosaid(atpara183)thatitisimpossibletoreadtheexpression"Amendmentofthe
Constitution"asempoweringParliamenttoabrogatetherightsofminorities.ThelearnedChiefJustice
alsonoted(para293):
Itwasthecommonunderstandingthatfundamentalrightswouldremaininsubstanceastheyareand
theywouldnotbeamendedoutofexistence.Itseemsalsotohavebeenacommonunderstandingthat
thefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitution,namely,secularism,democracyandthefreedomofthe
individualwouldalwayssubsistinthewelfarestate.
However,healsostatedthatreasonablerestrictionscouldbeimposedonthefundamental
rights(para297),thattheywerenotavailabletononcitizensandappliedonlyinlimitedformtothe
armedforces.
(66)ShelatandGrover,JJ.,wereoftheview(seepara549)thatPartsIII(relatingtofundamental
rights)andIV(relatingtodirectivesofpolicy)oftheConstitutionessentiallyformabasicelementofthe
Constitutionwithoutwhichitsidentitywillcompletelychange.ThelearnedJudgesalsoobserved(para
552)thatthepreservationoftherightsofminoritieswasaconditiononwhichminoritiesenteredinto
thefederationandthefoundationuponwhichthewholestructurewassubsequentlyerected.They
alsoemphasizedthedignityoftheindividualassecuredthroughthevariousfundamentalrightsand
thedirectivesofpolicy.(ThedignityofmanisnotofcourseexpresslyafundamentalrightintheIndian
ConstitutionunlikeourArticle14.)Reddy,J.alsoexpressedhimselfstronglyinrespectoffundamental
rightsandthedirectivesofpolicy.ThelearnedJudgeobservedasfollows:
ButdothefundamentalrightsinPartIIIandDirectivePrinciplesinPartIVconstitutetheessential
elementofthebasicstructureofourConstitutioninthattheConstitutionwillbetheConstitution
withoutthem?Inotherwords,ifPartsIIIandIVoreitherofthemaretotallyabrogated,canitbesaid
thatthestructureoftheConstitutionasanorganicinstrumentestablishingsovereigndemocratic
republicasenvisagedinthepreambleremainsthesame?InthesenseasIunderstandthesovereign
democraticrepublic,itcannot:withouteitherfundamentalrightsordirectiveprinciples,whatcansucha
governmentbeifitdoesnotensurepolitical,economic,orsocialjustice?[para1171]
ThispivotalfeatureoftheFundamentalRights[namelythatthereisalwaysaconstitutionalremedy
availablefortheirbreach]demonstratesthatthisbasicstructurecannotbedamagedordestroyed.
Whenaremedycannotbeabrogated,itshouldfollowthatthefundamentalrightscannotbeabrogated
forthereasonthattheexistenceofaremedywouldbemeaninglesswithouttherights.[para1173]
[T]houghthepowerofamendmentunderArt.368iswide,itisnotwideenoughtototallyabrogateor
whatwouldamounttoanabrogationoremasculatingordestroyinginawayaswouldamountto
abrogationofanyofthefundamentalrightsorotheressentialelementsofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionanddestroyitsidentity.[para1174]
(67)Ipauseheretorespectfullymakeacomment.ThedirectivesofpolicyeveninIndiaare
admittedlynotenforceablebyanycourt,althoughtheyaretoberegardedasfundamentalinthe
governanceofthecountry(Article37oftheIndianConstitution).Thatarticlealsoprovidesthatitshall
bethedutyoftheStatetoapplytheseprinciplesinmakinglaws.Nonetheless,ithasalwaysbeen
recognizedeveninIndianjurisprudencethatthedirectivesarenotenforceableassuchandanyalleged
breachthereofwillnotinvalidateanylaw.Now,thequestionthatarisesisthis:whyshouldthepolicy
directivesofsuchanatureberegardedaspartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution?Puttingthe
matterratherbluntly,theyconstitutepiouswishes,andapiouswishisjustthat.Ofcourse,thelearned
JudgesinKesavanandaBharatihavesoughttoelevatethepolicydirectivesasthefoundational
aspirationsunderpinningtheIndianConstitution.However,eveniftheybesuch,theaspirationscanbe
defeatedbytheStatethroughthesimpleexpedientofnotgivingthempracticaleffect.Andasfaras
aspirationsareconcerned,inanyfunctionaldemocracytheelectoralpromisesmadebypartiesvyingfor
powerarefarmorepotentandimmediate,andtheynormallyhavenothingtodoassuchwiththepolicy
directives.Theelectoratemaywellpunishapartyinpowerforfailingtoliveuptoitspromisesmadeat
electiontime;itwillrarely,ifever,punishitatelectiontimeforfailingtogiveeffecttothepolicy
directives,theexistenceofwhichmostofitisnotevenaware.Withtheutmostrespect,theinclusionof
policydirectivesinthebasicstructureofaconstitutionhighlightsacentralpointmadeearlierinthe
judgment,thatthisexpressionshouldonlybeusedinadescriptiveandnotaprescriptivesense.
(68)ReturningtoKesavanandaBharati,HedgeandMukherjea,JJ.observed(atpara682)thatthere
wasnopowerinParliamenttoabrogateoremasculatefundamentalrights.(Nowisitnotobvious
thatthesearehighlyemotiveterms?Parliamentcanamendorrepeal,butitisonlymilitarydictators
whorejecttheentireconstitution.So,whyusetheseterms?)Theyhadalsoearlierobserved(atpara
650)thattheywereunabletoacceptthepropositionthatthefundamentalrightscouldnotbeabridged.
Indeed,theyobservedthatsincethepolicydirectivescouldshapefundamentalrights,thelattercould
notberegardedasnatural,inalienable,primordialrightswhicharebeyondthereachofthe
amendmentoftheConstitution(para677).ThiswasapointmadebyRay,J.(para955),whowasinthe
minority,whenhedenied(seepara947)thatthefundamentalrightswerethesameasnaturalrightsor
thattheycouldnotbeabridgedortakenaway.MatthewJ.,alsointheminority,putthepointeven
morestrongly:
Restrictions,abridgment;curtailment,andevenabrogationoftheserightsincircumstancesnot
visualizedbytheConstitutionmakersmightbecomenecessary;theirclaimtosupremacyorpriorityis
liabletobeoverborneatparticularstagesinthehistoryofthenationbythemoralclaimsembodiedin
PartIV.Whetherataparticularmomentinthehistoryofthenation,aparticularFundamentalRight
shouldhavepriorityoverthemoralclaimembodiedinPartIVormustyieldtothemisamatterwhich
mustbelefttobedecidedbyeachgenerationinthelightofitsexperienceanditsvalues.And,if
Parliament,initscapacityastheAmendingBody,decidestoamendtheConstitutioninsuchawayasto
takeawayorabridgeaFundamentalRighttogivepriorityvaluetothemoralclaimsembodiedinPartIV
oftheConstitution,theCourtcannotadjudgetheConstitutionalamendmentasbadforthereasonthat
whatwasintendedtobesubsidiarybytheConstitutionmakershasbeenmadedominant.Judicial
reviewofaConstitutionalamendmentforthereasonthatitgivespriorityvaluetothemoralclaims
embodiedinPartIVovertheFundamentalRightsembodiedinPartIIIisimpermissible.Takingfor
granted,thatbyandlargetheFundamentalRightsaretheextensions,permutationsandcombinations
ofnaturalrightsinthesenseexplainedinthisjudgment,itdoesnotfollowthatthereisanyinherent
limitationbyvirtueoftheiroriginorcharacterintheirbeingtakenawayorabridgedforthecommon
good.[para1728]
Hefurtherobserved:InthelightofwhatIhavesaid,Idonotthinkthattherewereanyexpress
orimpliedlimitationsuponthepowerofParliamenttoamendtheFundamentalRightsinsuchawayas
todestroyordamageeventhecoreoressenceoftherights[para1729].
(69)Chandrachud,J.,whowasalsointheminority,observedthatanamendmenttotheConstitution
didnotbecomevoidbecauseofanyabridgementoffundamentalrightsandnotwithstandingthe
specialplaceofimportanceofsuchrights,thatwasnotbyitselfsufficienttojustifyaconclusionthat
theywerebeyondthereachoftheamendingpower(para2089).Healsoobserved(para2096):Itis
difficulttoaccepttheargumentthatinherentlimitationsshouldbereadintotheamendingpoweron
thegroundthatFundamentalRightsarenaturalrightswhichinhereineveryman.
(70)Astheforegoingsurveyindicates,theJudgeswhoconstitutedthemajorityandtheminority
respectivelywerefirmlydividedintheirviews.Thedivisionwasstarkandclear.Thejudgmentofthe
swingJudge,Khanna,J.thereforeassumedcrucialimportance.HisviewsaretheviewsoftheCourt
sincetheother12Judgesweresplitupequally,sixforandsixagainst.Whatiscriticallyimportant,aswill
beseenlater,isthatthesubsequentdevelopmentofthebasicstructuredoctrinebytheIndianSupreme
CourtisclearlyviolativeofmostoftheviewsofthelearnedJudge,althoughallthesubsequentcases
weredecidedbyBenchesthatweresmallerandwereboundbythejudgmentoftheCourtin
KesavanandaBharati.Khanna,J.himself,aswillalsobeseenbelow,inalatercaseclarifiedhis
judgmenttotryandexpandthescopeofthedoctrine.Aclarificationofcoursedoesnotjustifya
contradiction,andKhanna,J.wasasmuchboundbyhisownformulationasanyotherJudgesincehis
earlierviewswereembeddedina13memberBenchdecision.
(71)Butfornow,IlookatwhatthelearnedJudgesaidinKesavanandaBharatiitself.Heobserved
(emphasissupplied):
Itisnot,inmyopinion,acorrectapproachtoassumethatifParliamentisheldentitledtoamendPart
IIIoftheConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgefundamentalrights,itwouldautomaticallyor
necessarilyresultintheabrogationofallfundamentalrightsWhatweareconcernedwithisasto
whetheronthetrueconstructionofArticle368,theParliamenthasorhasnotthepowertoamendthe
Constitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgefundamentalrights.Sofarasthisquestionisconcerned,the
answer,inmyopinion,shouldbeintheaffirmative,aslongasthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionis
retained[para1432]
Distinctionhasbeenmadeonbehalfofthepetitionersbetweenafundamentalrightandtheessence,
alsodescribedascore,ofthatfundamentalright.ItisurgedthateventhoughtheParliamentin
compliancewithArticle368hastherighttoamendthefundamentalrighttoproperty,ithasnorightto
abridgeortakeawaytheessenceofthatright.Inmyopinion,thisdifferentiationbetweenfundamental
rightandtheessenceorcoreofthatfundamentalrightisanoverrefinementwhichisnotpermissible
andcannotstandjudicialscrutiny.Ifthereisapowertoabridgeortakeawayafundamentalright,the
saidpowercannotbecurtailedbyinvokingthetheorythatthoughafundamentalrightcanbeabridged
ortakenaway,theessenceorcoreofthatfundamentalrightcannotbeabridgedortakenaway.The
essenceorcoreofafundamentalrightmustinthenatureofthingsbeitsintegralpartandcannotclaim
astatusorprotectiondifferentfromandhigherthanthatofthefundamentalrightofwhichitis
supposedtobetheessenceorcore.Thereisalsonoobjectivestandardtodetermineastowhatisthe
coreofafundamentalrightandwhatdistinguishesitfromtheperiphery.Theabsenceofsucha
standardisboundtointroduceuncertaintyinamatterofsovitalanimportanceastheamendmentof
theConstitution.Iam,therefore,unabletoaccepttheargument,thatevenifafundamentalrightbe
heldtobeamendable,thecoreoressenceofthatrightshouldbeheldtobeimmunefromthe
amendatoryprocess.[para1475]
IamalsooftheviewthatthepowertoamendtheprovisionsoftheConstitutionrelatingtothe
fundamentalrightscannotbedeniedbydescribingthefundamentalrightsasnaturalrightsorhuman
rights.Thebasicdignityofmandoesnotdependuponthecodificationofthefundamentalrightsnoris
suchcodificationaprerequisiteforadignifiedwayofliving.Itwould,inmyopinion,benotacorrect
approachtosaythatamendmentoftheConstitutionrelatingtoabridgementortakingawayofthe
fundamentalrightswouldhavetheeffectofdenudinghumanbeingsofbasicdignityandwouldresultin
theextinguishmentofessentialvaluesoflife.[para1480]
Iam,therefore,oftheopinionthatthemajorityviewintheGolakNath'scasethatParliamentdidnot
havethepowertoamendanyoftheprovisionsofPartIIIoftheConstitutionsoastotakeawayor
abridgethefundamentalrightscannotbeacceptedtobecorrect.FundamentalrightscontainedinPart
IIIofourConstitutioncan,inmyopinion,beabridgedortakenawayincompliancewiththeprocedure
prescribedbyArticle368,aslongthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionremainsunaffected[para
1519]
(72)IwillreverttoKhanna,J.sviewslater.Forthetimebeingitmaybenotedthattheviewsofthe
otherJudges,bothinthemajorityandintheminority,wereunambiguouslyopposedtoeachother:the
majorityJudgesfoundbothfundamentalrightsandpolicydirectivesaspartoftheunalterablebasic
structureoftheConstitutionwhiletheminoritydidnot.Khanna,J.traversedhisownpath:
fundamentalrightscouldbeabridgedoreventakenaway,aslongasthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionremainedunaffected.Hecategorically,andinmyviewrightly,rejectedthevague,
amorphousanduntenablemetaphysicalconceptofanunamendableessenceofafundamentalright,
althoughdespitethis,itwassubsequentlyresurrectedbysmallerBenchesoftheSupremeCourt.Is
theresuchathingasanessenceofafundamentalrightwhichcannotbeamendedwhilethe
fundamentalrightitselfcan?Andhowissuchanessencetobediscerned?Isthereanylegalmethod
forthiswhichexists?Inmyrespectfulview,theobservationthatfundamentalrightscanbeabridgedor
curtailedaslongastheessenceoftherightsorthebasicstructureremainsunaffectedcarriesno
discerniblemeaning.Inandofitselfthiswouldnotbeanyissue.EveryJudgeoughttobeexcusedan
occasionallapseintoamannerofexpressionthatislessthanclear.Thedifficultyhoweveristhat
Khanna,J.wastheswingvote.WhathesaidandhowhesaidittiltedKesavanandaBharati,onewayor
theother.Thematterwouldfurthercomplicatedbytheexistenceofahighlycontroversialstatement
thatwassignedbynineJudges,whichwasissuedatthesametimebutseparately.AsIwillshowbelow,
thisstatementhasoftenbeentakentoreflectwhatitisthatKesavanandaBharatihassupposedly
decided.Howthisstatementcametobesignedisastoryinitself.Itissetoutinanarticlewrittenbya
formerSolicitorGeneralofIndia,Mr.T.R.Andhyarujina,whichappearedinTheHindunewspaperon
21.05.2007.ThearticlewasbasedonalecturegivenbytheauthortotheSupremeCourtBar
Association.TheoccasionwasthethirtyfourthanniversaryofKesavanandaBharati.ThisishowtheMr.
Andhyarujinaputit(emphasissupplied):
Thecasewasessentiallyapoliticalfightinacourtoflawwithapoliticalbackground.Itwasconducted
undercontinuousandintensepressurethelikesofwhichitishopedwillneverbeseenagain.One
authorhasdescribedtheatmosphereofthecourtas"poisonous."Ajudgeonthebenchlaterspoke
aboutthe"unusualhappenings"inthecase.Iftheseveral"unusualhappenings"inthecasearerelated
indetail,theywillmakeonedoubtifthedecisioninthecasewastrulyajudicialoneexpectedfrom
judgeswithdetachmentfromtheresultsofthecontroversybeforethem.
OnApril24,1973,theelevenseparatejudgmentsweredeliveredbyninejudges;collectivelytheseran
intomorethan1000printedpages.SixjudgesChiefJusticeS.M.SikriandJusticesJ.M.Shelat,K.S.
Hegde,P.JaganmohanReddy,A.N.Grover,andS.MukherjeawereoftheopinionthatParliament's
powerwaslimitedbecauseofimpliedandinherentlimitationsintheConstitution,includingthosein
fundamentalrights.SixotherjudgesJusticesA.N.Ray,D.G.Palekar,K.K.Mathew,S.N.Dwivedi,M.H.
Beg,andY.V.ChandrachudwereoftheopinionthattherewerenolimitationsatallonParliament's
powertoamendtheConstitution.ButonejudgeJusticeH.R.Khannatookneitherside.Heheldthat
ParliamenthadthefullpowerofamendingtheConstitution;butbecauseithadthepoweronly"to
amend,"itmustleave"thebasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitution"intact.Itwasahopelessly
dividedverdictafterallthelabourandcontestoffivemonths.Nomajority,nominority,nobodycould
saywhatwastheverdict.
HowwasitthensaidthattheCourtbyamajorityheldthatParliamenthadnopowertoamendthebasic
structureoftheConstitution?Therebyhangsatalenotgenerallyknown.Immediatelyaftertheeleven
judgesfinishedreadingtheirjudgments,ChiefJusticeSikri,inwhoseopinionParliament'spowerwas
limitedbyinherentandimpliedlimitations,passedonahastilypreparedpapercalleda"Viewofthe
Majority"forsignaturesbythethirteenjudgesonthebench.Oneoftheconclusionsinthe"Viewofthe
Majority"wasthat"Parliamentdidnothavethepowertoamendthebasicstructureorframeworkof
theConstitution."ThiswasliftedfromoneoftheconclusionsinthejudgmentofJusticeH.R.Khanna.
Ninejudgessignedthestatementincourt.Fourothersrefusedtosignit.
Byanyreadingoftheelevenjudgments,thisconclusioncouldnothavebeentheviewofthemajority.It
wasonlytheviewofonejudgeJusticeH.R.Khanna.Somejudgeshadnotimetoreadalltheeleven
judgmentsastheywerepreparedundergreatconstraintsoftimeowingtotheretirementoftheChief
Justicethenextday.JusticeChandrachudconfessedthathehadachancehurriedlytoreadfourdraft
judgmentsofhiscolleagues.Noconferencewascalledofalljudgesforfindingoutthemajorityview.
TheoneconferencecalledbytheChiefJusticeexcludedthosejudgeswhowereoftheopinionthat
therewerenolimitationsontheamendingpowers.Norwastheconclusiondebatedincourt,asitought
tohavebeen.TheChiefJustice'sactionhasbeendescribedbysomeasanactofstatesmanship.Others
believeitwasamanoeuvretocreateamajoritythatdidnotexist.
ImaynotethatMr.Andhyarujinasubsequentlywroteabookonthesubject:Kesavananda
BharatiCaseTheuntoldstoryofstruggleforsupremacybySupremeCourtandParliament(2011).(See
alsoMr.AndhyarujinasarticletitledTheuntoldstoryofhowKesavanandaBharatiandtheBasic
StructureDoctrinesurvivedanattempttoreversethembytheSupremeCourt,whichappearedinthe
SCCJournalat(2009)9SCC(J)J33,andacopyofwhichwasplacedbeforeusbyMr.KhalidAnwer.)
(73)Thesummaryorviewofthemajorityitselfwasinthefollowingterms(seeAIR1973SCatpg.
1642,EditorsNote)(emphasissupplied):
Theviewbythemajorityinthesewritpetitionsisasfollows:
1.GolakNathscaseisoverruled;
2.Article368doesnotenableParliamenttoalterthebasicstructureorframeworkofthe
Constitution;
3.TheConstitution(TwentyfourthAmendment)Act,1971isvalid;
4.Section2(a)and2(b)oftheConstitution(TwentyfifthAmendment)Act,1971isvalid;
5.ThefirstpartofSection3oftheConstitution(TwentyFifthAmendment)Act,1971isvalid.The
secondpart,namely,andnolawcontainingadeclarationthatitisforgivingeffecttosuchapolicyshall
becalledinquestioninanyCourtonthegroundthatitdoesnotgiveeffecttosuchapolicyisinvalid;
6.TheConstitution(TwentyninthAmendment)Act,1971isvalid.
TheConstitutionBenchwilldeterminethevalidityoftheConstitution(TwentysixthAmendment)Act,
1971(relatingtoabolitionofprivypursesandprivilegesofprinces)inaccordancewiththelaw.
Mr.Seervai,inhismonumentalConstitutionalLawofIndia(4thEd.)hasstronglycriticizedthe
summaryandhasexpressedtheviewthatithadnolegaleffectatall(seeVol.3(1996),pg.3114).Ifind
hiscriticismcompelling.Nonetheless,whateverthebasistheIndianSupremeCourtproceedsonthe
principlethatwhatKesavanandaBharatidecidedwasthatParliamentcannot,inexerciseofthe
amendingpowerunderArticle368,alterthebasicstructureorframeworkoftheIndianConstitution.
Suchaconclusionhasnotofcourseescapedacademicandscholarlycriticismandtherearestrong
dissentients(Mr.Andhyarujinabeingbutoneexample)fromtheacceptedversion.Thereasonsforthe
criticismanddissentare,notleast,theshakyandunsoundintellectualandconceptualunderpinningsof
thedoctrine.Ifindthiscriticismwhollyconvincing.Thesepointshavealreadybeenmadeandtakenby
meintheearlierpartofthejudgment.
(74)RevertingtoKhannaJ.sjudgment,hisconclusionsneedtobesetoutinfull(emphasis
supplied):
1550.ImaynowsumupmyconclusionsrelatingtopowerofamendmentunderArticle368ofthe
ConstitutionasitexistedbeforetheamendmentmadebytheConstitution(TwentyfourthAmendment)
ActaswellasaboutthevalidityoftheConstitution(TwentyfourthAmendment)Act,theConstitution
(TwentyfifthAmendment)ActandtheConstitution(TwentyninthAmendment)Act:
(i)Article368containsnotonlytheprocedurefortheamendmentoftheConstitutionbutalsoconfers
thepowerofamendingtheConstitution.
(ii)Entry97inListIoftheSeventhScheduleoftheConstitutiondoesnotcoverthesubjectof
amendmentoftheConstitution.
(iii)Theword"law"inArticle13(2)doesnotincludeamendmentoftheConstitution.Ithasreferenceto
ordinarypieceoflegislation.
(iv)ProvisionforamendmentoftheConstitutionismadewithaviewtoovercomethedifficultieswhich
maybeencounteredinfutureintheworkingoftheConstitution.Nogenerationhasamonopolyof
wisdomnorhasitarighttoplacefettersonfuturegenerationstomouldthemachineryofgovernments.
IfnoprovisionweremadeforamendmentoftheConstitution,thepeoplewouldhaverecoursetoextra
ConstitutionalmethodlikerevolutiontochangetheConstitution.
(v)ArgumentthatParliamentcanenactlegislationunderentry97ListIofSeventhSchedulefor
conveningaConstituentAssemblyorholdingareferendumforthepurposeofamendmentofPartIIIof
theConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgefundamentalrightsisuntenable.Thereisnowarrantfor
thepropositionthatastheamendmentsunderArticle368arenotbroughtaboutthroughreferendum
orpassedinaConventionthepowerofamendmentunderArticle368isonthataccountsubjectto
limitations.
(vi)Thepossibilitythatpowerofamendmentmaybeabusedfurnishesnogroundfordenialofits
existence.Thebestsafeguardagainstabuseofpowerispublicopinionandthegoodsenseofthe
majorityofthemembersofParliament.ItisalsonotcorrecttoassumethatifParliamentisheldentitled
toamendPartIIIoftheConstitution,itwouldautomaticallyandnecessarilyresultinabrogationofall
fundamentalrights.
(vii)ThepowerofamendmentunderArticle368doesnotincludethepowertoabrogatethe
ConstitutionnordoesitincludethepowertoalterthebasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitution.
SubjecttotheretentionofthebasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitution,thepowerof
amendmentisplenaryandincludeswithinitselfthepowertoamendthevariousarticlesofthe
Constitution,includingthoserelatingtofundamentalrightsaswellasthosewhichmaybesaidtorelate
toessentialfeatures.Nopartofafundamentalrightcanclaimimmunityfromamendatoryprocessby
beingdescribedastheessenceorcoreofthatright.Thepowerofamendmentwouldalsoincludewithin
itselfthepowertoadd,alterorrepealthevariousarticles.
(viii)RighttopropertydoesnotpertaintobasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitution.
(ix)Therearenoimpliedorinherentlimitationsonthepowerofamendmentapartfromthosewhich
inhereandareimplicitintheword"amendment".Thesaidpowercanalsobenotrestrictedby
referencetonaturalorhumanrights.Suchrightsinordertobeenforceableinacourtoflawmust
becomeapartofthestatuteortheConstitution.
(x)ApartfromthepartofthePreamblewhichrelatestothebasicstructureorframeworkofthe
Constitution,thePreambledoesnotrestrictthepowerofamendment.
(xi)TheConstitution(TwentyfourthAmendment)Actdoesnotsufferfromanyinfirmityandassuchis
valid.
(xii)TheamendmentmadeinArticle31bytheConstitution(TwentyfifthAmendment)Actisvalid.
(xiii)ThefirstpartofArticle31CintroducedbytheConstitution(TwentyfifthAmendment)Actisvalid.
Thesaidpartisasunder.
31C.NotwithstandinganythingcontainedinArticle13,nolawgivingeffecttothepolicyoftheState
towardssecuringtheprinciplesspecifiedinClause(b)orClause(c)ofArticle39shallbedeemedtobe
voidonthegroundthatitisinconsistentwith,ortakesawayorabridgesanyoftherightsconferredby
Article14,Article19orArticle31:
ProvidedthatwheresuchlawismadebytheLegislatureofaState,theprovisionsofthearticleshallnot
hisassent.
(xiv)ThesecondpartofArticle31Ccontainstheseedofnationaldisintegrationandisinvalidonthe
followingtwogrounds:
(1)ItgivesacarteblanchetotheLegislaturetomakeanylawviolativeofArticles14,19and31and
makeitimmunefromattackbyinsertingtherequisitedeclaration.Article31Ctakenalongwithits
secondpartgivesineffectthepowertotheLegislature,includingaStateLegislature,toamendthe
Constitutioninimportantrespects.
(2)Thelegislaturehasbeenmadethefinalauthoritytodecideastowhetherthelawmadebyitisfor
objectsmentionedinArticle31C.TheviceofsecondpartofArticle31Cliesinthefactthatevenifthe
lawenactedisnotfortheobjectmentionedinArticle31C,thedeclarationmadebytheLegislature
precludesapartyfromshowingthatthelawisnotforthatobjectandpreventsacourtfromgoinginto
thequestionastowhetherthelawenactedisreallyforthatobject.TheexclusionbyLegislature,
includingaStateLegislature,ofeventhatlimitedjudicialreviewstrikesatthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution.ThesecondpartofArticle31Cgoesbeyondthepermissiblelimitofwhatconstitutes
amendmentunderArticle368.
ThesecondpartofArticle31CcanbeseveredfromtheremainingpartofArticle31Canditsinvalidity
wouldnotaffectthevalidityofremainingpart1would,therefore,strikedownthefollowingwordsin
Article31C:
andnolawcontainingadeclarationthatitisforgivingeffecttosuchpolicyshallbecalledinquestionin
anyCourtonthegroundthatitdoesnotgiveeffecttosuchpolicy.
(xv)TheConstitution(TwentyninthAmendment)Actdoesnotsufferfromanyinfirmityandassuchis
valid.
(75)KeepinginmindthatKhanna,Jwastheswingvote,andreadinghisconclusions,Ifindit
difficulttofindfaultwithMr.AndhyarujinasviewoftheKesavanandaBharaticase:Nomajority,no
minority,nobodycouldsaywhatwastheverdict.Butfortheviewofthemajoritystatement
circulatedbythelearnedChiefJusticeandsignedbynineJudgesasnotedabove,thedecisionwould
havebeencastpermanentlyinastateofdoubtandconfusion.And,asadmirablydemonstratedbyMr.
Seervai,thestatementessentiallywaswithoutlegaleffect.
(76)OneimmediatefalloutofthedecisioninKesavanandaBharatiwasthatwhentheChiefJustice
ofIndiaretiredonedayafterannouncementofthejudgments,hewasnotsucceededbythesenior
mostJudge(ashadthithertobeenthesettledpractice)butbyA.N.Ray,J.,whowasfourthinseniority.
ThereasonwasthethreeseniormostJudgeshadallbeeninthemajority.Ray,J.hadbeeninthe
minority,i.e.,hadheldthatParliamenthaduntrammeledpowertoamendtheConstitution.Resipsa
loquitur.AllthreeofthesupersededlearnedJudgesresignedandtherewerewidespreadprotestsby
barassociationsandotherlegalgroupsallacrossIndia.Mr.MuhammadHidayatullah,whohadearlier
servedasthe11thChiefJusticeofIndia(February,1968toDecember,1970)saidofthesupersession
thatitwasanattemptofnotcreating'forwardlookingjudges'butthe'judgeslookingforward'tothe
plumesoftheofficeofChiefJustice(quotedonthewebsiteoftheIndianSupremeCourtBar
Association:seehttp://www.lexsite.com/services/network/scba/history.shtml).
(77)ThenextcasethatrequiresconsiderationisIndiraNehruGandhiv.ShriRajNarain&AnrAIR
1975SC2299.Mr.JusticeRaywasstilltheChiefJusticeofIndiawhenthecasecametobeheard.The
caseitselfcamebywayofanelectionappeal.RajNarainhadchallengedMrs.Gandhiselectioninthe
1971GeneralElectionsintheAllahabadHighCourt.ThatcasewasdecidedagainstMrs.Gandhi,the
HighCourtholdingherguiltyofcertainelectoralmalpractices(thoughofarelativelyminorifnot
downrighttrivialnature).TheresultwasthatMrs.Gandhistooddeseated.Sheimmediatelyappliedto
theHighCourtforsuspensionofthejudgment,andgettingatwoweekreprieve(bywayofan
unconditionalstay)appealedtotheSupremeCourt.ShealsoappliedforastayfromtheSupremeCourt,
whichwouldnormallyhavebeenroutinelygrantedinsuchcircumstances.Itbeingvacations,thestay
applicationwasheardon24.06.1975byalearnedsingleJudge(Iyer,J.).Incidentally,Mrs.Gandhiwas
representedbytherenownedMr.NaniPalkhivala,whohadbeentheleadcounselforthepetitionersin
KesavanandaBharati.Afterafulldayshearing,Iyer,J.surprisinglyonlygrantedaconditionalstay.The
conditionitselfwasrelativelyminorinnature.Thus,Iyer,J.(whoseorderisreportedatAIR1975SC
1590)suspendedthejudgmentoftheHighCourtanddirectedthatMrs.Gandhi,althoughremaining
PrimeMinistercouldnotvoteintheLokSabhaasamemberthereof,norinanyjointsittingof
Parliament.ShealsocouldnotdrawremunerationasamemberofthelowerHouse.Theordercameas
aboltfromtheblueforMrs.Gandhi.ShewasaverypowerfulPrimeMinisterandhadwonbya
landslide.Toheritmusthaveseemedasifthejudiciarywasgunningforher.
(78)Mrs.Gandhireactedwithunrestrainedfury.Emergencywasdeclaredtheverynextday
(25.06.1975).Amassivecrackdownwaslaunched.Hundredsandthenthousandsofpoliticalopponents
werearrested.Civillibertieswerecurtailed.Therewasgreatturmoilinthecountry.ItwasIndian
democracysdarkesthour.ItwasinsuchstressedcircumstancesthattheSupremeCourtheardMrs.
GandhisappealagainsttheverdictoftheHighCourt.Judicialmoralewasatalowebb,ashighlightedby
acasethatwasdecidedbytheSupremeCourtafewmonthsafterthedecisioninMrs.Gandhisappeal
(seebelow).OneotherconsequenceoftheEmergencywasthatMr.Palkhivalareturnedthebrief;he
refusedtoappearforMrs.Gandhiinsuchcircumstances.
(79)Beforetheappealcameupforhearing,Mrs.Gandhitookanotherdrasticmeasure,intheshape
ofthe39thAmendmenttotheConstitution.Thistookeffecton10.08.1975.Anewprovision,Article
329AwasaddedtotheConstitution.ItrelatedtotheelectionofthePrimeMinister(andalso,asafig
leaf,theSpeaker).(TherewerecertainchangesmadeinrespectofthePresidentandVicePresident.)It
providedthattheelectionofamemberoftheLokSabha,whowasatthattimetheholderofanyof
theseofficesorthereafterbecametheholderthereof,couldonlybechallengedbymeansofaspecial
lawandnototherwise.Aspeciallawwasenacted,whichsought,ineffect,tocuretheillegalitiesthatthe
HighCourthadfoundinMrs.Gandhiscaseandthislawwasalsoplacedinthe9thSchedulebythe39th
Amendment.Theattemptwaspatentlytocircumventandrenderinfructuousthedecisionofthe
AllahabadHighCourt,thusmakingthesuccessofherappealintheSupremeCourtirresistible.The39th
AmendmentandthespeciallawwerealsoallowedtobechallengedbytheSupremeCourtinthe
pendingappeal(ofcourse,bytherespondent).ThedecisionoftheSupremeCourtcanbestbestatedin
thewordsofMr.Andhyarujina,againtakenfromthearticlethatappearedinTheHindu(seeabove):
OnAugust11,1975,IndiraGandhi'selectionappealagainstherdisqualificationwasheardbyfive
judgespresidedoverbyChiefJusticeA.N.Ray.HehadbeenappointedChiefJusticeofIndiabythe
governmentthedayafterthejudgmentsintheKesavanadacasesupersedingthreeotherjudgeswho
haddecidedagainsttheunlimitedpowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Thegovernment
believedthatwiththeamendmenttoArticle329AoftheConstitution,herappealwouldsimplybe
allowed.Butsooutrageouswastheamendmentthatallfivejudgesdeclareditbadasitviolated"the
basicstructure."Nevertheless,IndiraGandhi'sappealwasallowedbyanamendmentmadetothe
RepresentationofthePeopleAct,1951,whichcuredallillegalitiesinherelection.Thecourtcouldstrike
downconstitutionallawbutnotanordinarylawthatcarriedoutthesamepurpose.Tomanythis
seemedperplexing.(emphasissupplied)
(80)IwouldventuretosuggestthatperhapsthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtwasnotas
perplexingassomefoundittobe.PerhapstheIndianSupremeCourthadtakenaleafoutofaveryold
book.Thiswasajudicialdecisionthatwas172yearsoldwhenMrs.Gandhisappealwasheardand
decided,butonethatcontinuedtoresonate.Indeed,itstillresonatesandisveneratedaroundthe
world.Itisthedecisionthatisrightlyregardedastheprogenitorofjudicialreview:theworldfamous
caseofMarburyv.Madison5US137(1803)andthejudgmentdeliveredbytheequallyfamousJustice
JohnMarshall,regardedgenerallyasthegreatestChiefJusticeinUShistory.ThestoryofMarburyv.
Madisonhasbeentoldmany,manytimesbutperhapsonemoretellingwillnotprovetooonerous.The
plaintiff,Marbury,hadbeenappointedaJusticeofthePeacebytheoutgoingadministrationof
PresidentJohnAdams(whoseSecretaryofState,andwhosealedthecommission,wasnoneotherthan
thesameJohnMarshall).TheFederalistPartyhadlosttheelectionsandwithitcontroloverCongress.In
whatwouldnowbecalledthelameduckperiodtheoutgoingpartysoughttoentrenchitselfinthe
federaljudiciarybymakingwholesaleappointmentstoofficessuchasmagistratesandJusticesofthe
Peace(whowereofcourseminorcogsinthejudicialmachinery).Thesejudicialappointees,including
Marbury,areknowntohistoryasthemidnightjudgessincetheywereappointedinmanycases
literallyonedaybeforethenewadministrationtookoffice.Allthisunderstandablyinfuriatedthe
incomingadministrationofPresidentJeffersonandhisRepublicanpartywhovowedtoundo,tothe
extentpossible,thedamagedonebytheFederalists.Now,itsohappenedthatintherushoflast
minutework,theoutgoingSecretaryofState(theaforementionedJohnMarshall)failedtodeliverto
Marburyhiscommission,withoutwhichhecouldnotassumeoffice.WhentheincomingSecretaryof
State(Madison)discoveredthishewithheldthecommissiononordersofPresidentJefferson.Marbury
thenfiledsuitintheSupremeCourt,seekingawritofmandamusforthedeliveryofthewithheld
commission.ThishedidonthebasisoftheoriginaljurisdictionconferredontheSupremeCourtbyan
ActofCongress.PresidentJeffersonandtheRepublicansmadeitabsolutelyclearthatshouldthe
SupremeCourtdecideinMarburysfavor,theywouldignoretheCourtsdecisionandsimplydisregard
anywritofmandamusissuedbyit.
(81)ChiefJusticeMarshallandtheSupremeCourtwerethereforeonthehornsofadilemma.Onthe
onehandwasMarburywhoundoubtedlyhadalegalrighttohiscommission.(Marshallcouldhardlysay
otherwisesincehehadhimselfappointedhim.)Ontheother,theRepublicans,ledbyPresident
Jefferson,waitingtoreducetheCourttoridiculeandimpotencebysimplyignoringanyorderorverdict
deliveredbyit.Theatmospherewasundoubtedlypoisonedbypartisanpoliticsandleanings.The
unanimousjudgmentoftheCourtwasauthoredbytheChiefJustice,andwhatMarshalldidisnow
regardedasanactofhighjudicialstatesmanship.HeheldthatMarburyundoubtedlyhadthelegalright
tothecommission.Thejudgmentmadethisabsolutelyclear.Now,asnotedabove,Marburyhad
approachedtheSupremeCourtinexerciseofitsoriginaljurisdictiongrantedunderanActofCongress.
However,theSupremeCourtonlyhad,andcouldbegranted,suchjurisdictioninalimitedsetof
circumstances,beingthosesetoutinArticleIII,section2oftheUSConstitution.Innoothercasesdid
theSupremeCourthaveoriginaljurisdictionandnorcouldsuchjurisdictionbeconferredonit.The
originaljurisdictionthatMarburyinvokeddidnotfallwithinthescopeofArticleIII,section2.Therefore,
theActofCongressthathereliedonwasinconsistentwiththeConstitution.WhatoughttheCourtto
do?Marshallhadnohesitationingivingtheanswer:theActhadtogivewaytotheConstitution.
CongresshadnothelegislativecompetencetoconfersuchjurisdictionontheCourt.Therelevant
provisionwasultravires.Ithadtobesetaside.Marburyhadsuedinthewrongforum.Professor
McCloskey,inTheAmericanSupremeCourt(5threviseded.,2005,pg.26),saidasfollowsofMarburyv.
Madison:
Amoreadroitseriesofparriesandriposteswouldbedifficulttoimagine.Thedangerofaheadon
clashwiththeJeffersonianswasavertedbythedenialofjurisdiction;but,atthesametime,the
declarationthatthecommissionwasillegallywithheldscotchedanyimpressionthattheCourt
condonedtheadministration'sbehaviour.Thesenegativemanoeuvreswereartfulachievementsintheir
ownright.ButthetouchofgeniusisevidentwhenMarshall,notcontentwithhavingrescuedabad
situation,seizestheoccasiontosetthedoctrineofjudicialreview.Itiseasyforustoseeinretrospect
thattheoccasionwasgolden.TheattentionoftheRepublicanswasfocusedonthequestionof
Marbury'scommission,andtheycaredverylittlehowtheCourtwentaboutjustifyingahandsoffpolicy
solongasthatpolicywasfollowed.Moreover,theCourtwasinthedelightfulposition,socommoninits
historybutsoconfusingtoitscritics,ofrejectingandassumingpowerinasinglebreath,forthe
Congresshadtriedheretogivethejudgesanauthoritytheycouldnotconstitutionallyacceptandthe
judgeswerehighmindedlyrefusing.Themomentforimmortalstatementwasathandallright,butonly
ajudgeofMarshall'sdiscernmentcouldhaverecognizedit.(ibid)
(82)Perhaps,soIwouldventuretosuggest,inIndiraNehruGandhiv.RajNarainAIR1975SC2299
didsomethingsimilar.Byallowingherappealintermsofthestatutoryprovisions,theCourtobviated
anyneedforhertotakeanyotherstepsormeasures.ThismeantthattheCourtsdecisiononthelarger
question,i.e.,theconstitutionalityofthe39thAmendmentanditsinvalidation,wouldnotbechallenged
orquestioned.Sometimes,soitwouldseem,judicialstatesmanshiprequiresthattheCourtlosethe
battleinordertowinthewar.
(83)TwofurtherpointsbeforeImoveontothenextcase.Asnotedabove,theEmergencydeclared
byMrs.GandhiwasIndiasdarkesthourinmanyways,notleastbecauseofthedamagetojudicial
morale.Theextentofthisjudicialdemoralizationisillustratedbythehighlycontroversialjudgmentof
theSupremeCourtinA.D.M.JabalpurvsShivakantShukla(1976)2SCC521.Thefactsweresimple.
NumerousopponentsofthegovernmentweredetainedundertheMaintenanceofInternalSecurityAct
(MISA).Writpetitionswerefiledonvariousgrounds.Thegovernmentreliedonanordersuspending
theenforcementoffundamentalrightsunderArticle19.ItalsoreliedonanamendmenttotheAct
underwhichthegroundsfordetentioncouldbetreatedasconfidentialandcouldbewithheld.Itwas
arguedforcefullyonbehalfofthepetitionersthatwhetherornotthefundamentalrightwassuspended
thebasicobligationoftheExecutivetoactinaccordancewithMISAremainedintact.Theutmostthat
couldbeurgedonbehalfofthegovernmentwasthatnorightcouldbeclaimedunderthefundamental
rightschapteroftheConstitution.Howeverthepetitionerscasewasthattheruleoflaw,whichhad
neitherbeennorcouldbesuspended,requiredthatadecisionhadtobemadeastowhetherthe
detentionwasvalidunderMISA.ThiswasarightwhichpreexistedtheConstitutionandwasstillintact.
Itwouldbeastartlingpropositionoflawtoholdthatthesuspensionoffundamentalrightsentitledthe
governmenttorefusetoabidebythelawsmadebyit.ThepoweroftheHighCourtwasnotmerelyto
enforcefundamentalrightsbutalsothelawsoftheland.TheSupremeCourtbyamajorityof4:1held
thattheorderofdetentioncouldnotbechallenged,notmerelyonthegroundthatitwasnotpassedin
accordancetheprovisionsoftheActbutevenifitwasvitiatedbymalafidesfactualorlegalorisbased
onextraneouscircumstances(emphasissupplied).ThusaCourtwhichchallengedthepowerof
ParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionfeltitshandsweretiedbeforeanadmittedlyillegalandmalafide
orderpassedbyaverylowlevelfunctionary.
(84)ThesecondpointisinrelationtoKesavanandaBharati.Again,thestorycanbetoldinthewords
ofMr.Andhyarujina(emphasissupplied):
Everyonetookitthatthecourthadnow[i.e.,afterthedecisioninMrs.Gandhisappeal]approvedthe
basicstructuretheorybystrikingdowntheamendmenttoArticle329Aeveryone,thatis,exceptChief
JusticeA.N.Ray.HehadstatedinIndiraGandhi'scasethatthehearingwouldproceed"onthe
assumptionthatitwasnotnecessarytochallengethemajorityviewinKesavanandaBharaticase."On
November9,1975,twodaysaftertheIndiraGandhicasewasdecided,theChiefJusticeconstituteda
newbenchofthirteenjudgestoreviewtheKesavanandaBharaticase.
Fortwodays,N.A.Palkhivalamadethemosteloquentandpassionateargumentagainstthereview.On
November12,thethirdday,theChiefJusticeannouncedsuddenlyattheveryoutsetofhearing:"The
benchisdissolved."ThusendedaningloriousattempttoreviewtheKesavanandajudgment.Whatever
thereasonsforthedissolutionofthebench,ChiefJusticeRay'smaladroitattempttoreviewthebasic
structurelimitationgaveitalegitimacythatnosubsequentaffirmationofitcouldhavegiven.
(85)Khanna,J.(theswingvoteinKesavanandaBharati)wasalsoamemberoftheBenchthat
heardMrs.Gandhisappeal.Khanna,J.tooktheopportunitytoclarifycertainaspectsofhisjudgment
inKesavanandaBharati.BeforeItakeuptheclarification,itwouldbeappropriatetorefertothenext
case,MinervaMillsandothersv.UnionofIndiaandothersAIR1980SC1789.Thisconcernedthe42nd
AmendmenttotheConstitution,whichcameintoeffecton28.08.1976(ormaybe3.1.1977).This
AmendmentmademanychangestotheConstitution.Forpresentpurposestwoareofparticular
relevance.OnewastomakechangestoArticle31C,whichhadbeenaddedbythe25thAmendmentand
towhichreferencehasbeenmadeabove.ThesecondwasbywayoftwoclausesaddedtoArticle368.
Thesewereasfollows(sees.55ofthe42ndAmendment):
(4)NoamendmentofthisConstitution(includingtheprovisionsofPartIII)madeorpurportingto
havebeenmadeunderthisarticlewhetherbeforeorafterthecommencementofsection55ofthe
Constitution(FortysecondAmendment)Act,1976shallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonany
ground.
(5)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveronthe
constituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealtheprovisionsofthis
Constitutionunderthisarticle.
(86)Asalreadydiscussedintheearlierpartofthisjudgment,theCourthadnodifficultyindeclaring
clauses(4)and(5)violativeofthebasicstructuredoctrine.Theconceptualdifficultiesinthisregard
havealsobeenmentioned.Thisaspectneednotthereforebetoucheduponagainhere.Alsoof
importanceisanotherpoint:thatevenin1980,thequestionofwhatitwasthathadbeendecidedin
KesavanandaBharaticontinuedtoperplextheCourt.Onceagain,thepointismadesuccinctlybyMr.
Andhyarujina(emphasissupplied):
In1980,intheMinervaMillscase,thequestionwasraisedwhethertherewasindeedamajorityview
onthelimitationofthebasicstructure.JusticeBhagwatisaidthatthestatementsignedbyninejudges
hadnolegaleffectatallandcouldnotberegardedasthelawdeclaredbytheSupremeCourt.Hesaid
thesocalledmajorityviewwasanunusualexercisethatcouldnothavebeendonebyjudgeswhohad
ceasedtohaveanyfunctionafterdeliveringtheirjudgmentsandwhohadnotimetoreadthe
judgments.HoweverJusticeBhagwatirelievedhimselffromdecidingwhathecalled"atroublesome
question"bysayingthatIndiraGandhi'scasehadacceptedthemajorityviewthatParliament'spowerof
amendmentwaslimited.Thiswasnotcorrectasthatcasewasdecidedontheassumptionthatitwas
notnecessarytochallengethemajorityview.
Soasinglejudge'sopinionJusticeKhanna'sofalimitationofthebasicstructureonParliament'spower
haspassedoffasthelaw.ButJusticeKhannawasresponsibleforanothervitaldimensionofthebasic
structuretwoyearsafterthecasewasdecided.IntheKesavanandacase,hedidnotsaythat
fundamentalrightswerepartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,althoughsixotherjudgessaid
thatandthecasewasentirelyaboutthevalidityofamendingfundamentalrightsbythechallenged
constitutionalamendments.ThreeofJusticeKhanna'sbrotherjudgesintheKesavanandacasewere
clearlyoftheopinionthatJusticeKhannahadnotheldthatfundamentalrightswerepartofthebasic
structureintheKesavanandaBharaticase.
ButinIndiraGandhi'selectioncasetwoyearslater,JusticeKhanna"clarified"hisjudgmentinthe
Kesavanandacase.Henowsaidthathehadgivenclearindicationsinhisjudgmentthatfundamental
rightswerepartofthebasicstructure.Bysoclarifyinghisjudgment,JusticeKhannadidnotrealisethat
thisclarificationrenderedhisjudgmentintheKesavanandacasehopelesslyselfcontradictory,ashehad
heldunconditionallyvalidtwoconstitutionalamendmentsthatnullifiedvitalfundamentalrights.With
thatdubiousexercise,JusticeKhanna's"clarification"isnowavitalpartofthebasicstructure.
Fundamentalrightsarenowimmunetoanamendmentifitviolatesthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution.
(87)ThejudgmentintheMinervaMillscaseisimportantforpresentpurposesforanotherreason.It,
anditsaftermath,exposetheweaknessesoftheconceptualunderpinningsofthebasicstructure
doctrineand,asIwillrespectfullydemonstrate,highlighttheundeniablefactthat,beinganentirely
Judgemadedoctrine,howsusceptibleitistowhateverareregardedasbeingthepressingissuesbythe
Judgesoftheday.TheactualpointinissuewasthenationalizationoftheMinervaMills.Inotherwords,
itrelatedtothefundamentalrighttoproperty,whichKhanna,J.hadexpresslyheldinhisconclusions
(seesubpara(viii)thereof)nottopertaintothebasisstructure.Themillsweretakenoverunderthe
SickTextileUndertakings(Nationalisation)Act,1974,whichhadbeenplacedinthe9thScheduletothe
IndianConstitutionbythe39thAmendment(1975).Itwillberecalledthatthe25thAmendment(1971)
hadintroducedArticle31CintotheConstitution,which,asnotedabove,wasmodifiedbythe42nd
Amendment(s.4).AlthoughIhavereproducedtheoriginalArticle31Cabove,itwillbeconvenienttoset
itoutonceagain,withthechangesmadebythe42ndAmendmentalsoincorporated.Thechangeswere
bywayofsubstitution.Thereplacingwordsofthe42ndAmendmentareinsquarebrackets;theoriginal
wordsbeingreplacedareunderlined:
NotwithstandinganythingcontainedinArticle13,nolawgivingeffecttothepolicyoftheStatetowards
securingtheprinciplesspecifiedinclause(b)orclause(c)ofarticle39[alloranyoftheprincipleslaid
downinPartIV]shallbedeemedtobevoidonthegroundthatitisinconsistentwith,ortakesawayor
abridgesanyoftherightsconferredbyArticle14,Article19orArticle31[Article14orArticle19];and
nolawcontainingadeclarationthatitisforgivingeffecttosuchpolicyshallbecalledinquestioninany
courtonthegroundthatitdoesnotgiveeffecttosuchpolicy:
ProvidedthatwheresuchlawismadebythelegislatureofaState,theprovisionsofthisArticleshallnot
hisassent.
(Forreasonsthatbecomeclearbelow,certainwordshavealsobeenplacedinitalics.)Inordertofully
appreciatethepointthatIwishtomake,itwillbenecessaryalsotoreproduceArticle39oftheIndian
Constitution:
39.CertainprinciplesofpolicytobefollowedbytheState.TheStateshall,inparticular,directitspolicy
towardssecuring
(a)thatthecitizens,menandwomenequally,havetherighttoanadequatemeansoflivelihood;
(b)thattheownershipandcontrolofthematerialresourcesofthecommunityaresodistributedasbest
tosubservethecommongood;
(c)thattheoperationoftheeconomicsystemdoesnotresultintheconcentrationofwealthandmeans
ofproductiontothecommondetriment;
(d)thatthereisequalpayforequalworkforbothmenandwomen;
(e)thatthehealthandstrengthofworkers,menandwomen,andthetenderageofchildrenarenot
abusedandthatcitizensarenotforcedbyeconomicnecessitytoenteravocationsunsuitedtotheirage
orstrength;
(f)thatchildrenaregivenopportunitiesandfacilitiestodevelopinahealthymannerandinconditions
offreedomanddignityandthatchildhoodandyouthareprotectedagainstexploitationandagainst
moralandmaterialabandonment.
Imaynotethatclause(f)wasaddedtoArticle39bythe42ndAmendment.Otherthanthat,it
hasretaineditsformasoriginallyenacted.
(88)ItwillalsoberecalledthatArticle31Chadbeenconsideredbythe13JudgeBenchinthe
KesavanandaBharaticase.There,thesixJudgesthathadformedpartofthemajorityhadstruckdown
Article31Cinitsentirety,whilethesixJudgesintheminorityhadupheldit,savethattheyhadread
downthewordsplacedinitalics.Khanna,J.(theswingJudge)hadupheldtheArticlesavethathehad
struckdownonlythewordsplacedinitalics.Thus,thepositionthatemergedafterconsiderationof
Article31Cbya13memberBenchwasthatitwasregardedasvalidlyenactedsavethattheportion
placedinitalicswasindoubt.
(89)IntheMinervaMillscase,the5memberBenchthatheardthecasedidsomething
extraordinary,byamajorityof4:1.Itstruckdowns.4ofthe42ndAmendment,wherebythe
aforementionedchangeshadbeenmadetoArticle31C.A5memberBenchhad,forallpractical
purposes,effectivelyoverruleda13memberBenchalthoughunderafigleaf.Thisbecomesclearwhen
theshortorderwherebythecasewasdisposedoffisconsidered:
"Section4oftheConstitution42ndAmendmentAct[wherebythechangesweremadetoArticle31C]is
beyondtheamendingpoweroftheParliamentandisvoidsinceitdamagesthebasicoressential
featuresoftheConstitutionanddestroysitsbasicstructurebyatotalexclusionofchallengetoanylaw
onthegroundthatitisinconsistentwith,ortakesawayorabridgesanyoftherightsconferredbyArticle
14orArticle19oftheConstitution,ifthelawisforgivingeffecttothepolicyoftheStatetowards
securingalloranyoftheprincipleslaiddowninPartIVoftheConstitution.Section55ofthe
Constitution42ndAmendmentAct[wherebytwoclauseswereaddedtoArticle368]isbeyondthe
amendingpoweroftheParliamentandisvoidsinceitremovesalllimitationsonthepowerofthe
Parliamentto264amendtheConstitutionandconferspoweruponittoamendtheConstitutionsoasto
damageordestroyitsbasicoressentialfeaturesoritsbasicstructure."
Andwhatismorepertinent,themajoritydecisionwaswrittenbyChandrachud,CJ,whohad
beenintheminorityinKesavanandaBharati,andhadupheldtheArticlethere(seepara2156ofthe
judgment,wherethelearnedJudgehasgivenhisconclusionsinthisregard).Howwasthispossible?The
reasongivenforthisapparentvoltefacewasthatthe42ndAmendmenthadallegedlysignificantly
alteredArticle31C.Asnotedabove,intheoriginalarticle,referencehadbeenmadetoonlyclauses(b)
and(c)ofArticle39(thewordsunderlined).The42ndAmendmenthadsubstitutedthesewithwords
thatbroughtallofthedirectivesofstatepolicywithintheambitofArticle31C(thewordsplacedin
squarebrackets).ThelearnedChiefJusticeusedthischangetojustifyhischange.Iwouldrespectfully
pointoutthatArticles14and19werealwaysreferredtoinArticle31C.Furthermore,thespecificissue
involvedintheMinervaMillscasewasthenationalizationofthemills.Now,asisclearfromArticle39,
thisissuewascoveredbyclauses(b)and(c)whichwerealwayscoveredbyArticle31C.Noneofthe
otherclausesofArticle39,oranyotherdirectivesofstatepolicy,wasengaged.Thus,thebasisonwhich
themajoritysoughttojustifyitsactionsimplydidnotexist.Itisasalutaryprincipleofinterpretation
that,whenconsideringconstitutionalprovisions,thecourtshouldonlygosofarasisnecessaryforthe
casebeforeit,andnofurther.TheMinervaMillscaseexposes,likenoother,thejurisprudentialdangers
inherentinanamorphousdoctrinesuchasthebasicstructuretheory.OnlyoneJudge,Bhagwati,J.
dissentedandheexpressedhimselfasfollows(emphasissupplied):
OnceweacceptthepropositionlaiddownbythemajoritydecisioninKesavanandaBharati'scasethat
theunamendedArticle31Cwasconstitutionallyvalid,itcouldonlybeonthebasisthatitdidnot
damageordestroythebasicstructureoftheConstitutionandmoreoverintheordermadeinWaman
Rao'scaseon9thMay,1980thisCourtexpresslyheldthattheunamendedArticle31C"doesnot
damageanyofthebasicoressentialfeaturesoftheConstitutionoritsbasicstructure,"andifthatbeso,
itisdifficulttoappreciatehowtheamendedArticle31Ccanbesaidtobeviolativeofthebasic
structure.IftheexclusionoftheFundamentalRightsembodiedinArticles14and19couldbe
legitimatelymadeforgivingeffecttotheDirectivePrinciplessetoutinclauses(b)and(c)ofArticle39
withoutaffectingthebasicstructureIfailtoseewhytheseFundamentalRightscannotbeexcludedfor
givingeffecttotheotherDirectivePrinciples.IftheconstitutionalobligationinregardtotheDirective
Principlessetoutinclauses(b)and(c)ofArticle39couldbegivenprecedenceovertheconstitutional
obligationinregardtotheFundamentalRightsunderArticles14and19,thereisnoreasoninprinciple
whysuchprecedencecannotbegiventotheconstitutionalobligationinregardtotheotherDirective
Principleswhichstandonthesamefooting.Itwould,tomymind,beincongruoustoholdtheamended
Article31CinvalidwhentheunamendedArticle31Chasbeenheldtobevalidbythemajoritydecisionin
KeshavanandaBharati'scaseandbytheordermadeon9thMay,1980inWamanRao'scase.
(90)ThedecisionofthemajorityintheMinervaMillscasedidnotescapecriticism.Itcame,inter
alia,intheshapeofthenextjudgmentthatrequiresconsideration,SanjeevCokeManufacturingCo.v.
BharatCokingCoalLtd.andanotherAIR1983SC239.Thecasewasheardbya5memberBench.Itwas
alsoregardingnationalization,thistimeofCokeovenplants.Someoftheseplantsweretakenover
undertherelevantstatute,butotherswereleftoutofthenationalizationprogram.Thepetitioner
challengedtheactionintermsofArticle14(whichcorrespondstoourArticle25).Thegovernments
responsewasthattheactionwascoveredbyArticle31C.Theprincipaljudgmentwaswrittenby
ChinnappaReddy,J.,whileAmarendraNathSen,Jconcurred.Thepetitionwasunanimouslydismissed.
Themajorityjudgmentidentifiedtheprincipalquestionforconsiderationbeingwhethertheimpugned
statutewasprotectedunderArticle31C.Naturally,learnedcounselforthepetitionerreliedstronglyon
theMinervaMillscaseinsupportofhiscontentionthattheimpugnedlegislationoughttobestruck
down.ThelearnedBenchthatdecidedtheSanjeevCokecasewasinnodoubtastowhatwasthe
correctpositioninlaw,andneedstobequotedatlengthonitsviewsregardingthedecisioninMinerva
Mills.Themajorityjudgmentstartedbycommentingontherarebeautyandpersuasiverhetoricofthe
judgment.However,itthencontinuedasfollows(emphasissupplied)(pp.24650):
11.Weconfessthecasehasleftusperplexed.Inthefirstplace,noquestionregardingthe
constitutionalvalidityofs.4ofthe[42ndAmendment]appearstohavearisenforconsiderationinthat
case.ThequestionwasaboutthenationalisationandtakeoverbytheCentralGovernmentofacertain
textilemillundertheprovisionsof[anActof1974].Inordertochallengetheprovisionsofthe[said
Actof1974]onthegroundofinconsistencyorabridgementortakingawayoftheFundamentalRights
conferredbyArt.14orArt.19,itwasnecessaryforthepetitionerstochallengetheconstitutional
validityoftheConstitutionTwentyfifthAmendmentAct,1971bywhichArt.31Cwasfirstintroduced
intotheConstitution.That,however,wasnotopentothepetitionersbecauseofthedecisionofthis
CourtinKesavanandaBharati'scase.Itwassoconcededtoobythelearnedcounselwhoappearedfor
thepetitionerintheMinervaMillscase.Thecounselwhoappeared,however,chosetoquestionthe
constitutionalvalidityof[s.4ofthe42ndAmendment].Noquestionregardingtheconstitutional
validityof[thesaid]s.4aroseforconsiderationinthecase,firstly,becausetheimmunityfromattack
giventoalawgivingeffecttothepolicyoftheStatetowardssecuringtheprinciplesspecifiedincl.(b)or
cl.(c)ofArt39wasgivenbythe[25thAmendment]itselfandsecondlybecausethe[aforementioned
Actof1974]hadbeenenactedbeforethe[42ndAmendment].Yet,counselsuccessfullypersuadedthe
Courttogointothequestionofthevalidityofs.4.AnobjectionwasraisedbeforetheCourtbythe
learnedAttorneyGeneralthattheCourtshouldnotconcernitselfwithhypotheticaloracademic
questions.TheobjectionwasoverruledonthegroundthattheFortysecondAmendmentwastherefor
anyonetoseeandthatthequestionraisedwasanimportantonedealingwith,notanordinarylaw,but,
aconstitutionalamendmentwhichhadbeenbroughtintooperationandwhichofitsownforce
permittedtheviolationsofcertainfreedomsthroughlawspassedforcertainpurposes.Wehaveserious
reservationsonthequestionwhetheritisopentoaCourttoansweracademicorhypotheticalquestions
onsuchconsiderations,particularlysowhenseriousconstitutionalissuesareinvolved.We(judges)are
notauthorisedtomakedisembodiedpronouncementsonseriousandcloudyissuesofconstitutional
policywithoutbattlelinesbeingproperlydrawn.Judicialpronouncementscannotbeimmaculatelegal
conceptions.Itisbutrightthatnoimportantpointoflawshouldbedecidedwithoutaproperlis
betweenpartiesproperlyrangedoneithersideandacrossingoftheswords.Wethinkitisinexpedient
fortheSupremeCourttodelveintoproblemswhichdonotariseandexpressopinionthereon.
12.Inthesecondplace,thequestionoftheconstitutionalvalidityofArt.31Cappearstoustobe
concludedbythedecisionoftheCourtinKesavanandaBharati'scase.
13.InKesavanandaBharati'scase,theCourtexpresslyruledthatArt.31Casitstoodatthattimewas
constitutionallyvalid.Nodoubt,theprotectionofArt.31Cwasatthattimeconfinedtolawsgiving
effecttothepolicyofthecls.(b)and(c)ofArt.39.BytheConstitutionFortysecondamendmentAct,
theprotectionwasextendedtoalllawsgivingeffecttoalloranyoftheprincipleslaiddowninPartIV.
Thedialectics,thelogicandtherationaleinvolvedinupholdingthevalidityofArt.31Cwhenitconfined
itsprotectiontolawsenactedtofurtherArt.39(b)orArt.39(c)should,uncompromisinglyleadtothe
sameresoluteconclusionthatArt.31Cwithitsextendedprotectionisalsoconstitutionallyvalid.No
onesuggeststhatthenatureoftheDirectivePrinciplesenunciatedintheotherArticlesofPartIVofthe
ConstitutionissodrasticordifferentfromtheDirectivePrinciplesincls(b)and(c),ofArt39,thatthe
extensionofconstitutionalimmunitytolawsmadetofurtherthoseprincipleswouldoffendthebasic
structureoftheConstitution.Infact,nosuchargumentappearstohavebeenadvancedintheMinerva
Millscaseandwefindnodiscussionandnoreferencewhatsoever,separatelytoanyofthedistinct
principlesenunciatedintheindividualArticlesofPartIVoftheConstitutiondecisioninMinervaMills.
Theargumentadvancedandtheconclusionarrivedatbothappeartobegeneral,applicabletoevery
clauseofArt.39,andeveryArticleofPartIVoftheConstitution,nolesstoclauses(b)and(c)thantothe
otherclauses.
16.Toacceptthesubmissionof[learnedcounselforthepetitioner]thatalawfoundedon
discriminationisnotentitledtotheprotectionofArt.31C,assuchalawcanneverbesaidtobeto
furthertheDirectivePrincipleaffirmedinArt.39(b),wouldindeedbe,touseahackneyedphrase,toput
thecartbeforethehorse.IfthelawmadetofurthertheDirectivePrincipleisnecessarilynon
discriminatoryorisbasedonareasonableclassification,thensuchlawdoesnotneedanyprotection
suchasthataffordedbyArt.31C.Suchlawwouldbevalidonitsownstrength,withnoaidfromArt.
31C.TomakeitaconditionprecedentthatalawseekingthehavenofArt.31Cmustbenon
discriminatoryorbasedonreasonableclassificationistomakeArt.31Cmeaningless.IfArt.14isnot
offended,nooneneedgiveanyimmunityfromanattackbasedonArt.14.
17.WearefirmlyoftheopinionthatwhereArt.31CcomesinArt.14goesout.Thereisnoscopefor
bringinginArt.14byasidewindasitwere,thatis,byequatingtheruleofequalitybeforethelawof
Art.14withthebroadegalitarianismofArt.39(b)orbytreatingtheprincipleofArt.14asincludedin
theprincipleofArt.39(b).Toinsistonnexusbetweenthelawforwhichprotectionisclaimedandthe
principleofArt.39(b)isnottoinsistonfulfilmentoftherequirementofArt.14.Theyaredifferent
conceptsandincertaincircumstances,mayevenruncountertoeachother.Thatiswhytheneedforthe
immunityaffordedbyArt.31C.Indeedthereareboundtobeinnumerablecaseswherethenarrower
conceptofequalitybeforethelawmayfrustratethebroaderegalitarianismcontemplatedbyArt.
39(b).
(91)ThenextcasethatrequiresconsiderationisI.R.Coelhov.StateofTamilNaduAIR2007SC861.
Itwasdecidedbya9memberBench,andmadewhatisregardedasanimportantrefinementinthe
basicstructuredoctrine.The9memberBenchwasconstitutedbecauseearliera5memberBenchhad
referredthecaseforhearingbyalargerBench.The9memberBenchstatedthebroadquestion
beforetheCourttobeasfollows:
5.Thefundamentalquestioniswhetheronandafter24thApril,1973whenbasicstructuresdoctrine
waspropounded[i.e.,thedateonwhichtheKesavanandaBharaticasewasdecided],itispermissiblefor
theParliamentunderArticle31Btoimmunizelegislationsfromfundamentalrightsbyinsertingthem
intotheNinthScheduleand,ifso,whatisitseffectonthepowerofjudicialreviewoftheCourt.
Afterconsideringthequestion,theCourtconcludedasfollows(emphasissupplied):
149.TheresultofaforesaiddiscussionisthattheconstitutionalvalidityoftheNinthScheduleLawson
thetouchstoneofbasicstructuredoctrinecanbeadjudgedbyapplyingthedirectimpactandeffecttest,
i.e.,rightstest,whichmeanstheformofanamendmentisnottherelevantfactor,buttheconsequence
thereofwouldbedeterminativefactor.
Inconclusion,weholdthat:
150(i)AlawthatabrogatesorabridgesrightsguaranteedbyPartIIIoftheConstitutionmayviolatethe
basicstructuredoctrineoritmaynot.Ifformeristheconsequenceoflaw,whetherbyamendmentof
anyArticleofPartIIIorbyaninsertionintheNinthSchedule,suchlawwillhavetobeinvalidatedin
exerciseofjudicialreviewpoweroftheCourt.Thevalidityorinvaliditywouldbetestedontheprinciples
laiddowninthisjudgment.
(ii)ThemajorityjudgmentinKesavanandaBharati'scasereadwithIndiraGandhi'scase,requiresthe
validityofeachnewconstitutionalamendmenttobejudgedonitsownmerits.Theactualeffectand
impactofthelawontherightsguaranteedunderPartIIIhastobetakenintoaccountfordetermining
whetherornotitdestroysbasicstructure.Theimpacttestwoulddeterminethevalidityofthe
challenge.
(iii)AllamendmentstotheConstitutionmadeonorafter24thApril,1973bywhichtheNinthSchedule
isamendedbyinclusionofvariouslawsthereinshallhavetobetestedonthetouchstoneofthebasicor
essentialfeaturesoftheConstitutionasreflectedinArticle21readwithArticle14,Article19,andthe
principlesunderlyingthem.ToputitdifferentlyeventhoughanActisputintheNinthSchedulebya
constitutionalamendment,itsprovisionswouldbeopentoattackonthegroundthattheydestroyor
damagethebasicstructureifthefundamentalrightorrightstakenawayorabrogatedpertainsor
pertaintothebasicstructure.
(iv)Justificationforconferringprotection,notblanketprotection,onthelawsincludedintheNinth
SchedulebyConstitutionalAmendmentsshallbeamatterofConstitutionaladjudicationbyexamining
thenatureandextentofinfractionofaFundamentalRightbyastatute,soughttobeConstitutionally
protected,andonthetouchstoneofthebasicstructuredoctrineasreflectedinArticle21readwith
Article14andArticle19byapplicationofthe"rightstest"andthe"essenceoftheright"testtakingthe
synopticviewoftheArticlesinPartIIIasheldinIndiraGandhi'scase.Applyingtheaboveteststothe
NinthSchedulelaws,iftheinfractionaffectsthebasicstructurethensuchalaw(s)willnotgetthe
protectionoftheNinthSchedule.
ThisisouranswertothequestionreferredtousvideOrderdated14thSeptember,1999inI.R.Coelhov.
StateofTamilNadu[1999]7SCC580.
(v)IfthevalidityofanyNinthSchedulelawhasalreadybeenupheldbythisCourt,itwouldnotbeopen
tochallengesuchlawagainontheprinciplesdeclaredbythisjudgment.However,ifalawheldtobe
violativeofanyrightsinPartIIIissubsequentlyincorporatedintheNinthScheduleafter24thApril,
1973,suchaviolation/infractionshallbeopentochallengeonthegroundthatitdestroysordamages
thebasicstructureasindicatedinArticle21readwithArticle14,Article19andtheprinciplesunderlying
thereunder.
(vi)ActiontakenandtransactionsfinalizedasaresultoftheimpugnedActsshallnotbeopento
challenge.
Weanswerthereferenceintheabovetermsanddirectthatthepetitions/appealsbenowplacedfor
hearingbeforeaThreeJudgeBenchfordecisioninaccordancewiththeprincipleslaiddownherein.
(92)Whatwerethedirectimpactandeffecttestandtherightstestthatwereenunciatedand
appliedbytheCourt?Beforeconsideringthisquestion,itwillbeappropriatetorecallwhatthe9th
Schedulewasabout.Asnotedabove,theveryfirstamendmenttotheIndianConstitutionhadadded
Article31Bandthe9thSchedulethereto.Article31Bprovidedthatthelawsmentionedinthe9th
Scheduleweredeemednottobevoid,orevertohavebecomevoid,onthegroundthatsuchAct,
Regulationorprovisionisinconsistentwith,ortakesawayorabridgesanyoftherightsconferredby,
anyprovisionsofthisPart,i.e.,thefundamentalrights.Ashasbeenseen,variouslawswerefromtime
totimeaddedtothe9thScheduleandsomeofthoseconstitutionalamendmentswerechallengedin
thevariouscasesmentionedhereinabove.IntheCoelhocasetheSupremeCourtdirectlytookupthe
questionwhether,inviewofthebasicstructuredoctrineandwitheffectfromthedateonwhichthe
KesavanandaBharaticasewasdecided,therecouldbeanyimmunityevenifthelawhadbeenplacedin
the9thSchedule.TheanswergivenbytheCourthasbeennotedabove.Thereasoningbehindthe
answernowneedstobelookedatinsomedetail.
(93)ThefirstpointtonoteregardingtheCoelhocaseisthattheconstitutionalityofArticle31Bwas
notcontested,andtheCourtproceededontheexpressbasisthatthesaidarticlewasvalid.However,on
behalfofthepetitionersithadbeenarguedthatinthepostKesavanandaBharatieratheconsequence
oftheevolutionoftheprinciplesofbasicstructureisthatNinthSchedulelawscannotbeconferredwith
constitutionalimmunityofthekindcreatedbyArticle31B.TheCourtdidnotacceptsuchabroadand
sweepingproposition:
76.Tobeginwith,wefinditdifficulttoacceptthebroadpropositionurgedbythepetitionersthatlaws
thathavebeenfoundbythecourtstobeviolativeofPartIIIoftheConstitutioncannotbeprotectedby
placingthesameintheNinthSchedulebyuseofdeviceofArticle31BreadwithArticle368ofthe
Constitution.InStateofMaharashtraandOrs.v.ManSinghSurajSinghPadviandOrs.(1978)1SCC
615,aSevenJudgeConstitutionBench,postdecisioninKesavanandaBharati'scaseupheldConstitution
(40thAmendment)Act,1976whichwasintroducedwhentheappealwaspendinginSupremeCourtand
therebyincludedtheregulationsintheNinthSchedule.ItwasheldthatArticle31BandtheNinth
Schedulecuredthedefect,ifany,intheregulationsasregardsanyunconstitutionalityallegedonthe
groundofinfringementoffundamentalrights.
Therealcruxoftheproblem,describedbytheCourtasbeinganintricateissue,was,what
wastheextentandnatureoftheimmunitythatArticle31Bcouldvalidlyprovide?Ipausehereto
respectfullynotethattheproblemwasinfactcreatedbytheCourtitself,perhapsinorderforittobe
abletogivethesolution.Theanswer,accordingtotheCourt,layinthebasicstructuredoctrine.The
CourtreferredtothevariousjudgmentsintheKesavanandaBharatiandinparticulartothe
clarification(referredtoabove)madebyKhanna,J.intheIndiraNehruGandhicaseofwhathehad
saidinhisjudgmentinKesavanandaBharatitoconcludethatsome,atleast,ofthefundamentalrights
wereindeedpartofthebasicstructureoftheIndianConstitution.
(94)AftercitingextensivelyfromMr.Seervaisworkalreadyreferredtoabove(paras30.48and
30.65(Vol.3)),andfurtherconsiderationofsomeofthejudgmentsintheKesavanandaBharaticase,the
Courtobservedasfollows(emphasissupplied):
98.Therightsandfreedomscreatedbythefundamentalrightschaptercanbetakenawayordestroyed
byamendmentoftherelevantArticle,butsubjecttolimitationofthedoctrineofbasicstructure.True,it
mayreducetheefficacyofArticle31Bbutthatisinevitableinviewoftheprogressthelawshavemade
postKesavanandaBharati'scasewhichhaslimitedthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendthe
ConstitutionunderArticle368oftheConstitutionbymakingitsubjecttothedoctrineofbasicstructure.
99.Todecidethecorrectnessoftherivalsubmissions,thefirstaspecttobeborneinmindisthateach
exerciseoftheamendingpowerinsertinglawsintoNinthScheduleentailsacompleteremovalofthe
fundamentalrightschaptervisavisthelawsthatareaddedintheNinthSchedule.Secondly,insertion
inNinthScheduleisnotcontrolledbyanydefinedcriteriaorstandardsbywhichtheexerciseofpower
maybeevaluated.TheconsequenceofinsertionisthatitnullifiesentirePartIIIoftheConstitution.
Thereisnoconstitutionalcontrolonsuchnullification.Itmeansanunlimitedpowertototallynullify
PartIIIinsofarasNinthSchedulelegislationsareconcerned.ThesupremacyoftheConstitution
mandatesallconstitutionalbodiestocomplywiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution.Italsomandatesa
mechanismfortestingthevalidityoflegislativeactsthroughanindependentorgan,viz.thejudiciary.
101.Ifthedoctrineofbasicstructureprovidesatouchstonetotesttheamendingpowerorits
exercise,therecanbenodoubtandithastobesoacceptedthatPartIIIoftheConstitutionhasakey
roletoplayintheapplicationofthesaiddoctrine.ByenactingFundamentalRightsandDirective
PrincipleswhicharenegativeandpositiveobligationsoftheStates,theConstituentAssemblymadeit
theresponsibilityoftheGovernmenttoadoptamiddlepathbetweenindividuallibertyandpublicgood.
FundamentalRightsandDirectivePrincipleshavetobebalanced.Thatbalancecanbetiltedinfavourof
thepublicgood.Thebalance,however,cannotbeoverturnedbycompletelyoverridingindividual
liberty.ThisbalanceisanessentialfeatureoftheConstitution.
55.FundamentalrightsenshrinedinPartIIIwereaddedtotheConstitutionasacheckontheState
power,particularlythelegislativepower.TheframersoftheConstitutionhavebuiltawallaround
certainpartsoffundamentalrights,whichhavetoremainforever,limitingabilityofmajoritytointrude
uponthem.Thatwallisthe'BasicStructure'doctrine.UnderArticle32,whichisalsopartofPartIII,
SupremeCourthasbeenvestedwiththepowertoensurecomplianceofPartIII.Theresponsibilityto
judgetheconstitutionalityofalllawsisthatofjudiciary.Thus,whenpowerunderArticle31Bis
exercised,thelegislationsmadecompletelyimmunefromPartIIIresultsinadirectwayout,ofthecheck
ofPartIII,includingthatofArticle32.ItcannotbesaidthatthesameConstitutionthatprovidesfora
checkonlegislativepower,willdecidewhethersuchacheckisnecessaryornot.Itwouldbeanegation
oftheConstitution.
104.Indeed,ifArticle31Bonlyprovidedrestrictedimmunityanditseemsthatoriginalintentwasonly
toprotectalimitednumberoflaws,itwouldhavebeenonlyexceptiontoPartIIIandthebasisforthe
initialupholdingoftheprovision.However,theuncheckedandrampantexerciseofthispower,the
numberhavinggonefrom13to284,showsthatitisnolongeramereexception.Theabsenceof
guidelinesforexerciseofsuchpowermeanstheabsenceofconstitutionalcontrolwhichresultsin
destructionofconstitutionalsupremacyandcreationofparliamentaryhegemonyandabsenceoffull
powerofjudicialreviewtodeterminetheconstitutionalvalidityofsuchexercise.
(95)Iwouldrespectfullydrawattentiontothefreeuseofphrasessuchasnullificationof
fundamentalrights,thejudiciarybeinganindependentorgan,andthedangersofaparliamentary
hegemonyexercisingthepowerunderArticle31Binanuncheckedandrampantmanner.Such
languagemayperhapsbesuitableforpoliticalspeeches;itshould,Irespectfullysubmit,beavoidedin
judgmentsofcourtsoflaw.But,toreturntotheobservationsoftheCourt:
107.TheParliamenthaspowertoamendtheprovisionsofPartIIIsoastoabridgeortakeaway
fundamentalrights,butthatpowerissubjecttothelimitationofbasicstructuredoctrine.Whetherthe
impactofsuchamendmentresultsinviolationofbasicstructurehastobeexaminedwithreferenceto
eachindividualcase.TaketheexampleoffreedomofPresswhich,thoughnotseparatelyandspecifically
guaranteed,hasbeenreadaspartofArticle19(1)(a).IfArticle19(1)(a)issoughttobeamendedsoasto
abrogatesuchright(whichwehopewillneverbedone),theacceptanceofrespondentscontention
wouldmeanthatsuchamendmentwouldfalloutsidethejudicialscrutinywhenthelawcurtailingthese
rightsisplacedintheNinthScheduleasaresultofimmunitygrantedbyArticle31B.Theimpactofsuch
anamendmentshallhavetobetestedonthetouchstoneofrightsandfreedomsguaranteedbyPartIII
oftheConstitution.Inagivencase,evenabridgementmaydestroytherealfreedomofthePressand,
thus,destructiveofthebasicstructure.Takeanotherexample.ThesecularcharacterofourConstitution
isamatterofconclusiontobedrawnfromvariousArticlesconferringfundamentalrights;andifthe
secularcharacterisnottobefoundinPartIII,itcannotbefoundanywhereelseintheConstitution
becauseeveryfundamentalrightinPartIIIstandseitherforaprincipleoramatterofdetail.therefore,
onehastotakeasynopticviewofthevariousArticlesinPartIIIwhilejudgingtheimpactofthelaws
incorporatedintheNinthScheduleontheArticlesinPartIII.Itisnotnecessarytomultiplythe
illustrations.
ThisbringsmetothenuboftheCourtsreasoningandconclusion(emphasissupplied):
108.Afterenunciationofthebasicstructuredoctrine,fulljudicialreviewisanintegralpartofthe
constitutionalscheme.TheplacementofarightintheschemeoftheConstitution,theimpactofthe
offendinglawonthatright,theeffectoftheexclusionofthatrightfromjudicialreview,theabrogation
oftheprincipleontheessenceofthatrightisanexercisewhichcannotbedeniedonthebasisof
fictionalimmunityunderArticle31B.
60.InIndiraGandhiscase,JusticeChandrachudpositsthatequalityembodiedinArticle14ispartofthe
basicstructureoftheConstitutionand,therefore,cannotbeabrogatedDealingwithArticles14,19
and21inMinervaMillscase,itwassaidthattheseclearlyformpartofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionandcannotbeabrogated.ItwasobservedthatthreeArticlesofourconstitution,andonly
three,standbetweentheheavenoffreedomintowhichTagorewantedhiscountrytoawakeandthe
abyssofunrestrainedpower.TheseArticlesstandonaltogetherdifferentfooting.Canitbesaid,after
theevolutionofthebasicstructuredoctrine,thatexclusionoftheserightsatParliament'swillwithout
anystandard,cannotbesubjectedtojudicialscrutinyasaresultofthebarcreatedbyArticle31B?The
obviousanswerhastobeinthenegative.Ifsomeofthefundamentalrightsconstituteabasicstructure,
itwouldnotbeopentoimmunisethoselegislationsfromfulljudicialscrutinyeitheronthegroundthat
thefundamentalrightsarenotpartofthebasicstructureoronthegroundthatPartIIIprovisionsare
notavailableasaresultofimmunitygrantedbyArticle31B.Itcannotbeheldthatessenceofthe
principlebehindArticle14isnotpartofthebasicstructure.Infact,essenceorprincipleoftherightor
natureofviolationismoreimportantthantheequalityintheabstractorformalsense.Themajority
opinioninKesavanandaBharati'scaseclearlyisthattheprinciplesbehindfundamentalrightsarepartof
thebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Itisnecessarytoalwaysbearinmindthatfundamentalrights
havebeenconsideredtobeheartandsouloftheConstitution.
114.TheresultoftheaforesaiddiscussionisthatsincethebasicstructureoftheConstitutionincludes
someofthefundamentalrights,anylawgrantedNinthScheduleprotectiondeservestobetested
againsttheseprinciples.Ifthelawinfringestheessenceofanyofthefundamentalrightsoranyother
aspectofbasicstructurethenitwillbestruckdown.Theextentofabrogationandlimitofabridgment
shallhavetobeexaminedineachcase.
139.TheobjectbehindArticle31BistoremovedifficultiesandnottoobliteratePartIIIinitsentiretyor
judicialreview.Thedoctrineofbasicstructureispropoundedtosavethebasicfeatures.Article21isthe
heartoftheConstitution.Itconfersrighttolifeaswellasrighttochoose.WhenthistriangleofArticle
21readwithArticle14andArticle19issoughttobeeliminatednotonlythe'essenceofright'testbut
alsothe'rightstest'hastoapply.
ThedoctrineofbasicstructurecontemplatesthattherearecertainpartsoraspectsoftheConstitution
includingArticle15,Article21readwithArticle14and19whichconstitutethecorevalueswhichif
allowedtobeabrogatedwouldchangecompletelythenatureoftheConstitution.Exclusionof
fundamentalrightswouldresultinnullificationofthebasicstructuredoctrine,theobjectofwhichisto
protectbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionasindicatedbythesynopticviewoftherightsinPartIII.
(96)TheCourtthenelaboratedontheessenceoftherighttestandtherightstest(emphasis
supplied):
141.Thereisalsoadifferencebetweenthe'rightstest'andthe'essenceofrighttest'.Bothformpartof
applicationofthebasicstructuredoctrine.WheninacontrolledConstitutionconferringlimitedpower
ofamendment,anentireChapterismadeinapplicable,'theessenceoftheright'testwillhaveno
applicability.Insuchasituation,tojudgethevalidityofthelaw,itis'righttest'whichismore
appropriate.Weareconsideringthesituationwhereentireequalitycode,freedomcodeandrightto
movecourtunderPartIIIareallnullifiedbyexerciseofpowertograntimmunizationatwillbythe
Parliamentwhich,inourview,isincompatiblewiththeimpliedlimitationofthepowerofthe
Parliament.Insuchacase,itistherightstestthatisappropriateandistobeapplied.Regarding
Articles31Aand31C(validitywhereofisnotinquestionhere)havingbeenheldtobevaliddespite
denialofArticle14,itmaybenotedthattheseArticleshaveanindiciawhichisnotthereinArticle31B.
PartIIIisamendablesubjecttobasicstructuredoctrine.ItispermissiblefortheLegislaturetoamend
theNinthScheduleandgrantalawtheprotectionintermsofArticle31Bbutsubjecttorightofcitizen
toassailitontheenlargedjudicialreviewconcept.TheLegislaturecannotgrantfictionalimmunitiesand
excludetheexaminationoftheNinthSchedulelawbytheCourtaftertheenunciationofthebasic
structuredoctrine.
143.Theconstitutionalamendmentsaresubjecttolimitationsandifthequestionoflimitationistobe
decidedbytheParliamentitselfwhichenactstheimpugnedamendmentsandgivesthatlawacomplete
immunity,itwoulddisturbthechecksandbalancesintheConstitution.Theauthoritytoenactlawand
decidethelegalityofthelimitationscannotvestinoneorgan.Thevaliditytothelimitationontherights
inPartIIIcanonlybeexaminedbyanotherindependentorgan,namely,thejudiciary.
(97)Finally,theCourtreachedthelogicalconclusionwithregardtotheextentoftheamending
powerinthelightofthebasicstructuredoctrine(emphasissupplied):
146.Thedoctrineofbasicstructureasaprinciplehasnowbecomeanaxiom.Itispremisedonthebasis
thatinvasionofcertainfreedomsneedstobejustified.Itistheinvasionwhichattractsthebasic
structuredoctrine.TheexistenceofthepowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionatwill,with
requisitevotingstrength,soastomakeanykindoflawsthatexcludesPartIIIincludingpowerofjudicial
reviewunderArticle32isincompatiblewiththebasicstructuredoctrine.Therefore,suchanexerciseif
challenged,hastobetestedonthetouchstoneofbasicstructureasreflectedinArticle21readwith
Article14andArticle19,Article15andtheprinciplesthereunder.
147.ThepowertoamendtheConstitutionissubjecttoaforesaidaxiom.Itis,thus,nomoreplenaryin
theabsolutesenseoftheterm.PriortoKesavanandaBharati,theaxiomwasnotthere.Fictional
validationbasedonthepowerofimmunityexercisedbytheParliamentunderArticle368isnot
compatiblewiththebasicstructuredoctrineand,therefore,thelawsthatareincludedintheNinth
Schedulehavetobeexaminedindividuallyfordeterminingwhethertheconstitutionalamendmentsby
whichtheyareputintheNinthScheduledamageordestroythebasicstructureoftheConstitution.This
CourtbeingboundbyalltheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandalsobythebasicstructuredoctrinehas
necessarilytoscrutinizetheNinthSchedulelaws.Ithastoexaminethetermsofthestatute,thenature
oftherightsinvolved,etc.todeterminewhetherineffectandsubstancethestatuteviolatesthe
essentialfeaturesoftheConstitution.Forsodoing,ithastofirstfindwhethertheNinthSchedulelawis
violativeofPartIII.Ifonsuchexamination,theanswerisintheaffirmative,thefurtherexaminationto
beundertakeniswhethertheviolationfoundisdestructiveofthebasicstructuredoctrine.Ifonsuch
furtherexaminationtheanswerisagaininaffirmative,theresultwouldbeinvalidationoftheNinth
ScheduleLaw.Therefore,firsttheviolationofrightsofPartIIIisrequiredtobedetermined,thenits
impactexaminedandifitshowsthatineffectandsubstance,itdestroysthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution,theconsequenceofinvalidationhastofollow.Everytimesuchamendmentischallenged,
toharkbacktoKesavanandaBharatiupholdingthevalidityofArticle31Bisasurestmeansofadrastic
erosionofthefundamentalrightsconferredbyPartIII.
80.Article31Bgivesvalidationbasedonfictionalimmunity.Injudgingthevalidityofconstitutional
amendmentwehavetobeguidedbytheimpacttest.ThebasicstructuredoctrinerequirestheStateto
justifythedegreeofinvasionoffundamentalrights.Parliamentispresumedtolegislatecompatiblywith
thefundamentalrightsandthisiswhereJudicialReviewcomesin.Thegreatertheinvasioninto
essentialfreedoms,greateristheneedforjustificationanddeterminationbycourtwhetherinvasion
wasnecessaryandifsotowhatextent.ThedegreeofinvasionisfortheCourttodecide.Compatibilityis
oneofthespeciesofJudicialReviewwhichispremisedoncompatibilitywithrightsregardedas
fundamental.Thepowertograntimmunity,atwill,onfictionalbasis,withoutfulljudicialreview,will
nullifytheentirebasicstructuredoctrine.Thegoldentrianglereferredtoaboveisthebasicfeatureof
theConstitutionasitstandsforequalityandruleoflaw.
(98)IhavequotedatsomelengthfromtheCoelhocasebecauseinmyviewitillustrates,rather
strikingly,allthedeficienciesof,anddangersinherentin,thebasicstructuredoctrine.Themannerin
whichthemanifestlanguageofArticle31Bisreducedtoafictionalimmunity,andultimatepoweris
arrogatedtothejudicialbranch,istheunsurprisingculminationofthedoctrine.TheCoelhocase
highlightsthereasonswhyIamentirelyunabletosubscribetothisdoctrine.However,itstillremainsto
assesstherefinementintroducedbythedecision.Ithascreatedtheconceptofaninnercoreor
essenceforcertain(butnotall)fundamentalrights.Ofcourse,therightssoselectedarethechoiceof
theCourtitself.Thisessenceoftheselectedfundamentalrightsispartofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionandcannotthereforebeabridgedorcurtailed.Hence,thetwosteptestdevelopedby
theCourtinrespectofalawplacedinthe9thSchedule.Firstly,theCourtistoseewhether,infact,the
lawsoplacedwouldhaveviolatedanyofthefundamentalrightsornot.Iftheanswerisinthe
affirmative,buttheright(s)soviolateddonotfallintheselectcategory,thechallengepresumablyfails.
However,ifthereisaviolationofanyoftherightsintheselectcategory,thenthesecondstep:an
assessmentofthedegreeofviolation,i.e.,itseffect.Shouldthedegreebesogreatastotouchthe
essenceofthefundamentalright,thenitwouldviolatetheConstitutionsbasicstructure(but,
presumably,nototherwise).Placingsuchalawinthe9thSchedulewouldthenbeofnoavail.Article31B
couldnotstandinthewayofstrikingdownthelaw.Thisatonceraisestheobviousquestion:whatisthe
testfordeterminingtheessenceofanytheselectedfundamentalrightsandhowisonetodetermine
thatthedegreeoreffectoftheinvasionissuchthattheessencehasbeentouched?Not
surprisinglynoanswercanbegiventothisquestionexceptthatitisatthewilloftheCourtitself.
(99)BeforeIproceedtoconsiderthelastIndianjudgment,itisnecessarytoemphasizeapointof
fundamentalimportanceregardingtheIndianjurisprudenceandwhich,withtheutmostrespect,Ifind
verytroubling.Thatishow,asIwillshowinamoment,thejudgmentsoftheIndianSupremeCourt
subsequenttotheKesavanandaBharaticase,whichhaveallbeengivenbyBenchescomprisingof
smallernumberofJudges,havemovedthebasicstructuredoctrineindirectionsthatarenotmerely
inconsistentwiththeearlierdecisionbutflatlycontradictit.This,tome,bringshomelikenothingelse
theacutedangersofthisdoctrine.HowcansmallerBenchestransformanyprincipleorruleoflawinto
somethingthat,ineffect,negatestheruleaslaiddownbyamuchlargerBench?Normally,Judgesare
mostparticularinfollowingthebindingrulethatappliesinsuchsituations:ifapointorprincipleoflaw
hastobereconsideredthenthismustbedonebyalargerBench.TheoftquotedcaseofMultiline
Associatesv.ArdeshirCowasjeeandothersPLD1995SC423isnothingbutthereaffirmationinthis
jurisdictionofageneralrulefirmlyembeddedinthecommonlawtradition.Itcertainlyfindsitsplacein
India.Now,inrespectofthebasicstructuredoctrinenoBenchlargerthantheonethatheard
KesavanandaBharatihasbeenconstitutedintheIndianSupremeCourt.Whateverwassaidtherebythe
Courtwas(andis)thereforebindingonthesubsequent,smallermemberBenches.Yet,thosesmaller
Benches,insuchkeycasesasMinervaMillsandCoelho,havedecisivelyalteredthedoctrineinamanner
thatdirectlyconflictswithandcontradictsKesavanandaBharati.
(100)Inordertoappreciatethispoint,itmustbekeptinmindthatKhanna,J.wastheswing,and
thereforedecisive,voteinKesavanandaBharati.Therelevantpassagesfromhisjudgment,andthe
conclusionsarrivedatbythelearnedJudge,havebeenreproducedabove.Asisabsolutelyclear,
Khanna,J.decisivelyrejectedthetheorythattherewasanycoreoressenceofortofundamental
rights.Hehaddismissedanysuchconceptasanimpermissibleoverrefinement.Ifatallapowerto
alterorabridgefundamentalrightsexisted(andKhanna,J.expresslyacceptedtheexistenceofsucha
power)thenitcouldnotbecurtailedbyinvokingthetheorythatthoughafundamentalrightcanbe
abridgedortakenaway,theessenceorcoreofthatfundamentalrightcannotbeabridgedortaken
away.ButwhatdidtheCoelhocasedo?Asisclearfromthepassagesreproducedabove,itcreated
preciselysuchadistinctionandincorporateditintothebasicstructuredoctrine,therebyfurther
drasticallycurtailingandabridgingtheamendingpoweronsuchbasis.This,inmyrespectfulview,
directlycontradictsKesavanandaBharati.TheverypointthatKhanna,J.haddismissedasanover
refinementwasresurrectedastheprincipalfindingandconclusionintheCoelhocase.Iwouldsubmit,
withrespect,thattheIndianSupremeCourtcouldnotdointheCoelhocasewhatithaspurportedto
do.Theentirerefinementofthedoctrineasmadeinthatdecisionisinclearbreachofthe
foundationalcase.Furthermore,inrevivingtherejectedpoint,theBenchintheCoelhocasejoineditto
thefundamentalrightsenshrinedinArticles14,19and21,therebyandtothatextentrenderingthem
unalterable.Again,thiswasindirectcontradictionofwhatKhanna,J.haddecidedinKesavananda
Bharati.Khanna,J.hadcategoricallydeniedanyimmutabilitytofundamentalrightsinthefoundational
case,although,ashasbeennoted,hesubsequentlytriedtobacktrackintermsofhisclarificationin
theIndiraNehruGandhicase.
(101)MinervaMillswas,withrespect,nobetter.Asnotedabove,thepointinissueinthatcasewas
thenationalizationofthemills.Inotherwords,therightviolatedwasarighttoproperty.In
KesavanandaBharati,KhannaJ.hadcategoricallystatedthattherighttopropertydoesnotpertainto
basicstructureofframeworkoftheConstitution(seesubpara(viii)ofhisconclusions).Theprincipal
partofArticle31C,whichwhenreadwithclauses(b)and(c)ofArticle39(asreferredtotherein)had
beenexpresslydeclaredasvalid.Yet,inMinervaMills,s.4ofthe42ndAmendment,whichhadamended
Article31C,wasstruckdownasviolativeofthebasicstructuredoctrine.Thepositionhasbeenexplained
indetailaboveandneednotberepeatedhere.Whatisimportanttonoteisthatinsodeciding,the
BenchinMinervaMillsineffectgavelifetoarighttopropertyaspartofthebasicstructureoftheIndian
Constitution.Thiswas,inmyviewandwithrespect,indirectcontradictionofKesavanandaBharati.It
wasforthisreason,inpart,thatthelearnedBenchinthesubsequentcaseofSanjeevCokerefusedto
followMinervaMillsandtrenchantlygaveitsviewsregardingthelatterdecisioninthepassages
reproducedabove.
(102)ThepointsmadehereinabovemoregenerallyinrelationtotheCoelhocaseareaptlyillustrated
bythesubsequentdecisioninGlanrockEstate(P)Ltd.v.TheStateofTamilNadu(2010)10SCC96.The
judgmentofthe3memberBenchwasauthoredbyKapadia,CJI,whohadbeenamemberoftheBench
thatdecidedtheCoelhocase.ThelearnedChiefJusticestartedhisjudgmentratheroddly,ifImaysayso
withrespect.Somedoctrines,heopined,diehard.Thatcertainlyistrueofthedoctrineofbasic
structureoftheConstitution.AtissuewasaTamilNadustatutethathadbeeninsertedinthe9th
Schedulebythe34thAmendment,whichwasmadein1974.ItwasthusaddedtothesaidSchedule
aftertheKesavanandaBharatidecisionandhencewithinthescopeoftheCoelhocase.Thelearned
ChiefJusticeobserved:
Inthesematters,wearerequiredtoapplytheprincipleslaiddowninI.R.Coelho'scaseinthematterof
challengetothe[TamilNadustatute]onthegroundthatthesaidActisbeyondtheconstituentpowerof
theParliamentsincethe[saidstatute]damagesthebasicoressentialfeaturesoftheConstitution.
ThelearnedChiefJusticetooktheopportunitytoexplainthedecisioninCoelhocase(emphasis
supplied):
8.Comingtotheapplicabilityofthejudgmentofthe9JudgeBenchdecisionofthisCourtinI.R.Coelho
(supra),timehascomeforustoexplaincertainconceptsinthatjudgmentlikeegalitarianequality,over
archingprinciplesandreadingofArticle21withArticle14.Inthisconnection,oneneedstokeepinmind
whatiscalledasthe"degreetest".Ultimately,inapplyingtheabovethreeconceptsenumeratedherein,
onehastogobythedegreeofabrogationaswellasthedegreeofelevationofanordinaryprincipleof
equalitytothelevelofoverarchingprinciple(s).Onemustkeepinmindthatinthiscasethechallengeis
nottotheordinarylawoftheland.Thechallengeistotheconstitutionalamendment.Inarigid
Constitution[SeeArticle368]powertoamendtheConstitutionisaderivativepower,whichisanaspect
oftheconstituentpower.ThechallengeistotheexerciseofderivativepowerbytheParliamentinthe
matterofinclusionofthe[TamilNadustatute]intheNinthScheduleoftheConstitution.Sincethe
powertoamendtheConstitutionisaderivativepower,theexerciseofsuchpowertoamendthe
Constitutionissubjecttotwolimitations,namely,thedoctrineofbasicstructureandlackoflegislative
competence.Thedoctrineofbasicstructureisbroughtinasawindowtokeepthepowerofjudicial
reviewintactasabrogationofsuchapowerwouldresultinviolationofbasicstructure.Whenwespeak
ofdiscriminationorarbitraryclassification,thesameconstitutesviolationofArticle14ofthe
Constitution.Inthisconnection,thedistinctionbetweenconstitutionallawandordinarylawinarigid
Constitutionlikeoursistobekeptinmind.Thesaiddistinctionproceedsontheassumptionthat
ordinarylawcanbechallengedonthetouchstoneoftheConstitution.However,whenitcomestothe
validityofaconstitutionalamendment,onehastoexaminethevalidityofsuchamendmentbyasking
thequestionastowhethersuchanamendmentviolatesanyoverarchingprincipleintheConstitution.
Whatisoverarchingprinciple?Conceptslikesecularism,democracy,separationofpowers,powerof
judicialreviewfalloutsidethescopeofamendatorypowersoftheParliamentunderArticle368.
Similarly,"egalitarianequality"isamuchwiderconcept.Itisanoverarchingprinciple.Takethecaseof
acquisitionofforests.ForestsinIndiaareanimportantpartofenvironment.Theyconstitutenational
asset.InvariousjudgmentsofthisCourtithasbeenheldthat"intergenerationalequity"ispartof
Article21oftheConstitution.ThedoctrineofsustainabledevelopmentalsoformspartofArticle21of
theConstitution.The"precautionaryprinciple"andthe"polluterpaysprinciple"flowfromthecore
valueinArticle21.Theimportantpointtobenotedisthatinthiscaseweareconcernedwithvestingof
forestsintheState.Whenwetalkaboutintergenerationalequityandsustainabledevelopment,weare
elevatinganordinaryprincipleofequalitytothelevelofoverarchingprinciple.Equalitydoctrinehas
variousfacets.ItisinthissensethatinI.R.Coelho'scasethisCourthasreadArticle21withArticle14.
Theaboveexampleindicatesthatwhenitcomestopreservationofforestsaswellasenvironmentvisa
visdevelopment,onehastolookattheconstitutionalamendmentnotfromthepointofviewofformal
equalityorequalityenshrinedinArticle14butonamuchwiderplatformofanegalitarianequality
whichincludestheconceptof"inclusivegrowth".ItisinthatsensethatthisCourthasusedthe
expressionArticle21readwithArticle14inI.R.Coelho'scase.
Ipauseheretorespectfullydrawattentiontothemannerinwhichtheexplanationofthe
Coelhocasehasmovedawayfromwhatwasactuallydecidedthere.TheCoelhocasewasconcerned
withtheessenceorcoreofthefundamentalrightsintheselectedcategory.Here,thelearnedChief
Justicespeaksofegalitarianequality,whichisstatedtobeanoverarchingprinciple,andamuch
widerconcept.Attentionisrespectfullydrawntothemannerinwhichtheexplanationhaschanged
intosomethingmuchbroader.Vagueandamorphous,conceptssuchasintergenerationalequityand
sustainabledevelopmentareexpresslyanddeliberatelyelevatedtoanoverarchingprinciple.These
areprincipleswhicharenormallyfoundindiscussionsofeconomicdevelopmentorenvironmental
protection.ThelearnedChiefJusticequiteopenlyassertsthattheconstitutionalamendment(i.e.,the
placingoftheTamilNadustatuteinthe9thSchedule)hastobelookedatfromthepointofviewofa
muchwiderplatform,whichincludestheconceptofinclusivegrowth.That,itisclaimed,isthesense
inwhichtheCourtusedtheexpression,Article21readwithArticle14,intheCoelhocase.Withthe
utmostrespect,nothingcouldbefurtherfromtheactualposition.
(103)IcontinuequotingfromthejudgmentofthelearnedChiefJustice(emphasissupplied):
Therefore,itisonlythatbreachoftheprincipleofequalitywhichisofthecharacterofdestroyingthe
basicframeworkoftheConstitutionwhichwillnotbeprotectedbyArticle31B.IfeverybreachofArticle
14,however,egregious,isheldtobeunprotectedbyArticle31B,therewouldbenopurposein
protectionbyArticle31B.Thequestioncanbelookedatfromyetanotherangle.CanParliament
increaseitsamendingpowerbyamendmentofArticle368soastoconferonitselftheunlimitedpower
ofamendmentanddestroyanddamagethefundamentalsoftheConstitution?Theanswerisobvious.
Article368doesnotvestsuchapowerinParliament.Itcannotliftalllimitations/restrictionsplacedon
theamendingpowerorfreetheamendingpowerfromalllimitations.Thisistheeffectofthedecisionin
KesavanandaBharati(supra).Thepointtobenoted,therefore,isthatwhenconstitutionallawis
challenged,onehastoapplythe"effecttest"tofindoutthedegreeofabrogation.Thisisthe"degree
test"whichhasbeenreferredtoearlier.Ifonefindsthattheconstitutionalamendmentseeksto
abrogatecorevalues/overarchingprincipleslikesecularism,egalitarianequality,etc.andwhichwould
warrantrewritingoftheConstitutionthensuchconstitutionallawwouldcertainlyviolatethebasic
structure.Inotherwords,suchoverarchingprincipleswouldfalloutsidetheamendatorypowerunder
Article368inthesensethatthesaidpowercannotbeexercisedevenbytheParliamenttoabrogate
suchoverarchingprinciples.
Idrawattentiontothewordsemphasized.EventhemostegregiousviolationofArticle14
wouldbesustainableandimmunizedbyArticle31Baslongasitdoesnotamounttoaviolationofthe
overarchingprinciplessuchasegalitarianequality,asdescribedintheexplanationoftheCoelho
case.PerhapsthelearnedChiefJusticehasnotkeptinmindthemeaningofegregiouswhenused
negatively:gross,flagrant,shocking(ShorterOxfordEnglishDictionary,2007,Vol.I,pg.802).
ApparentlyallthatmattersisthattheJudgecreateddoctrineofthecoreoressenceoftheselected
fundamentalrightsshouldnotbebreached.Andthatdoctrine,whichostensiblyhastheappearanceof
beinglimitedtotheabsoluteheartofthefundamentalright,cansuddenlyexpandmanifoldinto
somethingquiteunexpected,iftheCourtsodesires.

(104)ThedivergenceofviewsexpressedbythelearnedJudgesoftheIndianSupremeCourtinthe
variousjudgmentsastowhatis(orisnot)includedinthebasicstructureoftheIndianConstitution
hasbeenconvenientlyencapsulatedbyMr.KhalidAnwerintabularformandpresentedtousduringthe
courseofhissubmissions.IhaveadoptedthattableasanAnnextothisjudgmentsinceitgraphically
illustratesthepointthatIhavemadehereinaboveastooneofthemostfundamentaldeficienciesof
thedoctrine:whatexactlyarethe(normativeorprescriptive)basicfeaturesoftheIndian
Constitution?Ifweexaminethechart/tablesettingoutthefindingsofthedifferentjudgesinthe
KeswanandaBharatimattersomethinginterestingemerges.Itwillbefoundthatonnoneofthe
features,eachoneofwhichisseparatelydiscussedfurtherbelow,didevenabaremajorityofseven
judgesagree.Itshouldnotbeforgottenthatthejudgeswereveryexplicitinobservingthatwhatthe
basicstructureiswasveryclearandobvious.Shelat&Groverheldthatthebasicstructureofthe
constitutionisnotavagueconceptandtheapprehensionsexpressedonbehalfoftherespondentsthat
neitherthecitizensnortheParliamentwouldbeabletounderstanditareunfounded.(seepara599)
Howthendowegetthisremarkableconclusionthatperhapsitwasnotobviouseventoasimple
majorityofthelearnedjudges.Letustakeupthefindings.Inrelationtothesupremacyofthe
constitutionthreelearnedjudgesheldthatthisformedpartofthebasicstructure.Inrelationtothe
ruleoflawnotasinglejudgewasofthisview.Inrelationtothevitallyimportantquestionofseparation
ofpowersonlythreejudgesheldthatthiswouldbeincludedinthebasicstructure.Asfarasthe
independenceofthejudiciaryisconcernednotasinglejudgeintheBharaticasewasoftheopinionthat
thisispartofthebasicstructure.Judicialreviewwasconsideredimportantbyfiveofthelearned
judges.Theprincipleoffederalismwasconsideredpartofthebasicstructurebythreelearnedjudges
andsecularismwasconsideredassuchbyfourlearnedjudges.Whenweturntothequestionofthe
statusofthesovereignrepublicofIndiafourjudgeswereoftheviewthatthisformedpartofthebasic
structure.Threejudgeswereoftheviewthattheunityandintegrityofthenationwaspartofthebasic
structure.Thelargestnumberofvoteswereinfavouroftherepublicananddemocraticformof
governmentbuteventheseonlyadduptosixi.e.stillnotamajority.Theparliamentarysystemof
governmentwaspartofthebasicstructureaccordingtoonelearnedjudgeonly.Asfarasfreeandfair
electionsareconcernednotasinglejudgewasoftheviewthatthisformedpartofthebasicstructure.
However,threelearnedjudgeswereoftheviewthatfreedomanddignityoftheindividualwaspartof
thebasicstructure.Socialeconomicandpoliticaljusticewasconsideredimportantenoughtobepartof
thebasicstructurebyonlyonelearnedjudge.Themandatetobuildawelfarestateandegalitarian
societyattractedthreevotes.Fundamentalrightswereconsideredpartofthebasicstructurebyonly
threelearnedjudges.Theessenceoffundamentalrightswasconsideredpartofthebasicstructureby
twolearnedjudgesandthedirectiveprincipleswereconsideredassuchbythreelearnedjudges.
Libertyofspeechwasconsideredimportantenoughbyonlyonelearnedjudgeandtheprincipleof
equalitywasconsideredtobepartofthebasicstructurebythreelearnedjudges.Ifthereforenota
singleaspectofthebasicstructurecouldbeagreeduponbyevenabaremajorityofthelearnedjudges,
doesthisnotsaysomethingeloquentaboutthedoctrine.Subsequently,intheIndraGandhicase
Chandrachud,J.attemptedtobrushasidethedifficultybyboldlydeclaringthatwhathadbeenheldto
beapartofthebasicstructureinthecasewasanenquirybothfruitlessandirrelevant.The
observationspeaksforitself!
(105)ItwillalsobeconvenienttoconsiderherecertaindecisionsoftheUSSupremeCourtinrelation
totheamendingpowercontainedinArticleVoftheUSConstitution.Aswillbecomeclear,theapproach
oftheUSSupremeCourtisinstarkcontrastindeedisdiametricallyopposedtothebasicstructure
doctrine.ArticleVoftheUSConstitutionisinthefollowingterms:
TheCongress,whenevertwothirdsofbothhousesshalldeemitnecessary,shallproposeamendments
tothisConstitution,or,ontheapplicationofthelegislaturesoftwothirdsoftheseveralstates,shallcall
aconventionforproposingamendments,which,ineithercase,shallbevalidtoallintentsandpurposes,
aspartofthisConstitution,whenratifiedbythelegislaturesofthreefourthsoftheseveralstates,orby
conventionsinthreefourthsthereof,astheoneortheothermodeofratificationmaybeproposedby
theCongress;providedthatnoamendmentwhichmaybemadepriortotheyearonethousandeight
hundredandeightshallinanymanneraffectthefirstandfourthclausesintheninthsectionofthefirst
article;andthatnostate,withoutitsconsent,shallbedeprivedofitsequalsuffrageintheSenate.
(106)OftheUSSupremeCourtdecisionsonArticleV,onlytwoneedbeconsidered,beingDillonv.
Gloss(1921)256US368andColemanv.Miller(1939)307US433.Thefirstmentionedcasearoseoutof
the18thAmendmenttotheUSConstitution.Asiswellknown,bythatamendment(adoptedin1919),
Prohibitionwasdeclared,i.e.,therewasacompletebanonthemanufacture,sale,ortransportationof
intoxicatingliquorswithin,theimportationthereofinto,ortheexportationthereoffromtheUnited
States.DillonwasprosecutedunderalawmadebyCongresstogiveeffecttothe18thAmendment.He
argued,interalia,thatthe18thAmendmentwasineffectivesincetheresolutionwherebyCongress
adoptedandsentitforratificationbytheStateshadprovidedthatitwouldbeinoperativeunless
ratifiedwithinsevenyears,andthatconditionwasinvalidrenderingtheamendmentasawhole
inoperative.ReferringtoArticleV,theCourtobservedasfollows:
Theplainmeaningofthisis(a)thatallamendmentsmusthavethesanctionofthepeopleoftheUnited
States,theoriginalfountainofpower,actingthroughrepresentativeassemblies,and(b)thatratification
bytheseassembliesinthreefourthsofthestatesshallbetakenasadecisiveexpressionofthepeople's
willandbebindingonall.
AstoCongresspowertoimposeatimelimitwithinwhichaproposedamendmenthadtobe
adopted,theCourtobservedasfollows:
Wedonotfindanythinginthearticlewhichsuggeststhatanamendmentonceproposedistobeopen
toratificationforalltime,orthatratificationinsomeofthestatesmaybeseparatedfromthatinothers
bymanyyearsandyetbeeffective.Wedofindthatwhichstronglysuggeststhecontrary.First,proposal
andratificationarenottreatedasunrelatedacts,butassucceedingstepsinasingleendeavor,the
naturalinferencebeingthattheyarenottobewidelyseparatedintime.Secondly,itisonlywhenthere
isdeemedtobeanecessitythereforthatamendmentsaretobeproposed,thereasonableimplication
beingthatwhenproposedtheyaretobeconsideredanddisposedofpresently.Thirdly,asratificationis
buttheexpressionoftheapprobationofthepeopleandistobeeffectivewhenhadinthreefourthsof
thestates,thereisafairimplicationthatitmustbesufficientlycontemporaneousinthatnumberof
statestoreflectthewillofthepeopleinallsectionsatrelativelythesameperiod,whichofcourse
ratificationscatteredthroughalongseriesofyearswouldnotdo.
OfthepowerofCongress,keepingwithinreasonablelimits,tofixadefiniteperiodfortheratification
weentertainnodoubt.AsaruletheConstitutionspeaksingeneralterms,leavingCongresstodealwith
subsidiarymattersofdetailasthepublicinterestsandchangingconditionsmayrequire;12andarticle5
isnoexceptiontotherule.Whetheradefiniteperiodforratificationshallbefixed,sothatallmayknow
whatitisandspeculationonwhatisareasonabletimemaybeavoided,is,inouropinion,amatterof
detailwhichCongressmaydetermineasanincidentofitspowertodesignatethemodeofratification.It
isnotquestionedthatsevenyears,theperiodfixedinthisinstance,wasreasonable,ifpowerexistedto
fixadefinitetime;norcoulditwellbequestionedconsideringtheperiodswithinwhichprior
amendmentswereratified.
(107)Theforegoingobservationsledsomeobserverstoconcludethattheamendingpowerunder
ArticleVwassubjecttosomesortofjudicialreview,atleastinsofarasthereasonablenessofthetime
period,ifany,fixedforratificationbyCongresswasconcerned.Theseviews,inmyopinion,werefirmly
quashedinColemanv.Miller(1939)307US433.AtissuewasanamendmenttotheUSConstitution
knownastheChildLaborAmendment,proposedin1924.Infact,thisamendmentwasmovedon
accountofcertaindecisionsoftheSupremeCourtinvalidatinglegislationrelatingtochildlaborpassed
byCongress.TheresolutionwassenttotheStatesandthedisputebeforetheSupremeCourtaroseout
ofKansas.InJanuary,1925theKansaslegislaturehadrejectedtheproposedamendment.However,
manyyearslater,in1937(theproposedamendmentstillpendingratification),itwasreintroduced,and
waspassedbythestateSenate.Thatbodycomprisedof40senators.Whentheresolutioncameupfora
votein1937,thehousewasequallydivided:20senatorsvotedinfavoroftheamendmentand20
against.TheLieutenantGovernor,whowasintermsoftheKansasStateConstitutionthepresiding
officerofthestateSenate(asisthecaseoftheUSVicePresidentinrespectoftheUSSenate)thencast
hisvoteinfavoroftheresolution.OnsuchbasisitwascertifiedashavingpassedinthestateSenate.
Subsequently,thestateHouseofRepresentativesalsoadoptedtheresolutionbyamajority.Thestate
Senatorswhohadopposedtheresolution(alongwiththreemembersofthelowerHouse)thenfiledsuit
intheKansasSupremeCourtchallengingtheresolutiononvariousgrounds.However,thechallenge
failedandthepetitionerspetitionedtheUSSupremeCourtforawritofcertiorarionthegroundthatit
involvedafederalquestion,namelytheinterpretationandapplicationofArticleVoftheUS
Constitution.
(108)Anumberofgroundsweretakenbythepetitionersandtherespondents,includingachallenge
tothejurisdictionoftheUSSupremeCourt.ThejudgmentoftheCourt(bymajority)wasdeliveredby
theChiefJusticeHughes.Jurisdictionhavingbeenfound,theCourtthenwentontoconsiderthe
substantivequestions.Twoofthegroundstakenweretheeffectofthepreviousrejectionofthe
amendmentandofthelapseoftimesinceitssubmission.Thepetitionerscontendedthatinthe
periodfromJune,1924,toMarch,1927,theamendmenthadbeenrejectedbybothhousesofthe
legislaturesoftwentysixstates,andhadbeenratifiedinonlyfivestates,andthatbyreasonofthat
rejectionandthefailureofratificationwithinareasonabletimetheproposedamendmenthadlostits
vitality.TheCourtrejectedthefirstground(i.e.,ofthepreviousrejection)onthefollowingbasis
(emphasissupplied):
Wethinkthatinaccordancewiththishistoricprecedentthequestionoftheefficacyofratificationsby
statelegislatures,inthelightofpreviousrejectionorattemptedwithdrawal,shouldberegardedasa
politicalquestionpertainingtothepoliticaldepartments,withtheultimateauthorityintheCongressin
theexerciseofitscontroloverthepromulgationoftheadoptionoftheamendment.
Asregardsthesecondquestion(i.e.,thelapseoftime),referencewasmadetoDillionv.Gloss,
includingthepassagesreproducedabove.Congresshadfixednotimelimitfortheratificationofthe
ChildLaborAmendment.TheCourtobservedasfollows:
Butitdoesnotfollow[fromDillonv.Gloss]that,wheneverCongresshasnotexercisedthatpower,the
Courtshouldtakeuponitselftheresponsibilityofdecidingwhatconstitutesareasonabletimeand
determineaccordinglythevalidityofratifications.
TheCourtasked,[w]herearetobefoundthecriteriaforsuchajudicialdetermination?,and
answeredthequestionasfollows(emphasissupplied;internalcitationsomitted):
Inshort,thequestionofareasonabletimeinmanycaseswouldinvolve,asinthiscaseitdoesinvolve,
anappraisalofagreatvarietyofrelevantconditions,political,socialandeconomic,whichcanhardlybe
saidtobewithintheappropriaterangeofevidencereceivableinacourtofjusticeandastowhichit
wouldbeanextravagantextensionofjudicialauthoritytoassertjudicialnoticeasthebasisofdecidinga
controversywithrespecttothevalidityofanamendmentactuallyratified.Ontheotherhand,these
conditionsareappropriatefortheconsiderationofthepoliticaldepartmentsoftheGovernment.The
questionstheyinvolveareessentiallypoliticalandnotjusticiable.TheycanbedecidedbytheCongress
withthefullknowledgeandappreciationascribedtothenationallegislatureofthepolitical,socialand
economicconditionswhichhaveprevailedduringtheperiodsincethesubmissionoftheamendment.
(109)Mr.JusticeBlack(withwhomsomeoftheotherJusticesagreed)issuedaconcurringopinion.
Heputthematterinmuchstrongerterms(internalcitationsomitted;emphasissupplied):
TheConstitutiongrantsCongressexclusivepowertocontrolsubmissionofconstitutionalamendments.
FinaldeterminationbyCongressthatratificationbythreefourthsoftheStateshastakenplaceis
conclusiveuponthecourts.Intheexerciseofthatpower,Congress,ofcourse,isgovernedbythe
Constitution.However,whethersubmission,interveningprocedureorCongressionaldeterminationof
ratificationconformstothecommandsoftheConstitution,callfordecisionsbya'politicaldepartment'
ofquestionsofatypewhichthisCourthasfrequentlydesignated'political.'Anddecisionofa'political
question'bythe'politicaldepartment'towhichtheConstitutionhascommitteditconclusivelybinds
thejudges,aswellasallotherofficers,citizens,andsubjectsof...government.Proclamationunder
authorityofCongressthatanamendmenthasbeenratifiedwillcarrywithitasolemninsurancebythe
CongressthatratificationhastakenplaceastheConstitutioncommands.Uponthisassurancea
proclaimedamendmentmustbeacceptedasapartoftheConstitution,leavingtothejudiciaryits
traditionalauthorityofinterpretation.TotheextentthattheCourt'sopinioninthepresentcaseeven
impliedlyassumesapowertomakejudicialinterpretationoftheexclusiveconstitutionalauthorityof
Congressoversubmissionandratificationofamendments,weareunabletoagree.
UndividedcontrolofthatprocesshasbeengivenbytheArticleexclusivelyandcompletelytoCongress.
Theprocessitselfis'political'initsentirety,fromsubmissionuntilanamendmentbecomespartofthe
Constitution,andisnotsubjecttojudicialguidance,controlorinterferenceatanypoint.
SinceCongresshassoleandcompletecontrolovertheamendingprocess,subjecttonojudicialreview,
theviewsofanycourtuponthisprocesscannotbebindinguponCongress,andinsofarasDillonv.Gloss,
supra,attemptsjudiciallytoimposealimitationupontherightofCongresstodeterminefinaladoption
ofanamendment,itshouldbedisapproved.
Congress,possessingexclusivepowerovertheamendingprocess,cannotbeboundbyandisunderno
dutytoacceptthepronouncementsuponthatexclusivepowerbythisCourtorbytheKansascourts.
NeitherStatenorFederalcourtscanreviewthatpower.Therefore,anyjudicialexpressionamountingto
morethanmereacknowledgmentofexclusiveCongressionalpoweroverthepoliticalprocessof
amendmentisamereadmonitiontotheCongressinthenatureofanadvisoryopinion,givenwholly
withoutconstitutionalauthority.
(110)TheviewsexpressedbytheUSSupremeCourtinColemanv.Miller,asnotedabove,accord
withmyown.AsisclearthatSupremeCourtappearstohavetakenapositionthatiscompletely
opposedtothebasicstructuredoctrinedevelopedbytheIndianSupremeCourt.
(111)UpontheforegoingreviewoftheIndianandAmericanauthorities,Iamfirmlyoftheviewthat,
withrespect,thesubmissionsmadebylearnedcounselforthePetitionersinsupportofabasic
featuresdoctrine,whetheras,oralongthelinesas,developedintheIndianjurisprudencemustbe
rejected.Iamequallyfirmlyoftheviewthatthebasicfeaturesdoctrineshouldnotbeadoptedand
madepartoftheconstitutionallawofPakistan.
(112)Thesalientfeaturesdoctrine,avariantofthebasicstructuredoctrinedevelopedbythis
Court,needsaseparatediscussion.Inthetwocasesinwhichitwasconsidered,itwasamereobiter
dictumandneverarguedassuch.Itwasmeanttobeacheckonmilitarydictators.Thesalientfeatures
doctrineisexaminedindetailbelow.ThisCourthasrightlyrejectedthesedoctrinesinthepast.As
notedabove,theentirecaselawhasbeenreviewedindetailbythisCourtinthePakistanLawyers
Forumcase,andIwouldliketociteatlengththerelevantobservationsmadebytheCourt:
41.Ithasbeenurgedbythepetitionersthatthe17thAmendmentinitsentiretyoratleastspecifically,
Article41(7)(b)andArticle41(8)shouldbestruckdownasviolativeofthebasicfeaturesofthe
Constitution.ItmayfirstbenotedthatithasrepeatedlybeenheldinnumerouscasesthatthisCourt
doesnothavethejurisdictiontostrikedownprovisionsoftheConstitutiononsubstantivegrounds.
42.FirstthisissuewasexaminedinZiaurRahman'scase[PLD1973SC49]inwhichvariouspersonswho
hadbeenconvictedbyMilitaryCourtshadchallengedthepurportedratificationoftheactsofthat
regimevideArticle281oftheInterimConstitutionofPakistan,1972.Inaddition,thesaidpersonshad
alsochallengedtheviresoftheInterimConstitutionitself,interalia,onthebasisthatthesaid
Constitutionhadbeenframedbyanassemblywhichhadbeenelectedonthebasisofalegalframework
prescribedbyaregimelaterdeclaredtobeillegalbythisCourtinAsmaJilani'scasePLD1972SC139.A
fivememberBenchofthisCourtheldasfollows:
Sofar,therefore,asthisCourtisconcernedithasneverclaimedtobeabovetheConstitutionnorto
havetherighttostrikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Ithasacceptedthepositionthatitisa
creatureoftheConstitution;thatitderivesitspowersandjurisdictionsfromtheConstitution;andthatit
willconfineitselfwithinthelimitssetbytheConstitution...(page69)
ItisnownecessarytoexamineastowhetheranydocumentotherthantheConstitutionitselfcanbe
givenasimilarorhigherstatusorwhetherjudiciarycan,intheexerciseofjudicialpower,strikedown
anyprovisionoftheConstitutionitselfeither,because,itisinconflictwithlawsofGodorofnatureorof
moralityorsomeothersolemndeclarationwhichthepeoplethemselvesmayhaveadoptedfor
indicatingtheformofGovernmenttheywishtoestablish.I,formypart,cannotconceiveasituation,in
which,afteraformalwrittenConstitutionhasbeenlawfullyadoptedbyacompetentbodyandhasbeen
generallyacceptedbythepeople,includingthejudiciary,asaConstitutionofthecountry,thejudiciary
canclaimtodeclareanyofitsprovisionsultraviresorvoid.Thiswillbenopartofitsfunctionof
interpretation.(pages7071).
43.ThisjudgmentwassubsequentlyreexaminedbyafourmemberBenchofthisCourtinSaeedAhmed
Khan'scasePLD1974SC151;inwhichthesubmissionwasthatArticle269oftheConstitutionof1973
wasliabletobestruckdowntotheextentitsoughttooustthejurisdictionofthejudiciary.Inthis
context,theCourtheldasfollows:
Thelearnedcounselfortherespondentshas,relyingonthestatementsoflawcontainedinVol.16of
theCorpusJurisSecundum,impresseduponustoconstantlykeepinmindthemainpurposesoughtto
beaccomplishedbytheadoptionoftheConstitutionandtosoconstruethesameastoeffectuaterather
thandestroythatpurpose,whichaccordingtohim,isenshrinedinArticle3oftheInterimConstitution
andArticle4ofthepermanentConstitution.(pages165166).
WearenotunmindfuloftheseprovisionsbutafterourdecisioninZiaurRahman'scase,weareno
longerinapositiontosaythattheMartialLawRegulations,underwhichtheexecutiveactions
impugnedinthepresentcasesweretaken,havenotacquiredthestatusofa"law"withinthemeaning
oftheseArticles.Inanyevent,itisnotpossibleforustodeclarethataprovisionoftheConstitutionis
notlawbecauseitseekstooustthejurisdictionoftheCourtswithregardtocertainsubjectswithout
affectingthejudicialpoweritself.Wecannotstrikeitdown.Wecanonlyinterpretit,accordingtothe
acceptedrulesofinterpretationanddefineitsnatureandscope.(Emphasissupplied)(page166).

44.Subsequently,thisCourtreiteratedthisviewinBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Ali'scasePLD1975SC507inwhich
atpage528itheldthattheCourtscannotstrikedownalawonanysuchhigherethicalnotionsnorcan
Courtsactonthebasisofphilosophicalconceptsoflaw.
45.ItisworthnotingthatthisCourtinthecasesofZiaurRahman,SaeedAhmedKhanandF.B.Alidid
nottakeintoaccountIndiancaselawonthequestionofthejurisdictionofthesuperiorjudiciaryto
strikedownaConstitutionalamendment.However,theIndiancaselawwassubsequentlytakeninto
considerationbyasixmemberfullBenchofthisCourtinthewellknowncaseofIslamicRepublicof
Pakistanv.AbdulWaliKhanPLD1976SC57,100inwhichtheviresoftheamendmenttoArticle17
madebytheConstitution(FirstAmendment)Act,1974cameintoquestion.Morespecifically,theCourt
notedthemajorityjudgmentinthecaseofKesvavandaBharativ.StateofKeralaAIR1973SC1461and
thenheld:
Itisunnecessaryforustoenterintothiscontroversy,asthisCourtiscommittedtotheviewthatthe
judiciarycannotdeclareanyprovisionoftheConstitutiontobeinvalidorrepugnanttothenational
aspirationsofthepeopleandthevalidityofaConstitutionalamendmentcanonlybechallengedifitis
adoptedinamannerdifferenttothatprescribedbytheConstitution.(page100).
46.AchallengetotheFourthAmendmenttotheConstitutiononthegroundofthedoctrineofbasic
featureswasrejectedbytheHighCourtofSindhinDewanTextileMillsv.FederationPLD1976Kar1368.
47.ThechallengetotheSeventhAmendmenttotheConstitutionbeforetheHighCourtofSindhfailed
inthecasereportedasNiazA.Khanv.FederationPLD1977Kar.604at648.
48.Soonthereafter,thisCourtwasonceagainfacedwiththeissueofthevalidityofaConstitutional
amendmentinthecaseofFederationofPakistanv.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.PLD1977SC397,which
relatedtotheConstitution(4thAmendment)Act,1976.Inthesaidcase,afivememberfullBenchofthis
CourtagainreferredtoIndiancasesonthesubjectandheld:
InPakistan,thisCourtinthecaseofZiaurRahmanhas,however,firmlylaiddowntheprinciplethata
Constitutionalprovisioncannotbechallengedonthegroundofbeingrepugnanttowhataresometimes
statedasnationalinspirationsoranabstractconceptsolongastheprovisionispassedbythe
competentLegislatureinaccordancewiththeprocedurelaiddownbytheConstitution.(page410).
49.InJehangirIqbalKhanv.FederationPLD1979Pesh67thePeshawarHighCourtrejectedachallenge
totheFifthAmendmenttotheConstitution.
50.InthewellknowncaseofFaujiFoundationv.ShamimurRehmanPLD1983SC457afourmember
BenchofthisCourtexaminedtheconceptoflimitationsonlegislativepowerandreaffirmedthe
conclusionsinthecasesofZiaurRahmanandUnitedSugarMills.TheFaujiFoundation'scaseis
particularlynoteworthyinthatthisCourtspecificallyexaminedthevariousIndiancasesonthepoint,as
wellthejudgmentofMr.JusticeShameemHussainKadriinthecaseofDarweshM.Arbeyv.Federation
ofPakistanPLD1980Lah684.InthatcasethelearnedJudgehadheldwithrespecttotheConstitution
(7thAmendment)ActthatTheParliamentisnotsovereigntoamendtheConstitutionaccordingtoits
likesanddislikesmuchless,thanchangingthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.ThisCourtnotedat
p.627ofFaujiFoundationcasethattheIndiancasesdidnotadvancethepositiontakenbyKadri,J.and
thatthelearnedJudgefailedtonoticethattheamendingpower,unlessitisrestricted,canamend,
vary,modifyorrepealanyprovisionoftheConstitution.TheDarweshM.Arbeycasewasoverruled.
51.TheissueofamendmentstotheConstitutionwasconsideredalsobytheHighCourtofSindhin
SharafFaridi'scase[PLD1989Kar404].Inthesaidjudgment,asevenmemberfullBenchofthesaid
CourtheadedbyAjmalMian,J.(ashethenwas)examinedthequestionastowhetherthechangesin
theConstitutionbroughtaboutbytheFifthAmendmenttotheConstitutioncouldbedeclaredultravires
totheConstitutionandconcludedthatthesaidamendmentcouldnotbestruckdown,eitheronthe
basisofitsallegedrepugnancytoArticle2AoftheConstitutionorforbeingviolativeofthebasic
featuresoftheConstitution.
52.Subsequently,anothersevenmemberBenchofthatCourtexaminedtheprecisequestionasto
whetherthesuperiorjudiciarywascompetenttostrikedownamendmentstotheConstitutioninthe
contextoftheEighthAmendmentandthevariousamendmentstotheConstitutionmadebythe1985
AssemblyinAbdulMujeebPirzada'scase[PLD1990Kar9].AjmalMian,J.,(ashethenwas)concluded
onbehalfofaunanimousFullBench,afterathoroughanddetailedreviewofbothPakistaniandIndian
caselaw,asfollows
Iam,therefore,oftheviewthatinpresenceoftheaboveunambiguousdictumsofthePakistan
SupremeCourt,itisnotopentothisCourttoholdthataprovisionoftheConstitutioncanbestruck
downonthegroundofitsbeingviolativeoftheObjectiveResolutionorofnationalaspirationsorof
higherethicalnotionsorofphilosophicalconceptsoflaworofthebasicstructure.(page70).
53.ThejudgmentinAbdulMujeebPirzada'scasemayalsobenotedwithrespecttothepointthatit
specificallyconsideredthecontentionofthepetitionersthereinthatthedoctrineofbasicfeatures
alreadystoodimplicitlyacceptedbythisCourtinFaziulQuaderChowdhary'scasePLD1963SC486.This
contentionwasrejectedinthefollowingwords:
Itis,therefore,evidentthattheconsistentviewofthePakistanSupremeCourthasbeenthata
Constitutionalprovisioncannotbestruckdownonagroundotherthanthatitwaspassedinamanner
otherthanprovidedundertheConstitution.ThecaseofFazlulQuaderChowdharyrelieduponbyMr.
YahyaBakhtiardoesnotlaydownanycontrarypropositionthanwhathasbeenheldbytheSupreme
Courtintheaforesaidsubsequentcases.(page70).
54.ThejudgmentinthecaseofAbdulMujeebPirzadawassubsequentlyupheldbythisCourtin
MahmoodKhanAchakzai'scase.Thesaidcasewasdisposedofbyvirtueofashortorder,reportedas
AbdulMujeebPirzada'scase1997SCMR232,whichstatedinrelevantpartasfollows:
WhatisthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisaquestionofacademicnaturewhichcannotbe
answeredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinalitybutitcanbesaidthattheprominentcharacteristicsof
theConstitutionareamplyreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionwhichisnowsubstantivepartofthe
55.ThedetailedjudgmentinthesaidcasewassubsequentlyreportedasMahmoodKhanAchakzai's
case[PLD1997SC426].Itmaybenotedfurtherthatthesaidcasewasdecidednotbyonejudgment,
butthattherewereinfactthreeseparatejudgments.Oneofthetwoleadingjudgmentswaswrittenby
theChiefJustice,Mr.JusticeSajjadAliShahandwassigned(ineffect)byonlyfourotherJudges.Saleem
Akhtar,J.,didnotsignthejudgmentofSajjadAliShah,C.J.whileZiaMehmoodMirza,J.,notedthathe
concurredonlywiththeconclusionofthelearnedChiefJusticethattheappealsdeservedtobe
dismissed.SaleemAkhtar,J.,insteadauthoredaseparateleadingjudgment,whichwasalsosignedby
fourothermembersoftheBench,thistimewiththeexceptionofZiaMehmoodMirza,J.,andSajjadAli
Shah,C.J.FinallyRajaAfrasiab,J.,whohadalsoconcurredwiththejudgmentsofboththeChiefJustice
andSaleemAkhtar,J.,authoredhisownindependentjudgmentaswell.
Courtsofthiscountryhaveconsistentlyacknowledgedthatwhiletheremaybeabasicfeaturestothe
tosuchbasicfeatures,suchlimitationsaretobeexercisedandenforcednotbythejudiciary(asinthe
caseofconflictbetweenastatuteandArticle8),butbythebodypolitic,i.e.,thepeopleofPakistan.In
thiscontext,itmaybenotedthatwhileSajjadAliShah,C.J.observedthatthereisabasicfeaturesof
theConstitutionwhichmaynotbeamendedbyParliament,henowhereobservesthatthepowerto
theoryofbasicfeaturesorsalientfeatures,insofarasPakistanisconcerned,hasbeenusedonlyasa
doctrinetoidentifysuchfeatures.
parliamentarydemocracyandfreeelections.
58.Itmayfinallybenotedthatthebasicfeaturestheory,particularlyasappliedbytheSupremeCourtof
India,isnotanewconceptsofarasPakistanijurisprudenceisconcernedbuthasbeenalready
consideredandrejectedafterconsiderablereflectionasdiscussedinthecasesnotedhereinabove.It
mayalsobenotedthatthebasicfeaturestheoryhasnotfoundsignificantacceptanceoutsideIndia,as
alsodiscussedandnotedintheAchakzai'scase.Morespecifically,theSupremeCourtofSriLanka
refusedtoapplythesaidtheoryinacasereportedasInretheThirteenthAmendmenttothe
ConstitutionandtheProvincialCouncilsBill(1990)LRC(Const.)1.Similarly,thesaidtheorywasrejected
bytheSupremeCourtofMalaysiainacasetitlePhangChinHockv.PublicProsecutor(1980)1MLJ70.
59.ThepositionadoptedbytheIndianSupremeCourtinKesvavanandaBharaticaseisnotnecessarilya
doctrinewhichcanbeappliedunthinkinglytoPakistan.Pakistanhasitsownuniquepoliticalhistoryand
itsownuniquejudicialhistory.IthasbeentheconsistentpositionofthisCourteversinceitfirst
enunciatedthepointinZiaurRahman'scasethatthedebatewithrespecttothesubstantiveviresofan
amendmenttotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestiontobedeterminedbytheappropriatepolitical
forum,notbythejudiciary.ThatintheinstantpetitionsthisCourtcannotabandonitswellsettled
jurisprudence.
Irespectfullyagree,especiallywiththeconclusionssetforthinparas5659.
(113)Aspointedoutabove,thetheoryofsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionwasinitially
enunciated,ortobemoreprecisesuggested,inapassingreflectionbySajjadAliShah,C.Jwithoutany
analysis,orjustification,forthefirsttimeintheMehmoodKhanAchakzaicasePLD1997SC426which,
afteranexhaustiveanalysisrejectedthedoctrineofthebasicstructureoftheconstitutionasadopted
inIndia(seepages501etal).Paragraph35oftheconcurringjudgmentofSalimAkhtar,J.clearlybrings
outthispoint(emphasissupplied):
35.Mr.IsmailQureshicontendedthattheObjectivesResolutionwhichwasincludedinthe1956
ConstitutionasaPreambleisthekeytotheConstitution.ThisResolutionwasmovedintheFirst
ConstituentAssemblyandhascontinuedtobeadoptedasaPreambletotheConstitution.ByEighth
Amendment,Article2Awasadded,whichhasmadetheObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartofthe
Constitution,buttosaythatitisthebasicstructureinthesensetheIndianSupremeCourthasadopted,
doesnotholdforce.Mr.IsmailQureshicontendedthateverybuildinghasastructure.Hehasreferredto
themeaningofstructureasgiveninBlack'sLawDictionaryandcontendedthatstructuralalterationor
changeaffectsthevitalandsubstantialportionofathingwhichchangesitscharacteristicswhich
destroysthefundamentalpurposeofitserectionandcontemplateduses.Asobservedearlier,thereare
somecharacteristicfeaturesineveryConstitutionwhichareembeddedinthehistorical,religiousand
socialbackgroundofthepeopleforwhomitisframed.ItcannotbedeniedthateveryConstitutionhas
prominentfeatures,characteristicsandpictureframestuddedwithpublicaspiration,historical
inspiration,geographicalrecognition,politicalformulationsandpeoplesexpectation.Thesewinding
pathswhichrollintothestream,withthepassageoftimeandtidedoaffecttheflowintheirown
perspectivewhichtotherigidtheorywouldamounttounpardonablechangebuttoaflexibletheoryit
wouldbeanaturalresultofsuchconfluenceandinfluence.Doubtless,Pakistanowesitscreationto
ideologicalbeliefwhichissomanifestlyreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionthatithasalways
remainedthePreambleofalmostallourConstitutionsandhasbeenasourceofguidancetoall.The
provisionsoftheConstitutionthoughnotrigidlyencircledbyit,alwaysremainwithinitshorizonsubject
toallsuchchangeswhichmanifestdifferentshadesofthesamecolour.AConstitutionistheaspiration
ofthepeople.Itistheexperienceofthepast,thedesiresofthepresentnationandlastbutnottheleast
ahopeforthefuture.AConstitutionisadocumentforalltimestocome.Itcannotbemaderigid
becausesuchrigidityifconfrontedwiththesocialandpoliticalneedsofthetime,islikelytocreate
cracksinit.TheconsistentviewofthesuperiorCourtsofPakistanismorerealandshouldbefollowed
andmaintained.
(114)TheoperativepartofthejudgmentiscontainedintheshortorderoftheCourtwhichwas
incorporatedinparagraph10ofthejudgmentofSajjadAliShah,CJ.Thisreadsasfollows:
Forreasonstoberecordedlater,wepassfollowingshortorder:
(2)WhatisthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisaquestionofacademicnaturewhichcannotbe
(3)TheObjectivesResolutionwasPreambleoftheConstitutionsmadeandpromulgatedinour
countryin1956,1962and1973.PerusaloftheObjectivesResolutionshowsthatforschemeof
governancethemainfeaturesenvisagedareFederalismandParliamentaryFormofGovernment
blendedwithIslamicprovisions.TheEighthAmendmentwasinsertedintheConstitutionin1985,after
whichthreeelectionswereheldonpartybasisandtheresultantParliamentsdidnottouchthis
AmendmentwhichdemonstratesamplythatthisAmendmentisratifiedbyimplicationandhascometo
stayintheconstitutionunlessamendedinthemannerprescribedintheConstitutionascontemplated
underArticle239.Article58(2)(b)broughtintheConstitutionbytheEighthAmendment,which
maintainsParliamentaryFormofGovernmenthasprovidedchecksandbalancesbetweenthepowersof
thePresidentandthePrimeMinistertoletthesystemworkwithoutletorhindrancetoforestalla
situationinwhichmartiallawcouldbeimposed.
(4)IntheresultthetwoCivilAppealsNos.397K/90(AbdulMujibPirzadav.FederationofIslamic
RepublicofPakistan),399K/90(HajiAhmedv:FederationofPakistanandothers),andthree
ConstitutionalPetitionsNos.60/96(MahmoodKhanAchakzaiv.PresidentofPakistanandothers),
67/96(HabibulWahabulKhairiv.FederationofPakistanandothers)and68/96(WukalaMahazBarai
TahafuzDastoorv.FederationofPakistanandothers)aredismissed.
(115)Itisalsoimportanttokeepinmindwhether,oncethedoctrineofbasicstructuredoctrineof
theConstitutionhasbeenrejectedandthevalidityofthe8thAmendmenttotheConstitutionaccepted,
thereisanylegalsignificanceofanyobservationsrelatingtothesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution.
Indeedthequestionofthevalidityofthe8thAmendmentwasexpresslydescribedasapolitical
questionasthefollowingabstractfromthejudgmentofRajaAfrasiabKhan,J.indicates:
Thecontroversymayalsobeseenfromanotherangle,inasmuchasonthefaceofitthevalidityor
otherwiseof8thAmendmentissubstantiallyapoliticalquestionwhich,ofcourse,cannotbesubjectto
judicialreview.
(116)Anyobservationsrelatingtothesalientfeaturesmustthereforebedeemedtobemerelyobiter
dicta.Bydefinitiontheconceptofanobiterdictumisrelatabletothosejudicialobservationswhichare
notnecessaryforthedecisioninthecase,whichwasofcoursetoupholdthevalidityofthe8th
Amendment.Itisnoteworthythatthedecisioncamedespitethefactthatthe8thAmendment(which,
asnoted,washeldtohavebeenvalidlyenacted)waspassedincircumstanceswhichwerefarfromideal.
Theparliamentwhichapproveditwaselectedintermsofpartylesselectionswhichwereheldunder
thedirectionsofamilitarydictator.Neverthelessitwasobservedthatthesewereessentiallypolitical
issuesanditwasforParliamentandnotthejudiciarytodecidetheconstitutionalstructureoftheState.
(117)Itis,inmyopinion,aprofounderrortobelievethateveryconflictordifferenceofopinioninthe
countrymustbesubjecttoajudicialresolution.Therearemanyquestionsoftheutmostimportance
whicharebestlefttobedecidedthroughdemocraticmodalities.Aperusalofparagraphs26and27of
thejudgmentauthoredbySajjadAliShah,CJ.,inwhichthesalientfeaturesarereferredto,makesone
thingcrystalclear:noconstitutionalanalysisorlegalprincipleswereenunciatedtojustifythisradical
andwhollyunprecedentedtheory,whichexfacieseemsashadowofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,
whichhoweverwasexplicitlyrejected.Indeedtheentirequestionwasdisposedofinonebriefsentence,
whichisreproducedbelow:
InnutshellitcanbesaidthatbasicstructureassuchisnotspecificallymentionedintheConstitutionof
1973butObjectivesResolutionaspreambleoftheConstitutionandnowinsertedasthesubstantive
partintheshapeofArticle2AwhenreadwithotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionreflectssalient
featuresoftheConstitutionhighlightingfederalism,parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwith
Islamicprovisions.
(118)Theextenttowhichthisviewwassharedbytheotherjudgesisalsoclear.Thejudgmentof
SajjadAliShah,CJissignedbyoneotherjudge,namelyFazalEllahiKhan,J.ZiaMehmoodMirza,J.only
agreedwiththeconclusionarrivedatinthejudgment,namely,thattheappealsandpetitionsshouldbe
dismissedandstatedhewouldrecordhisreasonsseparately.IrshadHassanKhanandMunawarMirza,
JJ.,addedbriefnotesagreeingwiththejudgmentproposedbythelearnedChiefJusticebutalsowith
thatofSaleemAkhtar,J.althoughinfact,SaleemAkhtar,J.didnotacceptthetheoryofsalientfeatures
asbeingarestrictiononthepowersofParliament.Thenetresultisthatthejudgmentinthiscase
containsnolegaljustificationorlegaldoctrinewhatsoeverforadoptingthetheoryofsalientfeatures
ashavingvirtuallythesameeffectasthebasicstructuretheorywhichwasdiscussedatlengthand
thenrejected.Asobservedearliertheobservationsrelatingtosalientfeatureswerebynomeans
necessaryforthedecisionofthecaseandthusshouldatbestbetreatedasobiterdicta.Itisalso
interestingtonotethatthesalientfeaturesnotedbythelearnedChiefJusticedidnotincludethe
independenceofthejudiciary,whichfurtherindicatesthattheobservationsmadeinthisbehalfwere
neitherfullydevelopednorintendedtobemorethanobiterdicta.Theywereconfinedtofederalism
andparliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Asobservedearlier,thesestray
observationsareconspicuouslymissingfromtheoperativeorderoftheCourt.Evenifthisjudgmentis
thereforetakentobethetouchstoneonwhichthefateofthepresentcaseistobedecidedit
necessarilyfollowsthatthepresentPetitionsmustbedismissed.
(119)Itiscriticallyimportanttonotethattheshortorderdoesnotstatethatthesalientfeatures
theorycontrolsorlimitsthepowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitution.Inbrief,thesalient
featurestheoryisdescriptiveoftheConstitutionandnotprescriptive.Itmerelystatesthatthe
prominentfeaturesoftheConstitutionweretobefoundintheObjectivesResolution,whichisnowa
substantivepartoftheConstitutionandofcourse,thatchangewasbymeansofaconstitutional
amendment.SincetheObjectivesResolutionwasneveranintegralpartoftheConstitutionuntilitwas
somadebyamilitarydictator,andsubsequentlythiswasformalizedthroughthe8thAmendment,itisa
littledifficulttoseehowitcouldbetreatedtobeabasicfeatureoftheConstitutionasoriginally
promulgated.ThecontentionthattheObjectivesResolutionshouldbetreatedastheconscienceof
theConstitutionandthus,impliedly,givensomesortofsupraconstitutionalstatus,whichisindeed
whatisimpliedbythebasicfeaturesdoctrineinthePakistanicontext,wasexplicitlyrejectedbythis
CourtinZiaurRehmanscaseasthefollowingextractfromthejudgmentofHamoodurRehman,CJ.,
clearlyreveals:
ItwillbeobservedthatthisdoesnotsaythattheObjectivesResolutionisthegrundnorm,butthatthe
grundnormisthedoctrineoflegalsovereigntyacceptedbythepeopleofPakistanandthe
consequencesthatflowfromit.IdidnotdescribetheObjectivesResolutionasthecornerstoneof
Pakistanslegaledificebutmerelypointedoutthatoneofthelearnedcounselappearinginthecase
haddescribeditassuch.Itisnotcorrect,therefore,tosaythatIhadheldit,asJusticeAtaullahSajjad
hassaidinhisjudgment,tobeatranscendentalpartoftheConstitutionor,asJusticeMuhammad
AfzalZullahhassaid,tobeasupraConstitutionalInstrumentwhichisunalterableandimmutable.
(120)ThereisavitallyimportantaspectoftheObjectivesResolution,whichisoftengenerally
disregardedbyadherentsofthebasicstructuredoctrine.TheopeningparagraphsoftheResolution
are,inasense,themostimportant,sincetheyencapsulatetheIslamicDoctrineofsovereignty.The
doctrinestatesthatsovereigntyovertheentireUniversebelongstoAllahAlmightyaloneandthe
authoritytobeexercisedbythepeopleofPakistanisasacredtrust.Whatiscriticaltonoteisthatthe
Resolutionexplicitlystatesanddelineateswhoistoexercisethatauthority.Thelanguageis(emphasis
supplied):
WhereintheStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthe
people.
Itdoesnotstatethattheauthorityistobeexercisedbythejudicialofficersappointedbythe
State.Therepositoryofultimatepoweristhebodyofelectedrepresentatives.Thefinalwordmust
alwaysthereforerestwiththemandwithnooneelse.ThejudicialorganoftheStatecannot,andought
not,toclaimthatitistheultimateauthorityintheland.Suchaclaimwouldbeclearlyviolativeofthe
explicitlanguageoftheResolution.
(121)ItisworthnotingthatthetheorythattheConstitutioncontainsanunidentified,andconstantly
shifting,supraconstitutionwithinitselfismanifestlyselfcontradictory.Ifthatweresowhat
preventedtheframersoftheConstitutionfromidentifyingcertainfeaturesoftheConstitutionand
declaringthemunamendable?(Infactthisispreciselywhathasbeendoneincertainother
constitutionsandthisisamattertowhichIwillrevertsubsequently.)Whyshoulditbeassumed,
withouttheslightestshredofhistoricalevidence,thatthatiswhatwasintendedinrelationtothe
ObjectivesResolution?Andiftheydidnotintendit,arewejustifiedinascribingsuchanintentionto
them?Infact,theirintentionwastheexactoppositesincethey,incommonwiththeframersofthe
earlierconstitutions,leftitwiththestatusofanonbindingpreamble.Thetitleitselfmadeitclear:itisa
resolutionwhichsetsouttheobjectiveswhicharecontemplated,andnotanironstraitjacket.Infact
ifthetextoftheObjectivesResolutioniscomparedwiththetextofthesubstantivepartsofthe
Constitution,numerouscontradictionsbecomeselfevident.Forexample,takethefollowingextract
fromtheObjectivesResolution:
Whereinshallbeguaranteedfundamentalrights,includingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityand
beforelaw,social,economicandpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,
worshipandassociation,subjecttolawandpublicmorality.
Thisparagraphguaranteesfundamentalrights.Butwhereforexample,isthereafundamental
rightaboutequalityofopportunity?Itdoesnotexist.Thefundamentalrightsmentionedinthis
ObjectiveResolutionarenotcongruentorcoterminuswiththefundamentalrightswhichappearinthe
textoftheConstitution.Furthermore,thetextoftheConstitutionrevealsthatsofarfrombeing
guaranteed,thefundamentalrightsareliabletobesuspendedatanytimeandinfacthavebeen
suspendedfornumerousyears.Thusinasense,thefundamentalrightsareamongsttheleast
fundamentalpartoftheConstitution,sincetheotherArticlescannotbesuspended.Indeed,
fundamentalrightsweresuspendedfromtheverydaythattheConstitutioncameintoforce
(14.08.1973),sinceArticle280expresslycontinuedtheemergencythathadbeenimposedon
23.11.1971,deemingittobeanemergencyundertheConstitution.Thus,theguaranteed
fundamentalrightswerestillborn.Furthermore,isthesocial,economicandpoliticaljusticereferredto
inthesameparagraphoftheObjectivesResolutionguaranteedundertheConstitution?Again,the
answerisinthenegative.Article37whichisentitledpromotionofsocialjusticeanderadicationof
socialevilsfallsinChapter2ofPartII(PrinciplesofPolicy)andArticles29and30makeitcrystalclear
thatitisanonenforceablerightasfarascitizensareconcernedsincetheresponsibilityfordoingthis
restswiththedifferentorgansoftheStatewhichdealwithsuchmatters.Thejudiciaryhasnotbeen
conferredanypowerinrelationthereto.EvenaftertheObjectivesResolutionwasmadeasubstantive
partoftheConstitutionbyGenZiaulHaq,thisCourtinHakimKhanvGovernmentofPakistanPLD1992
SC595explicitlyrejectedanysuperiorstatusbeingaccordedtoit,asisclearfromtheleadingjudgment
ofNasimHasanShah,J.:
TheroleoftheObjectivesResolution,accordinglyinmyhumbleview,notwithstandingtheinsertionof
Article2AintheConstitution(wherebythesaidObjectivesResolutionhasbeenmadeasubstantivepart
thereof)hasnotbeenfundamentallytransformedfromtheroleenvisagedforitattheoutset;namely
thatitshouldserveasbeaconlightfortheConstitutionmakersandguidethemtoformulatesuch
provisionsfortheConstitutionwhichreflecttheidealsandtheobjectivessetforththerein.Thus,
whereasaftertheadoptionoftheObjectivesresolutionon12thMarch,1949,theConstitutionmakers
wereexpectedtodraftsuchprovisionsfortheConstitutionwhichweretoconformtoitsdirectivesand
theidealsenunciatedbythemintheObjectivesResolutionhandincaseofanydeviationfromthese
directives,whiledraftingtheproposedprovisionsfortheConstitutiontheConstituentAssembly,before
whomthesedraftprovisionsweretobeplaced,wouldtakethenecessaryremedialstepsitselftoensure
compliancewiththeprincipleslaiddownintheObjectivesResolution.However,whenaConstitution
alreadystandsframedbytheNationalAssemblyofPakistanexercisingplenarypowersinthisbehalf
whereindetailedprovisionsinrespectofallmattersreferredtointheObjectivesResolutionhave
alreadybeenmadeandArticle2Awasmadeamandatorypartthereofmuchlateri.e.after1985
accordinglynowwhenaquestionariseswhetheranyoftheprovisionsofthe1973Constitutionexceeds
toanyparticularrespectthelimitsprescribedbyAllahAlmighty(withinwhichHispeoplealonecanact)
andsomeinconsistencyisshowntoexistbetweentheexistingprovisionsoftheConstitutionandthe
limitstowhichthemanmadelawcanextend;thisinconsistencywillberesolvedinthesamemanneras
wasoriginallyenvisagedbytheauthorsandmoversoftheObjectivesResolutionnamelybytheNational
Assemblyitself.Inpracticalterms,thisimpliesinthechangedcontext,thattheimpugnedprovisionof
theConstitutionshallbecorrectedbysuitablyamendingitthroughtheamendmentprocesslaiddown
intheConstitutionitself.
(122)ThereisalsoanotherveryimportantaspectoftheObjectivesResolutionthatmustbeclearly
understoodandkeptinmind.TheObjectivesResolutionwasintroducedintoacentralpositionin
constitutionaldiscourseinAsmaJilaniscase(PLD1972SC139).However,itisoftenforgotten,thatthis
wasagainstaspecificcontextualsetting.InDossoscase(PLD1958SC533)theSupremeCourthad
reliedonKelsensPureTheoryofLaw(Theory)inordertojustifythemilitarytakeoverof1958.When
thequestionofmilitaryruleagainarosein1972theapplicationoftheTheory(asreproducedinDossos
case)wasfirmly,andrightly,rejected.KelsenhadnevereveradvancedtheTheoryasapotential
justificationfortheactionsofmilitaryadventurersanditwasclearlymisread,misunderstoodand
misappliedinDossoscase.ItwillberecollectedthattheTheoryintroducedtheconceptofagrundnorm
orbasicnorm,intojurisprudence.InAsmaJilaniscasethisCourt,whilerefutingtheapplicationofthe
Theory,noted,inpassing,thatinthepresenceoftheObjectivesResolutiontherewasnoneedtolook
forforeignguidanceastothenormstobeapplied.Buildingonthisobservation(asmentionedbyme
earlier),twoofthejudgesoftheLahoreHighCourtinacasewhichsubsequentlycametotheSupreme
CourtandwasreportedasStatevs.ZiaurRehmanandothersPLD1973SC49enhancedthestatusof
theObjectivesResolutionandcarrieditmuchhigher.Thesefindingswere,asIhavepointedoutbefore,
sharplyoverruledbytheSupremeCourt.HamoodurRehman,C.J.(seepg.71)categoricallyrejectedthe
findingthattheObjectivesResolutionwastobetreatedasagrundnormandthereforeimpliedlystood
onahigherpedestalthantheConstitution.
(123)ThequestionofthestatusoftheObjectiveResolutionhasonceagainbeenraisedinthepresent
proceedings.Aview,whichissometimesexpressed,isthattheResolutionoffersauniqueinsightinto
thevisionofthefoundersofPakistanasarticulatedbythemtherein.Thatbymeansofittheyexpressed,
definitivelyandonceandforall,whattheirthinkingandbeliefsabouttheoriginandfuture
developmentofthestateofPakistanwere.TheResolutionissaidtobeanoriginalstatement,
encapsulatingtheirdeepesthopes,theiraspirationsandtheidealswhichhadinspiredtheMuslim
nationinitsstruggletocreatethestateofPakistan.Itshouldthereforebetreatedasahallowed
documentpreparedbythefoundersoftheStateand,assuch,tohaveauniquelybindingstatusinthe
developmentofconstitutionallawinthecountry.Itshouldbetreatedasenforceableandbindingforall
timestocome.
(124)Now,therecanbenodoubtabouttheimportanceoftheResolution,especiallytheopening
sentencewhichsetsouttheIslamicdoctrineofsovereignty.Thisdoctrinepostulatesthatsovereignty
overtheentireuniverserestsinAlmightyAllahandinHimalone,andalltemporalpoweristobe
exercisedasasacredtrustthroughthechosenrepresentativesofthepeople.However,toconfera
similarstatusontherestoftheResolutionistoclearlystrayveryfarfromthehistoricalrecord.The
conceptualrootsandcontentsoftheObjectivesResolution(whichwaspassedon12thMarch,1949
whentheQuaideAzamhadalreadyexpired)areneitheruniquetoPakistanand,norindeed,didthe
formulationoftheResolutionevenoriginatewithinthecountry.Inordertoexplorethesubjectfurther
itisnecessarytolookovertheborder.
(125)On9thDecember,1946theConstituentAssemblyofIndiametforthefirsttimeinNewDelhi.
ThesessionwasfiercelyopposedbytheMuslimLeague,whoboycottedit.ButNehruwasadamantand
defiantlydeclaredthatwhateverformofconstitutionwasadoptedbytheConstituentAssemblywould
becometheConstitutionofIndia.HemovedanObjectivesResolutionwhichwaspassedbythe
ConstituentAssemblyonJanuary20,1947.ThustheconceptofanObjectivesResolutionoriginatedin
theIndianCongress,andhowittravelledacrosstheborderissomethingthatwewillseeinamoment.
Thiswasunanimouslyadoptedon22ndJanuary,1947.Subsequently,on29.8.1947adraftingcommittee
wassetupunderthechairmanshipofDr.B.R.AmbedkartodrafttheIndianConstitutionwhichwas
adoptedon26November,1949andcameintoforceon26January,1950.Inthemeanwhile,intermsof
theMountbattenPlanof3June,1947aseparateConstituentAssemblywassetupforPakistanwhich
carriedonafter14thAugust,1947butunfortunatelyneversucceededinfinalizingaconstitution.Itis
notnecessarytotracethetroubledconstitutionalhistoryofthiscountryfurtherforpurposesofthe
presentcasebutifwesetoutbothObjectivesResolutions,theoriginaloneaspassedinIndiain1946,
andthePakistanResolutionwhichwasadoptedtwoyearslaterbutmodeledontheearlierdocument,
thestrikingsimilaritieswillatoncebecomeapparent.Aswillbenotedtheframework,thestructureand
evenoccasionallythepreciselanguageofthePakistanObjectivesResolutionwasbasedontheIndian
document.Indeed,asignificantparthasbeencopiedoutverbatim.
IndiaObjectivesResolution1947
(1)THISCONSTITUTENTASSEMBLYdeclaresitsfirmandsolemnresolvetoproclaimIndiaasan
IndependentSovereignRepublicandtodrawupforherfuturegovernanceaConstitution;
(2)WhereintheterritoriesthatnowcompriseBritishIndia,theterritoriesthatnowformtheIndian
States;andsuchotherpartsofIndiaasareoutsideBritishIndiaandthestates,aswellassuchother
territoriesasarewillingtobeconstitutedintotheIndependentSovereignIndia,shallbeaUnionof
themall;and
(3)Whereinthesaidterritories;whetherwiththeirpresentboundariesorwithsuchothersasmay
bedeterminedbytheConstituentAssemblyandthereafteraccordingtothelawoftheConstitution,
shallpossessandretainthestatusofautonomousunits,togetherwithresiduarypowers,andexercise
allpowersandfunctionsofgovernmentandadministration,saveandexceptsuchpowersandfunctions
asarevestedinorassignedtotheUnion,orasareinherentorimpliedintheUnionorresulting
therefrom;and
(4)WhereinallpowersandauthorityoftheSovereignIndependentIndia,itsconstituentpartsand
organsofgovernment,arederivedfromthepeople;and
(5)WhereinshallbeguaranteedandsecuredtoallthepeopleofIndia;justice,social,economic
andpolitical;equalityofstatus,ofopportunity,andbeforethelaw;freedomofthought,expression,
belief,faith,worship,vocation,associationandaction,subjecttolawandpublicmorality;and
(6)whereinadequatesafeguardsshallbeprovidedforminorities,backwardandtribalareas,and
depressedandotherbackwardclasses;and
(7)wherebyshallbemaintainedtheintegrityoftheterritoryoftheRepublicanditssovereign
rightsonland,sea,andairaccordingtojusticeandlawofcivilizednations,and
(8)thisancientlandattainsitsrightfulandhonouredplaceintheworldandmakesitsfulland
willingcontributiontothepromotionofworldpeaceandthewelfareofmaking.

PakistanObjectivesResolution,1949
WhereassovereigntyovertheentireUniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andthe
authoritytobeexercisedbythepeopleofPakistanwithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust;
AndwhereasitisthewillofthepeopleofPakistantoestablishanorder
WhereintheStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthority,throughthechosenrepresentatives
ofthepeople;
Whereintheprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjusticeasenunciatedby
WhereintheMuslimsshallbeenabledtoordertheirlivesintheindividualandcollectivespheresin
Whereinadequateprovisionsshallbemadefortheminoritiesfreelytoprofessandpracticetheir
religionsanddevelopmenttheircultures;
WhereintheterritoriesnowincludedinorinaccessionwithPakistanandsuchotherterritoriesasmay
Whereinshallbeguaranteedfundamentalrights,includingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbefore
law,socialeconomicandpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipand
association,subjecttolawandpublicmorality;
Whereinadequateprovisionshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesand
Whereintheindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured;
WheretheintegrityoftheterritoriesoftheFederation,itsindependenceandallitsrights,includingits
sovereignrightsonland,seaandair,shallbesafeguarded;
SothatthepeopleofPakistanmayprosperandattaintheirrightfulandhonouredplaceamongstthe
nationsoftheWorldandmaketheirfullcontributiontowardsinternationalpeaceandprogressand
happinessofhumanity:
(126)ThesimilaritybetweenthenomenclatureandstructureofthetwoObjectivesResolutionsisso
strikingastoleavenoneedforfurtherdebateordiscussiononthepoint.Inparticular,theallimportant
paragraphrelatingtofundamentalrights,equalityofstatus,social,economicandpoliticaljusticeand
freedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,thoughtandassociationsubjecttolawandpublicmorality
isvirtuallyawordbywordcopy.Theprovisionreferringtominoritiesisalsostrikinglysimilar.The
paragraphsrelatingtotheintegrityoftheterritoryofthestateanditssovereignrightsonland,seaand
airarealsonotablefortheirconvergenceofconceptandphraseology.
(127)Oneadditionalpointneedstobemade.NehruobviouslydidnotconsiderthattheObjectives
ResolutionwassouniquelyimportantthatitshouldbeembodiedaspartoftheIndianconstitutionby
beingmadethepreamblethereto.ThePreambletotheIndianConstitution,asoriginallyframed,is
completelydifferent:
WE,THEPEOPLEOFINDIA,havingsolemnlyresolvedtoconstituteIndiaintoaSOVEREIGN
DEMOCRATICREPUBLICandtosecuretoallitscitizens:
JUSTICE,social,economicandpolitical;
LIBERTYofstatusandofopportunity;andtopromoteamongthemall
FRATERNITYassuringthedignityoftheindividualandtheunityofthenation.
INOURCONSTITUTENTASSEMBLYthisTwentysixthdayofNovember,1949,doHEREBY
ADOPT,ENACTANDGIVETOOURSELVESTHISCONSTITUTION.
(128)Itcanbeseentherefore,thattheoriginatorsoftheconceptofanObjectivesResolutiondidnot
consider,orattach,somuchimportancetoitsphraseologyandstructureastojustifyitbeingmadea
partoftheIndianConstitution.Itwouldseemtofollowfromtheabovethatanyattempttoattacha
quasimystical,orsupremelyoverarchingsignificanceandimportancetotheObjectivesResolutionby
thisCourt,asifithadbeenuniquelyconceivedbythefoundersofPakistan,isnotaltogetherjustified,to
saytheleast.Indeed,ifaswiftglanceiscastatthenumerousdeclarationsofhumanrights,aswellas
theconstitutionsofdifferentcountriesaroundtheworld,wewillfindsimilarideasexpressedin
terminologywhichissometimessimilarandsometimesdissimilar,butinanyeventtheultimate
objectivestobeachievedarecommontotheentirecivilizedworld.WhatisspecialabouttheObjectives
Resolutionissomethingelse,namelyitsreferencetotheIslamicdoctrinewhichstatesthatsovereignty
overtheentireuniverserestsinAlmightyAllahalone.ThatisthetruebasisoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan.Furthermore,andcritically,thecategoricalassertioninitthattheexerciseofthepowerofthe
Stateistorestinthechosenrepresentativesofthepeopleneedstobehighlighted.Inotherwords
supremepoweristorestintheelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleandnotinthejudicialofficialsof
theState.Ifthereisanymoraltobedrawnfromthissagathensurelythisisit.Andthisperhapsisthe
underlyingreasonthatthisCourthas,inallitspreviousdecisionsonthepoint,firmlyrejectedthebasic
structuredoctrineasitselfbeingalientothebasicstructureoftheConstitutionofPakistan.(Needlessto
sayIamusingthetermbasicstructureinitsdescriptiveandnotprescriptivesense.)Theprimary
importanceoftheIslamicdoctrineofsovereigntyisnotstrictlylegalbutessentiallyreligious.The
doctrinewouldremaintrueforallbelieversinIslamwhetheritbeincludedintheConstitutionornot.If
atallalegaljustificationforitsinclusionintheConstitutionexistsitisthis,thatallpersonswhowield
powerundertheConstitutionshouldhaveimbuedinthemasensethattheywillbeheldresponsiblefor
theiractionsontheDayofJudgment.Theelectedrepresentativesareresponsibleandaccountablefor
theiractionstothepeopleofPakistan.Buttowhomisthejudiciaryanswerable?Essentially,toitself!
ThejudiciaryinPakistanisuniquelypositioned.Ifcomparedwithotherjudicialinstitutionsaroundthe
world,itwillbenotedthatthereisnoparallelforajudiciarywhichisappointedbythejudiciaryandis
answerabletothejudiciary.Iwouldrespectfullyventuretosuggestthatwehavesufficientjudicial
poweralreadyanddonotneedtoconferfurtherpoweronourselvesbyclutchingatthebasicstructure
doctrine.WehavenonecessitytoborrowIndianjudicialtheorieswhichhavebeenbornanddeveloped
inresponsetoadifferenthistoryandadifferentsociopoliticalbackground.Whenitisrecognizedthat
allpowerisinthenatureofasacredtrust,thenanethicalandmoraldimensionisintroducedintothe
constitutionalequation.However,underallcircumstancesthedemocraticprincipleremainspre
eminent.InthewordsoftheQuaideAzaminaspeechinFebruary1948:
TheconstitutionofPakistanhasyettobeframedbythePakistanConstituentAssembly.Idonotknow
whattheultimateshapeofthisConstitutionisgoingtobe,butIamsurethatitwillbeofademocratic
type,embodyingtheessentialprinciplesofIslam.Today,theyareasapplicableinactuallifeasthey
were1,300yearsago.Islamanditsidealismhavetaughtusdemocracy.Ithastaughtequalityofman,
justiceandfairplaytoeverybody.Wearetheinheritorsoftheseglorioustraditionsandarefullyaliveto
ourresponsibilitiesandobligationsasframersofthefutureconstitutionofPakistan.Inanycase
PakistanisnotgoingtobeatheocraticStatetoberuledbypriestswithadivinemission.Wehave
manynonMuslimsHindu,Christians,andParsisbuttheyareallPakistanis.Theywillenjoythesame
rightsandprivilegesasanyothercitizensandwillplaytheirrightfulpartintheaffairsofPakistan.
(129)ThenextimportantcaseisthatofZafarAliShahvPervezMusharrafPLD2000SC869.Thiswas
thecaseinwhichthequestionbeforetheCourtwasaboutthevalidityofthemilitarytakeoverwhich
wasupheldonthebasisofthediscrediteddoctrineofstatenecessitywhichadmittedlycarriesno
credibilitywhatsoeveratpresent.However,amazingly,afterupholdingthevalidityofmilitary
takeoverwhichisallthatthecasewasaboutthisCourtwentontoconferpower(whichitdidnot
enjoyitself)ontheArmyChieftosinglehandedlyandunilaterallycarryoutconstitutionalamendments
intermsofparagraph6whichisreproducedbelow:
6.(i)ThattheChairman,JointChiefsofStaffCommitteeandtheChiefoftheArmyStaffthrough
ProclamationofEmergencydatedthe14thOctober,1999,followedbyPCO1of1999,wherebyhehad
beendescribedasChiefExecutive;havingvalidlyassumedpowerbymeansofanextraConstitutional
step,intheinterestoftheStateandforthewelfareofthepeople,wasentitledtoperformallsuchacts
andpromulgatealllegislativemeasuresasenumeratedhereinafter,namely:
Allactsorlegislativemeasureswhich.wereinaccordancewith,orcouldhavebeenmadeunderthe
1973Constitution,includingthepowertoamendit;
Allactswhichtendedtoadvanceorpromotethegoodofthepeople;
AllactsrequiredtobedonefortheordinaryorderlyrunningoftheState;and
AllsuchmeasuresaswouldestablishorleadtotheestablishmentofthedeclaredobjectivesoftheChief
Executive.
(ii)ThatConstitutionalamendmentsbytheChiefExecutivecouldberesortedtoonlyiftheConstitution
failedtoprovideasolutionforattainmentofhisdeclaredobjectivesandfurtherthatthepowerto
amendtheConstitutionbyvirtueofclause(6),subclause(i)(a)(ibid)wascontrolledbysubclauses(b),
(c)and(d)inthesameclause.
(iii)ThatnoamendmentshallbemadeinthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutioni.e.independenceof
judiciary,federalism,parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.
(iv)ThatFundamentalRightsprovidedinPartII,Chapter1oftheConstitutionshallcontinuetoholdthe
fieldbuttheStatewillbeauthorizedtomakeanylawortakeanyexecutiveactionindeviationof
Articles15,16,17,18,19and24ascontemplatedbyArticle233(1)oftheConstitution,keepinginview
thelanguageofArticles10,23and25thereof.
(v)Thattheseacts;oranyofthem,maybeperformedorcarriedoutbymeansofordersissuedbythe
ChiefExecutiveorthroughOrdinancesonhisadvice;
(vi)ThatthesuperiorCourtscontinuetohavethepowerofjudicialreviewtojudgethevalidityofany
actoractionoftheArmedForces,ifchallenged,inthelightoftheprinciplesunderlyingthelawofState
necessityasstatedabove.TheirpowersunderArticle199oftheConstitution,thus,remainavailableto
theirfullextent,andmaybeexercisedasheretofore,notwithstandinganythingtothecontrary
containedinanylegislativeinstrumentenactedbytheChiefExecutiveand/oranyorderissuedbythe
ChiefExecutiveorbyanypersonorauthorityactingon.hisbehalf.
(vii)ThattheCourtsarenotmerelytodeterminewhetherthereexistsanynexusbetweentheorders
made,proceedingstakenandactsdonebytheChiefExecutiveorbyanyauthorityorpersonactingon
hisbehalf,andhisdeclaredobjectivesasspeltoutfromhisspeeches,dated13thand17thOctober,
1999,onthetouchstoneofStatenecessitybutsuchordersmade,proceedingstakenandactsdone
includingthelegislativemeasures,shallalsobesubjecttojudicialreviewbythesuperiorCourts.
(130)Itwillbeseenthatthefulllegislativepowerwasconferredonasingleperson.Furthermore,an
additionalpowerwasconferredontheArmyChieftoamendtheConstitutionif,inhisopinion,the
Constitutionfailedtoprovidesolutionsfortheattainmentofhisdeclaredobjectives(whichwere,
amazingly,thereforegivenasupraconstitutionalimportance)andfurthermorethatthepowerto
amendtheConstitutionwascontrolledonlybysubclauses(b),(c)and(d)ofclause(i)ofthe
judgment,whichsubclausesaresovagueastobevirtuallymeaningless.Whywasprimacygiventothe
declaredobjectivesoftheArmyChief?Noanswerisprovidedtothisvitalquestioninthejudgment.In
otherwords,itwasassumedthatthedeclaredobjectivesoftheArmyChiefwerethetouchstoneon
thebasisofwhichtheConstitutioncouldbeamended.Thisamazingtheoryhadneverbeforebeen
eitherpropoundedoracceptedbyanycourtoflaw.AmerespeechbytheArmyChiefhadbecomemore
importantthanthetextoftheConstitution.Thus,therestrictionwhichwasalso,atthesametime,
imposedonthepoweroftheArmyChieftoamendtheConstitutionbystatingthatnoamendment
shouldbemadeinthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,whichwerenowdescribedasbeingthe
independenceofthejudiciary,federalismandaparliamentaryformofgovernmentblendedwithIslamic
provisions,isinextricablylinkedupwiththeunprecedentedpowergrantedtohimtounilaterallyamend
theConstitution.Surely,therestrictiononlyapplied,andwasintendedtosoapply,totheArmyChief
andnottoademocraticallyelectedParliamentundertheConstitution.Onceagain,asintheMehmood
Achakzaicasenolegalanalysiswascarriedouttojustifythisfinding.Withtheprofoundestrespectithas
tobeobservedthatthisCourtquiteclearlylackedthepowertoconferontheArmyChieftherightto
unilaterallyamendtheConstitutionofPakistan.Ifthepowertomakeconstitutionalamendmentswas
lackingitnecessarilyfollowsthatthequestionofanyrestrictiononthispowerdoesnotarise.This
judgmentthereforehardlyadvancesthecaseforadoptingthesalientfeaturestheory.TheBench
hearingthiscaseconsistedoftwelvejudges(headedbyIrshadHasanKhan,CJandincludedIftikhar
MuhammadChaudhry,J.(ashethenwas)).AlltwelvejudgeshadtakenanoathunderaPCO.Thefive
seniorjudgeswhohaddeclinedtotaketheoathhadresignedandleftjudicialofficeearliertotheirever
lastingcredittheyhadkeptthehonoroftheinstitutionalive.
(131)DespitemycandidandconfirmviewthatthisCourthasnojurisdictiontoexamineanddeclare
ultravires(orannul)anamendmentmadeintheConstitution,yetasextensive,strenuousandvaluable
submissionshavebeenmadebythelearnedcounselforthepartiesonmeritsoftheamendments,
therefore,Iamtemptedtoanddonotwanttomissthisopportunityofexpressingmyopinioninthis
contextaswell.IthusnowturntoexaminethesubmissionsmadebylearnedcounselforthePetitioners
withrespecttothespecificprovisionschallengedbythemintermsofthe18thAmendment,namelythe
newlyaddedArticle175A,thesubstitutedArticle63A,andthedeletion,fromthesubstitutedArticle17,
oftherequirementrelatingtointrapartyelections.Beforedoingsohowever,Iwouldliketoclarifya
pointonwhichsomeconfusionmayunnecessarilyarise,andthatrelatestotheindependenceofthe
judiciary.Therecanbenocavilatallwiththepropositionthatthejudiciarymustbeindependent.The
jurisprudenceofthisCourtisfirmlyestablishedonthepointandthecaselawisrepletewithjudicial
observationsinthisregard.TherecentdecisionsofthisCourtinSindhHighCourtBarAssociationv
FederationofPakistanandothersPLD2009SC789andChiefJusticeofPakistanIftikharMuhammad
ChaudhryvPresidentofPakistanandothersPLD2010SC61arebuttwoexampleswhichreaffirmthis
wellestablishedconstitutionalprinciple.Thereisnoneedtociteanyspecificpassagesfromthe
aforementionedcasesinsupportoftheproposition:theindependenceofthejudiciaryisabedrock
principleofdemocracyandmodeofgovernance.However,itmustbekeptclearlyinmindthatwhatis
inissueinthesePetitionsisnotwhetherthejudiciaryoughttobeindependent,butratherwhetherthat
independenceisimpingeduponorimpairedbytheconstitutionalamendmentsunderchallenge.And
thatismanifestlyanaltogetherseparateanddistinctquestion.Simplyrepeatingthatthejudiciarymust
beindependentvirtuallyasamantradoesnotaddress,butratherobscures,therealquestionbeforethe
Court.
(132)Althoughthereisagreatdealofmaterialontheimportanceoftheindependenceofthe
judiciary,surprisingly,thereisverylittlediscussionontheanteriorquestion,astowhatpreciselyisthe
meaningofthisphrase.Thevitalandallimportantquestionis,independencefromwhatorwhom?Itis
wellsettledthatthephrasehasapreciseandclearlyenunciatedmeaning.Itisatermofart.Thephrase
independenceofthejudiciaryinconstitutionalparlancemeans:
(i)Aninstitutionalindependencei.e.,thejudiciary,asaninstitution,isindependent.Thereference
isnottopersonalitiesbuttotheofficeheldbymembersofthejudiciary.
(ii)Anindependence,aboveall,fromtheExecutive,and
(iii)AnindependencealsofromtheLegislature.
Whatisvitallyimportanttograspisthatthisconceptisnottobeconfusedwiththepower
whichisconferredonthejudiciarybylaw.Apowerfuljudiciaryisnotnecessarilyanindependent
judiciary.Andconversely,anindependentjudiciaryisnotnecessarilyapowerfuljudiciary.Similarly,the
jurisdictionconferredonthejudiciaryhasnothingtodowiththeindependenceofthejudiciaryandvice
versa.Thereisalsoagreatdealofconceptualconfusiononthedistinctionbetweenjudicialpowerand
jurisdictiondespitethefactthatthepointisamplyclarifiedbothinAsmaJillaniscase(PLD1972SC139)
aswellasZiaurRehmanscase(PLD1973SC49).Thequestionofwhatjurisdictionisconferredonthe
judiciaryisaddressedintheConstitutionandinanylawsmadeunderandinaccordancewiththe
Constitution.ThisCourtisdecidingthepresentcasepreciselybecauseArticle184(3)framedbythe
legislatureintheexerciseofitsconstituentpowerhasconferredthejudicialpowertodosoonit.It
neednothavedoneso.AndifithadnotthematterwouldhavebeenheardanddecidedbytheHigh
CourtunderArticle199.ThejudiciaryisthecreatureoftheConstitutionitisnotaboveit.Itmust
functioninaccordancewithit.Article184(3)existsnotbecauseoftheObjectivesResolutionorArticle
2AorbecauseofanydirectconfermentofpowerbythepeopleofPakistanontheSupremeCourtbut
becauseoftheconsciousdecisionofthedulyelectedrepresentativesofthepeopletoincludeitinthe
Constitution.Itwouldnotberighteitherethically,legallyorconstitutionallyfortheCourttonowturn
aroundandseektodenyprimacytothelanguageofthatveryConstitutionandtherightofelected
representativestoamendit.
(133)Itisnowtimetoturntothespecificquestionsraisedinthepresentpetitionsregardingthe
constitutionalityofthe18thAmendment.IfirsttakeupArticle175A,sincemostofthesubmissionsof
learnedcounselforthePetitionersweredirectedagainstthisprovision.ThisArticlewassubsequently
amendedbythe19thAmendmentandtheamendedversionreadsasfollows:
175A.AppointmentofJudgestotheSupremeCourt,HighCourtsandtheFederalShariatCourt.
(1)ThereshallbeaJudicialCommissionofPakistan,hereinafterinthisArticlereferredtoasthe
Commission,forappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,HighCourtsandtheFederalShariat
Court,ashereinafterprovided.
(2)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,theCommissionshallconsistof
(i)ChairmanChiefJusticeofPakistan;
(ii)MembersfourmostseniorJudgesoftheSupremeCourt;
(iii)MemberaformerChiefJusticeoraformerJudgeoftheSupremeCourtofPakistantobe
nominatedbytheChiefJusticeofPakistan,inconsultationwiththefourmemberJudges,foraperiodof
twoyears;
(iv)MemberFederalMinisterforLawandJustice;
(v)MemberAttorneyGeneralforPakistan;and
(vi)MemberaSeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeCourtofPakistannominatedbythePakistan
BarCouncilforatermoftwoyears.
(3)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinclause(1)orclause(2),thePresidentshallappointthe
(4)TheCommissionmaymakerulesregulatingitsprocedure
(5)AppointmentofJudgesofaHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shallalsoincludethe
following,namely:
(i)MemberChiefJusticeoftheHighCourttowhichtheappointmentisbeingmade;
(ii)MemberthemostseniorJudgeofthatHighCourt;
(iii)MemberProvincialMinisterforLaw;and
(iv)MemberanadvocatehavingnotlessthanfifteenyearspracticeintheHighCourttobe
nominatedbytheconcernedBarCouncilforatermoftwoyears:
ProvidedthatforappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofaHighCourtthemostSeniorJudgementionedin
paragraph(ii)shallnotbememberoftheCommission:
ProvidedfutherthatifforanyreasontheChiefJusticeofaHighCourtisnotavailable,heshallbe
substitutedbyaformerChiefJusticeorformerJudgeofthatCourt,tobenomicatedbytheChiefJustice
ofPakistaninconsultationwiththefourmemberJudgesoftheCommissionmentionedinparagraph(ii)
ofclause(2).
(6)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheIslamabadHighCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shall
alsoincludethefollowing,namely:
(i)MemberChiefJusticeoftheIslamabadHighCourt;and
(ii)MemberthemostseniorJudgeofthatHighCourt
ProvidedthatforinitialappointmentoftheChiefJusticeandtheJudgesoftheIslamabadHighCourt,
theChiefJusticesofthefourProvincialHighCourtsshallalsobemembersoftheCommission:
Providedfurtherthatsubjecttotheforegoingproviso,incaseofappointmentofChiefJusticeof
IslamabadHighCourt,theprovisostoclause(5)shall,mutatismutandis,apply.
(7)ForappointmentofJudgesoftheFederalShariatCourt,theCommissioninclause(2)shall
alsoincludetheChiefJusticeoftheFederalShariatCourtandthemostseniorJudgeofthatCourtasits
members:
ProvidedthatforappointmentofChiefJusticeofFederalShariatCourt,theprovisostoclause(5)shall,
mutatismutandis,apply.
ShariatCourt,asthecasemaybe.
(ii)fourmembersfromtheNationalAssembly:
ProvidedthatwhentheNationalAssemblyisdissolved,thetotalmembershipoftheParliamentary
CommitteeshallconsistofthemembersoftheSenateonlymentionedinparagraph(i)andthe
provisionsofthisArticleshall,mutatismutandisapply.
(10)OutoftheeightmembersoftheCommittee,fourshallbefromtheTreasuryBenches,two
fromeachHouseandfourfromtheOppositionBenches,twofromeachHouse.Thenominationof
membersfromtheTreasuryBenchesshallbemadebytheLeaderoftheHouseandfromtheOpposition
BenchesbytheLeaderoftheOpposition.
(12)TheCommitteeonreceiptofanominationfromtheCommissionmayconfirmthenominee
bymajorityofitstotalmembershipwithinfourteendays,failingwhichthenominationshallbedeemed
tohavebeenconfirmed:
ProvidedthattheCommittee,forreasonstoberecorded,maynotconfirmthenominationbythree
fourthmajorityofitstotalmembershipwithinthesaidperiod:
ProvidedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmedbytheCommitteeitshallforwarditsdecision
withreasonssorecordedtotheCommissionthroughthePrimeMinister:
Providedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmed,theCommissionshallsendanothernomination.
(13)TheCommitteeshallsendthenameofthenomineeconfirmedbyitordeemedtohave
beenconfirmedtothePrimeMinisterwhoshallforwardthesametothePresidentforappointment.
(15)ThemeetingsoftheCommitteeshallbeheldincameraandtherecordofitsproceedings
shallbemaintained.
(16)TheprovisionsofArticle68shallnotapplytotheproceedingsoftheCommittee.
(134)ThesubmissionsoflearnedcounselforthePetitionerscanbestated,ineffect,asfollows.
Article175AisviolativeofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionsinceitallegedlyaffectsthe
independenceofthejudiciaryanddisturbstheseparationofpowersamongthethreeorgansofthe
State.Parliamenthasthusactedbeyonditsamendingpower.Inthiscontext,referencewasalsomade
bylearnedcounseltothemethodnowprevalentintheUnitedKingdomforjudicialappointmentsunder
theUKConstitutionalReformAct,2005(UKAct)andareferencewasalsomadetotherecent
introductionofajudicialcommissioninIndia.
(135)Ihavealready,intheearlierpartofthisjudgment,expressedmyviewsonthebasicfeatures
doctrine.Obviously,ifthatviewweretoprevail,namelythatthebasicfeaturesdoctrineoughttobe
rejected,thatwouldbedispositiveofthePetitions,sincethespecificobjectionstotheparticularArticles
underchallengeareallbasedandpremisedonthebasicfeaturesdoctrine.Inthisportionofthe
judgment,Iwillhoweverexaminethespecificobjectionswhileassumingthatthereis,orcanbe,some
suchdoctrine,andgivemyreasonsastowhyIconcludethattheattackonArticles175A,63Aand17
mustintheendfailevenonthisbasis.
(136)InordertoproperlycomprehendtheobjectionstoArticle175A,onemustfirstexamineand
understandthesystemthatprevailedinPakistanpriortothe18thAmendmentregardingthe
appointmentofthesuperiorjudiciary,i.e.,thejudgesoftheSupremeCourt,theHighCourtsandthe
FederalShariatCourt.Thefirstpointtonoteisthatinallcases,excepttheappointmentoftheChief
JusticeofPakistan,thePresidenthadtomaketheappointmentinconsultationwiththeconsultees
referredtointherelevantprovisions.Inotherwords,thePresidentwastheappointingauthority.The
referencetothePresidentinthiscontextmeantthePresidentactingontheadviceofthePrimeMinister
inviewoftherelevantArticlesoftheConstitution.Thesecondpointtonoteisthatadmittedlypriorto
thedecisionofthisCourtinAlJehadTrustvFederationofPakistanPLD1996SC324,themeaning
attributedtothewordconsultationwasthatwhiletheconsulteenominatedintherelevantArticle
hadtobeconsulted,hisviewwasnotbinding;itwasbutoneelementtobetakenintoconsiderationby
theappointingauthority,namelythePresidentactingontheadviceofthePrimeMinister.Thus,inthe
Constitutionasoriginallypromulgated,inrelationtotheappointmentofjudgesoftheSupremeCourt
andHighCourttheroleassignedtothejudicialbranchwasdefinitelyneitherdeterminativenordecisive.
ItisalsocriticallyimportanttonotethatinrelationtotheappointmentofChiefJusticeofPakistanthe
judiciaryhadnosaywhatsoever.ThereasonisthatArticle177,asitoriginallystood,required
consultation,however,construed,onlyinrelationtotheappointmentofSupremeCourtjudges.For
theappointmentofChiefJusticeofPakistannoconsultationwasrequired.Theentiretyofpowerwas
vestedexclusivelyonthePresidentofPakistaninhissoleandunfettereddiscretion.Thus,itwasthe
Executivewhichhadthefinalsay,andiftheConstitutionhadabasicstructurein1973itwasthis
whichwasembeddedintoitsfoundationatthetimeofitsbirth.Didthismeanthattheframersofthe
Constitutiondidnotintendthejudiciarytobeindependent?Thisisanimportantquestionwhichis
worthpondering.Atthispointitisnecessarytomakeafundamentalandcriticaldistinctioninlaw
between(i)modeofappointments,and(ii)thepowersofanappointee,whichisoftenignoredor
obscuredintherepeateddiscussionsonthesubject.Thereisacleardistinctionbetweenthesetwo
concepts,whichcanperhapsbeillustratedbytwoexamples:
(A)ThePrimeMinisterhasthepowertoappointorremoveanArmyChiefundertheConstitution.Does
thismeanthattheArmyChief,onappointment,becomesthePrimeMinistersmanwithno
discretionarypowersofhisown?Thehistoryofthiscountry,withitsrepeatedmilitaryinterventions,
providesaclearandunambiguousanswer,whichdoesnotneedtobespeltout.
(B)AjudgeoftheUSSupremeCourtisnominatedbythePresident,butconfirmedbytheSenate.What
roledoesthejudiciaryhaveinhisappointment?Nonewhatsoever.EarlWarrenisarguablythemost
famouschiefjusticeoftheUSSupremeCourtofthe20thcentury.Whatwashepriortohisappointment
assuch?TheGovernorofCalifornia!Hehadnopriorjudicialexperience.Hewasnotrecommendedby
anyjudicialforum.PresidentEisenhowerproposedhisnameandtheSenateconfirmedhim.Butit
wouldbearashmanwhowouldtherebyinferthatthereisnoindependenceofthejudiciaryinthe
UnitedStates.Theveryideaisinconceivable.Andletitnotbeforgottenthattheconceptofjudicial
independence,asalsothealliedconceptofjudicialreview,bothoriginatedintheUnitedStates.Ifthe
objectionbethatconditionsintheUnitedStatesaredifferentfromPakistan,andindeedthey
indisputablyare,letitnotbeforgottenthatthereisnocountryintheworldinwhichtheappointment
ofjudgesvestsexclusivelyinthejudiciary.Arewereallysodifferentfromtherestoftheworld?Arewe
unique?Areweperhapsnotlackingalittleinmodestywhenwetoleratesuchclaimsbeingmade,even
ifimpliedly.RobertStevens,writingaboutthepositioninGreatBritainbutbeforetheenactmentofthe
UKAct,putsthematterbluntlyinTheEnglishJudges:TheirRoleinthechangingConstitution(2002):
Judgeschoosingjudgesistheantithesisofdemocracy.InallmajorcommonlawcountriestheUS,
Canada,AustraliaandSouthAfricatheexecutivechoosesthejudiciary,althoughsometimeswith
advicefromtheJudicialAppointmentsCommission.Tohandovertheappointmentofjudgestoa
commissionmightwellensureblandappointmentsThechoiceofjudgesistooimportanttobelefttoa
quangoAttheveryleast,ifthereistobeaConstitutionalorSupremeCourt,itsjudgesmustbechosen
byelectedofficialsandsubjecttoexaminationbyademocraticbody.(pg144;emphasissupplied)
(137)Theinterestingquestionwhicharisesis,whatisthereasonforthislackofclarityonacrucial
matter?Forthatonehastoexaminehowtheconceptoftheindependenceofthejudiciaryhasevolved
inPakistaninthepastyears.TheProvisionalConstitutionalOrderofNovember2007was,inessence,a
desperateattemptbyabeleagueredmilitaryautocrattosavehisrapidlysinkingregime.Whenthis
attemptfailedtheHonbleChiefJusticewasrestoredtoofficebyahugetidalwaveofpublicopinion,in
thevanguardofwhichstoodthelawyerscommunityandcivilsociety.Thereafter,theconsensuswas
thatthejudiciarywasfullyindependentinPakistan.Wenowcometothevitalpoint:whatiscriticalto
noteisthattherestorationoftheHonbleChiefJusticeandconsequentialindependenceofthejudiciary
wasneitherheraldednorfollowedbyaconstitutionalamendment.TheConstitutionunderwhichthe
formerChiefJusticeandthepresentHonbleChiefJusticefunctionisexactlythesame.However,earlier
thejudiciarywasnot,inpractice,independentbuttodayitis.Whatthenhascausedthechange?The
answer,inoneword,isdemocracy.Itwastheforcesofdemocraticchangewhichcompelledthe
EstablishmenttorestoretheChiefJustice:itwasnotaconstitutionalamendment!Whatwasimportant
wasthespirit,nottheletterofthelaw.Fromthisone,andonlyone,conclusionflows:itisdemocracy
anditsattendantforceswhicharethetruefoundationofanindependentjudiciary.Whenweweaken
democracyweweakenthejudiciary.Itis,inmyopinion,essentialforthisCourttodonothingwhichmay
lead,directlyorindirectlytoaweakeningofthefoundationsofdemocracy.Whatisimportantisnotthe
calibreofthepresentelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleofPakistantheyareheretodayandwillbe
gonetomorrowbuttheallimportantfactthattheyaretheelectedrepresentativesandinall
democraciesallovertheworldultimatepoweralwaysresidesinelected(andnotappointed)
representatives.ThisisexactlywhattheObjectivesResolutionstates:theultimatepowerwhichresides
intheOmnipotentCreatoristobeexercised,notbythejudicialrepresentatives,butbytheelected
representativesofthepeople.IftheObjectivesResolutionistheconscienceoftheConstitution,thenon
thispoint,itslanguageiscrystalclear.Thisfoundationalpointispurelyinstitutionalinnatureandhas
nothingwhatsoevertodowiththecalibreofthepresentmembersofParliamentorofthejudiciary.The
interpretationoftheConstitutioncannotbealteredmerelybecausethemembersofanygiven
Parliament,oranygivensetofjudges,arenotfaithfullydischargingtheirresponsibilities.Indeed,our
historyisrepletewithepisodesinwhichmilitaryautocratsoverthrewconstitutionalgovernments,often
totheplauditsofthepublicandpreciselyonthegroundthattheelectedrepresentativeswerecorrupt
andincompetent.ItisincumbentonthisCourttoavoidsobasicandfundamentalafallacy.Itisnotthe
functionofthisCourttoweakendemocraticinstitutionsandtraditionsbydeclaringthatsincethe
electedrepresentativesofthepeoplearenot,initsopinion,dischargingtheirfunctionshonestly,hence
thosefunctionsinrelationtothejudiciarywillbetakenoverbythejudiciaryitself.Letitnotbe
forgottenthatthejudiciaryinPakistanisneitherelectedbythepeoplenorisitanswerableor
accountabletothepeople.ItisanswerableonlytoitselfunderArticle209oftheConstitution.Nojudge
ofasuperiorcourtinPakistanhaseverbeenprosecutedinacriminalcourt.Indeed,ifanyother
institutionclaimedtherighttobeonlyanswerabletoitselftherewouldbeapublicoutcry.Inother
countriesoftheworld,includingIndia,thegeneralruleisthatthesuperiorjudiciaryisanswerabletothe
electedrepresentativesofthepeopleinIndiaandEnglandtoParliamentandintheUnitedStatesto
Congress.ThejudiciaryinPakistanthusholdsauniquelyprivilegedpositionconstitutionallyanditis
thereforeincumbentonittoexerciseitsgreatpowerswithrestraintandwisdom.Thebasicpostulate,
onwhichallinstitutionsrest,is,thegreaterthepower,thegreatertheresponsibility.
(138)Iwouldthereforeobserve,withrespect,thatamomentsreflectionontheoriginalshapeofthe
Constitutionputspaidtotheviewnowbeingadvancedthatsomehowtheindependenceofthejudiciary
isunderthreatbecausethelegislativeandexecutivebrancheshavebecomeinvolvedinthe
appointmentprocess.Thelegislativeandexecutivebrancheshavealwaysbeeninvolvedinthe
appointmentprocess.Toputthepointdifferently,theinvolvementofthebranchesintheappointment
processhasalwaysbeenabasicfeatureoftheConstitution,andindeedupuntiltheAlJehaddecision,
theothertwobranchesalwayshadthelargerroletoplay.Certainly,uptotheearly1990snoone
questionedtheindependenceofthejudiciaryatleastonthisbasis.Thelackofindependenceofthe
judiciarywasalwaysascribedtothepersonalitiesofdifferentjudgesoftheCourtandnottothemode
ofappointment.(IfMunir,CJandhiscolleagueshadsochosentheycouldhavedecidedtheTamizud
dincasedifferently.TherewasnothinginthethenConstitutionpreventingthemfromdoingso.)
(139)Tocarryonthenarrative,inthe1990s,afeelingdidariseinthejudicialbranchitself,thatthe
consultativesystemwasperhapsnotworkingasitshould.Inparticular,therewasafeelingthatperhaps
theviewsofthejudicialbranchwerenotbeinggivensufficientweight.Matterscametoahead,asit
were,intheAlJehadcase,andthisCourtgavenewmeaningandcontenttothewordconsultation
usedintherelevantArticlesinthefollowingmanner:
ThewordsafterconsultationemployedinteraliainArticles177and193oftheConstitutionconnote
thattheconsultationshouldbeeffective,meaningful,purposive,consensusoriented,leavingnoroom
forcomplaintofarbitrarinessorunfairplay.TheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistanandtheChief
JusticeofaHighCourtastothefitnessandsuitabilityofacandidateforjudgeshipisentitledtobe
acceptedintheabsenceofverysoundreasonstoberecordedbythePresident/Executive.(emphasis
supplied)
(140)Inthedetailedjudgments,emphasiswasalsoplacedonparticipatoryconsultativeprocess
betweentheconsulteesandalsowiththeExecutive.AjmalMian,J.,putthematterinthefollowing
terms:
Iam,therefore,oftheviewthatthewordsafterconsultationreferredtointeraliainArticles177and
193oftheConstitutioninvolveparticipatoryconsultativeprocessbetweentheconsulteesandalsowith
theExecutive.Itshouldbeeffective,meaningful,purposive,consensusoriented,leavingnoroomfor
complaintorarbitrarinessorunfairplay.TheChiefJusticeofaHighCourtandtheChiefJusticeof
PakistanarewellequippedtoassessastotheknowledgeandsuitabilityofacandidateforJudgeshipin
thesuperiorCourts,whereastheGovernorofaProvinceandtheFederalGovernmentarebetter
equippedtofindoutabouttheantecedentsofacandidateandtoacquireotherinformationastohis
character/conduct.Iwillnotsaythatanyoneoftheaboveconsultees/functionariesislessimportantor
inferiortotheother.Allareimportantintheirrespectivespheres.TheChiefJusticeofPakistan,being
Paterfamiliasi.e.headofthejudiciary,havingexpertiseknowledgeabouttheabilityandsuitabilityofa
candidate,definitelyhisviewsdeserveduedeference.Theobjectoftheaboveparticipatoryconsultative
processshouldbetoarriveataconsensustoselectbestpersonsfortheJudgeshipofasuperiorCourt
keepinginviewtheobjectenshrinedinthePreambleoftheConstitution(emphasissupplied)
(141)Idonotofcourse,disagreewiththeobservationsandconclusionsoftheAlJehadcase,butfor
presentpurposes,theimportantpointisthis:bymeansofjudicialinterpretation,thecontentofwhatis
nowbeingdescribedasabasicfeatureoftheConstitutionwasdecisively,anddramatically,altered.
Theviewsofthejudicialbranchwerenowtobeaccordedprimacy.However,eventheAlJehadcasedid
notdoawaywithconsultationamong,andwith,theotherbranches(inparticular,theexecutive).Itisto
berememberedthatthePrimeMinister(onwhoseadvicethePresidentwasrequiredtoact)isthehead
oftheCabinet,andtheCabinet,boththroughthedoctrineofcollectiveresponsibilityandotherwise,is
traditionallyknownasthebucklethatfastensthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesina
parliamentarydemocracy.Thus,toinvolvethePrimeMinisterinanydecisionmakingprocessisto
involveboththeexecutiveandlegislativebranches,directlyand/orindirectly.NordidAlJehadprovide
thatthejudiciarysviewcouldnotbequestioned.TheeffectoftheAlJehadcasecanthereforebestated
asfollows.Intheappointmentofjudges,therehadtobeaproperandmeaningfulconsultationamong
thedifferentbranchesoftheState.Theviewsexpressedbythejudicialbranchweretohaveprimacyin
relationtothemerits,whiletheviewsoftheExecutiveweretobeconsideredinrelationtothe
suitabilityandantecedentsofanominee,andiftheotherbranches(inparticulartheexecutive)
disagreedwiththeformer,verysoundreasonshadtoberecorded.Ifsuchreasonswerefoundto
exist,thentheexecutive/legislativebranchcouldrejecttheopinionofthejudicialbranch,i.e.,refuseto
appointthepersonrecommendedbythelatter.ThisaspectoftheAlJehadcaseseemstohavebeen
totallyoverlookedinsubsequentdiscussions.
(142)Itwillbeseenthat,insubstance,allthepointsraisedagainstArticle175Aweretobefoundin
theappointmentprocessthatexistedpriortothe18thAmendment,evenasmodifiedbytheAlJehad
decision.Itwasonlythemannerinwhichtheappointmentprocesswasstructuredthatwasdifferent
fromthemethodnowadoptedinArticle175A.Howthen,hasArticle175Aalteredthesituationandin
particular,hasbroughtaboutachangefortheworse?Inordertoexaminethisquestion,theprovisions
relatingtotheJudicialCommissionandtheParliamentaryCommitteewillhavetobeexamined
separately.ThefirstpointtonoteabouttheCommissionisthatwhennominatingapersonfor
appointment,itactsbyasimplemajorityofitstotalmembership,andthecrucialpointisthatitisjudges
(servingandretired)whocomprisethattotalmajority.Thisiscompletelyunprecedentedinourhistory
andalsothatofotherwellestablishedandfunctionaldemocracies.Thus,inthecaseofSupremeCourt
appointments,theCommissionistocompriseof9members,ofwhom6arejudges.InthecaseofHigh
Courtappointments(otherthantotheIslamabadHighCourt),theCommissionistocompriseof13
members,ofwhom8arejudges.Thus,judgescan,independentlyoftheothermembersofthe
Commission,makenominationsforvacanciesinthesuperiorcourts.Article175A,ratherthan
derogatingfromtheearlierpositioninwhichtheviewsofthejudiciarymerelyhadprimacy,hasactually
strengthenedthejudiciaryshandimmeasurably.Itshouldbewelcomedandnotcriticizedbyallwho
valueanindependentjudiciary.NomatterwhattheLawMinister(s)andtheAttorneyGeneralandthe
senioradvocateappointedbytheBar(s)maysay,ordo;eveniftheyacttogether,thejudgesviewwill
alwaysprevail.Thisisanextraordinary,andindeedunique,situation.Ajudgeofthesuperiorcourtscan
onlyberemovedbytheSupremeJudicialCouncil,abodycomprisingsolelyofjudges.Now,the
Constitutionunequivocallyprovidesthatnominationsforappointmentasjudgesaretobemadebya
Commissionthatisnotmerelydominatedbyjudges,butinwhichtheyhaveanabsolute,andindeed,
unassailable,majority.Inallotherconstitutionalsystems,thereisadecisiveinvolvementoftheother
branchesofthestateinboththeappointmentandremovalofjudges.Thus,intheUSConstitution,
judgesareappointedbythePresident(theexecutivebranch)withtheadviceandconsentoftheSenate
(thelegislativebranch),andjudgesareremovedbyimpeachmentbyCongress(thelegislativebranch).In
theUK,evenundertheUKActofwhichlearnedcounselaresoenamored,eventhejudgesofthenewly
formedUKSupremeCourt,holdofficeduringgoodbehaviorandcanberemovedbyParliament(see
s.33oftheUKAct).(TheappointmentprocessundertheUKActisexaminedindetailbelowanditwill
beseenthattheroleoftheExecutiveisfargreaterthaninPakistanunderthe18thAmendment.)In
relationtothecriticismwhichhasrepeatedlybeenadvancedthattheconstitutionalpositioninthe
UnitedStatesisdifferentandcannotbecomparedwithPakistan,theansweristhatitisindeed
different,butinacompletelydifferentway,whichhasnotbeenenvisagedbythePetitioners.The
doctrineoftheindependenceofthejudiciaryflowsfromthetheoryofseparationofpowers,sometimes
calledthetrichotomyofpowers,i.e.,thattheconstitutionhaserectedbarriersbetweenthethreegreat
departmentsoftheState,thelegislature,theexecutiveandthejudiciary.Butthisdoctrineisnowhere
categoricallystatedorexpressedassuchinourConstitution.Itisessentiallyajudicialinterpretationof
thestructureoftheConstitution.Whatneedstobestresseditisthatthetheorywasfirstclearlysetout
intheUSConstitution.ArticleIoftheUSConstitutionstatesthatalllegislativepowersshallvestin
Congress,ArticleIIstatesthattheexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentandArticleIII
statesthatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandsuch
inferiorcourtsetc.SuchacategoricalassertionisnotmerelymissinginourConstitution,butArticle
175(2)infact,ifanything,tiltsintheoppositedirectionbyaffirmingthatnocourtshallhaveany
jurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionorbyorunderanylaw!Itherefore
findthiscontentionwhollyunconvincing.Onanyconceivablebasis,thecreationoftheJudicial
Commissionhasstrengthened,andnotweakened,theindependenceofthejudiciary.
(143)Quiteapartfromtheforegoing,theinclusionoftheother(i.e.,nonjudicial)membersofthe
Commissiondoesnot,inmyview,alterthesituationfortheworse.Thus,onememberofthe
CommissioninthecaseofSupremeCourtnominationsisasenioradvocateofthisCourtnominatedby
thePakistanBarCouncil.InthecaseofHighCourtnominations,heisaugmentedbyaseniormember
nominatedbytheProvincialBarCouncil.TheothermembersaretheFederalLawMinisterandthe
AttorneyGeneral,and(forHighCourtappointments)theProvincialLawMinisteraswell.Thereis
nothingatallwhichwouldindicatethatthesememberswouldacttogethertounderminethe
functioningoftheCommission.Theymayevenbeatloggerheads.Forexample,ifthegovernmentatthe
Federallevelisformedbyonepartyandthatattheprovinciallevelbyanother,thetwoLawMinisters
maynotseeeyetoeyeontheappointments,withtheirvotesineffectcancelingeachother.Inanycase,
whiletheselatterappointmentsareexofficio,thereisnothingtoindicatethattheyaretoactas
representativesoftheexecutive/legislativebranches.Indeed,suchconductisnoweffectivelyprecluded
bythewellknownjudgmentsofthisCourtinrelationtoArticle175A.(Eveniftheyweretosoact,the
situationwouldnot,forthereasonsalreadygiven,bemateriallydifferentfromthatprevailingpriorto
the18thAmendment.)
(144)ThereisoneimportantfeatureoftheCommissiontowhichIwouldliketoadvert.UndertheAl
Jehadformula,primacywasaccordedtooneperson,namely,theChiefJusticeofPakistan.Thiswas
understandablebecausetheConstitutionreferredtohimaloneandnottohisseniorcolleagues.Article
175Ahasnowmadeadeparture.TheChiefJusticeofPakistanisnowtosharehisresponsibilitieswith
hisfourseniormostcolleagues.Probablytherationaleforthischangeisthefeelingthatthese
responsibilitiesaresoonerousthattheseniorjudgesshouldbeaskedtoassisttheChiefJusticeintheir
discharge.InIndia,althoughthelanguageofthecorrespondingArticleissomewhatdifferent,theIndian
SupremeCourthasvoluntarilyevolvedasysteminwhichthefourseniormostjudges(collectively
knownasthecollegium)participateintheprocess.
(145)SomuchfortheCommission.WhatoftheParliamentaryCommittee?Thefirstpointtonoteis
thatunlesstheCommitteerefusestoconfirmthenomineeinquestionwithin14days,thenomineeshall
bedeemedtohavebeenconfirmed.Thus,inasense,theformalconfirmationbytheCommitteeis
irrelevant,andcanonlybringforwardtheconfirmation.The14dayperiodisfixedandimmutable.Once
theCommissionhasmadeitsrecommendationanditiscommunicated,thetimebeginstorunatonce,
andonceitstartstorun,nothingcanstopit.IfatalltheCommitteewishestorefusetoconfirm,itmust
dosowithinthisperiod,ornotatall.Thesecondpointisthatsuchrefusalmustbebyathreequarters
majority,i.e.,atleastsixoutoftheCommitteeseightmembersmustrefusetoconfirm.The
membershipoftheCommitteeisevenlysplitbetweenthetwoHousesofParliament,andtheTreasury
(i.e.,government)andOppositionbenches.Itisthereforeadiversemix,andatleastsixmustcastthe
negativevote.ThepositionunderArticle175Amaynowbecomparedwiththesituationpriortothe
18thAmendment.Inthelattercase,thepersonnominatedbythejudicialconsulteescouldberefused
appointmentbythePresidentaslongasherecordedverysoundreasonsforhisdisagreement.As
alreadyexplained,ineffectthismeantthePrimeMinister.Thus,oneindividualalonecouldblockthe
personnominatedbythejudicialbranchprovidedhecouldadduceverysoundreasonsfordoingso.In
thecaseoftheCommittee,notlessthan6individuals,representingtheGovernmentandthe
Opposition,whocouldbeatloggerheads,wouldhavetoagreeontheverysoundreasonsbeforethe
Commissionsnomineecouldbeblocked.Itmayalsobenotedthat,unlikeArticle175A,thePrime
Ministerdidnotfaceanydeadline;hecouldsitonthefileforhoweverlonghedeemedappropriate.
And,asregardsthefearthattheCommitteewouldpoliticizetheappointmentofjudges,ina
parliamentarydemocracy,isnotthePrimeMinisterpreeminentlyapolitician?Surelythequestion
answersitselfandneedsnoelaboration.ItisonlyinamilitaryautocracythatthePrimeMinisteris
supposedlyatechnocrat.ThePrimeMinisterisindeedapoliticianparexcellence.Finally,andmost
definitively,thereisnowanestablishedbodyofcaselawdevelopedbythisCourtinwhichtheroleof
theParliamentaryCommittee,andthescopeofitspowersandhowthosepowersaretobeexercised
hasbeenexhaustivelydiscussedanddelineated.Asthecaselawmakesclear,thescopeofactionforthe
Committee,weresixormoreofitsmembersbemindedtorejectanominationmadebythe
Commission,islimitedindeed.ThepracticalimpactoftheCommitteeontheappointmentprocess
standsnarrowedconsiderably.
(146)ItisalsotobeemphasizedthatArticle175Adoesnotcontainanyprovisionbarringthe
jurisdictionofthecourts.AsthecaselawofthisCourtvividlydemonstrates,evenonthoseoccasions
wheretheCommitteehasrefusedtoconfirmtheCommissionsnominee,thatactionhasbeenjudicially
reviewed,andjudicialandlegallyenforceableverdictshavebeenpronounced.Inmyopinion,therefore,
thereisnothinginArticle175A,whetherinrespectoftheCommissionortheCommitteeaswouldinany
mannerderogatefromtheindependenceofthejudiciary.Ifanything,thehandofthejudicialbranch
hasbeenconsiderablystrengthened,andhascertainlynotbeenweakened.
(147)ThesubmissionthatthepoliticalpartiesfoughttheGeneralElectionspriortothe18th
Amendmentonplatformsthatdidnotrefertoanyintenttoreformthemethodofjudicialappointment
isalsowithoutmerit.Itineffectrequiresthataconstitutionalamendmentisvalidonlyifhasthe
peopleswillbehindit,totheextentthatthiscanbeascertainedfromtheelectionmanifestoofthe
party(orcoalition)whichwinstheelections.Thissubmissionisbothconstitutionallyandfactually
inappropriate.ThereisnothingatallintheConstitutionthatrequiresthattheamendingpowercannot
beexercisedunlesssupportedbyamanifestationofthepopularwill;certainly,anysuch
requirementisalientoArticle239.Itisevenalientothebasicfeaturesdoctrine.Forexample,there
isnothingintheIndianjurisprudencethatwouldsupportanysuchconclusion.Toholdthatthereissuch
arequirementwouldbetoimplyorreadyetanotherlimitationintheamendingpower,forwhichthere
isnowarrant.Onthefactualside,itisnotoriousthatevenifpartiespublishelectionmanifestoes,thatis
almostinvariablyinanattempttogainvotes,andhardlyanymemberofthepublicavidlyseeksoutand
readssuchmanifestoesandbaseshisdecisiontovoteonthesame.Forexample,afailuretoimplement
anelectionsloganlikeroti,kapraaurmakandoesnotmeanthattheGovernmentsconstitutionally
conferredpowerscannotbeexercised.Secondly,thequestionofreformofthemethodofjudicial
appointmentwasverymuchpartofthepoliticaldiscourseforsometime,asmanifestedindeclarations
suchastheCharterofDemocracy,andotherpronouncementsofpoliticalleaders.Indeed,theCharterof
Democracyforthefirsttimeintroducedtheconceptbothofajudicialcommissionandaparliamentary
committee,asthefollowingextractfromitreveals:
3.(a)Therecommendationsforappointmentofjudgestosuperiorjudiciaryshallbeformulated
throughacommission,whichshallcompriseofthefollowing:i.Thechairmanshallbeachiefjustice,
whohasneverpreviouslytakenoathunderthePCO.
ii.Themembersofthecommissionshallbethechiefjusticesoftheprovincialhighcourtswhohavenot
takenoathunderthePCO,failingwhichtheseniormostjudgeofthathighcourtwhohasnottakenoath
shallbethemember.
iii.ViceChairmenofPakistanandViceChairmenofProvincialBarAssociationwithrespecttothe
appointmentofjudgestotheirconcernedprovince.
iv.PresidentofSupremeCourtBarAssociation.
v.PresidentsofHighCourtBarAssociationsofKarachi,Lahore,Peshawar,andQuettawithrespectto
theappointmentofjudgestotheirconcernedprovince.
vi.FederalMinisterforLawandJustice.
vii.AttorneyGeneralofPakistan.
(ai)Thecommissionshallforwardapanelofthreenamesforeachvacancytotheprimeminister,who
shallforwardonenameforconfirmationtojointparliamentarycommitteeforconfirmationofthe
nominationthroughatransparentpublichearingprocess.
(aii)Thejointparliamentarycommitteeshallcompriseof50percentmembersfromthetreasury
benchesandtheremaining50percentfromoppositionpartiesbasedontheirstrengthinthe
parliamentnominatedbyrespectiveparliamentaryleaders.
(b)NojudgeshalltakeoathunderanyProvisionalConstitutionalOrderoranyotheroaththatis
contradictorytotheexactlanguageoftheoriginaloathprescribedintheConstitutionof1973.
Administrativemechanismwillbeinstitutedforthepreventionofmisconduct,implementationofcode
ofethics,andremovalofjudgesonsuchchargesbroughttoitsattentionbyanycitizenthroughthe
proposedcommissionforappointmentofJudges.(d)Allspecialcourtsincludingantiterrorismand
accountabilitycourtsshallbeabolishedandsuchcasesbetriedinordinarycourts.Furthertocreatea
setofrulesandprocedureswhereby,thearbitrarypowersofthechiefjusticesovertheassignmentof
casestovariousjudgesandthetransferofjudgestovariousbenchessuchpowersshallbeexercisedby
theChiefJusticeandtwoseniormostjudgessittingtogether.
Itwasexplicitlystatedthatthischangewastobemadethroughaconstitutionalamendment.
Thus,inthisrespectatleastthepoliticalpartiescannotbefaultedforfailingtodisclosetheirintentions.
Boththemajorparties,thePPPandthePML(N)weresignatoriestotheCharter.Thus,toholdthatany
exerciseoftheamendingpowermustalwaysbebackedbyspecificandexplicitpublicorpopular
demandwouldbeentirelyinappropriate.Infact,itisanegationoftheprincipleofparliamentary
democracy.Onceaparliamenthasbeenelected,itisfreetoperformallactspermissibleunderthe
Constitutionandifthesedonotaccordwiththerulingparty/coalitionsmanifesto,theremedylieswith
theelectorateintheensuingelectionsandnotinadistortionoftheconstitutionalpowersvestedin
Parliament.Furthermore,anditisworthponderingthepoint,withallduerespectstoallconcerned,
thatitperhapsappearsunseemlyforthejudicialbranchtoimposesucharequirementontheelected
representativesontheirexerciseoftheamendingpowerwhentheCourthasonpreviousoccasions
itselfdeemeditappropriatetoconfersuchapoweronmilitarydictatorswhobydefinitionimpose
theirwillonthepeople,thoughtheysometimesdopretendtogarnerpopularsupportthroughpatently
bogusreferendums.
(148)Anotherobjectionwhichhasbeenraisedinthepastwasthatthemeetingsoftheconstitutional
committeethatscrutinizedthetextoftheAmendmentwhileitwaspassingthroughParliamenttook
placeinsecret.Therewerenoconsultationswithmembersofcivilsocietyorotherstakeholders.And
whenthereportwasplacedbeforeParliament,the18thAmendmentwaspassedwithhardlyany
debate.IconfessIamsomewhatsurprisedbythenatureofthisobjection.Sincewhenhasthe
constitutionalityofanylawbeenjudgedonthebasisoftheextentofconsultationswhichtakeplace
withmembersofthepublic?Isthereasinglecasewhichhaslaiddownthepropositionthat
Parliamentspowertopassalawispredicatedontheextentandnatureofconsultationsorinteractions
withvariousstakeholders?Ifthisbethecriterion,notmerelythe18thAmendmentbutthevast
majorityoflawsenactedbyParliamentwouldbestruckdown.Insofarasthepaucityofdebatesin
ParliamentisconcernedsurelythisisamatterofParliamenttointernallyregulate.Ifthemembersare
agreedonthewisdomofalegislationorconstitutionalmeasure,isitthefunctionofthecourtstodirect
themtoneverthelesscontinuedebatingthematter,whethertheywanttoornot?Thelanguageof
Article69,whichisreproducedbelow,isselfexplanatory:
(1)ThevalidityofanyproceedingsinMajliseShoora(Parliament)shallnotbecalledinquestiononthe
groundofanyirregularityofprocedure.
(2)NoofficerormemberofMajliseShoora(Parliament)inwhompowersarevestedbyorunderthe
Constitutionforregulatingprocedureortheconductofbusiness,orformaintainingorderinMajlise
Shoora(Parliament)shallbesubjecttothejurisdictionofanycourtinrespectoftheexercisebyhimof
thosepowers.
InthisArticle,MajliseShoora(Parliament)hasthesamemeaningasinArticle66.
(149)Quiteapartfromtheabove,thespiritoftheConstitutionrequiresinstitutionalrespectinboth
directions.Thejudiciaryfunctionsinitsownmanner,andsubjecttoitsownrules,andthelegislatureis
entitledtothesamerespect.Anyotherapproachcanleadtoaninstitutionalclash.Supposethe
ExecutivedeclinedtoimplementthejudgmentoftheCourtonasimilarground,viz.,thatfulland
detailedargumentswerenotheardorthat,ifthematterpertainstopublicinterestlitigation,allthe
stakeholderswerenotissuedanoticeandgivenanopportunitytoparticipateintheproceedings,would
itbejustifiedindoingso?Surelynot.Thereshouldbeconsistencyinsuchmatters.
(150)Itwouldbeconvenienttopausehereforasummingup.UndertheConstitutionasitoriginally
stoodappointmentsofthesuperiorjudiciaryweremadeintermsofArticle177and193ofthe
Constitution.Clause(1)ofArticle177providedthattheChiefJusticeofPakistanshallbeappointedby
thePresident,andeachoftheotherjudgesshallbeappointedbythePresidentafterconsultationwith
theChiefJustice.Article193oftheConstitution,whichrelatestoappointmentofHighCourtjudges,
stipulatedthataHighCourtjudgeshallbeappointedbythePresidentafterconsultationwiththeChief
JusticeofPakistan,withtheGovernorconcernedand,exceptwheretheappointmentwasthatofChief
Justice,withtheChiefJusticeoftheHighCourt.Asdiscussedabove,Article177didnotcontemplateany
consultationsbythePresidentwithanyotherfunctionaryoftheStatefortheappointmentofthesingle
mostimportantfunctionaryintheadministrationofjusticenamelytheChiefJusticeofPakistan.The
powerwasconferredsolelyandexclusivelyonthePresidenttobeexercisedinsuchmannerashemay
deemfit,actingofcourseontheadviceofthePrimeMinister.Toreiterate:theappointmentprocessfor
theChiefJusticecontemplatedanexclusivityofpowerbeinggrantedtotheExecutive.Inrelationto
otherjudgesoftheSupremeCourtArticle177mandatednonbindingconsultationwiththeChief
Justice.Similarly,inArticle193,inrelationtoappointmentsofHighCourtjudges,althoughconsultation
wasprescribed,neverthelessitwasnotprovidedthattheconsultationprocesswastobemeaningfulor
binding.Theconsistenthistoryofjudicialappointmentsaftertheenforcementofthe1973Constitution
(and,indeed,evenpriorthereto)madeitclearthattheessentialpowerofmakingappointmentsvested
withtheExecutive.Thenthefirstmajorchangecame:thelandmarkdecisionofthisCourtintheAl
Jehadcase.Thiscaselaiddownspecificcriteriainrelationtohowtheappointmentprocesswastotake
place.Asdescribedabove,itwasprovidedthereinthatthewordconsultation,asutilizedinArticle177,
wastobeeffective,meaningful,purposeful,consensusorientedandleavingnoroomforcomplaintof
arbitrarinessorunfairplay.ItwasfurtherlaiddownthattheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan(and
theChiefJusticeofaHighCourt)astothefitnessandsuitabilityofacandidateforjudgeshipwas
entitledtobeacceptedintheabsenceofverysoundreasonstoberecordedbythePresident.Onthe
basisofthisjudgmentanewpracticeevolvedintermsofwhichprimacywasgiventotheviewofthe
ChiefJusticeofPakistan.However,itmaybenoted,thatalthoughthisprincipledealtwithall
appointmentsinrelationtotheSupremeCourtandalso,ofcourse,inrelationtotheHighCourt(after
takingintoaccountandconsiderationtheviewsoftheChiefJusticeoftheconcernedHighCourt),there
stillremainedagrayareainrelationtotheappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan.TheAlJehad
casehadmadetheconsultationprocessbindingbut,sinceArticle177didnotusethewordconsultation
inrelationtotheappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan,thequestionwas,whowastobe
consulted?TheAlJehadjudgmentdidhoweverlaydown,inrelationtotheappointmentofChiefJustice
ofaHighCourt,theprincipleoflegitimateexpectancybystatingthattheseniormostjudgeofaHigh
CourthadalegitimateexpectancytobeconsideredforappointmentastheChiefJusticeand,inthe
absenceofanyconcreteorvalidreasonstoberecordedbythePresident,hewasentitledtobe
appointedassuchintheHighCourtconcerned.Thisprinciple,however,wasnotlaiddownasbeing
applicabletotheofficeoftheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourtofPakistan.Thislacunawas
subsequentlyfilledinbythisCourtinMalikAsadAliandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothersPLD
1998SC161.Whatisimportanttonoteisthatinthesystemthatdevelopedpostthesejudicial
interventions,theChiefJusticeofPakistan,onceappointed,remainedthepivotalfiguresinceinrelation
totheappointmentofotherjudgeshisviewenjoyednotmerelyprimacybut,forallpracticalpurposes,
conclusiveness.Hehadthefinalsayinrelationtotheappointmentofjudgesofthehighestcourtinthe
land.Allpowerwasconcentratedinonepairofheads.Wasthisdesirableontheplaneofprinciple?
Shouldonemanexercisesomuchpower?Itisthissystemwhichhasbeendisturbedbytheenactment
ofthe18thAmendment.Attheriskofsomerepetition,whatthe18thAmendmentreadwiththe19th
Amendmenthasdone,inbrief,isthatithasmadetheappointmentofjudges,bothtotheSupreme
CourtaswellastotheHighCourt,onthebasisofdecisionmakingbyaJudicialCommissionwhich
consistsofandisheadedbytheChiefJusticeofPakistanandincludesthefourmostseniorjudgesofthe
SupremeCourtaswellasaformerChiefJusticeorformerJudgeoftheSupremeCourt(whoistobe
nominatedbytheChiefJusticeofPakistaninconsultationwiththefourmemberjudgesforaperiodof
twoyears).Asanalyzedindetailabove,theExecutivehasbeengrantedaverylimitedroleinthis
processtotheextentoftwonomineesonlybeingmembersoftheCommission.Evenwhentheother
membersoftheCommissionaretakenintoaccount,asnotedabovethefinalsayrestswiththe
judiciary,andthejudiciaryalone.Essentiallythesameprocedureisadoptedinrelationtoappointments
ofjudgesoftheHighCourt.Again,thejudiciaryhasanabsoluteandunassailablecommandoverthe
decisionsoftheCommission.
(151)Thequestionwhichnaturallyarisesiswhichsystemissuperior?Isit(a)thatwhichwas
originallycontemplatedbytheframersoftheConstitution,asperthebasicstructuredoctrineinterms
ofwhichcompletediscretionarypowerswereconferredontheExecutive,or(b)thesystemas
introducedbytheAlJehadjudgmentintermsofwhichessentiallytheviewsofonemanalone,namely,
theChiefJusticeofPakistan,haddispositiveanddeterminativeeffect,or(c)thepresentsystemwhich
contemplatesthesharingofpowerandresponsibilitybytheChiefJusticeofPakistanwiththefourmost
seniormostjudgesoftheSupremeCourt?Ientertainnodoubtinmymindthatthepresentsystemisfar
superiorbothtotheoriginaloneaswellastheonecontemplatedbythejudgmentintheAlJehadcase.
TheJudicialCommissiondoesnotimpingeonthepowersofthejudiciarywhatitdoesistosharethe
exercisablepowersbetweentheChiefJusticeofPakistanandtheseniormostjudges.Surely,thisisa
greatadvancewhichistobewelcomed.Indeed,ifatallanyonecouldhaveagrievanceatthenew
systemitwouldbeanincumbentChiefJusticewhofeltaggrievedbythesingulardilutioninhis
discretionarypowers.Hispowershavebeendiminishedwhilethoseofhiscolleagueshavebeen
enhanced.Humannaturebeingwhatitisitwouldbeunderstandableifhefelttheearliersystemwas
preferable.Insofarasthefunctioningofthesystemasawholeisconcernedsurelytherecanbelittle
doubtaboutthefactthataconsultativeprocessengagedinbytheseniormostmembersofthejudiciary
isexponentiallysuperiortothatinwhichallpowersareconferredononeindividualalone.Iam
accordinglyoftheopinionthatifthe18thAmendmentweretobestruckdown,theconsequenceof
whichwouldbeareversiontothepriorsystem,thatwouldcertainlynotbeanimprovementinthe
judicialappointmentsprocess.Theconfermentofexclusiveandcompletepoweronasingleindividual,
whetherhebeamemberoftheExecutiveortheJudiciary,issurelylessdesirablethenameaningful,
purposefulandconsensusorientedsystemintermsofwhichappointmentsaremadebyabroadbased
bodyaftercarryingoutaconsultativeprocessfallingwithindefinedparameters.Itfollowsthereforethat
thestrikingdownofthe18thAmendmentwouldbeasignificantstepbackwardsandleadtoa
diminutioninrelationtotheintegrityoftheappointmentprocess.
(152)ReturningtothecaseputforwardbylearnedcounselforthePetitionersinrelationtoArticle
175A,reliancewasalsoplacedontheUKActtoshow,bycomparison,howasystemofjudicial
appointmentscouldbeestablishedinwhichthereisnoinvolvementoftheexecutiveorlegislative
branches.IhavecarefullygonethroughtheprovisionsoftheUKActandtherecanbelittledoubtthat
theExecutivehasfargreaterpowersintermsthereofthanParliamentorthejudiciary.Thefirstpointto
noteisthepivotalroleplayedbytheLordChancellor,whoisamemberoftheCabinet,i.e.,the
executive.Indeed,section2oftheUKActstatesthatthePrimeMinister(himselfofcourse,apolitician)
isnottoappointanypersonasLordChancellorunlessheisqualifiedbyexperience,andthenprovides
thefollowingcriteriaforsuchqualificationinsubsection(2):ThePrimeMinistermaytakeintoaccount
anyofthese(a)experienceasaMinisteroftheCrown;(b)experienceasamemberofeitherHouseof
Parliament;(c)experienceasaqualifyingpractitioner;(d)experienceasateacheroflawinauniversity;
(e)otherexperiencethatthePrimeMinisterconsidersrelevant.
(153)TheprocedurefortheappointmentsoftheseniorjudiciaryinEnglandandWales,andNorthern
Ireland,andthejudgesoftheUKSupremeCourt(itselfcreatedbyandundertheUKAct)issomewhat
complicatedandmultilayered,butforpresentpurposesitisnecessarytoonlyexamineandunderstand
certainunderlyingprinciples.ThefirstpointtonoteisthattheUKActsetsupanewbody,akintothe
CommissionunderArticle175A,calledtheJudicialAppointmentsCommission(s.61).Schedule12ofthe
UKActdealswiththeJudicialAppointmentsCommission(JAC).Itisabodythatcomprisesofa
Chairmanand14othermembers(i.e.,atotalof15members),allofwhoareappointedbytheQueenon
therecommendationoftheLordChancellor.TheChairmanmustbealaymember,asmustbe5ofthe
othermembers.Paragraph4(3)definesalaymemberasmeaningapersonwhohasneverheldalisted
judicialofficeorbeenapracticinglawyer.(Schedule14liststherelevantjudicialoffices;theseare
essentiallywhatwewouldregardasthesubordinatejudiciary.)Thus,theChairmanand5members
must,bylaw,havenothingwhatsoevertodowiththelaw.TwooftheothermembersoftheJACareto
bepracticinglawyers.Thus,themajorityoftheJACareeitherlawyersorlaymembers,allofwhomare
nominatedbytheexecutive.TheothermembersoftheJACarejudges,butcomefrombothwhatwe
wouldconsiderthesuperiorandsubordinatejudiciary.Thus,theJACisaverydiversemix,containing
notmerelyjudgesandlawyersbutalsolaymembers(ineffect,ordinarycitizens)anditisthisbody
whichplaysacentralroleintheappointmentprocessoftheseniorjudiciary.Itmaybenotedthatthe
positionintherecentpasthasbeenthatthecurrentchairpersonoftheJAChasbeenamemberofthe
HouseofLords(theupperHouseofParliament),whiletheotherlaymembersincludealawprofessor,a
formersoldier,ajournalist,aformercharteredaccountantandagovernoroftheLondonSchoolof
Economics.Ofthetwolawyermembers,oneisapracticingsolicitor,andtheotherisapracticing
barrister.ThecontrastwiththeCommissionunderArticle175A,wherethejudgeshaveanabsolute
majority,couldnotbegreater.IconfessIamwhollyunabletocomprehendhowtheJACcouldbe
termedtobeabodywhichisconsistentwiththeprinciplesofjudicialindependencewhileArticle175A
isnot.
(154)Thesecondbodythatmustbeconsidered(forreasonsthatwillbecomeclear)istheJudicial
AppointmentsBoardforScotland.Asitsnamesuggests,itisconcernedwithjudicialappointmentsfor
Scotland.(ItwillberememberedthattheBritishjudiciaryisdividedamongEnglandandWales,Scotland
andNorthernIreland.)Theimportantpointtonoteaboutthisbody,whichoriginallywasonlyan
executivebody,andwasonlygivenstatutoryrecognitionin2008,isthatitalsocomprisesofjudicial
members,legalmembersandlaymembers.Thenumberoflaymembersmustbeequaltothatofthe
judicialandlegalmemberscombined,andthelegalandlaymembersareappointedbyScottish
Ministers,i.e.,themembersoftheScottishexecutive.Ofthetenmembersofthisbody,threeare
judicialmembers,twoarelegalmembersandfivearelaymembers.Thus,onceagain,thenonjudicial
membersformthemajority.The(laymember)chairmanhasbeenaformerprincipaloftheUniversityof
Glasgow,whowaspreviouslyalsothePermanentSecretarytotheScottishExecutive(i.e.,thesenior
bureaucratoftheScottishgovernment).Theotherlaymembersincludeaprofessor,achartered
accountant,anotherformerbureaucrat(acivilservantintheEducationdepartment),andamemberof
whomtheofficialwebsitesaysonlythatherbackgroundisinhumanresources.Again,thecontrast
withtheCommissionunderArticle175Acouldnotbegreater.
(155)Thethirdbodythatmustbeconsidered(again,forreasonsthatwillshortlybecomeclear)isthe
NorthernIrelandJudicialAppointmentsCommission.Itcomprisesof13memberswhoareagain,amix
ofjudicial,legalandlaymembers.Itslaymembershaveincludedtwopsychologists(oneofwhomisalso
alaymagistrate),twoeducationists,ahumanresourcemanagerandalawprofessor.
(156)InowturntothemannerinwhichtheUKSupremeCourtjudgesaretobeappointed.Sections
26and27oftheUKActprovide,interalia,thattheappointmentistobemadebyaselection
commission.Schedule8dealswithselectioncommissions.Thisprovidesthattheselectioncommission
istocompriseof5members,ofwhomoneisthePresidentoftheSupremeCourt,thesecondisthe
DeputyPresident,andtheremainingthreeareonemembereachoftheJAC,theJudicialAppointments
BoardforScotlandandtheNorthernIrelandJudicialAppointmentsCommission.Thus,onceagain,the
exofficiojudicialmembersoftheselectionbodyareinaminority,unliketheCommissionunderArticle
175A.Paragraph6ofSchedule8dealswiththenonjudicialmembers.ItprovidesthattheLord
Chancelloristoappointthenonjudicialmembersontherecommendationofthebodyconcerned,i.e.,
JAC,theJudicialAppointmentsBoardforScotlandandtheNorthernIrelandJudicialAppointments
Commission,butthatatleastoneofsuchmembersmustbeapersonwhoisnonlegallyqualified.Thisis
however,onlyaminimumrequirement;thereisnobaronallofthenonjudicialmembersbeingnon
legallyqualified.Therefore,ifeachofthebodiesconcerned(i.e.,JAC,theJudicialAppointmentsBoard
forScotlandandtheNorthernIrelandJudicialAppointmentsCommission)nominatesalay(nonlegally
qualified)membertotheselectioncommission,theresultwouldbethattherecommendationfor
appointmenttotheUKSupremeCourtwouldbemadebyabodyinwhichordinarymembersofthe
publiccomprisethemajority.TherecouldnotbeagreatercontrastwiththepositionoftheCommission
underArticle175A.
(157)ImaynoteherethatthefirstappointeestotheUKSupremeCourtwereofcoursetheLaw
LordswhohadsatonthejudicialsideintheHouseofLords.Thefirstappointment,assuch,tothecourt
wasthatofSirJohnDyson.TheselectioncommissioninhiscasecomprisedofthePresidentofthe
SupremeCourt(LordPhilips),theDeputyPresident(LordHope)andthreemembersnominatedbythe
bodiesconcerned.Ofthese,onewasajudge(LadySmith),thesecondwasamemberoftheHouseof
Lords(acrossbencher,BaronessPrashar)andthirdalaymember,oneMrsRuthLaird.TheUKActstates
thattheselectioncommissionmustineachcaseselecttheselectionprocesstobeapplied,without
howeverelaboratingwhatthatprocessistobe.InthecaseofthevacancyeventuallyfilledinwithSir
JohnDyson,theselectioncommissiontookthedecisionthatthevacancybeadvertisedandinterested
personsinvitedtoapply.ThepositionofajudgeintheUKSupremeCourtwasthereforefilledinby
publicadvertisement.IsthisthemodelthatlearnedcounselforthePetitionersarerecommendingfor
Pakistan?
(158)Onceaselectioncommissionhasmadeaselection,itthenrecommendsthenametotheLord
Chancellorinareport(whichmustbeinaformapprovedbytheLordChancellor).Onreceivingthe
report,theLordChancellormustconsultwithanyofthejudgeswithwhomtheselectioncommission
consultedduringtheselectionprocess,andmustalsoconsultwiththeFirstMinisterofScotland,the
FirstMinisterforWalesandtheSecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland(s.28oftheUKAct).Imaynote
thats.27providesthataspartoftheselectionprocess,theselectioncommissionmustalsoconsultwith,
interalia,theLordChancellor,FirstMinisterofScotland,theFirstMinisterforWalesandtheSecretary
ofStateforNorthernIreland.Thus,thereisanongoing,repetitiveconsultativeprocessamongthe
selectioncommission,seniorjudgesandmembersoftheexecutive(i.e.,thepoliticiansanswerableto
thelegislature).However,themerefactthattheLordChancellorisalsopartofthisconsultativeprocess
doesnotmeanthathishandsbecometiedandheisboundbytherecommendationoftheselection
commission.TheLordChancellormayrejecttherecommendationorasktheselectioncommissionto
reconsideritsdecision.Section30providesthattheLordChancellorcanrejecttherecommendationif
heisoftheopinionthatthepersonselectedisnotsuitedforthepost,andmayaskforreconsideration
onanyofthegroundsstatedinsubsection(2).Ineithercase,hemustgivereasonsinwritingtothe
selectioncommissionforhisdecision.Butforpresentpurposes,theimportantpointisthatasingle
memberoftheCabinet(i.e.,theexecutive)canrejecttherecommendation.IsthatwhatthePetitioners
desireforPakistan?
(159)Insofarastheappointmentofotherseniorjudges,includingtheLordChiefJustice,theMaster
oftheRolls,thePresidentsoftheQueensBenchandFamilyDivisions,ChancelloroftheHighCourtand
theLordJusticesofAppealisconcerned,apersonhastoberecommendedforthevacantpostbya
selectionpaneloftheJAC.Ineachcase,theselectionpanelistocompriseoffourmembers,ofwhom
twoareseniorjudgesexofficio.However,theothertwomembersofeachselectionpanelarethe
chairpersonoftheJAC(who,asnotedabove,isalaymember)orhisnomineeandanotherlaymember
oftheJAC.Thus,ordinarymembersofthepublichaveanequalsayintheappointmentofthesenior
mostjudgesinEnglandandWales.AsinthecaseoftheUKSupremeCourtappointments,thereisa
consultativeprocessandtheLordChancellormayrejecttherecommendationorasktheselectionpanel
toreconsideritsdecision.AswiththeUKSupremeCourtappointments,theLordChancellormayreject
therecommendationifheisoftheopinionthatthepersonselectedisnotsuitedforthepost,andmay
askforreconsiderationonanyofthegroundsstatedinrelevantprovisionoftheUKAct.
(160)Itshouldalsobenotedthatateachlevel,andtoeachrecommendingauthority,theLord
Chancellormayissueguidance,whichmustbetakenintoaccountbytherecommendingauthority
whileconsideringmatterofappointments.However,theUKActprovidesthatsuchguidancemustbe
placedindraftformbeforeeachHouseofParliament,anditisonlyifbothHousesapprovethedraftby
resolutionsthatthesamecanbeissuedbytheLordChancellor.Thereisthusanexplicitanddirect
involvementofthelegislatureinthedecisionmakingprocess(quiteapartfromitsindirectinvolvement
throughtheofficeoftheLordChancellor).
(161)Astheforegoingsummaryanalysisshows,anyonerecommendingtheUKpracticeaspreferable
isclearlymistakeninhisviewsabouttheUKAct.Notmerelyistheexecutivedirectlyanddeeply
involvedatallstagesoftheappointmentprocess,butsoarelawyersandordinarymembersofthe
public.Ineachcase,thelaymembers,withorwithoutnonjudicialmembers,areeitherinthemajority
orhaveequalrepresentation.NothingcouldbefurtherfromtheprocessenvisagedunderArticle175A
orindeed,eventheprocedurethatwaspreviouslyinplace.Iftheindependenceofthejudiciarywere
reallyandtrulyputunderthreatasaresultofArticle175A,then(onthebasisofthereasoningadopted
bylearnedcounsel)itwouldstandfatallyerodedundertheUKAct.Butofcourse,anysuchconclusion
wouldbeplainlywrong.Judicialindependenceisnotmerelymadestrongtherebutambiguouslyand
incontrovertibilityso.
(162)AninterestingquestionthatarisesinthecontextoftheUKActisastotheroleoftheBritish
PrimeMinisterintheentireprocess.PriortotheUKAct,thepowertoselectandappointjudgesrested
solelyanddirectlyinthehandsofMinisters,andinthecaseoftheseniormostjudiciary,thispower
historicallylaywiththePrimeMinister.Indeed,thepowersofpatronagethatthePrimeMinister
enjoyedinthisregardusedtoberegardedasahallmarkofthatoffice.Overtime,theexerciseof
appointingjudgesbecamemoreandmoreapolitical,butthedecisionmakingpowerlayalwaysinthe
handsoftheexecutivebranch(and,sinceBritainisaparliamentarydemocracy,ultimatelywith
Parliament).WhatisthepositionnowundertheUKAct?Itwouldseemthatinrespectofthealljudicial
appointments,otherthantheUKSupremeCourt,theroleofthePrimeMinisterhasbeeneliminated
altogether.TheappointmentsaremadeonrecommendationsmadetotheLordChancellorandaresent
totheQueenforformalappointment.InthecaseoftheUKSupremeCourt,thePrimeMinisterdoes
findmentionintheUKAct,ins.26,subsection(2)ofwhichstatesthataSupremeCourtjudgeisonlyto
beappointedontherecommendation(totheQueen)ofthePrimeMinister.Subsection(3)immediately
clarifiesthatthePrimeMinistermayonlyrecommendapersonnominatedtohimasaresultofthe
selectionprocess(describedabove)andmaynotrecommendanyotherperson.Inotherwords,therole
oftheBritishPrimeMinisterhasbeeneithereliminatedtotallyorhasbeenreducedsharply.Butcould
oneconcludefromthatthatparliamentarydemocracyintheUnitedKingdomisunderthreatoris
endangeredorweakened?Anysuchsuggestioninthatcountrywouldberegarded,quiterightly,as
untenable.
(163)Inthecontextofjudicialindependence,itispertinenttonotethatthisCourthasshownsuch
sensitivityontheissuethateventheRegistrarhasbeendirectednottoappearbeforethepublic
accountscommitteeofParliament.Thatcommitteeofcoursescrutinizesthebudgetsandexpenditures
ofalldepartmentsoftheGovernment.TheattitudetakenbythisCourtisinsharpcontrasttothe
positionintheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,whereseniorJudgesregularlyappearandtestify
beforeCongressionalandParliamentarycommittees,includinginrespectofbudgetarymatters.Asis
wellknown,thetestimonygivenbeforesuchcommitteesisonoath.Thus,e.g.,on23.03.2015,Justices
KennedyandBreyeroftheUSSupremeCourtappearedbeforetheHouseAppropriationsCommitteeas
witnessesinrespectoftheCourtsbudgetforFiscal2016.Theirtestimonywasbroadcastliveandis
availableat:http://www.cspan.org/video/?3249701/supremecourtbudgetfiscalyear2016.Likewise,
on22.01.2015,theLordChiefJusticeofEngland,LordThomas,appearedbeforetheJusticeCommittee
inrespectofhisannualreportfor2014.ThetestimonywasbroadcastonParliamentTVandis
availableat:http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committeesaz/commonsselect/justice
committee/news/lordchiefjusticereport2014evidence/.Tellingly,thehearingisdescribedonthe
webpageastheJusticeCommitteetakingevidencefromtheLordChiefJustice.Noonehasofcourse
eversuggestedthatthejudicialindependenceoftheUnitedStatesandEnglishjudiciaryhasbeen
compromisedbysuchappearances.Inmyrespectfulview,wearefarremovedfromanydangeror
threattojudicialindependenceonaccountofArticle175A.Theapprehensionsexpressedbythe
petitionersareentirelymisplacedandmisconceived.
(164)HavingdealtwiththeobjectionstoArticle175A,Inowturntoconsidertheobjectionstothe
substitutedArticle63A,whichprovidesasfollows:
63A.Disqualificationongroundsofdefection,etc.(l)IfamemberofaParliamentaryPartycomposed
ofasinglepoliticalpartyinaHouse
resignsfrommembershipofhispoliticalpartyorjoinsanotherParliamentaryParty;or
votesorabstainsfromvotingintheHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbytheParliamentaryPartyto
whichhebelongs,inrelationto
electionofthePrimeMinisterortheChiefMinister;or
avoteofconfidenceoravoteofnoconfidence;or
aMoneyBilloraConstitution(Amendment)Bill;
Providedthatbeforemakingthedeclaration,thePartyHeadshallprovidesuchmemberwithan
opportunitytoshowcauseastowhysuchdeclarationmaynotbemadeagainsthim.
Explanation.PartyHeadmeansanyperson,bywhatevernamecalled,declaredassuchbytheParty.
(2)AmemberofaHouseshallbedeemedtobeamemberofaParliamentaryPartyifhe,havingbeen
electedasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalpartywhichconstitutestheParliamentaryPartyinthe
Houseor,havingbeenelectedotherwisethanasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalparty,has
becomeamemberofsuchParliamentaryPartyaftersuchelectionbymeansofadeclarationinwriting.
(3)Uponreceiptofthedeclarationunderclause(1),thePresidingOfficeroftheHouseshallwithintwo
daysrefer,andincasehefailstodosoitshallbedeemedthathehasreferred,thedeclarationtothe
ChiefElectionCommissionerwhoshalllaythedeclarationbeforetheElectionCommissionforits
(4)WheretheElectionCommissionconfirmsthedeclaration,thememberreferredtoinclause(1)shall
ceasetobeamemberoftheHouseandhisseatshallbecomevacant.
(5)AnypartyaggrievedbythedecisionoftheElectionCommissionmay,withinthirtydays,preferan
appealtotheSupremeCourtwhichshalldecidethematterwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthefiling
oftheappeal.
HousemeanstheNationalAssemblyortheSenate,inrelationtotheFederation;andaProvincial
AssemblyinrelationtotheProvince,asthecasemaybe;
PresidingOfficermeanstheSpeakeroftheNationalAssembly,theChairmanoftheSenateorthe
SpeakeroftheProvincialAssembly,asthecasemaybe.
(Clause(8)hasnotbeenreproducedasbeingnowonlyofhistoricalinterest.)
(165)WhatArticle63Aclearlytriestodo(i.e.,themischiefthatitseekstoaddress)istheperennial
problemofhorsetradingandfloorcrossingthathasplaguedpoliticsinourcountryfordecades.It
providesthatifanyoneoffivespecifiedsituationsarisesinrelationtoanymemberofaparliamentary
party,hemaybedeclaredbythepartyheadtohavedefectedinwhichcase,andthedeclarationisto
bereferredtotheChiefElectionCommissioner.Beforemakingsuchadeclaration,thepartyhead
mustgiveanopportunityofhearingtothememberconcerned.TheChiefElectionCommissioneristhen
tolaythedeclarationbeforetheElectionCommission,anditisonlyiftheElectionCommissionconfirms
thedeclarationthatthemembershallceasetobeaparliamentarianandhisseatshallstandvacated.
TheaggrievedpartyhastherighttoappealtotheSupremeCourt.
(166)ItisimportanttorememberthatArticle63Ahasacertainlegislativehistory.Itwasfirst
introducedintotheConstitutionbythe14thAmendmentin1997.Asoriginallyinserted,amemberofa
politicalpartywasdeemedtohavedefectedfromhispartyifhe(a)committedabreachofparty
discipline(whichmeantaviolationofthepartyconstitution,codeofconductanddeclaredpolicies),or
(b)votedcontrarytoanydirectionissuedbytheparliamentarypartytowhichhebelonged,or(c)
abstainedfromvotingintheHouseagainstpartypolicyinrelationtoanybill.Asisobvious,these
provisionsweremuchmoredraconianthanthosefoundinArticle63Aafterthe18thAmendment.The
provisionswerealsomuchvaguer,makingitallthemoreeasierforaparliamentariantobedeclareda
defector.Inbrief,undertheearlierversion,theheadofapoliticalpartyhadfarmorepowersthanunder
thepresentversion.Furthermore,theoriginalArticle63Ahadanousterprovision(inclause(6))
wherebydefectionmattersweresoughttobeplacedbeyondthejurisdictionofallcourts,includingthis
CourtandtheHighCourts.
(167)Article63AwassubstitutedbyGen.MusharrafbymeansoftheLegalFrameworkOrder2002
andthissubstitution(thefirstsubstitution)wasvalidatedbythe17thAmendment.Whenthefirst
substitutioniscomparedwiththeArticleasitnowstands,itappearsthat(apartfromafewminor
changes)thereisonlyoneapparentlysignificantdifference;otherthanthat,thetwoappeartobe
identical.Thisdifferenceisthatwhilepreviouslythepowertoinitiateproceedingslaywiththeheadof
theconcernedparliamentaryparty,thatpowernowlieswiththepartyhead,whoisdefinedtobe
anyperson,bywhatevernamecalled,declaredassuchbytheParty.Itisimportanttonotethat
Article63A,asfirstintroducedbymeansofthe14thAmendmentin1997,wasunanimouslypassedby
Parliament.UndertheoriginalversionasenactedbyParliamentthepowerofremovalvestednotwith
theheadoftheparliamentaryparty(whichwasaninnovationintroducedbyGenMusharraf)butwith
theheadofthepoliticalparty.Itisthisoriginalversionwhichhasnowbeenunanimouslyreintroduced
byParliament.Thus,ontwoseparateoccasionsParliamenthasunanimouslyresolvedthatthepower
shouldrestwiththeheadofthepoliticalpartyandnotwiththeheadoftheparliamentaryparty.Itis
obviousthattheheadofthepoliticalpartyistheoverallhead,whiletheheadoftheparliamentary
party,insofarasthegroundrealitiesareconcerned,isthepersonnominatedassuchbytheoverall
headsandthenformallyconfirmedbyavoteofparliamentarians.However,beforeproceedingto
examinethisdifference,therearecertainothermatterswhichmustbeconsidered.
(168)Thefirstpointisthat,asnotedabove,apetitionunderArticle184(3)ismaintainableonlyifany
fundamentalrightshavebeeninfringed.Themannerinwhichthishasallegedlyhappenedasaresultof
theinsertionofArticle175Ahasalreadybeenexplainedabove.InrelationtothesubstitutionofArticle
63Ahowever,noargumentshavebeenadvancedbylearnedcounselforthePetitionersinthisregard.
ItisnotatallapparentwhetheranyfundamentalrightsareinfringedbythesubstitutedArticle63A.
ThisisofcourseajurisdictionalpointandgoestotherootoftheCourtspowertoconsiderthe
objectionstoArticle63Ainthepresentproceedings.Itistobekeptinmindthat,asnotedabove,
Article63Aasitstandstodayandthefirstsubstitutionarevirtuallyidentical,andthelatterwas
validatedbymeansofthe17thAmendment.ThisCourthasalreadydismissedachallengetothe17th
AmendmentinthePakistanLawyersForumcase.Therefore,sincetheredoesnotappeartobeany
infringementofanyfundamentalrights,thejurisdictionofthisCourtcannotbeinvokedinthepresent
proceedings.
(169)Evenifthefirstpointisoverlooked,thereisasecondpointinvolved.Ithasnotreallybeen
explainedwhichbasicfeatureoftheConstitutionhasbeentamperedwithorviolatedbythe
substitutionofArticle63A.Presumably,thebasicfeatureinvolvedisparliamentarydemocracy.The
questionthereforeiswhether,andifsohow,andtowhatextent,isparliamentarydemocracyweakened
bythisprovision.Article63Aessentiallyplacesacurbondefections.NowtheIndianConstitutionalso
hasanantidefectionclauseintheshapeofthe10thScheduletothatConstitution,whichwas
insertedbythe52ndAmendment.Paragraph2ofthe10thScheduleprovidesfordisqualificationand,
insofarasispresentlyrelevant,isinthefollowingterms:
2.Disqualificationongroundofdefection(1)Subjecttotheprovisionsofparagraphs3,4and5,a
memberofaHousebelongingtoanypoliticalpartyshallbedisqualifiedforbeingamemberofthe
House
ifhehasvoluntarilygivenuphismembershipofsuchpoliticalparty;or
ifhevotesorabstainsfromvotinginsuchHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbythepoliticalpartyto
whichhebelongsorbyanypersonorauthorityauthorisedbyitinthisbehalf,withoutobtaining,in
eithercase,thepriorpermissionofsuchpoliticalparty,personorauthorityandsuchvotingor
abstentionhasnotbeencondonedbysuchpoliticalparty,personorauthoritywithinfifteendaysfrom
thedateofsuchvotingorabstention.
(170)Asisclear,theprovisionsofparagraph2aremuchmoredraconianthanthoseofArticle63A,
andarequitesimilarinmanyrespectstoArticle63Ainitsoriginalform.The10thSchedulealsohadan
ousterofjurisdictionclauseinparagraph7.Theconstitutionalityofthe10thSchedulewaschallenged
beforetheIndianSupremeCourtontheground,interalia,ofbeingviolativeofthebasicfeatures
doctrine.TheIndianSupremeCourt,bymeansofamajoritydecisioninKihotaHollohonvsZachilhuand
others(1992)Supp(2)SCC651rejectedthechallengeandupheldtheconstitutionalityofthe10th
Schedule(otherthantheousterclauseinparagraph7,whichwasdeclaredinvalidoncertaintechnical
grounds).TheSupremeCourtcategoricallyheldasfollows(emphasissupplied):
ThecontentionthattheprovisionsoftheTenthSchedule,evenwiththeexclusionofParagraph7,
violatethebasicstructureoftheConstitutioninthattheyaffectthedemocraticrightsofelected
membersand,therefore,oftheprinciplesofParliamentarydemocracyisunsoundandisrejected.
ThatParagraph2oftheTenthScheduletotheConstitutionisvalid.Itsprovisionsdonotsufferfromthe
viceofsubvertingdemocraticrightsofelectedMembersofParliamentandtheLegislaturesofthe
States.Itdoesnotviolatetheirfreedomofspeech,freedomofvoteandconscienceascontendedThe
provisionsaresalutoryandareintendedtostrengthenthefabricofIndianParliamentarydemocracyby
curbingunprincipledandunethicalpoliticaldefections.
(171)ItisinterestingtonotethattheoriginalArticle63Awasalsochallengedonthegroundofbeing
violativeofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.ThischallengewasrejectedbythisCourtinthe
WukalaMahazcasePLD1998SC1263onthegroundthatthedoctrineofbasicstructurehadneverbeen
acceptedinPakistan.Inrelationtotheproblemscreatedbyfloorcrossing,thelearnedChiefJustice
observedinvividlanguagethatitwasonaccountofthecancerousviceoffloorcrossingthat
Parliamentwasunabletoachievestability.Iconcurwiththisview,thatsomethingwhichisso
destructiveinnatureshouldberigidlybanned.Iamalsorespectfullyoftheviewthatifananti
defectionclauseisregardedasconstitutionallyvalidinthebirthplaceofthebasicfeaturesdoctrine,
especiallywhenitsprovisionsaremuchstrongeranddraconianthanthoseArticle63A,thenany
objectiontothelatterprovisionis,tosaytheleast,problematic.
(172)ThetwospecificobjectionstakentoArticle63Aaspresentlyinsertedwereasfollows.Thefirst
objectionwasthatitwascontendedthatthepowertomakeadeclarationofdefectionnowlaywiththe
partyheadwhomaynotevenbeamemberofParliament.Onapurelypersonalplane,Ihavesome
sympathywiththeviewthatitwouldhavebeenpreferableifthepowerhadvestedintheParliamentary
head,althoughinpracticethiswouldprobablyhavemadenodifference.However,onthejudicial
plane,thepositionisdifferent.EssentiallythisisadecisionforParliamenttomake,andifithas
unanimouslyresolvedontwooccasionsthatthepowershouldvestintheoverallheadoftheparty,I
thinkitwouldbeinappropriatetheCourttointerfere.Thus,inmyopinion,thisobjectionisnot
sustainable.Thereasonsaremanifold.Firstly,eventhepartyheadmustgiveashowcausenoticeto
theallegeddefector.Secondly,hisdecisionisnotfinalandbinding.Hisdeclarationissimplyreferredto
theElectionCommission(viatheChiefElectionCommissioner)anditisforthelatterdodecidewhether
adefectionhasoccurredornot.Thirdly,anappealliestotheSupremeCourt.Finally,thereisnoouster
ofjurisdictionclause,andthematteristhereforejusticiableateverystage.
(173)Thesecondobjectionis,ifImaysaysowithrespect,somewhatonthestrangeside.Itwas
contendedthatasaresultofArticle63A,eventhePrimeMinistercouldbedeclaredtobeadefectorby
thepartyhead(assumingthatthePrimeMinisterisnothimselfthepartyhead,whichheusuallyis
inaparliamentarydemocracy).Evenamomentsreflectionshowshowtrulystrangethisobjectionis.
ThefirstgroundforapplyingArticle63Aisofcourse,ifthememberdefectsfromhispartyorjoins
anotherparty.Obviously,aPrimeMinisterwhodidsowouldatonceceasetobeprimeminister.The
othergroundsareifthemembervotesorabstainsfromvotingintheHousecontrarytoanydirection
issuedbytheParliamentaryPartytowhichhebelongsinrespectof(a)anelectionofthePrimeMinister;
or(b)avoteofconfidenceoravoteofnoconfidence;or(c)aMoneyBilloraConstitution
(Amendment)Bill.IfailtoseewhyaPrimeMinisterwouldevervotecontrarytothedirectionsissuedby
theParliamentaryParty(whichhewouldhead,evenifheishimselfnotthepartyhead)sinceallof
thesemattersgodirectlytohispositionasprimeministerandwouldinevitablyresultinhislosingthat
position.Ofcourse,itisnottotallybeyondtherealmofpossibilitythataPrimeMinistermaywishto
commitpoliticalsuicide(inwhatwouldbearatherspectacularmanner)bydoinganyoftheacts
proscribedbyArticle63A,butthispossibilityissoremote(andfrankly,andwithrespect,sobizarre)that
itneednotbeseriouslycountenanced.
(174)IturntoArticle17,andtheremovaloftherequirementforintrapartyelections.Incidentally,
thechangesmadetoArticle17inrelationtointrapartyelectionshighlightoneoftheobjectionstothe
basicfeaturesdoctrinenotedabove.Ifafundamentalrightwasoriginallyinacertainform,anditwas
thenamendedinamannerthat(presumably)isdesirable,doesParliamentlosethepowertotakethe
fundamentalrightbacktoitsoriginalform?Forreasonsalreadystated,Ithinknot.Inanycase,thelaw
ofthelandprovides(and/orcanprovide)forintrapartyelections.Evenduringtheperiodthatthe
requirementwaspartofArticle17,itwasnotcompliedwithandwas,toallintentsandpurposes,a
deadletter.Theimportantpointthereforeistoensurethefulfillmentofthisobligationbyallpolitical
parties,whethertheobligationbefoundinordinarylaworconstitutionallawandthat,asisobvious,is
adifferentmatteraltogether.ThemerefactthatithasbeenremovedfromArticle17doesnot
thereforeinanymannermeanorwarrantthatthesaidArticlebenullified.
(175)OnefinalpointbeforeItakeuptheobjectionstakentothe21stAmendment.Asnotedabove,
thebasicstructuredoctrine,asithasdevelopedandevolved,ineffectmeansthattheConstitution
containsanunidentifiedandconstantlyshiftingsupraconstitutionwithinitself,whichrenderscertain
provisionsoftheConstitutionunamendable(andthoseprovisionsarethemselvesunknownand
unknowableuntiltheSupremeCourtidentifiesthemonacasebycasebasis).Ifatalltheintenthad
beentomakecertainprovisionsoftheConstitutionunamendable,itwouldhavebeenthesimplestthing
tosaysoexpresslyandthatiswhatistobefoundinnumerousconstitutionsinotherstatesincluding
Germany(whichisrelevantsincetheoriginatorofthebasicstructuretheorywasaGermanjurist).
Learnedcounselforthepetitionersdrewattentiontosuchconstitutions,butsurelythepointgoes
decisivelyagainsttheircase.ItwaspreciselybecausethepeopleofPakistandidnotwantthe
Constitutiontobeimmutableinanymannerortoanyextentthatnoprovisionthereofwasentrenched
inthemanneradoptedinotherconstitutions.InadditiontoGermany,constitutionsthatcontainexpress
provisionsrelatingtoentrenchmentofspecificprovisionsincludethoseofAlgeria(initsArticle178),
Brazil(Article60),Greece(Article110),Iran(Article177)andItaly(Article139).Thesearticlesexpressly
prohibitotherprovisionsfrombeingamended.TheGermanconstitutionprovidesasfollowsinclause(3)
oftheprovision(Article79)thatdealswiththeamendmentoftheBasicLaw(astheGerman
constitutioniscalled):
AmendmentstothisBasicLawaffectingthedivisionoftheFederationintoLnder,theirparticipation
onprincipleinthelegislativeprocess,ortheprincipleslaiddowninArticles1and20shallbe
inadmissible.
Articles2to19containthefundamentalrightsenshrinedintheGermanconstitution.Article1
guaranteesallsuchrightsinGermany,bindingeachofthethreeorgansoftheStatetoabideby,and
apply,them.Article20dealswiththefederalanddemocraticstructureoftheGermanstate.Given
Germanyshistory,andthehorrorsofitsNazipast,onefinds(ratherunusuallybutquiteunderstandably
inthehistoricalcontext)clause(4)ofArticle20providingasfollows:AllGermansshallhavetherightto
resistanypersonseekingtoabolishthisconstitutionalorder,ifnootherremedyisavailable.The
FrenchconstitutionprovidesinArticle89that[t]herepublicanformofgovernmentshallnotbethe
objectofanamendment.Article139oftheItalianconstitution,notedabove,inlikemannerprovides
thattherepublicanformofgovernmentcannotbeamended.Article177oftheIranianconstitutionhas
entrenchedtheIslamiccharacterofthepoliticalsystem,thereligiousfootingandobjectivesofthe
Republic,thedemocraticcharacterofthegovernment,theofficeofthewilayatal'mrtheImamate
ofUmmah,andtheofficialreligion,i.e.,IslamaccordingtotheJafariFiqh.InBangladesh,bythe15th
Amendment,anewArticle7BwasinsertedintheConstitutionin2011.Thisarticlehasentrencheda
numberofprovisionsbymakingthemunamendable.Byonecount,aroundonethirdofthe
constitutionalprovisionsarecoveredbyArticle7B.Otherconstitutions,suchasthoseofNorway,
Turkey,Switzerland,Australia,Portugal,Romania,Nepal,Morocco,Mauretania,Haiti,HongKong,
Cyprus,BosniaandAngolahavealsospecificallyentrenchedprovisions.Theseexamplescanofcourse
bemultiplied,butthebasicpointisobviousenough.Whenevertheamendingpoweristobecurtailed,
theconstitutionexpresslysayssoitself.IfthepeopleofPakistanwishedtoplacesimilarrestrictionson
thepowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitutiontheycouldeasilyhavedonedoso.Thematterhasto
bedecidedbythechosenorelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleandputinblackandwhitetoplaceit
beyondanydoubt.Itisnottobeleftinthehandsofthejudicialbranchandnorisittobean
amorphous,evershiftingdoctrinethatcanonlybediscoveredbythecourtsbyatortuousprocessof
reasoning.Itis,inotherwords,tobetheembodimentofthewillofthepeople.Ifthepeoplewantto
curtailthepowerthatvestsinthemtoexerciseconstituentpower,thenitisthepeoplewhomustsay
so,andnooneelse.Surelythatistheonlytrueandpropermannerinwhichtheexerciseofconstituent
powercanbecurtailed.Toplaceconstituentpowerinthehandsofanyotherbody,nomatterhowwell
intentioned,eruditeandsensitivetothepublicgoodthatbodymaybe,istobegintodeviatefromthe
pathoftheruleoflaw,andsuchdeviation,nomatterhowslightitmayinitiallybe,invariablytakesona
lifeofitsown,becomeswiderandwider,andsoonerratherthanlaterreachesthepointofnoreturn.
Thatistheharshandgrimlessonthathistoryteaches,anditwoulddowelltopayheedtothathard
teacher.Thecordofprivateopinion(ifonemaybeallowedtoechothefamouswordsofSirEdward
Coke)willintheendinvariablybecomecrooked,nomatterhowelevatedbethebodywhoseopinionis
givenprimacy,andthatisadangertowhichwemusteverbealertandvigilant.
(176)Inowturntothe21stAmendment,andthequestionoftheconstitutionalityofmilitarycourts
andtheamendmentsmadeintheMilitaryAct.IhaveperusedthejudgmentauthoredbymybrotherSh.
AzmatSaeed,J.anddonotfindmuchreasonstodisagreewiththeviewsexpressedtherein.HoweverI
wouldliketoemphasizecertainspecificaspectsofthematter.InparticularIwouldliketoexaminethe
statusofmilitarycourtsinotherwellentrencheddemocraciesforreasonspertainingtocomparative
constitutionallaw.Thelogicalpointofdepartureforsuchanenquiryobviouslyhastobeinrelationto
theUnitedStatesConstitutionwhich,afterall,istheoriginatoroftheconceptofjudicialindependence
andseparationofpowers.TheFederalistPapersisgenerallyrecognizedtobethesinglemostimportant
workinrelationtotheoriginandinterpretationoftheUnitedStatesconstitution.Thebookisa
collectionofarticleswrittenduringtheprocessleadinguptotheratificationoftheUnitedStates
Constitutionwhen,afteritsdraftingbythefoundingfathers,itwassenttotheStatesinaccordancewith
ArticleVII.Itisaseminalworkwhichhasprofoundlyinfluencedthedevelopmentandinterpretationof
constitutionallawintheUnitedStates.ThefollowingextractsfromFederalistNo.47(authoredby
Madison)areinterestingandeducative:
Nopoliticaltruthiscertainlyofgreaterintrinsicvalue,orisstampedwiththeauthorityofmore
enlightenedpatronsoflibertythanthatonwhichtheobjectionisfounded.Theaccumulationofall
powers,legislative,executive,andjudiciary,inthesamehands,whetherofone,afew,ormany,and
whetherhereditary,selfappointed,orelective,mayjustlybepronouncedtheverydefinitionof
tyranny.WerethefederalConstitution,therefore,reallychargeablewiththisaccumulationofpower,or
withamixtureofpowers,havingadangeroustendencytosuchanaccumulation,nofurtherarguments
wouldbenecessarytoinspireauniversalreprobationofthesystem.Ipersuademyself,however,thatit
willbemadeapparenttoeveryonethatthechargecannotbesupported,andthatthemaximonwhich
itrelieshasbeentotallymisconceivedandmisapplied.Inordertoformcorrectideasonthisimportant
subjectitwillbepropertoinvestigatethesenseinwhichthepreservationoflibertyrequiresthatthe
threegreatdepartmentsofpowershouldbeseparateanddistinct.
TheoraclewhoisalwaysconsultedandcitedonthissubjectisthecelebratedMontesquieu.Ifhebenot
theauthorofthisinvaluablepreceptinthescienceofpolitics,hehasthemeritatleastofdisplayingand
recommendingitmosteffectuallytotheattentionofmankind.Letusendeavour,inthefirstplace,to
ascertainhismeaningonthispoint.
OntheslightestviewoftheBritishConstitution,wemustperceivethatthelegislative,executiveand
judiciarydepartmentsarebynomeanstotallyseparateanddistinctfromeachother.Theexecutive
magistrateformsanintegralpartofthelegislativeauthority.Healonehastheprerogativeofmaking
treatieswithforeignsovereignswhich,whenmade,have,undercertainlimitations,theforceof
legislativeacts.Allthemembersofthejudiciarydepartmentareappointedbyhim,canberemovedby
himontheaddressofthetwoHousesofParliament,andform,whenhepleasestoconsultthem,oneof
hisconstitutionalcouncils.Onebranchofthelegislativedepartmentformsalsoagreatconstitutional
counciltotheexecutivechief,as,onanotherhand,itisthesoledepositaryofjudicialpowerincasesof
impeachment,andisinvestedwiththesupremeappellatejurisdictioninallothercases.Thejudges,
again,aresofarconnectedwiththelegislativedepartmentasoftentoattendandparticipateinits
deliberations,thoughnotadmittedtoalegislativevote.Fromthesefacts,bywhichMontesquieuwas
guided,itmayclearlybeinferredthatinsayingTherecanbenolibertywherethelegislativeand
executivepowersareunitedinthesameperson,orbodyofmagistrates,or,ifthepowerofjudgingbe
notseparatedfromthelegislativeandexecutivepowers,hedidnotmeanthatthesedepartments
oughttohavenopartialagencyin,ornocontrolover,theactsofeachother.Hismeaning,ashisown
wordsimport,andstillmoreconclusivelyasillustratedbytheexampleinhiseye,canamounttono
morethanthis,thatwherethewholepowerofonedepartmentisexercisedbythesamehandswhich
possessthewholepowerofanotherdepartment,thefundamentalprinciplesofafreeconstitutionare
subverted.Thiswouldhavebeenthecaseintheconstitutionexaminedbyhim,iftheking,whoisthe
soleexecutivemagistrate,hadpossessedalsothecompletelegislativepower,orthesupreme
administrationofjustice;oriftheentirelegislativebodyhadpossessedthesupremejudiciary,orthe
supremeexecutiveauthority.
This,however,isnotamongthevicesofthatconstitution.Themagistrateinwhomthewholeexecutive
powerresidescannotofhimselfmakealaw,thoughhecanputanegativeoneverylaw;noradminister
justiceinperson,thoughhehastheappointmentofthosewhodoadministerit.Thejudgescanexercise
noexecutiveprerogative,thoughtheyareshootsfromtheexecutivestock;noranylegislativefunction,
thoughtheymaybeadvisedbythelegislativecouncils.Theentirelegislaturecanperformnojudiciary
act,thoughbythejointactoftwoofitsbranchesthejudgesmayberemovedfromtheiroffices,and
thoughoneofitsbranchesispossessedofthejudicialpowerinthelastresort.Theentirelegislature,
again,canexercisenoexecutiveprerogative,thoughoneofitsbranchesconstitutesthesupreme
executivemagistracy,andanother,ontheimpeachmentofathird,cantryandcondemnallthe
subordinateofficesintheexecutivedepartment.ThereasonsonwhichMontesquieugroundshismaxim
areafurtherdemonstrationofhismeaning.Whenthelegislativeandexecutivepowersareunitedin
thesamepersonorbody,sayshe,therecanbenoliberty,becauseapprehensionsmayariselestthe
samemonarchorsenateshouldenacttyrannicallawstoexecutetheminatyrannicalmanner.Again:
Werethepowerofjudgingjoinedwiththelegislative,thelifeandlibertyofthesubjectwouldbe
exposedtoarbitrarycontrol,forthejudgewouldthenbethelegislator.Wereitjoinedtotheexecutive
power,thejudgemightbehavewithalltheviolenceofanoppressor.Someofthesereasonsaremore
fullyexplainedinotherpassages;butbrieflystatedastheyareheretheysufficientlyestablishthe
meaningwhichwehaveputonthiscelebratedmaximofthiscelebratedauthor.[Emphasissupplied]
(177)Theessentialpointcannowbeformulatedwithclarity.Theexerciseofbothjudicialand
legislativepowerbythesamepersonsistobereprobatedandcondemned.Butthebasicstructure
doctrinerequiresjudgestoexercisenotmerelylegislativepowerbutconstituentpower,whichisthe
highestformoflegislativepower,bydecidingwhatshould,andwhatshouldnotremainpartofthe
constitution.Aunanimouslypassedconstitutionalamendment,asisthecasewiththe21st
Amendment,maybedeclaredinvalidunderthebasicstructuredoctrine.Howcanthisberight?How
canthisbeconsistentwiththeprinciplesofdemocracy?
(178)IhaveearlierreferredtothefactthatundertheUnitedStatesConstitutionthetotalityof
legislativepowerhasbeenconferredonCongressunderArticleI.Similarlyexecutivepowershavebeen
conferredonthePresidentunderArticleII,andArticleIIIconfersthetotalityofthejudicialpowerofthe
UnitedStatesontheSupremeCourtandothercourtsestablishedbylaw.Thequestionarises,what
thenistobethestatusofmilitarycourtsintheUnitedStates?Thosesafeguardswhichareavailablefor
andinrelationtotheSupremeCourtandothercourtsestablishedbylawquiteclearlyandadmittedly
arenotpresentinmilitarycourtsormilitarytribunalsormilitarycommissions,howsoevercalledorset
up.HowthencantheybeconsideredtobevalidundertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates?This
questionhasarisenonnumerousoccasionsandthereisnoshortageofmaterialintheUnitedStates
whichseekstoaddressit.BywayofillustrationImayrefertothefollowingpassagefromawell
establishedtreatise,AmericanConstitutionalLawbyProf.LaurenceTribe(pg.58):
TheSupremeCourtsdecisionsconcerningtherelationshipbetweenarticleIIIcourtsandthemilitary
justicesystemillustratetherightsbasedapproachsanctionedinCrowellandperpetuatedin
Marathon.ArticleI(8)authorizesCongresstomakeRulesfortheGovernmentandRegulationofthe
landandnavalForces.AstheSupremeCourtlongagorecognizedinDynesv.Hoover,this
constitutionalgrantofauthorityempowersCongresstoprovideforthetrialandpunishmentofmilitary
andnavalofficersinthemannerthenandnowpracticedbycivilizednations;thepowertodosois
givenwithoutanyconnectionbetweenitandthe3rdarticleoftheConstitutiondefiningthejudicial
poweroftheUnitedStates.Congresshasexercisedthispowertoestablishasystemofmilitaryjustice
whichinmanywaysexistsseparateandapartfromthelawwhichgovernsinourfederaljudicial
establishment.Becauseitistheprimarybusinessofarmiesandnaviestofightorbereadytofight
warsshouldtheoccasionarise,inevitablythemilitaryhasbecomeaspecializedsocietyseparatefrom
civiliansociety.AstheSupremeCourtnotedinParkerv.Levy,theCodeofMilitaryJusticecannotbe
equatedtoaciviliancriminalcode.Whileaciviliancriminalcodechargesoutarelativelysmallsegment
ofpotentialconductanddeclaresitcriminal,theUniformCodeofMilitaryJusticeessaysmorevaried
regulationofamuchlargerargumentoftheactivitiesofthemoretightlyknitmilitarycommunity.
Thedistinctcharacterofmilitaryjusticeisreflectednotonlysubstantivelybutprocedurally.TheFifth
Amendmentexemptscasesarisinginthelandornavalforces,orintheMilitia,wheninactualservicein
timeofWarorpublicdangerfromitsrequirementofgrandjuryindictmentasaconditionprecedentto
federalcriminalprosecution.TheSupremeCourtstatedinExparteMiliganthattheframersofthe
Constitution,doubtless,meanttolimittherightoftrialbyjury,intheSixthAmendment,tothose
personswhoweresubjecttoindictmentorpresentmentinthefifth.Moregenerally,theCourt
suggestedinExparteQuirinthatcasesarisinginthelandornavalforcesaredeemedacceptedby
implicationfromthesixthamendment.TheCourthasnotinrecentyearsconfirmedtheMiliganand
Quirindicta,butithasheld,inMiddendorfv.Henry,thatthereisnosixthamendmentrighttocounsel
insummarycourtmartialproceedingsnotwithstandingthefactthat,underArgersingerv.Hamlin,sucha
rightwouldexistinacivilianmisdemeanortrialifthattrial,likeasummarycourtmartialproceeding,
wouldresultinadefendantsimprisonment.TheFifthAmendmentdueprocessclausedoesapplyinthe
militarycontext.ButastheMiddendorfCourtdemonstrated,theprocedurallimitationsimposedbydue
processareflexible,andthussubjecttorelaxationwhencourtsfindtheneedforproceduralprotections
outweighedbytheexigenciesofmilitarylife.AlthoughtheSupremeCourthasnotyetdecidedwhat
proceduralrightsdueprocessrequiresinthemilitarycontext,theCourtscurrentinterestbalancing
approachmayyieldaconstitutionalrequirementwhichwouldtoleratethetraditionallyroughformof
justicewhichhascharacterizedmilitaryjustice,emphasizingsummaryprocedures,speedyconvictions
andsternpenaltieswithaviewtomaintainingobedienceandfightingfitnessintheranks.[Emphasis
supplied]
(179)ItwillbeseenthatwhattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasdonehasbeentofinda
pragmaticanswertotheproblem.Theconceptofindependenceofthejudiciaryrequiredstringent
safeguardsinrelationtothesecurityoftenureaswellastheotherproceduralsafeguardsprovidedin
termsoftheAmericanConstitution.These,however,forfairlyobviousreasons,arenotreallyfeasiblein
relationtothefunctioningofmilitarycourts.Theanswertothedilemmawasthereforefoundbythe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourtbydrawingadistinctionbetweenthejudicialpowerwhichwasconferred
ontheSupremeCourtunderArticleIIIoftheConstitutionontheonehand,andthepowerofCongress
underArticleIsection8,whichsetsout,orenumeratesthelegislativepowersofthelatter.Aspresently
relevant,section8providesasfollows:
TheCongressshallhavepowerto
Todeclarewar,grantlettersofmarqueandreprisal,andmakerulesconcerningcapturesonlandand
water;
Toraiseandsupportarmies,butnoappropriationofmoneytothatuseshallbeforalongertermthan
twoyears;
Toprovideandmaintainanavy;
Tomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthelandandnavalforces;
(180)ThesamedilemmaaroseinAustraliawherealsothereisastrictdemarcationindistributionof
powersimilartothatintheUnitedStatesConstitution.InthecaseofKingv.Bevanandothers(1942)66
CLR452(whichalsorelatedtothequestionofmilitarycourts),thefollowingpassageisillustrativeofthe
principleinvolved(p.466):
NowthiscaseinvolvestheinterpretationoftheConstitution,becausethepositionofcourtsmartialin
relationtothejudicialpoweroftheCommonwealthcomesinquestion.ThisCourthasheldthatthe
judicialpoweroftheCommonwealthcanonlybevestedincourtsandthatifanysuchcourtbecreated
byParliamentthetenureofofficeofthejusticesofsuchcourt,bywhatevernametheymaybecalled,
mustbeforlife,subjecttothepowerofremovalcontainedinsec.72oftheConstitution.(Waterside
WorkersFederationofAustraliavs.J.W.AlexanderLtd.(3);BritishImperialOilCo.Ltd.v.Federal
CommissionerofTaxation(4);ShellC.ofAustraliaLtd.v.FederalCommissionerofTaxation(5).Judicial
powerforthispurposemaybedescribedasthepowerwhicheverysovereignauthoritymustof
necessityhavetodecidecontroversiesbetweenitssubjects,orbetweenitselfanditssubjects,whether
therightsrelatetolife,libertyorproperty.Theexerciseofthispowerdoesnotbeginuntilsome
tribunalwhichhaspowertogiveabindingandauthoritativedecision(whethersubjecttoappealornot)
iscalledupontotakeaction.(Huddart,Parker&Co.Pty.Ltd.v.Moorehead(6);ShellCo.ofAustralia
Ltd.v.FederalCommissionerofTaxation(7).Navalcourtsmartialaresetup(NavalDefenceAct1910
1934oftheCommonwealth,whichincorporatestheDefenceNavalct19031941oftheCommonwealth,
(Seesecs.5,36),andImperialNavalDisciplineAct1866,secs.87,45andPartIV)andtheyexercisethe
judicialpoweroftheCommonwealth?Ifsotheproceedingsofsuchcourtsareunwarrantedinpointof
law.ThequestiondependsupontheinterpretationoftheConstitutionandwhethersuchcourtsstand
outsidethejudicialsystemestablishedundertheConstitution.TheParliamenthaspower,subjectto
theConstitution,tomakelawsforthepeace,order,andgoodgovernmentoftheCommonwealthwith
respecttothenavalandmilitarydefenceoftheCommonwealthandoftheseveralStatesandthe
controloftheforcestoexecuteandmaintainthelawsoftheCommonwealth.Andbysec.68ofthe
ConstitutionthecommandinchiefofthenavalandmilitaryforcesoftheCommonwealthisvestedin
theGovernorGeneralastheKingsrepresentative.
UndertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmericathejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates
isvestedintheSupremeCourtandinsuchinferiorcourtsasCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainand
establish:Cf.theAustralianConstitution,sec.71.Andthejudgesholdofficeduringgoodbehavior
(art.III.,sec.I).PowerisconferreduponCongresstoprovideandmaintainanavyandtomakerulesfor
thegovernmentandregulationofthelandandnavalforces(art.I.,sec.8,clauses13,14).ThePresident
isCommanderinChiefofthearmyandnavyoftheUnitedStates(art.II.,sec.2,clause1).AndtheFifth
Amendmentprovidesthatnopersonshallbeheldtoanswerforcapitalorotherinfamouscrimeunless
onapresentmentorindictmentofagrandjuryexceptincasesarisinginthelandornavalforces,
whereastheAustralianConstitution(sec.80)providesthatthetrialonindictmentofanyoffenceagainst
anylawoftheCommonwealthshallbebyjurybutthereisnoexceptionincasesarisinginthelandor
navalforcesasintheAmericanConstitution.ButtheframeofthetwoConstitutionsandtheir
provisions,thoughnotidentical,arenotunlike.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshasresolved
thatcourtsmartialestablishedunderthelawsoftheUnitedStatesformnopartofthejudicialsystemof
theUnitedStatesandthattheirproceedingswithinthelimitsoftheirjurisdictioncannotbecontrolled
orrevisedbycivilcourts.ThusinDynesv.Hoover(1)Mr.JusticeWayne,deliveringtheopinionofthe
Court,said:Theseprovisions(thatis,theprovisionsalreadymentioned)showthatCongresshasthe
powertoprovideforthetrialandpunishmentofmilitarycourtandnavaloffencesinthemannerthen
andnowpracticedbycivilizednations;andthatthepowertodosoisgivenwithoutanyconnection
betweenitandthe3rdarticleoftheConstitutiondefiningthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates;
indeed,thatthetwopowersareentirelyindependentofeachother:SeealsoKurtzv.Moffitt(2);
WilloughbyonTheConstitution,2nded.(1929),vol.3,p.1542,par.1011;WillisonConstitutionalLaw,
pp.447etseq.
Inmyopinionthesameconstructionshouldbegiventotheconstitutionalpowercontainedin
sec.51(vi)oftheAustralianConstitution.Thescopeofthedefencepowerisextensive,asissuggested
bythedecisionsofthisCourt(Josephv.ColonialTreasurer(N.S.W.)(3);Faryv.Burvett(4),andthough
thepowercontainedinsection.51(vi)issubjecttotheConstitutions,tillthewordsnavalandmilitary
defenceoftheCommonwealthandthecontroloftheforcestoexecuteandmaintainthelawsofthe
Commonwealth,coupledwithsec.69andtheincidentalpower(sec.51(xxxix.),indicatelegislative
provisionsspecialandpeculiartothoseforcesinthewayofdisciplineandotherwiseandindeedthe
Courtshouldinclinetowardsaconstructionthatisnecessary,notonlyfromapractical,butalsofroman
administrativepointofview.
(181)ItisvitallyimportanttonotethatbothintheUnitedStatesaswellasAustraliatheabove
interpretationsweregivendespitethefactthattherewasnospecificprovisionintheconstitutionsof
thosecountrieswhichdealtwiththequestionofmilitarycourts.Theinterpretationwhichwasplacedin
bothcountrieswasthatwhichwasdrawnonthebasisofthestructureoftakingarealisticand
pragmaticviewsoastoenablethesecurityandsanctityofthestatetobemaintainedandkeptalive.It
should,ofcourse,benotedthatthediscussioninrelationtomilitarycourtsinboththosecountrieswas
notlimitedorconfinedonlytotimesofwar,orcrisis,buteveninrelationtothefunctioningofmilitary
courtsinpeacetime.Asagainsttheabove,thepositioninPakistanisvastlydifferent.Ifreferenceis
madetoArticle199oftheConstitutionitwillbeseenthatrightfromitsinceptionthejurisdictionofthe
HighCourtwasrestrictedinrelationtopersonswhoaremembersofthearmedforcesorsubjecttoany
lawrelatingtothoseforcesinrespectoftheirtermsandconditionsofserviceorinrespectofany
matterarisingoutoftheirservice,orinrespectofanyactiontakeninrelationtothemasmembersof
thearmedforcesoraspersonssubjecttosuchlaw.Subsequenttothatofcoursehasfollowedthe21st
Amendmentwhichhasexplicitlyaddressedtheproblemwithwhichthecountryisconfrontedat
present.Article175,asamendedbythe21stAmendment,isreproducedbelow:
175EstablishmentandJurisdictionofCourts.
(1)ThereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,aHighCourtforeachProvinceandaHighCourtfor
theIslamabadCapitalTerritoryandsuchothercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.
Explanation.Unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,thewords"HighCourt"whereveroccurringinthe
Constitutionshallinclude"IslamabadHighCourt.
(2)NocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionor
byorunderanylaw.
(3)TheJudiciaryshallbeseparatedprogressivelyfromtheExecutivewithinfourteenyearsfromthe
commencingday.
ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisArticleshallhavenoapplicationtothetrialofpersonsunderanyof
theActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofsubpartIIIorPartIoftheFirstSchedule,whoclaims,or
isknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligionorasect.
(182)Theessentialpointstonoteabouttheimpactofthe21stAmendmentinrelationtothe
jurisdictionofcourtsare,firstly,thattheamendmentinquestionhasbeenexpresslylimitedtoremainin
forcefortheperiodoftwoyearsonlyinthehopeandexpectationthatbythattimetheexistential
threatwhichwasbeingfacedbythecountrywouldhavebeenresolved.Thusthisisexplicitlya
temporaryprovisionintendedtomeetaspecificcrisis.Itisnotintendedtoremainapartofthe
permanentstructureoftheconstitution.Thisisavastlyimportantcircumstancewhichjustifiesthe
restrictionplacedthereininrelationtothefunctioningofthenormalcourts.Thesecondaspectofthe
amendment,whichneedstobetakennoteof,isthatitisArticle175whichnotmerelycreatesthe
SupremeCourtaswellastheHighCourtsbutalsoexplicitlystatesthatnocourtshallhaveany
jurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheconstitutionbyorunderanylaw.Butforthe
existenceofArticle175therewouldbenoSupremeCourtorHighCourtatall.Boththecreationofthe
Courts,aswellastheconfermentofjurisdictionthereiniscomprehendedbythesaidArticle.Bystating
intermsoftheprovisowhichhasbeenintroducedbythe21stAmendmentthattheprovisionsofthis
Articlehavenoapplicationtothetrialofpersonsbelongingtoterroristgroupsororganizationsthe
legislativeintenthasbeenmadeclearbeyondanydoubt.Ifwerevert,foramoment,tothepositionin
theUnitedStatesitmaybenotedthatalthoughnoconstitutionalamendmenthasbeenintroducedfor,
andinrelationto,thefightagainstterrorismorthewaragainstterrorismasitisreferredtointhe
UnitedStatesanumberofdecisionsbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshasmadeclearits
consideredviewthatduedeferencemustbegiventotheExecutiveforandinrelationtothewaragainst
terrorism.InthecaseofBoumedienevBush,553US723(2008),itwasobservedasunderatpp.79697:
Inconsideringboththeproceduralandsubstantivestandardsusedtoimposedetentiontopreventacts
ofterrorism,properdeferencemustbeaccordedtothepoliticalbranch.SeeUnitedStatesv.Curtiss
WrightExportCorp.299US304,320(1936).UnlikethePresidentandsomedesignatedmembersof
Congress,neitherthememberofthisCourtnormostfederaljudgesbeginthedaywithbriefingsthat
maydescribenewandseriousthreatstoournationanditspeople.Thelawmustaccordtheexecutive
substantialauthoritytoapprehendanddetainthosewhoposearealdangertooursecurity.
(183)AnotherimportantjudgmentoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtisthecaseofExParteQuirin
317US1(1942).Thiswasacaseinwhichthequestionwaswhetherafederalcourtwasentitledto
refusetoissueawritofhabeascorpusduringtheSecondWorldWar.Thecasepertainedtopersons
whowereborninGermanyandsettleddownandbecamecitizensoftheUnitedStates.Thechallenge
inthecasewastoanorderdatedJuly2,1942issuedbythePresident,asCommanderinChiefofthe
ArmyandNavy,appointingamilitarycommissionanddirectingittotrythepetitionersforoffences
againstthelawofwarandthearticlesofwar.Thesaidorderprescribedregulationsfortheprocedure
onthetrialandforreviewofanyjudgmentorsentenceofthecommission.Theproclamationfurther
statedthatallsuchpersonsweredeniedaccesstothecourtsoflaw.ThiswaschallengedintheUnited
StatesSupremeCourt.ThemaincontentionraisedwasthatthePresidentlackedanystatutoryor
constitutionalauthoritytoorderthepetitionerstobetriedbymilitarytribunalforoffenceswithwhich
theywerechargedandinconsequencetheywereentitledtobetriedinthecivilcourtswithalldue
safeguardsincludingtrialbyjury,whichthe5thand6thAmendmentsguaranteetoallpersonscharged
insuchcourtswithcriminaloffences.ItwasfurtherarguedthatthePresidentsOrder,inprescribingthe
procedureofthecommissionwasinconflictwiththearticlesofwaradoptedbyCongress.TheUS
SupremeCourtnotedthattherewasnothingintheproclamationtoprecludeaccesstothecourtsfor
determiningitsapplicabilitytotheparticularcase.Itfurthernotedthatneithertheproclamation,nor
thefactthatthepetitionerswereenemyaliens,foreclosedconsiderationbythecourtsoftheir
contentionthattheConstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStatesconstitutionallyenactedforbadetheir
trialbymilitarycommission.AninterestingaspectofthecasewasthatthePresidenthadnotreliedon
congressionallegislationtojustifythetrialofthepetitionersbymilitarycommissions.Hehadexercised
hispowersascommanderinchiefundertheConstitution.TheSupremeCourtafterexaminingthe
constitutionalpositionincludingreferencetoarticle1(8)whichconferspoweronCongresstosetupthe
armedforcesandtodeclarewareventuallycametotheconclusionthatthepetitionerswerenot
entitledtorelief.
(184)Ihavenownearedtheendofmyjudgment.Beforeconcludingbysummarizingtheviewsthat
havebeenexpressedhereinabove,IwouldliketoquoteThomasJeffersononwhatmightberegarded
asthegeneral,butalsofundamental,themeofthisjudgment:thatthequestionwhether,whenorhow
theConstitutionistobeamendedoughttobeleftinitsentiretytothechosen(i.e.,elected)
representativesofthepeopleofPakistan.Jefferson,whowasoneofthemostfamousandimportantof
theFoundingFathersoftheUSConstitutionandtheprincipaldraftsmanoftheDeclarationof
Independence,makesthepointwithhisusualeloquenceandelegance.Hewasveryclearinhisviews
thattheoriginalvisionoftheFoundersshouldnotoperateasastraitjacketforallfuturetimes.Ina
famousdocument(alettertooneSamuelKerchevalwrittenin1816someyearsafterhehadservedtwo
termsasPresident),Jefferson,speakingwiththewisdomhonedbyalifetimesexperience,declaredas
under(emphasissupplied):
Somemenlookatconstitutionswithsanctimoniousreverence,anddeemthemlikethe[ark]ofthe
covenant,toosacredtobetouched.Theyascribetothemenoftheprecedingageawisdommorethan
human,andsupposewhattheydidtobebeyondamendment.Iknewthatagewell;Ibelongedtoit,and
laboredwithit.Itdeservedwellofitscountry.Itwasverylikethepresent,butwithouttheexperienceof
thepresent;andfortyyearsofexperienceingovernmentisworthacenturyofbookreading;andthis
theywouldsaythemselves,weretheytorisefromthedead.Iamcertainlynotanadvocateforfrequent
anduntriedchangesinlawsandconstitutions.Ithinkmoderateimperfectionshadbetterbebornewith;
because,whenonceknown,weaccommodateourselvestothem,andfindpracticalmeansofcorrecting
theirilleffects.ButIknowalso,thatlawsandinstitutionsmustgohandinhandwiththeprogressofthe
humanmind.Asthatbecomesmoredeveloped,moreenlightened,asnewdiscoveriesaremade,new
truthsdisclosed,andmannersandopinionschangewiththechangeofcircumstances,institutionsmust
advancealso,andkeeppacewiththetimes.Wemightaswellrequireamantowearstillthecoatwhich
fittedhimwhenaboy,ascivilizedsocietytoremaineverundertheregimenoftheirbarbarous
ancestors.ItisthispreposterousideawhichhaslatelydelugedEuropeinblood.Theirmonarchs,instead
ofwiselyyieldingtothegradualchangeofcircumstances,offavoringprogressiveaccommodationto
progressiveimprovement,haveclungtooldabuses,entrenchedthemselvesbehindsteadyhabits,and
obligedtheirsubjectstoseekthroughbloodandviolencerashandruinousinnovations,which,hadthey
beenreferredtothepeacefuldeliberationsandcollectedwisdomofthenation,wouldhavebeenput
intoacceptableandsalutaryforms.Letusfollownosuchexamples,norweaklybelievethatone
generationisnotascapableasanotheroftakingcareofitself,andoforderingitsownaffairs.Letus,as
oursisterStateshavedone,availourselvesofourreasonandexperience,tocorrectthecrudeessaysof
ourfirstandunexperienced,althoughwise,virtuous,andwellmeaningcouncils.Andlastly,letus
provideinourconstitutionforitsrevisionatstatedperiods.
(185)Itwillbeconvenienttoconcludewithasummary,ingeneralterms,oftheviewsexpressedin
thisjudgment.Thissummarymustofcoursebereadinthelightofwhathasbeenstatedhereinabove:
a.InIndia,theConstitutionwasframedbyitsfoundingfathersandthereforehasaspecialplacein
Indianconstitutionalthoughtanddevelopment.
b.ThefundamentalrightsasenshrinedintheConstitutionwereforthatreasonaccordeda
sanctitythat,itwasacutelyfelt,wasviolatedwhenattemptsweresubsequentlymadetoabridgeor
curtailthoserights,eitherthroughdirectchangesorbyplacinglawsinthe9thSchedule(itselfaddedto
theConstitutionbythefirstamendment).Thus,inanimportantsensethesubsequentconstitutional
amendmentswereregardedasadeviationfromtheidealsituationcreatedbytheConstitution.The
importanceofthishistoricalfactmustalwaysbekeptinmind.
c.InourConstitutiontwoimportantpointsmustbemadeinrelationthereto.Firstly,andmost
regrettablythefundamentalrightsconferredbytheConstitutionwerestillborn:Article280expressly
continued,fromthecommencingday,theearlierimposedemergency.Fundamentalrightswerenot
actuallyenforcedtill1986.Furthermore,almostimmediatelyandforreasonswellknownthe
Constitutionwassubjectedtoundesirableamendments.Theexamplesincludesuchnotoriousinstances
asthe5thAmendment,whichwassupposedtotamethejudiciary.Thischangewasmadebythesame
AssemblywhichframedtheConstitutionAsIhaveshown,themorerecentconstitutionalamendments
haveallhadagenerallypositiveintentandeffect.Thus,unliketheIndianexperience,theprocessof
constitutionalchangethroughamendmentshashadabeneficialandusefuleffect.
d.Secondly,theConstitutiononitspromulgationwasverymuchadocumentofitstimes(the
early1970s)whenleftwingtheoriesweremuchinvogue;witnessthepresenceoftheMarxistbased
Article3.AspointedoutearlierMarxismcategoricallyrejectstheprincipleofindependenceofthe
judiciary.Thusthisisthedirectioninwhichthebasicstructuredoctrinewilltakeus.Isthiswhatthe
Petitionerswant?
e.Thebasicstructuredoctrineitselfis,ifImaysaysowithrespect,hasendedinbecoming(and
thiswaseasilyforeseeable)avehicleforjudicialaggrandizementofpowerattheexpenseoftheelected
representativesofthepeople.Ontheconceptualplane,itisdevoidofmeritandamountstolittlemore
thanavesselintowhichtheJudgescanpourwhatevereconomic,politicalorsocialtheoryasmaycatch
theirfancyorwhimatanygiventime.ThedecisionsoftheIndianSupremeCourt,discussedabove,
amplydemonstratethissorrystateofaffairs.WhatwasdecidedinKesavanandaBharaticontinuesto
perplex,eludeanddividejuristsandscholars,whattosayoflessermortals.MinervaMillsandthe
Coelhocase,andtheexplanationofthelatterdecisioninGlanrockEstate,morethanamply
demonstratehowamorphousandvaguethecentraltenetsofthedoctrineactuallyare.Themorethe
Judgesindulgeingeneralitiesthefurtherthelawmovesfromconcretenessandcomprehensibility.
f.AnotherdangerofthedoctrineisthatitcantempttheCourtintojudicialoverreach.Thisis
amplydemonstratedbytheIndiraNehruGandhicaseanditsaftermathincludingADMJabulpur,when
theIndianSupremeCourthadtoignominiouslybacktrackinthefaceofthearousedfuryofapowerfully
entrenchedPrimeMinister.
g.Intheforegoing,andother,waysoneespeciallydamagingeffectofthedoctrinehasbeenthe
erosionofthejudicialmethodinIndiainconstitutionalmatters.Theessenceofthejudicialmethod,as
practicedincommonlawcountries(andcertainlyinIndiabeforetheadverseeffectsofthisdoctrine
assumeddominance),isthatlegalprinciplesareobjectivelyappliedtoconcretefactsanddisputesthat
arisebeforethecourt.Ofcourse,thelawcontinuouslydevelopsbutitisnotatthesubjectivewhimsof
thejudges.Thebasicstructuredoctrineontheotherhandtakessubjectivitytoanextremeandelevates
ittohighconstitutionalprinciple.Itisexpresslyapartofthedoctrinethatnoonenoteventhe
JudgesknowwhatisincludedinitsscopeuntiltheJudgesthemselvesdeclaresomethingtobepartof
thebasicstructure.None,savetheJudges,know,orcanknow,whatthebasicfeaturesoftheIndian
Constitutionare(aspartoftheprescriptivedoctrineasopposedtosimplybeingadescriptiveconcept).
AndeventheJudgesareatalosstosayinonegowhatthosefeaturesare;theymustgropetheirway
forwardonacasebycasebasis.
h.Constitutionsinfreesocietiesaremadebythepeople,forthemselvesandthroughtheirchosen
representatives.Ofcourse,inanIslamicpolityandforaMuslimcommunity,thisissubjectforeverto
theundisputedfactthatsovereigntyovertheentireUniversebelongstoAllahalone.But,withinthe
parametersofthateternalprinciple,itisforthechosenrepresentativesandnooneelsetoactinsuch
matters.And,thesamenecessarilyappliestoconstitutionalamendments.Whyshouldthatpowernot
beexercisablebysuchrepresentativesintheircollectivewisdom,andwhyshoulditsexercisebeatthe
mercyofthecollectivewisdomofunelectedJudges?Thedecisionsofelectedrepresentativeshavebeen
wrongandhaveoccasionallybroughtusclosetodisaster.Istherecordofthejudiciarythatmuch
better?Theelectedrepresentativesatleastneedtohavetheirmandaterenewedperiodically.Whatof
Judges,whoinanypolityaretheleastaccountablebranchandinPakistaninparticularare,inaquite
literalsense,aclosedbrotherhood?
i.ThetemptationtoreadtoomuchintotheObjectivesResolution,whetherasthePreambleto
theConstitutionoranoperativepartthereofbyreasonofArticle2A,mustbestronglyresisted.The
historicalantecedentsofthesocial,politicalandeconomicagendaspeltoutintheResolutionhas
alreadybeenlaidbare.Itisintheverynatureofconstitutionsthattheymustchangeinwaysbigand
smallandwhetherbywayofjudicialexpositionorintheexerciseoftheamendingpower.Toartificially
binddownaconstitutiononthebasisofadoctrinesuchasthatexpoundedbytheIndianSupremeCourt
wouldbeagrossdisservicetothedevelopmentofconstitutionallaw.
j.Theexperienceofthe(sofar)greatestexperimentindemocracy,andthehomeofthemodern
writtenconstitution,i.e.,theUnitedStates,amplydemonstratesthevalidityofwhathasbeensaid
hereinabove.TheviewsofThomasJefferson,oneofthemostfamousoftheAmericanFounding
Fathers,havebeenreproduced.TheconsideredopinionsoftheJusticesoftheUSSupremeCourthave
beennoted.Thereisaroleandaplaceforthejudiciaryintheconstitutionalfirmamentanditiswithout
anydoubtacrucialandvitallyimportantroleandplace.However,theConstitutiondoesnotend(it
certainlydidnotbegin)withtheJudges,andthecourtswoulddowelltorememberthat.Every
institutionandeachorganoftheStatehasitsownroletoplay.Thatrealizationandacceptanceensures
thattheconstitutionalbalanceismaintained.TheCourtshouldnotdoanythingthatunbalancesthe
Constitution.Itshouldneverassumeinitsownfavorthatitistheultimatearbiterinallconstitutional
matters.That,ultimately,iswhatthebasicstructuredoctrineisabout.ThisCourthasinthepastrefused
morethanoncetoadoptthistheory(oranyvariantthereof).Itoughtagaintodoso.
(186)Intheend,IreiteratethepointwithwhichIbegan.Whereshouldtheamendingpowervest:in
thehandsofanunelectedjudiciaryeventhoughactingingoodfaith,orthechosenrepresentativesof
thepeople?AsIhopeismadeclearbywhathasbeensaidabove,myansweris:thelatterandnotthe
former.Accordingly,Idismissthesepetitions.
Sd/
(MianSaqibNisar)
ANNEX
SUMMARYOFFINDINGSININDIANCASELAWREBASICSTRUCTURE
SupremacyoftheConstRuleofLawSeparationofPowersIndependenceofthe
JudiciaryJudicialReviewSuperintendenceofHighCourtoverotherCourtsFederalism
SecularismSovereignRepublicUnity&IntegrityoftheNationRepublican&Democratic
formofGovtParliamentarysystemofgovernanceFreeandFairElectionsFreedomanddignity
oftheindividualJustice,social,economicandpoliticalMandatetobuildawelfarestateand
egalitariansocietyFundamentalRightsEssenceoffundamentalrightsDirective
PrinciplesBalancebetweenPartIII&PartIVLibertyofthoughtspeechand
expressionEqualityAmendingPower
KESAVANANDA
BHARATI
SIKRI????
???
?
SHELAT&GROVER??????
????
??
HEGDE&MUKHERJEA??
???
?
REDDY??
???x???
?
KHANNA
?
xx
INDIRA
GANDHI
CHANDRACHUD????
??
??
KHANNA?
???
BEG?
?
MATHEW?
??x
x
RAY
?
x
SupremacyoftheConstRuleofLawSeparationofPowersIndependenceofthe
JudiciaryJudicialReviewSuperintendenceofHighCourtoverotherCourtsFederalism
SecularismSovereignRepublicUnity&IntegrityoftheNationRepublican&Democratic
formofGovtParliamentarysystemofgovernanceFreeandFairElectionsFreedomanddignity
oftheindividualJustice,social,economicandpoliticalMandatetobuildawelfarestateand
egalitariansocietyFundamentalRightsEssenceorcoreoffundamentalrightsDirective
PrinciplesBalancebetweenPartIII&PartIVLibertyofthoughspeechand
expressionEqualityAmendingPower
MINERVA
MILLS
CHANDRACHUD(+3)
?
???
BHAGWATI
?
x??
WAMANRAO
CHANDRAKUMAR
?
GANPATRAO
?
SAMPAT
KUMAR
BHAGWATIx
?
MISRAx
?
SAMBAMURTHY
?
IRCOELHO??
??
??
MADRASBARASSN(2014)x?
?
AsifSaeedKhanKhosa,J.:
TheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act
(ActXof2010)
ThroughtheseConstitutionPetitionsfiledunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,1973someBarCouncils,BarAssociations,registeredandotherbodiesandpublic
spiritedindividualshavechallengeddifferentpartsoftheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act(Act
Xof2010).ApartfromthegenerallycommonchallengethrownagainsttheprovisionsofArticle175Aof
theConstitution,wherebyanewmechanismhasbeenintroducedregardingappointmentofChief
JusticesandJudgesoftheSupremeCourtofPakistan,FederalShariatCourtandtheHighCourts,
differentpetitionershavealsocalledinquestionsomepartsandprovisionsofArticles1,17,27,38,45,
46,48,51,62,63,63A,91,106,148,175,177,193,203C,209,219,226,245,260and267Aaffectedby
theEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution.Someofthepetitionershavealsoassailedtherepeal
anddeletionofArticles17(4)and58(2)(b)oftheConstitutionandoneofthepetitionershasprayedfor
strikingdowntheentireEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution.Thepetitionershavemaintained
thatdespiteanousterofthisCourtsjurisdictionbyclause(5)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionvisvis
callinginquestionanyamendmentoftheConstitutiontheCourthastherequisitejurisdictioninheringin
ittostrikedownanamendmentoftheConstitutionifsuchamendmentrunscontrarytooradversely
affectsthebasicfeaturesorthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Thefateofthesepetitions,thus,
primarilyhingesupontheissueofjurisdictionofthisCourtinthematterwhichinturndependsupon
acceptanceorrejectionofthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionandIintend
toweavemydiscussionaboutthattheorymainlyaroundthefreshlyintroducedprovisionsofArticle
175AoftheConstitutionwhichprovisionshaveremainedthecentreofattentionandfocusthroughout
thehearingofthesepetitions.
2.[T]heappointmentofjudgestothesuperiorcourtsistooseriousamattertobeleftonlyto
judgeswasanopinionexpressednotbyanypoliticianorbureaucratmotivatedtoundermine
independenceofthejudiciarybutbyoneofthemostindependent,experiencedandreveredjudgesof
thiscountryandhewasnoneotherthanJustice(Retired)DorabF.Patel.WhiledeliveringtheThird
CorneliusMemorialLectureonDecember23,1995theperceptiveandastutejudgehadinteraliathe
followingtoobserveonthesubject:
theIndianSupremeCourthasrecentlyheldthattheconcurrentadviceofthechiefjusticesabout
anappointmentofajudgeofHighCourtisbindingontheIndianPresident.Iregretmyinabilitytoagree
withthisview.TheappointmentofjudgesofHighCourtsistooseriousamattertobelefttothe
judiciaryalone.
UnfortunatelynepotismisahazardinappointmentstothejudiciaryinSouthAsia,andthisstateof
affairswillcontinueaslongasthepressandtheBarassociationsareweak.Inanycase,theviewthatthe
peoplethroughtheirelectedrepresentativesshouldnothaveanyvoiceinappointmentstotheSuperior
Courtsis,inmyopinion,contrarytodemocraticnorms.
AchiefjusticeisinafarbetterpositionthanthePresidenttoassesstheabilityofadvocatesandof
districtjudges,butasheisnotlikelytoknowmuchabouttheirprivatelives,hemay,ingoodfaith,
recommendforappointmenttotheHighCourtanadvocatewholacksintegrity,whohasresortedto
sharppracticesandgotawaywithit.Orhemaybeinfluencedtorecommendaninexperiencedadvocate
forappointment.Amoredifficultcasewouldbeifachiefjusticedoesnotrecommendadeserving
personforappointmentbecauseofsomepersonalorparochialprejudice.Societyinthissubcontinentis
riddledwithsuchprejudices,andchiefjusticesarepartofthesocietyinwhichtheylive.ThatiswhyI
saidthattheappointmentofjudgestothesuperiorcourtsistooseriousamattertobeleftonlyto
judges.
IwouldnowmakeafewsuggestionsfortheappointmentofJudges.Thepeoplemusthaveavoicein
thoseappointments,butatthesametime,asfarasispossible,judgesshouldnotbebeholdentoany
politicalpartyfortheirappointments.HighCourtjudgesshouldbeappointedbyaCommission
consistingoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan,theChiefJusticeandtheSeniorJudgeoftheHighCourt,and
theprovincialChiefMinisterandtheLeaderoftheOpposition.Butforobviousreasonssucha
CommissionshouldsitwithoutanyjudgeoftheHighCourtwhenithastoappointitsChiefJustice.The
appointmentofalljudgestotheSupremeCourtshouldbemadebyaCommissionoffivemembers:the
ChiefJusticeofPakistan,thetwoseniormostJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,thePrimeMinisterandthe
LeaderoftheOpposition.SuchacommissionwouldnotbeappropriatefortheappointmentoftheChief
Justice,becauseseniorjudgesoftheCourtwouldbeeligibleforthisappointment:Inmyopinion,the
appointmentoftheChiefJusticeofthecountryhastobelefttothePresident,asisthepracticeinmost
democraticcountries.
3.V.R.KrishnaIyerisoneofthemostcelebratednamesintheIndianlegalcirclesandinhisbook
AConstitutionalMiscellany(2003)hehadthefollowingcommenttomakeaboutthesystemofjudicial
appointmentsinIndia:
Thesystemneedsoverhaulanddemocratization.Ifwarscannotbelefttogeneralsalone,judicial
administrationcannotbelefttotherobedbrethrenalone.AsuperlativelydignifiedJudicial
Commission,withtheChiefJusticeofIndiapresiding,isamustifforensicchaosinthejudicatorycosmos
istocease.ThecompositionoftheproposedIndianCommissionisamatterofpragmatic
consideration.TheLawMinisterandtheHomeMinisterhavetobethere.Afewseniorjudgesofthe
SupremeCourtandoftheHighCourtsmayusefullybemembers,theBarCouncilsinIndiamaybe
representedand,perhaps,highacademicsfromtheLawUniversitiesmaybeavaluableaddition.A
coupleofoutstandingstatesmen,notinvolvedinthepoliticalpolemicsofthecountry,maybringina
freshapproachintheselectionprocess.
4.Justice(Retired)DorabF.Patelhasnotbeenthesoleproponentofchangeinthemodeof
judicialappointmentsinPakistanastheideaforsuchchangehasbeenmurmuredinjudicialandlegalas
wellaspoliticalcirclessincelong.Apartfrominnumerableprivatewhispersandpublicoutcriestheneed
forchangeintheappointmentprocessvoicedfromtimetotimebyvariousrelevantquartershasalso
beenreflectedinvariousdocumentsemanatingfromrepresentativesofthelegalfraternity,responsible
legislatorsandmajorpoliticalquartersmanifestingtheextensiveswayofthepopulardemandinthat
regard.On13.03.2000uponarecommendationmadebyitsLawReformsCommitteethePakistanBar
Council,thehighestelectedbodyrepresentingthelawyersofthecountry,adoptedaresolution
proposingaconstitutionalamendmentforconstitutingaCommissionforthepurposesofappointment
ofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandalsofordisciplinaryproceedingsagainstthem.Theproposed
CommissionwastocompriseoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan,twomostseniorJudgesoftheSupreme
Court,alltheChiefJusticesoftheHighCourts,ViceChairmanofthePakistanBarCouncil,Presidentof
theSupremeCourtBarAssociation,PresidentsofalltheHighCourtBarAssociations,amemberofthe
NationalAssemblytobenominatedbythePrimeMinister,amemberoftheNationalAssemblytobe
nominatedbytheleaderoftheoppositionintheNationalAssemblyandfourmembersoftheSenate,
oneeachfromeveryProvince.TheproposedCommissionwas,thus,tohaverepresentationofthe
judiciary,thelegalfraternityandthepeople.On13.07.2002thePakistanBarCouncilpassedanother
resolutiondeclaringthatnoconstitutionalpetitionwouldbefiledbeforetheSupremeCourtofPakistan
becausethelegalcommunityhadlostconfidenceintheindependenceandimpartialityoftheCourtasit
stoodcomposedatthattime.Intheyear2003thePakistanBarCouncilpublishedaWhitePaper
highlightingvariousinstanceswhich,accordingtoit,manifestedlackofindependenceandimpartiality
onthepartofthesuperiorjudiciaryofthiscountryingeneralandthisCourtinparticular.Subsequently,
intheyear2005SenatorRazaRabbanihadtabledaPrivateMembersBillbeforetheSenateand
throughthatBillhetoohadproposedaconstitutionalamendmentforconstitutingaCommissionforthe
purposesofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandalsofordisciplinaryproceedingsagainst
them.ThecompositionoftheCommissionproposedthroughthatBillwasidenticaltothatproposed
earlieronbythePakistanBarCouncil.Stilllater,on14.05.2006theleadersoftwomajorandmost
popularpoliticalpartiesofthiscountryatthattimehadsignedadocumentcalledtheCharterof
Democracywhereinconcernwasexpresslyvoicedagainstabsenceofruleoflawandlackof
confidenceinthejudicialsystemandithadbeenagreedinteraliathatthemethodofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtsinthecountryneededasubstantialchange.Thenewsystemof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsenvisagedbytheCharterofDemocracyincluded
nominationofacandidatebyaJudicialCommissionandconfirmationofthenominationbya
ParliamentaryCommittee.IntheManifestoesissuedbyboththesaidpoliticalpartiesbefore
participatinginthegeneralelectionsheldinthecountryonFebruary18,2008ithadexpresslybeen
resolvedtoimplementtheprinciplesagreeduponintheCharterofDemocracyandrestructuringand
reformingofjudicialsystemonthelinesagreeduponinthatCharter.Determinationtoimplementthe
principlesagreeduponintheCharterofDemocracywas,thus,expresslymentionedintheManifestoes
issuedbyboththesaidpoliticalpartiesbeforeparticipatinginthegeneralelectionsheldinthecountry
onFebruary18,2008andasaresultofthesaidgeneralelectionsboththesaidpoliticalpartiesonce
againemergedasthemostpopularpoliticalpartiesinthecountry.On10.08.2009theDemocracyand
GovernancePanelofthePakistanInstituteofLegislativeDevelopmentandTransparency(PILDAT)
chairedbyJustice(Retired)SaeeduzzamanSiddiqui,aformerChiefJusticeofPakistan,alsoproposed
someconstitutionalamendmentsintroducinganewsystemofjudicialappointmentswhereunder
appointmentstothesuperiorjudiciarywouldbemadebyaJudicialAppointmentsCommissionanda
JointParliamentaryCommittee.Nobodyinhisrightmindcouldattributeobliquemotivesinthematter
tothehonourableformerChiefJusticeofPakistanwhohadtheexperienceofknowingtheshortcomings
oftheprevalentsystemofjudicialappointmentsfirsthandandwhohadinthepastgivenagreat
personalsacrificeforthecherishedindependenceofthejudiciaryofthiscountry.Afterthegeneral
electionswhentheparliamentariansbelongingtothetwomajorpoliticalpartiesandthosefromallthe
otherpoliticalpartiesrepresentedintheParliamentwerejointlycontemplatingconstitutionalreforms
inthelightoftheCharterofDemocracyandtheelectionmanifestoesofthemajorpoliticalpartiesthe
PakistanBarCouncilagainpassedaresolutionon13.03.2010proposinganewsystemofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtsandon10.04.2010ameetingofleadersofallthemajorBarCouncilsand
BarAssociationsofthecountryunanimouslyexpressedgraveconcernoversomefreshappointments
madetodifferentHighCourtsandreiteratedtheneedforchangingtheexistingsystemofappointment
ofjudgesofthesuperiorcourts.ItwasinthisbackdropthattheParliamenthadunanimouslypassedthe
EighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionwhich,amongstotherchanges,replacedtheoldsystemof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtswithatotallynewsystem.Thenewmethodof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitution
(beforeArticle175AwasitselfamendedbytheNineteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution)
contemplatesanominationforappointmentasJudgeoftheSupremeCourttobemadebyaJudicial
CommissioncomprisingoftheChiefJusticeofPakistan,twomostseniorJudgesoftheSupremeCourt,a
formerChiefJusticeoraformerJudgeoftheSupremeCourtofPakistantobenominatedbytheChief
JusticeofPakistaninconsultationwiththetwomemberJudges,FederalMinisterforLawandJustice,
AttorneyGeneralforPakistanandaSeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeCourtofPakistannominatedby
thePakistanBarCouncilandsuchnominationtobeconfirmedbyaParliamentaryCommittee
comprisingofeightmembersoutofwhomfouraretobefromtheTreasuryBenches,twofromeach
House,andfourfromtheOppositionBenches,twofromeachHouse.Thenominationofmembersfrom
theTreasuryBenchesistobemadebytheLeaderoftheHouseandthenominationofmembersfrom
theOppositionBenchesistobemadebytheLeaderoftheOpposition.Fornominationforappointment
asJudgeofaHighCourttheJudicialCommissionisalsotoincludeChiefJusticeoftheconcernedHigh
Court,themostseniorJudgeofthatHighCourt,ProvincialMinisterforLawandaseniorAdvocatetobe
nominatedbytheProvincialBarCouncil.Onemay,thus,wonderwhethertheinitiativefortherecent
introductionofArticle175AinourConstitutionhadstemmedfrommotivatedpoliticalquarters,as
assertedbeforethisCourtbythepetitionersinthesecases,orfromtheaccumulatedjudicial,legal,
politicalandpracticalwisdomitself.ItmaywellbethatthescriptfortherecentlyintroducedArticle
175Ahadstartedbeingwrittenmuchearlierthanitsapparentrecentorigin.ChiefJusticeWilliam
RehnquistoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesofAmericahadonceremarkedthat
Justiceistooimportantamattertobelefttothejudges,oreventothelawyers;theAmericanpeople
mustthinkabout,discussandcontributetothefutureplanningoftheircourts.

ItisevidentthatinthebackgroundoftheirpastexperiencesthepeopleofPakistanhave,inthewords
ofChiefJusticeWilliamRehnquist,thoughtabout,discussedandcontributedtothefutureplanningof
theirsuperiorcourtsandhavecollectivelyandunanimouslydecidedtoreplacetheearlierconstitutional
systemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtswithanewsystem.Theextentand
pervasivenessofthedesireforchangeinthisregardmayalsobegaugedfromthefactthat,while
diggingholesinthenewsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsintroducedthrough
Article175AoftheConstitution,allthelearnedcounselforthepetitionersinallthepresentpetitions,
withoutanysignificantexception,haveexpresslyandcategoricallystatedthattheydonotsupportthe
earliersystemofsuchappointmentsanddonotwantitsrevivalorrestoration!
5.Veryextensiveanddetailedargumentsinsupportandinoppositionofthesepetitionshave
beenaddressedbeforethisCourtbythelearnedcounselrepresentingdifferentpartiesandthelearned
lawofficersandsuchargumentsandthesupportingmaterialfindadetailedmentionintheopinions
proposedtobedeliveredbysomeofmylearnedbrothers.Imay,thus,avoidrepetitionandunnecessary
burdeningofmyopinioninthatregard.ThemainplanksoftheargumentsaddressedbeforetheCourtin
thesecasesbythelearnedcounselforthepetitionersarethatinacountrylikeourshavingawritten
ConstitutionitistheConstitutionandnottheParliamentwhichissovereignorsupreme;thebasic
featuresandthebasicstructureoftheConstitutioncannotbealteredoramendedbytheParliament
andindependenceofthejudiciaryisoneofsuchbasicfeaturesandapartofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionof1973;modeofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtshasadirectnexuswith
independenceofthejudiciaryasaninstitutionandorganoftheStateandinterventionoftheother
institutionsororgansoftheState,particularlyparliamentariansandpoliticians,intheprocessof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsmilitatesagainstseparationofpowerswhichisa
cornerstoneoftheConstitutionandunderminesindependenceofthejudiciary;andtheParliament
cannotalteroramendthemodeofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsprescribedinthe
originalConstitutionof1973.ThelearnedcounselfortheFederalGovernmentandthelearnedlaw
officersincludingthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanandthelearnedAdvocatesGeneralofthe
ProvincesandtheIslamabadCapitalTerritoryhave,ofcourse,opposedthesepetitionstoothandnail
andhavecontestedandcontrovertedeachandeveryargumentadvancedbythelearnedcounselforthe
petitioners.Afterhearingthelearnedcounselforthepartiesandthelearnedlawofficersatquitesome
lengthandaftercarefullygoingthroughthevoluminousmaterialrelieduponbytheminsupportoftheir
respectivecontentionsIhavenotfeltpersuadedtoagreewithanyoftheargumentsofthelearned
counselforthepetitionersmentionedaboveandmyreasonsinthatregardarerecordedinthe
followingparagraphs.
6.IthasbeendebatedbeforeusfromonesidethattheParliamentinourcountryissovereign
whereastheothersidehasmaintainedthatinacountryadoptingawrittenConstitutionitisthe
ConstitutionwhichissovereignandeventheParliamenthastoexerciseitsauthoritywithinthelimits
andscopeprescribedforitbytheConstitution.Tometheanswertothisquestionisprovidedbythe
PreambletotheConstitutionwhichdeclaresinnouncertaintermsthatWhereassovereigntyoverthe
entireUniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthoritytobeexercisedbythepeopleof
PakistanwithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust.ThesaidwordscontainedinthePreamble
hadactuallyandsubstantiallybeenborrowedfromtheObjectivesResolutionof1949theprinciplesand
provisionsofwhichweresubsequentlymadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionthroughinsertionof
Article2Atherein.Itis,therefore,quiteobviousthatinourcountrysovereigntyofAlmightyAllahisto
beexercisedbythepeopleofPakistanandtheonlylimitationplaceduponsuchexerciseofsovereignty
isthatthepeopleofPakistancannotactagainstthelimitsprescribedbyAlmightyAllah.Inotherwords
intheircollectiveactivitiesaslongasthepeopleofPakistandonotactagainstanyDivinecommand
theyarefreetoactinanymannertheyconsidergoodforthem.ItisalsoprovidedinthePreamble,and
wasalsoresolvedthroughtheObjectivesResolution,thatWhereastheStateshallexerciseitspowers
andauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthepeopleand,thus,thedelegatedsovereign
authorityofthepeopleofPakistanpracticallyvestswiththechosenrepresentativesofthepeople,i.e.
theParliament.ItistruethatwhileworkingwithintheexistingframeworkoftheConstitutionthe
ParliamenthastoactwithintheparameterslaiddownbytheConstitutionbutwhenitcomesto
amendingtheConstitutionitselfithasspecificallybeenprovidedinArticle238oftheConstitutionthat
SubjecttothisPart,theConstitutionmaybeamendedbyActofMajliseShoora(Parliament).Itis
importanttohighlightthattheParliamentspowertoamendtheConstitutionismadesubjectonlyto
theprovisionscontainedinPartXIoftheConstitution(dealingwithAmendmentofConstitution)andis
notmadesubjecttoanyotherPartorprovisionoftheConstitution.Asifthiswerenotenough,clause
(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionhas,withoutmincingwords,goneontoclarifythatForthe
removalofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthepoweroftheMajlis
eShoora(Parliament)toamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.Theseprovisionsleaveno
doubtinmymindthattheConstitutionmayenjoysupremacyandmaybeinapositiontocontrolthe
Parliamentintheareasofitslegislativeandotherpowers,functionsandprocessesprescribedbythe
existingConstitutionbutwhenitcomestoamendingtheConstitutionitselfthechosenrepresentatives
ofthepeopleintheParliamentassumesovereigntyandcontrolandtheexistingConstitutioncannot
stopthemfromamendinganyprovisionoftheConstitutioninanymannertheywish.Duringthehearing
ofthesepetitionsaquestionhasrepeatedlybeenaskedbysomelearnedcounselandalsobysome
honourablemembersoftheBenchastowhethertheParliamentcanalsoamendtheconstitutional
provisionsregardingIslamicwayoflifeandIslambeingtheStatereligionofPakistanandmyanswerto
thatquestionisquitesimple.Islamisnotjustafundamentalprincipleorasalientfeatureofthe
ConstitutionofPakistanbutitistheverylifeandsoulofthePakistanisocietyandisamatteroffaith
transcendinganyconstitutionaldispensation.Itisbutobviousthatinthiscountrywhichwascreatedin
thenameofIslamandwhichispredominantlyinhabitedbyMuslimstheParliamentismostunlikelyto,
notwithstandinganyexpressorimpliedconstitutionallimitationtothateffectornot,amendthe
ConstitutionforachievingsomethingwhichmayoffendagainstanyexpressDivinecommandbecause
actingtothecontrarymaynegatetheraisondtreofthecountrysconception,creationandexistence.
Itisanelementarylessonofpoliticalsciencethatparliamentariansandpoliticianshavetheirhandson
thepulseofthenationandtherepresentativesofthepeopleareneverfondofcommittingharakiri!I
may,however,addthatifatsomefuturestagethepeopleofthiscountryhaveachangeofheartor
mindinthisrespectthenthewillofthepeoplewillhaveitswayandtheaspirationsofyoreor
yesteryearsmaynotbeabletoshackleit.
7.WiththehelpofsomeprecedentcasesfromPakistanandabroadandwithreferencetosome
academicopinionsexpressedbysomeauthorsbeyondourshoresithasbeencanvassedbeforeusby
thelearnedcounselforthepetitionersthattherearesomebasicfeaturesofourConstitutionupon
whichrestsitsbasicstructureandthateventheParliamentcannotamendtheConstitutionina
mannerwhichbringsaboutchangeinsuchbasicfeaturesorstructureoradverselyaffectsthem.After
ponderingoversuchargumentsfromdiverseanglesIhavefounditdifficulttoacceptthesame,
particularlyinourlocalcontext.Tostartwith,thetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionmayhavesomeattractioninacountrywhereaConstitutionhasbeenacteduponforalong
timeandwherethepeopleofthecountryhavestuckoradheredtothebasicfeaturesofthat
Constitutionconsideringthesametoberepresentingcontinuednationalaspirationsandcorevaluesof
thesociety.Suchanacademictheorymay,however,havenorelevancetoacountrylikeourswhichhas,
quiteunfortunately,seenmanyconstitutionaldispensationsinitsshorthistorydepictingvaryingsalient
features.AbarelookattheObjectivesResolutionof1949,theConstitutionof1956,theConstitutionof
1962,theInterimConstitutionof1972andtheConstitutionof1973besidesotherconstitutional
instrumentsintroducedfromtimetotimeliketheLegalFrameworkOrdersandtheProvisional
ConstitutionOrders,etc.clearlyshowsthatitispracticallynotpossibletolaydowninblackandwhiteas
towhatthesalientfeaturesofourconstitutionaldispensationshaveconsistentlybeen.Prescriptiondue
toeffluxoftimeandlonguser,tomymind,isnecessarytogatherastowhetheraparticularfeatureof
theConstitutioncontinuestorepresentthenationalaspirationorresolveornot.Inourcontextitis
difficulttodenythatthesocalledbasicfeaturesorthebasicstructuresoftheabovementioned
Constitutionsandconstitutionalinstrumentsintroducedandpractisedinourcountryfromtimetotime
havebeenvastlyoscillatingbetweendifferentformslikefederalandunitary,oneunitandmultiple
provinces,presidentialandparliamentary,unicameralandbicameral,jointelectorateandseparate
electorate,martialanddemocratic,capitalistandsocialist,theocraticandliberal,provincialautonomy
andcentralcontrol,conservativeandmodern,andwhatnotunderthesun.Besidesthat,the
Constitutionof1962initiallydidnotcontainanyFundamentalRight,andtheFundamentalRights
providedintheConstitutionof1973havemostlyremainedsuspendedandwhentheyareoperational
mostofthemcanbedescribedatbestasqualifiedrightsbecausetheyaresubjecttosomanyconditions
orrestrictionstobeimposedbylaw.EventheConstitutionof1973itselfhasbeenamendedfromtime
totimesofrequentlyandsodrasticallythatitisnotpossibletoobservewithanydegreeofcertaintyas
towhatitssalientfeatureshavethroughoutbeen,eveniftheintermittentandstretchedperiodsofits
suspensionandabeyancearetakenoutofconsideration.TheStatementofObjectsandReasons
accompanyingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010,throughwhichinteraliaArticle
175AwasintroducedintheParliament,itselfrecognizedthatTheConstitutionof1973wasnot
implementedinletterandspirit.Thedemocraticsystemwasderailedatdifferenttimes.Thenon
democraticregimeswhichcameintopoweratdifferenttimescentralizedallauthorityandthusaltered
thestructureoftheConstitutionfromaParliamentaryformtoaquasiPresidentialformofGovernment
throughtheEighthandSeventeenthConstitutionalAmendments.Thus,theequilibriumestablishedby
theConstitutionbetweenvariousorgansofStatewasdisturbedwhichledtoweakeningofdemocratic
institutions(italicshavebeensuppliedforemphasis).Itwas,thus,recognizedbythehighestrelevant
quartersthatthesocalledbasicstructureoftheConstitutionof1973wasnotimplementedproperly,
derailed,alteredanddisturbedfromtimetotimeandtheParliamenthaditselfbeenpartlyresponsible
fororinvolvedintheprocessofsuchnonimplementation,derailment,alterationanddisturbance.Itis
proverbialthatarollingstonegathersnomossanditisnothingbutsadandunfortunatethattheever
changingconstitutionaldispensationinourcountryhasturnedourConstitutionintoarollingstoneand
therapidityofitschangehasnotallowedittogatheranymossoffixedvaluesandaspirationstobe
termedoracceptedasitsbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureandthiswassorecognizedbySaleemAkhtar,
J.inthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaiandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1997SC
426)inthefollowingwords:
ThepoliticalhistoryoftheConstitutionischeckeredandmarredbydeviationsandConstitutional
breakdownswhichbayonetedtwoConstitutionsandthethirdoneremainedsuspendedfornineyears.
Thedarkshadowsofmilitaryinterventionhadbecomeacommonphenomenonwhichhascastits
influenceonthedeathandbirthoftheConstitutions.Thehistorydoesnotspeakofconsistentadoption
ofanybasicstructurefortheConstitution.
(italicshavebeensuppliedforemphasis)
IthadalsobeenconcludedbythisCourtinthesamecasethat:
answeredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinality.
InthispeculiarbackdropIforoneamnotreadytoacceptorapplytheacademictheoryofbasicfeatures
orbasicstructureoftheConstitutiontothesituationinPakistanatthisstageofourconstitutional
historyandgrowth.Theaspirationsthatweasasocietymayentertaintodayunfortunatelydonothave
thebackingofaconsistentandlonghistoryofpracticeand,therefore,thesameareyettomatureinto
basicfeaturesoftheConstitutionforacourtoflawtoacceptandapply,ifatall.
8.Ithasbeenarguedbysomeofthelearnedcounselforthepetitionersthatbyusingthewords
thestructureoftheConstitutionintheStatementofObjectsandReasonsaccompanyingthe
Constitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010themoversofthatBillhaddemonstrablyrecognized
thetheoryofbasicstructureoftheConstitutionand,thus,thisCourtwouldbejustifiedinapplyingthe
saidtheoryinthepresentcases.Suchanargument,however,overlooksthefactthattheword
structureisanordinarywordofEnglishlanguageandthatwordisyettoattainthestatusofatermof
arttobealwaysunderstoodintermsofaparticularacademictheoryofconstitutionallaw.Inthisview
ofthemattermereuseofthewordsthestructureoftheConstitutionbythemoversoftheBillinthe
StatementofObjectsandReasonsdidnotperseimplythatthemoversoftheBillhadconcededtothe
courtsthepowerofreviewofconstitutionalamendments.Inthecontextofallthepreviousjudgments
renderedbythisCourtonthesubject,referredtolaterinthisjudgment,categoricallyrejecting
applicabilityofthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionitcannotbeinferred
thatbyusingthewordsthestructureoftheConstitutionintheStatementofObjectsandReasonsthe
moversoftheBillhadconsciouslyanddeliberatelyextendedthejurisdictionofthisCourteventothe
fieldwhichthisCourthadexplicitlydeclaredearlierontobeaforbiddenarea.Theabovementioned
argumentalsoconvenientlyoverlooksthefactthatthesameStatementofObjectsandReasons
accompanyingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010containedthefollowinginits
paragraphNo.3:
ThepeopleofPakistanhaverelentlesslystruggledfordemocracyandforattainingtheidealsofa
Federal,Islamic,democratic,parliamentaryandmodernprogressivewelfareStatewhereintherightsof
citizensaresecured,andtheProvinceshaveequitableshareintheFederation.
Itisstrikinglynoticeablethattheaspirationsofthepeopleofthiscountrymentionedinthatparagraph
weredescribedthereinasidealsandnotasbasicfeaturesoraspartofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution!EventhePreambletotheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010aswellasthe
PreambletotheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,2010containedasfollows:
ANDWHEREASthepeopleofPakistanhaverelentlesslystruggledfordemocracyandforattainingthe
idealsofaFederal,Islamic,democratic,parliamentaryandmodernprogressivewelfareStatewherein
therightsofthecitizensaresecuredandtheProvinceshaveequitableshareintheFederation.
Onceagain,thePreamblestothesaidBillandtheActhadreferredtotherelevantaspirationsofthe
peopleasidealsandnotasbasicfeaturesoraspartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Those
advancingtheabovementionedargumenthavefurther,againveryconveniently,ignoredthatthe
idealsreferredtointheStatementofObjectsandReasonsaswellasinthePreambletothe
Constitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010andthePreambletotheConstitution(Eighteenth
Amendment)Act,2010didnotcontainanyreferencetoindependenceofthejudiciary!Apartfromthat
anyreferencetotheStatementofObjectsandReasonsinthisparticularcontextmaynotbequiteapt
becauseitisbynowasettledpropositionthataStatementofObjectsandReasonsaccompanyingaBill
maysometimesbealludedtobyacourtforproperlyunderstandingorappreciatingthespiritofthelaw
proposedandenactedbutsuchStatementofObjectsandReasonshasnootherutilityforthecourt,
certainlynottheutilityofopeningajurisdictionaldoorwhichalreadystandsfirmlyshutbymany
previousconsideredandauthoritativejudicialpronouncements.
9.Apartfromwhathasbeenobservedabovethecollectiveaspirations,ideals,objectives,values,
moralityandethosofthepeopleofacountryaresusceptibletochangeandthatisinkeepingwiththe
evolvingandchangingtimesandgroundrealities.Thepeopleandsocietyofonegiventimecanalsonot
beheldashostagetoorslaveoftheaspirations,objectives,values,moralityorethosoftheir
forefathers.Evolutionofpeopleandsocietiesisarealityanditwouldbenothingbutnavetobelieveor
holdotherwise.Itispertinenttomentionherethatsuchevolutionandgrowthofthesocietywas
recognizedbythepeopleofthiscountrywhenithadbeenobservedinthePreambletotheConstitution
of1973thatwe,thepeopleofPakistan,Dohereby,throughourrepresentativesinthe
NationalAssembly,adopt,enactandgivetoourselves,thisConstitutionandtheConstitutionhad
categoricallyprovidedinArticle238thereofthattheConstitutionmaybeamendedbytheParliament
besidesclarifyinginclause(6)ofArticle239thatFortheremovalofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthat
thereisnolimitationwhateveronthepoweroftheMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamendanyofthe
provisionsoftheConstitution.Thepeoplehadevidentlyandsurelyreservedtheirrighttoamendor
evenrewritetheConstitutioninfuturesoastoreflecttheirevolvedorchangedaspirations,objectives,
values,moralityorethosortochangethemechanismsormethodologiesadoptedin1973forachieving
suchaspirations,objectives,values,moralityorethosandwewouldbedoingadisservicetothepeople
bydenyingthemsuchrightalreadyexplicitlyreservedbythem.TheNationalAssemblyadoptingthe
Constitutionof1973hadneverclaimedorpresumedthatitwasomnipotent,asisevidentfromthe
provisionsofArticles238and239mentionedabove,and,thus,raisingofanysuchpresumptionbya
courtoflawatthislatestagemaybefarfetchedandincongruousbesidesbeinginconsistentwiththe
declaredintentionofthepeople.Imayventuretoobserveinthiscontextthatitmaynotbepossiblefor
anycourttoacceptorholdthattheNationalAssemblyofPakistanadoptingtheConstitutionof1973
couldbindallthesuccessorParliamentsnottoamendcertainpartsorprovisionsoftheConstitution
ever.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatwisdombaseduponexperienceknowsnotemporallimitsandthe
conceptofsovereigntyofParliamentcannotbecircumscribedbysequentialbounds.Anillustrationof
changinggroundrealitiesaffectingsomefundamentalsofaConstitutionistheconceptofparity
betweentheWestPakistanandtheerstwhileEastPakistanwhichwasoneofthefundamentalsofthe
Constitutionof1956butwithsubsequentcessationofEastPakistanthesaidfundamentalsimply
disappearedbecauseofthechangedgroundrealities.DeemingthepeopleortheParliamentofPakistan
tobeboundbythatfundamentalforeverdespitethatsubsequentdevelopmentwouldbenothingbut
anabsurdity.Ausefulexpositionoftheconceptofchanginggroundrealitiesandevolvingaspirations,
objectives,values,moralityandethosofthepeopleandsocietyistobefoundinthejudgmentrendered
inthecaseofDewanTextileMillsLtd.v.Pakistanandothers(PLD1976Karachi1368)whereinitwas
observedasfollows:
Anothercircumstancewhichmustnotbelostsightofisthatnogenerationhasmonopolyofwisdom
norhasanygenerationarighttoplacefettersonfuturegenerationstomouldthemachineryof
Governmentandthelawsaccordingtotheirrequirements.Althoughaguidelinefortheorganization
andfunctioningofthefutureGovernmentmaybelaiddownandalthoughnormmayalsobedescribed
forlegislativeactivity,neithertheguidelineshouldbesorigidnorthenormsoinflexibleandunalterable
asshouldratherthantheybeincapableofchange,alterationandreplacementeventhoughthefuture
generationswanttochange,alterorreplacethem.Theguidelinesandnormwould,insuchanevent,be
lookeduponasfetterandshacklesuponthefreeexerciseofsovereignwillofthepeopleintimesto
comeandwouldbedoneawaywithbymethodotherthanconstitutional.Itwouldbenothingshortofa
presumptuousandvainact,ifonegenerationdistruststhewisdomandgoodsenseofthefuture
generationsandtotreattheminawayasifthegenerationstocomewouldnotbesuijuris.Thegrantof
powerofamendmentisbasedupontheassumptionthatasinotherhumanaffairssoinConstitution,
therearenoabsolutes,andthathumanmindscanneverreconcileitselftofetters,initsquestfora
betterorderofthings.W.J.Garnerin"PoliticalScienceandGovernment"atpages537538saidthat
"whatistrueoftranscendentalphilosophyisequallytrueinmundanesphereofaconstitutional
provision.AnunamendableConstitution,accordingtoMulford,istheworsttyrannyoftime,orrather
theverytyrannyoftime.Itmakesanearthlyprovidenceofaconventionwhichwasadjournedwithout
delay.Itplacesthesceptreoverafreepeopleinthehandsofdeadmenandtheonlyofficelefttothe
peopleistobuildthronesoutofthestonesoftheirspulchres.
Eachgeneration,accordingtoJefferson,shouldbeconsideredasdistinctnationwitharightbythewill
ofthemajoritytobindthemselvesbutnonetobindthesucceedinggeneration,morethanthe
inhabitantofanothercountry.Theearthbelongsinusufructtotheliving,thedeadshaveneitherthe
powernortherightoverit.
InhispoemOnChildrenKhalilGibranhadsaidsomethingwhichmayberelevanttotheissueathand.
Thisiswhathehadsaid:
Yourchildrenarenotyourchildren.
TheyarethesonsanddaughtersofLife'slongingforitself.
Theycomethroughyoubutnotfromyou,
Andthoughtheyarewithyouyettheybelongnottoyou.
Youmaygivethemyourlovebutnotyourthoughts,
Fortheyhavetheirownthoughts.
Youmayhousetheirbodiesbutnottheirsouls,
Fortheirsoulsdwellinthehouseoftomorrow,
whichyoucannotvisit,noteveninyourdreams.
Youmaystrivetobelikethem,
butseeknottomakethemlikeyou.
Forlifegoesnotbackwardnortarrieswithyesterday.
InhisbookNeedtoAmendaConstitutionandDoctrineofBasicFeatures(2007)Dr.AshokDhamijahad
thefollowingtosayonthesubject:
Whatthefuturegenerationswillrequiremoreistheamendmentofthebasicfeaturesofthe
Constitutionbecauseonlythatcanmeettheiraspirationsandrequirements,ifatallneeded.Itisonly
thenonamendabilityofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionwhichcanleadtoarevolutionandnot
theinconsequentialprovision.
Agood,butsad,exampleofthisaspectofthematteristhatofthepeopleoftheerstwhileEastPakistan
whoformedmajorityofthepopulationofPakistanatthetimeofitscreation.Throughtheir
representativesinthethenConstituentAssemblyofthenewlycreatedPakistanthepeopleofEast
Pakistanhadfullysharedthecommonaspirations,ideals,objectives,values,moralityandethoswith
theircounterpartsinWestPakistanatthetimeofadoptionoftheObjectivesResolutionintheyear
1949beforeframingofaConstitutionforthemotherlandbutwithinalittleovertwodecadesthat
communityofinterestandvisionhadundergoneadrasticchange.ThepeopleofEastPakistanlosttheir
commitmenttoPakistanandtheloftyidealsattachedtoitscreation,brokeawayandcarvedoutanew
Stateforthemselveswithnewidealsandcommitments.AbarelookatthePreambletotheConstitution
ofBangladeshadoptedintheyear1972showsthattheaspirationsofthepeopleofBangladeshin1972
weremateriallydifferentfromthoseoftheirforefathersreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionof1949.
ItisstrikinglynoticeablethattheaspirationsoftheforefathersaboutaStatebaseduponIslamic
ideologyhad,withinacoupleofdecades,givenwaytotheaspirationsoftheirgrandchildrenregarding
establishingasecularandsocialistdemocraticState.IntheoriginalConstitutionofBangladesh,1972
secularismwasdeclaredtobeoneofthefundamentalprinciplesofStatepolicy.Lateronin1977
throughthefifthamendmentoftheConstitutionsecularismwasremovedfromtheConstitutionand
IslamwasintroducedastheStatereligionbutin2010theSupremeCourtofBangladeshstruckdownthe
fifthamendmentoftheConstitutionrestoringsecularismasoneofthefundamentalprinciplesofState
policyandatthesametimekeepingIslamastheStatereligion.Turkeyhappenstobeanotherexample
inthisregardwhichhad,inthepastnottoodistant,traveledfrombeingtheheadquartersofthe
OttomanEmpireandtheseatoftheCaliphofIslamtoasecularcountry.
10.TheconstitutionalpositionintheUnitedStatesofAmericainthisregardisnodifferent.Inhis
articleWhatintheConstitutioncannotbeamended?(23ArizonaLawReview717)DouglasLinderhad
thefollowingtowriteonAnImpliedLimitationonthesubjectmatterofAmendments:Caseofthe
UnamendableAmendment:
HadtheframersmeanttoprohibitamendmentsabolishingtheSupremeCourt,establishinga
hereditarymonarchy,orunitingtwoexistingstates,onecouldreasonablyexpectthemtohavesaidso.
Butthesamecannotbesaidaboutaprohibitionagainstenforcementofamendmentsthatarebytheir
owntermsnotsubjecttorepeal.Theprohibitionofamendmentsthatwoulddismantlecertain
fundamentalinstitutionsandarrangementsestablishedbytheConstitution,includingthestates
themselves,wasatopicspecificallydebatedbydelegatestothePhiladelphiaConvention;thequestion
ofamendmentsthatwouldalterthenatureoftheConstitutionitselfwasnotdiscussed.Thedebates
indicatethattheframerswantedtheprinciplesandinstitutionsestablishedintheConstitutiontobe
opentoevaluationandchange.Whatisnotcleariswhethertheyintendedtheirconceptionofa
Constitutiontobesimilarlysubjecttomodification.
Thereislittledoubt,however,thatthemakersviewedtheConstitutionnotasanendinitselfbutasa
meansofachievingastableandjustUnion.TheConstitutionwastoprovideavehiclethroughwhich
changecouldpeaceablyoccur.Itwasthoughtfarpreferablefordissatisfiedconstituentgroupstowork
throughtheamendingprocessthantoresorttoothermeanstoachievetheirobjectives.Masonsaidat
theConvention:"Theplannowtobeformedwillcertainlybedefective,astheConfederationhasbeen
found,ontrial,tobe.Amendmentstherefore,willbenecessaryanditwillbebettertoprovideforthem
inaneasy,regular,andconstitutionalway,thantotrusttochanceandviolence."Later,JusticeStory
wrote:
[T]heConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisconfessedlyanewexperimentinthehistoryofthe
nations.Itsframerswerenotboldenoughtobelieve,ortopronounceittobeperfect.Theybelieved
thatthepowerofamendmentwasthesafetyvalvetoletoffalltemporaryeffervescencesand
excitements;andtherealeffectiveinstrumenttocontrolandadjustthemovementsofthemachinery,
whenoutoforder,orindangerofselfdestruction.
MasonandStory,andindeedalmostalloftheircontemporaries,sharedaconceptionofaconstitution
asa"living"document.Therewasdisagreementoverpreciselyhowdifficultoreasyitshouldbeto
changetheConstitution;butalmostnobodyarguedthatchangeshouldnotbepossible.

NothingcouldbemoreinconsistentwiththeconceptionofthelivingConstitutionthananunamendable
amendmentoranamendmentauthorizingunamendableamendmentsandwhichbyitsowntermsis
unamendable.Astheframersrecognized,theforeclosingofallpossibilityofconstitutionalchangeposes
twodangers:itincreasestheriskofviolenceandrevolutionarychange,anditincreasestheriskthat
peoplewillgrowtodisrespectthesourceoftheinstitutionsandarrangementsthatareforcedonthem.
11.WhiledwellingontheissueofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionImayadd
thatifatallIweretoacceptthetheoryofbasicfeaturesthenIwouldrecognizebasicfeaturesofthe
aspirationsofthepeopleorsocietyandstopshortofconsideringthemasbasicfeaturesorbasic
structureoftheConstitutionsoastoapplythelegaltheoryattachedwiththatconcept.Iwouldalso
drawadistinctionbetweenbasicaspirationsofthepeopleandthemodalitiesormethodologiesfor
achievingsuchaspirationscontainedinaConstitution.AConstitutionisareflectionofthebasic
aspirationsofthepeopleandsocietyatthetimeofadoptionoftheConstitutionandcontainsthe
prescribedmodalitiesormethodologiesforachievingsuchaspirations.Iwouldrefusetoacceptthat
afteradoptingtheConstitutionthepeopleandsocietymayneverbeabletochangeoraltersuch
modalitiesormethodologiesinabidtoachievethesameaspirationsthroughanimprovedordifferent
modalityormethodology.Theargumentsadvancedbythelearnedcounselforthepetitionersdepicting
independenceofthejudiciaryasanaspirationinitselfandportrayingthemodeofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtsadoptedintheoriginalConstitutionof1973astheobjectinitselfhave
failedtoimpressmebecausetomemereindependenceofthejudiciaryoraparticularmodeof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtscannotbeacceptedasendsinthemselvesbecause,tome,
theyareonlysomeofthemeanstotheendandtheend,forsure,isachievementofjusticeforall
throughagoodjudicialsystemwhichdelivers.ItwasrecognizedbythisCourtinthecaseofSyedZafar
AliShahandothersv.GeneralPervezMusharraf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothers(PLD2000SC
869)thattherelevantidealwasjusticeandthatindependenceofthejudiciarywasoneofthe
componentsofthesystemofadministrationofjustice.SimilarlyinthecaseofChiefJusticeofPakistan
IftikharMuhammadChaudhryv.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD2010SC61),whilerecognizing
justiceastheideal,thisCourthadthefollowingtoobserve:
Whileendorsingtheseviews,letmealsoaddthatthecourtssetupbytheConstitutionorunderits
authorityhavebeensoestablishednotjustasameansofsecuringbreadandbutterforthemembersof
theBenchoroftheBarbuttoprovidejusticetothepeopleandtheresultantpeaceinthesocietyandit
isthusthey,whoaretheactualstakeholdersandforwhosebenefitandwelfare,thejudicialsystem
standscreated.
12.Itmaynotbeinappropriatetoobservethatanindependentjudiciaryisjustoneofthetoolsto
beemployedforachievingtheidealofjusticeforall.Fordiversereasonsconceivablebyallanotherwise
independentjudiciaryappointedthroughaparticularmodemaystillnotbeimpartial,competent,
efficientoreffectiveandthatiswhymereachievementorsecuringofindependenceofthejudiciary
maynotbegoodenoughiftherealobjectiveofjusticeforallremainsanillusion.Imay,therefore,
emphasizethatforanymeaningfulunderstandingoftheissueitisimperativetorealizeandappreciate
onaphilosophicallevelthatindependenceofthejudiciaryappointedthroughaparticularmodeisnot
theultimatemilestonetobecrossedorthefinaltargettobeachievedbutitisonlyoneofthetools
employedinanongoingeffortinwhichdifferenttargetsaretobesetandachieved,differentstagesare
tobecrossedanddifferentlevelsaretobeattainedtillachievementoftheultimateobjectiveofjustice
forall.Itisgenerallyappreciatedandunderstoodthatforaccomplishingjusticeforalltherearedifferent
imperativesforajudicialsystemwhicharesinequanonandtheyincludeimpartiality,independence,
competence,efficiencyandeffectiveness.Foreachofsuchimperativesdifferentfactorsplayimportant
rolesandthoseforindependenceincludeconstitutionallyentrenchedcourts,securityoftenurefor
judges,transparentappointmentprocess,articulatedjudicialandethicalstandards,impartialdiscipline
process,adequateandconstitutionallyprotectedsalary,physicalsecurity,civilimmunityforjudicial
functions,freedomfrominterferenceindecisionmakingfromsuperiorjudicialofficersoutsideofthe
appellateprocess,integrationofsubordinatecourtsasfullmembersofthejudiciary,separationofthe
judiciaryfromtheexecutive,judicialcontrolofitsownbudget,judicialcontrolofitsownadministration,
judicialcontrolofthecurriculumandfacultyofjudicialeducation,freedomfromarbitrarygeographic
transfers,avoidanceofretrospectivelegislationaboutanythingtodowiththejudiciary,executive
supporttoenforcejudgmentsevenagainstitself,executivesupporttoprosecuteandpunishattempted
oractualjudicialcorruption,executiverestraintfrominterferenceinjudicialdecisionmakingprocess,an
independentBar,agovernmentsensitivetopublicopinion,aneducatedpublicdemandingan
independentandimpartialjudiciaryandafreeandinformedprintandelectronicmedia.Similarly,the
otherimperativesforajudicialsystemtoensurejusticeforall,i.e.impartiality,competence,efficiency
andeffectivenessalsohavemultiplefactorsplayingimportantrolesanditmaynotbenecessaryto
enlistthemhere.Itmay,thus,beappreciatedthat,asalreadyalludedtoearlier,independenceofthe
judiciaryoradoptionofaparticularmodeofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorjudiciaryisnotan
endinitselfbutitisonlyoneofthemeanstotheend.Itisconceivablethatajudiciarymaybe
absolutelyindependentbutitmaystillbepartialinmanywaysorthatitmaybequiteindependentbut
incompetent,inefficientorineffectiveand,thus,itsindependencemaynotbeofanyavailbecausethe
endresultmaynotbejustandfair.Italsogoeswithoutsayingthatajudiciaryknowntobeafflictedwith
itsownbiasesorprejudicesmaybeindependentfromextraneousinfluencesbutitcannotbeperceived
bythepublicatlargeasanindependentjudiciaryifitdoesnotdecidecasesbroughtbeforeitwiththe
requisiteindependenceofmind.Inthisviewofthematterifjusticeforallisanidealoranaspirationto
beachievedthenmereindependenceofthejudiciarymaynotservethepurposeaslongastheother
imperativesarenotsimultaneouslyensured.
13.Imayalsoobserveinthiscontextthataparticularmodeofjudicialappointmentscannotbe
equatedwiththeidealortheobjectiveitselfanditcannotbelaiddownthatonemechanismor
methodologydeemedappropriatebythesocietyforachievingjusticeforallatonepointoftimeistobe
theonlymechanismormethodologywithwhichthesocietyistobestuckforever.Itmayalsobe
observedwithoutfearofcontradictionthatanidealoranaspirationiscapableofsurvivingevenifthere
isnoConstitutionoreveniftheexistingConstitutionisreplacedorevenifaparticularmodeof
achievementofthatidealoraspirationadoptedpreviouslyischanged.Letusnotforgetthatthe
objectiveintheObjectivesResolutionof1949Whereintheindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefully
securedhassurvivedtheabrogation,repeal,suspensionandreplacementofmanyconstitutionsand
constitutionalinstrumentsthatfollowed.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatifonemechanismormethodology
forachievinganobjectivefailstodeliveraccordingtothesatisfactionofthesocietyorthepeoplethen
suchmechanismormethodologycanbechangedbythesocietyorthepeoplewithoutalteringthe
objectiveitself.Recognizingthedifferencebetweensubstantialandmachineryaspectsofthe
ConstitutionithadclearlybeenobservedbythisCourtinthecaseofMr.FazlulQuaderChowdhryand
othersv.Mr.MuhammadAbdulHaque(PLD1963SC486)thatandiftheConstitutionwereitself
alteredforsomesuchreason,andthatinasubstantial,andnotmerelyamachineryaspect,therewould
clearlybeanerosion,awhittlingawayofitsprovisions,whichitwouldbethedutyofthesuperior
CourtstoresistindefenceoftheConstitution.Inthatcasethereferencetoamachineryaspectwasa
referencetothemechanismormethodologyofachievingaconstitutionalaspiration.Itwasalso
observedbythisCourtinthecaseofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanotherv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(PLD1998SC1263)thatanychangeordeviationastotheworkingofalimbofthe
State,whichdidnotdestroyanyofthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,couldbeupheld.The
referenceinthatcasetochangeordeviationastotheworkingofalimboftheStatewassurelya
referencetothechangeofmodalitiesadoptedforachievementofabasicaspiration.Itwasalso
recognizedinthecaseofI.R.Coelhov.StateofTamilNadu(AIR2007SC861)thatthewholetheoryof
basicstructureisbaseduponcorevaluesandnotuponthemachineryprovisionsormodeof
achievementofthosecorevalues.ItwasfurtherrecognizedinthecaseofAshokaKumarThakurv.
UnionofIndiaandothers(AIR2008SC(Suppl.)1)thatanalterationormodificationinthemodeof
accomplishingabasicfeatureisnotdestructiveofthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionandthat
changeofmodebaseduponevolutioncannotberesisted.Inthesaidcasethetheoryofbasicfeatures
orbasicstructureoftheConstitutionwasputinproperperspective,andalsosignificantlydiluted,byK.
G.Balakrishnan,C.J.byobservingasfollows:
91.AsurveyoftheconclusionsreachedbythelearnedJudgesinKesavanandaBharati'scase
(supra)clearlyshowsthatthepowerofamendmentwasverywideandeventhefundamentalrights
couldbeamendedoraltered.AcloseanalysisofthedecisionsinKesavanandaBharati'scase
(supra)showsthatalltheprovisionsoftheConstitution,includingthefundamentalrights,couldbe
amendedoralteredandtheonlylimitationplacedisthatthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionshall
notbealtered.ThejudgmentinKesavanandaBharati'scase(supra)clearlyindicateswhatisthebasic
structureoftheConstitution.Itisnotanysingleideaorprinciplelikeequalityoranyotherconstitutional
principlesthataresubjecttovariation,buttheprinciplesofequalitycannotbecompletelytakenaway
soastoleavethecitizensinthiscountryinastateoflawlessness.Butthefacetsoftheprincipleof
equalitycouldalwaysbealteredespeciallytocarryouttheDirectivePrinciplesoftheStatePolicy
envisagedinPartIVoftheConstitution.TheConstitution(NinetyThirdAmendment)Act,2005istobe
examinedinthelightoftheaboveposition.
92.ThebasicstructureoftheConstitutionistobetakenasalargerprincipleonwhichthe
Constitutionitselfisframedandsomeoftheillustrationsgivenastowhatconstitutesthebasicstructure
oftheConstitutionwouldshowthattheyarenotconfinedtothealterationormodificationofanyofthe
FundamentalRightsaloneoranyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.Ofcourse,ifanyofthebasic
rightsenshrinedintheConstitutionarecompletelytakenout,itmaybearguedthatitamountsto
alterationoftheBasicStructureoftheConstitution.Forexample,thefederalcharacterofthe
ConstitutionisconsideredtobethebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Therearelargenumberof
provisionsintheConstitutiondealingwiththefederalcharacteroftheConstitution.Ifanyoneofthe
provisionsisalteredormodified,thatdoesnotamounttothealterationofthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution.VariousfundamentalrightsaregivenintheConstitutiondealingwithvariousaspectsof
humanlife.TheConstitutionitselfsetsoutprinciplesforanexpandingfutureandisobligatedtoendure
forfutureagestocomeandconsequentlyithastobeadaptedtothevariouschangesthatmaytake
placeinhumanaffairs.
93.ThelargerprinciplesofequalityasstatedinArticle14,15and16maybeunderstoodasan
elementofthe"basicstructure"oftheConstitutionandmaynotbesubjecttoamendment,although,
theseprovisions,intendedtoconfiguretheserightsinaparticularway,maybechangedwithinthe
constraintsofthebroaderprinciple.Thevariabilityofchangingconditionsmaynecessitatethe
modificationsinthestructureanddesignoftheserights,butthetransientcharactersofformal
arrangementsmustreflectthelargerpurposeandprinciplesthatarethecontinuousandunalterable
threadofconstitutionalidentity.Itisnottheintroductionofsignificantandfarreachingchangethatis
objectionable,ratheritisthecontentofthischangeinsofarasitimplicatesthequestionof
constitutionalidentity.
94.
95.IfanyConstitutionalamendmentismadewhichmoderatelyabridgesoralterstheequality
principleortheprinciplesunderArticle19(1)(g),itcannotbesaidthatitviolatesthebasicstructureof
theConstitution.Ifsuchaprincipleisaccepted,ourConstitutionwouldnotbeabletoadaptitselftothe
changingconditionsofadynamichumansociety.Therefore,theplearaisedbythePetitionersthatthe
presentConstitutionalNinetyThirdAmendmentAct,2005altersthebasicstructureoftheconstitution
isofnoforce.Moreover,theinterpretationoftheConstitutionshallnotbeinanarrowpedanticway.
TheobservationsmadebytheConstitutionBenchinNagaraj'scase(supra)atpage240arerelevant:
"Constitutionisnotanephermallegaldocumentembodyingasetoflegalrulesforthepassinghour.It
setsoutprinciplesforanexpandingfutureandisintendedtoendureforagestocomeandconsequently
tobeadaptedtothevariouscrisisofhumanaffairs.Therefore,apurposiveratherthanastrictliteral
approachtotheinterpretationshouldbeadopted.AConstitutionalprovisionmustbeconstruednotina
narrowandconstrictedsensebutinawideandliberalmannersoastoanticipateandtakeaccountof
changingconditionsandpurposessothatconstitutionalprovisiondoesnotgetfossilizedbutremains
flexibleenoughtomeetthenewlyemergingproblemsandchallenges."
14.TheacademictheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionhadinitiallybeen
rejectedinIndiabutsubsequentlyitwasinthatcountrythatitmadeitsbiggestgains.TheSupreme
CourtofIndiahadrefusedtoacceptorapplythesaidtheoryinthecasesofShankariPrasadSinghDeo
andothersv.TheUnionofIndiaandothers(AIR1951SC458),SajjanSinghv.TheStateofRajasthan
(AIR1965SC845)andI.C.GolakNathandothers.v.TheStateofPunjabandothers(AIR1967SC1643)
butfinallyitwasaccordedacceptanceinthecaseofKesavanandaBharativ.TheStateofKerala(AIR
1973SC1461)andinthelatercasesofIndiraNehruGandhiv.RajNarain(1975(Supp.)SCC1),Minerva
MillsLtd.v.UnionofIndia(AIR1980SC1789),WamanRaoandothersv.UnionofIndiaandothers(AIR
1981SCR1),AshokaKumarThakurv.UnionofIndiaandothers(AIR2008SC(Suppl.)1),StateofWest
BengalandOrs.v.CommitteeforProtectionofDemocraticRights,WestBengalandOrs.(AIR2010SC
1467),MadrasBarAssociationv.UnionofIndia(201410SCC1),PramatiEducationalandCulturalTrust
andothersv.UnionofIndiaandothers(AIR2014SC2114)andUnionofIndiaandOrs.v.MajorGeneral
SriKantSharmaandAnr.(CivilAppealNo.7400of2015decidedbytheSupremeCourtofIndiaon
11.03.2015)thesaidtheorywasappliedasamatterofcourse.InBangladeshthelegalpositiondeclared
inIndiainthecaseofKesavanandaBharatiwasunquestioninglyfollowedbytheAppellateDivisionof
theSupremeCourtofBangladeshinthecasesofAnwarHossainChowdharyv.Bangladesh(1989BLD
(Spl.)1)andKhondkerDelwarHussainv.BangladeshItalianMarbleWorksandothers((2010)62DLR
(AD)298).Itis,however,noticeablethatthereisaparalleltrendinthejudgmentsoftheIndianSupreme
Courttowardsdilutingthescopeofthattheoryrestrictingthesametothecorevaluesandnotapplying
thesametothemodesofachievingthosecorevalues,asisevidentfromitsjudgmentinthecaseof
SanjeevCokeManufacturingCompanyv.M/SBharatCokingCoalLtd.(AIR1983SC329)wherein
seriousreservationswereexpressedagainsttheearlierjudgmentdeliveredinthecaseofMinerva
MillsLtd.(supra)andalsofromitsabovementionedjudgmentinthecaseofAshokaKumarThakur.
RenownedIndianlegalcommentatorDr.DurgaDasBasuwascriticalofthejudgmentinthecaseof
KesavanandaBharatiandhehadobservedthat
TheCourttookuponitselfthetaskofdifferentiatingbetweentheessentialandnonessentialfeatures
oftheConstitution.NosuchpowerwasvestedintheCourtbyArticle368eitherexpresslyorby
implication.
Itisobviousthatinourcountrytheexperiencewiththeprevioussystemormethodofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtshas,unfortunately,failedtoconvincethepeopleofitscontinuedefficacy
orutilityand,arguably,introductionofArticle175AintheConstitutionisavoteofnoconfidence
againsttheprevioussystemandthepeoplesurelyhavetherighttochangethemodeofachievingthe
originalidealorthemachineryprovisionsinthatregardwhilestillstrivingtoachievetheoriginalidealor
basicaspiration.TheStatementofObjectsandReasonsaccompanyingtheConstitution(Eighteenth
Amendment)Bill,2010expresslyreferredtotheParliamentscommitmenttoindependenceofthe
judiciarywhichitwantedtoachievethroughtheproposednewsystemofjudicialappointmentsbecause
theprevioussystemhadfailedtoliveuptothepeoplesaspirations.Inhisspeechesmadebeforethe
NationalAssemblyon06.04.2010andbeforetheSenateon13.04.2010SenatorMianRazaRabbani,
AdvisortothePrimeMinisterandChairmanoftheSpecialCommitteeoftheParliamentfor
ConstitutionalReform,hadalsounambiguouslyreiteratedthatcommitmentwhileintroducingthe
Constitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010tothetwoHousesoftheParliament.Letusnotforget
thatthroughtheConstitutionalReformAct,2005theUnitedKingdomhasdrasticallychangedthe
methodofappointmentofjudgesofallthecourtsinthecountryandnobodyhaseveraccusedherof
deviatingfromtheidealofindependenceofjudiciaryonaccountofchangeofmethodofjudicial
appointments.Imayalsoobserveinthiscontextthatifaparticularmodeofjudicialappointmentsisto
haveanythingtodowithindependenceofthejudiciarythentherewasauniversalhueandcryinour
countrythatthejudiciarywasnotindependentforthebetter,naysubstantial,partoftheperiodof
currencyoftheprevioussystemofjudicialappointmentsandthatbyitselfhadprovidedareasonor
justificationgoodenoughforreforminthatregard.
15.Itmayalsobestatedinthiscontextthatifmerechangeofmodeormannerofappointmentor
electiontoaconstitutionalofficeprovidedintheoriginalConstitutionof1973weretobeacceptedas
adverselyaffectingthebasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionoradverselyaffecting
independenceorcharacterofaninstitutionororganoftheStatethensubsequentenlargementofthe
ElectoralCollegeforelectionofthePresident,changeofmodeofelectionofthePrimeMinisterfrom
invitationtoascertainmenttoelection,changeofmodeofelectiontotheseatsreservedinthe
Parliamentforwomenandminoritiesandchangeofcomposition,strengthandjurisdictionofthe
Senate,tociteonlyafewexamples,wouldalsobequestionablebutnoquestionhaseverbeenraised
againstthatsofar.Ifthatbesothenquestioningchangeofmodeofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtsmayappeartobeequallyimmuneforthesimplereasonthatamerechangeinthemode
ormannerofanappointment,selectionorelectionhaspreviouslybeendeemedbyallconcernednotto
berelevanttoindependenceorcharacteroftherelevantinstitutionororganoftheState.
16.InthecaseofAlJehadTrustandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC324)
thisCourthadobservedthatTheindependenceofJudiciaryisinextricablylinkedandconnectedwith
theconstitutionalprocessofappointmentofJudgesofthesuperiorJudiciaryandwithreferencetothat
observationithasvehementlybeenarguedbeforeusbythelearnedcounselforthepetitionersthatthe
modeortheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsisanintegralpartofand
inseparablylinkedwiththebasicfeatureoftheConstitutionquaindependenceofthejudiciaryand,
therefore,anychangeintheprocessofappointmentmaydirectlyimpingeuponindependenceofthe
judiciary.Ihave,however,notfeltpersuadedtoacceptthisargumentasadvanced.Theprocessof
appointmenttoahighjudicialofficemayberelevanttoindependenceofthejudiciarybutnotalwaysso
becausenotallprocessesofsuchappointmentmayhavetheeffectofunderminingindependenceofthe
judiciary.Thelearnedcounselforthepetitionersareinunisoninmaintainingthattheprocessof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsadoptedthroughtherecentlyintroducedArticle175Aof
theConstitutionisgoingtopoliticizetheprocessasitassociatespoliticiansandpoliticalofficeholdersin
theprocessandsuchpoliticizingoftheprocesswouldunderminethecherishedindependenceofthe
judiciary.Asregardspoliticizingthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtssufficeitto
observeherethatthepeopleofthiscountryarethemostimportantstakeholderinthematterand,
thus,theirinvolvementinthesamethroughtheirchosenrepresentativescannotbetermedas
politicizingthematter.Thisobservationofminefindsawholeheartedsupportfromtheobservations
madebythisCourtinthecaseofChiefJusticeofPakistanIftikharMuhammadChaudhry(supra)
reproducedaboveandaccordingtothesamethepeoplearetheactualstakeholdersandforwhose
benefitandwelfare,thejudicialsystemstandscreated.Ajudicialofficemaybeahighofficecarryinga
lotofprestigeandhonourbutitcannotbedeniedthatthepeoplearetheultimateworldlysovereignas
wellasthepaymastersandiftheywishtohaveadirectroleinthematterofhiringpersonsforsuch
officethensuchrolecannotbedeniedtothesovereignpaymastersbybrandingitaspoliticization.With
respecttothoseadvancingtheargument,Ifindsuchanargumenttobesmackingofcontemptforthe
peopleandtheirchosenrepresentativeswhichrunscountertoourcommitmenttodemocracyand
parliamentarysystemofgovernment.Apartfromthatthecontentionadvancedinthisregardoverlooks
twocriticalaspectsandtheyare,firstly,thatinourconstitutionaldispensationinvolvementofsome
otherorgansoftheStateinappointmentsorelectionstoadifferentorganalreadystandsrecognized
andisinvogueforlongand,secondly,thatinourconstitutionalschemeofthingsindependenceofan
organorofitsmembersstartsaftertheorganalreadystandsconstitutedanditsmembersarealready
appointedorelectedandnotbeforethatstage.
17.Itcannotbelaiddownasageneralruleorprinciplethatinvolvementofsomeotherorgansin
appointmentsorelectionstoadifferentorganisalwaysdestructiveofindependenceofthatorgan.In
factourConstitutionandlawsalreadyrecognizeinvolvementofsomeotherorgansinappointmentsor
electionstoadifferentorganinasmuchasappointmentstotheExecutiveinvolvetheLegislaturelaying
downtheparameters,qualificationsandprocedures,etc.andtheJudiciaryparticipatingintheprocess
ofselectionthroughmembershipofthePublicServiceCommissionsandalsojudiciallyscrutinizingthe
appointmentswhenchallengedsoastoensureadherencetotherequiredparameters,qualifications
andprocedures,etc.;electionstotheLegislatureinvolvetheElectionCommissioncomprisingofJudges
holdingtheelections,theExecutivearrangingandorganizingsuchelectionsandtheJudiciaryensuring
thatonlyeligibleandgenuinelyelectedcandidatesbecomemembersoftheLegislature;anditis
concededbeforeusbyallconcernedthatappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsisessentiallyan
Executivefunctionandevenunderthepreviousconstitutionalprocessappointmentstothesuperior
judiciaryinvolvednotonlytheChiefJusticeofPakistanandtheChiefJusticeoftheconcernedHigh
CourtbutalsothePresidentandtheGovernorsrepresentingtheExecutiveandthePrimeMinisterand
theChiefMinistersrepresentingtherespectiveLegislatures.Suchinvolvementoftheotherorgansis
meanttoensureinteralialegality,regularity,correctnessandfairnessoftheprocessofappointmentor
electionandalsotomaketheprocessdemocraticandparticipatory,conferringacceptabilityofallthe
stakeholdersupontheappointmentsmadeortheelectionsheld.Itisaftersuchparticipatorymannerof
appointmentorelectionthattherelevantorganstandsconstitutedorpersonsbecomepartofthat
organandthereafterindependenceofthatorganoritsdulyappointedorelectedmembersactually
starts.Accordingtomyunderstandingofourconstitutionalschemeindependenceofanorganorofits
membersstartsaftertheorganstandsconstitutedanditsmembersaredulyappointedorelectedtothe
sameandtheconceptofindependenceoftheorgancannotbeundulystretchedorappliedtothe
processofappointmentorelectiontoanorgan,especiallywheresuchprocessismadeparticipatoryand
democraticbytheConstitutionitself.ThisiswhywhentheConstitutionspeaksofindependenceofthe
judiciaryitspeaksofindependenceofthejudiciaryasanexistingorganwhenthejudgesalreadystand
appointedtothesameandthisisalsowhywhentheConstitutioncontemplatessovereigntyofthe
ParliamentitcontemplatessovereigntyoftheParliamentasanexistingorganwhenitsmembersalready
standdulyelectedtothesame.Atsuchastagetheparticipatoryrolesoftheotherorgansceaseasfaras
functioningoftheorganisconcernedandindependenceoftheorganfromtheotherorgansisjealously
guarded.Independenceofanorgan,thus,isrelatabletoitsfunctioningassuchandnottoitsinitial
formationorcreationandsupportforthisistobefoundfromArticles68and69oftheConstitution.
AccordingtoArticle68NodiscussionshalltakeplaceinMajliseShoora(Parliament)withrespectto
theconductofanyJudgeoftheSupremeCourtorofaHighCourtinthedischargeofhisduties.
Accordingtoclause(1)ofArticle69ThevalidityofanyproceedingsinMajliseShoora(Parliament)
shallnotbecalledinquestiononthegroundofanyirregularityofprocedureandclause(2)ofArticle69
goesontoprovidethatNoofficerormemberofMajliseShoora(Parliament)inwhompowersare
vestedbyorundertheConstitutionforregulatingprocedureortheconductofbusiness,orfor
maintainingorderinMajliseShoora(Parliament),shallbesubjecttothejurisdictionofanycourtin
respectoftheexercisebyhimofthosepowers.Ithasalreadybeenobservedabovethatappointment
ofjudgesisessentiallyanExecutivefunction.Itisalsoevidentthatinourconstitutionalandlegal
schemeofthingstheLegislaturemayhavearoleintheappointmentofapersontotheJudiciaryandthe
JudiciarymayhavearoleintheelectionofapersontotheParliamentbutafterapersonbecomesapart
oftheJudiciaryandafterapersonbecomesapartoftheParliamentthemechanismsofindependence
oftheinstitutionsororganssetoutbytheConstitutionbecomeoperationalandstartprotectingone
institutionororganfromtheothervisvisitsfunctionalautonomy.Thus,evenfromthisangleIhave
notbeenabletoaccepttheargumentofthelearnedcounselforthepetitionersthatinvolvementofthe
Parliamentortheparliamentariansintheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsis
likelytoimpingeuponindependenceofthejudiciaryandwouldtherebyadverselyaffectthebasic
structureoftheConstitutioninvitingapplicationoftheacademictheoryattachedwiththatconcept.I
understandthattheconceptofindependenceofthejudiciaryenvisionedbytheConstitutionisprimarily
relatabletoindependenceofthejudgesindividuallyandcollectivelyvisvisdischargeoftheirfunctions
aspartofthejudicialorganoftheStateandthatajudgebecomesajudgeandamemberofthejudiciary
onlyaftercompletionoftheselectionprocessandaftermakingtheoathofhisofficeprescribedbythe
Constitution,andnotbeforethat.
18.ItmayberelevanttomentionherethatonmanypreviousoccasionsthisCourthasalready
firmlyandcategoricallydeclinedtoacceptorapplythetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionforthepurposesofstrikingdownanamendmentoftheConstitutionandImaynotburden
myjudgmentwithdetailedreferencestosuchcasesastheyalreadyfindadetailedmentioninthe
opinionsproposedtobedeliveredbysomeofmylearnedbrothers.ThesecasesincludethecasesofThe
Statev.ZiaurRehman(PLD1973SC49),PirSabirShahv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1994
SC738),FederationofPakistanthroughtheSecretary,MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofPakistan,
Islamabad,etc.v.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.,Karachi(PLD1977SC397),MahmoodKhanAchakzaiand
othersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(supra),WukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanotherv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(supra),SyedZafarAliShahandothersv.GeneralPervezMusharraf,
ChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothers(supra)andPakistanLawyersForumandothersv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(PLD2005SC719).InsomeofthesecasesthisCourthad,however,referredto
somefundamentalprinciples,salientfeaturesandbasicfeaturesofourvariousConstitutions,
includingtheConstitutionof1973,butadmittedlyinnoneofthesaidcasesanyvalidlyandproperly
enactedconstitutionalamendmenthadactuallybeenstruckdownbythisCourtonthatyardstick.Inthe
caseofSindhHighCourtBarAssociationthroughitsSecretaryandanotherv.FederationofPakistan
throughSecretaryMinistryofLawandJustice,Islamabadandothers(PLD2009SC879)thisCourthad
declaredtheConstitution(Amendment)Order,2007(PresidentsOrderNo.5of2005)promulgatedby
GeneralPervezMusharraf,PresidentofPakistan,afterproclamationofEmergencyamendingArticles
175,198and218oftheConstitution(establishingtheIslamabadHighCourt),amendingArticles186A,
270Band270CoftheConstitutionandaddingArticle270AAAtotheConstitutionasvoidbecausesuch
purportedamendmentshadnotbeenbroughtaboutthroughtheprocedureprovidedbythe
ConstitutionforamendmentoftheConstitutionandnotbecausesuchamendmentshadadversely
affectedthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.ItmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionherethatinSri
LankatheSupremeCourthadrefusedtoacceptorapplythebasicstructuretheoryinthecaseofInre
theThirteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionandtheProvincialCouncilsBill(1990)LRC(Const.)1and
theSupremeCourtofMalaysiahadalsorejectedthattheoryinthecaseofPhangChinHockv.Public
Prosecutor(1980)1MLJ70.IntheUnitedStatesofAmericachallengestoconstitutionalamendments
haveinvariablyfailedbeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtandareferenceinthisrespectmaybe
madetothecasesofStateofRhodeIslandv.A.MitchellPalmer(253U.S.350),Leserv.Garnett(258
U.S.130)andUnitedStatesofAmericav.WilliamH.Sprague(282U.S.716).Imay,however,addand
clarifythatnoneofthechallengessomadebeforetheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwasbaseduponthe
doctrineofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionasnosuchtheoryordoctrinehassofar
succeededinfindinganyplaceinthelegalorjudicialreasoninginthatcountry.
19.Itisbutobviousthateverydocumentofwhatevernatureorcharacterhassomesalientorbasic
featuresandwheneverthatdocumentisamendedinanysignificantwayitsearliersalientorbasic
featuresdostandalteredaccordingly.Thus,salientorbasicfeaturesoftheoriginaldocumentby
themselvesareneverimmutableorunalterableandtheyhavenopermanenceoftheirownastheyare
relatabletotheshapeandcontentsoftherelevantdocumentasitexistsataparticulartime.Inthis
contextsalientorbasicfeaturescanclearlybedistinguishedfromimmutablefeatureswhichcarrya
differentconnotation.Apartfromthatrecognizingasalientorbasicfeatureisonethingandapplyinga
legaltheorytothesameisanotherthing.Thisisexactlywhydespiterecognizingcertainsalientorbasic
featuresofourConstitutionsinvariousjudgmentsmentionedabovethisCourthadinvariablystopped
shortofapplyingtheacademictheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionbecauseit
didnotacceptthesaidacademictheoryanditsaidsoinsomanywords.Thesalientorbasicfeatures
wererecognizedbythisCourtinthosecasesonlytohelpitproperlyinterprettherelevantprovisionsof
theConstitutionandnotforstrikingdownanyprovisionoramendmentoftheConstitution.The
plethoraofprecedentcasesandothermaterialfromsomeothercountriescitedandreferredtobythe
learnedcounselforthepartiesalsofindsadetailedmentioninthejudgmentsproposedtobedelivered
bysomeofmylearnedbrothersandIwould,therefore,avoidanydetailedreferencetothoseprecedent
casesandmaterialandwouldprefer,asfaraspossible,torecordmyownviews,perceptionsand
understandingoftheissuesrelevanttothesepetitions.Itisimportanttomentionherethatthecaseof
SyedZafarAliShah(supra)wastheonlycaseinwhichthisCourthadeverobservedthattheParliament
cannotalterthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionbutwhileobservingsotheCourtwaslabouring
underanimpressionthatithadalreadybeensoheldbythisCourtinthecaseofMahmoodKhan
Achakzai(supra).Apparently,andIobservesowithgreatrespect,thisCourthadoverlookedonthat
occasionthatthemajorityoftheHonourableJudgesdecidingthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaihad
infactnotagreedwiththatviewexpressedbysomeotherHonourableJudges.However,whatismore
importantinthepresentcontextisthecircumstancesorthebackgroundinwhichtheabovereproduced
observation,thoughfactuallymistaken,wasmadebythisCourtinthecaseofSyedZafarAliShah.The
fullobservationmadeinthatcasebythisCourtwasWeareoftheconsideredviewthatifthe
ParliamentcannotalterthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,asheldbythisCourtinAchakzaiscase
(supra),powertoamendtheConstitutioncannotbeconferredontheChiefExecutiveofthemeasure
largerthanthatwhichcouldbeexercisedbytheParliament.Itwasinthecontextofamilitarytakeover
thatwhileallowingtheusurpertoamendtheConstitutionforthepurposesofdaytodaygovernanceof
thecountryhehadbeenrestrainedfromamendingthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.Thereis
hardlyanyneedtoemphasizethatrestrainingamilitaryusurperfromtinkeringwiththesalientorbasic
featuresoftheConstitutionismateriallydifferentfromsettingatnaughtanamendmentofsuchsalient
orbasicfeaturesbroughtaboutbythepeople,thepoliticalsovereign,themselveswhichsalientorbasic
featureshadbeenincorporatedintheConstitutionbythepeoplethemselvesinthefirstplace.This
Courthasneveradoptedthelattercoursebeforeand,inmyconsideredopinion,itoughtnottoadopt
thatcourseonthisoccasioneither.Unfortunatelyourhistoryisfullofmilitarytakeoversandincases
comingupinthatbackgroundthisCourthadtriedtoregulatetheauthoritytoamendtheConstitution
extraconstitutionallyandnottheauthoritybestowedbytheConstitutionitselftoamend.Thosecases
mayonlybeauthorityforthelimitsofamendingtheConstitutioninasituationwheretheConstitutionis
notfullyinforceandnotauthorityforasituationinwhichtheConstitutioniscompletelyinforceand
governsitsownprocedures.AperusaloftheprecedentcasesfromtheIndianandotherjurisdictions
citedbeforethisCourtclearlyshowsthattheIndianandothercourtshadreferredto,acceptedor
appliedthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureinthebackdropofsomeseriousactualor
apprehendedthreatstotheconstitutionallyguaranteedrightsofthepeople.Thosecaseswereproducts
ofextraordinarysituationsandtheIndianandothercourtshadleanedinfavourofprotectingthe
peopleandtheirrights.ThesituationinPakistaninthisrespecthasalsonotbeenanydifferent
inasmuchasthesalientorbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionhadbeenreferredtobythecourtsinthis
countryonlywhenthemattersinhandcalledforprotectingtheconstitutionalandlegalrightsofthe
peoplefromthehandsofmilitaryrulersorpuppetgovernmentsorparliamentsandnototherwise.The
commonthread,therefore,runningbetweenthejudicialapproachesadoptedinPakistan,Indiaand
othercountriesinsuchmattershasthroughoutbeenthatifthepeoplehavevoluntarilydemonstrateda
willtoamendtheConstitutionthenthecourtshavedecidednottostandintheirwaybutwhensome
amendmentsarebroughtaboutintheConstitutionbyanotherwiseunconstitutionalforceorbya
democraticforcetryingtoforceitswayagainstthepeoplesconstitutionallyandlegallyprotectedrights
throughitstemporarymajorityintheParliamentthenthecourtshaveplayedtheirroleintryingto
protectthepeoplesrightseveniftheyhadtoinvokesomeacademictheoriesforthepurpose.Itmaybe
welltorememberthatthetheoryofimpliedlimitationsoftheamendingpower(thetheoryofbasic
featuresorbasicstructureoftheConstitution)isinessencemeantforextremesituationswherean
existingconstitutionaldispensationistobepreservedinthefaceofanoverpoweringtransientforce
attemptingtomutilateit,beitabrutetemporarymajorityintheparliamentoramilitaryforce
momentarilyusurpingconstitutionalapparatus,andinvokingsuchatheoryforblockinganamendment
unanimouslypassedbytheParliamentandyearnedforbythepeopleatlargefordecadeswould
amounttocommittingviolenceuponthattheoryitself.Wehavebeeninformedthatnoneofthe
constitutionalamendmentsinterferedwithbytheSupremeCourtsofIndiaandBangladeshhadbeen
passedbytheParliamentsofthesaidcountriesunanimouslyandthatsurelyisaclearandunmistakable
pointofdistinctionasfarastheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionofPakistanisconcerned.In
hisautobiographyBeforeMemoryFades(publishedbyHayHouse,India)FaliS.Nariman,alegendary
Indianlawyer,hadcalledthebasicstructuretheoryofdoubtfullegalvalidityandillogicalbuthad
foundtheSupremeCourtofIndiatobejustifiedinutilizingthattheoryforprotectingtheConstitution
andthepeoplefromatemporaryoverpoweringmajorityintheParliament.Hehadobservedthat
Thoughofdoubtfullegalvalidity,thebasicstructuretheorywasthereactionofacourtthatwas
apprehensiveofanoverenthusiastic,overpoweringonepartymajorityinParliament.
Thebasicstructuretheorywastheresponseofananxious,activistcourttotheexperienceofthe
workingoftheIndianConstitutionduringthefirst23years.Itremainstodayanauxiliaryprecaution
againstapossibletidalwaveofmajoritarianrulemajoritarianrulewasthepoliticalorderofthedayfor
40longyears(from1950rightuptothelate1980s).
EvenDr.DurgaDasBasuinhisclassiccommentaryontheConstitutionofIndiahadcommentedonthis
matteronthesamelineswhenhehadwrittenthat
ThedoctrineofbasicfeatureshadbeeninventedbytheSupremeCourtinordertoshieldthe
Constitutionfromfrequentandmultipleamendmentsbyamajoritariangovernment.
Itis,thus,palpablethatinIndiatheillogicaltheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionwhichwasofdoubtfullegalvalidityhadbeeninventedbytheSupremeCourtofIndia
onlytopreservetheexistingConstitutioninthefaceofabrutetemporarymajorityintheParliament
attemptingtomutilatesomeofitsfundamentalstothedetrimentoftheminoritypoliticalopinioninthe
country.ThattheorywasfoundinIndiatoberelevanttoapoliticaldivideonaconstitutionalissueandit
shallbenothingbutunthoughtfulandincentiveincompatibletoinvokeandapplythesaidtheoryinour
countryforsettingatnaughtaconstitutionalamendmentpassedunanimouslybytheParliamentand
yearnedforbythepeopleatlargefordecades.Itmaybewelltorememberinthiscontextthatthe
academicdoctrineofnecessityhadbeeninvokedbythecourtsofthiscountryforthewrongreason,i.e.
insupportofabridgingtherightsofthepeopleandweallknowthedisastrousconsequencesthathad
followed.Article175AhasbeenintroducedinourConstitutionwiththeunanimoussupportofallshades
ofpublicopinionandinvokinganotheracademictheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
Constitutionfordefeatingthepopularwillinthisregardmayalsoleadtoequallycalamitous
consequences.Thebottomlineisthatprotectingthepeoplesrightsevenbyinvokingacademictheories
mayappeartosometobejustifiablebuttoothersutilizingacademictheoriesfordefeatingthepeoples
freewillmaybeunforgivable.
20.Imustrecordhereanoteofcautionagainstunthoughtfulutilizationofpurelyacademic
theoriesbyacourtoflawwhileadjudicatinguponpracticalissues,particularlyinmattersaffecting
governanceandrunningoftheState.Imayobservewithprofoundrespecttothoseintheacademiathat
academictheoriesdepictingintellect,scholarshipandingenuityandadvancedthroughalectureora
bookarelikeintellectualkiteflyingwhichmaybeessentialorusefulforintellectualgrowth,making
contributiontojurisprudenceandadvancementoflearningthroughtriggeringthoughtprocessesbut
suchtheoriesremainintheairtilltheyattaingeneralacceptabilityontheground.Itmaybequite
hazardousforacourtoflawtodecideconstitutionalorlegalissuessolelyonthebasisofhalfbaked
academictheoriesuntilsuchtheoriesmatureandseasonasdoctrinesfitforbeingusedasstandardsor
yardsticksanduntiltheyattaingeneralacceptabilityorwidespreadrecognition.Thetheoryofbasic
featuresorbasicstructureofaConstitutionisoneofsuchacademictheorieswhichisstillinitsnascent
orembryonicstageandattemptsmadetointroduceorapplythesaidtheoryincourtsoflawhavesofar
failedtomeetanynoticeablesuccessonthebroadercanvas.Asamatteroffactthesaidtheoryhas
alreadybeenexpresslyrejectedbythisCourtonmanyapreviousoccasion.Weinthiscountryareina
goodpositiontoappreciatethatwheninthepastanacademicandjurisprudentialtheory,i.e.Hans
Kelsenspuretheoryoflawbaseduponnecessityandeffectivenesswasimprudentlyutilizedbythe
courtsfordecidingreallifecasesinvolvinggovernanceandrunningoftheStateandsocietytheresults
werecatastrophicandcalamitous,ashadbeenexperiencedinourcountryduringthelastabouthalfa
century.Itis,thus,notsurprisingthatthesaidtheoryinvokedandappliedwithtrumpetingandfanfare
inthecaseofStatev.Dosso(PLD1958SC(Pak)533)hadultimatelytobeburiedwithanotsomournful
knelltollinginthecaseofSindhHighCourtBarAssociationandanotherv.FederationofPakistanand
others(supra).Asimilarhalfbakedacademicandjurisprudentialtheoryofimpliedlimitationsofthe
amendingpower,commonlyknownasthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
Constitution,propoundedbyaGermanjuristnamedProfessorDietrichConradisnowtryingtomakean
inroadintoourconstitutionallawandpracticeandisbeingadvocatedforoverthrowingan
overwhelmingpopularwillandIbelievethatweshalldobetterifweexercisecautionandrestraintin
thisregardatsuchaprematurestageinthelargerinterestofdemocracyandconstitutionalisminour
country.Itmaybewelltorememberthatthesaidacademicallypropoundedtheoryhassofarprincipally
beenjudiciallyacceptedandappliedonlyinoneofthehundredsofcountriesoftheworld,i.e.Indiaand
thattoowiththethinnestofmajorityandgravestofcontroversyandBangladeshhasonlyfollowedthe
Indianexample.EvenwhenacceptingandapplyingthattheoryeveryJudgeoftheSupremeCourtof
IndiahaddiscoveredandidentifieddifferentbasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionofIndiaandaccordingto
aresearchpaperreadoutbeforeussofarasmanyastwentysevenbasicfeaturesoftheIndian
Constitutionhavebeenidentifiedbydifferentjudgesindifferentcasesandthatlistisstillexpanding.
Suchelasticityofthattheorywiththeconcomitantuncertaintybyitselfmakesthattheoryunworthyof
acceptanceasaconstitutionaltestandthatiswhyinPakistanthisCourthasalreadydeclaredinthecase
ofMahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra)thatWhatisthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisaquestionof
academicnaturewhichcannotbeansweredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinality.Someofoursages
havealreadywarnedusinthisregardinthepastandweshouldpayheedtotheirwordsofwisdom.In
thecaseofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Aliandanotherv.TheState(PLD1975SC506)HamoodurRahman,C.J.had
observedthatTheCourtscannotstrikedownalawonanysuchhigherethicalnotionsnorcanCourts
actonthebasisofphilosophicalconceptsoflaw.MamoonKazi,J.hadalsoobservedinthecaseof
WukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoor(supra)thatvalidityofaConstitutionalprovisioncannotbetested
onthetouchstoneofanyotherprovisionorruleoradoctrine.Themostrelevantobservationmadein
thepresentcontextwasthatmadebythisCourtinthecaseofFaujiFoundationandanotherv.
ShamimurRehman(PLD1983SC457)wherein,afterrefusingtofollowtheIndianjudgmentsonthe
theoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution,itwasaddedthatSowhatisnowleftis
onlyatheoryofbasicstructureorframeworkoftheConstitutionhavingnolegalcompulsionasa
constitutionalprinciple.OnlyafewmonthsagointhecaseofDr.MobashirHassanandothersv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2010SC265)mylearnedbrotherJawwadS.Khawaja,J.had
observedasunder:
TheCourtwhileexercisingthejudicialfunctionentrustedtoitbytheConstitutionisconstrainedbythe
Constitutionandmust,therefore,performitsdutyofresolvingmatterscomingbeforeit,inaccordance
withthedictatesoftheConstitutionandthelawsmadethereunder.IftheCourtveersfromthiscourse
chartedforitandattemptstobecomethearbiterofwhatisgoodorbadforthepeople,itwillinevitably
entertheminefieldofdoctrinessuchasthelawofnecessityorsaluspopulisupremalex,withthesame
disastrousconsequenceswhichareamatterofhistoricalrecord.
ApartfromwhathasbeenobservedaboveitmustnotbeignoredthatbyvirtueofArticle175(2)ofthe
ConstitutionofPakistan,1973NoCourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonit
bytheConstitutionorbyorunderanylawandArticle239(5)oftheConstitutionmandatesthatNo
amendmentoftheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonanygroundwhatsoever.It
oughttogowithoutsayingthatajurisdictionexpresslytakenawayfromacourtbytheConstitution
itselfcannotbedeemedtohavebeenconferreduponsuchcourtbyanacademictheorypropounded
byaforeignscholar.Ifinditverydifficulttoacceptthatanunambiguoustextualousterofjurisdiction
canbeignoredonthebasisofnothingbutaconceptualargumentorstatement.
21.ExaminingthecontentionsofthelearnedcounselforthepetitionersfromyetanotherangleI
mayobservethatwhileinvokingthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionthe
learnedcounselforthepetitionershavetriedtosetuptheprovisionsofthenewlyintroducedArticle
175AoftheConstitutionagainstthesocalledbasicfeaturequafullysecuringindependenceofthe
judiciaryintroducedthroughArticle2AoftheConstitutionwhichhadmadetheObjectivesResolutionof
1949asubstantivepartoftheConstitution.ItisimportanttonotethatbothArticle2AandArticle175A
werenotapartoftheoriginalConstitutionof1973andwereinsertedthereinatdifferentsubsequent
stages.TheObjectivesResolutionwasnotasubstantivepartoftheoriginalConstitutionof1973butwas
merelyapartofthePreambletotheConstitutionand,thus,unenforceable.Thewholeargumentbased
upontheObjectivesResolutionbeingthegrundnormmanifestingthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,
therefore,maybemisconceivedasthesaidsocalledgrundnormwasnottreatedbytheFounding
Fathersevenworthyofenforceability!BeforeinsertionofArticle2AintheConstitutionmakingthe
ObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionitsstatusasapartofthePreambletothe
ConstitutionvisvisthesubstantiveprovisionsoftheConstitutionhadbeenexaminedbythisCourtin
thecaseofZiaurRahman(supra)andithadbeenconcludedasfollows:
AbodyhavingthepowerofframingaConstitutionisnotomnipotentnorcanitdisregardthe
mandategiventoitbythepeopleforframingaConstitutionorcanframeaConstitutionwhichdoesnot
fulfiltheaspirationsofthepeopleorachievetheircherishedobjectives,political,socialoreconomic.
Theselimitationsonitspower,however,arepoliticallimitationsandnotjusticiablebythejudiciary.Ifa
ConstituentAssemblyorNationalAssemblysoactsindisregardofthewishesofthepeople,itisthe
peoplewhohavetherighttocorrectit.ThejudiciarycannotdeclareanyprovisionoftheConstitutionto
beinvalidorrepugnantonthegroundthatitgoesbeyondthemandategiventotheAssembly
concernedorthatitdoesnotfulfiltheaspirationsorobjectivesofthepeople.Toendeavourtodoso
wouldamounttoenteringintothepoliticalarenawhichshouldbescrupulouslyavoidedbythe
judiciary.
AfterinsertionofArticle2AintheConstitutionmakingtheObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartof
theConstitutionitspositionvisvistheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutioncameunderscrutinyofthis
CourtinthecaseofHakimKhanand3othersv.GovernmentofPakistanthroughSecretaryInteriorand
others(PLD1992SC595)anditwasfoundbythisCourtthatincaseofanapparentconflictbetween
twoprovisionsoftheConstitutionthecourtsmusttrytoharmonizetheseeminglyconflictingprovisions
butiftheyareincapableofbeingharmonizedortheconflictbetweenthemisincapableofbeing
resolvedthenthecourtsoughtnottoembarkuponchoosingorpreferringoneprovisionofthe
ConstitutionovertheotherandinsuchasituationthemattershouldbelefttotheParliamenttoresolve
thesamethroughitspowertoamendtheConstitution.Whatiscriticalinthecontextofthepresent
petitionsisthatinthatcaseofHakimKhanithadcategoricallybeenheldbythisCourtthatthe
provisionsofArticle2AoftheConstitutionoroftheObjectivesResolutionof1949cannotbeusedasa
touchstoneoratestofrepugnancyorcontrarietyvisvistheotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.The
petitionersinthepresentpetitionswishtoestablishexactlytheoppositeofwhatthisCourthad
unmistakablyheldinthecaseofHakimKhan.Someextractsfromvariousopinionsrecordedinthatcase
maybeparticularlyrelevanttothecontroversyinhandandtheyarereproducedbelow:
Thequestionbeforeusnow,therefore,iswhethertheHighCourtrightlyconstruedtheamplitudeof
theprovisionsofArticle2A,especiallytheireffectontheotherprovisionsoftheConstitution,suchas
Article45thereof?
ThisruleofinterpretationdoesnotappeartohavebeengiveneffecttointhejudgmentoftheHigh
CourtonitsviewthatArticle2AisasupraConstitutionalprovision.Because,ifthisbeitstruestatus
thentheabovequotedclausewouldrequiretheframingofanentirelynewConstitution.Andevenif
Article2Areallymeantthatafteritsintroductionitistobecomeincontroloftheotherprovisionsofthe
Constitution,thenmostoftheArticlesoftheexistingConstitutionwillbecomequestionableonthe
groundoftheirallegedinconsistencywiththeprovisionsoftheObjectivesResolution.Accordingtothe
openingclauseofthisResolutiontheauthoritywhichAlmightyAllahhasdelegatedtotheStateof
PakistanistobeexercisedthroughitspeopleonlywithinthelimitsprescribedbyHim.Thusallthe
provisionsoftheexistingConstitutionwillbechallengeablebeforeCourtsoflawonthegroundthat
theseprovisionsarenotwithinthelimitsofAllahandareintransgressionthereof.Thus,thelaw
regardingpoliticalparties,modeofelection,theentirestructureofgovernmentasembodiedinthe
Constitution,thepowersandprivilegesofthePresidentandotherfunctionariesofthegovernmentwill
beopentoquestion.Indeed,theverybasisonwhichtheConstitutionisfoundednamelythetrichotomy
ofpowersi.e.thatthethreegreatorgansoftheStatehavetheirownparticularspheresofauthority
whereintheyexercisetheirrespectivepowersorthesystemofchecksandbalancescouldbe
challenged,alongwithalltheancillaryprovisionsembodiedinthe1973Constitutioninrelationthereto.
Thus,insteadofmakingthe1973Constitutionmorepurposeful,suchaninterpretationofArticle2A,
namelythatitisincontrolofalltheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionwouldresultinunderminingit
andpavethewayforitseventualdestructionoratleastitscontinuanceinitspresentform.This
presumablywasnottheintention.TheirintentionsimplywasthattheObjectivesResolution
shouldnolongerbetreatedmerelyasadeclarationofintentbutshouldenjoythestatusofa
substantiveprovisionandbecomeequalinweightandstatusastheothersubstantiveprovisionsofthe
Constitution.Incaseanyinconsistencywasfoundtoexistbetweentheprovisionsofthe1973
ConstitutionandthoseoftheObjectivesResolutionwould,theyexpected,beharmonisedbytheCourts
inaccordancewiththewellestablishedrulesofinterpretationoftheConstitutionaldocumentsalready
mentioned.BeingcreaturesoftheConstitutionitwasnotvisualisedthattheycouldnotannulany
existingConstitutionalprovisions(onthepleaofitsrepugnancywiththeprovisionsofArticle2A)asno
Court,operatingunderaConstitution,candoso.TousethepicturesquewordsofMr.Justice(Rtd.)Sh.
AftabHussain,formerChiefJusticeoftheFederalShariatCourt,inhisdiscourseonthesubjectofthe
ShariatBillanditsimplicationsPLD1986Journal327,TheCourtsarethecreationoftheConstitution
andonnoprincipleoflawcantheybeallowedtocutthetreeonwhichtheyareperched.
(perNasimHasanShah,J.)
NowhereintheObjectivesResolution,eitherexpresslyorimpliedlydoIfindeitheratestofrepugnancy
orofcontrariety,norempoweringofanindividualorofaninstitutionorauthorityorevenaCourtto
invoke,applyanddeclareDivinelimits,andgoonstrikingeverythingthatcomesinconflictwithitby
referencetoArticle2A.SuchaninterpretationofArticle2AoftheConstitutionandappropriationof
authoritysotodoamountstousurpation.Itwouldindeedbesowhentheamplitudeofpowerreserved
fortheParliamentinthesameConstitutionalinstrumentiskeptinview.
TheviewtakenintheSupremeCourtdecisionssofaristhatArticle2AoftheConstitutiondidnot
subordinateChapter3AofPartVIIoftheConstitution(Ahmedv.AbdulAzizPLD1989SC771);thatit
couldnotbeadoptedasaruleofrepugnancefordefeatingtheotherArticlesoftheConstitution(Safdar
AliscasePLD1988SC287);itcouldbeutilisedforcorrectingandreviewingtheordersofjudicialand
quasijudicialtribunalsasheldinthecaseofMianAzizA.Sheikh(PLD1989SC613).
TheCourtsprimarydutyistoadjudicatebyreferencetopositivelawinamannertolendcertainty,
clarityandprecisiontotheapplicationoflawtoconcretequestionsoflawandfactnecessarilyrequired
tobedecided.TheCourtshouldnotundertakeexaminationoftheoreticalacademicquestionsnor
shouldordinarilylookforanomaliesintheConstitutionwithaviewtosuggesttoParliament
amendmentorimprovementintheConstitution.IftheintroductionofArticle2AoftheConstitutionasa
substantiveprovisionoftheConstitutiondoesnotbyitselfauthorisetheCourttoadoptitasatestof
repugnancywithregardtotheotherConstitutionalprovisionsitwouldbebetterforthesuperiorCourts
nottoundertakethisexerciseortorecordopinionsonmeritswithregardtosuchrepugnancy.That
wouldbeacommitmentnotconducivetothepurelyjudicialfunctionsthattheCourtsarerequiredto
performundertheConstitution.
(perShafiurRahman,J.)
IalsoagreethatifanyArticleoftheConstitutionisinconflictwithArticle2Atheappropriateprocedure
istohaveitamendedinaccordancewiththeprescribedprovisionforthepurpose.
(perAbdulShakurulSalam,J.)
22.SubsequentlyinthecaseofMst.KaneezFatimav.WaliMuhammadandanother(PLD1993SC
901)thisCourthadobservedinthecontextofArticle2AoftheConstitutionandtheObjectives
Resolutionof1949asfollows:
Asisobviousfromtheaforesaidweightyobservations,Article2Acannotbepressedintoservicefor
strikingdownanyprovisionoftheConstitutiononthegroundthatitisnotselfexecutoryandalsothat
anotherprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownbeinginconflictwithanyotherprovisionof
theConstitution.
Article2AmakestheObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartoftheConstitution.TheObjectives
Resolutioninteraliaprovidesthatandensurestheindependenceofjudiciary.Thesehighideals
weresetouttobeincorporatedintheConstitutionandonthebasisoftheseguidelinestheConstitution
wasframed.
InthelatercaseofJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinderandothersv.FederationofPakistanandanother
(PLD2010SC483)aBenchofthisCourtcomprisingoffourteenHonourableJudges(includingthe
presentHonourableChiefJusticeandJawwadS.Khawaja,J.)hadthefollowingtoobserveinrespectof
theObjectivesResolutionof1949andArticle2AoftheConstitution:
TheObjectivesResolutionremainedasubjectofdiscussioninvariousjudgmentsandthejudicial
consensusseemstobethatwhileinterpretingtheConstitution,theObjectivesResolutionmustbe
embodiedtherein.ButthatdoesnotmeanthatObjectivesResolutionistobegivenastatushigherthan
struckdownonthebasisofanotherprovision.TheObjectivesResolutionmadesubstantivepartofthe
Constitutionprovidesanewapproachtotheconstitutionalinterpretationsincetheprinciplesand
provisionsoftheObjectivesResolutionhavebeenplacedinthebodyoftheConstitutionandhavenow
tobereadalongwiththeotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.
(italicsandunderlininghavebeensuppliedforemphasis)
Twothingsdecidedinthatcaseareofcriticalimportancetothepresentsetofpetitions:firstly,any
conceptualassumptionofjurisdictionbythisCourtbytreatingtheprinciples(calledbywhatevername
orexpression)oftheObjectivesResolutionof1949,thePreambletotheConstitutionorArticle2Aof
theConstitution,uponwhichthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionislargely
basedbythepetitioners,tobeofhigherstatusthantheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionisnot
acceptableinourconstitutionaldispensationandsecondly,eventextuallyoneprovisionofthe
Constitutionoraconceptattachedtothesamecannotbeallowedtobeutilizedforthepurposeof
strikingdownanyotherprovisionoftheConstitutionwhichmayseeminglybeinconflictwiththat
provisionorconcept.Inthepresenceofthatjudgmentunanimouslyhandeddownbyafourteen
memberBenchofthisCourttheObjectivesResolution,thePreambleandArticle2Aaswellasthe
principlescontainedtherein(thesocalledbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution)cannot
nowbydeclaredasatouchstoneoratestofrepugnancyorcontrarietyvisvistheotherprovisionsor
anamendmentoftheConstitutionunlessinthepresentorinsomefuturecasefourteenormore
HonourableJudgesofthisCourtholdotherwisebyoverrulingtheinterpretationoftheObjectives
Resolution,thePreambleandArticle2ApropoundedinthesaidcaseofJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinder.
ItisalsoimportanttonotethatthedeclarationthatOneprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruck
downonthebasisofanotherprovisionmadebyfourteenHonourableJudgesofthisCourtinthatcase
undoubtedlycoversalltheprovisionsoftheConstitutionincludingArticle175(3)pertainingto
separationbetweentheExecutiveandtheJudiciaryandthesaiddeclarationmadeandtheprinciple
enunciatedbyfourteenHonourableJudgesofthisCourtcannotnowbeundoneordepartedordeviated
frombyaBenchorgroupofHonourableJudgesoflessernumericalstrength.Iunderstandthatinthe
presentsetofcasesthenumericalstrengthoftheHonourableJudgesofthisCourtpurportingtoassume
jurisdictioninthematter,beitonconceptualortextualbasis,islessthanfourteenandifthatbeso
then,withprofoundrespect,suchanendeavourorenterprisemay,inthewordsofShakespeare,
amounttomuchadoaboutnothingbecausetheconstitutionalinterpretationadvancedandthelaw
declaredbyfourteenHonourableJudgesofthisCourtinthecaseofJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinder
wouldstillholdthefield.
23.ThroughthepresentpetitionstheprovisionsofArticle175AoftheConstitutionhavebeen
assailedonnothingbutthetouchstoneoftheObjectivesResolution,thePreambleandArticle2Aofthe
Constitution,particularlywithreferencetotheprovisioncontainedthereinregardingfullysecuring
independenceofthejudiciary.InthecaseofHakimKhan(supra)thisCourthadparticularlynoticedwith
referencetosomespecificportionsofthespeechesmadebysomeveryimportantandresponsible
FoundingFathersbeforetheConstituentAssemblythattheidealsandobjectivesmentionedinthe
proposedObjectivesResolutioncouldevenbemodifiedatthetimeofframingoftheactualConstitution
itself.Itis,thus,obviousthatusingtheidealandobjectivequafullysecuringtheindependenceofthe
judiciarycontainedintheObjectivesResolution,nowformingasubstantivepartoftheConstitution
throughArticle2A,andmakingthesameabasisforacceptingandapplyingthetheoryofbasicfeatures
orbasicstructureoftheConstitutionwouldbemisconceivedbesidesbeinginconflictwiththemanifest
intentionoftheFoundingFathersinthisregard.Itisalsoclearfromthejudgmentsrenderedbythis
CourtinthecasesofHakimKhan,Mst.KaneezFatimaandJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinder(supra)that
theObjectivesResolutionwasmeantonlytoenvisionthepillarsonwhichthestructureoftheproposed
Constitutionwastobeerectedandthatoncethestructurewasinfacterectedthentheidealsand
objectivescontainedintheObjectivesResolutioncouldnotbeallowedtobeutilizedforthepurposeof
demolishinganypillaroranypartofthestructureactuallyconstructedorforpullingortearingdown
anymodificationofsuchstructure.Tomethatapproachwasaveryprudentapproachandina
somewhatsimilarsituationthrownupbythepresentpetitionsthatcoursewouldbethewisestto
adopt.InviewoftheconsideredopinionsalreadyrecordedbythisCourtonthesubjectintheabove
mentionedthreecasesthereishardlyanyoccasion,proverbiallyspeaking,totrytoreinventthewheel
throughthepresentpetitions.
24.ApartfromwhathasbeenobservedaboveImayaddthatitisquiteunderstandableastowhy
theprovisionsoftheObjectivesResolutionof1949,thePreambletotheConstitutionreflectingthe
principlesoftheObjectivesResolutionandArticle2AoftheConstitutionmakingtheprinciplesand
provisionssetoutintheObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionandgivingthem
effectaccordinglyhadnotbeenacceptedintheabovementionedcasesasatouchstoneoratestof
repugnancyorcontrarietyquatheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionandthereasonsprevailinginthat
regardcanalsobepressedintoservicewithanequalpersuasiveforcefornotacceptingandapplyingthe
theoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution.TheObjectivesResolutionof1949
containedtheidealsandobjectivesofthepeopleandwaspassedbytheConstituentAssemblytoguide
theframersoftheConstitutioninframingtheConstitution.Thebasicidealsandobjectivesofthepeople
reflectedintheObjectivesResolutionrevolvedaroundIslam,democracy,federalism,provincial
autonomy,fundamentalrightsincludingprotectionforminoritiesandindependenceofthejudiciary.It
isnotdisputedthatthePreamblestoallthepermanentConstitutionsframedinthiscountryafter
passageoftheObjectivesResolutionwerebyandlargebasedupontheprovisionsoftheObjectives
ResolutionandtheConstitutionsthemselvesenshrinedmoreorlessallthesaididealsandobjectives
andinfactallthesaidConstitutionswereactuallywovenaroundthoseidealsandobjectives.Through
insertionofArticle2AintheConstitutionof1973theprinciplesandprovisionssetoutintheObjectives
ResolutionweremadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionandeffecthadbeengiventothem
accordingly.Thenexus,nayinterchangeability,betweentheObjectivesResolution,thePreamble,Article
2AandthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionof1973is,thus,undeniableandthesamewasso
recognizedintheShortOrderpassedunanimouslybyalltheHonourableJudgesdecidingthecaseof
MahmoodKhanAchakzai(supra).TherelevantpartoftheShortOrderreadasfollows:
ThatbeingthefactualpositionitmayarguablybesaidthattheprinciplesofIslam,democracy,
federalism,provincialautonomy,fundamentalrightsincludingprotectionforminoritiesand
independenceofthejudiciaryformedthebedrock,fundamentalprinciples,basicfeaturesorbasic
structureofalltheConstitutionsframedandadoptedinthiscountry.Suchastatementnecessarilysets
thestageforlaunchingandacceptingthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution
andopensadoorforthisCourttostrikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitutionoranyamendmentof
theConstitutiononthetouchstoneofthattheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructurebut,quiteclearly,
intheabovementionedcasesofHakimKhan,Mst.KaneezFatimaandJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinder
thisCourtwasconsciousofthedangersinherentinacceptingtheidealsandobjectivessetoutinthe
ObjectivesResolution,thePreambleandArticle2Aasatouchstoneoratestofrepugnancyor
contrarietyquatheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionbecauseacceptanceofoneoftheaforereferred
fundamentalprinciplesorbasicfeaturesasatouchstoneoratestofrepugnancyorcontrarietywould
havemeantacceptanceofeachoftheotherfundamentalprinciplesandbasicfeaturesalsoasa
touchstoneoratestofrepugnancyorcontrarietyandthatwouldhaverenderedtheentireConstitution
vulnerable.ItisevidentthatinthosecasesthisCourtwasconsciousofthefactthattheObjectives
Resolution,thePreamble,Article2AandthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionweredifferentsidesor
facetsofthesamecoinandacceptabilityofoneasatouchstoneoratestofrepugnancyorcontrariety
wouldipsofactomeangivingthesameeffecttotheotherandthisCourtconsciouslywantedtoavoid
thatresult.RegardingIslamasatouchstoneithadbeenobservedbyNasimHasanShah,J.inthecaseof
HakimKhanthatThusalltheprovisionsoftheexistingConstitutionwillbechallengeablebeforeCourts
oflawonthegroundthattheseprovisionsarenotwithinthelimitsofAllahandareintransgression
thereof.Thus,thelawregardingpoliticalparties,modeofelection,theentirestructureofgovernment
asembodiedintheConstitution,thepowersandprivilegesofthePresidentandotherfunctionariesof
thegovernmentwillbeopentoquestion.Likewise,ifdemocracyweretobeallowedtobecomea
touchtonethentheprovisionsintheConstitutionregardingbicamerallegislature,structureof
governments,modeofelections,powersofthepoliticalexecutive,etc.wouldbecomeshuttlecocksin
thecourtsatthehandsofpeopleadvocatingdifferentformsandpatternsofdemocracy.Similarly,if
federalismandprovincialautonomyweretobeacceptedastouchstonesthentheprovisionsinthe
Constitutionregardinglegislativelists,relationsbetweentheFederationandtheProvincesandinter
provincialrelationswouldbeassailablebeforethecourtsthroughallsortsofchallenges.Inthesame
vein,ifindependenceofthejudiciaryweretobedeclaredandacceptedasatouchstoneoratestof
repugnancyorcontrarietyquatheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionthentheprovisionsofthe
Constitutioninrespectofstructureofthejudicialhierarchy,jurisdictionofvariouscourts,modesof
appointmentanddisciplinaryprocesseswouldallbecomechallengeablebeforethecourtsoflawon
differentgrounds.Allsuchchallengeswould,ofcourse,requireavaluejudgmentbythecourtsand
insteadofthepeopledecidingastowhatisgoodforthemitwouldultimatelybethecourtsdetermining
astowhatisgoodforthepeople.Thatsurelywouldbringseriousdamageanddestruction,ifnotdoom,
totheconstitutionalsystemasweknowittodayandthisisexactlywhathadbeenwarnedagainstby
NasimHasanShah,J.whenhislordshiphadobservedinthecaseofHakimKhanthatThus,insteadof
makingthe1973Constitutionmorepurposeful,suchaninterpretationofArticle2A,namelythatitisin
controlofalltheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionwouldresultinunderminingitandpavetheway
foritseventualdestructionoratleastitscontinuanceinitspresentform.Thereishardlyanydifference
betweentheidealsandobjectivescontainedintheObjectivesResolution,thePreambleandArticle2A
oftheConstitutionontheonehandandthebasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitution
canvassedbeforeusthroughthesepetitionsontheotherhand.Inthisviewofthemattertheapproach
adoptedbythisCourtinrespectoftheObjectivesResolution,thePreambleandArticle2Ainthecases
ofHakimKhan,Mst.KaneezFatimaandJusticeKhurshidAnwarBhinder(supra)mustalsobeadoptedin
respectofthesocalledbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionifwearetoproperly
dischargeourdutytopreserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionasswornbyusinourofficialoath.
ThisalsoexplainswhyintheabovementionedcasesofZiaurRehman,PirSabirShah,UnitedSugar
Mills,MahmoodKhanAchakzai,WukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandPakistanLawyersForum
(supra)thisCourthad,despiteidentifyingandrecognizingsomesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,
consciouslyandconsistentlyrefusedtotreatthemasbasicfeaturesinaparticularsenselesttheymight
beutilizedforattractingthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionand,asNasim
HasanShah,J.hadremarkedinthecaseofHakimKhan,pavethewayforitseventualdestructionorat
leastitscontinuanceinitspresentform.Thisisalsothereasonwhydespiteacceptanceandapplication
ofthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionbytheIndianandsomeothercourts
thecourtsinPakistanhavesofarstoppedshortofacceptanceandapplicationofthattheorybecause
suchacceptanceandapplicationofthattheorywouldrekindleandunleashthedestructivepotentials
engrainedintreatingtheprinciplesandprovisionsoftheObjectivesResolutionof1949,thePreamble
andArticle2AoftheConstitutionofPakistanastouchstoneortestofrepugnancyorcontrarietyvisvis
theotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.Admittedlythesaidtheoryhasnotextualsupportfromthe
ConstitutionandIentertainnomannerofdoubtthatanyattemptmadetoreintroduceandapplythat
academicandjudiciallydiscardedtheoryinthegarboforundertheveilofaconceptualinterpretation
oftheConstitutionwouldbewroughtwiththesamehazardsandperilsaswerefearedfromadirect
acceptanceandapplicationofthattheory.Theproverbialoldwine,ifoxidizedandturnedintovinegar
anddeclaredassuch,wouldbeequallysourevenifpresentedinanewbottle.
25.Anapparentconflictbetweentwoormorefundamentalprinciplesorcorevaluesofa
Constitutionisachallengewhichisfrequentlybeingfacedbythejudiciariesofmanycountriesthese
daysandforresolvingsuchconflictsbaseduponcompetingprinciplesorvaluesorbasedupon
conflictingrightsguaranteedbydifferentprovisionsofthesameConstitutiondifferentapproachesare
beingadoptedindifferentpartsoftheworld.InCanadaPartIoftheConstitutionAct,1982containsthe
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsandsection1ofthesameprovidesasfollows:

TheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsguaranteestherightsandfreedomssetoutinitsubject
onlytosuchreasonablelimitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeand
democraticsociety.
InReferenceReSecessionofQuebec[1998]2S.C.R.217,apartfromthecompetingrightscontext,
CanadasSupremeCourtwasconfrontedwithaveryinterestingpropositionthatinvolvedresolvingand
articulatingunderlyingconstitutionalvaluesderivedfromhistory,andnotthetext.Thequestionwas
whetherQuebeccouldlegallyandconstitutionallysecedefromCanadabyholdingaunilateral
referendumandtheCourtinteraliaheldasfollows:
OurConstitutionisprimarilyawrittenone,theproductof131yearsofevolution.Behindthewritten
wordisanhistoricallineagestretchingbackthroughtheages,whichaidsintheconsiderationofthe
underlyingconstitutionalprinciples.Theseprinciplesinformandsustaintheconstitutionaltext:theyare
thevitalunstatedassumptionsuponwhichthetextisbased.Thefollowingdiscussionaddressesthefour
foundationalconstitutionalprinciplesthataremostgermaneforresolutionofthisReference:
federalism,democracy,constitutionalismandtheruleoflaw,andrespectforminorityrights.These
definingprinciplesfunctioninsymbiosis.Nosingleprinciplecanbedefinedinisolationfromtheothers,
nordoesanyoneprincipletrumporexcludetheoperationofanyother.
SecessionwouldinvolveanamendmenttotheConstitutionandQuebeccouldnotamendthe
Constitutionunilaterally.Ontheotherhand,thereferendumhadnoconstitutionalrecognitionorvalue.
TheCourtsaidthattheunderlyingprincipleofdemocracydemandedthatthereferendumbegiven
somevalue.Ontheotherhand,underlyingprinciplesoffederalism,democracy,constitutionalismand
ruleoflawrequiredthatunilateralactionnotbetaken(becausefortheotherstatesinclusionofQuebec
intheunionwaspartofthebargainofbeingwithintheunion).Therefore,theCourtreconciledthese
conflictsbyreadingintotheamendmentclauseadutytonegotiateQuebecsexitshouldsucha
referendumtakeplaceandhavethatresult.
26.InthecontextoftwoormorecompetingfundamentalrightstheCanadianapproachisthat
whereastateactionseemstorestrictafundamentalright/freedomtheconstitutionallyprescribedtest
underSection1iswhetherornottherestrictioncanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocratic
society.TheCanadianSupremeCourtlaiddownthetestforwhenarestrictioncanbedemonstrably
justifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyinRv.Oakes[1986]1S.C.R103andlateronthesaidtestwas
appliedinthecasesofRossv.NewBrunswickSchoolDistrictNo.15[1996]1S.C.R.825,Rv.S.(N.)2012
SCC72,Dagenaisv.CanadianBroadcastingCorp.[1994]3S.C.R385,Rv.Keegstra[1990]3S.C.R.697,
Canada(HumanRightsCommission)v.Taylor[1990]1S.C.R892andRv.Mills[1999]3S.C.R.668.
27.InGermanytheConstitution(TheBasicLaw)explicitlyrankscertainprovisionsoverothers
andstatesthatcertainportionsofTheBasicLawareunamendable.Article79(3),governing
amendmenttoTheBasicLaw,provides:
AmendmentstothisBasicLawaffectingthedivisionoftheFederationintoLander,theirparticipation
onprincipleinthelegislativeprocess,ortheprincipleslaiddowninArticles1and20shallbe
inadmissible.
Article1providesfortherighttofreedevelopmentofpersonality(subjectonlytotheconstitutional
order,therightsofothersandthemorallaw).Italsoprovidesfortherighttolife,physicalintegrityand
freedomoftheperson.Article20providesforthedemocratic,socialfederalState,i.e.thenatureofthe
StatethatGermanywillbeandthesefeaturescannotbeamended.ItwasinthiscontextthatGermany
decidedtwoAbortioncases.IntheAbortionCaseIof1975thelawwasamendedanditwaslaiddown
thatabortionwouldbepunishableif(a)carriedoutinthefirst12weekswithconsentofthepregnant
woman;(b)carriedoutafter12weeksandtherewasadangertolifeorhealthofthewoman;(c)carried
outpriorto22weeksifthechildhadsomegravehereditaryorotherharmfulcondition.Inallcasesthe
pregnantwomanwouldhavefirstreceivedcounselingandonlythenwouldabortionnotbepunishable;
andincaseofafter12weeks,thecounselingcenterhadtocertifythattheconditioninquestionexisted.
ThequestionwaswhetherArticle2(2)(righttolifeandphysicalintegrity)readwithArticle1(human
dignity,inalienabilityofhumanrights)protectionextendstoafetusandwhataboutthefundamental
rightsofthelivingperson(themother)?TheFederalConstitutionalCourtofGermanyverymuch
adoptedahierarchyofrightsapproach.Itstatedthattherighttolifeisprotectednotjustagainst
attacksbytheStateitselfbutthereisanobligationontheStatetoprotectlifeagainstattacksbyothers,
i.e.adutytopreservelifeandpunishtheactofitstaking.Therefore,theunbornchildhadarighttolife
asagainstitsmotheranditwasrequiredthatabortionbeacriminalact.However,inlimited
circumstances,wherethetotalityofcircumstanceswouldmakeitunreasonablethatawomanbeforced
tocarryapregnancytotermagainstherwill(e.g.wheretodosowouldjeopardizeherownlifeorrisk
serioushealthissues)thelegislaturecouldmakeprovisionforsuchabortionsnottobepunished.The
scopeofjudicialinterventioninthislegislativedomainwascarefullyarticulatedbytheCourtanditwas
observedasfollows:
Theconstitutionalrequirementtoprotectdevelopinglifeisdirectedinthefirstinstancetothe
legislature.ThedutyisincumbentontheFederalConstitutionalCourt,however,todetermine,inthe
exerciseofthefunctionallottedtoitbytheBasicLaw,whetherthelegislaturehasfulfilledthis
requirement.Indeed,theCourtmustcarefullyobservethediscretionofthelegislaturewhichbelongsto
itinevaluatingthefactualconditionswhichlieatthebasisofitsformationofnorms,whichdiscretionis
fittingfortherequiredprognosisandchoiceofmeans.Thecourtmaynotputitselfintheplaceofthe
legislature;itis,however,itstasktoexaminecarefullywhetherthelegislature,intheframeworkofthe
possibilitiesstandingatitsdisposal,hasdonewhatisnecessarytoavertdangersfromthelegalvalueto
beprotected.
InthecontextofconflictbetweencompetingrightstheCourthadthefollowingtoobserveregardingthe
hierarchyofrights:
TheBasicLawoftheFederalRepublicofGermanyhaserectedanorderboundtogetherbyvalues
whichplacestheindividualhumanbeingandhisdignityatthefocalpointofallofitsordinances.Atits
basisliestheconcept,astheFederalConstitutionalCourtpreviouslypronounced(Decisionsofthe
FederalConstitutionalCourt,2,i12),thathumanbeingspossessaninherentworthasindividualsin
orderofcreationwhichuncompromisinglydemandsunconditionalrespectforthelifeofeveryindividual
humanbeing,evenfortheapparentlysocially"worthless"andwhichthereforeexcludesthedestruction
ofsuchlifewithoutlegallyjustifiablegrounds.Thisfundamentalconstitutionaldecisiondeterminesthe
structureandtheinterpretationoftheentirelegalorder.Eventhelegislatureisboundbyit;
considerationsofsociopoliticalexpediency,evennecessitiesofState,cannotovercomethis
constitutionallimitation(DecisionsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,1,1436).
TheAbortionCaseIIof1993didnotdepartradicallyfromthereasoningofthefirstcasementioned
above.However,itdiddepartinconclusions.ItsaidthattheStatehadaconstitutionalobligationto
makesurethattoolittleprotectionwasnotprovidedtounbornlife.Ifabortionislegalized,thiswould
bethecase.Soabortionmustbeconsideredillegal,butdoesnotneednecessarilytobeacriminal
offence.However,thelegislaturecanmakeprovisionforwhenevenanillegalabortionwillnotbe
punished.Therefore,itrelaxeditsviewontheabortionquestionandpermittedabortionswithinthe
first12weeksaslongastherewasstatecounselingoftheindividualwhosoughttheabortion.Thisis
becausetheCourtsaidtheonlywaytomakecounselingeffectivewasfortheswordofcriminalsanction
nothangingovertheheadsofthoseseekingabortions.
28.InGermanytheMuslimHeadscarfCaseof2003highlightedaconflictbetweenaconstitutional
valueandanindividualsright.ThedecisionoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtinthatcaseseemsto
suggestthatwhererightsconflictthebalancingactistobedonebytheParliament.Thereis,inGerman
law,aprincipleofpracticalconcordancewhenconstitutionalrulesconflict.Thenameissuggestiveof
theexercisetobecarriedoutinsuchcases.
29.IntheUnitedStatesofAmericathecaselawlargelydoesnotemploythekindofanalysisthat,
forexample,theCanadianSupremeCourtemploys.Tobesure,whenStateactionorindividualrights
conflict,aresolutionisfoundbutitusuallyisnotfoundbyacknowledgingcompetingrightsand
reconcilingthem.AgoodexampleistheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdecisiononabortion:Roev.Wade
(No.7018)410U.S.113.WhereastheGermanConstitutionalCourtrecognizedasetofcompetingrights
theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdidnot.Itsreasoningwasthattherewasonerightinvolved:thatof
thewoman,herbodilyintegrityandprivacy.Ontheotherhand,werenotrightsbutrathertwovalid
stateinterests:theStateinteresttoprotectwomenshealthandtheStateinteresttofosterthe
potentialityoflife.Insuchcases,whenthegovernmenttakesameasureinpursuanceofavalidState
interestthathastheeffectofinfringingafundamentalright,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtemploys
astrictscrutinytest.Thetestisthreefold:
(i)Theremustbeacompellinggovernmentalinterest.
(ii)Thelaworpolicymustbenarrowlytailoredtoachievethatinterest.
(iii)Anditmustbetheleastrestrictivemeansofachievingthatinterest.
InthecaseofRoeabanonabortionwasunderconsiderationandtheCourtheldthatinthefirst
trimesterthegovernmentinterestwasnotcompellingenoughtointerferewiththewomansright
becausetherisktohealthwasminimalandpotentialityoflifetooremote.Inthethirdtrimesterthe
interestbecomescompellingenoughand,therefore,abortioncanberestricted.Inthiswaydefining
awayonesetofrightsasacompellinginterestistypicaloftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtasis
evidentfromthecasesofCapitolSquareReviewandAdvisoryBoardv.Pinette(515U.S.753)andNew
YorkTimesCo.v.UnitedStatesSupremeCourt(403U.S.713).IntheformercaseonlySouterJ.briefly
followedthecompetingvaluesanalysis.IntheUnitedStatesthecasesonthisissuehavetwo
distinguishingfactors:
(i)Therearenoconstitutionalamendmentsintheircases.
(ii)Thecaselawisgenerallyframedinthesenseofarightversusagovernmentalinterest.
ThecaseofSchenckv.U.S.((1918)249U.S.47)wasalsoanexampleofbalancingcompetingrightsor
conflictingpublicinterests.Evenintheirpost9/11nationalsecuritydecisions,thekeyissueisthe
applicabilityoftheUnitedStatesConstitutiononcertaindetainees.First,theissuewaswhether
GuantanamoBaydetaineeshadtherighttochallengetheirdetentionasenemycombatants.TheCourt
saidthatarighthadtobegiventothemandthen,inordertodoso,thegovernmentthroughan
executiveorderestablishedmilitarycommissionswherethedetaineescouldbringsuchachallengeand
thiswaschallengedandstruckdownonthegroundthatonlytheCongresscoulddoso(andnotthe
Executive).ThereaftertheCongressenactedasimilarregimeandthiswaschallengedonthegroundthat
itwasnotanadequatereplacementfortherightofhabeascorpusgrantedintheConstitution.Sothe
questionaroseastowhethertheconstitutionalrightofhabeascorpusappliedtothedetaineesornot
andtheCourtheldthatitdid.However,ineachofthesecasesasubconstitutionalinstrument
attemptedtoavoidtheConstitutionwhichfactormaynotbestrictlyrelevanttotheissuebeforethis
Courtinthepresentsetofpetitions.
30.IntheUnitedKingdomthecaseofA.G.v.TimesNewspaper(1974)A.C.273,inIndiathecases
ofChintamanRaov.M.P.(1950)S.C.R.759,Madrasv.V.G.Row(1952)S.C.R.597,RamjiLalModi.v.
U.P.(1955)1S.C.R.1004,BabulalParatev.Maharashtra(1961)3S.C.R.423andS.Rangarajanv.P.
JagjivanRam(1989)2S.C.C.574andinPakistanthecasesofEastandWestSteamshipCompanyv.
Pakistan(PLD1958SC41),IndependentNewspaperCorporation(Pvt.)Ltd.v.ChairmanFourthWage
BoardandImplementationTribunalforNewspaperEmployees(1993PLC673),JameelAhmedMalikv.
PakistanOrdinanceFactoriesBoard(2004SCMR164)andPakistanMuslimLeaguev.Federation(PLD
2007SC642)aresomeofthecaseswhereintheissuedealtwithbythecourtswasbalancingcompeting
rightsorconflictingpublicinterests.InthePakistanicontextthecourtshavegenerallytotreadvery
carefullyinthiskindofasituationbecausebringingaboutabalanceincompetingorconflictingvaluesor
principlesisonethingandallowingonevalueorprincipletotrumpanotherisatotallydifferentthing
andifthelattercourseisadoptedinPakistanthenIslamasreligion(withallitsdifferentsectsand
interpretationshavingnouniformityofthoughtoraction)maytrounceorovershadowallothervalues
orprinciplesandthisiswhatwascautionedagainstbyNasimHasanShah,J.inthecaseofHakimKhan
(supra)whenhehadobservedthatThus,insteadofmakingthe1973Constitutionmorepurposeful,
suchaninterpretationofArticle2A,namelythatitisincontrolofalltheotherprovisionsofthe
Constitutionwouldresultinunderminingitandpavethewayforitseventualdestructionoratleastits
continuanceinitspresentform.
31.Thisbringsmetotheissueofseparationofpowersandtheroleofthecourtsinrespectof
judicialreview.InsistinguponisolationofthejudicialorganoftheStatefromtheotherorganssomeof
thelearnedcounselforthepetitionershaveinvokedtheconceptofseparationofpowersandhave
criticizedinclusionofpoliticiansintheprocessofappointmentofjudges.Clause(3)ofArticle175ofthe
ConstitutionrequiresthattheJudiciaryistobeseparatedfromtheExecutivebutthatprimarilymeans
thattheJudiciaryisnottoperformexecutivefunctionsandtheExecutiveisnottoperformjudicial
functions.Itisimportanttonoticethatinclause(2)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionithadbeen
stipulatedthatNocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbythe
Constitutionorbyorunderanylawandthatclausewasfollowedbyclause(3)mandatingthatThe
JudiciaryshallbeseparatedprogressivelyfromtheExecutivewithin[fourteen]yearsfromthe
commencingday.Itisevidentthatclause(2)ofArticle175dealtwithjurisdictionofthecourtsand
clause(3)talkedofthejudiciaryasaninstitutionperformingjudicialfunctionsand,thus,theseparation
beingcontemplatedwasinrespectofthefunctionsbeingperformedbythetwoorgansoftheStatein
theirdefinedspheres.Apartfromthatsuchseparationwasprimarilyintendedtobeachievedatthesub
constitutionallevelandwasnevermeanttobringaboutaseparationbetweenthetwoorgansofthe
StateeveninmatterswheretheConstitutionitselfprovidesforcollaborativeandconcertedactionby
thetwoinmattersessentiallynonjudicial.Inordertounderstandtheextentandscopeoftheprovisions
ofclause(3)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionvisvisseparationoftheJudiciaryfromtheExecutiveit
shallbeadvantageoustoreproduceanextractfromaspeechdeliveredbyMr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,
oneoftheFoundingFathersoftheConstitutionof1973,ontheflooroftheNationalAssemblyon
03.09.1976duringthedebateontheConstitution(FifthAmendment)Bill,1976whereinhehad
remarkedasfollows:
WehadprovidedintheConstitutionthatwithinaperiodofthreeyears,Judiciaryshallbeseparated
fromtheExecutive.BytheseparationofJudiciarywedidnotcontemplatethesuperiorcourtsofjustice,
theSupremeCourtandtheHighCourts.ThesewerecourtsofMagistrates.
ThejudgmentdeliveredbythisCourtinthecaseofGovernmentofSindhandothersv.SharafFaridiand
others(PLD1994SC105)alsounmistakablyshowsthattheseparationoftheJudiciaryfromthe
Executivemandatedbyclause(3)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionprimarilypertainedtoseparation
regardingperformanceofrespectivefunctionsbythetwoorgansoftheStateandnottoageneral
prohibitionregardinganyinteractionbetweenthemwhatsoeverevenwheresuchinteractionwas
contemplatedorprovidedforbytheConstitutionitselfinnonjudicialmatters.Whileholdinginthat
judgmentthatindependenceofthejudiciaryisnecessarilyrelatabletoindependenceinperformanceof
judicialfunctionsitwasobservedbythisCourtasunder:
Nowaccordingtotheconsensusofthejurists,theindependenceofthejudiciarymeans
(a)thateveryJudgeisfreetodecidemattersbeforehiminaccordancewithhisassessmentofthe
factsandhisunderstandingofthelawwithoutimproperinfluences,inducementsorpressures,director
indirect,fromanyquarterorforanyreason;and
(b)thatthejudiciaryisindependentoftheExecutiveandLegislature,andhasjurisdiction,directly
orbywayofreview,overallissuesofajudicialnature.
AppointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsisessentiallyanexecutivefunctionbuttheConstitution
itselfhasalwaysprovidedforeffectiveparticipationofsomehighestmembersofthejudiciaryinthe
processofsuchappointments.Itisbutobviousthatthespecifiedmembersofthejudiciaryparticipating
intheconsultativeanddeliberativeprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsparticipate
insuchprocessaspersonadesignataandtheydonotperformanyjudicialfunctioninthatcapacity.Such
participationoftheExecutiveandtheJudiciaryintheconsultativeordeliberativeprocesspriortoan
appointmentandparticipationofeventheLegislatureinthatprocess,thus,cannotbesaidtobe
offensivetotheconstitutionalconceptofseparationofpowers.Thereisnodoubtinmymindthatthe
separationtalkedaboutinclause(3)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionpertainstofunctionalseparation
andnotinstitutionalisolation.ThisviewfindssupportfromthejudgmentshandeddownbythisCourtin
thecasesofUnitedSugarMills(supra)andFaujiFoundation(supra)whereinithadclearlybeen
recognizedthatseparationbetweendifferentorgansoftheStateisnotwatertight.
32.Whiledwellingonthequestionofseparationofpowerssomeofthelearnedcounselforthe
petitionershavealsoreferredtotheprovisionsofArticle7oftheConstitutiontomaintainthatwhile
definingtheStateinthatArticlethejudiciaryhadbeenkeptoutofthatdefinitionandthattoo
highlightsthatthejudiciaryistobekeptalooffromtheotherorgansoftheState.Ihave,however,
remainedunabletosubscribetothissubmission.Article7isplacedinPartIIoftheConstitutionandthat
PartoftheConstitutiondealswithFundamentalRightsandPrinciplesofPolicy.Article7ofthe
Constitutionreadsasfollows:
InthisPart,unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,theStatemeanstheFederalGovernment,Majlis
eShoora(Parliament),aProvincialGovernment,aProvincialAssembly,andsuchlocalorother
authoritiesinPakistanasarebylawempoweredtoimposeanytaxorcess.
AbarereadingofthisArticleshowsthatthedefinitionoftheStatecontainedthereinisrestrictedinits
applicabilitytoPartIIoftheConstitutiononlyandthewordsunlessthecontextotherwiserequires
manifestthateventhatdefinitionmaynotapplyinthatPartoftheConstitutionitselfifthecontextofa
particularmatterrequiresotherwise.Apartfromthatitisquiteunderstandablethatthejudiciarycould
notbeincludedinthedefinitionoftheStateforthepurposesofthatPartoftheConstitutionbecause,
intermsofthatPart,theStateistogiveeffecttotheFundamentalRightscontainedinChapter1ofthat
Partanditisthejudiciarywhich,inexerciseofitsjurisdictionunderclause1(c)ofArticle199andclause
(3)ofArticle184oftheConstitution,istoenforcethoserightsagainsttheStateincasesoftheir
violation.Insuchmatterstheroleofthejudiciaryisthatofamonitororanadjudicatorand,therefore,it
couldnotatthesametimebeclubbedtogetherwiththosewhoaretobemonitoredoradjudicated
against.AsregardsthePrinciplesofPolicycontainedinChapter2ofPartIIoftheConstitutionsufficeit
toobservethattheprinciplesofpolicycontainedinthatChapteraremeanttobeadoptedandfollowed
bytheexecutiveandlegislativeorgansoftheStateandnotbythejudiciaryandbyvirtueofclause(2)of
Article30oftheConstitutionvalidityofanyactiontakenorofanylawenactedinthatregardisnot
justiciable.Inthisviewofthematterthejudiciarylacksanydirectroleinrespectofsuchprinciplesof
policyand,therefore,itsexclusionfromthedefinitionoftheStateinArticle7shouldnotbedifficultto
comprehend.InthecaseofSharafFaridiand3othersv.TheFederationofIslamicRepublicofPakistan
andanother(PLD1989Karachi404)SaleemAkhtar,J.hadrecordedsimilarreasonsforexplainingasto
whythejudiciaryhadnotbeenincludedinthedefinitionoftheStateinArticle7oftheConstitution.
ThesubmissionmadeonthestrengthofArticle7oftheConstitutionhas,thus,utterlyfailedtoimpress
me.Itmayappeartobesomewhatincongruoustopointout,butsufficienttotakethewindoutofthis
submission,thatinthecaseofMst.FazalJanv.RoshanDinand2others(PLD1990SC661)thisCourt
andinthecaseofHajiNizamKhanv.AdditionalDistrictJudge,Lyallpurandothers(PLD1976Lahore
930)theLahoreHighCourthadheldthatforthepeculiarsituationsmentionedinthosejudgmentsthe
judiciarywouldbedeemedtobeincludedinthedefinitionoftheStatecontainedinArticle7ofthe
Constitution.Thosejudgmentsindicatethatthewordsunlessthecontextotherwiserequires
appearinginArticle7oftheConstitutionhaveexpresslykeptadooropenandthesubmissionmade
abovemaybeshownthedooronthisscoreaswell.
33.Judicialreviewofexecutiveactionandjudicialreviewoflegislativeactionstandexpressly
recognizedbyourConstitutionanditisjudicialreviewofconstitutionalamendmentwhichisatissuein
thepresentcases.Itisproverbialthatjudgesdonotmakelawbuttheyonlyinterpretit.However,while
advancingtheirownversionsofthetheoryoflegalpositivismlegalphilosopherslikeH.L.A.Hartand
RonaldDworkinhadmaintainedthatwhileinterpretingthelawjudgessometimesmakelawand,thus,
theylegislateandasasequeltothattheorysomelegalphilosophersmaintainthattheroleofjudges
shouldberestrictedtoapplyingthelawonlyandtheyshouldnotevenbeinterpretingthelaw.Justice
OliverWendellHolmesoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesofAmericahadsomethingofhisown
tosayonthesubjectandaccordingtohimJudgesdoandmustlegislatebuttheydosoonly
interstitially;theyareconfinedfrommolartomolecularmotions.Afurtherelaborationofthatwas
madebyJusticeCardozoofthesameCourtbyobservingthatthejudgelegislatesonlybetweengaps.
AccordingtohimEvenwithinthegaps,restrictionsnoteasytodefine,butfelt,howeverimpalpable
theymaybe,byeveryjudgeandlawyer,hedgeandcircumscribehisaction.Theyareestablishedbythe
traditionsofthecenturies,bytheexampleofotherjudges,hispredecessorsandhiscolleagues,bythe
collectivejudgmentoftheprofession,andbythedutyofadherencetothepervadingspiritofthelaw.
TheunderlyingthemeofthetheoryadvancedbyH.L.A.HartandRonaldDworkinandthefillingofthe
gapsbyjudgesintermsofthepervadingspiritofthelawtalkedaboutbyJusticeCardozomaybe
understandablebutagaintheyfallwithintherealmofacademictheoryandjudicialphilosophywhich
must,inagivencase,yieldtotheletteroftheConstitutionorthelawwhereitisclearandadmitsofno
ambiguity.InPakistanclause(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionclearlyprovidesthatFortheremoval
ofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthepoweroftheMajliseShoora
(Parliament)toamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandclause(5)ofthesameArticlegoes
ontomandatethatNoamendmentoftheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonany
groundwhatsoever.Onthestrengthofthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutiontheleanedcounselforthepetitionersrequirethisCourttodisregardtheunambiguous
provisionsofArticle239inthegarbofconstitutionalinterpretationandtheywantthisCourttoinject
judicialassumptionsintotheConstitutionnothavingthebackingofitsexplicitwordsorprovisionsso
thatthepresentwillofthepeopletobeachievedthroughrecentinsertionofArticle175Ainthe
Constitutionmaybethwartedand,surprisingly,theywantittobedoneinthenameofachievingthe
aspirationsofthepeoplewhohadadoptedtheoriginalConstitutionwaybackintheyear1973!A
judicialreviewwhichthwartsthepresentwillofthepeopleandtriestoimposethepastwillofthose
whoarenomoremaynothavemuchtocommenditself.Apartfromthatajudicialreviewwhich
sacrificestheexplicitwordsofaConstitutionatthealtarofsomehypotheticaljudicialassumptionsmay
alsonotcommenditselfforapproval.Ihavefoundalotofsubstanceinthesubmissionofthelearned
lawofficersthatwithinourconstitutionalsystemofseparationofpowersthelegitimatepowerof
judicialreviewoughtnottobeconfusedwithundertakingaconstitutionalreviewandthattooonthe
basisofnothingbutsomejudicialassumptions.TheJudgesofthisCourthaveswornanoathto
preserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionandstrikingdownapartoftheConstitutionbythem
may,inthewordsofSirFrancisBaconinhisessayOfInnovations,piecenotsowellwithsuchoath.
ThejudiciaryisacreationoftheConstitutionanditsjobistoapplyandinterprettheConstitutionand
thelaw.Itwouldappeartobeunwiseonitsparttotrytobewiserthanthecreator.Judgesareexpected
tobewiseanditwouldbeotherwiseiftheylayclaimonbeingwiserthanthewholesocietytheyare
meanttoserve.
34.Thesumtotalofalltheprecedentcasestreatingthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructure
favourablyisthatapowertoamenddoesnotincludeapowertodestroyand,therefore,theParliament
cannotbeallowedtodestroyabasicfeatureoftheConstitutionorthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionthroughaconstitutionalamendment.Accordingtothesaidtheorythejudiciaryhasthe
prerogativetointerprettheConstitutionand,therefore,throughthemeansofinterpretationitcanstop
theParliamentfromdestroyingtheConstitution.However,whatthistheorydoesnotcontemplateis
thatsovereigntyoftheParliamentanditspowerofamendingoftheConstitutionarealsofundamentals
oftheConstitutionandinanappropriatecasetheParliamentmayalsofeelthatthejudiciaryspowerto
interpretalsodoesnotincludeapowertodestroyanditcannotbeallowedtodestroythose
fundamentalsoftheConstitutioninthenameofinterpretationoftheConstitution.Ifthepowerto
amendtheConstitutionisaderivativepoweroftheParliamenttheneventhepowertointerpretthe
Constitutionisalsoaderivativepowerofthejudiciary.Thejudiciarysuseofthetheoryofbasicfeatures
orbasicstructureinsuchasituationmay,therefore,legitimatelybeperceivedasselfservingand
lopsided.Theconstitutionalprincipleofseparationofpowersisbaseduponabalanceofpowerand,
thus,thehazardsposedbyanytransgressionbythejudiciarymaybeasharmfultothebalanceasany
transgressionbytheParliament.Ifsuchbalanceisdisturbedorunderminedthenthejudiciarymayclaim
tohavethelastwordbutthepeopleandtheParliamentmayhavethelastlaugh.Letnobodyforgetthat
ifthepeoplecanadoptaConstitutionthentheycanalsooverthroworscrapthesameorrewriteit.An
attemptbythejudiciarytooversteptheprescribedlimitsinthenameofinterpretationsoastoreignin
theParliamentmayattractorpromptabacklashfromtheParliamentwhich,byinvokingsovereignty,
maywanttoreigninthejudiciaryandthatwouldbeasurerecipefordestructionoftheConstitution
anditsdelicatelypoisedsystemwhichboththeinstitutionsmayostensiblyandavowedlybeattempting
toavoid.TheConstitutionisasocialcontractwhichcreatesabalanceofpowersbyplacinglimitations
upondifferentorgans.Oversteppingofsuchlimitationsbyanyorganmaydestroythesocialcontact
itselfandmaymakethesystemcollapse,leadingtoanarchyandfreeforall.TheConstitutionof1973
clearlyrecognizestheParliamentasalegislativeaswellasaconstituentbodyasitexpresslyallowsitto
amendtheConstitutionandplacesnorestrictionuponitspowerstoamendtheConstitution.The
Constitutionalsoexpresslyouststhejurisdictionofthejudiciaryfromentertaininganychallengeagainst
anamendmentoftheConstitutionbroughtaboutbytheParliamentinaccordancewiththeprescribed
procedure.Inviewofsuchexplicitconstitutionalmandatesandsuchunequivocalconstitutional
prohibitionanyinterventioninthematterbythejudiciaryinthenameofsalvagingtheconstitutional
designwouldinfacthavetheeffectoftearingdowntheconstitutionalsystemratherthanrescuingor
savingit.Itis,thus,notsurprisingthatinthecasesofZiaurRahman,PirSabirShah(supra),Federation
ofPakistanv.SaeedAhmadKhanandothers(PLD1974SC151),IslamicRepublicofPakistanv.Abdul
WaliKhan,MNA(PLD1976SC57),DewanTextileMills,UnitedSugarMills,FaujiFoundation,Hakim
KhanandSyedZafarAliShah(supra)ithadcategorically,emphaticallyandunmincinglybeendeclared
thatthecourtsinPakistanderivingtheirauthorityandjurisdictionfromawrittenConstitutionhaveno
jurisdictiontostrikedownanyprovisionoramendmentoftheConstitution,exceptonthegroundof
someexpressinternalrequirementasopposedtoanyjudicialassumption.Itisofcriticalimportanceto
mentionherethatintheabovementionedcasesofAbdulWaliKhan,DewanTextileMills,UnitedSugar
Mills,FaujiFoundation,PirSabirShah,MehmoodKhanAchakzaiandPakistanLawyersForum(supra)
theIndiancasesofShankariPrasad,SajjanSingh,GolakNath,KesavanandaBharati,IndiraNehru
Gandhi,MinervaMillsandWamanRao(supra)weretakenduenoticeofwithreferencetotheissueof
judicialreviewofconstitutionalamendmentsandthetheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionanditwasconsciouslyandconsistentlydecidednottofollowtheIndianjudgmentsinthat
regard.Toquoteonlyfromacoupleofthesaidjudgments,inthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaiit
wasconcludedbySaleemAkhtar,J.asfollows:
ItcanthusbesaidthatinPakistanthereisaconsistentviewfromtheverybeginningthataprovisionof
theConstitutioncannotbestruckdownholdingthatitisviolativeofanyprominentfeature,
impliedlyacceptthetheoryofthebasicstructureoftheconstitution.Ithasonlybeenreferredto
illustratethateveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristics.
SimilarlyinthecaseofPakistanLawyersForumitwasobservedbythisCourtinmostcategoricalterms
asunder:
56.ThereisasignificantdifferencebetweentakingthepositionthatParliamentmaynotamend
salientfeaturesoftheConstitutionandbetweenthepositionthatifParliamentdoesamendthese
salientfeatures,itwillthenbethedutyofthesuperiorjudiciarytostrikedownsuchamendments.The
superiorCourtsofthiscountryhaveconsistentlyacknowledgedthatwhiletheremaybeabasic
structuretotheConstitution,andwhiletheremayalsobelimitationsonthepowerofParliamentto
makeamendmentstosuchbasicstructure,suchlimitationsaretobeexercisedandenforcednotbythe
judiciary(asinthecaseofconflictbetweenastatuteandArticle8),butbythebodypolitic,i.e.,the
peopleofPakistan.Inthiscontext,itmaybenotedthatwhileSajjadAliShah,C.J.observedthatthereis
abasicstructureoftheConstitutionwhichmaynotbeamendedbyParliamenthenowhereobserves
thatthepowertostrikedownoffendingamendmentstotheConstitutioncanbeexercisedbythe
superiorjudiciary.Thetheoryofbasicstructureorsalientfeatures,insofarasPakistanisconcerned,has
beenusedonlyasadoctrinetoidentifysuchfeatures.
57.TheconclusionwhichemergesfromthesurveyisthatpriortoSyedZafarAliShah'scase,there
wasalmostthreedecadesofsettledlawtotheeffectthateventhoughtherewerecertainsalient
58.Itmayfinallybenotedthatthebasicstructuretheory,particularlyasappliedbytheSupreme
CourtofIndia,isnotanewconceptsofarasPakistanijurisprudenceisconcernedbuthasbeenalready
mayalsobenotedthatthebasicstructuretheoryhasnotfoundsignificantacceptanceoutsideIndia,as
alsodiscussedandnotedintheAchakzaiscase.Morespecifically,theSupremeCourtofSriLanka
refusedtoapplythesaidtheoryinacase,reportedasInretheThirteenthAmendmenttothe
bytheSupremeCourtofMalaysiainacasetitledPhangChinHockv.PublicProsecutor(1980)1MLJ70.
59.ThepositionadoptedbytheIndianSupremeCourtinKesavanandaBharaticaseisnot
necessarilyadoctrine,whichcanbeappliedunthinkinglytoPakistan.Pakistanhasitsownunique
politicalhistoryanditsownuniquejudicialhistory.IthasbeentheconsistentpositionofthisCourtever
sinceitfirstenunciatedthepointinZiaurRahmanscasethatthedebatewithrespecttothe
substantiveviresofanamendmenttotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestiontobedeterminedbythe
appropriatepoliticalforum,notbythejudiciary.ThatintheinstantpetitionsthisCourtcannotabandon
itswellsettledjurisprudence.
Theredoesnotappeartobeanygoodreasonatthislatestageastowhytheconsciousapproach
adoptedbythecourtsofthiscountryintheabovementionedregardmaynowbereversedafterabout
threedecadesofconsistentpracticeandconsidereddeclarations.Suchareversalismostcertainlygoing
toinviteadreadfulallegationthatthevoltefaceismotivatedandselfservingbecausethistimeoneof
theconstitutionalamendmentsunderchallengepertainedtothepowersoftheChiefJustices
themselvesandthatthejudgeshadactedasjudgesintheirowncause!
35.ItmustbeappreciatedthatthepeopleofPakistanhavegivennomandatetothejudgesor
courtsquajudicialreviewofconstitutionalamendmentsandthesameisevidentfromtheprovisionsof
clause(2)ofArticle175andclause(5)ofArticle239oftheConstitution.Accordingtoclause(2)of
Article175NocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitution
orbyorunderanylawandclause(5)ofArticle239stipulatesthatNoamendmentoftheConstitution
shallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonanygroundwhatsoever.Itmay,however,beaddedinthis
contextthatdespitetheousterofjurisdictionclausecontainedinclause(5)ofArticle239theremaystill
beavailableawindowforchallengingaconstitutionalamendmentandsuchwindowisprovidedby
Article238.AccordingtoArticle238oftheConstitutionthepowertoamendtheConstitutionissubject
toPartXIoftheConstitutionwhichcomprisesofArticles238and239.Itisnoteworthythatthepower
toamendtheConstitutionisnotmadesubjecttoanyotherPartorprovisionoftheConstitution,not
eventoArticle2AorArticle8.Thus,apparentlytheonlychallengetoaconstitutionalamendment
conceivedbytheConstitutionisifsuchamendmentisnotbroughtaboutintermsoftherequirements
oforintermsofthemechanismsprovidedbyArticles238and239anditwasonthisverygroundthat
someconstitutionalamendmentspurportedlybroughtaboutbyGeneralPervezMusharraf,Presidentof
Pakistan,duringanEmergencyweresetatnaughtbythisCourtinthecaseofSindhHighCourtBar
Associationandanotherv.FederationofPakistanandothers(supra).
36.AdvertingnowtothecontentsoftheprovisionsofArticle175AoftheConstitutionbrought
underchallengethroughthepresentpetitionsImayobservethatuponacarefulreadingand
considerationoftherecentlyintroducedprovisionsofArticle175AIhavenotbeenabletofindanything
thereinwhichmaymilitateagainstindependenceofthejudiciary.Itmustbestatedattheoutsetthatit
wouldbewrongorunfairtojudgethemeritsofthenewsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtsintroducedthroughArticle175Aupontheyardstickoftheprevioussystemofsuch
appointmentsbecausethenewsystemisatotallydifferentsystem,thoughcareseemstohavebeen
takeninthenewsystemtoattendtotheconcernswhichwerethehallmarksoftheprevioussystem.I
findthattheprovisionsofArticle175Atendtoexpandthepreviousconsultativeprocessofappointment
ofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandmaketheprocessmoreparticipatory.ThisCourthadrecognizedin
thecaseofAlJehadTrust(supra)thattheActofappointmentofaChiefJusticeoraJudgeinthe
superiorCourtsisanexecutiveact.Itisundeniablethatthepreviousprocessofsuchappointments
involvednotonlytheJudiciarybutalsotheExecutiveandtheLegislatureandthisfactwasrecognizedby
thisCourtinthePresidentsReferenceNo.2of1996andAlJehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(PLD
1997SC84).IntheearliersystemtheJudiciarywasrepresentedbytheChiefJustices,theExecutivewas
representedbythePresidentandGovernorsandtheLegislaturewasrepresentedbythePrimeMinster
andtheChiefMinisters.AccordingtothePresidentsReferenceNo.2of1996andthecaseofAlJehad
Trust(supra)thePresidentwastoactinthematterupontheadviceofthePrimeMinisterandaccording
tothelatercaseofSindhHighCourtBarAssociation(supra)theGovernorwastoactinthematterupon
theadviceoftheChiefMinister.ThroughthefreshlyintroducedprovisionsofArticle175Athe
representationofalltheseorgansoftheStateintheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperior
courtshasbeenexpandedandnowthemembersoftheJudiciaryinvolvedintheprocesshavebeen
increased,participationoftheExecutivehasbeenbeefedupandtheLegislaturesinvolvementhasbeen
expandedthroughinclusionofparliamentariansbelongingtothegovernmentaswellastheopposition.
UnderthenewsystemtheChiefJusticeofPakistan,twomostseniorjudgesoftheSupremeCourtanda
formerChiefJusticeoraJudgeofthisCourtnominatedbytheChiefJusticeofPakistanconstitutea
majorityintheJudicialCommission.TheParliamentaryCommitteecomprisesofeightmemberswith
equalrepresentationofthegovernmentandtheoppositionandtheParliamentaryCommitteewould
notbeabletostoptherecommendationsoftheJudicialCommissionprovidedatleastsixoutofitseight
membersfavoursuchanaction.Itmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionherethattheconceptof
collegiumofjudgesintheJudicialCommissionintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitutionhad
alreadystartedbeingpractisedinformallyinthiscountryandacknowledgmentofthesameistobe
foundinthecaseofSupremeCourtBarAssociationv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2002SC939).
InclusionoftheFederalMinisterforLawandJusticeintheJudicialCommissionmaynotbeopentoany
seriousobjectionbecauseafterallappointmentofajudgeofasuperiorcourtisanexecutiveactandthe
FederalMinisterforLawandJusticeistheexecutiveofficermostrelevanttothematter.Apartfromthat
byvirtueoftheprovisionsofclause(1)ofArticle90oftheConstitutiontheexecutiveauthorityofthe
FederationistobeexercisedinthenameofthePresidentbytheFederalGovernmentconsistingofthe
PrimeMinisterandtheFederalMinistersandonaccountofclause(2)ofArticle90oftheConstitution
thePrimeMinistermayperformhisfunctionsundertheConstitutioneitherdirectlyorthroughthe
FederalMinisters.AsregardsinclusionoftheAttorneyGeneralforPakistanintheJudicialCommission
contemplatedbyArticle175AoftheConstitutionsufficeittoobservethattheAttorneyGeneralisnot
onlytheChairmanofthePakistanBarCouncilbutalsotheprincipallawofficerofthecountryandclause
(3)ofArticle100oftheConstitutionprovidesthatitisthedutyoftheAttorneyGeneraltogiveadviceto
theFederalGovernmentuponsuchlegalmatters,andtoperformsuchotherdutiesoflegalcharacter,as
maybereferredorassignedtohimbytheFederalGovernment.InthecaseofFederationofPakistan
andothersv.AftabAhmadKhanSherpaoandothers(PLD1992SC723)thisCourthadrecognizedthe
exaltedconstitutionalstatusenjoyedbytheAttorneyGeneralandtheimportantlegalroleplayedby
himvisvistheExecutiveandtheJudiciary.AssigningafunctiontohimbytheConstitutionitselfinthe
matterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsis,thus,nottobeoutofcharacterwithhisjobor
office.InvolvementofaformerChiefJusticeoraformerJudgeofthisCourtinthemattercanbringalot
ofexperienceandvaluableinputtothedeliberationsoftheJudicialCommissionand,likewise,
participationofaSeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeCourtofPakistannominatedbythePakistanBar
CouncilinthemeetingsoftheJudicialCommissioncaninjectintothedeliberationsanassessmentofa
candidatebythelegalfraternity.ThePakistanBarCouncilisthehigheststatutoryandrepresentative
bodyofthelegalcommunityinthecountryandbeinggrantedthestatusofaSeniorAdvocateofthe
SupremeCourtisanhonourconferreduponanAdvocateoftheSupremeCourtbytheSupremeCourtof
Pakistanitselfonthebasisofhisknowledge,abilityandexperience.OrderIVrule5oftheSupreme
CourtRules,1980providesasfollows:
TheChiefJusticeandtheJudgesmayselect,fromtimetotime,fromamongthosewhosenamesareon
theRolloftheAdvocates,personswhoarejudged,bytheirknowledge,abilityandexperience,tobe
worthyofbeinggrantedthestatusofSeniorAdvocateandonsigningtheRollofSeniorAdvocatesshall
assumethesaidstatus.
ItmaybeinterestingtopointoutthatduringtheConstitutionalConventionheldintheUnitedStatesof
AmericainJune,July,AugustandSeptemberof1787DoctorBenjaminFranklinhadreferredtothe
Scottishmodeofappointmentofjudgesinwhichthenominationproceededfromthelawyers,who
alwaysselectedtheablestoftheprofessioninordertogetridofhim,andsharehispracticeamong
themselves.MembershipofsomepoliticalofficeholdersintheJudicialCommissionandreferenceof
themattertoaParliamentaryCommitteemaynotamounttopoliticizingofthejudiciarybecauseany
nominationforappointmenthastocomethroughtheJudicialCommissionwhichisdominatedbyjudges
andtheParliamentaryCommitteecannotintroduceanypersonforappointmentonitsown.While
introducingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010beforetheNationalAssemblyon
06.04.2010SenatorMianRazaRabbani,AdvisortothePrimeMinisterandChairmanoftheSpecial
CommitteeoftheParliamentforConstitutionalReform,hadcategoricallyassuredthatevenunderthe
newsystemofjudicialappointments,asintheprevioussystem,anameforappointmentasajudgeshall
originatefromtheChiefJusticeofPakistan.Itis,thus,obviousthatunderthenewdispensationnoother
organ,authorityorpersoncangetanybodyappointedasajudgeofanysuperiorcourtiftheJudicial
Commissiondominatedbyjudgesdoesnotnominatehimforappointment.Inthisviewofthematter
participationofthepeopleofPakistanintheprocessthroughtheirchosenrepresentativescannotbe
dubbedaspoliticizingofthematteranddumpedonthebasisofmeresemantics.
37.Inhisbooktitled8thAmendment:ConstitutionalandPoliticalCrisisinPakistan(publishedby
Wajidalis,Lahorein1994)Mr.HamidKhan,SeniorAdvocateoftheSupremeCourthaddecried
favourtismandnepotismbeingpractisedinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperior
courtsonaccountoflackofobjectivecriteriafordeterminationofrelativemeritamongstthosewho
wereunderconsiderationforappointmentasjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandhadpleadedfor
provisionofsomechecksontheconstitutionalfunctionariesinvolvedintheprocessofjudicial
appointments.Mr.HamidKhanhadsuggestedinthatbookthat
ItmaybeusefultoborrowfromtheU.S.ConstitutionbyinvolvingtheParliamentinjudicial
appointments.AppointmentsofJudgesoftheSupremeCourtofPakistanandtheProvincialHighCourts
shouldcontinuetobeinthehandsofthePresidentinconsultationoftheConstitutionalfunctionaries
mentionedintheConstitution,buttheirconfirmationshouldbemadesubjecttotheapprovalofa
ParliamentaryCommitteedrawnfromtheSenateandtheNationalAssembly.TheOppositionshouldbe
givenduerepresentationonsuchCommitteewhichshouldholdpublichearingsinwhichqualifications
andmeritofthoseunderconsiderationareopenlydiscussed.
Thepitfallsoftheearliersystemofappointmentsaswelltheconsequencesoflackoftransparency
thereinhadalsobeenhighlightedbyMr.HamidKhaninanotherbookofhistitledConstitutionaland
PoliticalHistoryofPakistan(publishedbyOxfordUniversityPressin2001).Inthatbookhehadobserved
thattheprevioussystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtswascapableofbeing
manipulatedandasaresultofconstantmanipulationsthejudgesofthesuperiorcourtshadbecome
pawnsonthepoliticalchessboard.ThedetailsoftheinstancesmentionedbyMr.HamidKhaninthat
respectmaynotbereproducedherebecausesuchdetailsmayembarrassthesocalledpawns.The
systemthatreducedthejudgestopawns,accordingtoMr.HamidKhan,neededanoverhaulora
completereplacement.ItisironicalthatMr.HamidKhanhappenstobeoneoftheleadingcounsel
appearingfordifferentpetitionersinthepetitionsinhandandithasnotsurprisedmetonoticethat
duringhisargumentshehasnotsoughtrevivalorrestorationoftheearliersystemofappointmentsand
hasassailedonlysomepartsofthenewsystem.Inthatbackdroponeofthebiggestgainsofthenew
systemintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitutionappearstobethattheroleofthePrime
Ministerinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtshasbeenmarginalized.Judges
becoming,inthewordsofMr.HamidKhan,pawnsonthepoliticalchessboardwasduetoundue
interventionoftherulingpartyintheaffairsofthejudiciary,particularlyinthematterofappointments,
andsuchinterventionwasmainlythroughthePrimeMinisterwhoistheleaderofthemajorityinthe
NationalAssembly.ThedirectroleofthePrimeMinisterinthematterofappointmentsandhispowerto
blockanappointmentthroughhisnegativeadvicetothePresident,subsequentlyjudiciallyrequiredto
bebaseduponrecordedreasonswhichwerejusticiable,providedhimaleveragewhichcouldthrowa
spannerinthewholeconsultativeprocessandwhichopenedadoorforjudicialaccommodationinthe
matterforthosecandidateswhowerepushedforappointmentuponpoliticalandextraneous
considerations.InthenewsystemintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitutionthePrime
MinistersrolehasbeenreducedtothatofapostofficebetweentheJudicialCommission/Parliamentary
CommitteeandthePresidentthroughthenecessaryadvicecontemplatedbytheprovisionsofclause(1)
ofArticle48oftheConstitution.AlthoughArticle175AdoesnotexpresslyrefertothatroleofthePrime
MinisterinthematterandspeaksofconfirmationoftheJudicialCommissionsnominationbythe
ParliamentaryCommitteegoingtothePresidentforappointmentyetitgoeswithoutsayingthatinall
themattersnotfallinginthePresidentsdiscretionarypowersheisboundtoactupontheadviceofthe
PrimeMinisterandtheRulesofBusinessoftheFederalGovernmentwouldnecessarilyrequirethatthe
ParliamentaryCommitteesconfirmationisroutedtothePresidentthroughtheFederalMinistryofLaw
andJusticeandthePrimeMinister.Itwouldbenothingbutmisconceivedtoholdthatinour
parliamentarysystemofgovernancetheofficeofthePrimeMinistercanneverbereducedtothatofa
postofficebecauseinstancestothateffectcanbefoundintheConstitutionitselfandareferenceinthis
respectmaybemadetotheprovisionsofArticles56(3),72(1),73(1A),75(1),75(2),75(3),77,87(3),
160(4),213(1),213(2),213(2A),213(2B)and234(1)oftheConstitution.Allthoseprovisionsofthe
ConstitutionclearlyshowthatinsomeofthemattersspecificallyprovidedbytheConstitutionthePrime
MinistersroleisthatofnothingbutapostofficeandheistoadvisethePresidentinthosemattersasa
matterofcoursebecauseadecisioninthatregardhasalreadybeentakenbysomeotherauthority,
bodyorinstitutionspecificallyempoweredinthatrespectbytheConstitution.Similaritiesbetweenthe
provisionsofArticle175AandArticle213inthisparticularrespectareunmistakableandnobodyhas
challengedthelatterArticlesofaronthatoranyotherground.AsurveyoftheConstitutionmanifests
thattherearematterswherethePrimeMinisteristoapplyhisownmindtoaparticularmatterbefore
tenderinganadvicetothePresidentandthenthereareothermatterswhereadecisioninthematteris
tobetakenbysomeotherauthority,bodyorinstitutionwhichthenistobegiveneffecttobythe
PresidentuponanadviceofthePrimeMinisterandinthelattermattersthePrimeMinistersadviceto
thePresidentistobenothingbutaformality.Itmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionherethateven
undertheprevioussystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsafterthecaseofAlJehad
Trust(supra)andamendmentofArticle260oftheConstitutionquathedefinitionofconsultation
makingtheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistanbindingthePrimeMinistersadvicetothePresident
inthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtshadbeenreducedtoamereformalityand
hadpracticallyreducedtheofficeofthePrimeMinistertothatofapostofficeinthatregard.Itwould
beanomaloustobemoanmarginalizingofthePrimeMinistersroleinthenewsystemofjudicial
appointmentswhenintheearliersystemthePrimeMinistersroleoradvicewasreducedtoamere
formalitybynoneotherthanthisCourtitselfthroughthemeansofinterpretation!Inthisviewofthe
matterifindependenceofthejudiciaryisinextricablylinkedwiththemodeofappointmentofjudges
thenbymarginalizingtheroleofthePrimeMinister,andoftherulingpartyactingthroughhim,inthe
matterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsthefreshlyintroducedArticle175Aofthe
Constitutionseemstohavetakencareofthebiggestirritantinthatregard.Asifthiswerenotenough,
Article175AhasalsoensuredequalrepresentationoftheTreasuryandtheOppositionBenchesinthe
ParliamentaryCommitteeandthemanifestintentioninthatregardistofurtherobviateanyundue
influenceofthegovernmentofthedayortherulingpartyinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourts.Iftakeninthepositivespirit,theParliamentappearstohavegoneanextramileby
expandingtheconsultativeprocessandatthesametimereducingandmarginalizingtherolesofthe
President,thePrimeMinisterandtherulingpartyinsuchmatterinordertocleansetheappointments
processofundueinfluenceofthepoliticalexecutive.Itmaybepertinenttomentionherethatevenin
theUnitedKingdom,whichcountryisquiteaptlydescribedasthemotherofmodernparliamentary
democracy,i.e.Westminsterstyleofparliamentarydemocracy,throughtheConstitutionalReformAct
of2005theroleofthePrimeMinisterinthematterofappointmentofjudgeshasbeenreducedtothat
ofonlyapostoffice.It,thus,cannotbearguedwithanydegreeofseriousnessthatmarginalizingofthe
PrimeMinistersroleinthematterhastheeffectofadverselyaffectingparliamentarysystemof
governance.Apartfromthatinsistinguponeffectivejudicialcontrolovertheappointmentsprocessand
simultaneouslybemoaningmarginalizingofthePrimeMinisterseffectiveroleintheprocessappearto
metobeacontradictionintermswhichmaybehardtoreconcileorcomprehend.
38.Thelearnedlawofficershaveinformeduswithreferencetosomedocumentsthatoneofthe
mainobjectsofbringinginthenewsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtswasto
provideforparliamentaryoversightoftheprocess.Inthedismalhistoricalbackdropquatheearlier
processofappointmentifthedisappointedandfrustratedpeopleofthecountryhaddecidedtodirectly
overseetheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsinfuturethennobodycouldblame
themordenythemtherighttodoso.Itmayberelevanttomentionherethatwhileintroducingthe
Constitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010beforetheNationalAssemblyon06.04.2010Senator
MianRazaRabbani,AdvisortothePrimeMinisterandChairmanoftheSpecialCommitteeofthe
ParliamentforConstitutionalReform,hadclarifiedthat
thefunctionsthatwerebeingperformedbythePrimeMinisterintermsofthepresentsystemof
appointmentofJudgeswouldbetakenoverbytheParliamentaryCommittee.
IntheearliersystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsthePrimeMinisterrepresentedthe
ParliamentbutinthenewsystemtheParliamenthasdecidedtoreclaimthatauthorityfromthePrime
Ministerandhasdelegatedittoabipartisancommitteeofparliamentarians.Anybodybelievinginthe
parliamentarysystemofgovernancecannotseriouslydisputetheParliamentsrightorpowertoreclaim
anauthoritydelegatedbyittoabody,authorityorfunctionaryundertheConstitutionandtodelegateit
againinfavourofsomeotherbody,authorityorfunctionary.
39.Therearedifferentmethodsofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorjudiciaryprevalentin
differentcountriesoftheworldandtheyincludesharingofappointmentpowersbetweentheexecutive
andthejudiciary,virtualcontrolofthejudiciaryoverjudicialappointmentswhichisalsoknownasself
appointmentprocessandtheexecutiveandlegislativecontroloverappointmentofjudgeswhichadmits
ofnoformalroleofthejudiciaryinthisprocess.Ithasbeendemonstratedbeforeusthatmostofthe
countrieshaveadoptedproceduresthatprovideforsharingthepowerofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorjudiciarybythejudiciaryandtheexecutive.Inthismethodtheextentoftheexecutives
discretioninthemattervariesfromcountrytocountrybutgenerallytheexecutiveisnotboundto
accepttherecommendationsoftheChiefJustice.Asregardstheselfappointmentprocessonlya
handfulofcountriesconferanexclusivepowerofappointmentupontheChiefJusticeandhissenior
colleagues.InIndiaandPakistanthispowerwasnotexplicitlyrecognizedintheConstitutionbutsuch
powerwasacquiredbytheSupremeCourtsofboththecountriesthroughtheirjudgmentsutilizing
interpretativeapproach.InIndiatheChiefJusticeandsomeseniorjudgesoftheSupremeCourtusedto
exercisethispowerwhereasinPakistanoneperson,theChiefJusticeofPakistan,hadbeenexercising
thispowerbecausehisrecommendationsinthematterhadbeengivenprimacythroughajudgmentof
thisCourthandeddownintheyear1996andthenthroughanamendmentinArticle260ofthe
Constitutionintheyear2002makingtheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistaninthematterbinding.
WehavebeeninformedthatquiterecentlythroughaconstitutionalamendmentIndiahasalsodone
awaywithitsoldsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorjudiciaryandaJudicialCommission,
onthepatternofthenewJudicialCommissionofPakistan,hasbeenintroducedforallappointmentsto
theSupremeCourtandtheHighCourts.Thethirdmethod,adoptedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,
providesfornoroleoftheChiefJusticeorotherjudgesintheappointmentofjudges.Inthatmethod
thePresidentrecommendsthenameandtheSenateapprovesorrejectsthenomination.Itmaybe
possibletosuggestthatonemethodofappointmentismoresuitedtoindependenceofthejudiciary
thantheotherbutthefactremainsthatallsuchmethodshavebeenadoptedindifferentcountries
avowedlytosecureindependenceofthejudiciary.It,thus,maynotbecorrecttoassumethat
independenceofthejudiciarywouldbeunderminedifthesuperiorjudiciaryisnotgiventheexclusive
righttoappointitsjudges.UnitedKingdom,thecountrywhosemodelweinheritedandgenerallyfollow
andwheretheLordChancellorsrecommendationtothePrimeMinisterandthenthePrimeMinisters
advicetotheCrownwasconsideredbinding,hasalsochangeditsappointmentssystemsincetheyear
2005.ThroughtheConstitutionalReformAct,2005aSelectionCommissionandaJudicialAppointments
Commissionhavebeenestablishedinthatcountryandroleshavebeenprovidedthereintoevenlay
personshavingnodirectconcernwiththelegalprofession!Ithasbeenpointedoutbeforeusthatas
manyasonehundredandtwentyonecountriesoftheworldpresentlyhaveJudicialCommissionsor
JudicialCouncilstakingcareofjudicialappointments,administration,transfers,promotionsand
discipline,etc.andinmanyofthosecountriespoliticaloversightofthematterisprovidedby
ParliamentaryCommitteesortheircounterpartscarryingdifferentnomenclature.
40.Ihavefoundalotofsubstanceinthesubmissionofthelearnedlawofficersandthelearned
counselfortheFederalGovernmentthatnosinglepersonshouldhavetheexclusivepowertoappoint
judgesofthesuperiorcourts.On24.05.1949Dr.B.R.Ambedkar,ChairmanoftheConstituent
AssemblysDraftingCommittee,hadthefollowingtosayabouttheprovisionsoftheproposedIndian
Constitutionrelatingtoappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourts:
ToallowtheChiefJusticepracticallyavetoupontheappointmentofjudgesisreallytotransferthe
authoritytotheChiefJusticewhichwearenotpreparedtovestinthePresidentorthegovernmentof
theday.
InhisbookTheEnglishJudgesRobertStevenshadopinedthat
Judgeschoosingjudgesistheantithesisofdemocracy.
IntheschemeenvisagedbytheoriginalConstitutionof1973theconsultativeprocessforappointment
ofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsinPakistaninvolvedthePresident,theChiefJusticeofPakistan,the
GovernorsoftheProvincesandtheChiefJusticesoftheHighCourtsandthroughjudicialinterpretations
therolesofthePrimeMinisterofPakistanandtheChiefMinistersoftheProvincesintheprocesswere
alsorecognizedbutsubsequently,asalludedtoabove,therecommendationoftheChiefJusticeof
Pakistanhadbeengivenprimacyandstilllaterthesamewasmadebindingwhichhadtheeffectof
reducingtheconsultativeprocesstovirtualnominationandappointmentbytheChiefJusticeof
Pakistan.Existenceofunbridleddiscretioninthehandsofpublicfunctionarieshasconsistentlybeen
disapprovedbythisCourtandthisCourthasalwaysinsistedthatexerciseofdiscretionshouldbe
structuredand,ifpossible,sharedinordertomakeittransparentaswellasfair.Thelatestjudgment
renderedbythisCourtonthesubjectisthatinthecaseofInre:TariqAzizudDinandothers(2010
SCMR1301).BecomingwiserthroughtheirexperiencesthepeopleofPakistan,actingthroughtheir
chosenrepresentativesintheParliament,havenowfeltthatinsteadofdependingupononepersons
choicethematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsshouldbeamatterofshared
responsibilitywithdueweighttobegiventotheopinionoftheChiefJusticeofPakistanandhissenior
colleaguesandthishasbeenachievedthroughintroductionofArticle175AoftheConstitution.Thenew
systemmaintainstheprimacyofthejudiciaryinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperior
courtsand,atthesametime,itismoreconsultativeandcollectiveratherthanbeingdominatedbya
singleperson.Thehallmarksofthenewsystemappeartobecollectivewisdomandshared
responsibility.Thereisaneedtotakealongtermviewandperspectiveonthenewmethodof
appointmentandifsomeweaknessesinthemethodsurfaceovertimethentheParliamentcanalways
takeanappropriateremedialactioninthatregardasandwhenrequired.InthecaseofUnitedStatesv.
Wunderlich((1951)342US98)Douglas,J.hadobservedthatLawhasreacheditsfinestmomentswhen
ithasfreedmanfromtheunlimiteddiscretionofsomeruler.Wherediscretionisabsolute,man
hasalwayssuffered.
41.TheearlierprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtshadtheChiefJusticeof
PakistanasitslinchpinorpivotandinoneofitsjudgmentsthisCourthadreferredtotheChiefJusticeof
PakistanasthePaterFamilias.Weshallbenaveifwedenythatifwehadsomeveryhonourableand
respectedPaterFamiliasinthepastthentherewerealsootherswhowerenotheldbythepeoplein
thatesteem.Intheoldprocesstheaspirationofthepeoplequajusticeforallthroughanimpartial,
independent,competent,efficientandeffectivejudiciary,thus,dependedontheluckofthepeopleand
ontheintegrity,independenceandgoodchoiceofjustoneman.Inthatbackdropexpansionofthe
consultativeprocessandmakingoftheprocessmoreparticipatorydoesnotappeartobeabadideaon
thepartofthepeople.Partingwithpowermustsurelybedifficultbutanimpressionthatthejudgesdo
notwanttopartwiththeirexclusiveordominantroleinthematterwouldnotbeahealthyimpression.
Itmaywellbethattothepeoplethematterisnotofindependenceofthejudiciarybutofdiminishing
roleoftheChiefJusticeofPakistanwhoseopinionpreviouslyhadprimacyandbindingeffect.Itmayalso
beappreciatedthatinthecontextofindependenceofthejudiciarytheChiefJusticeofPakistancannot
betreatedastheentirejudiciaryasaninstitutionand,thus,somediminishingofhisprimacyinthe
matterofjudicialappointmentsonlycannotbeequatedwithunderminingindependenceofthejudiciary
asawhole.Itsurelyispainfultoletgoapowerwhichonehasexercisedandenjoyedforalongtimebut
itisgoodtobegracefulinpartingwithpowerwhentimeforthesamecomes.ThelegendaryLord
Denning,oneofthegreatestjudicialmindsintheUnitedKingdominthelastcenturyandwithwhomI
mayboastofhavinghadapersonalassociationinmydaysattheHonourableSocietyofLincolnsInn,
London,haddecidedtoretirefromserviceattheageofmorethaneightythreeyearsafterservingas
MasteroftheRollsforovertwentyyearswhenTheTimesnewspaper,alsonicknamedTheThunderer,
hadcriticizedsomeobservationsmadebyhiminhisbookWhatNextintheLawandhadquestionedhis
abilitytocontinuedischargingjudicialfunctions.LordDenninghaddescribedthewholeepisodeinhis
lastbookTheClosingChapterwhichhehadwrittenafterhisretirementandthenarrativeand
descriptionisaneyeopener.TheThundererinourcaseistheParliamentrepresentingthepeopleof
thiscountryandithasspokeninthematterwithonevoice.Itshallbesenselessnottopayheedtothe
unanimousvoiceofthepeopletowhomtheinstitutionofjudiciaryismeanttoserve.
42.Itmayalsobeappreciatedthatinthepreviousprocesstherewereotherswhoalsohadtheir
rolesinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourts,i.e.PrimeMinister,Governorsand
ChiefMinistersandtheyhavenotsofarclaimedthatdiminishingorexclusionoftheirrolesunderthe
newprocessunderminesindependenceofthejudiciary.Theprincipalcriticismofferedbythelearned
counselforthepetitionerstothenewprocessofappointmentstothesuperiorjudiciaryunderthe
provisionsofArticle175AoftheConstitutionisthatitinvolvespoliticiansintheprocessbutthatcannot
beacceptedatitsfacevalueasitinvolvesmanyassumptionsincludinganassumptionthatanexclusive
judicialcontroloverthematterofappointmentstothesuperiorjudiciaryisimperativeforindependence
ofthejudiciary,anassumptionthatallpoliticiansandparliamentariansarebadandalsoanassumption
thatallpoliticiansandparliamentariansaremotivatedtodestroyindependenceofthejudiciary.These
assumptionsaretoowildandoutrageoustobeacceptedasadvanced.Letusnotforgetthat
independenceofthiscountrywasbroughtaboutbyamovementspearheadedbypoliticians,the
ObjectivesResolutionof1949,whichhasbeencharacterizedbeforeusbysomeasthegrundnorm,
includedthereinaresolvetofullysecureindependenceofthejudiciaryandthesamewasadoptedby
noneotherthanpoliticiansandtheConstitutionof1973,whichhasbeentermedbeforeusasasacred
document,wasalsogiventousbypoliticians.Therearemanycountriesintheworldwhereinjudicial
appointmentsaremadethroughJudicialCommissionswhichhavesomenonjudicialmembersandthere
areotherswhereinelectedrepresentativesofthepeoplehaveadirectroleinjudicialappointmentsand
suchcountriesincludetheUnitedKingdom,theRepublicofSouthAfricaandtheUnitedStatesof
America.IntheearliersystemofjudicialappointmentsprevalentintheUnitedKingdomthemain
personresponsibleforjudicialappointmentswastheLordChancellorwhowasalsoamemberofthe
HouseofLords.IntheUnitedStatesofAmericaanominationtoahighjudicialofficemadebythe
PresidentneedsconfirmationfromtheSenateandinIndiaitistheParliamentwhichcanimpeacha
judgeofthesuperiorjudiciary.NobodyhaseveraccusedtheBritish,theAmericanortheIndianjudiciary
oflackingindependencemerelybecausepoliticiansorelectedrepresentativesareinvolvedinjudicial
appointmentsorremovalinthosecountries.Paintingthepoliticiansblackasaclassandtarnishingall
theparliamentarianswiththesamebrushmayalsonotbefairorproperas,afterall,itisthesame
parliamentarianswhomakelawsforuswhichweallreligiouslytrytoobeyandtheCabinetwhich
governsthecountryisselectedfromthesameparliamentarians.Imayalsoobservethatthesuspicion
anddistrustofthepoliticiansandparliamentariansvoicedbythepetitionersbeforeuscouldalsobe
turnedaroundtomaintainthatthechangeofmodeofappointmentstothesuperiorjudiciarybrought
aboutbythepeopleofthiscountrythroughtheirelectedrepresentativescouldbeareflectionof
graduallydevelopedsuspicionanddistrustofthepeopleintheearliermodeofselfappointment
whereunderjudicialappointmentswereprimarilyinthehandsofthejudgesthemselves.Thelogicof
suchacontentionisloadedbesidesbeingpoliticaland,therefore,thelesssaidaboutthesamethe
better.IftheParliamentaryCommitteesinvolvementintheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtsiscalledpoliticizingtheprocesstheneventhisaspecthasasilverlining.Ithasalready
beenobservedbymeabovethatunderthenewsystemtheParliamentaryCommitteecannotintroduce
anypersonforappointmentasajudgeanditcanonly,byathreefourthmajorityofitstotal
membership,blockanominationmadebytheJudicialCommission.Theparliamentariansbecoming
membersoftheParliamentaryCommitteewouldberepresentingthepeopleofthiscountryandifa
sizeablechunkofthepopulationshowslackoftrustquaanomineethenordinarily,intheinterestofa
judiciaryinspiringconfidenceofthepopulace,thatnomineeshouldevenotherwisenotbeappointedas
ajudge.IhavealreadynotedabovethatwhileintroducingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)
Bill,2010beforetheNationalAssemblyon06.04.2010SenatorMianRazaRabbani,AdvisortothePrime
MinisterandChairmanoftheSpecialCommitteeoftheParliamentforConstitutionalReform,had
categoricallyassuredthatevenunderthenewsystemofjudicialappointments,asintheprevious
system,anameforappointmentasajudgeshalloriginatefromtheChiefJusticeofPakistan.Apartfrom
thatthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanappearinginthesecasesonCourtsnoticehadthe
followingtosubmitthroughhiswrittensubmissionswhichnowformapartoftherecordofthesecases:
15.ImayfurthersubmitherethatIhaveinstructionstostatethatthenamesoftherecommendees
willbeinitiatedintheJudicialCommissionbytheHonbleChiefJusticeinconsultationwiththeother
HonbleJudgesintheCommission.TheExecutivehowever,also,ifneedbemaysuggestnamesfor
considerationbytheHonblejudicialmembers.
16.ItisfurtherstatedthatitisthestanceoftheFederationthatincaseofrejectionofnomination
byParliamentaryCommittee,thesaidCommitteeshallhavetostatereasonswhichshallbejusticiable.
Itis,thus,obviousthatevenunderthenewsystemofjudicialappointmentsintroducedthroughArticle
175AoftheConstitutiontheprimacyofthejudiciaryinthematterofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtsistocontinueand,notwithstandingexpansionoftheconsultativeanddeliberative
process,nopersonwouldbeappointedasajudgeunlessthehighestjudicialauthoritiesinitiatehis
nominationandnonominationwouldfallunlessthehighestjudiciary,throughajudicialprocess,agrees
withnonconfirmationofthenomination.This,Ithink,shouldbesufficienttoallayorassuagemostof
thefearsandapprehensionsexpressedbeforeusquathenewsystemofappointments.
43.Thesepetitionsbeforeusbyandlargealsorestuponthreeotherassumptions,i.e.thepeople
werekeptinthedarkvisvistheproposalsforconstitutionalreformsinthematterofjudicial
appointments,theproposalswereneverproperlyoradequatelydebatedbytheparliamentariansbefore
acceptanceofthesameandtheparliamentarianshadintroducedArticle175AintheConstitutionwith
motivesotherthanbonafide.Thereis,however,nofactualbasisavailableforraisinganysuch
assumptionandtherecordproducedbeforeusinfactcontradictssuchassumptions.Intheopening
paragraphsofthisjudgmentIhavealreadymentionedthatchangeinthesystemofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtshasbeenalongstandingdemandofthelegalfraternityaswellasthepublic
atlargeandthepopularsentimentinthatrespectwasreflectedintheCharterofDemocracysignedby
theleadersoftwomajorandmostpopularpoliticalpartiesofthiscountrywhereinconcernwas
expresslyvoicedagainstlackofconfidenceinthejudicialsystemandithadbeenagreedinteraliathat
themethodofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsinthecountryneededasubstantialchange.
ThenewsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsenvisagedbytheCharterofDemocracy
includednominationofacandidatebyaJudicialCommissionandconfirmationofthenominationbya
ParliamentaryCommittee.IntheManifestoesissuedbyboththesaidpoliticalpartiesbefore
participatinginthegeneralelectionsheldinthecountryonFebruary18,2008ithadexpresslybeen
resolvedtoimplementtheprinciplesagreeduponintheCharterofDemocracyandrestructuringand
reformingofjudicialsystemonthelinesagreedinthatCharter.Apartfromaresolvetoimplementthe
CharterofDemocracytheManifestoofthePakistanPeoplesPartyhadexpresslypromisedthat
TheappointmentsofJudgestoSuperiorJudiciarywillbemadewiththeadviceandconsentofaJoint
ParliamentaryCommitteeconsistingofequalrepresentativesoftheTreasuryandtheOppositiononthe
recommendationofaCommissionheadedbyformerChiefJustice,whohasnottakenoathunderthe
PCO.
Likewise,theManifestoofthePakistanMuslimLeague(N)hadnotonlyresolvedtoimplementthe
CharterofDemocracybuthadalsoexpresslypromisedasfollows:
AppointaJudicialCommissioncomprisingeminentjurists,Judges,parliamentarians,representativesof
lawyers,andcivilsocietytorecommendandsuperviserestructuringandreformsofjudicialsystem.The
systemofappointmentofjudgeswillbereformedtoensureappointmentsonmeritaloneandina
transparentmanner.
Asaresultofthesaidgeneralelectionsboththesaidpoliticalpartiesonceagainemergedasthemost
popularpoliticalpartiesinthecountryandthePakistanPeoplesPartycameintopowerandthePakistan
MuslimLeague(N)becamethelargestpartyintheoppositionattheFederallevelandifputtogether
thestrengthofthosetwopoliticalpartiesintheParliamentwasalittlelessthantwothirdofitstotal
membership.TheResolutionpassedbytheNationalAssemblyon10.04.2009aswellastheResolution
passedbytheSenateon29.04.2009seekingcreationofanAllPartiesSpecialCommitteeforsuggesting
constitutionalreformshadexpresslyreferredtoageneralconsensusthattheprinciplescontainedinthe
CharterofDemocracyoughttobegiveneffecttothroughappropriatelyamendingtheConstitutionand
thereaftertheSpeakeroftheNationalAssemblyhadconstitutedaSpecialCommitteeoftheParliament
forConstitutionalReformwhereinrepresentativesfromallthepoliticalpartiesrepresentedinthe
Parliamentwereincluded.TheSpecialCommitteehadprovidedsufficientopportunitytothepeopleat
largetosendanysuggestiontotheSpecialCommitteetheythoughtappropriateandhundredsof
suggestionswereinfactreceivedbyitinthatregard.TheproposalsmadeunanimouslybythatSpecial
Committeeincludedaproposaltoreplacetheexistingsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperior
courtswithanewsystemandintheStatementofObjectsandReasonsaccompanyingtheConstitution
(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010,throughwhichinteraliaArticle175Awasintroducedtothe
Parliament,hadalsoexpresslyreferredtotheCharterofDemocracyfromwhichguidancehadbeen
soughtforconstitutionalreforms.Finally,theParliamenthadunanimouslyacceptedtheproposalsfor
reformsforwardedtoitbytheSpecialCommittee.Itwould,therefore,beunfairtoassertthatthe
peopleofthiscountrywerekeptinthedarkandthattheyhadneverauthorizedtheirelected
representativesintheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionsoastobringaboutanewsystemof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourts.Apartfromthattheassumptionregardingkeepingthe
peopleinthedarkappearstometobeadangerousassumptionmeanttodriveawedgebetweenthe
peopleandtheParliamentcomprisingoftheirelectedrepresentatives.Ithasnotbeendisputedbefore
usthatpassageoftheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010bytheParliamentwasnot
followedbyanyprotestfromanyquarterorsectionofthesocietyandinfactpassageofthatBillbythe
ParliamentandassentgiventoitbythePresidentwerefollowedbywidespreaddemonstrationof
jubilationandcelebrationbythepublicthroughoutthecountry.Imayaddthatinthematterofthe
Parliamentactinginitsrepresentativecapacityandinaccordwiththewishesofthepeoplethe
Parliamentisaccountabletothepeoplewhomitrepresentsandnottoanycourtandthatanysanction
againstitinthatregardhastobepoliticalratherthanjudicial.
44.Inourconstitutionalschemewhileelectingtheirrepresentativesthepeopleinvestsuch
representativeswithallthelegislativeandconstituentpowerstobeexercisedontheirbehalfanddonot
reserveanyrighttobeconsultedbeforeexerciseofsuchpowers,irrespectiveofthegravityoftheissue
involved.Suchinvestmentanddelegationofauthoritybythepeopleinfavouroftheirelected
representativesisclearlyborneoutfromthePreambletotheConstitutionitself.Inotherwordsafter
electingtheirrepresentativesthepeopleexhausttheirsovereigntyandfortheensuingtermofthe
Parliamenttheelectedrepresentativesarecompetenttoexercisethepeoplessovereigntywithout
consultingthemandwithoutseekinginstructionsfromthem.InthecaseofDewanTextileMillsLtd.v.
Pakistanandothers(supra)therelationshipbetweenthepeopleandtheParliamentandthe
Parliamentsauthoritytoactonbehalfofthepeoplewithoutconsultingtheminthematterof
amendmentoftheConstitutioncameunderadetaileddiscussionanditwasobservedasfollows:
Letme,however,indulgeinthelegalfictionandassumeasthePreambledeclaresthatitwasthe
'people'whoframedtheConstitution.CoulditbesaidaftertheConstitutionwasframedthatthe
'people'stillretainandcanexercisetheirsovereignConstituentpowertoamendormodifythat
documentbyvirtueoftheirlegalsovereignty?
Butitisdifficulthowtheunorganisedmassofpeoplecanlegallybesovereign.Thisisonlytoputmore
explicitlywhatAustinmeantwhenhesaidthatpoliticalpowermustbeadeterminatepersonorbodyof
persons,for,thepeople,atlarge,thewholepeople,asdistinctfromparticularpersonorpersons,are
incapableofconcertedactionandhence,ofexercisingpoliticalpowerand,therefore,oflegal
supremacy.
Willoughbyhassaidthat"thesovereigntyofthepeople,popularsovereigntyandnationalsovereignty
cannotaccuratelybeheldtomeanthatunderanestablishedGovernment,thesovereigntyremainsin
thepeople.Itmaymean,however,thattheConstitutionaljurisprudenceoftheStatetowhichithas
appliedispremeditatedupontheprinciplethatnopoliticalorindividualorganoftheGovernmentisto
beregardedasthesourcewhencebydelegationalltheotherpublicpowersarederived,butthatupon
thecontrary,alllegalauthorityoffendsitsoriginalsourceinthewholecitizenbodyorinanelectorate
representingtheGovernment."
Thequestionmaythenbeaskedifthe'people'bydesigningtheirrepresentativesandbytransmittingto
themthepowertoamendtheConstitution,loseorgiveuppossessionoftheirinherentconstituent
power?
TherewasgreatcontroversyamongtheciviliansintheMiddleAgeswhether,aftertheRomanpeople
hadtransferredtheirauthoritytolegislatetotheEmperor,theystillretaineditorcouldreclaimit.
Thereisalwaysadistinctionbetweenthepossessionofarightorpowerandtheexerciseofit.Itwasin
theexerciseofthe'constituentpower'thatthe'people'framedtheConstitutionandinvestedthe
AmendingBodywiththepowertoamendtheveryinstrumenttheycreated.Theinstrumentsocreated,
bynecessaryimplication,limitsthefurtherexerciseofthepowerbythem,thoughnotthepossessionof
it.TheConstitution,whenitexists,issupremeoverthe'people',andasthe'people'havevoluntarily
excludedthemselvesfromanydirectorimmediateparticipationintheprocessofmakingamendmentto
itandhavedirectlyplacedthatpowerintheirrepresentativeswithoutreservation,itisdifficultto
understandhowthe'people'canjuridicallyresumethepowertocontinuetoexerciseit.Itwould
beabsurdtothinkthattherecanbetwobodiesfordoingthesamethingundertheConstitution.It
wouldbemostincongruoustoincorporateintheConstitutionaprovisionforitsamendment,ifthe
constituentpowertoamendcanalsobeexercisedatthesametimebythemassofthepeople,apart
fromthemachineryprovidedfortheamendment.Inotherwords,thepeoplehavingdelegatedthe
powerofamendment,thatpowercannotbeexercisedinanywayotherthanthatprescribed,norby
anyinstrumentalityotherthanthatdesignatedforthatpurposebytheConstitution.Therearemany
Constitutionswhichprovideforactiveparticipationofthepeopleinthemechanismforamendment
eitherbywayofinitiativeorreferendumasinSwitzerland,AustraliaandEire.ButinourConstitution
thereisnoprovisionforanysuchpopulardeviseandthepowerofamendmentisvestedonlyinthe
AmendingBody.
Itis,however,unnecessarytoenterthisaridtractofwhatLincolncalled'perniciousabstraction'where
nogreenthingsgrow,orresolvethemetaphysicalniceties,for,underourConstitution,thereisno
scopefortheconstituentpowerofamendmentbeingexercisedbythepeopleaftertheyhavedelegated
powerofamendmenttotheAmendingBody.TowhatpurposedidthatInstrumentgivetheAmending
BodythepowertoamendtheInstrumentunlessitbetoconferplenarypower,upontheAmending
Body.
Thepropositionthatanunlimitedamendingauthoritycannotmakeanybasicchangeandthatthebasic
changecanbemadeonlybyarevolutionissomethingextralegalthatnoCourtcancountenanceit.In
otherwords,speakinginconventionalphraseology,therealsovereign,thehundredpercent.sovereign
thepeoplecanframeaConstitution,butthatsovereigncancomeintoexistencethereafter,unless
otherwiseprovided,onlybyrevolution.Itexhaustsitselfbycreationofminorandlessersovereignswho
cangiveanycommand.Thehundredpercent.sovereignisestablishedonlybyrevolution,andhecan
comeintobeingagainonlybyanotherrevolution.AsWheareclearlyputsit,oncetheConstitution
isenacted,evenwhenithasbeensubmittedtothepeopleforapproval,itbindsthereafter,notonlythe
institutionswhichitestablishes,butalsothepeoplethemselves.TheymayamendtheConstitution,if
atall,onlybythemethodwhichtheConstitutionitselfprovides.Thisisillustratedalsointhecase
ofthesovereignpowerofthepeopletomakelaws.WhenonceaConstitutionisframedandthepower
oflegislationwhichappertainstothepeopleistransferredordelegatedtoanorganconstitutedunder
theConstitution,thepeoplecannotthereafterexercisethepower."Thelegalassumptionthat
sovereigntyisultimatelyvestedinthepeopleaffordsnolegalbasis,forthedirectexercisebythepeople
ofanysovereignpower,whosedirectexercisebythemhasnotbeenexpresslyorimpliedlyreserved.
ThusthepeoplepossessthepoweroflegislationdirectlyonlyiftheirConstitutionsoprovides."
OurConstitutionmakesnoprovisionfordirectexercisebythe'people'ofanysovereignpowermuch
lessordinarylawmaking.Sovereignty,asdeclaredinthePreambletotheConstitution,belongsto
AlmightyAllahalone.Itisfurtherclarifiedthat"theStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythrough
thechosenrepresentativesofthepeople".
45.OnlyafewyearsagoaBenchofthisCourtcomprisingoffourteenHonourableJudgeshad
reiteratedtheabovepositioninthecaseofSindhHighCourtBarAssociation(supra)byobservingas
follows:
ItmaybementionedthatthepowertoamendtheConstitutionisanoneroustaskassignedtothe
Parliament,whichrepresentsthewillofthepeoplethroughtheirchosenrepresentatives.Itistobe
carriedoutinaccordancewiththeprocedureprescribedinArticles238and239oftheConstitution,viz.
byatwothirdmajorityofthemembersofboththeHousesofMajliseShoora(Parliament),andbyno
othermeans,innoothermanner,andbynooneelse.
ItispertinenttomentionherethatintheConstitutionof1962clause(6)ofArticle209empoweredthe
PresidenttoorderholdingofaReferenduminthecountryifhedidnotwanttogiveassenttoa
constitutionalamendmentpassedbytheNationalAssembly.SuchaReferendumwasanappealtothe
peopleagainstthedecisionoftheirelectedrepresentatives.TheframersoftheConstitutionof1973
had,however,decidednottoretaintheabovementionedprovisionoftheConstitutionof1962andthe
mostlikelyreasonforthatomissionwasthatthesystemofgovernanceintheConstitutionof1962was
presidentialwhereastheConstitutionof1973wasbasedupontheconventionalparliamentarysystem
whereintheelectedrepresentativesofthepeoplearetherepositoryofalltheconstituentand
legislativeauthorityofthepeople.TheabovementionedomissionintheConstitutionof1973was
nothingbutdeliberateandthemessagewasloudandclear,i.e.therewasnottobeanyappealtothe
peopleagainstthedecisionoftheirelectedrepresentativesintheParliamenttoamendtheConstitution
inanymannertheydeemedappropriate.ItmaynotbelostsightofthataccordingtothePreambleto
theConstitutionof1973we,thepeopleofPakistan;Dohereby,throughour
representativesintheNationalAssembly,adopt,enactandgivetoourselves,thisConstitutionwhich
showsthatiftheConstitutionitselfcouldbeadopted,enactedandgiventothepeoplethroughtheir
electedrepresentativesthenadopting,enactingandgivingtothepeopleanamendmentofthe
Constitutionalsofellwithinlegitimatecompetenceoftheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople.The
conceptofinvestmentanddelegationofthepeoplesconstituentandlegislativeauthorityinfavourof
theirelectedrepresentativesalsofindssupportfromthethesispropoundedbyDr.MuhammadIqbalin
ReconstructionofReligiousThoughtinIslamwhereinthepoetphilosopheroftheEasthadadvocated
thateventhefunctionofIjtehad(religiousreinterpretation)is,inmoderntimes,tobeperformednotby
thepeopleatlargebutbytheirelectedrepresentativesintheParliament.
46.AsregardsthepassageoftheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Bill,2010bythe
Parliamentwithinashortperiodoftimesufficeittoobservethatshortnessofthedebatemaynot
necessarilybeattributedtolackofproperdeliberationsbyitandasamatteroffactthesamemay
reflectwidespreadandwholeheartedacceptanceoftheproposalsforreformsforwardedtoitbythe
SpecialCommittee.ItwasobservedbyK.G.Balakrishnan,C.J.inthecaseofAshokaKumarThakur
(supra)that
Onethinghoweverneedstobenotedherethatmereshortlengthofdebatecannotanddoesnot
becomeagroundforinvalidityofthedecisionandthereverseisalsonottrue.
ImayaddthatiflittletimeconsumedbytheParliamentinpassageofalegislativeproposalisaccepted
asavalidgroundforinferringlackofproperapplicationofmindbyitthentomorrowasimilarargument
thatacourtoflawhadtakenverylittletimetodecideacaseshallalsohavetobeacceptedfor
interferenceintheorderorjudgmentpassedbyit.Thefrivolityofsuchanargument,thus,maynot
detainmeanyfurther.
47.RegardingtheintentionsoftheParliamentsufficeittoobservethatattributingmalafidetothe
Parliamentandthroughittothepeopleofthecountryatlargeisaveryseriousmatterandan
assumptionhasbeenraisedbythepetitionersinthatregardwithoutlayinganyfactualfoundationfor
thesame.Intheabsenceofanyconcretematerialproducedinrespectofulteriormotivesonthepartof
theParliamentitmaynotbepossibleforustoundertakewhatJusticeRobertJacksonoftheUnited
StatesSupremeCourthadtermedinthecaseofUnitedStatesv.PublicUtilitiesCommission(345U.S.
295,319(1953))aspsychoanalysisofCongress.TheobservationsmadebyhimaresointerestingthatI
cannothelpreproducingthesamehere:
IshouldconcurinthisresultmorereadilyiftheCourtcouldreachitbyanalysisofthestatuteinsteadof
bypsychoanalysisofCongress.Whenwedecidefromlegislativehistory,includingstatementsof
witnessesathearings,whatCongressprobablyhadinmind,wemustputourselvesintheplaceofa
majorityofCongressmenandactaccordingtotheimpressionwethinkthishistoryshouldhavemadeon
them.NeverhavingbeenaCongressman,Iamhandicappedinthatweirdendeavor.Thatprocessseems
tomenotinterpretationofastatutebutcreationofastatute.
Withreferencetosomeunpleasantperiodsofournationalhistorywhereinsomepoliticalelementshad
notremainedverypleasedwiththeperformanceofthesuperiorjudiciaryithasbeenmaintainedby
someofthepetitionersthatintroductionofthenewsystemofjudicialappointmentswasadesignon
thepartofsomedisgruntledelementsinpoliticstogetbackatthejudiciaryandtotakearevengefrom
it.Ihave,however,notfeltpersuadedtoextendorattachanyimportancetosuchawildlineof
arguments.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatanygrouseentertainedorgrumbleutteredbyafewindividuals
inthepoliticalarenacouldnotbeattributedtoallthepeopleandallthepoliticalpartiesanditought
nottobelostsightofthattheamendmentsintheConstitutionchallengedbeforethisCourtthroughthe
presentpetitionshadbeenpassedbytheParliamentunanimously.Agripeorgrievanceinthedistant
pastattributedtoafewindividualscanhardlybeacceptedassufficienttoundothewillofthepeople
expressedthroughtheParliamentwithonevoice.Iwouldgoontoobservethatraisingofanysuch
assumptionbythepetitionersmayinfactcallforintrospectionbythejudiciaryasaninstitutionrather
thanshowinganyotherreactiontosuchhypothesis.
48.Ithasalsobeenarguedbythelearnedcounselforthepetitionersthattheschemeof
appointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitutionis
impracticableandunworkable.Inordertosupportthiscontentionthelearnedcounselforthe
petitionershavetriedtostretchsomeoftheprovisionsofArticle175Atosomehypotheticalextremes
soastohighlightthatinsuchsituationstheprovisionsofArticle175Awouldhavenosolutiontooffer
andwouldresultincreatingadeadlockoravacuum.Ihave,however,remainedunimpressedbysuch
contentionsbecauseifhypotheticalabsurditiesweretobeacceptedasavalidgroundforundoinga
constitutionalprovisionoramendmentthennosystemordocumentwouldeverbesafeorimmune
fromsuchachallengeorcriticism.Itmaybepertinenttomentionherethatevenundertheprevious
modeofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsmanyadeadlockhadoccurredandmanya
constitutionalcrisishademergedandtheprescribedmethodofferednosolutiontosuchdeadlocksor
crises.Forinstance,intheyear1996thepoliticalexecutivehadpracticallyrefusedtofillthevacanciesin
varioushighjudicialofficesandhadprotractedlyignoredthejudiciarysrecommendationsmadeinthat
regardandforendingthatdeadlockandforresolvingthatcrisisthePresidenthadtofileaReference
beforethisCourtseekingitsopinioninthatconnection.Areferenceinthisrespectmaybemadetothe
PresidentsReferenceNo.2of1996andAlJehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(supra).Thematterof
appointmentofthemostseniorJudgeoftheSupremeCourtastheChiefJusticeofPakistanhadalso
rockedtheconstitutionalarenaintheyear1997andtheexistingconstitutionalsystemhadnoclear
answertotheissue.Thatissuewasfinallyresolvedafteramessyjudicialbattlethescarsofwhichstill
hauntthejudiciary.AreferenceinthisregardmaybemadetothecaseofMalikAsadAliandothersv.
FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1998SC161).Inthebeginningoftheyear2010yetanother
constitutionalcrisishadengulfedthecountrywhenthePresidentandthepoliticalexecutivehadrefused
toabidebythebindingadviceoftheChiefJusticeofPakistaninthematterofappointmentoftwo
judgestothisCourtandhadinsteadproceededtomakesomeappointmentswithoutanyconsultationin
thatregardwiththeChiefJusticeofPakistan.ThisCourthadthentostepinforthesakeofsalvagingthe
systemandwhileproceedinginthecaseofNadeemAhmad,Advocatev.FederationofPakistanand
others(2010SCMR563)aBenchofthisCourt,constitutedandassembledinthedarknessofanight,
suspendedtheoperationoftherelevantNotificationissuedinthatrespectandalsorestrainedthe
relevantauthoritiesaswellastheconcernedjudgesfromactinguponthatNotification.Thedeadlock
andthecrisissocreatedbedeviledtheconstitutionalprocessandwerefinallyresolvedbythePrime
MinisterthroughsomeprivateoverturesmadeatthediningtablesintheSupremeCourtbuildingand
thecoffeetableatthePrimeMinisterHouse.Evenonthatoccasionthesystemofappointments
prescribedbytheConstitutionwasstretchedtoitslimitsandhadresultedinadeadlockofimmenseand
colossalproportionspitchingtheChiefJusticeofPakistanagainstthehighestpoliticalexecutiveandthe
President.Therearemanyotherinstanceswheretheprevioussystemofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtshadbeenfoundtobenotfreefromambiguitiesandsuchambiguitieshadgivenriseto
seriouscontroversieswhichhadultimatelytoberesolvedbythisCourtthroughjudicialinterventions.I
mayreferinthisrespecttothecasesofIbrarHussainv.GovernmentofPakistan(PLD1976SC315),
MuhammadAkramSheikh,Advocatev.FederationofPakistan(PLD1989SC229),AlJehadTrustv.
FederationofPakistan(supra),SupremeCourtBarAssociationv.FederationofPakistan(supra),
SupremeCourtBarAssociationv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2003SC82)andSindhHighCourtBar
Associationv.FederationofPakistan(supra).Itgoeswithoutsayingthatnodocumentofhumanorigin,
beitaConstitution,legislativeenactmentordeedofatransaction,caneverbecompletelyexhaustive,
allencompassingorpervasivesoastocaterforallpossiblehypotheticalsituations.Itmaybewellto
rememberthatclauses(4)and(15)ofthefreshlyintroducedArticle175Aallowrulestobeframedfor
carryingoutthepurposesofthesaidconstitutionalprovisionandmostofthehypotheticalsituations
highlightedbythelearnedcounselforthepetitionersmaybetakencareofwhileframingsuchrules.The
EighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution,throughwhichArticle175Ahasbeenintroduced,hasalso
insertedArticle267AintheConstitutionwhichreadsasunder:
IfanydifficultyarisesingivingeffecttotheprovisionsoftheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,
2010,hereinafterinthisArticlereferredtoastheAct,orforbringingtheprovisionsoftheActinto
effectiveoperation,themattershallbelaidbeforebothHousesinajointsittingwhichmaybya
resolutiondirectthattheprovisionsoftheActshall,duringsuchperiodasmaybespecifiedinthe
resolution,haveeffect,subjecttosuchadaptations,whetherbywayofmodification,additionor
omission,asmaybedeemednecessaryorexpedient:
Providedthatthispowershallbeavailableforaperiodofoneyearfromthecommencementofthe
Act.
TheParliament,thus,hastakencareofresolvinganyimmediatedifficultyfacedingivingeffecttothe
provisionsoftheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionorinmakingthemoperational.Apartfrom
thatanylongtermseriousimpracticalitysurfacingduringtheoperationoftherelevantconstitutional
provisionscanalsoberesolvedthroughjudicialinterpretationormayberemovedorrectifiedbythe
ParliamentthroughexerciseofitspowertoamendtheConstitution.Incaseofanysuchdifficultyor
quandaryresortmayalsobehadtofilingofaReferencebythePresidentunderArticle186ofthe
ConstitutionseekingopinionofthisCourtontheissue.Aconstitutionalschemeorsystemcannotbe
condemnedorstruckdownbyacourtoflawmerelyonthebasisofitshypotheticalimpracticalityor
conjecturalabsurdity.Thereisnoprecedentintheentireworldwhereaconstitutionalamendmenthas
beenstruckdownbyacourtoflawonsuchanunsureground.Nocourtorjudgeintheknownhistory
hasventuredtotreadonthispathbeforeandIwouldnotliketobetherecklessfirstinthisfield.
HypotheticalandconjecturalabsurditiesofArticle175Apressedintoservicebythelearnedcounselfor
thepetitionershave,thus,notbeenabletopersuadeorcompelmetoplungeintosuchajudicial
absurdity.Itiseverydayexperiencethatatitsinceptioneverysystemofwhateverkindislikelytoface
somepracticalhiccupsbutcontinuedpracticeofthesystemironsoutthedifficultiesandpaveswayfor
itssmoothfunctioning.
49.Itmayalsobementionedthatsomeofthelearnedcounselforthepetitionershavealso
halfheartedlyarguedthatgrievancesofdifferentsectionsofthesocietyagainstthesuperiorjudiciaryof
thiscountryandagainsttheprocessofitsappointmentstemmedfromunsatisfactoryconductofsome
membersofthesuperiorjudiciaryinthepastandthattheconductdisplayedbythepresent
independentandrestoredsuperiorjudiciaryamplydemonstratesthatithasturnedanewleafand,
therefore,theearlierprocessofappointmentshouldhavebeengivensomemorechance.Suchan
argument,thoughveryattractivetotherestoredandindependentjudiciaryofthepresent,cannot,
however,beacceptedasalegalargumentforundoingaconstitutionalamendmentbroughtaboutinthe
relevantregardunanimouslybythepeopleofthecountrythroughtheirelectedrepresentativesinthe
Parliament.Theargumentasadvancedispersonsspecificanditappearsthatthepeopleofthecountry
intheirgeneralityhavenotfeltconvincedthatthedoortobadorunacceptableappointmentstothe
superiorcourtsnowstandsslammedforevereveniftheoldsystemofappointmentsisallowedto
remainintact.Itmaynotbelostsightofinthiscontextthat,asreferredtointheopeningparagraphsof
thisjudgment,itwasafterrestorationoftheindependentjudiciaryinMarch2009andaftersome
judicialappointmentshadbeenmadebyitthattheDemocracyandGovernancePanelofthePakistan
InstituteofLegislativeDevelopmentandTransparency(PILDAT)chairedbyJustice(Retired)
SaeeduzzamanSiddiqui,aformerChiefJusticeofPakistan,hadon10.08.2009proposedconstitutional
reformsinthefieldofjudicialappointments,thePakistanBarCouncilhadagainpassedaresolutionon
13.03.2010proposinganewsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandon10.04.2010
ameetingofleadersofallthemajorBarCouncilsandBarAssociationsofthecountryhadunanimously
expressedgraveconcernoversomefreshappointmentsmadetodifferentHighCourtsandhad
reiteratedtheneedforchangingtheexistingsystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourts.It
isobviousthatthepeoplehavetheireyesonthefutureand,takingalongtermview,throughthenew
methodofjudicialappointmentsintroducedthroughArticle175AoftheConstitutiontheyappearto
havemadeanattempttoobviateorminimizethechancesofbadorunacceptableappointmentsinthe
timestocome.Tome,giventheirexperiencesinthepast,thepeoplehavereasonsformakingsuchan
attemptandalsoarighttotakeastepinthatdirectionandIwouldbethelastpersontostandbetween
thepeopleandthejudiciarytheydesire.InthecaseofPakistanLawyersForum(supra)thisCourthad
declaredthat
ThisCourtmusthavedueregardforthedemocraticmandategiventoParliamentbythepeople.That
requiresadegreeofrestraintwhenexaminingtheviresoforinterpretingstatutes.ItisnotforthisCourt
tosubstituteitsviewsforthoseexpressedbylegislatorsorstrikedownstatutesonconsiderationsof
whatitdeemsgoodforthepeople.ThisCourtisandalwayshasbeenthejudgeofwhatisConstitutional
butnotofwhatiswiseorgood.ThelatteristhebusinessofParliament,whichisaccountabletothe
people.
MylearnedbrotherJawwadS.Khawaja,J.hadobservedinthecaseofDr.MobashirHassan(supra)that
IftheCourtveersfromthiscoursechartedforitandattemptstobecomethearbiterofwhatisgoodor
badforthepeople,itwillinevitablyentertheminefieldofdoctrinessuchasthelawofnecessityor
saluspopulisupremalex,withthesamedisastrousconsequenceswhichareamatterofhistorical
record.Decisionsastowhatisgoodorbadforthepeoplemustbelefttotheelected
representativesofthepeople.
50.ManycenturiesagoSirFrancisBacon,aLordChancellorofEngland,hadobservedinhisessay
titledOfInnovationsthat:
Asthebirthsoflivingcreaturesatfirstareillshapen,soareallinnovations,whicharethebirthsof
time.Yet,notwithstanding,asthosethatfirstbringhonourintotheirfamilyarecommonlymoreworthy
thanthemostthatsucceed,sothefirstprecedent(ifitbegood)isseldomattainedbyimitation.ForIll,
tomansnatureasitstandsperverted,hathanaturalmotion,strongestincontinuance;butGood,asa
forcedmotion,strongestatfirst.Surelyeverymedicineisaninnovationandhethatwillapplynew
remediesmustexpectnewevils.Fortimeisthegreatestinnovator;andwisdomandcounselshallnot
alterthemtothebetter,whatshallbetheend?Itistruethatwhatissettledbycustom,thoughitbenot
good,yetatleastitisfit;andthosethingswhichhavelonggonetogether,are,asitwere,confederate
withinthemselves;whereasnewthingspiecenotsowell;but,thoughtheyhelpbytheirutility,yetthey
troublebytheirinconformity.Besides,theyarelikestrangers,moreadmired,andlessfavoured.Allthis
istrue,iftimestoodstill;whichcontrariwisemovethsoroundthataforwardretentionofcustomisas
turbulentathingasaninnovation;andtheythatreverencetoomucholdtimes,arebutascorntothe
new.
Itweregood,therefore,thatmenintheirinnovations,wouldfollowtheexampleoftimeitself;which
indeedinnovatethgreatly,butquietly,andbydegreesscarcetobeperceived;forotherwise,
whatsoeverisnewisunlookedfor;andeveritmendssome,andpairsother;andhethatisholpentakes
itasafortune,andthanksthetime,andhethatishurt,forawrong,andimputethittotheauthor.
ItisgoodalsonottotryexperimentsinStates,exceptthenecessitybeurgent,ortheutilityevident;and
welltobeware,thatitbethereformationthatdrawethonthechange,andnotthedesireofthechange
thatpretendeththereformation:andlastly,thatthenovelty,thoughitbenotrejected,yetbeheldfora
suspect;and,astheScripturesaith,thatwemakeastandupontheancientway,andthenlookabout
us,anddiscoverwhatisthestraightandrightway,andsotowalkinit.
Asobservedbymeintheopeningparagraphsofthisjudgment,therewasageneraldissatisfactionover
theprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsandalsoovermanyanappointmentmade
inthelasthalfacenturyanddifferentsectionsofthesocietyhadbeendemandingchangeofthe
process.Inthatbackdropchangeoftheprocessbroughtaboutbythepeopleofthiscountry
unanimouslythroughtheirchosenrepresentativesintheParliamenthaditsnecessityurgentandits
utilityevidentand,inthewordsofBacon,itwasthereformationthatdrewonthechangeandnotthe
desireofchangethatpretendedthereformation.ThomasJefferson,thirdPresidentoftheUnitedStates
ofAmerica,hadwrittentoSamuelKerchevalonJuly12,1810asunder:

Iamcertainlynotanadvocateforfrequentanduntriedchangesinlawsandconstitutions.Ithink
moderateimperfectionshadbetterbebornewith:because,whenonceknown,weaccommodate
ourselvestothem,andfindpracticalmeansofcorrectingtheirilleffects.ButIknowalso,thatlawsand
institutionsmustgohandinhandwiththeprogressofthehumanminds.Asthatbecomesmore
developed,moreenlightened,asnewdiscoveriesaremade,newtruthsdisclosed,andmannersand
opinionschangewiththechangeofcircumstances,institutionsmustadvancealso,andkeeppacewith
thetimes.Wemightaswellrequireamantowearstillthesamecoatwhichfittedhimwhenaboy,as
civilizedsocietytoremaineverundertheregimenoftheirbarbarousancestors.
Itistruethatbeingapprehensiveofaninnovationorbeingfearfuloftheunknownandclingingontothe
oldwaystowhichoneisaccustomedisapartofhumannaturebutformakinganimprovementonehas
toletgosomethingofthepast.Dr.MuhammadIqbalhadquiteaptlysummedupthispredicamentin
thefollowingcouplet:
(Translation:Beingafraidofthenewwaysandclingingontotheoldconduct,customsandtraditionsis
therealchallengingstageinthelivesofnations)
Withalotofhopeandenthusiasmthepeopleofmycountryhavedecidedtoembarkuponanew
journeytowardsfulfillmentoftheirdreamsandaspirationsandI,withmyheartandsoulandwalking
withthemshouldertoshoulder,wouldliketojointheminthismarchtowardsthepromisedland.
51.InthecontextofthepresentpetitionsthisCourtmustpayheedtothefactthatthepeopleof
Pakistanhavespokeninthematterandthattooquiteloudlyandwithonevoiceandthoseinthe
judiciarymusthearkenthecall.WhiledilatingupontheconstitutionalpowersofthejudiciaryChief
JusticeHamoodurRehmanhadobservedinthecaseofZiaurRahman(supra)thatInexercisingthis
power,thejudiciaryclaimsnosupremacyoverotherorgansoftheGovernmentbutactsonlyasthe
administratorofthepublicwill.Thejudiciaryis,thus,onlytheadministratorofthepublicwillandit
cannotarrogatetoitselftheroleofanadjudicatorofthepublicwill.Itwouldservethejudiciarywellto
submittothewillofthepoliticalsovereignitiscreatedtoservelestthesovereignunleashesitswrath
andpoweragainstit.AccordingtothePreambletotheConstitutionwe,thepeopleofPakistan
Dohereby,throughourrepresentativesintheNationalAssembly,adopt,enactandgiveto
ourselves,thisConstitution.TheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionhasalsobeenadopted,
enactedandgiventothemselvesbythepeopleofPakistanthroughtheirrepresentativesinthe
ParliamentbyadoptingtheprocessprovidedforthepurposebytheConstitutionitself.Itissimplynot
possibleforthisCourttodeclarethatthepeoplehavebeenunwiseinamendingtheConstitutionasthey
wishedandthattheydidnotknowwhatwasgoodforthem.ThisCourtisacreationoftheConstitution
andtheConstitutionconfersnosuchpowerontheCourt.Ithasalreadybeenobservedbymeabove
thatitwouldevenotherwisebeunwiseonthepartofthisCourttotrytobewiserthanthefundamental
laworthelawgiver.ThefictionalmonstercalledFrankenstein,acreationbecomingadangertoits
creator,hadtobedealtwithnotbyhandlingormanagingitbutbydestroyingit!Itshall,therefore,be
advisabletopayheedinthisregardtothewordsofwisdomexpressedbyKania,C.J.andMahajan,J.in
thecaseofA.K.Gopalanv.StateofMadras(AIR(37)1950SC27)whereinithadbeenobservedas
follows:
Ifthewordsbepositiveandwithoutambiguity,thereisnoauthorityforaCourttovacateorrepeala
statuteonthatgroundalone.Butitisonlyinexpressconstitutionalprovisionslimitinglegislativepower
andcontrollingthetemporarywillofamajoritybyapermanentandparamountlawsettledbythe
deliberatewisdomofthenationthatonecanfindasafeandsolidgroundfortheauthorityofcourtsof
justicetodeclarevoidanylegislativeenactment.Anyassumptionofauthoritybeyondthiswouldbeto
placeinthehandsofthejudiciarypowerstoogreatandtooindefiniteeitherforitsownsecurityorthe
protectionofprivaterights.
ThecaseofA.K.Gopalaninvolvedjudicialreviewofalegislativeactionbutinthecasesinhandwhathas
beenpressedisjudicialreviewofaconstitutionalamendmentwhichamendmenthadbeenpassedby
theParliamentunanimously.ThejudiciaryinPakistanmustbeware,andtheexperiencesoftherecent
pastsodemonstrate,thatanyperceivedtransgressionoroverreachofitsdefinedlimitsmayinvitea
backlash.Abacklashfromunrepresentativeforcesmaybedefendedwiththesupportofthepeoplebut
abacklashfromthepeoplethemselvesmayleavethejudiciarysquarelyinthelurchwithoutany
defenderatall.FaliS.Narimanhadthefollowingtoobserveinthiscontextinhisabovementioned
autobiography:
Assumptionofpowerbywhichoneorganofgovernmentisenabledtocontrolanotherhasbeen
characterizedaspoliticalpower.Inassertingthebasicstructuretheory,theSupremeCourtofIndiahas,
inthissense,assertedpoliticalpowerintheguiseofjudicialinterpretation.Thatiswhythereareso
manycriticsofthebasicstructuretheory.Bypropoundingit,theguardiansoftheConstitutionhadat
oneboundbecomeguardiansovertheConstitution.Constitutionaladjudicatorshadassumedtheroleof
Constitutionalgovernors.Itmustbeadmittedthatthecriticismisvalid.Butequallyvalidisthestarkfact
thatParliamentinitswisdomhasnotsoughtanyconfrontation.Ifithad,thecasualtywouldhavebeen
theSupremeCourt.
InthesameautobiographyFaliS.Narimanhadalsorecordedasfollows:
InJuly1986justbeforehisretirement,ChiefJusticeWarrenBurgeroftheUSSupremeCourtwas
interviewedontelevisionbyBillMoyers.Inthecourseofhisinterview,C.J.WarrenBurgersaid:
Congress(hewasspeakingoftheUSCongress)canreviewusandchangeuswhenwedecidea
statutoryquestion,andfrequentlydo.Butwhenwedecideaconstitutionalissue,rightorwrong,thats
ituntilwechangeit.Or,thepeoplechangeit.Dontforgetthat.Thepeoplemadeitandthepeoplecan
changeit.ThepeoplecouldabolishtheSupremeCourtentirely.
How?askedBillMoyers.
C.J.WarrenBurgersanswerwasclearandcategorical,ByaConstitutionalAmendment.
Intheend,ifImaydabblealittleinphilosophy,Imustobservethatitisoneoftheprinciplesof
interpretationofConstitutionsthatifharmonizingtwoconflictingprovisionsofaConstitutionis
impossiblethentheprovisioncarryingmoreweightistobepreferredovertheothercarryinglesser
weight.Tome,ifinagivensituationindependenceofthejudiciaryisfoundtobepitchedagainst
sovereigntyoftheParliamentthenIwouldleaninfavourofsovereigntyoftheParliamentbecause
withoutasovereignParliamenttheremaynotbetruedemocracyandwithouttruedemocracy
independenceofthejudiciarymaybenothingmorethananillusion.
52.BeforeconcludingthisopinionImustobservethatchangingthesystemofappointmentof
judgesofthesuperiorcourtsthroughtheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitution,filingofthese
petitionsbyacrosssectionofthesociety,ratherlonghearingsofthesemattersbeforetheCourtand
extensivecoverageofthesamebytheprintandelectronicmediahavegeneratedanatmosphereinthe
countrywhichhasabsorbedthesocietyasawholeandIrecallthebeautifulwordsofJusticeCardozoof
theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwhenhehadobservedthatThegreattidesandcurrentswhichengulf
therestofmankinddonotturnasideintheircourseandpassthejudgesidlybyandthetellingwords
ofJusticeFrankfurterofthesameCourtwhenhehadremarkedthatthejudgesare[m]ennot
disembodiedspirits,theyrespondtohumanemotions.JusticeHolmesofthatCourthad,however,
termedthosetides,currentsandemotionsassomeaccidentofimmediateoverwhelminginterest
whichappealstothefeelingsanddistortsthejudgment.WhilerecordinghisdissentinacaseJustice
Holmeshadobservedasfollows:
IamunabletoagreewiththejudgmentofthemajorityoftheCourt,andalthoughIthinkituselessand
undesirable,asarule,toexpressdissent,Ifeelboundtodosointhiscaseandtogivemyreasonsforit.
Greatcaseslikehardcasesmakebadlaws.Forgreatcasesarecalledgreatnotbyreasonoftheirreal
importanceinshapingthelawofthefuturebutbecauseofsomeaccidentofimmediateoverwhelming
interestwhichappealstothefeelingsanddistortsthejudgment.Theseimmediateinterestsexertakind
ofhydraulicpressurewhichmakeswhatpreviouslywasclearseemdoubtful,andbeforewhicheven
wellsettledprinciplesoflawwillbend.
ForthelastaboutthreedecadesthisCourthasconsciouslyandconsistentlybeenrejectingtheacademic
theoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutioninmostcategoricalterms,andforvalid
andforcefulreasons,butitappearsthatwhenthematterofappointmentstothesuperiorjudiciary
itselfhascomebeforeitthen,inthewordsofJusticeHolmes,theaccidentofimmediateoverwhelming
interestwhichappealstothefeelingsanddistortsthejudgmenthasgeneratedakindofhydraulic
pressurewhichImustconsciouslyresistsoasnottoallowmyvisiontobecloudedbyanyselfinterest
orfraternalprejudicedetractingmefromthebeatentrack.Whileonthesubjectofoverturningasettled
judicialviewIamalsoremindedofthedissentingopinionrecordedbyJusticeRobertsoftheUnited
StatesSupremeCourtinthecaseofSmithv.Allwright(321US649(1944))whereinhehadobservedas
follows:
InMahnichv.SouthernSteamshipCo.,321U.S.96,64S.Ct.455,Ihaveexpressedmyviewswith
respecttothepresentpolicyofthecourtfreelytodisregardandtooverruleconsidereddecisionsand
therulesoflawannouncedinthem.Thistendency,itseemstome,indicatesanintoleranceforwhat
thosewhohavecomposedthiscourtinthepasthaveconscientiouslyanddeliberatelyconcluded,and
involvesanassumptionthatknowledgeandwisdomresideinuswhichwasdeniedtoourpredecessors.
Ibelieveitwillnotbegainsaidthecasereceivedtheattentionandconsiderationwhichthequestions
involveddemandedandtheopinionrepresentedtheviewsofallthejustices.Itappearsthatthoseviews
donotnowcommendthemselvestothecourt.Ishallnotrestatethem.Theyareexposedintheopinion
andmuststandorfallontheirmerits.Theirsoundness,however,isnotamatterwhichpresently
concernsme[321U.S.649,669].Thereasonformyconcernisthattheinstantdecision,overrulingthat
announcedaboutnineyearsago,tendstobringadjudicationsofthistribunalintothesameclassasa
restrictedrailroadticket,goodforthisdayandtrainonly.Ihavenoassurance,inviewofthecurrent
decisions,thattheopinionannouncedtodaymaynotshortlyberepudiatedandoverruledbyjustices
whodeemtheyhavenewlightonthesubject.

InthecontextofthepresentpetitionsImaypointoutthatthelastdecisioninthecaseofPakistan
LawyersForum(supra)expressly,categoricallyandemphaticallyrejectingthetheoryofbasicfeaturesor
basicstructureoftheConstitutionwasrenderedbythisCourtunanimouslyonlyafewyearsago.
53.Noneofthepetitionershasallegedthattherequirementsorproceduresforamendingthe
ConstitutionprovidedforinArticle239oftheConstitutionhadbeenviolatedatthetimeofpassageor
promulgationoftheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionand,forthereasonsdetailedabove,I
havenotbeenabletofindanygoodreasonforventuringtoassumejurisdictionwhereitexpressly
standsoustedbyclause(5)ofArticle239oftheConstitution.Whilerecognizingsomesalientfeaturesof
theConstitutionreflectingthepresentaspirationsofthepeople,whichaspirationsaresusceptibleto
changeifthepeoplesowish,forthepurposesofinterpretationoftheConstitution,particularlyinthe
contextofourpresentconstitutionalhistoryanddevelopments,Ihavealsonotfeltpersuadedtoaccept
andapplytheacademiclegaltheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructureoftheConstitutionwhether
invokedconceptually,textuallyorcontextually.IunderstandthatinthecontextoftheConstitutionthe
onlylimitationstotheParliamentsamendatorypowersarepoliticallimitationsandnotjudicially
enforceablelimitations.AllthesepetitionschallengingdifferentpartsandprovisionsoftheConstitution
(EighteenthAmendment)Act(ActXof2010)are,therefore,dismissed.
54.BeforepartingwiththeissuesrelatingtotheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionImay
observebywayofanaddendumthatduringthependencyofthesepetitionsaninterimorderwas
unanimouslypassedbythisCourtonOctober21,2010expectingtheParliamenttoreconsidersomeof
theprovisionsofArticle175AoftheConstitutionandtoamendthesameinthelightofvariousissues
raisedandconcernsvoicedduringthehearingofthepresentpetitions.Theexpectedreconsideration
pertainedinteraliatomodificationofcompositionoftheJudicialCommissionofPakistanand
justiciabilityofthereasonstoberecordedbytheParliamentaryCommitteeforrejectinganomination
madebytheJudicialCommissionofPakistan.
55.Thatinterimorderwasimmediatelyhailedinthecountrybyallandsundryasaverypositive
orderwhichhadavertedapossibleclashofinstitutionsandhadsupportedandbolstereddemocratic
normsandspiritandsoonafterpassageofthatordertheSpecialCommitteeoftheParliamentfor
ConstitutionalReformsstartedponderingoverthematterofamendingtheConstitutionfurtherinthe
lightoftheobservationsmadebythisCourtinthatinterimorder.InthemeanwhiletheJudicial
CommissionofPakistancreatedunderArticle175AoftheConstitutionmetonNovember6,2010and
framedtheJudicialCommissionofPakistanRules,2010asrequiredunderclause(4)ofArticle175Aof
theConstitution.WithinthenextfewdaystheLeadersoftheHouseandtheLeadersoftheOpposition
intheNationalAssemblyandtheSenatenominatedtherequisitemembersoftheParliamentary
CommitteeunderArticle175AoftheConstitution,thememberssonominatedchoseaChairmanand
theParliamentaryCommitteeframedtheParliamentaryCommitteeonJudgesAppointmentinthe
SuperiorCourtsRules,2010ascontemplatedbyclause(15)ofArticle175AoftheConstitution.The
ParliamentalsodidnotlagbehindandthespiritinwhichthisCourthadpasseditsinterimorderon
October21,2010wasbefittinglymatchedandreciprocatedbytheParliamentwithequal
accommodationandgoodwillanduponunanimousrecommendationsmadetoitbytheSpecial
CommitteeoftheParliamentforConstitutionalReformstheParliamentpassedtheConstitution
(NineteenthAmendment)Act,2010inthemonthofDecember2010whichwasassentedtobythe
PresidentonJanuary1,2011.ThroughthatNineteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionmostofthe
concernsvoicedbeforethisCourtbythepetitionersregardingArticle175AoftheConstitution
introducedthroughtheEighteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionweredulyaddressedbythe
ParliamentandArticle175AwasamendedmostlyinthetermshintedatbythisCourtthroughits
interimorderdatedOctober21,2010.IamsanguinethattheRulesframedbytheJudicialCommission
andtheParliamentaryCommitteeandtheamendmentsbroughtaboutinArticle175Athroughthe
NineteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionshallgoalongwayinmakingthetransitionfromtheold
systemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtstothenewsystemquitesmoothandshallalso
satisfyjudicialconcernsaboutprimacybesidesensuringparliamentaryoversightoftheprocesswhich
wastheavowedmainobjectofintroductionofArticle175AoftheConstitution.
56.AsaresultoftheabovementioneddevelopmentsitisnowincumbentupontheParliamentary
CommitteetorecorditsreasonsfornotconfirminganominationmadebytheJudicialCommissionand
thisCourthasalreadyheldinthecaseofMunirHussainBhatti,Advocateandothersv.Federationof
Pakistanandanother(PLD2011SC407)thatsuchreasonsrecordedbytheParliamentaryCommittee
arejusticiablebeforetheSupremeCourtofPakistan.Thesaidlegalpositionwassubsequentlyreiterated
bythisCourtinthecasesofFederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryMinistryofLawv.MunirHussain
Bhattiandothers(PLD2011SC752)andFederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,MinistryofLawand
ParliamentaryAffairsandJustice,Islamabadv.SindhHighCourtBarAssociationthroughPresidentand
another(PLD2012SC1067).Inmyviewsuchacoursewouldgoalongwayinservingthetwinobjects
ofensuringinvolvementofrepresentativesofthepeopleintheprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthe
superiorcourtsand,atthesametime,maintainingprimacyofthejudiciaryinsuchprocess.Eveninthe
earliersystemofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsthePresidentwasjudiciallymadeobliged
torecordreasonsfornotagreeingwithanyrecommendationmadeinthatregardbytheChiefJusticeof
PakistanwhichreasonsweredeclaredbythisCourttobejusticiable.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralfor
PakistanappearinginthesecasesonCourtsnoticehadsubmitteduponinstructionsthroughhiswritten
submissionsthatincaseofrejectionofnominationbyParliamentaryCommittee,thesaidCommittee
shallhavetostatereasonswhichshallbejusticiable.IntheabovequotedessayOfInnovationsSir
FrancisBaconhadquotedtheScripturesayingthatwemakeastandupontheancientway,andthen
lookaboutus,anddiscoverwhatisthestraightandrightway,andsotowalkinit.Itwould,thus,be
advisablethatevenwhenfollowingthenewprocessofappointmentofjudgesofthesuperiorcourtsthe
jurisprudencedevelopedundertheoldsystemandthewisdomgatheredfromthatexperienceoughtto
beutilizedtotheoptimum,ofcoursewiththenecessaryadaptations,sothatthenewpathtotheold
destinationismadesmoothandthejourneylessturbulent.
TheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)
&
ThePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)
57.Lawandorderisanexpressioncommonlyusedbyalaymaninacompactsensedenoting
peaceandsecurityinthesocietyachievedthroughapplicationofthelawofthelandbutinacourtof
lawoneneedstobecarefulinusingtheexpressionslawandordertogether.Amoreinformed
memberofthesocietywouldknowthatmaintainingorderisthefunctionoftheexecutivewhereas
ensuringthatorderisachievedbytheexecutivethroughproperapplicationofthelawliesinthedomain
ofthejudiciary.Itis,thus,obvioustoanypersonacquaintedwiththeconceptoftrichotomyor
separationofpowersinthestructureoftheStatethatthejudiciarysroleinthesocietyistoensure
properapplicationofthelawsanditoughtnevertobeexpectedtobecomealimb,extensionortoolof
theexecutiveinthematterofachievingormaintainingorderhowsoeverbadtheexecutives
performancemaybeindischargingitsfunctionsinthatregard.Anyromancewithshortcircuitingthe
judicialprocessandcompromisingjusticeforthesakeoforderinasituationwheretheexecutive
seeminglyfailstoproperlydischargeitsdutytoestablishorderinthesocietyought,therefore,tobe
lookedatwithsuspicionandtreatedwithcautionbecausesuchromanceblurs,naydistorts,thevery
essenceofconstitutionaldispensationbesidestrumpingconstitutionalprinciplesatthealtarof
expedience.Thelongtermconsequencesofsuchmeasuresofexpediencecannotbehealthyfor
constitutionalismanddemocracybecausegivingprimacytopracticalityoverthecorevalueofjustice
tendstodestroyorunderminetheveryfabricofthesocialcontract.Itmaybewelltorememberthatit
isjusticewhichensurespeaceandtranquilityinthesocietyandanydoseormeasureofinjusticeforthe
sakeoforderisnothingbutcounterproductiveasitfeedsdisorderratherthancuringit.
58.Nationsaredefinednotbythecolouroftheirskin,thelanguagetheyspeakorthedressthey
wearbutbythevaluestheycherishandpractice.Justiceisavaluewhichisnotonlyfundamentaltothe
lifeitselfbutthesamealsoimpactseveryothervaluebydeterminingandregulatinghowsuchother
valueisensuredandputtopractice.Intryingtimesnationsaretestedandtheyaresometimescalled
upontochoosebetweenorprioritizecompetingvalesandmaturenationsseldomsacrificejusticeatthe
altarofexpedience.InaWorldWaragreatnationputitstrustinthejusticebeingdispensedattheOld
Baileybutwhenstruckwithanationaltragedyanothergreatnationconvenientlydecidedtoignorethe
injusticeatGuantanamoBay.Infantnationslearnfromtheexperiencesofmaturernationsandintheir
timesofcrisestheynormallychoosefromdifferentmodelsofresponseavailableonthecanvasofthe
world.ThetragicincidenttakingplaceintheArmyPublicSchool,PeshawaronDecember16,2014
whereinover150innocentpersonsincludingstudentsandstaffwerebrutallyandmercilesslykilledby
someterroristshadshockedthesocietyasawholetosuchanextentthatitdecidedtodeviatefromthe
constitutionalnormsandbypassingthenormaljudicialsysteminthecountrytheParliament
unanimouslypassedtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)andthePakistan
Army(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)onJanuary06,2015whichwereassentedtobythePresidenton
January07,2015andtherebyopenedthedoorstotrialofaclassofciviliansbymilitarycourtsand
purportedlyprovidedconstitutionalprotectiontothenewmeasures.Tosomesucharesponseofthe
peopleactingthroughtheirchosenrepresentativesintheParliamentwasabefittingandappropriate
responsetothegravechallengetosecurityofthepopulacebuttoothersitwasakneejerkreactionofa
shockednationwhichinthestateofimmensegriefhadadoptedanimprudentcoursewhilesettlingfor
ashorttermapproach.SuchasituationremindsmeofJusticeOliverWendellHolmes,aJudgeofthe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourt,whohad,asalreadyreferredtoearlieron,talkedaboutanaccidentof
immediateoverwhelminginterestwhichappealstothefeelingsanddistortsthejudgmentand
generatesakindofhydraulicpressure.ThesameJusticeHolmeshadobservedinconnectionwiththe
ShermanAntitrustAct(whichhepersonallyregardedasoneoftheworstandcertainlyoneofthemost
poorlywrittenpiecesoffederallegislationtobeenactedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaduringhis
lifetime)thatOfcourseIknowandeveryothersensiblemanknows,thattheShermanlawisdamned
nonsense,butifmycountrywantstogotohell,Iamheretohelpit.AccordingtoJusticeHolmesthe
people,speakingthroughtheirrepresentatives,hadaconstitutionalrighttomakeassesof
themselves.OneofthemostfrequentlycitedcommentsmadebyJusticeHolmesonthesubjectwas
madetohiscolleagueJusticeStone,whowasthensixtyoneyearsold:Youngman,about75yearsagoI
learnedthatIwasnotGod.Andso,whenthepeoplewanttodosomethingthatIcantfind
anythingintheConstitutionexpresslyforbiddingthemtodo,Isay,whetherIlikeitornot,Goddamit,
letemdoit.WithrespecttoJusticeHolmesIwouldbemorecharitabletothewillofthepeopleofmy
countrywhomIservethanhewastothewillofthepeopleofhiscountryandwouldsaythatifthe
peopleofPakistanhavefeltconfidentorconvincedthatthroughthenewmeasurestheycanachievethe
cherishedobjectivesofpeaceandsecuritythen,notwithstandingmypersonalviewsontheissueeither
way,myjobwouldbetogiveeffecttotheirwillexpressedclearlyandunanimously.ToJusticeHolmes
wisdomandconstitutionalitywerenotrelatedandtohimandhismanyfollowersintheUnitedStatesof
AmericatheConstitutionrequiredgovernmentalobediencetoitsterms,notgovernmentalwisdom.
KeepinginviewtheprovisionsofArticles175and239oftheConstitutionofmycountryIfinditdifficult
todisagreewithJusticeHolmesinthisregard.
59.GrouchoMarxhadonceobservedthatMilitaryjusticeistojusticewhatmilitarymusicisto
music.Itisnotformetositinjudgmentoverwhichkindofmusicthepeopleshouldpreferortodictate
howthepeopleofmycountryshouldwantjusticetobeserved.Irespectthechoiceandthewillofthe
peopleaslongasthechoicemadeorthewillexpressediswithintheboundsoftheConstitutionoris
adequatelyandproperlyprotectedbyitanditisherethatmyjurisdictioninthematterbeginsandends.
60.ItisnotforthefirsttimethattheStateofPakistanhasattemptedtomakeitpermissiblefor
civilianstobetriedbymilitarycourtsforsomeheinousoffencesandactsofterrorismbutoneverysuch
occasionthecourtsinthecountryhavefounditdifficulttofindanadjustmentofsuchmilitarycourtsin
thejudicialsystemenvisagedandprovidedforbytheConstitutionofthecountry.Inthecaseof
MuhammadUmarKhanv.TheCROWN(PLD1953Lahore528)itwasheldbytheLahoreHighCourt,
LahorethatmilitarycourtsormilitarytribunalsarenotreallycourtsandthatTheyareessentiallyin
thenatureofexecutiveaction.Itwasfurtherheldthatthroughsuchcourtsortribunalsjudicialfunction
hadbeenhandedovertotheexecutivewhichmilitatedagainsttheconstitutionallyentrenchedconcept
ofseparationofpowersand,therefore,theworkingofsuchcourtsortribunalsnecessarilyrequired
validationbytheConstitutionitselfandintheabsenceofsuchvalidationsuchcourtsortribunalscould
notbetermedoracceptedasconstitutional.InthecaseofAbdusSattarKhanNiaziv.TheCROWN(PLD
1954FC187)theFederalCourtofPakistanhadheldthattheactsofsuchmilitarycourtsortribunals
wereactspurportingtobeactsperformedintheadministrationofjusticeand,thus,theyneeded
propervalidationsoastobeacceptedasconstitutional.InthelatercaseofDarveshM.Arbey,Advocate
v.FederationofPakistanthroughtheLawSecretaryand2others(PLD1977Lahore846=PLD1980
Lahore206)theLahoreHighCourt,Lahorehadcategoricallyheldanddeclaredthatthepresent
ConstitutionneitherenvisagestheimpositionofMartialLawnortheexercisebytheArmedForcesof
anyjudicialfunction.SomewhatsimilarobservationshadbeenmadebytheHighCourtofSindh,
KarachiinthecaseofNiazAhmedKhanv.ProvinceofSindandothers(PLD1977Karachi604).Inthe
subsequentcaseofMehramAliandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1998SC1445),
whichwasacaseaboutspecialcourtstotrycasesofterrorism,etc.andnotacasepertainingtomilitary
courts,ithadbeendeclaredbythisCourtinunambiguoustermsthattheconstitutionalframework
relatingtothejudiciaryinthiscountrydidnotadmitoforpermitestablishmentofaparallelsystemof
courtsortribunalswhichwerenotunderthejudicialreview,administrativecontrolandsupervisionof
theHighCourtsortheSupremeCourtunlesstheConstitutionitselfmadespecialprovisionsforsuch
courtsortribunals.IthadclearlybeendeclaredbythisCourtinthatcasethatInthepresentcasethe
establishmentoftheSpecialCourtsisthroughanActoftheParliamentandisnotfoundedona
constitutionalprovisionand,therefore,ifanyofitsprovisionorprovisionsareinconflictwiththe
constitutionalprovisions,thesamecannotbesustained.Intheyear1998PakistanArmedForces
(ActinginAidoftheCivilPower)Ordinance,1998waspromulgatedbytheFederalGovernmentandwas
subsequentlyamendedfromtimetotimeallowingestablishmentofMilitaryCourtsfortrialofcivilians
chargedwiththeoffencesmentionedinsection6thereofandtheScheduletothesaidOrdinancebut
throughthejudgmenthandeddowninthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussainandothersv.Federationof
PakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(PLD1999SC
504)thisCourthaddeclaredthesaidOrdinancetobeunconstitutional,withoutlawfulauthorityandof
nolegaleffect.IthadbeenheldbythisCourtinthatcasethatevenanActofParliamentwillnotenable
theArmedForcestoperformthejudicialfunctionsunlessitisfoundedonthepowerconferredbya
Constitutionalprovision.ItisinthisbackdropthatthistimetheParliamenthastriedtoplugthathole
andhaspurportedtoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActII
of2015)throughtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)whichwereassentedto
bythePresidentonJanuary07,2015.Inowproceedtoexamineastowhetherthenewmeasuresare
indeedconstitutionallyfoundedorprotectedornotandiftheconstitutionalfoundingorprotectionis
properlyinplacethenImayhavenoproblemwithsuchmeasuresbutifthepurportedconstitutional
foundingorprotectioniseitherincompleteornotproperlyinplacethenthefateofthenewmeasuresis
nottobeanydifferentfromthoseintroducedintheyear1998.
61.Beforeembarkinguponanydiscussiononthesubjectitmaybeadvantageoustoreproducethe
fulltextofboththeenactmentsinissue.
TheGazetteofPakistan
EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHEDBYAUTHORITY
ISLAMABAD,THURSDAY,JANUARY8,2015
PARTI
Acts,Ordinances,PresidentsOrdersandRegulations
SENATESECRETARIAT
Islamabad,the7thJanuary,2015
No.F.9(2)/2015Legis.ThefollowingActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)received
theassentofthePresidenton7thJanuary,2015,isherebypublishedforgeneralinformation:
ACTNo.IOF2015
AnActfurthertoamendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan;
WHEREASextraordinarysituationandcircumstancesexistwhichdemandspecial
measuresforspeedytrialofcertainoffencesrelatingtoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainst
PakistanandpreventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristorterroristgroup,
armedgroup,wingandmilitiaortheirmembersusingthenameofreligionorasect;
ANDWHEREASthereexistsgraveandunprecedentedthreattotheintegrityof
PakistanandobjectivessetoutinthePreambletotheConstitutionbytheframersoftheConstitution,
fromtheterroristgroupsbyraisingofarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameofreligionorasectorfrom
theforeignandlocallyfundedantistateelements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristsgroupsincludinganysuch
terroristsfightingwhileusingthenameofreligionorasect,capturedortobecapturedincombatwith
theArmedForcesorotherwisearetriedbythecourtsestablishedundertheActsmentionedhereinafter
insection2;
ANDWHEREASthepeopleofPakistanhaveexpressedtheirfirmresolvethroughtheir
chosenrepresentativesintheallpartiesconferencesheldinaftermathofthesadandterribleterrorist
attackontheArmyPublicSchoolatPeshawaron16December2014topermanentlywipeoutand
eradicateterroristsfromPakistan,itisexpedienttoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothenecessary
measurestakenhereunderintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan;
Itisherebyenactedasfollows:
1.Shorttitleandcommencement.(1)ThisActmaybecalledtheConstitution(Twenty
firstAmendment)Act,2015.
(2)Itshallcomeintoforceatonce.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedate
ofitscommencementandshallceasetoformpartoftheConstitutionandshallstandrepealedonthe
expirationofthesaidperiod.
2.AmendmentofArticle175oftheConstitution.IntheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan,hereinaftercalledtheConstitution,inArticle175,inclause(3),forthefullstopat
theendacolonshallbesubstitutedandthereafter,thefollowingprovisoshallbeinserted,namely:
theActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofthesubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstSchedule,who
claims,orisknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligionorasect.
3.AmendmentintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.IntheConstitution,intheFirst
Schedule,insubpartIIIofPartI,afterserialNo.5,thefollowingnewentriesshallbeadded,namely:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXIVof1952).
7.ThePakistanAirForceAct,1953(VIof1953).
8.ThePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961(XXXVof1961).
9.TheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014)..
AMJEDPERVEZ,
Secretary.
TheGazetteofPakistan
EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHEDBYAUTHORITY
ISLAMABAD,THURSDAY,JANUARY8,2015

PARTI
Acts,Ordinances,PresidentsOrdersandRegulations
SENATESECRETARIAT
No.F.9(3)/2015Legis.ThefollowingActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)received
theassentofthePresidenton7thJanuary,2015,isherebypublishedforgeneralinformation:
ACTNo.IIOF2015
AnActfurthertoamendthePakistanArmyAct,1952;
WHEREASextraordinarysituationandcircumstancesexistwhichdemandspecial
measuresforspeedytrialofcertainoffencesrelatingtoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainst
PakistanandpreventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristgroup,armed
group,wingandmilitiaortheirmembersusingnameofreligionorasect;
ANDWHEREASthereexistsgraveandunprecedentedthreattotheintegrityof
Pakistanbyraisingofarmsandinsurrectionusingnameofreligionorasectbygroupsofforeignand
locallyfundedelements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristsgroupsincludinganysuch
terroristsfightingwhileusingthenameofreligionorasectcapturedortobecapturedincombatwith
theArmedForcesorotherlawenforcementagenciesorotherwisearetriedunderthisAct;
ANDWHEREASArticle245oftheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan
enjoinsupontheArmedForcestoactinconsonancewiththeprovisionsofthesaidArticle.
1.Shorttitleandcommencement.(1)ThisActmaybecalledthePakistanArmy
(Amendment)Act,2015.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedate
ofitscommencement.
2.Amendmentofsection2,ActXXXIXof1952.InthePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXIXof
1952),hereinafterreferredtoasthesaidAct,insection2,
(1)insubsection(1),inclause(d),aftersubclause(ii),thefollowingnewsubclauses,shallbe
inserted,namely:
(iii)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameof
religionorasect;and
(a)raisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,orattacktheArmedForcesofPakistanorlaw
enforcementagencies,orattackanycivilormilitaryinstallationsinPakistan;or
(c)possess,store,fabricateortransporttheexplosives,firearms,instruments,articles,suicide
jackets;or
(e)provideorreceivefundingfromanyforeignorlocalsourcefortheillegalactivitiesunderthis
clause;or
(f)acttooverawethestateoranysectionofthepublicorsectorreligiousminority;or
(g)createterrororinsecurityinPakistanorattempttocommitanyofthesaidactswithinor
outsidePakistan,
(iv)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameof
religionorasectandraisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,commitanoffencementionedatserial
Nos.(i),(ii),(iii),(v),(vi),(vii),(viii),(ix),(x),(xi),(xii),(xiii),(xv),(xvi),(xvii)and(xx)intheScheduletothe
ProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014)
Providedthatanypersonwhoisallegedtohaveabetted,aidedorconspiredinthe
commissionofanyoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)shallbetriedunderthisAct
whereverhemayhavecommittedthatoffence:
Providedfurtherthatnopersonaccusedofanoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)
shallbeprosecutedwithoutthepriorsanctionoftheFederalGovernment.
Explanation:Inthisclause,theexpressionsectmeansasectofreligionanddoesnotincludeany
(4)TheFederalGovernmentshallhavethepowertotransferanyproceedingsinrespectofany
personwhoisaccusedofanyoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)ofclause(d)ofsub
section(1),pendinginanycourtforatrialunderthisAct.
(5)Anyproceedingstransferredundersubsection(4)shallbedeemedtohavebeeninstituted
underthisAct.
(6)Whereacaseistransferredundersubsection(4)itshallnotbenecessarytorecallanywitness
oragainrecordanyevidencethatmayhavebeenrecorded..
3.Amendmentofsection60,ActXXXIXof1952.InthesaidAct,insection60,inclause
(k),afterthewordlawoccurringattheend,thewordsandanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforce,
shallbeadded.
(2)IncasethereisanyconflictbetweentheprovisionsofthisActandanyotherlawforthetime
beinginforce,theprovisionsofthisActshallprevailtotheextentofinconsistency.
AMJEDPERVEZ,
Secretary.
Tostartwith,Ifindthatthroughtheabovementionedtwoenactmentstrialofciviliansbymilitarycourts
forsomespecifiedoffenceshasbeenmadepermissiblebutthemilitarycourtsjurisdictionforsuchtrial
ofciviliansisnotfoundedonanypowerconferredbyanyprovisionoftheConstitution.ThePakistan
Army(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)makesitpermissibleforthealreadyestablishedmilitarycourts
totryaspecifiedcategoryofciviliansandtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)
onlyreferstosuchtrialstobeconductedbythemilitarycourtsunderActNo.IIof2015.ThePreamble
toActNo.Iof2015itselfrecognizesinsomanywords(ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaid
terroristsgroupsincludinganysuchterroristsfightingwhileusingthenameofreligionorasect,
capturedortobecapturedincombatwiththeArmedForcesorotherwisearetriedbythecourts
establishedundertheActsmentionedhereinafterinsection2)thatthemilitarycourtstotrycivilians
areestablishedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952andthatsuchcourtsarenotcreated,constitutedor
establishedbyorundertheConstitution.Itis,thus,obviousthatthejurisdictionofmilitarycourtsfor
trialofciviliansisstillnotfoundedonanypowerconferredbyanyprovisionoftheConstitution.Ihave
alreadymentionedabovethatinthecaseofMehramAli(supra)ithadbeendeclaredbythisCourtin
mostcategoricaltermsthataSpecialCourtconstitutedbyanActofParliamentistobeunconstitutional
unlessitscreationisfoundedonaconstitutionalprovisionandinthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussain
(supra)thisCourthadreiteratedthatevenanActofParliamentwillnotenabletheArmedForcesto
performthejudicialfunctionsunlessitisfoundedonthepowerconferredbyaConstitutional
provision.I,therefore,feelnohesitationinconcludingthatthenewmeasuresmakingitpermissiblefor
themilitarycourtstotryciviliansareunconstitutional,withoutlawfulauthorityandofnolegaleffect,as
wasthecaseinthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussain(supra).Noefforthasbeenmadebeforeusbyanyofthe
partiestothepresentsetofpetitionsforpersuadingthisCourttorevieworrevisittheprinciplesofthe
ConstitutionandlawlaiddownintheabovementionedcasesofMehramAliandSh.LiaquatHussain.
62.ItappearsthatthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanisconsciousoftheabovementioned
constitutionalinfirmityinthetrialofciviliansbymilitarycourtsauthorizedinthatregardbyActNo.IIof
2015whensuchauthorizationisnotfoundedonanypowerconferredbyaconstitutionalprovisionand,
therefore,themainthrustofhisargumentsaddressedbeforeushasbeenthatunderArticle245(1)of
theConstitutiontheArmedForcesareunderaconstitutionaldutytodefendPakistanagainstexternal
aggressionorthreatofwarand,thus,inmattersinvolvinginternalinsurrectionorinsurgency
threateningthedefenceofPakistanthemilitarycourtsconstitutedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952
alwayshadthejurisdictiontotryevenciviliansforoffencesrelatabletothedefenceofthecountry.The
learnedAttorneyGeneralhasreferredinthisrespecttothecaseofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Aliandanotherv.
TheState(PLD1975SC506)whereinithadbeenheldbythisCourtthatretiredarmyofficers(then
treatedascivilians)couldvalidlybetriedbyamilitarycourtunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952along
withservingofficersofthearmyforoffencesfallingwithinthejurisdictionofamilitarycourtandthata
trialbyamilitarycourtmettheminimumstandardsofafairtrialandthesamecouldnotbetermedas
discriminatory.HehasalsocitedthecaseofMrs.ShahidaZahirAbbasiand4othersv.Presidentof
Pakistanandothers(PLD1996SC632)insupportofthesaidargument.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneral
hasalsoreferredtothecaseofCol.(Retd.)MuhammadAkramv.FederationofPakistanthrough
SecretaryMinistryofDefence,Rawalpindiandanother(PLD2009FSC36)whereintheFederalShariat
CourthaddeclaredthattheprovisionsofthePakistanArmyAct,1952werenotrepugnanttothe
InjunctionsofIslam.ImustadmitthatIhavefounditdifficulttocomprehendtherelevanceofsuch
argumentsbasedupontheprovisionsofArticle245(1)oftheConstitutiontotheissueathandwhich
involvesconstitutionalityorotherwiseofActsNo.IandIIof2015.Ifthecivilianspurportedtobe
broughtwithinthenetofthePakistanArmyAct,1952throughActsNo.IandIIof2015couldotherwise
betriedunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952onthestrengthoftheprovisionsofArticle245(1)ofthe
ConstitutionthentherewashardlyanyoccasionfororrequirementofenactingActsNo.IandIIof2015
andtheveryfactthattheParliamentfeltthenecessityofintroducingActNo.IIof2015andofproviding
constitutionalprotectiontothesamethroughActNo.Iof2015clearlyshowsthattheviewsofthe
learnedAttorneyGeneralbasedupontheprovisionsofArticle245(1)oftheConstitutionwerenot
sharedbytheParliamentandnotevenbytheFederalGovernmentwhomthelearnedAttorneyGeneral
representsbeforeus.ApartfromthataccordingtotheprovisionsofArticle245(1)oftheConstitution
TheArmedForcesshall,underthedirectionsoftheFederalGovernmentdefendPakistanagainst
externalaggressionorthreatofwar,and,subjecttolaw,actinaidofcivilpowerwhencalledupontodo
so.WehadrequiredthelearnedAttorneyGeneraltoproducebeforeusanydocumentwherebythe
FederalGovernmenthaddirectedthePakistanArmytosetupmilitarycourtsfortrialofcivilians
becausetherewasathreatofwarwithinthecontemplationoftheprovisionsofArticle245(1)ofthe
ConstitutionandindependentlyofthepowerconferredinthatregardundertheimpugnedActNo.IIof
2015butnosuchdocumentcontaininganysuchdirectionoftheFederalGovernmenthasbeen
producedbyhim.IntheabsenceofanysuchdirectionoftheFederalGovernmentthePakistanArmy
couldnotsetupmilitarycourtsfortrialofciviliansevenifitentertainedanyperceptionofathreatof
waronitsown.ApartfromthatthewordwarusedinArticle245(1)oftheConstitutionisatermof
artandithastobeunderstoodinthecontextofthewordsprecedingthesame,i.e.external
aggression.TomymindinthecontextofthefirstpartofArticle245(1)oftheConstitutionthewords
defendPakistanagainstexternalaggressionorthreatofwararetobereadtogetherandconjunctively
tocaterforanactualexternalaggressionorathreatenedexternalaggressionandthesecondpartof
Article245(1)dealingwiththeArmedForcesactinginaidofcivilpowerisrelevanttointernal
disturbance,beitacivilcommotion,naturalorotherdisaster,insurrectionorinsurgency,etc.Itistrue
thatoflateinthenationalandinternationalmediaandpoliticsthetermwaronterrorismhasgained
currencybutacourtoflawistoexercisecautionbeforeallowingliftingthewordwarfromits
journalisticorpoliticaluseandinterpretingconstitutionalprovisionsinthelightofsuchbroad,
nonspecificandgenericuseofthatword.InCorpusJurisSecundumthedefinitionandnatureofWar
havebeendetailedasfollows:
War,inthebroadsense,isaproperlyconductedcontestofarmedpublicforces,orinanarrower
sense,astateofaffairsduringthecontinuanceofwhichthepartiestothewarmaylegallyexerciseforce
againsteachother.Thetermwar,inthepracticalandrealisticsenseinwhichitiscommonlyused,
referstotheperiodofhostilitiesandnottoatechnicalstateofwarwhichmayexistafterthefighting
hasended.Itisnotnecessary,toconstitutewar,thatbothpartiesshallbeacknowledgedas
independentnationsorsovereignstates,butwarmayexistwhereoneofthebelligerentsclaims
sovereignrightsasagainsttheother.Thewordwaristobeunderstoodinitsordinarysense,andthe
popularconnotationofthewordisnotlimitedtowarsformallydeclaredbyCongresstobesuch.Warin
thematerialsenseistobedistinguishedfromwarinthelegalsense.Theexistenceofwarinthe
materialsenseisevidentintheuseofforcebytheparties.War,inlaw,isnotamerecontestof
physicalforce,onhoweverlargeascale.Warinthelegalsenseisthestateofnationsamongwhom
thereisaninterruptionofallpacificrelationsandageneralcontestationofarmsbyauthorityofthe
severalsovereigns;itisnotamerecontestofforce,butmustbeanarmedstrugglecarriedonbytwo
politicalbodieseachofwhichexercisesdefactoauthorityoverpersonswithinadeterminateterritory,
anditsexistenceisdeterminedbytheauthorizedpoliticaldepartmentofthegovernment.So,lawful
warcanneverexistwithouttheactualconcurrenceofthewarmakingpower,butmayexistpriortoany
contestofthearmedforces.Thecourtsareboundbyadeclarationordeterminationbytheproper
departmentofgovernmentthatawarexists,butuntiltherehasbeensuchadeclarationor
determinationthecourtscannottakejudicialnoticeoftheexistenceofawarbytheirgovernment.
Inthesametreatisethefollowinghasbeenrecordedinrespectofinsurgents:
Insurgentsrisingagainstanestablishedgovernmentdonot,fromthemerefactofrevolt,become
entitledtotherightsofsovereigntyortoberecognizedasbelligerents,soastocomewithinthelawsof
war,anduntilsomerecognition,express,tacit,orimplied,ofnewconditionshasbeenextendedbythe
politicaldepartmentofthegovernment,thereisnowarofwhichacourtcantakecognizance,andno
enemies,butonlyinsurgents.
WarhasbeencommenteduponinAmericanJurisprudence,SecondEdition(1975)asfollows:
Warisanarmedstruggleorcontestbyforcecarriedonforanypurposebetweentwoormorenations
orstatesexercisingatleastdefactoauthorityoverpersonswithinagiventerritoryandcommandingan
armypreparedtoobservetheordinarylawsofwar.Warmyalsobedefinedasconsistingintheexercise
offorcebybodiespoliticagainsteachotherandundertheauthorityoftheirrespectivegovernments
withapurposeofcoercion,andasthestateinwhichanationprosecutesitsrightsoritsclaimsbyforce
ofarms.
Waristhustobedistinguishedfrominsurrectionandrebellion.Thelattertermsareusedtodescribe
openandactiveoppositionofanumberofcitizensorsubjectsofacountryorstatetoitsgovernment;
neitherinsurrectionnorrebellionconstituteswarinalegalsensepriortotherecognitionofthe
participantsasbelligerentsbytheexistingdomesticgovernmentsorbyforeignnations.Thosewhojoin
inaninsurrectionorrebellionofmajorproportionsmay,however,berecognizedbytheexisting
governmentasbelligerents;andwhenthehostilitiesconductedattainsuchdimensionsastointerfere
withexerciseoffunctionsoftheexistinggovernmentandinterrupttheregularcourseofjustice,and
particularlywheretheexistinggovernmentsjurisdictionhasbeenentirelysuspendedinsomeofthe
territorialdistricts,astateofcivilwarexists,whichisordinarilyaccompaniedbytheincidentsofana
internationalwar.
Anarmedstrugglebetweenopposingandcontendingfactionsofthestate,ordinarilyforthecontrolof
thestategovernment,istermedacivilwar;anarmedstrugglebetweentwonationsinexternal
mattersisapublicwar.
ItisquiteobvioustomethattheemphasislaidbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralonthewordwar
appearinginArticle245(1)oftheConstitutionismisplacedasajournalisticorpoliticaluseofthatword
cannotsufficeforreplacingtheconstitutionalorlegalmeaningsofthesame.Imayaddawordof
cautionherethattheargumentsofthelearnedAttorneyGeneralbaseduponanexistingorthreatened
warinthecountrymayemboldenthecapturedinsurgentstoclaimtheinternationallyrecognized
statusandprotectionsavailabletoprisonersofwarundertherelevantConventionsandother
instrumentsofinternationallawrelatingtowarswhichstatusandprotections,Iamsure,arenot
attractedtooursituationbecausethecanvassedthreatofwarwithinthepurviewofArticle245(1)of
theConstitutionisnotlegallyrecognizableatthisstage.
63.TheargumentsadvancedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralinthecontextofArticle245(1)ofthe
ConstitutionalsooverlookthefactthatwhatischallengedbeforeusistheviresofActsNo.IandIIof
2015andtheissuewhethermilitarycourtsfortrialofcivilianscanbesetupunderArticle245(1)ofthe
Constitutionornotisnotgermanetothechallengemadebeforeus.Itmay,however,bewellto
rememberthatinthecontextoftheArmedForcesactinginaidofcivilpowerunderArticle245(1)ofthe
Constitutionithasalreadybeenheldinthecasesmentionedabovethatwhileactinginaidofcivilpower
theArmedForcescannotarrogatetothemselvesorcannotbepermittedtoexercisejudicialpowerover
civilianstotheexclusionofthenormaljudicialhierarchyunlessitisfoundedonthepowerconferredby
aConstitutionalprovision.
64.TheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)hadpurportedlyprotectedtrial
ofciviliansbymilitarycourtsunderthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)fromchallenges
basedupontheconstitutionallyentrenchedconceptoftrichotomyorseparationofpowersorbased
uponviolationofthefundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitutionbutIfindthatActNo.Iof2015
hadbothinfactandeffectfailedtoprovidetherequisiteconstitutionalprotectiontotheprovisionsof
ActNo.IIof2015.ThePreambletotheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)inter
aliareadsasunder:
ANDWHEREASthepeopleofPakistanhaveexpressedtheirfirmresolvethroughtheirchosen
representativesintheallpartiesconferencesheldintheaftermathofthesadandterribleterrorist
attackontheArmyPublicSchoolatPeshawaron16December2014topermanentlywipeoutand
eradicateterroristsfromPakistan,itisexpedienttoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothenecessary
measurestakenhereunderintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan;
(Underlininghasbeensuppliedforemphasis)
ActNo.Iof2015hadthengoneontoamendArticle175oftheConstitutionandalsosubpartIIIofPartI
oftheFirstScheduletotheConstitutioninanattempttoensurethattheconceptofseparationof
powersandthenotionofjudicialreview,administrativecontrolandsupervisionoftheSupremeCourt
andtheHighCourtsoverallmattersjudicialinnaturedonotapplytothetrialofciviliansbythemilitary
courtsfortheoffencescontemplatedbythePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)andalsoto
keepsuchtrialsbymilitarycourtsawayfromapplicationorenforcementofallthefundamentalrights
otherwiseguaranteedbytheConstitution.I,however,seeamajorproblemherebecausetomy
understandingthenecessarymeasurestakenwhichweresoughtbyActNo.Iof2015tobeprovided
constitutionalprotectionhadinfactnotevenbeentakenwhenthepurportedprotectionwas
extendedtothem.ThisissobecauseActNo.Iof2015hadbeenassentedtobythePresidentbefore
assentingtoActNo.IIof2015andbyvirtueofArticle75(3)oftheConstitutionaBillbecomeslawandit
canbecalledanActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)onlyafterreceivingassentofthePresident.The
recordavailablebeforeusclearlyestablishes,andthelearnedAttorneyGeneralhasnotbeenableto
controvertit,that,intermsofArticle75(3)oftheConstitution,ActNo.IIof2015hadnotevencome
intoexistenceasalawtillcomingintoexistenceofActNo.Iof2015and,thus,ActNo.Iof2015could
notpossiblyextendanyconstitutionalorlegalprotectiontoActNo.IIof2015whichhadnotbecome
lawbythen.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralhas,however,referredtothecasesofSaiyyadAbulAla
Maudoodiandothersv.TheGovernmentofWestPakistan,throughSecretarytoGovernmentofWest
Pakistan,HomeDepartment,Lahore(PLD1964Karachi478)andKhalidM.Ishaque,ExAdvocate
General,Lahorev.TheHonbleChiefJusticeandtheJudgesoftheHighCourtofWestPakistan,Lahore
(PLD1966SC628)andtosection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897tomaintainthatActNo.IIof
2015isaCentralActandafterassenttoitbythePresidentonJanuary7,2015itcameintooperationat
zerohourduringthenightbeforeandthusthesameistobedeemedtobeinoperationwhenassent
wasgivenbythePresidenttoActNo.Iof2015onJanuary7,2015.Ihave,however,foundthe
precedentcasesreferredtobythelearnedAttorneyGeneralontheissuetobehardlyrelevantandhis
relianceupontheprovisionsofsection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897tobequiteinapt.The
precedentcasesreferredtobyhiminvolveddifferentissuesandareferencetosection5(3)ofthe
GeneralClausesAct,1897wasmadethereinonlybywayofananalogy.Apartfromthat,section5(3)of
theGeneralClausesAct,1897providesthatUnlessthecontraryisexpressed,aCentralActor
Regulationshallbeconstruedascomingintooperationimmediatelyontheexpirationoftheday
precedingitscommencementandinthecasesofActsNo.IandIIof2015thecontraryintentionwas
expressedloudandclearwhenithadbeenprovidedthereinthatthesaidenactmentsweretocome
intoforceatonce.
65.Thereisyetanotheranglewhichexposesthefallacyoftheabovementionedargumentofthe
learnedAttorneyGeneralbasedupontheprovisionsofsection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897.
TheGeneralClausesActwasenactedintheyear1897atatimewhentherewerenofundamentalrights
guaranteedbyaConstitution.PakistanPenalCodeisaCentralActandifthroughitsamendmentanew
offenceiscreatedwithassentofthePresidentat11.00A.M.onaparticulardaythentheactofaperson
committedintheprecedingelevenhours,whentheactwasnotanoffencepunishablebyanylaw,is
madepunishableretrospectivelybysection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897byprovidingthatthe
amendedlawistocomeintooperationatzerohourduringtheprecedingnight.Article12(1)ofthe
ConstitutionofPakistan,1973guaranteesafundamentalrightensuringprotectionagainstretrospective
punishmentinthefollowingterms:
12.(1)Nolawshallauthorizethepunishmentofaperson
(a)foranactoromissionthatwasnotpunishablebylawatthetimeoftheactoromission;or
(b)foranoffencebyapenaltygreaterthan,orofakinddifferentfrom,thepenaltyprescribedby
lawforthatoffenceatthetimetheoffencewascommitted.
Consciousofthefactthattheprovisionsofsection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897make
retrospectivepunishmentpossibletheframersoftheConstitutionhaddecidedtotakeoverthisareaby
providinginArticle75(3)oftheConstitutionthatWhenthePresidenthasassentedorisdeemedto
haveassentedtoaBill,itshallbecomelawandbecalledanActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)witha
concomitantinalienablerightunderArticle4(1)oftheConstitutiontoenjoytheprotectionoflawand
tobetreatedinaccordancewithlawandaninviolableobligationunderArticle5(2)oftheConstitution
toobeythelawfromthemomentitbecomesthelawofthelandunderArticle75(3)oftheConstitution.
Article75(3)oftheConstitutioncoversalltheBillstobeassentedtobythePresidentand,thus,itnow
occupiestheterritorypreviouslygovernedbytheprovisionsofsection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,
1897.ItisnottheonlyinstancewheretheConstitutionhastakenoverafieldpreviouslyoccupiedbythe
GeneralClausesAct,1897andanotherexampleofthesameissection6oftheGeneralClausesAct,
1897dealingwithEffectofRepealwhichfieldhasbeentakenoverbyArticle264oftheConstitution
providingforEffectofrepealoflaws.Ihave,therefore,founditinappropriateonthepartofthe
learnedAttorneyGeneraltorelyupontheprovisionsofsection5(3)oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897
whenthefieldofaBillbecomingalawandcomingintoforceatonceissquarelytakenoverand
governedbytheprovisionsofArticle75(3)oftheConstitutionitself.Itoughttogowithoutsayingthat
oncetheConstitutionhastakenoverthisfieldtheprovisionsoftheGeneralClausesAct,1897havelost
theirrelevancetothatextentandareunenforceable.
66.IthasalsobeenarguedbeforeusthatgivingofassenttothetwoBillsbythePresidentwas
merelyaministerialfunctionand,therefore,thetemporalsequenceofgivingofassentbythePresident
tothetwoBillsonthesamedaywashardlymaterialorofanyseriousconsequence.Iforone,with
respect,cannotsubscribetosuchaview.GivingofassenttoaBillbythePresidentisamostsolemn
functionasitisthroughsuchassentthataBillbecomesthelawoftheland.ApartfromthatthetwoBills
inissuewerenotordinarypiecesoflegislationsoastominimizetheimportanceofthePresidential
assenttothesame.IthadrepeatedlybeendeclaredbythisCourtinthepastthattrialofciviliansby
militarycourtsisunconstitutionalunlessthejurisdictionofthemilitarycourtsinthatrespectisfounded
onsomeconstitutionalprovisionandthroughBillNo.Iof2015aconstitutionalprotectionwassoughtto
beaffordedtothemeasurestobetakenunderBillNo.IIof2015.Suchpurportedconstitutional
protectionwastohaveasignificantbearinguponlivesandlibertyofhundreds,ifnotthousands,of
accusedpersonstobetriedbythemilitarycourtsundertheproposedmeasuresandtheirfundamental
rights,alongwiththeirnecks,weretobeonthelineandI,therefore,cannotignorethisillegality,evenif
termedasamistakeorablunder,committedinthematterofthepurportedconstitutionalprotection.I
cannottrashthefundamentalrightsofsuchaccusedpersonstotheirlivesandlibertyandtofairtrial
andallowthedeeplyentrenchedconceptofseparationofpowersunderArticle175(3)ofthe
Constitutiontobecomeinapplicabletotrialofsuchaccusedpersonsbygivingapremiumtothe
executiveforitsfauxpasortolooktheotherwaywhenameasureotherwisedeclaredunconstitutional
bythisCourtisbeinggivenaconstitutionalprotectioninamannerwhichonthefaceofitisflawed.This
CourtistheultimateguardianoftheconstitutionalrightsofthecitizensandIhaveswornanoathto
preserve,protectanddefendtheConstitutionand,therefore,itisinconceivableformetoallowthe
constitutionalrightsofthecitizenstobecurtailed,abridgedortakenawayinanymannerwhichmay
haveevenasemblanceofunconstitutionality.
67.AnecessarycorollarytowhathasbeendeducedaboveisthatwhenActNo.Iof2015had
includedThePakistanArmyAct,1952(ActXXXIXof1952)insubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduleto
theConstitutionorhadaddedaprovisotoArticle175(3)oftheConstitutionithadincludedorreferred
toThePakistanArmyAct,1952intheformunamendedbyActNo.IIof2015and,thus,theimmunity
fromapplicationandenforcementofthefundamentalrightsandtheconceptofseparationofpowers
purportedlysoughttobeextendedtothetrialofciviliansunderActNo.IIof2015hadnotsuccessfully
beenachievedbyActNo.Iof2015becauseActNo.IIof2015hadnotevenbecomelawbythen.
68.ThepurportedinclusionofThePakistanArmyAct,1952(ActXXXIXof1952)andthreeother
lawsinsubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduletotheConstitutionthroughtheConstitution(Twenty
firstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)hasbeenfoundbymetobeproblematicfromanotheranglealso.
PartIIoftheConstitutiondealswithFundamentalRightsandPrinciplesofPolicyandArticle8inChapter
1ofPartIIoftheConstitutionprovidesasfollows:
CHAPTER1.FUNDAMENTALRIGHTS
8.(1)Anylaw,oranycustomorusagehavingtheforceoflaw,insofarasitisinconsistent
withtherightsconferredbythisChapter,shall,totheextentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.
(2)TheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightssoconferred
andanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofsuchcontravention,bevoid.
(3)TheProvisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(a)anylawrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForces,orofthepoliceorofsuchotherforcesasare
chargedwiththemaintenanceofpublicorder,forthepurposeofensuringtheproperdischargeoftheir
dutiesorthemaintenanceofdisciplineamongthem;or
(b)anyofthe
(i)lawsspecifiedintheFirstScheduleasinforceimmediatelybeforethecommencingdayoras
amendedbyanyofthelawsspecifiedinthatSchedule;
(ii)otherlawsspecifiedinPartIoftheFirstSchedule;
andnosuchlawnoranyprovisionthereofshallbevoidonthegroundthatsuchlaworprovisionis
inconsistentwith,orrepugnantto,anyprovisionofthisChapter.
(4)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinparagraph(b)ofclause(3),withinaperiodof
twoyearsfromthecommencingday,theappropriateLegislatureshallbringthelawsspecifiedinPartII
oftheFirstScheduleintoconformitywiththerightsconferredbythisChapter:
ProvidedthattheappropriateLegislaturemaybyresolutionextendthesaidperiodoftwoyearsbya
periodnotexceedingsixmonths.
Explanation.IfinrespectofanylawMajliseShoora(Parliament)istheappropriate
Legislature,suchresolutionshallbearesolutionoftheNationalAssembly.
(5)TherightsconferredbythisChaptershallnotbesuspendedexceptasexpressly
providedbytheConstitution.
AplainreadingofArticle8(3)(b)(i)reproducedaboveshows,andshowswithoutanyambiguity,thatit
dealswithonlythoselawsoramendmentstothoselawswhichwereinforceonthecommencingdayof
theConstitutionandsuchlawshadbeenplacedintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionatthetimeof
commencementoftheConstitution.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralhasconcededthatthePakistanArmy
Act,1952hadnotbeenplacedintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutiononthecommencingdayofthe
Constitutionand,thus,anyamendmentofthatlawcannotbeplacedintheFirstScheduleofthe
ConstitutionbyutilizingtheprovisionsofArticle8(3)(b)(i)oftheConstitution.ThelearnedAttorney
Generalhas,however,maintainedthatThePakistanArmyAct,1952(asamendeduptodate)could
validlybeplacedintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionbyutilizingtheprovisionsofArticle8(3)(b)(ii)
oftheConstitutionandthisisexactlywhathadbeenachievedthroughtheConstitution(Twentyfirst
Amendment)Act(ActIof2015).ThissubmissionofthelearnedAttorneyGeneralappearstobe
attractiveatitsfacebut,tomyunderstanding,thesamecannotwithstandadeeperscrutiny.The
ConstitutionisasocialcontractbetweenthecitizensandtheStateandonthecommencingdayofthe
Constitutionsomelawshadexpresslybeenexcludedfromapplicationandenforcementofthe
fundamentalrightsbeingguaranteedbytheConstitutionwhereasforfuturepurposesandfortheother
lawsithadcategoricallybeendeclaredbytheConstitutioninArticle8(2)thatTheStateshallnotmake
anylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightssoconferredandanylawmadeincontraventionofthis
clauseshall,totheextentofsuchcontravention,bevoid.Theintentionoftheframersofthe
Constitutionwasclearthatalthoughsomeexistinglawswerebeingexemptedfromapplicationand
enforcementofthefundamentalrightsyetinfuturenosuchtransgressionwouldbepermissibleand
thisintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutionismanifestfromthespeechmadebyMr.AbdulHafeez
Pirzada(thethenMinisterforLaw)ontheflooroftheNationalAssemblyon17.02.1973atthetimeof
presentingtheConstitutionBill.Mr.Pirzadahadsaid:intheFirstScheduletherearecertainlawswhich
havebeenexemptedfromtheoperationofFundamentalRightsinasmuchasonthegroundsofviolation
ofFundamentalRightstheycannotbechallengedbeforethecourts.Theitalicssuppliedbymetothe
wordsareandhavebeeninthatspeechclearlyshowthatthelistofsuchexemptedlawswas
exhaustedonthecommencingdayoftheConstitutionandthatiswhyArticle8(2)oftheConstitution
closedthedooruponanyfuturelawtobeexemptedfromapplicationandenforcementofthe
fundamentalrightsbeingguaranteedbytheConstitution.Itistruethatsubsequentlytheprovisionsof
Article8(3)(b)(i)oftheConstitutionhadbeenamendedbutthatamendmentonlyallowedamendments
tothealreadyexemptedlawstobealsoexemptedandsuchamendmentofArticle8(3)(b)(i)never
allowedanyotherindependentlawtobeaddedtothelistofthealreadyexemptedlaws.Itissignificant
tonotethatwhileamendingArticle8(3)(b)(i)oftheConstitutionnocorrespondingamendmentwas
madeinArticle8(3)(b)(ii)oftheConstitution.Itappearstomethatthewordsotherlawsspecifiedin
PartIoftheFirstScheduleappearinginArticle8(3)(b)(ii)oftheConstitutionrefertothelawsspecified
inPartIoftheFirstScheduleonthecommencingdayoftheConstitutionleavingnoroomforadditionto
thelistofthespecifiedlawsatanyfuturestage.ThepasttenseusedinthewordspecifiedinArticle
8(3)(b)(ii)oftheConstitutionis,thus,notwithoutanysignificance.Ifthisisthetrueimportofthe
provisionsofArticle8(3)(b)(ii)oftheConstitutionthenadditionofThePakistanArmyAct,1952and
threeotherlawstosubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduletotheConstitutionthroughthe
Constitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)appearstobeatransgressionwithdoubtful
constitutionalcompetenceorvaliditybecauseforproperinclusionofanyotherlawintheFirstSchedule
oftheConstitutionwithreferencetoArticle8(3)(b)(ii)therehadtobeanamendmentofArticle
8(3)(b)(ii)inthefirstinstance,aswasdonepreviouslyinthecaseofArticle8(3)(b)(i),butthatwasnever
donebeforeintroducingtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015).Iam,therefore,
convincedthattheattemptmadethroughtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof
2015)toincludeThePakistanArmyAct,1952andthreeotherlawsintheFirstScheduleofthe
Constitutionhadremainedabortiveandunsuccessful.
69.ItisalsoimportanttomentionherethatbyvirtueofthepurportedinsertionofThe
PakistanArmyAct,1952insubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduletotheConstitutionthroughthe
Constitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)itisbeingmaintainedbytheFederal
GovernmentthatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)alsoautomaticallystandsinserted
insubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduletotheConstitution.ThisassertionoftheFederal
Governmentisalsodifficulttoaccept.IthasalreadybeenobservedbymeabovethatatthetimeofAct
No.Iof2015becominglawActNo.IIof2015wasnoteveninexistenceand,therefore,therewashardly
anyquestionofActNo.IIof2015findinganyplaceintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionthroughAct
No.Iof2015.Apartfromthat,evenifitisassumedforthesakeofargumentthatActNo.Iof2015had
validlyplacedThePakistanArmyAct,1952intheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionstillanyamendment
ofThePakistanArmyAct,1952throughanordinarylegislationcouldnotamendanypartofthe
ConstitutionbecausetherequisitesforamendingtheConstitutionaredifferent.Iamnotreadyto
acceptthatoncealawisplacedintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionthoughaconstitutional
amendmentthenanyamendmentofsuchlawintroducedthroughordinarylegislationbytheParliament
orthroughanOrdinanceissuedbytheexecutiveshallautomaticallyfinditsplaceintheFirstScheduleof
theConstitutionandshallalsoprejudiciallyaffectoroustapplicationandenforceabilityofthe
fundamentalrightsofthecitizens.TheConstitutiondoesnotcountenancesuchamodeofamendment
oftheConstitutionand,therefore,Icannotpermitthis.Aliveexampleofsuchanunconstitutionalityis
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Ordinance(OrdinanceIof2015)issuedintheaftermathofActsNo.I
andIIof2015andwhenquestionedinthatregardthelearnedAttorneyGeneralkeptquietandcould
notutterevenasinglewordindefenceofthesaidOrdinance.AccordingtomyunderstandingActNo.II
of2015aswellasOrdinanceNo.Iof2015areseparatelawswhichthemselvesneedindependent
protectionoftheFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionthroughtheirproperinsertioninthatScheduleasis
thecaseoftheamendinglawswithinthecontemplationofArticle8(3)(b)(i)oftheConstitutionandin
theabsenceofanyindependentconstitutionalprotectiontheycannotbedeemedtohaveautomatically
beentransposedtotheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.Ifthisunderstandingofmineisnotcorrect
thenanamendingActpassedbyasimplemajorityoftheParliamentoranamendingOrdinanceissued
bytheexecutivemayautomaticallyfinditsplaceintheConstitutionandtherebyimpliedlyamendthe
ConstitutioninviolationoftheprocedureandprocessforthepurposemandatedbyArticles238and
239oftheConstitution.
70.ThePreambletoActNo.Iof2015statesthat
WHEREASextraordinarysituationandcircumstancesexistwhichdemandspecialmeasuresforspeedy
trialofcertainoffencesrelatingtoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainstPakistanand
preventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristorterroristgroup,armedgroup,
wingandmilitiaortheirmembersusingthenameofreligionorasect;
(underlininghasbeensuppliedforemphasis)
Itisimportanttomentionherethattheoffencesrelatingtoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrection
againstPakistanandactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanareoffencesrecognizedandcateredforby
thePakistanPenalCode,AntiTerrorismAct,1997andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014andtheonly
declaredpurposeformakingitpermissibleformilitarycourtsconstitutedunderthePakistanArmyAct,
1952totrysuchoffencesisspeedytrialofsuchoffences.I,however,findarealproblemwiththis
declaredpurposebecauseacomparisonofsections19and25oftheAntiTerrorismAct,1997withthe
relevantprovisionsofthePakistanArmyAct,1952unmistakablyshowsthatatrialandanappealunder
theAntiTerrorismAct,1997arefarspeedierthanthoseunderthePakistanArmyAct,1952.Itis,
therefore,evidentthattheactualpurposeformakingitpermissibleformilitarycourtstotryciviliansis
notspeedytrialbutsomethingelseandthatundisclosedsomethingelsecannotbeachievedthrough
ordeliveredbythenormalcourtsofthecountrywhicharetrainedtodispenseandachievenothingbut
justiceaccordingtolaw.ThroughsomematerialshowntotheCourtthelearnedAttorneyGeneralhas
passionatelysubmittedthattheterroristsofthekindtobedealtwithandtriedbythemilitarycourtsare
barbaricsavagesand,thus,denialofprotectionofthenormalconstitutionalandlegalrightstothem
throughtheimpugnedmeasuresisamplyjustified.SuchasubmissionmadebythelearnedAttorney
GeneralremindsmeofsomeobservationsmadebymeasaJudgeoftheLahoreHighCourt,Lahorein
thecaseofAbidHussainandanotherv.Chairman,PakistanBaitulMalandothers(PLD2002Lahore
482)whichobservationsreadasfollows:
Puttingahumanbeing,thebestofAlmightyAllahscreations(AlQuran:Sura95:Verse4),inaniron
cagefortherestofhislifefornootherreasonthanhisabjectpovertyisanideaabhorrenttothe
dignitybestoweduponhimbytheCreator(Sura17:Verse70).WhentheHolyQuranenjoinsuponthe
believerstospendonprisoners,slavesandthoseindebtandforsavingtheirnecksandforlesseningof
theirburdens(Sura76:Verse8,Sura2:Verse177andSura9:Verse60)itsendsanunmistakable
messagethatwhatistobehatediscrimeandnotthecriminalandtheunfortunatepredicamentofsuch
ahumanbeingistobevisitedwithcompassionandmercywhereverandhoweverpossible.Itis
manifestlyinthisbackdropthattheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973ensuresitasa
FundamentalRightguaranteedbyArticle14thereofthatthedignityofmanisinviolable.Inthecaseof
Inre:SuoMotuConstitutionalPetition(1994SCMR1028)theHonbleSupremeCourtofPakistanhad
unequivocallydeclaredthateventheworstcriminalisentitledtohisdignityasamanandthecrime
committedbyhimdoesnotdenudehimofsucharightwhichisreferabletohisbelongingtothehuman
raceandnottohisbelongingtothecommunityofcriminals.
InthecontextofthepresentsetofpetitionsImayaddthattheStateoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan
hasadoptedIslamasitsreligion(Article2oftheConstitution)andaccordingtoArticle2Aofthe
ConstitutionreadwiththePreambletothesameandtheObjectivesResolutionof1949thechosen
representativesofthepeopleofPakistanaretoexerciseAlmightyAllahssovereigntyasasacred
trust.AlmightyAllahhasveryclearlyordainedinVerse8ofSurah5oftheHolyQuranthat
Oyouwhobelieve,standupaswitnessesforGodinallfairness,anddonotletthehatredofapeople
deviateyoufromjustice.Bejust:Thisisclosesttopiety;andbewareofGod.SurelyGodisawareofall
youdo.
(TranslationbyAhmedAli)
AlmightyAllahhasproclaimedthatthebalanceoftheentireuniversehasbeenbasedbyHimuponthe
scalesofjusticebutthroughtheimpugnedmeasuresadoptedinourcountryanattemptappearsto
havebeenmadebythetrusteesofAlmightyAllahssovereigntytotiltthatbalancebytinkeringwiththe
scalesofjusticeonlyforatemporarygain.Thepresentspateofterrorismmightbeamomentaryphase
orphenomenononthelargercanvasofhistoryanditmay,therefore,beimprudenttocompromiseor
injurethepermanentmoral,religiousandconstitutionalvalueofjusticefortacklingthistransitory
menace.HazratAliIbneAbiTalib(KaramAllahhowajho)hadobservedthatasocietycanlivewithzulm
butitcannotsurvivewithinjustice.Thistragicphenomenonofterrorismmighthavedevoured
thousandsofthisnationsinnocentcitizensandbravesoldiersandpolicemenbutcompromisingjustice
forcombatingthismenacemaybeadeathknellforthevaluesystemoftheentirenationofmorethan
onehundredandeightymillionpeople.Thechoicesbeforeusmaybehardbuttheyareotherwisequite
simple:revengeorsanity,distressorpatienceandemotionorwisdom.Itmaybetruethatthe
constitutionalandlegalmeasuresinissuehavebeenadoptedbythepeopleofPakistanthroughtheir
chosenrepresentativesintheParliamentwithoutanyregistereddissentbutatthesametimeitis
equallytruethatevensomeofthestalwartswhohadvotedinfavourofsuchmeasureshaveexpressly
beenapologeticinthatrespect.Someofthemhavecalleditabitterpill,acupofpoisonandadark
dayfordemocraticconstitutionaldispensationandothershavepublicallyexpressedshameand
disgustovertheirownconduct.Someofthosevotinginfavourofthesemeasureshavegonetothe
extentoftermingsuchmeasuresassuicidalfordemocracy.Asuicidalmeasureonthepartofthe
societytocountersuicidebombersmaynotbethemostrationallegislativesteptotake.Constitutionis
oftencalledasocialcontractandthelawofcontractlooksatthevalidityofacontractwithdoubtand
suspicionwhereacontractingpartyentersintothecontractinvoluntarilyorwithoutfreeconsent.There
mighthavebeenaconsensusovertheproposedmeasuresbutwasitadidemisanotherthing.Ifthe
measuresbeingadoptedweregoodandhealthythentheywouldhavebeenadoptedonapermanent
basisandintroductionofasunsetclauseitselfindicatesthatthoseadoptingthesemeasuresunderstood
quitewellthatthesamedidnotpiecewellwiththevaluesoftheConstitutionand,thus,theyweretobe
temporary.So,thequestionthatboilsdownisastowhetheritwasadvisablethattheallimportant
constitutionalvalueofjusticebesuspendedinitsoperationalbeittemporarilyornotbutImusthasten
toaddthatthesaidquestionisnotformetoanswer.MydomainisapplicationoftheConstitutionand
thelawandintheprecedingparagraphsIhaverecordedmyanswerstotheconstitutionalandlegal
issuesraisedbeforeme.Imay,however,observeinthiscontextthatthepassionatesubmissionmade
bythelearnedAttorneyGeneralaskingthisCourttolooktheotherwayandallowtheadopted
temporarymeasurestoholdthefieldforalimitedperiodinordertomeettheemergentandgrave
threatbeingfacedbytheStateofPakistanatthehandsoftheterroristsobliquelyandimpliedly,ifnot
explicitly,invokestheinfamousdoctrineofnecessity.Itisironicalthatinthelastmanydecadesitisthe
judiciaryofthiscountrywhichwasblamedandmalignedforinvokingthedoctrineofnecessityfor
condoningsomeunconstitutionalmeasuresandthistimethedoctrineisbeinginvokedbythe
legislatureandtheexecutiveandthejudiciaryisbeingaskedtogoalongwithit.A.V.Dicey,thepioneer
inthefieldofConstitutionallaw,haswritteninhiscelebratedbookIntroductiontothestudyoftheLaw
oftheConstitutionthatMartialLawissaidtobeimposedwhenacivilgovernmentisrunthrough
militarycourtsortribunals.Itisagainparadoxicalthatthroughtheimpugnedmeasuresmartiallaw,in
theDiceyansense,hasbeenimposedinthecountrybythelegislatureandtheexecutiveandvalidation
ofthesaidmeasuresisbeingsoughtfromthisCourt.Willcondoningorvalidatingofsuchmeasuresby
thisCourtnotamounttoreacceptanceofthedoctrineofnecessitywhichthisCourthasbeentaking
prideforsometimeinabandoning?
71.Thediscussionmadeandtheconclusionsreachedaboveleadmetoholdthatthatthe
Constitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)hadfailedtoprotectorimmunizethe
PakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)eitherfromtheswayofArticle175oftheConstitution
orfromapplicationandenforcementofthefundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitutionandthat
themilitarycourtsfortrialofciviliansconstitutedorauthorizedunderthePakistanArmy(Amendment)
Act(ActIIof2015)havenotbeenfoundedonanypowerconferredbyaConstitutionalprovisionand,
therefore,theratiodecidendiofthecaseofSh.LiquatHussain(supra)isequallyapplicabletothecasein
handrenderingthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)pertainingtotrialofciviliansby
militarycourtsunconstitutional,withoutlawfulauthorityandofnolegaleffectanditisdeclared
accordingly.Asaconsequenceofthisdeclarationallthetrialsconductedandtheappealsheardandall
thejudgmentsdeliveredintheprocesswhilederivingauthorityforsuchtrialsandappealsfromthe
PakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)aretobetreatedasnonestandincapableof
implementationandexecution.Afurtherconsequenceofthedeclarationmadeinrespectofthe
PakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)isthattheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act
(ActIof2015)haslostitsraisondtre,efficacyandutilityand,therefore,nodeterminationneedstobe
madeaboutitsfateorcontinuedexistence.
72.BeforepartingwiththeissuesraisedinconnectionwithActsNo.IandIIof2015Imayobserve
thatnoneofthesaidenactmentshasexpresslyoustedthejurisdictionofthisCourtoroftheHighCourts
toexaminematterspertainingtotrialofciviliansbymilitarycourtsandforsuchousterofjurisdiction
thelearnedAttorneyGeneralhadreferredtotheprovisionsofArticle199(3)oftheConstitution.This
Courthasalreadyclarifiedonanumberofoccasionsthatthepurportedousterofjurisdictionunder
Article199(3)oftheConstitutionisnotrelevantwheretheimpugnedproceeding,actionororderofa
militarycourtiswithoutjurisdiction,coramnonjudiceormalafideandareferenceinthisrespectmay
bemadetothecasesofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Aliandanotherv.TheState(PLD1975SC506),Federationof
Pakistanandanotherv.MalikGhulamMustafaKhar(PLD1989SC26),Mrs.ShahidaZahirAbbasiand4
othersv.PresidentofPakistanandothers(PLD1996SC632),SaburRehmanandanotherv.Government
ofSindhand3others(PLD1996SC801),SyedZafarAliShahandothersv.GeneralPervezMusharraf,
ChiefExecutiveofPakistanandothers(PLD2000SC869),Mst.TahiraAlmasandanotherv.Islamic
RepublicofPakistanthroughSecretary,MinistryofInterior,Islamabadandanother(PLD2002SC830),
MushtaqAhmedandothersv.Secretary,MinistryofDefencethroughChiefofAirandArmyStaffand
others(PLD2007SC405),GhulamAbbasNiaziv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2009SC866),
FederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryDefenceandothersv.AbdulBasit(2012SCMR1229),Rana
MuhammadNaveedandanotherv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryMinistryofDefence(2013
SCMR596)andGhulamAbbasv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,MinistryofDefenceand
others(2014SCMR849).Asregardslackofapplicabilityorenforceabilityofthefundamentalrightsto
trialofcasesbeforemilitarycourtsithardlyneedstobestatedthatthebasicprinciplesoffairtrial,due
processandnaturaljusticehavealwaysbeeninsisteduponbythisCourtinsuchcasesbyinvoking
Article4oftheConstitutionevenbeforeArticle10A(entitlementtoafairtrialanddueprocess)was
addedtotheConstitutionasafundamentalright.Bethatasitmay,Ihavealreadydeclaredabovethat
thePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)pertainingtotrialofciviliansbymilitarycourtsis
unconstitutional,withoutlawfulauthorityandofnolegaleffectand,therefore,thequestionabout
jurisdictionofthisCourtoroftheHighCourtsinrespectoftheproceedings,actionsorordersofsuch
courtshaspaledintoirrelevance.
Conclusions
73.AsaresultofthediscussionmadeaboveIhaveconcludedasfollows:
(i)InviewoftheclearandcategoricalprovisionsofArticle175(2)andArticle239(5)and(6)ofthe
ConstitutionIhavenotfeltpersuadedtoaccepttheacademictheoryofbasicfeaturesorbasicstructure
oftheConstitutionasconferringjurisdictionuponthisCourtforstrikingdownanamendmentofthe
Constitution.
(ii)AlltheConstitutionPetitionschallengingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act(ActX
of2010)aredismissed.
(iii)TheConstitutionPetitionsassailingtheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof
2015)andthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)arepartiallyallowedandthePakistan
Army(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)isdeclaredtobeunconstitutional,withoutlawfulauthorityand
ofnolegaleffect.Asaconsequenceofthisdeclarationallthetrialsconductedandtheappealsdecided
bythemilitarycourtsderivingauthorityfromthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)areto
betreatedasnonestandallthejudgmentsdeliveredbyinvokingthatlawarerenderedincapableof
implementationandexecution.
(iv)AsanoutcomeofthedeclarationmadeaboveinrespectofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act
(ActIIof2015)theConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act(ActIof2015)haslostitsraisondtre,
efficacyandutilityand,therefore,nodeterminationneedstobemadeaboutitsfateorcontinued
existence.

Sd/
(AsifSaeedKhanKhosa)
Judge
Islamabad.
Dated:14.07.2015
SARMADJALALOSMANY,J.:IhavegonethroughtheJudgmentproposedtobedeliveredbymy
LearnedbrotherSheikhAzmatSaeed,J.WhilstIfullyconcurwiththereasoningthereinandthe
conclusionsthereof,Iventurewithutmostrespecttoaddashortnoteasfollows.
2.ThesePetitionsassailtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,2010,the(Nineteenth
Amendment)Act,2010the(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,2015andthePakistanArmyAmendment
Act,2015(hereinafterreferredtoasthe18thAmendment,19thAmendment,21stAmendment
andPakistanArmy(Amendment)Act2015)
2.Essentiallytwoissuesneedtobedeterminedinthesepetitionswhichareasfollows:
a.Isthereabasicstructure/grundnorm/essentialfeatureinthe1973Constitutionwhichsoto
speakformsitscoreandassuchinviolable?
b.Iftheanswertotheabovequestionisinthepositivethenwhetherabovementioned
amendmentstotheConstitutionandthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act2015shouldbestruckdown
asbeingviolativeofsuchbasicstructure/grundnorm/essentialfeature?
3.Revertingtothefirstquestion,itwouldbeseenthatourConstitutionisawrittendocumentand
isacompletecodepertainingtotheestablishmentofthestateofPakistan,theformofGovernment
whichwouldadministerit,theprinciplesofpolicywhichwouldbeadoptedbytheGovernmenttodoso,
theestablishmentofthethreepillarsofthestateviz.Executive,LegislatureandJudiciaryandthe
manneroftheirfunctioningwithinthererespectivespheresetc.Infactthehopes,aspirations,dreams,
willandthedeterminationofthepeopleofPakistantodosowerefirstlyexpressedintheObjectives
ResolutionwhichwaspassedbythefirstConstituentAssemblyofPakistanonthe7thofMarch1949by
ourfoundingfathers.Henceinmyhumbleopinionbeforeundertakinganyjudicialanalysisofthe
aforementionedissuesandtheeruditeargumentsaddressedatthebarbytheLearnedCounselfrom
bothsidesaswellasthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistan,itwouldbeexpedienttoreproducethe
ObjectivesResolutionwhichisasunder:
TheObjectivesResolution
(InthenameofAllah,themostBeneficent,themostmerciful.)
WhereassovereigntyovertheentireuniversebelongstoAllahAlmightyaloneandtheauthoritywhich
HehasdelegatedtotheStateofPakistan,throughitspeopleforbeingexercisedwithinthelimits
prescribedbyHimisasacredtrust;
ThisConstituentAssemblyrepresentingthepeopleofPakistanresolvestoframeaConstitutionforthe
sovereignindependentStateofPakistan;
people;
Whereintheprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjusticeasenunciatedby
Islamshallbefullyobserved;
accordancewiththeteachingsandrequirementsofIslamassetoutintheHolyQuranandtheSunnah;
Whereinadequateprovisionshallbemadefortheminoritiesto[freely]professandpracticetheir
religionsanddeveloptheircultures;
Whereinshallbeguaranteedfundamentalrightsincludingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbefore
law,social,economicandpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipand
Whereinadequateprovisionsshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesand
WhereintheindependenceoftheJudiciaryshallbefullysecured;
WhereintheintegrityoftheterritoriesoftheFederation,itsindependenceandallitsrightsincludingits
sovereignrightsonland,seaandairshallbesafeguarded;
SothatthepeopleofPakistanmayprosperandattaintheirrightfulandhonoredplaceamongstthe
happinessofhumanity.
4.TheObjectivesResolutionmeanswhatitsays;itisastatementoftheobjectivesforwhichthis
Countrywascreatedthroughthesacrificesofmillionsofpeoplewhowantedaseparatehomelandfor
themselves.ThecruxoftheObjectivesResolutionisfirstly,adeclarationthatsovereigntyovertheentire
universebelongstoAllahAlmightyaloneandtheauthoritywhichhehasdelegatedtotheStateof
Pakistanthroughitspeopleforbeingexercisedwithinthelimitsprescribedbyhimisasacredtrust.The
meaningofthesewordsshouldnotbelostuponusbecausetheyareuniqueinthesensethatAllahs
sovereigntyhasbeendeclaredtobeasacredtrustwhichhehasdelegatedtothepeopleofthisCountry
tobeexercisedbythemthroughtheirchosenrepresentatives.Thisisthereasonwhysoofteninmanya
reportedcasewefindobservationstotheeffectthatallpublicofficesareinthenatureofatrustwhich
includethoseoftheJudiciary,ExecutiveandLegislative.Inthisregard,Iamincompleteagreementwith
theviewsofmylearnedBrotherJawwadS.Khawaja,J.perhisseparateopinion.TheResolutiongoeson
tosaythatintheStateofPakistansovereigntyistobeexercisedinamannerwhereintheprinciplesof
democracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjusticeasenunciatedbyIslamshallbefullyobserved
andwhereinadequateprovisionshallbemadefortheminoritiestoprofessandpracticetheirreligious
anddeveloptheirculturesandwhereinshallbeguaranteedfundamentalrightsandwhereinthe
independenceofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured.Pakistansinceindependencein1947hasbeen
subjectedtovariousexperimentsingovernancei.e.parliamentaryformofdemocracy,apresidential
formofgovernment,militarydictatorshipetc.EachrulertinkeredwithourConstitutioninordertosuit
hisneedsandinordertoensurehisperpetuity,butasthesayinggoesthegraveyardsofthisworldare
fullofindispensiblepeople.However,onethingissettled,thattheObjectivesResolution,firstlyinserted
inthepreambletothe1956Constitutionsurvivedasthepreambletothe1962and1973Constitutions
withminorchangesinthe1973ConstitutionandfinallyitwasmadeapartoftheConstitutionitselfvide
Article2AaddedbyP.O.OrderNo14of1985..
5.KeepinginviewtheObjectivesResolution,Iwouldnowproceedtoexaminethecaselaws
developedoverthepasthalfacenturywhereintosomeextentthecontentsoftheObjectives
Resolutionwereconsideredortheresultsflowingfromitexamined.
(a)ThefirstcaseinthisconnectionisMr.FazlulQuaderChowdhryv.Mr.Mohd.AbdulHaque(PLD
1963SupremeCourt486),whereinanamendmenttoArticle104(1)ofthe1962Constitutionwas
consideredwherebythewordMinisterwasremovedfromArticle104(1)withaviewtoenabling
ministersappointedfromamongstmembersoftheassemblies,toretaintheirseatsaftersuch
appointment.ItwasheldthatsuchamendmentwasultraviresoftheConstitution.A.R.Cornelius,C.J.
speakingfortheCourtheldthattheamendmentinquestionwasagainsttheformofthegovernment
prescribedbytheConstitutionandmilitatedagainsttheconceptofseparationofpowersbetweenthe
threepillarsoftheStateandhencestruckdown.ItwasalsoreiteratedthattheMembersofthe
AssemblyhadtakenanoathofpreservingprotectinganddefendingtheConstitutionashadtheJudges
oftheSuperiorCourtsandconsequentlytheirinsistenceuponalterationtotheConstitutionbeforethey
becameMinistersmilitatedagainstthesolemnityoftheiroath.
(b)InthecaseofJhamandasv.ChiefLandCommr.(PLD1966SC229),theorderoftheLand
Commissioner,deprivingmembersofaJointHinduFamilyoftheirinheritance,wasinissue.A.R.
Cornelius,C.J.whilespeakingfortheCourtobservedthatArticle2ofthe1962Constitutionguaranteed
equaltreatmenttoallcitizensinaccordancewithlawandinparticularthatnoactiondetrimentaltothe
propertyofanypersonshallbetakenexceptinaccordancewithlaw.Hence,theimpugnedorderofthe
LandCommissionerwasstruckdownasbeingviolativeofsaidArticlewhichwasdescribedasthe
constitutionalconscienceofPakistan.
(c)InthecaseofAsmaJilaniv.Govt.ofthePunjab(PLD1972SC139),wherethemartiallaw
imposedbyGeneralYahyaKhanwasproscribed,itwasheldbyHamoodurRahman,C.J.thatPakistans
owngrundnormisenshrinedinitsowndoctrinethatthelegalsovereigntyovertheentireuniverse
belongedtoAlmightyAllahaloneandtheauthorityexercisablebythepeoplewithinthelimits
prescribedbyhimisasacredtrust.Thiswasheldtobeanimmutableandunalterablenormwhichwas
clearlyacceptedintheObjectivesResolutionpassedbytheConstituentAssemblyofPakistanonthe7th
ofMarch1949.Thishasnotbeenabrogatedbyanyonesofar,norhasthisbeendepartedordeviated
frombyanyregime,militaryorcivil.Indeed,itcannotbe,for,itisoneofthefundamentalprinciples
inscribedintheHolyQuran.Consequently,themartiallawimposedbyGeneralYahyaKhanwasset
asideandtheprinciplesetdowninthecaseofStatev.Dosso(PLD1958SC533)disapproved,whichhad
sanctifiedthemartiallawofGeneralAyubKhanontheprincipleofstatenecessityrelyinguponKelsens
theorytothateffect.
(d)However,inthecaseofStatev.ZiaurRahman(PLD1973SC49),HamoodurRahman,C.J.held
thattheSupremeCourtwasacreatureoftheConstitutionandcanneitherclaimnorhastherightto
strikedownanyprovisionoftheConstitutionofPakistan.TheCourtdidclaim,however,therightto
interprettheConstitutionevenifaprovisionintheConstitutionoustedthejurisdictionoftheCourt.It
wasfurtherheldthattheObjectivesResolutionof1949isadocumentwhichhasbeengenerally
acceptedandhasneverbeenrepealedorrenouncedbutitdoesnothavethesamestatusorauthority
astheConstitutionitselfuntilitisincorporatedwithinitormadepartofit.Explaininghisobservationsin
AsmaJilaniscase,HamoodurRahman,C.J.statedthatthereinithadnotbeenlaiddownthatthe
ObjectivesResolutionisthegrundnormoftheConstitutionbutthatthegrundnormisthedoctrineof
legalsovereigntyofAllahacceptedbythepeopleofPakistanandtheconsequencesthatflowfromit
anditdoesnotdescribetheObjectivesResolutionasthecornerstoneofPakistanslegaledifice.Hence,
thegrundnormreferredtobytheSupremeCourtinAsmaJilaniscasewasevenabovetheObjectives
Resolutionwhichembodiesthespiritandthefundamentalnormsoftheconstitutionalconceptof
Pakistan.Consequently,theObjectivesResolutioncouldnotstandonahigherpedestalthanthe
ConstitutionitselfasitisapreambleonlyandcannotcontrolthesubstantivepartsoftheConstitution.
(e)InthecaseofFederationofPakistanv.UnitedSugarMillsLtd(PLD1977SC397),the
amendmentmadeinArticle199oftheConstitutionbyaddingsubclause4Athroughthe4th
amendmentwasupheld.ItwasalsoobservedthatasheldinthecaseofZiaurRahmanaconstitutional
provisioncannotbechallengedonthegroundofbeingrepugnanttowhataresometimesstatedas
nationalaspirationsoranabstractconceptsolongastheprovisionispassedbythecompetent
LegislatureinaccordancewiththeprocedurelaiddownbytheConstitutionorasupraconstitutional
instrument.
(f)InthecaseofBegumNusratBhuttov.ChiefofArmyStaffEtc.(PLD1977SC657)perthe
majority,martiallawimposedbyGeneralZiaulHaq,wasupheldonthegroundofstatenecessity.The
caseofAsmaJilanitothecontrarywasdistinguishedandinamannerofspeakingoverruled.Itwasheld
thattheConstitutioncouldbeamendedorsuspended.
(g)InthecaseofHakimKhanv.GovernmentofPakistan(PLD1992SC595),itwasheldthatby
virtueofArticle2A,theObjectivesResolutionhadbecomeasubstantialpartoftheConstitution.
However,itwasnotasupraConstitutionalprovisionandhencecarriedthesameweightandstatusas
otherArticlesoftheConstitutionwhichwerealreadyasubstantivepartthereof.Consequently,
amendmenttotheConstitutioncannotbetestedonthetouchstoneofArticle2A,whichwaspurelyan
ObjectivesResolution,wherebythepeopleofPakistanhadlaiddownhowtheywouldbegovernedand
whatthesystemofgovernmentwouldbeandhowthepowerwastobesharedbetweenthethree
pillarsofthegovernment.
(h)InthecaseofAlJehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996SC324),videshortorderinter
aliaitwasheldthatPakistanisgovernedbytheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973,
preambleofwhichsaysthattheprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjustice,
asenunciatedbyIslam,shallbefullyobservedandindependenceofJudiciaryfullysecured.Italso
providedthattheMuslimsshallbeenabledtoordaintheirlivesintheirindividualandcollectivespheres
inaccordancewiththeteachingsandrequirementsofIslamassetoutintheHolyQuranandSunnah.
ThepreambleisareflectionoftheObjectivesResolutionwhichwasinsertedintheConstitutionas
Article2AasasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionbyP.O.No.14of1985.Article2oftheConstitution
statesinunequivocaltermsthatIslamshallbetheStatereligionofPakistan.PartIXoftheConstitution
containsIslamicProvisionsinwhichArticle227envisagesthatallexistinglawsshallbebroughtin
conformitywiththeInjunctionsofIslamaslaiddownintheHolyQuranandSunnah.TheInstitutionof
JudiciaryinIslamenjoysthehighestrespectandthispropositionisbeyondanydispute.The
appointmentsofJudgesandthemannerinwhichtheyaremadehaveclosenexuswithindependenceof
Judiciary.
(i)InthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaiv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1997SC426),itwasheld
bymajorityinteraliathatthequestionastothebasicstructureoftheConstitutionofPakistan(1973),is
aquestionofanacademicnaturewhichcannotbeansweredauthoritativelywithatouchoffinality.
BasicstructureassuchisnotspecificallymentionedintheConstitutionbuttheObjectivesResolution
whenreadwithotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionreflectssalientfeaturesoftheConstitution
highlightingFederalismandParliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.
(j)InthecaseofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1998SC
1263),itwasheldthatthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionwasarepresentativeformofGovernment,
Islamicconceptofdemocracyandindependenceofjudiciary.However,thistheorycouldnotbeadopted
todeclareanyprovisionoftheConstitutionasbeingultraviresofanyofthefundamentalrights.Onthe
contrary,itwasobservedthatwhenthereisaconflictbetweentwoArticlesoftheConstitution,efforts
shouldbemadetoresolvethesamebyreconcilingthemandthatinterpretationshouldbeaccepted,
whichisclosesttothebasicstructurei.e.independenceofjudiciaryetc.
(k)InthecaseofZafarAliShahv.PervezMusharaf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistan(PLD2000SC869),
itwasheldinteraliathatthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionwereindependenceoftheJudiciary,
federalism,parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.
(l)InthecaseofPakistanLawyersForumv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2005SC719),itwasheld
thatalthoughitwasrecognizedthattherewerecertainsalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,no
constitutionalamendmentcouldbestruckdownbythesuperiorjudiciaryasbeingviolativeofthose
features.Theremedylayinthepoliticalandnotthejudicialprocessandhencetheappealinsuchcases
wastobemadetothepeopleandnottheCourts,sincetheConstitutionalamendmentinissueposeda
politicalquestionwhichcouldberesolvedonlythroughthenormalmechanismofparliamentary
democracyandfreeelections.
6.Anoverviewoftheaforementionedcaseswouldestablishthatinitiallyinthecasesof
Mr.FazlulQuaderChowdhryandJhamandastheprincipleofseparationofpowersbetweenthreepillars
oftheStatewasrecognizedandsoalsotheequalityclauserespectivelyascontainedpresentlyinArticle
4oftheConstitutionwhichwasdescribedastheConstitutionalconscienceofPakistan.Thereaftervery
visiblyinAsmaJilaniscasethisCourtacceptedtheObjectivesResolutionasthegrundnormofthe
Constitutionparticularlythedeclarationthatsovereigntyovertheentireuniversebelongstoalmighty
Allahaloneandthesamewastobeexercisedbythepeopleasasacredtrustwhichdidnotcondonethe
impositionofmartiallawbyGeneralYahyaKhanwhichwasaccordinglydeclaredtobeunconstitutional.
HoweverstrangelyenoughinthecaseofZiaurRehmanitwasobservedthatinAsmaJilaniscasethe
ObjectivesResolutionitselfwasnotthegrundnormbutthedoctrineofAllahssovereigntyacceptedby
thepeopleofPakistanandtheconsequencesthatflowfromiti.e.suchgrundnormwasevenabovethe
ObjectiveResolutionandembodiesthespiritandthefundamentalnormsoftheconstitutionalconcept
ofPakistan.InthecasesofUnitedSugarMillsandBegumNusratBhutto,thecaseofZiaurRehmanwas
followed.AgaininthecaseofHakimKhanitwasheldthatalthoughbyvirtueofArticle2Atothe
Constitution,theObjectivesResolutionhadbecomeasubstantialpartoftheConstitution,yet,itwasnot
asupraConstitutionalprovisionandhenceanyamendmenttotheConstitutioncouldnotbetestedon
itstouchstone.AgaininthecaseofAlJehadTrustitwasheldthatthepreambletotheConstitutionisa
reflectionoftheObjectivesResolutionwhichwasinsertedasArticle2Aasasubstantivepartofthe
sameandsinceArticle2oftheConstitutionsaysthatIslamshallbethestatereligionofPakistanand
sincetheinstitutionofJudiciaryinIslamenjoysthehighestrespectandhencetheappointmentof
Judgeshasaclosenexuswiththeindependenceofjudiciary.FinallyinthecaseofMahmoodKhan
AchakzaiagainbymajorityitwasheldthattheObjectiveResolutionwhenreadwithotherprovisionsof
theConstitutionreflectsitssalientfeatureshighlightingFederalismandParliamentaryformof
GovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.ButinWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoor(Supra)
althoughitwasrecognizedthatthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionwasarepresentativeformof
Government,Islamicconceptofdemocracyandindependenceofjudiciaryhoweverthistheorycould
notbeadoptedtodeclareanyprovisionsoftheConstitutionasbeingultraviresofanyofthe
fundamentalrights.YetagaininthecaseofZafarAliShahitwasheldinteraliathatsalientfeaturesof
theConstitutionwereindependenceofjudiciary,federalism,parliamentaryformofGovernment
blendedwithIslamicprovisionsbutinthecaseofPakistanLawyersForum(afivemembersbench)itwas
heldthatnoconstitutionalamendmentcouldbestruckdownbythesuperiorjudiciaryasbeingviolative
ofthesefeatures.
7.Itwouldthereforebeseenthatperhapsforthefirsttimeitwasrecognizedbythis
CourtinthecaseofAsmaJilanithatpertheObjectivesResolutionsovereigntyovertheentireuniverse
belongedtoAlmightyAllahaloneandhehasdelegatedthesametothepeopleofPakistanasasacred
trustwhichyetagainistobeexercisedthroughtheelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleandthisis
reflectedintheenactmentofthe1973Constitutionbysuchelectedrepresentativeswhichprescribeda
parliamentaryformofGovernmentetc..InmyhumbleopinionthecaseofAsmaJilaniindeedbrokenew
groundintheconstitutionalhistoryofthiscountryandthejudicialinterpretationofthesamewhenthe
conceptofatrustinbetweenthepeopleandtheirchosenrepresentativeswasfirstlyrecognized.
AlthoughinthecaseofZiaurRehmanthisdeclarationviztheObjectivesResolutionwaswatereddown
inthesensethatthereinitwasheldthatthegrundnormreferredtointhecaseofAsmaJilaniwaseven
abovetheObjectivesResolutioni.e.somethingetherealembodyingthespiritandthefundamental
normsoftheconceptofPakistan,insubsequentcasesparticularlyinMuhammadKhanAchakzaiby
majorityofsixtoone,ithasbeenacceptedbythisCourtthattherearesomesalientfeaturesi.e.
federalismandparliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Tothecontrary,in
thecaseofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoor,bymajorityofsixtoone,thebasicstructuretheory
wasnotaccepted.HoweverinthecaseofZafarAliShah,thefullCourtconsistingof12members,
acceptedthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionasbeingindependenceofjudiciary,federalism,
parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Consequentlyinmyopinionthe
definingdecisioninthematteristhecaseofZafarAliShahinwhichithasinnouncertaintermsbeen
declaredthatthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionwereindependenceofthejudiciary,federalism,
parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisionsandthiswasbyaTwelveMembers
BenchoftheCourti.e.fullCourtatthattime.AlthoughthecaseofZafarAliShahhasbeenmuch
criticizedashavingbeenupheldthemartiallawimposedbyGeneralPervezMusharaf,yetthefact
remainsthatitdidotherwisedeclarethesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionasreproducedabove.Seen
inthiscontextaswellasinthecontextofthetheoryofTrusttheonlyconclusionthereforeisthatthe
ObjectivesResolutionwhichisnowasubstantialpartoftheConstitutionbyvirtueofArticle2A
embodiesthewillofthepeoplewhichisasacredtrustuntotheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople
whichyetagainrepresentsthesovereigntyofAlmightyAllahovertheentireuniverseandistobe
exercisedwithinthelimitsprescribedbyhimperIslamicdoctrines.Thiscountrywasachievedinthe
nameofIslam.Ourfoundingfathersrealizedasfaragoasin1940whenthePakistanResolutionwas
tabledatLahorethatthetwocommunitiesvizMuslimsandHinduscouldnotlivetogetherastheyhad
separateidentities,cultures,customs,languagesetc.andthiswasagainhighlightedintheObjectives
Resolution.ConsequentlyinmyhumbleopinionconcurringwiththeviewsofmyLearnedBrotherSheikh
AzmatSaeed,J.itwouldbeseenthatanyamendmenttotheConstitutionwhichwoulddenythepeople
ofthiscountrytheirfreedompertheirfundamentalrightsortheformofGovernmentwhichtheyhad
chosenortheindependenceofthejudiciarycouldneverbecondoned.Wemaylookforour
philosophies,ourexistenceandourwayoflifehereandtherebutitisallembodiedintheConstitution
ofwhichtheobjectiveresolution,sotospeak,isinshortformitscrux.
8.Havingopinedthatindeedthereisabasicstructure/grundnorm/salientfeatureorwhatever
othertermmaybeusedi.e.theconstitutionalconscienceetc.whichisembodiedintheObjectives
ResolutionparticularlythedeclarationthatsovereigntyovertheentireuniversebelongstoAlmighty
Allahalone,nowIwouldexaminewhethertheConstitution18thAmendment,19thAmendment,21st
AmendmentandthePakistanArmyAmendmentAct2015violatesthesameandtothatextentshould
bestruckdown.
9.Revertingfirstlytothe18thAmendmentitwouldbeseenthatanumberofprovisionsofthe
Constitutionhavebeenamendedbythesamebutthechallengebasicallythrownatthebarwasinterms
ofArticle63AwhichprovidesfordisqualificationofmembersofParliamentonthegroundsofdefection
etc.andtheadditionofArticle175Aprovidingfortheappointmentofpersonstothesuperiorjudiciary
ofPakistan.
(a)InsofarasArticle63Aisconcerneditwouldbeseenthatoriginallythe1973
Constitutiondidnothaveanyprovisioninrespectofdisqualificationofamemberonthegroundof
defectionfromhisorherpoliticalparty.ThiswasintroducedviatheConstitutional14thAmendment
1977wherebyArticle63Awasintroducedwhichprovidedforsuchdisqualification.Article63Awas
upheldbythisCourtinthecaseofWukalaMahazandheldtobeintraviresoftheConstitution.Itwas
observedthereinthatArticle63Aasitoriginallystoodbringsstabilityinthepolityofthecountryasit
wouldbeinstrumentalineradicatingthecancerousviceoffloorcrossing.Itisalsoinconsonancewith
theQuranandSunnahasthesameenjoinitsbelieverstohonourtheircommitmentsiftheyarenotin
conflictwiththeteachingsoftheformer.Initspresentshapevidethe18thAmendmentthereisno
significantchangetotheoriginalArticle63Aotherthanthescopeofthedirectionsinspecificmatters
mentionedinsubparagraphs1to3ofparagraphbofclause1ofArticle63Ahasbeenenhanced.I
concurwithmyLearnedBrotherSheikhAzmatSaeed,J.thattheyappeartobereasonableandalso
necessaryforthemaintenanceofpartydiscipline,stabilityandsmoothfunctioningofdemocracyin
Parliament.SoalsoitwouldbeseenthatthereisaninbuiltsafeguardmechanismaffordedtoaMember
beforeheisdisqualifiedsincethereisanopportunitytoshowcausewhyadeclarationthathe/shebe
hasdefectedfromthepartymaynotbemade.ThisdeclarationisthensenttothePresidingOfficerof
theconcernedHouseandcopiedtotheElectionCommissionandfinallytheElectionCommissionis
requiredtodecidethesamewhichisjusticiablebeforethisCourt.Inouropinionsuchsafeguards
adequatelyprotectapartymemberfrombeingdisqualifiedifhemerelydebatesorraisesapointof
orderinthehouseagainstaparticularissuebeingdiscussedintheParliamentandevenifhedoes
decidetovoteagainsthispartyasamatterofconscience,asstatedabove,hehaslegalredressupto
thisCourt.HencewhilstconcurringwithmyLearnedBrotherSheikhAzmatSaeed,J.,inmyopinionthe
newlyamendedprovisionsofArticle63Awillnotinanymannerundermineorareviolativeofthebasic
structureoftheConstitutionasdescribedabove.
(b)ThenextchangebroughtaboutintheConstitutionvidethe18thAmendmentisthe
introductionofArticle175AprovidingfortheprocedurewherebytheJudgesofthesuperiorcourtsof
thisCountryaretobeappointed.Inthisregarditwouldbeseenthattwocollegiumshavebeencreated,
theJudicialCommissionandtheParliamentaryCommittee.ForappointmentoftheJudgesofthe
SupremeCourt,theJudicialCommissioniscomposedoftheHon'bleChiefJusticeofPakistanasa
Chairman,fourseniormostJudgesoftheSupremeCourtasMembers,aformerChiefJusticeoraformer
JudgeoftheSupremeCourtofPakistantobenominatedbytheHon'bleChiefJusticeofPakistan,the
FederalMinisterforLawandJustice,theAttorneyGeneralforPakistanandaseniorAdvocateofthe
SupremeCourtofPakistannominatedbythePakistanBarCouncilforatermoftwoyears.For
appointmenttotheJudgesoftheHighCourt,theCommissionwouldalsoincludetheChiefJusticeofthe
relevantHighCourtalongwiththeseniorPuisneJudgeofthatCourt,theProvincialMinsterforLawand
anAdvocatehavingnotlessthanfifteenyearsofpracticeattheHighCourttobenominatedbythe
concernedbarcouncil.ThesameisthecaseforappointmentoftheJudgestotheIslamabadHighCourt
whereasforappointmentofJudgesintheFederalShariatCourt,CommissionshallalsoincludetheChief
JusticeoftheFederalShariatCourtandtheseniormostJudgeofthatCourtasitsmembers.Oncea
personhasbeennominatedbymajoritybytheJudicialCommission,hisnameissenttothe
ParliamentaryCommitteewhichconsistsoffourmembersoftheSenateandfourmembersofthe
NationalAssemblyoutofwhichfourshallbefromthetreasurybenchestwofromeachhouseandfour
fromtheoppositionbenches,twofromeachhousetobenominatedbytheleaderoftheHouseandthe
Opposition.WheretheCommitteeonreceiptofnominationbymajorityapprovesitthesameistobe
senttothePrimeMinsterwhoshallforwardittothePresidentofPakistanforappointment.However
wheretheCommitteedecidesnottonominateapersonbythreequartermajority,itsdecisionistobe
forwardedtotheCommissionthroughthePrimeMinsterwhowouldthereafternominateanother
person.InmyopiniontheinclusionofpersonsotherthantheJudgesofthesuperiorCourtsinthe
appointmentofJudgesisasalutaryprovision.WeasJudgescannotclaimtobetherepositoryofall
wisdominsofarastheantecedentsofacandidateareconcerned.Ofcoursewecanevaluatethe
professionalworthofanomineei.e.hisknowledgeofthelaw,hisgraspoflegalprinciplesandhis
acumenasalawyerbuttheotherqualitiesrequiredofajudgewhicharehisimpeccableintegrity,
characterandreputationetc.canperhapsbestbeascertainedbynonjudicialmembersofthe
CommissionaswellastheCommitteewhosotospeakarenotasalooffromsocietyasJudgesare
supposedtobe.HenceIdonotseeastohowinanymannertheprocessofappointmentofJudgesto
thesuperiorCourtsmilitatesagainsttheindependenceofthejudiciaryorforthatmatteranyother
provisionoftheConstitution.ItwouldbeseenthatwheretheCommitteedoesnotendorsesthe
nominationoftheCommissionthesameisjusticiableasdecidedinthecaseofMunirHussainBhattiVs.
FederationofPakistan(PLD2011SC308).
10.NowIwouldexaminethe21stAmendment(whichaddsaprovisotoArticle175andamends
theFirstScheduletotheConstitution)andthePakistanArmyAmendmentAct,2015inorderto
ascertainwhethertheyareviolativeofanyoftheessentialfeaturesorbasicstructureofthe
Constitution.
(a)ItwillbeappropriatetoreproduceArticle175asitexistedpriortotheamendmentandthe
additionsmadetheretopursuanttothe21stAmendment:
175:.(1)ThereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,aHighCourtforeachProvinceandaHighCourtfor
Explanation.Unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,thewordsHighCourtwhereveroccurringin
theConstitutionshallincludeIslamabadHighCourt.
(2)NoCourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionor
byorunderanylaw.
commencingday.
The21stAmendmentintroducedaprovisotoArticle175whichreadsasfollows:
(b)Soalsovidethe21stAmendmentthePakistanArmyAct1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,
thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014havebeenaddedinthe
FirstScheduleinSubPartIIIofpartIthereofafterSl.No.5.
(c)Consequentlywhatthe21stAmendmentachievesisfirstlybyvirtueoftheprovisotoArticle
175itexemptsthetrialofsuchpersonsunderthePakistanArmyAct1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,
1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961whoareknowntobelongtoanyterroristorganizationusing
thenameofareligionorasect.fromtherigorsofArticle175.Inmyhumbleopinionthereforethesaid
amendmentdoesnotsetupsuchCourtswhicharealreadyinexistencebyvirtueoftheirseparate
enactmentsbutonlytriestoobviateachallengetosuchCourtstothetrialofthepersonsmentioned
thereinbysuchCourts.Article175(1)clearlyprovidesthatthereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,
HighCourtofeachProvinceandHighCourtforIslamabadCapitalTerritoryandsuchotherCourtsasmay
beestablishedbylaw.(Emphasisissupplied).ItisnobodyscasethattheArmy,NavyorAirForceCourts
arenotestablishedbylawasindeedtheyhavebeenestablishedbytheirrespectiveenactments.
ConsequentlyIdonotseeastohowtheamendmentinquestionbyvirtueofadditionofaprovisoto
Article175inanymannereffectstheestablishmentofsuchCourts.Article175isaveryimportant
ArticleoftheConstitutionasitdealswithestablishmentoftheCourtsoflawinPakistanwhichmeans
civilianCourtswhicharetobegracedbysuchpersonsasareappointedtothesuperiorCourtsbyvirtue
oftheConstitutionandtotheotherCourtsbyvirtueofthelaw.OntheotherhandtheArmy,AirForce
andtheNavyCourtsareestablishedbyvirtueoftheirseparateenactmentsandforpersonswhoare
subjecttothejurisdictionofsuchCourtsasdefinedtherein.InfacttheArmyActhasbeenamended
separatelytoextenditsjurisdictionforthepurposeoftrialofanypersonsclaimingorareknownto
belongtoanyterroristgrouporanorganizationusingthenamesofareligionorasectandraisearmsor
wagewaragainstPakistanetc.,orattackthearmedforcesofPakistanorlawenforcementagenciesor
attackanycivilormilitaryestablishmentofPakistanetc..HenceinmyopiniontheprovisotoArticle175
ismoreorlessinsignificant.
(d)IwouldnowconsidertheaffectofincludingintheFirstScheduletotheConstitutionthe
PakistanArmyAct1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andthe
ProtectionofPakistanAct,2014.ThisSchedulei.e.subpart3ofPart1pertainstoArticle8ofthe
Constitutionwhichprovidesasunder:
Article8.LawsinconsistentwithorinderogationofFundamentalRightstobevoid.
(1)Anylaw,oranycustomorusagehavingtheforceoflaw,insofarasitisinconsistentwiththe
rightsconferredbythisChapter,shall,totheextentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.
(2)TheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightssoconferredandany
lawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofsuchcontravention,bevoid.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(a)AnylawrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForces,orthePoliceorofsuchotherforcesasare
(b)anyofthe
(ii)otherlawsspecifiedin,PartIoftheFirstSchedule;
andnosuchlawnoranyprovisionsthereofshallbevoidonthegroundthatsuchlaworprovisionis
(4)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinparagraph(b)ofclause(3)withinaperiodoftwoyears
fromthecommencingday,theappropriateLegislatureshallbringthelawsspecifiedinPartIIoftheFirst
ScheduleintoconformitywiththerightsconferredbythisChapter:
ProvidedthattheappropriateLegislaturemaybyresolutionextendthesaidperiodoftwoyearsbya
periodnotexceedingsixmonths.
Explanation.IfinrespectofanylawMajliseShoora(Parliament)istheappropriateLegislature,such
resolutionshallbearesolutionoftheNationalAssembly.
(5)TherightsconferredbythisChaptershallnotbesuspendedexceptasexpresslyprovidedbythe
Constitution.
(i)ConsequentlytheintentofaddingtheaforesaidenactmentvizPakistanArmyAct1952,the
PakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,
2014(thelastofwhichcreatesspecialCourts)istoobviateanychallengethrowntothetrialofthe
accusedbysuchCourtsonthegroundthatitisviolativeoftheirfundamentalrights.HencenowIwould
examinewhetherthetrialofsuchaccusedwhoallegedlyclaimorareknowntobelongtoanyterrorist
groupororganizationusingthenameorreligionorsect.isviolativeofsuchrights.Beforeattemptingto
dosoitwouldbeinstructivetoexaminethecurrentlawandorderconditionprevailinginPakistaninthe
backdropofwhichthe21stAmendmenttotheConstitutionwasenacted.InthisregardIcandono
betterthantoreproducethepreambletoAct1of2015viz21stAmendment:
ActNo.Iof2015
AnactfurthertoamendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan
preventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristgroup,armedgroup,wingand
militiaortheirmembersusingthenameofreligionorasect;
ANDWHEREASthereexistsgraveandunprecedentedthreattotheintegrityofPakistanandobjectives
setoutinthePreambletotheConstitutionbytheframersoftheConstitution,fromtheterroristgroups
byraisingofarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameofreligionorasectorfromtheforeignandlocally
fundedantistateelements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristgroupsincludinganysuchterroristsfightingwhile
usingthenameofreligionorasect,capturedortobecapturedincombatwiththeArmedForcesor
otherwisearetriedbythecourtsestablishedundertheActsmentionedhereinafterinsection2;
representativesintheallpartiesconferencesheldinaftermathofthesadandterribleterroristattackon
theArmyPublicSchoolatPeshawaron16December2014topermanentlywipeoutanderadicate
terroristsfromPakistan,itisexpedienttoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothenecessarymeasures
takenhereunderintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan;
1.Shorttitleandcommencement(1)ThisActmaybecalledtheConstitution(Twentyfirst
Amendment)Act,2015.
2.Itshallcomeintoforceatonce.
3.TheprovisionsofthisActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedateofits
commencementandshallceasetoformpartoftheConstitutionandshallstandrepealedonthe
2.AmendmentofArticle175oftheConstitution.IntheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan,hereinaftercalledtheConstitution,inArticle175,inclause(3),forthefullstopattheenda
colonshallbesubstitutedandthereafter,thefollowingprovisoshallbeinserted,namely:
theActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofsubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstSchedule,whoclaims,or
isknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupoforganizationusingthenameofreligionorasect.
3.AmendmentintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.IntheConstitution,intheFirst
Schedule,insubpartIIIofPartI,afterserialNo.5,thefollowingnewentriesshallbeadded,namely:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXIXof1952)
7.ThePakistanAirForceAct,1953(VIOF1953)
8.ThePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961(XXXVOF1961)
9.TheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014)
(ii)AsimilarpreambleisavailableinArticle2oftheAct2015byvirtueofwhichthePakistanArmy
Act1952hasbeenamendedtogivethejurisdictiontotheArmyCourtsforthetrialofsuchpersonswho
claimorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofareligionora
sect.etc..Itisnoanylongerasecretthatweareanationatwaraspersonswhoclaimtobelongto
differentreligiousorganizationsorsectsareengagedinaninsurgencyinordertopropagatetheirown
viewofreligion.Theirobjectivesarenosecretandinshortthesearetograbpoliticalandeconomic
powerofthestatethroughforceofarms.Wehaveseenhowtheseinsurgentsoperateinthenameof
religionthemannerinwhichtheymurder,decapitate,tortureandotherwiseendthelivesofinnocent
peoplewhomtheyperceivetobetheirenemiesonlybecausetheydonotsubscribetotheirparticular
brandofreligion.WehaveseentheterribleatrocitiescarriedoutbysuchpeopleinthePeshawarArmy
PublicSchoolmassacrewheremorethan140innocentchildrenandstaffmembersoftheschoolwere
mercilesslyshotfornootherreasonthattheschoolwasbeingrunbytheArmyandtheArmywas
carryingoutanoperationagainstsuchinsurgents.Thisshowstheabsolutedesperationofthese
insurgentsastheydidnotevensparewomenandchildrenwhilecarryingouttheiragendaofchallenging
thewritofthestateofPakistan.HenceinmyopiniontheextensionoftheArmyCourtsjurisdictionover
suchterroristelementswouldnotinanymannermilitateagainsttheindependenceofjudiciaryas
desperatetimescallfordesperatemeasures.InthiscontextitwouldbeseenthatvideArticle4ofthe
Constitutionallpersonsaretobedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw.SuchArticlehasbeeninterpretedin
thecaseofGovernmentofBalochistanthroughAdditionalChiefSecretaryVs.AzizullahMemonand16
others(PLD1993SC341)andhasbeencategorizedastheequalprotectionoflawandheldthatequal
protectionoflawdoesnotenvisagethateverycitizenistobetreatedalikeinallcircumstancesbutit
contemplatesuchpersonssimilarlysituatedorsimilarlyplacedaretobetreatedalike.Bynostretchof
imaginationcanitbesaidthattheseinsurgents/desperadoesareordinarycriminalsbecausetheyare
wagingawaragainsttheStateofPakistanandhencetheycannotclaimprotectionofArticle4.Similarly
insofarasArticle8isconcernedagainitwouldbeseenthatthiscategoricallystatesthatanylawor
customorusagehavingforceoflawinsofaritisconsistentwiththerightsconferredbythischapter
(fundamentalrights)shalltotheextentofsuchinconsistencybevoid.HowevervidesubArticle3which
isanexceptiontosubarticle1theprovisionsofthearticlearenottoapplytothemembersofthe
armedforcesoranyofthelawspecifiedintheFirstSchedulebeingpart1thereofwhichnowhasbeen
amendedbythe21stAmendmenttoincludeThePakistanArmyAct,1952,ThePakistanAirForceAct,
1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014.Sothequestion
ariseswhetherthePakistanArmyActdoesnotcontainanyfundamentalrightsforanaccusedbeforeit.
Itissettledlawthatinacriminaltrialthebasicrightsofanaccusedarefirstlytobeapprisedofthe
chargeagainsthim,therighttocounselofhischoice,therighttocrossexaminetheprosecution
witnessesandtherighttoleadhisownevidence.InthecaseofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.AliandanotherVs.The
State(PLD1975SC506)itwasheldthatalltheserightsareavailabletoanaccusedbeforeamilitary
Court.NodoubtinthecaseofMehramAli(PLD1988SC1445)itwasstatedthattheconstitutional
frameworkrelatingtothejudiciarydoesnotadmit/permittheestablishmentofaparallelsystemof
CourtsorTribunalswhicharenotunderthejudicialreviewandadministrativecontrolandsupervisionof
theHighCourt.SoalsointhecaseofSh.LiaquatHussainandothersVs.FederationofPakistanthrough
MinistryofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(PLD1999SC504)thetrialof
civiliansbymilitaryCourtsforcriminaloffenceswassetasideanditwasheldthatunderArticle245the
Armysroleisverylimitedi.e.inaidofcivilpoweranditdisqualifiesthearmytoactinsupersessionof
thecivilCourtsandevenanActoftheParliamentcannotenablethemtoperformsuchjudicial
functions.Howeverasstatedabovewearepassingthroughdifficulttimes,theterrorists/insurgentswho
aretofacetheirtrialsbeforethemilitarycourtsaredesperatepersonswhoseavowedobjectiveisto
destabilizetheGovernmentandtheStateofPakistanandtoestablishtheirownwritbasedupontheir
owninterpretationofreligion.Suchpersonscancertainlybesubjectedtoamorestringent/strictregime
oftrial.Intheenditmayalsobeseenthataspersettledlaw,eventhosepersonswhoareconvictedby
themilitarycourtscanapproachthesuperiorcourtsiftheycanestablishthateitherthetrialwas
malafideorwithoutjurisdictionorquorumnonjudice.Consequentlyinmyopinionthe21st
AmendmenttotheConstitutionofthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act2015doesnotmilitateagainst
theessentialfeaturesoftheConstitutionandneitherdoesthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act2015.
Sd/
(SarmadJalalOsmany)
EJAZAFZALKHAN,J.BythissinglejudgmentweproposetodecideConstitutionPetitionsNo.
12/2010,13/2010,18/2010,20/2010,21/2010,22/2010,30/2010,35/2010,36/2010,39/2010,
40/2010,42/2010,43/2010,44/2010,1901/201andH.R.C.No.22753K/2010challengingtheviresof
theConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,2010,andConstitutionPetitionsNo.99/2014,2/2015,
4/2015,5/2015,6/2015,7/2015,8/2015,9/2015,10/2015,11/2015,12/2015,23/2015and24/2015
challengingtheviresoftheConstitution(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,2015.However,Constitution
PetitionNo.13/2015wasfiledinsupportofthe21stAmendmentprayingforvalidationofthe21st
AmendmentAct,2015.
2.Mr.HamidKhan,thelearnedSr.ASCappearingforLahoreHighCourtBarAssociationin
ConstitutionPetitionNo.18of2010wasfirsttobreaktheice.Heaftercitingastringofjudgmentsfrom
IndianandPakistanijurisdictionenunciatingthedoctrineofbasicstructuresoughttocanvassatthebar
thatthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutioncannotbealteredandthatthe18thAmendmentaltering
manyofthemcannotstand.ThemainthrustofhisargumentwasthatinterventionofParliamentary
CommitteeintheappointmentofJudgeswouldtendtopoliticizetheprocesswhichisagainsttheletter
andspiritofthepreambleandArticle175oftheConstitution.Whentoldthattheprovisionrelatingto
theroleandConstitutionofParliamentaryCommitteeismoredemocraticthaneverbeforeasit
decentralizedthepowerofthePresidentamongeightMembersoftheCommittee,fourfromthe
treasuryandfourfromtheoppositionbenches,hecouldnotadvanceanyargumentjustifyingits
eliminationfromtheprocess.WhenaskedastohowtheParliamentaryCommitteecaninfluencethe
processorpoliticizetheappointmentofjudgeswhenitsdecisionhasbeenmadejusticiableinviewof
theverdictrenderedinthecaseofMunirBhattiandothersv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2011SC407),
thelearnedSr.ASCagaincouldnotsayanythingconvincingagainstthe18thAmendmentexceptthat
somethingevenworseisintheoffingintheformofthe22ndAmendment.Thisargumentbeing
speculativecannotbeaddressedatthisstage.Incaseanyamendmentcomesonthesurfaceitcanwell
bedealtwithatthattimeandnotnow.
3.Challengingtheviresofthe21stamendment,Mr.HamidKhan,thelearnedSr.ASCcontended
thattheMilitaryCourtssetuppursuanttothesaidamendmentareworstever,therefore,their
comparisonwithanyCourtsetupinthepastwouldberatherominousandmisleading.Withtheriseof
terrorism,thelearnedSr.ASCmaintained,everybodyhasbecomeinsecureineverypartofthecountry
butthatinnowaycallsforcompoundingthestandardsofproofwhichhavebeeninvoguesincetime
immemorial.Dueprocess,thelearnedASCadded,hastobeobservedregardlessofthemagnitudeand
heinousnessofthecrime.ThelearnedASCinsupportofhiscontentionplacedrelianceonthecaseof
SheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,Justiceand
ParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(supra).ThelearnedASCbyreferringtothecaseof
DarweshM.Arbey,Advocatev.FederationofPakistanthroughtheLawSecretaryand2others(PLD
1980Lahore206)contendedthatenforcementoffundamentalrightsshallbejustinconceivableifthe
provisionssecuringtheindependenceofjudiciaryaretamperedwith.
4.Mr.A.K.Dogar,Sr.ASCcontendedthattheBasicStructuretheoryindeedemergedfromthe
caseofMr.FazlulQuaderChowdhryv.Mr.MuhammadAbdulHaque(PLD1963SC486)whereinthelaw
enablingtheMinisterstoretaintheirMembershipintheAssemblywasdeclaredvoidonaccountofits
beingagainstthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionof1962.Islam,hecontended,isastructuralbaseof
thehomelandfoundedforMuslimsonthebasisoftheTwoNationTheory,therefore,itssubstitutionby
secularismisunthinkable.ThelearnedASCnextcontendedthatoncedemocracyisacceptedtobeone
ofthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,deletionofClause(4)ofArticle17providingforholdingintra
partyelectiontoelectitsofficebearersandpartysleadersisviolativeofthesalientfeaturesofthe
Constitution.WhilecommentingonArticle63(g)and(h),thelearnedASCcontendedthatlapseoffive
yearscannottransformaconvictintosagacious,righteous,nonprofligate,honestandAmeen,
therefore,theybestruckdown.Butwhentoldthatduetolapseoftimeandconvictioninthecrimethe
convictcouldshrugofftherustanddustofhispast,therefore,itwouldberatherharshtodebarhim
fromtakingpartintheelectoralprocess,thelearnedASCdidnotpressthisargumentanymore.Taking
strongexceptiontothemethodofnominationforappointmentofjudges,thelearnedASCcontended
thatwecouldnotsofarevolveanadequatemethodofnominationforappointmentofJudgesonmerit
whichisoneofthecausesforthedeterioratingStateofruleoflaw.
5.Mr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,Sr.ASCarguedthatlikeallotherConstitutions,theConstitutionof
1973hasabasicstructureandthatasthebasicstructureofConstitutions,moreoftenthannot,is
beyondtheamendatorypoweroftheParliamentsoisthatoftheConstitutionof1973.Henext
contendedthatthebasicstructureisfullyreflectedinthepreambleandtheotherprovisionsofthe
Constitutionwhichhastobeprotectedwithoutbeingswayedbythedoctrineofsovereigntyof
ParliamentwhichisnolongeracceptedevenintheUK.HewentontoarguethatArticle8ofthe
Constitutionguardsagainstanyinroadintofundamentalrightswhetheritappearsinthegarbof
amendmentinlawortheConstitution.Whentoldthatamendmentinlawcannotbeheldsynonymous
withamendmentintheConstitutioninviewofthedictalaiddowninthecasesofShankariPrasadDeov.
UnionofIndiaandWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanotherv.FederationofPakistanand
others(Supra),thelearnedSr.ASCstatedstraightoffthatheisnotinclinedtorecognizethedistinction
thusdrawnintheaforesaidjudgments.
6.Mr.IbrarHassan,ASCappearingonbehalfofPakistanBarCouncilcontendedthathemaynot
supportthebasicstructuretheoryandholdanypartoftheConstitutionbeyondtheamendatorypower
oftheParliament,allthesameanyamendmentinlawortheConstitutionabridgingFundamentalRights
orimpingingontheindependenceofjudiciarycannotbemadeimmunefromchallenge.Henext
contendedthatamendmentintheConstitutionaswellastheArmyActisdiscriminatorybecauseonlya
specialclassofterroristshadbeenpickedupforstringenttrialandstringentpunishment,
notwithstandingterroristsofeverycultandcreeddeservealiketreatment.
7.Ms.AsmaJehangir,learnedSr.ASCappearingonbehalfofSupremeCourtBarAssociationin
ConstitutionPetitionNo.10of2015contendedthateveryamendmentintheConstitutionistobe
judgedonitsownmeritswithoutreferencetothebasicstructureasthereisnothingintheConstitution
of1973whichcouldbetermedassuch.ObjectivesResolution,shecontended,cannotbeheldtobea
consensusdocumentwhenthenonMuslimmembersoftheConstituentAssemblyvoiced
apprehensionsaboutsomeofitsclauseswhichwereprovedtobetruebytheeventstakingplacein
80s.Shesoundedantitheticalandevenambivalentwhenshesoughtannulmentoftheamendmentand
atthesametimestressedthesovereigntyofParliament.Shethensoughtrefugeintheargumentthat
sincetheamendmentintheConstitutionwasmadefirstandamendmentintheArmyActwasmade
later,thelatterwillhavenoeffect.AnyConstitutionalamendment,shemaintained,cuttingdeepinto
thefundamentalrightshastobereaddownunderthemandateofArticle8oftheConstitution.Trialof
thepersonsundertheArmyActetc,shemaintained,cannotbeimmunefromjudicialreviewifitisheld
inderogationofArticle4,9,10and10AoftheConstitution.SheblamedtheCourtforjustifyinghonor
killingwithoutadvertingtothejudgmentifatallthereisanyanditsnexuswiththecaseinhand,little
knowingthatinthecaseofAbdulZahirandanotherv.TheState(2000SCMR406),asevenmember
BenchofthisCourtheldthatanaccusedkillinghiswife,sisterorotherclosefemalerelativesonthe
groundofhonorcannotbringhiscasewithinthepurviewofsection302(c)PPC.
8.Mr.KhalidAnwar,learnedSr.ASCwhiledefendingthe21stAmendmentintheConstitution
contendedthatthereisnothinglikethebasicstructureintheConstitutionof1973.Article239ofthe
Constitution,thelearnedSeniorASCargued,projectssupremacyoftheParliamentwhichbeingthehub
ofdemocracydoesnotadmitofanyfetteronitsconstituentpower.He,byelaboratinghisargument,
contendedthatwhenClause5ofArticle239providesthatnoamendmentoftheConstitutionshallbe
calledinquestionbyanyCourt,SupremeCourtcannotbeanexceptiontothat.Henextcontendedthat
SupremeCourtofIndiainthecaseofKesavanandaBharati.Vs.StateofKeralaandIndiraNehruGandhi.
Vs.RajNarain(supra)despiteespousingthedoctrineofthebasicstructureorthesalientfeaturescould
notenunciateindefinitivetermsastowhatthebasicstructureandthesalientfeaturesofthe
Constitutionare.Thebasicstructureorthesalientfeatures,thelearnedSr.ASCargued,cannotbemade
abasisforstrikingdownanyamendmentintheConstitution.Article3,learnedASCcontended,projects
socialisticratherthanIslamicpolityasitslatterpartisareplicaofArticle12oftheConstitutionofthe
USSR,1936.HenextcontendedthattheCriminalJusticeSysteminplacehasfailedtodelivergoodsas
manycriminalsdespitehavingbeenhookedwereletoffattheendofthedaywiththeresultthatevery
partofthecountryisnowinthegripofterrorism.Henextcontendedthathadthemeasuresproposed
inthecaseofSheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,
JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(PLD1999SC503),beentakennoteofthe
situationwouldnothaveworsened.21stAmendment,hemaintained,istheonlyeffectiveweaponto
fighttherapidlyspreadingmenaceofterrorism,therefore,itbelookedatinthatcontext.
9.Mr.AbidS.Zubairi,ASCappearingonbehalfofSindhHighCourtBarAssociation,contended
thatalawlegislatedundertheswordofArticle63AoftheConstitutioncannotbesaidtobe
representativeofthefreewillofthepeoplewhenMembersoftheParliamenthadnochoicebuttovote
accordingtothedirectionoftheParliamentaryPartytheybelongedto;andthatbeforestrikingdown
anyotheramendment,theamendmentinsertingArticle63Abestruckdownfirst.Whenweaskedto
nameanyofthemembersoftheParliamentwhosaidanywherethathevotedinfavourofthebill
againsthisconscience,thelearnedASCcouldnotnameany.ThelearnedASCalsocouldnotgiveany
satisfactoryreplywhentoldthattheaforesaidamendmenthastreatedthemalaiseofhorsetrading
whichhadvirtuallyretardedthegrowthofdemocraticcultureinthepolity.Evenotherwise,aperson
contestingelectionforthemembershipoftheParliamentontheticketofapartyissupposedto
consideritsimplicationsatthetimeofaskingforit.Onceheconteststheelectionontheticketofthe
partyandiselectedassuchhehastoabidebythepartyslineofaction.Incasehehasanyqualmsabout
thedecisionofthepartyhecanwellleaveandquitit.
10.Mr.IftikharHussainGillani,Sr.ASCappearingfortheGovernmentofKPKcontendedthatwhere
theParliamenthaspowertoamendtheConstitution,itcandosoaslongasitisinaccordancewiththe
provisionsofArticle239;thatanyamendmentthusmadecannotbequestionedinanyCourtoflawon
anygroundwhatsoever;thatamendmentinlawisnotsynonymouswithamendmentinthe
Constitution,therefore,thelattercannotbetestedonthetouchstoneofArticle8oftheConstitutionof
Pakistan;thatfundamentalrightscanbeabridgedthroughconstitutionalamendmentandthatneither
HighCourtnorthisCourtcanstepintoundosuchabridgementoramendmentinthelaw.No
restriction,thelearnedSr.ASCadded,couldbeplacedontheconstituentpoweroftheParliamentand
thatappealtotheelectoratewould,however,beimperativewherethemainconstitutionalprinciples
aresoughttobealtered.ThelearnedASCbyreferringtothecasesofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafaz
Dastoorandanothervs.FederationofPakistanandothersandPakistanLawyersForumandothersvs.
FederationofPakistanandothers(Supra)soughttocanvassatthebarthatneitherthebasicstructure
theorynorfundamentalrightshavebeenrecognizedasatouchstoneforstrikingdownanyamendment
intheConstitution.WhenaskedifConstitutionalfundamentalslikefundamentalrights,independence
ofjudiciary,separationofpowerandpowerofjudicialreviewarenotbeyondtheamendatorypowerof
theParliament,woulditnotmeanthattheConstitutioncouldbechangedbeyondrecognition,thereply
ofthelearnedASCwasthatitcouldbe,providedonappealtotheelectoratethemembersofthe
Parliamenthavebeengivensuchmandate.
11.Mr.ShahidOrakzai,appearinginConstitutionPetitionNo.22of2010andCivilPetitionNo.
1901of2010questioningthe18thAmendmentmainlyfocusedonthechangeofthenameofKPKasthis
namebeingspecificonlytooneoftheagenciescannotbesaidtorepresentallpartsoftheProvince.He,
however,couldnotadvanceanyconvincingreasonascouldcallforitssubstitutionbythisCourtin
exerciseofitsjurisdictionunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitution.Henextcontendedthatwhere
jurisdictionandpowersoftheSupremeCourtcannotbecurtailedinviewofentryNo.55oftheFederal
LegislativeList,anyamendmentcurtailingitsjurisdictionandpowersbeingultravireswouldbenon
est.
12.Mr.MuhammadIkramCh.,thelearnedSr.ASCappearingonbehalfofDistrictBarAssociation,
RawalpindialsoquestionedtheviresofArticle175AoftheConstitutionmainlyonthegroundthatit
tendstoimpingeupontheindependenceofjudiciary.Article63and63A,hecontended,areultravires
inasmuchastheyimposelimitationsontheexerciseoffundamentalrights.Whilequestioningthevires
ofthe21stAmendment,thelearnedASCcontendedthatwhatwasundonebythisCourtinthecasesof
MehramAliandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanandothersandSheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.
Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadand
others(supra)hasbeendoneonceagainbygivingitadifferenthueandcolor.Henextcontendedthat
wheretheamendmenttendstotakeawaytherightsguaranteedbyArticle4,5,8,9,10,10Aand25of
theConstitutionofPakistanwithoutanyintelligiblejustificationitcannotbeallowedtostayunderany
cannonsofjurisprudence.
13.Mr.ZulfiqarAhmedBhutta,learnedASCappearingforpetitionerinConstitution
PetitionNo.43of2010mainlycontendedthatelectionofthememberstotheseatsreservedfornon
Muslimsthroughproportionalrepresentationisnotonlyagainstthefundamentalrightsofthe
minoritiesbutthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Whenaskedastohowtheelectionofthe
memberstotheseatsreservedfornonMuslimsthroughproportionalrepresentationisagainst
fundamentalrightsorthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionwhenanyofthenonMuslimsoverand
abovethathasarighttocontestelectionongeneralseatsandassuchisdoublyadvantaged,thelearned
ASCcouldnotgiveanysatisfactoryreply.
14.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanappearingfortheFederationcontendedthattrialof
aspecialclassofterroristsbyFieldGeneralCourtMartialisnotunprecedentedaseveninthepast,they
hadbeentriedbysuchCourts;thatapersonactingagainstthedefenceofPakistanorraisingarmsor
wagingwaragainstPakistancanbetriedbytheCourtsunderthePakistanArmyAct;thatthetrialof
specialclassofterroristsunderthePakistanArmyActpursuanttoamendmentsisperfectlyin
accordancewithlaw;thatwherePakistanArmyAct1952andthreeotherenactmentshavebeenadded
inFirstScheduleoftheConstitutionthrough21stAmendment,neitherArticle8norArticle199ofthe
ConstitutionofPakistancouldbeinvoked;thatthewordspecifiedusedinArticle8(3)(b)(ii)cannotbe
restrictedtopastasitwouldincludefutureaswell;andthattrialoftheclassofterroristsspecifiedin
section2(1)(iii)ofthePakistanArmyActbytheMilitaryCourtisneitheragainstlawnortheConstitution.
Thisclassification,headded,isnotonlybasedonintelligibledifferentiabuthasnexuswiththepurpose
soughttobeachieved.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneraltosupporthiscontentionplacedrelianceonthe
judgmentrenderedinthecaseofBrig.(Retd).F.B.Aliandanotherv.TheState(PLD1975SC506).The
learnedAttorneyGeneralcontendedthattheCourtsundertheActslistedatSrl.Nos.6to9insubpart
IIIofpartIoftheFirstSchedulearetheCourtsalreadyestablished,therefore,theirestablishmentisnot
anissue.Weaskedhimwell!establishmentsofthecourtsundertheActsmaynotbeanissuebuthow
jurisdictiononsuchCourtscouldbeconferredinavacuumwhentheprovisionconferringjurisdictionon
themhasbeenpracticallynullifiedbytheadditionoftheproviso.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneraljust
parriedthequestionwiththepromisetodealwithitatalaterstagewhichnevercame.Helastlyargued
thatwhenatnostageoftrial,theCourts,mentionedabovedepartfromthedueprocessoflaw,the
apprehensionthatthetrialwouldnotbefairiswhollymisconceived.
15.WehaveheardthelearnedSr.ASCs,ASCsforthepartiesandAttorneyGeneralforPakistan,
AdvocatesGeneraloftheProvincesandconsideredtheirarguments.
16.Beforewediscusstheargumentsaddressedatthebar,itisworthwhiletoknowwhatthe
Constitutionis,whatdoesitstandfor,whydoesitreignsupremeintheSchemeoftheState,whydoes
itneedamendment,andwheredoesittranscendamendment?
17.Constitution,asfarasweknow,isanorganicandfundamentallawofaState.Itmaybewritten
orunwritten.Itestablishesthecharacterandconceptionofitsgovernment,layingthebasicprinciples
regulatingitsaffairsinalmosteverysphereofitsexistence.Itisacharterdefininganddelineatingthe
presentandfuturecourseofaState.Sinceitisnotaholyscriptureoradocumentframedbyadivinely
inspiredperson,itcannotbeperfect.Sinceitcannotbeperfect,itchangeswithachangeinattending
circumstances.Atanyrate,growthofaConstitutioncoincideswiththegrowthofaState.Itsurvivesifit
dynamicallyassimilateschangesaround.Ifitdoesnot,itisdoomedtoextinction.Amendmentisoneof
thewaysandmeanswhichnotonlyrevampsandupdatestheConstitutionbutkeepsitgoingand
growing.AmendmentinaConstitutionaccordingtothechangingconditionsinthedomainofpoliticsis
asessentialforitssurvivalasadaptationtothechangingconditionsforthesurvivalofacreatureinthe
domainofbiology.ItisagainstthisbackdropthateverylawandConstitutionhavebeenmadeamenable
toamendmentbytheirframers.
18.TheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistanisnotanexceptiontothat.Ittoois
amenabletoamendmentsolongastheamendmentsoughttobemadedoesnotalterthepartsforming
itsbasicstructure.WhatarethepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionneednotbe
exploredasitiswritlargeonthefaceoftheObjectivesResolutionwhichreadsasunder:
WhereassovereigntyovertheentireUniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthoritytobe
exercisedbythepeopleofPakistanwithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust;
AndwhereasitisthewillofthepeopleofPakistantoestablishanorder;
people;
Whereintheprinciplesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjustice,asenunciatedby
Whereinadequateprovisionshallbemadefortheminoritiesfreelytoprofessandpracticetheir
religionsanddeveloptheircultures;
Whereinshallbeguaranteedfundamentalrights,includingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbefore
law,social,economicandpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipand
Whereinadequateprovisionshallbemadetosafeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesand
Whereintheindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured;
WhereintheintegrityoftheterritoriesoftheFederation,itsindependenceandallitsrights,includingits
sovereignrightsonland,seaandair,shallbesafeguarded;

SothatthepeopleofPakistanmayprosperandattaintheirrightfulandhonouredplaceamongstthe
happinessofhumanity;
Now,therefore,we,thepeopleofPakistan;
ConsciousofourresponsibilitybeforeAlmightyAllahandmen;Cognizantofthesacrificesmadebythe
peopleinthecauseofPakistan;
FaithfultothedeclarationmadebytheFounderofPakistan,QuaidiAzamMohammadAliJinnah,that
PakistanwouldbeademocraticStatebasedonIslamicprinciplesofsocialjustice;
Dedicatedtothepreservationofdemocracyachievedbytheunremittingstruggleofthepeopleagainst
oppressionandtyranny;
Inspiredbytheresolvetoprotectournationalandpoliticalunityandsolidaritybycreatinganegalitarian
societythroughaneworder;
Dohereby,throughourrepresentativesintheNationalAssembly,adopt,enactandgivetoourselves,
thisConstitution.
19.TheResolutionreproducedabovewasadoptedbytheConstituentAssemblyon12thMarch,
1949.Itwasmoreorlessaconsensusdocumentinasmuchasitwasacceptedassuchbyalmostallthe
MuslimMembersoftheConstituentAssembly.ItwasopposedbytheNonMuslimMembersofthe
ConstituentAssembly,whobelongedtoPakistanNationalCongresshavingitsrootsinIndianNational
Congress.They,aspertheirpartyprogramme,stoodforsecularism.They,quiteobviously,hadan
agendaoftheirown.They,withthatbackground,expressedreservationsabouttheinclusionofIslamic
principlesintheresolution,asreligionandpolitics,accordingtothem,aretwodifferentdomains.The
speechdeliveredbyMaulanaShabbirAhmedOsmaniwasabefittingrejoindertotheirreservations,
whichreadsasunder:
Islamhasneveracceptedtheviewthatreligionisaprivateaffairbetweenmanandhiscreatorandas
suchhasnobearinguponthesocialorpoliticalrelationsofhumanbeings.Someotherreligioussystems
mayexpoundthistheoryandmay,incidentally,betooidealistictopossessacomprehensiveandall
embracingcodeoflife.ButIslamhasnouseforsuchfalsenotionsanditsteachingsareindirect
contradictiontothem.ThelateQuaidiAzammadethefollowingobservationsintheletterhewroteto
GandhijiinAugust,1944:
TheQuranisacompletecodeoflife.Itprovidesforallmatters,religiousorsocial,civilorcriminal,
militaryorpenal,economicorcommercial.Itregulateseveryact,speechandmovementfromthe
ceremoniesofreligiontothoseofdailylife,fromthesalvationofthesoultothehealthofthebody;
fromtherightsofalltothoseofsuchindividual,fromthepunishmentheretothatinthelifetocome.
Therefore,whenIsaythattheMuslimsareanation,Ihaveinmymindallphysicalandmetaphysical
standardsandvalues.
In1945,JinnahobservedinanEidDaymessagetotheMuslims:
EveryMussalmanknowsthattheQuranisnotconfinedtoreligiousandmoralduties.TheQuranisthe
dearestpossessionoftheMuslimsandtheirgeneralcodeoflifeareligious,social,civil,commercial,
military,judicial,criminalandpenalCode.OurProphethasenjoinedonusthateveryMussalmanshould
possessacopyoftheQuranandstudyitcarefullysothatitmaypromoteourmaterialaswellas
individualwelfare.
TheQuaidiAzamgavefrequentexpressiontosuchideas.Inthefaceofsuchunequivocalandrepeated
declarations,isitnotfittosaythatreligionhasgotnothingtodowithpoliticsorthatiftheQuaidi
Azamhadbeenalive,theResolutionwouldnothavecomeupbeforethisHouse.TheQuaidiAzamtoo
wasreferringtothebasicprincipleofourconstitutionwhenheobservedinthecourseofhis
presidentialaddressdeliveredataconferenceoftheAllIndiaStudentsFederationatJalandharin1943:
InmyopinionoursystemofgovernmentwasdeterminedbytheQuransome1,350yearsago.Inhis
lettertothePirSahibofMankiSharifinNovember1945,heclearlystated:
ItisneedlesstoemphasizethattheConstituentAssemblywhichwouldbepredominantlyMusliminits
composition,wouldbeabletoenactlawsforMuslims,notinconsistentwiththeShariatlawsandthe
MuslimswillnolongerbeobligedtoabidebytheunIslamiclaws.
20.LiaquatAliKhanwhilewindingupthedebaterepelledtheapprehensionsofnon
MuslimsaboutthemisuseofcertainclausesoftheObjectivesResolutioninthewordsasfollows:
Sir,myHonourablefriends,theLeaderoftheCongressPartyhadavisitfromsomeulemas.Hedidnot
telluswhetheritwasthattheyhadcomeinsearchofknowledgetohimorwhetherhehadgonein
searchofknowledgetothem.ButIpresumethatthisvisitwaspaidbycertainulemasaccordingtohim
fromLahoreontheirowninitiativeandtheyleftcertainliteraturewithhim,whichseemstohaveupset
myHonourablefriend,whoisveryseldomupset.Icanquiteunderstandwhythisvisitandwhythese
handingoverofthisliteraturewasdone.Therearesomepeopleherewhoareouttodisruptand
destroyPakistanandthesesocalledulemaswhohavecometoyoutheyhavecomewiththatparticular
missionofcreatingdoubtsinyourmindregardingthebonafidesoftheMussalmansofPakistan.Donot,
forGodssake,lendyoureartosuchmischievouspropaganda.
IwanttosayandgiveawarningtothiselementwhichisouttodisruptPakistan,thatweshallnotbrook
itanylonger.TheyhavemisrepresentedthewholeideologyofIslamtoyou.Theyareinfactenemiesof
IslamwhileposingasfriendsandsupportersofIslam.
Sir,letmetellmyHonourablefriendthatthegreatestguaranteethatthenonMuslimscanhave,they
willgetonlythroughthisResolutionandthroughnoothermannerand,therefore,Iwouldrequesthim
nottobemisledbyinterestedpersonsanddonotthinkforamomentthatthisResolutionisreally
intendedorwillreallyresult,indrivingoutthenonMuslimsfromPakistanorreducingthemtothe
positionofashedescribedhewersofwoodanddrawersofwater.InarealIslamicsociety,letmetell
you,Mr.President,therearenoclassesofhewersofwoodanddrawersofwater.Thehumblestcanrise
tothehighestposition.Asamatteroffact,letmetellyou,Mr.President,whatwehaveprovidedhere
forminoritiesIonlywishthatthesisterdominionofIndiahadprovidedsimilarconcessionsandsimilar
safeguardsfortheminoritiesinIndia.Here,weareguaranteeingyouyourreligiousfreedom,
advancementofyourculture,sanctityofyourpersonallaws,andequalopportunities,aswellasequality
intheeyeofthelaw.Whathavetheydoneontheotherside?Noquestionofculture.Asamatterof
fact,thepersonallawofMuslimsisnottoberecognizedinIndia.Thatistheposition.
Sir,myHonourablefriend,Mr.B.C.Mandal,toldmethatposteritywillcursemeforbringingforward
thisResolution.Letmetellmyfriend,ifwesucceedinbuildingPakistanonthebasisofthisResolution,
weshallbeabletocreateconditionsthatposterityinsteadofcursingme,willblessme.
Sir,Iwouldjustonceagaintellmyfriends,ontheotherside,thatwhetheryoubelieveusorwhether
youdonotbelieveus;whetheryoudesireitorwhetheryoudonotdesireit,aslongasyouarecitizens
ofPakistan,wearedeterminedtodotherightthingbyyouforthesimplereasonthatourreligiontells
ustodoso;forthesimplereasonthatwearetryingtobuildupthisstateonmoralityandonhigher
valuesoflifethanwhatmaterialismcanprovide.
21.HavingadoptedtheObjectivesResolutiontheConstituentAssemblyproceededto
frametheConstitution.IteventuallyframedtheConstitutionwhichbecameeffectiveon23rdMarch
1956.Itcouldhardlyworkfortwoandahalfyearsthatamilitaryadventurertookover.Herealizedthat
thecountrycouldnotberunondaytodayorderswithoutaConstitution.HegaveanotherConstitution
tothepeoplein1962.Itworkedforsometime,butbeforethepeoplecouldevolveaculturetoberun
bytheConstitution,anotheradventurertookoverinthegarbofasavior.He,too,playedfastandloose
withthedestinyofthepeopleforacoupleofyears.He,however,heldanelectioninthecountry.The
resultwasthatAwamiLeagueledbySheikhMujeeburRehmanintheEastWingandPakistanPeoples
PartyledbyZulfiqarAliBhuttointheWestWingsecuredmajority.Parliamentwastobeconvenedfor
framingaConstitution.IntransigenceofMujeeburRehman,intrigueofinternalandexternalforcesand
unpardonablefolliesoftheleadershipaftertheassassinationofLiaqatAliKhanresultedinthe
dismembermentofPakistan.ParliamentconvenedafterthedismembermentofPakistanbecamea
ConstituentAssemblyasithadtoframeaConstitutionfirst.Conscious,conscientiousandcollective
effortsofthemembersoftheParliamentsucceededinframingtheConstitutionof1973whichisa
unanimousdocumentonallaccounts.ItbyincorporatingtheObjectivesResolutioninthePreambleof
theConstitutionwithminoradditionsenactedalmostallofitsprovisionsinlinewiththePreamble.
Democracy,FundamentalRights,independenceofjudiciary,separationofpowers,federalcharacterof
theConstitution,protectionoftherightsofminoritiesandthedeclarationthatanylaworanycustomor
usagehavingtheforceoflaw,insofarasitisinconsistentwiththerightsconferredbyChapter1ofPartII
oftheConstitutionshalltotheextentofsuchinconsistencybevoid;thatStateshallnotmakeanylaw
whichtakesawayorabridgestherightssoconferred;thatanylawmadeincontraventionofArticle8(2)
shalltotheextentofsuchcontraventionbevoid;thatalltheexistinglawsshallbebroughtinconformity
withtheinjunctionsofIslamandnolawshallbeenactedwhichisrepugnanttosuchinjunctionsarethe
partsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Anyefforttoreplace,impairoralteranyofthem
wouldleadtoanarchyandevenannihilationoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan.
22.We,therefore,dontagreewiththeargumentsofMr.IftikharHussainGillani,learnedSr.ASC
fortheGovernmentofKPK,addressedonthestrengthofthejudgmentrenderedinthecaseofWukala
MahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanother.Vs.FederationofPakistanandothers(supra)thatneitherthe
basicstructuretheorynorthefundamentalrightshavebeenrecognizedasatouchstoneforstriking
downanyamendmentintheConstitution.WealsodontagreewithMr.KhalidAnwar,learnedSr.ASC
whenhecontendedthatthebasicstructureorthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutioncannotbemade
basisforstrikingdownanyamendmentintheConstitution,becausewithoutthebasicstructure,it
wouldbeavoyageacrosstheuncharteredseaoflife,withoutasenseofdirection.Wherewouldthe
whimsoftheParliamentlikethewindsoftheseatakeitspeopleisanybodysguess.Itisthusas
indispensableasalinchpintokeepawheelinplace.
23.QuestionariseswhethertheParliament,inviewoftheargumentsaddressedbythelearnedSr.
ASCsfortheFederationandtheProvinceoftheKPK,canreplaceIslamwithsecularismandthe
Federationwithaconfederation?Toanswerthisquestionwewillhavetogobacktothelatterhalfof
the19thcenturywhereSyedAhmedKhanappearedasanambassadorofHinduMuslimUnity,whoday
inanddayoutstruggledfortheupliftofHindusandMuslimsalike.Heinspiredthemtostudyscience
andotherbranchesofknowledgeandthelanguagestheyarewrittenin.This,accordingtohim,wasthe
onlywaytocomeatparwiththeadvancednationsoftheworld.Buttheprocessiontakenoutbythe
HindusofBanarasin1867toreplaceUrduwithHindi,tohisdismayandsurprise,convincedhimthat
HindusandMuslimswouldneverjoinwholeheartedlyinanything.Thischangeofmindisevidentfrom
aconversationSyedAhmedKhanisreportedtohavehadwithMr.ShakespearetheCommissionerof
Banarasin1887.HisbiographerMoulanaHalirecallsinthewordsasfollows:
Duringthesedays,whenHindiUrducontroversywasgoingoninBenares,onedayImetMr.
ShakespearewhowaspostedthereastheDivisionalCommissioner.Iwassayingsomethingaboutthe
educationofMuslims,andMr.Shakespearewaslisteningwithanexpressionofamazement,when,at
length,hesaid:ThisisthefirstoccasionwhenIhaveheardyouspeakabouttheprogressofthe
Muslimsalone.Beforethisyouwerealwayskeenaboutthewelfareofyourcountrymeningeneral.I
said,NowIamconvincedthatboththesenationswillnotjoinwholeheartedlyinanything.Atpresent
thereisnoopenhostilitybetweenthetwocommunities,butonaccountofthesocallededucated
peopleitwillincreaseimmediatelyinfuture.Hewholiveswillsee.Mr.Shakespearethereuponsaid,I
amalsoextremelysorrybutIamconfidentabouttheaccuracyofthisprophecy.
24.WhatwouldbethefateofMuslimsinademocraticIndiahasbeenreflectedinoneofhis
speecheshedeliveredin1883,tenyearsbeforetheBombayriots.Hesaid:
NowsupposethatalltheEnglish..weretoleaveIndia.ThenwhowouldbetherulersofIndia?Isit
possiblethatunderthesecircumstances,twonationstheMohammedanandHinducouldsitonthe
samethroneandremainequalinpower?Mostcertainlynot.Itisnecessarythatoneofthemshould
conquertheotherandthrustitdown.Tohopethatbothcouldremainequalistodesiretheimpossible
andtheinconceivable.
InanotherhistoricspeechonDecember28,1887atLucknowAnnualSessionofthe
MohamedanEducationConferenceSirSyedsaidasunder:
TheywanttocopytheBritishHouseofLordsandtheHouseofCommons.Nowletusimaginethe
ViceroysCouncilmadeinthismanner,AndletussupposethatalltheMuslimelectorsvoteforaMuslim
memberandalltheHinduvotersvoteforaHindumemberandnowcounthowmanyvotestheMuslim
memberswillhave,andhowmanytheHindu.ItiscertainthattheHindumemberswillhavefourtimes
asmanybecausetheirpopulationisfourtimesasnumerous.Therefore,wecanprovebymathematics
thattherewillbefourvotesfortheHindutoeveryonevotefortheMuslim.Andnowhowcanthe
Muslimguardhisinterests?Itwillbelikeagameofdice,inwhichonemainhadfourdiceandtheother
onlyone.
25.Dr.MohammadIqbalwhostudiedthisphenomenaforaconsiderablylongtimedismissedthe
HinduMuslimunityasimpossible.Tobaseaconstitution,hesaid,ontheconceptionofa
homogeneousIndia,ortoapplytoIndiatheprinciplesdictatedbyBritishdemocraticsentiments,is
unwittinglytoprepareherforacivilwar.Hethusadvocatedpartition.Heevendemanded,anddefined
thefrontiersofaproposedconsolidatedMuslimState,which,hebelievedwouldbeinthebest
interestsofIndiaandIslam.Hesaid,IwouldliketoseethePunjab,theNorthWestFrontierProvince,
SindandBaluchistan,amalgamatedintoasinglestate..theformationofaconsolidatedNorthWest
IndianMuslimStateappearstobethefinaldestinyoftheMuslims,atleastofNorthWestIndia.Inone
ofhislettersof28thMay,1937addressedtoJinnah,hestatedasunder:
..AfteralongandcarefulstudyofIslamicLaw,IhavecometotheconclusionthatifthissystemofLaw
isproperlyunderstoodandapplied,atleasttherighttosubsistenceissecuredtoeverybody.Butthe
enforcementanddevelopmentoftheShariatofIslamisimpossibleinthiscountrywithoutafree
MuslimStateorStates.ThishasbeenmyhonestconvictionformanyyearsandIstillbelievethistobe
theonlywaytosolvetheproblemofbreadofMuslimsaswellastosecureapeacefulIndia.Ifsucha
thingisimpossibleinIndiatheonlyotheralternativeisacivilwarwhichasamatteroffacthasbeen
goingonforsometimeintheshapeofHinduMuslimriots.Ifearthatincertainpartsofthecountry,
e.g.,N.W.India,Palestinemayberepeated.AlsotheinsertionofJawaharlalssocialismintothebody
politicofHinduismislikelytocausemuchbloodshedamongtheHindusthemselves.Theissuebetween
socialdemocracyandBrahaminismisnotdissimilartotheonebetweenBrahaminismandBuddhism.
WhetherthefateofsocialismwillbethesameasthefateofBuddhisminIndiaIcannotsay.Butitis
cleartomymindthatifHinduismacceptssocialdemocracyitmustnecessarilyceasetobeHinduism.
ForIslamtheacceptanceofsocialdemocracyinsomesuitableformandconsistentwiththelegal
principlesofIslamisnotarevolutionbutareturntotheoriginalpurityofIslam.Themodernproblems,
therefore,arefarmoreeasytosolvefortheMuslimsthanfortheHindus.ButasIhavesaidabovein
ordertomakeitpossibleforMuslimIndiatosolvetheproblemsitisnecessarytoredistributethe
countryandtoproveoneormoreMuslimStateswithabsolutemajorities.Dontyouthinkthatthetime
forsuchademandhasalreadyarrived?Perhapsthisisthebestreplyyoucangivetotheatheistic
socialismofJawaharlalNehru.
26.HowdidQuaideAzamMuhammadAliJinnahviewthisphenomenonisoverwhelminglyclear
fromoneofhisArticlesinTimeandTide.Hesaid:
WhatisthepoliticalfutureofIndia?ThedeclaredaimoftheBritishGovernmentisthatIndiashould
enjoyDominionStatusinaccordancewiththeStatuteofWestminsterintheshortestpracticabletime.
Inorderthatthisendshouldbebroughtabout,theBritishGovernment,verynaturally,wouldliketosee
inIndiatheformofdemocraticconstitutionitknowsbestandthinksbest,underwhichtheGovernment
ofthecountryisentrustedtooneorotherpoliticalPartyinaccordancewiththeturnoftheelections
Such,however,istheignoranceaboutIndianconditionsamongeventhemembersofthe
BritishParliamentthat,inspiteofalltheexperienceofthepast,itisevenyetnotrealizedthatthisform
ofGovernmentistotallyunsuitedtoIndia.Democraticsystembasedontheconceptofahomogeneous
nationsuchasEnglandareverydefinitelynotapplicabletoheterogeneouscountriessuchasIndia,and
thissimplefactistherootcauseofIndiasconstitutionalills
27.On23rdMarch,1940,Mr.JinnahpresidedovertheAllIndiaMuslimLeagueSessionatLahore
wherethePakistanResolutionwaspassed.AfewdaysbeforeSirPercivalGriffithsdinedwithJinnah.
DuringDinner,Jinnahdeclaredthatatthestageofimperialrulewhereselfgovernmentwasnotin
sight,theBritishwerethefinestadministratorsknowntohistory,butwhenpoliticsandnationalfeeling
hadbeguntocount,theycompletelyfailedtounderstandthementalityofsubjectraces.Hesaid:
YoutalkoftheunityofIndia,butyououghttoknowthatitisachimera,existingnowhereexceptin
yourmindsandintheexternalunitywhichyouwiselyforcedonthecountry.Yougoontotalkof
parliamentarydemocracyandyoufailtorealizethattheassumptionsonwhichitdependshaveno
applicationatalltoIndianconditions.
28.WhilerespondingtooneoftheletterswrittenbyGANDHIJinnahsaidasunder:
WemaintainthatMuslimsandHindusaretwomajornationsbyanydefinitionortestasanation.We
areanationofahundredmillion,andwhatismore,weareanationwithourowndistinctiveculture
andcivilization,languageandliterature,artandarchitecture,namesandnomenclature,senseofvalues
andproportion,legallawsandmoralcodes,customsandcalendar,historyandtraditions,aptitudesand
ambitions;inshort,wehaveourowndistinctiveoutlookonlifeandoflife.Byallthecanonsof
internationalLaw,weareanation.
29.Democracy,nodoubt,isthebestpossiblesystemeverinventedbyhumanmindbutdecidedlyit
hadnoapplicationtotheconditionsthenprevailinginIndia.ToliveintheUnitedDemocraticIndiawas
toliveundertheHinduRaj.AwayoutofthisdilemmawassuggestedthroughtheCabinetMissionPlan.
QuaidiAzamMuhammadAliJinnahagreedtothePlan.MaulanaAbulKalamAzadintheconcluding
partofChapter11ofhisbookIndiaWinsFreedomcommentsontheagreementasunder:
TheacceptanceofCabinetMissionPlanbyboththeCongressandtheMuslimLeaguewasaglorious
eventinthehistoryofthefreedommovementinIndia.ItmeantthatthedifficultquestionofIndian
freedomhadbeensettledbynegotiationandagreementandnotbymethodsofviolenceandconflict.It
alsoseemedthatthecommunaldifficultieshadbeenfinallyleftbehind.Throughoutthecountrythere
wasasenseofjubilationandallthepeoplewereunitedintheirdemandforfreedom.Werejoicedbut
wedidnotthenknowthatourjoywasprematureandbitterdisappointmentawaitedus.
30.ImpoliticandindiscretebehavioroftheHinduleadershipresultedinthelossofthelast
opportunityforHindusandMuslimstolivetogether.Whatturnedouttobetheimmediatecauseofthat
hasbeenbetterillustratedinChapter12ofthesaidBookinthewordsreadingasunder:
Nowhappenedoneofthoseunfortunateeventswhichchangethecourseofhistory.On10July,
JawaharlalheldapressconferenceinBombayinwhichhemadeanastonishingstatement.Somepress
representativesaskedhimwhether,withthepassingoftheResolutionbytheAICC,theCongresshad
acceptedthePlanintoto,includingthecompositionoftheInterimGovernment.
JawaharlalinreplystatedthatCongresswouldentertheConstituentAssemblycompletelyunfettered
byagreementsandfreetomeetallsituationsastheyarise.
PressrepresentativesfurtheraskedifthismeantthattheCabinetMissionPlancouldbemodified.
JawaharlalrepliedemphaticallythattheCongresshadagreedonlytoparticipateintheConstituent
AssemblyandregardeditselffreetochangeormodifytheCabinetMissionPlanasitthoughtbest.
TheMuslimLeaguehadacceptedtheCabinetMissionPlanonlyunderduress.Naturally,Mr.Jinnahwas
notveryhappyaboutit.InhisspeechtotheLeagueCouncil,hehadclearlystatedthatherecommended
acceptanceonlybecausenothingbettercouldbeobtained.Hispoliticaladversariesstartedtocriticize
himbysayingthathehadfailedtodeliverthegoods.Theyaccusedhimthathehadgivenuptheideaof
anindependentIslamicState.TheyalsotauntedhimthatiftheLeaguewaswillingtoaccepttheCabinet
MissionPlanwhichdeniedtherightoftheMuslimstoformaseparateStatewhyhadMr.Jinnah
madesomuchfussaboutanindependentIslamicState?
Mr.JinnahwasthusnotallhappyabouttheoutcomeofthenegotiationswiththeCabinetMission.
Jawaharlalsstatementcametohimasabombshell.Heimmediatelyissuedastatementthatthis
declarationbytheCongressPresidentdemandedareviewofthewholesituation.Heaccordinglyasked
LiaqatAliKhantocallameetingoftheLeagueCouncilandissuedastatementtothefollowingeffect.
TheMuslimLeagueCouncilhadacceptedtheCabinetMissionPlaninDelhiasitwasassuredthatthe
CongressalsohadacceptedtheschemeandthePlanwouldbethebasisofthefutureconstitutionof
India.NowthattheCongressPresidenthaddeclaredthattheCongresscouldchangethescheme
throughitsmajorityintheConstituentAssembly,thiswouldmeanthattheminoritieswouldbeplaced
atthemercyofthemajority.HisviewwasthatJawaharlalsdeclarationmeantthattheCongresshad
rejectedtheCabinetMissionPlanandassuchtheViceroyshouldcallupontheMuslimLeague,which
hadacceptedthePlan,toformtheGovernment.
TheMuslimLeagueCouncilmetatBombayon27July.Mr.Jinnahinhisopeningspeechreiteratedthe
demandforPakistanastheonlycourseleftopentotheMuslimLeague.Afterthreedaysdiscussion,the
CouncilpassedaresolutionrejectingtheCabinetMissionPlan.Italsodecidedtoresorttodirectaction
fortheachievementofPakistan.
31.Manyotherfactorsandinterrelatedeventsinspiredthequestofaseparatehomeland,which
includedsubjugationofMuslimsandtheirexploitationbyHinduseversincethemiddleofthe19th
Century.Everypassingdayworsenedtheirlot.FallofMughalEmpireprecipitatedtheirfallonallfronts.
Theylosteverything.Theylosteventhesenseofdirection.SyedAhmedKhanlitthecandleofhope,
heldithighandtherebyinspiredtheMuslimstoequipandempowerthemselveswithmodern
educationbutthiscoursebeingevolutionarycouldnotbringMuslimsatparwithHindusovernightwhen
thelattersmonopolyintheeconomic,politicalandeducationalsphereswentunchallenged.The
overlordsrulingthesubcontinentalsopreferredHindusoverMuslims.FutureofMuslimsintheUnited
DemocraticIndiabecameincreasinglybleak.They,thus,neededahomelandwheretheycouldlive
accordingtotheirtraditions.TheyundernocircumstancescouldliveundertheyokeofHinduismafter
beingfreedfromtheyokeofColonialism.Thecreationofaseparatehomelandbecameanideological,
political,economic,social,culturalandcivilizationalimperative.Thisaspecthasbeenelaboratelydealt
withinaconversationbetweenMr.JinnahandtheBritishauthorBeverelyNichols:
SELF[Nichols]Thefirstiseconomic.AretheMuslimslikelytobericherorpoorerunderPakistan?And
wouldyousetuptariffsagainsttherestofIndia?
JINNAHIllaskyouaquestionforachange.Supposingyouwereaskedwhichyouwouldprefer...arich
EnglandunderGermanyorapoorEnglandfree,whatwouldyouranswerbe?
SELFItshardlynecessarytosay.
JINNAHQuite.Well,doesntthatmakeyourquestionlookalittleshoddy?Thisgreatidealrisesfar
abovemerequestionsofpersonalcomfortortemporaryconvenience.TheMuslimsareatoughpeople,
leanandhardy.IfPakistanmeansthattheywillhavetobealittletougher,theywillnotcomplain.But
whyshoulditmeanthat?Whatconceivablereasonistheretosupposethatthegiftofnationalityis
goingtobeaneconomicliability?Asovereignnationofahundredmillionpeopleeveniftheyarenot
immediatelyselfsupportingandeveniftheyareindustriallybackwardishardlylikelytobeinaworse
economicpositionthanifitsmembersarescatteredanddisorganized,underthedominanceoftwo
hundredandfiftymillionHinduswhoseoneideaistoexploitthem.HowanyEuropeancangetupand
saythatPakistaniseconomicallyimpossibleaftertheTreatyofVersaillesisreallybeyondmy
comprehension.ThegreatbrainswhocutEuropeintoaridiculouspatchworkofconflictingandartificial
boundariesarehardlythepeopletotalkeconomicstous,particularlyasourproblemhappenstobefar
simpler.
SELFAnddoesthatalsoapplytodefence?
JINNAHOfcourseitappliestodefence.OnceagainIwillaskyouaquestion.HowisAfghanistan
defended?Well?Theanswerisnotverycomplicated.BytheAfghans.Justthat.Weareabraveand
unitedpeoplewhoarepreparedtoworkand,ifnecessary,fight.Sohowdoesthequestionofdefence
presentanypeculiardifficulties?Inwhatwaydowedifferfromothernations?FromIran,forexample?
Obviously,therewillhavetobeatransitionperiod....
JINNAHYouwillrememberIsaid,amomentago,thattheBritishwouldhavetodoalotofhardthinking.
Itsahabittheydontfindverycongenial;theyprefertobecomfortable,towaitandsee,trustingthat
everythingwillcomerightintheend.However,whentheydotakethetroubletothink,theythinkas
clearlyandcreativelyasanypeopleintheworld.AndoneoftheirbestthinkersatleastontheIndian
problemwasoldJohnBright.Haveyoueverreadanyofhisspeeches?
SELFNotsinceIleftschool.
JINNAHWell,takealookatthis.Ifounditbychancetheotherday.
Hehandedmethebook.Itwasafadedoldvolume,TheSpeechesof
JohnBright,andthedateofthepageatwhichitwasopenedwasJune4th,1858.Thisiswhatthe
greatestoratorintheHouseofCommonssaidonthatoccasion:
HowlongdoesEnglandproposetogovernIndia?Nobodycananswerthisquestion.Butbeit50or100
or500years,doesanymanwiththesmallestglimmeringofcommonsensebelievethatsogreata
country,withits20differentnationalitiesandits20differentlanguages,caneverbeboundedupand
consolidatedintoonecompactandenduringempireconfine?Ibelievesuchathingtobeutterly
impossible.
JINNAHWhatBrightsaidthenistruetoday...Infact,itsfarmoretruethough,ofcourse,the
emphasisisnotsomuchonthe20nationalitiesasonthe2...theMuslimandtheHindu.Andwhyisit
moretrue?Whyhasnttimebroughtustogether?BecausetheMuslimsareawake...becausetheyve
learnt,throughbitterexperience,thesortoftreatmenttheymayexpectfromtheHindusinaUnited
India.AUnitedIndiameansaHindudominatedIndia.Itmeansthatandnothingelse.Anyother
meaningyouattempttoimposeonitismythical.IndiaisaBritishcreation...itismerelyasingle
administrativeunitgovernedbyabureaucracyunderthesanctionofthesword.Thatisall.Itisapaper
creation,ithasnobasisinfleshandblood.
SELFTheironicalthingisthatyourcriticssaythatPakistanitselfisaBritishcreationthatitisan
exampleofourgeniusforapplyingtheprincipleofdivideandrule.
JINNAH(withsomeheat)Themanwhomakessuchasuggestionmusthaveaverypooropinionof
Britishintelligence,apartfromhisopinionofmyownintegrity.TheonethingwhichkeepstheBritishin
IndiaisthefalseideaofaUnitedIndia,aspreachedbyGandhi.AUnitedIndia,Irepeat,isaBritish
creationamyth,andaverydangerousmyth,whichwillcauseendlessstrife.Aslongasthatstrife
exists,theBritishhaveanexcuseforremaining.Foronceinaway,divideandruledoesnotapply.
SELFWhatyouwantisdivideandquit?
JINNAHYouhaveputitveryneatly.
SELFYourealizethatallthiswillcomeassomethingofashocktotheBritishelectorate?
JINNAHTruthisoftenshocking.Butwhythistruthinparticular?
SELFBecausetheaverage,decent,liberalmindedvoter,whowishesBritaintofulfillherpledges,and
grantindependencetoIndia,hasheardnothingbuttheCongresspointofview.TheMuslimshave
hardlyasinglespokesmanintheWest.
JINNAH(bitterly)Iamwellawareofthat.TheHindushaveorganizedapowerfulPressandCongress
MahasabhaarebackedupbyHinducapitalistsandindustrialistswithfinancewhichwehavenotgot.
SELFAsaresulttheybelievethatCongressisIndia,andsinceCongressnevertiresofrepeatingthat
Indiaisoneandindivisible,theyimaginethatanyattempttodivideitisilliberal,reactionary,and
generallysinister.Theyseriouslydobelievethis.Iknowthatitismuddleheaded,butthenademocracy
suchasours,whichhastomakeupitsmindonanincrediblenumberofcomplicatedissues,usuallyis
muddleheaded.Whattheyhavetolearnisthattheonlyliberalcourse,theonlygenerouscourse,the
onlycoursecompatiblewithasincereintentiontoquitIndiaandhandoverthereinsofgovernment...
JINNAHAndtheonlysafecourse,youmightadd,is...
SELFPakistan!
JINNAH
TheessenceofPakistanatleastofitsspiritisfoundintheforegoingdialogue.Togiveacomplete
expositionofthedetailsoftheplan,inabookofthissize,wouldbequiteimpossible.Itwouldneeda
sheafofmapsandpagesofstatistics,anditwouldcarryusfarafield,overthebordersofIndia,and
involveusinagreatdealofunprofitablespeculation.Itisfairlycertain,however,thatthereaderwho
takesthetroubletogoreallydeeplyintothematter,withamindunwrappedbyprejudice,willcometo
theconclusionthatPakistanoffersnoinsuperabledifficulties,economic,ethnographic,politicalor
strategicandislikely,indeed,toproveagooddealeasierofattainmentthanalargenumberofsimilar
problemswhichtheworldhassuccessfullyresolvedinthepastfiftyyears.Itis,ofcourse,amajor
surgicaloperation,butunfortunatelythereareoccasionsinthelivesofnations,asofindividuals,when
majorsurgicaloperationsarenotonlydesirablebutvitallynecessary.Andthisisoneofthoseoccasions.
TheconstantfrictionbetweentheHinduandMuslimnationshasproducedsomethingwhichstrongly
resemblesacancerinthebodypolitic.Thereisonlyoneremedyforacancer,initsadvancedstages,and
thatistheknife.Gandhisfaithcures,Britishsoothingsyrup,theingeniousnostrumswhichare
profferedbyeagerhandsthroughouttheworldalltheseareuseless.Theyonlyaggravatethepatients
conditionandmakehisultimatecuremoredifficult.Totheknifeitwillhavetocomeintheend,and
surelyoneknife,usedswiftlyandwithprecision,isbetterthanamillionknives,hackinginblindanarchy
inthedark?Whatisstrange,inthewholePakistancontroversy,isnotthesupportwhichitisslowly
gainingamongallrealisticmenbuttheoppositionwhichitstillevokesfromsincerewellwishersof
India.Thisis,ofcourse,duetothestrengthandpersistenceofCongresspropaganda,backedbyHindu
bigbusiness.TheHindushavealmostamonopolyofpropaganda.Bysubtleandpersistentsuggestion
theyhavemanagedtopersuadetheworldthattheyareIndiaandthatanyattempttodivideIndiaisa
wickedplotonthepartoftheBritish,actingonthewellestablishedprincipleofdivideandrule.Most
liberalsoftheWesthavefallenforthispropaganda,hook,lineandsinker.Consequently,wehavethe
extraordinaryspectacleofadvancedBritishpoliticiansrisingtotheirfeetintheHouseofCommons,
andsolemnlyandsincerelypleadingthecauseofIndianUnityinthejointcauseofIndian
independencesublimelyignorantofthefactthattheirinsistenceonthissocalledunityistheone
andonlythingthatkeepstheBritishinthesaddle!
32.IncessantrecurrenceofantiMuslimriotsinIndiaandatrocitiescommittedagainsttheMuslims
inoccupiedKashmirbytheSecurityForcesattheinstanceoftheDehlibackedgovernmentwith
unabatedcontinuityalsoleavelittledoubtthatthedemandforaseparatehomelandonthebasisofthe
TwoNationTheorywasperfectlyjustifiedfromwhateverangleitislookedat.Islam,asaptlyputbyMr.
A.K.Dogar,petitionerinConstitutionPetitionNo.20of2010isastructuralbaseofthehomeland
foundedforMuslimsonthebasisoftheTwoNationTheory.Therefore,theParliamentcannotreplace
IslamwithsecularismnorcanitreplacetheFederationwithaconfederation.ThisiswhattheMuslimsof
thesubcontinentaspiredandendeavoredfor.Thisisinessencetheraisondetrefortheestablishment
oftheseparatehomeland.
33.Letusnowseehowthetermslikebasicstructure,fundamentalframework,grundnormor
cornerstonehavebeenlookedatintheConstitutionalhistoryofPakistan.InthecaseofMissAsmaJilani
vs.TheGovernmentofthePunjabandanother(PLD1972SC139)thisCourtwhiledealingwiththis
aspectoftheConstitutionheldasunder:
Inanyevent,ifagrundnormisnecessaryforusIdonothavetolooktotheWesternlegaltheoriststo
discoverone.Ourowngrundnormisenshrinedinourowndoctrinethatthelegalsovereigntyoverthe
entireuniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthorityexercisablebythepeoplewithinthe
limitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust.Thisisanimmutableandunalterablenormwhichwasclearly
acceptedintheObjectivesResolutionpassedbytheConstituentAssemblyofPakistanonthe7thof
March1949.ThisResolutionhasbeendescribedbyMr.Brohiasthe"cornerstoneofPakistan'slegal
edifice"andrecognisedevenbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralhimself"asthebondwhichbindsthe
nation"andasadocumentfromwhichtheConstitutionofPakistan"mustdrawitsinspiration".Thishas
notbeenabrogatedbyanyonesofar,norhasthisbeendepartedordeviatedfrombyanyregime,
militaryorCivil.
Thebasicconceptunderlyingthisunalterableprincipleofsovereigntyisthattheentirebodypolitic
becomesatrusteeforthedischargeofsovereignfunctions.Sinceinacomplexsocietyeverycitizen
cannotpersonallyparticipateintheperformanceofthetrust,thebodypoliticappointsState
functionariestodischargethesefunctionsonitsbehalfandforitsbenefit,andhastherighttoremove
thefunctionarysoappointedbyitifhegoesagainstthelawofthelegalsovereign,orcommitsanyother
breachoftrustorfailstodischargehisobligationsunderatrust.ThefunctionalHeadoftheStateis
chosenbythecommunityandhastobeassistedbyaCouncilwhichmustholditsmeetingsinpublic
viewandremainaccountabletopublic.ItisunderthissystemthattheGovernmentbecomesa
Governmentoflawsandnotofmen,for,nooneisabovethelaw.ItisthisthatledVonHammer,a
renownedorientalist,toremarkthatundertheIslamicsystem"thelawrulesthroughtheutteranceof
justice,andthepoweroftheGovernorcarriesouttheutteranceofit."
34.InthecaseofTheStatevs.ZiaurRehmanandothers(PLD1973SC49),thisCourtwhile
discussingthescopeofobjectiveresolutionandpreambleoftheConstitutionheldasunder:
Iformypartcannotconceiveasituation,inwhich,afteraformalwrittenConstitutionhasbeenlawfully
adoptedbyacompetentbodyandhasbeengenerallyacceptedbythepeopleincludingthejudiciaryas
theConstitutionofthecountry,thejudiciarycanclaimtodeclareanyofitsprovisionsultraviresorvoid.
Thiswillbenopartofitsfunctionofinterpretation.Therefore,inmyview,howeversolemnor
sacrosanctthedocument,ifitisnotincorporatedintheConstitutionordoesnotformapartthereofit
cannotcontroltheConstitution.Atanyrate,theCourtscreatedundertheConstitutionwillnothavethe
powertodeclareanyProvisionoftheconstitutionitselfasbeinginviolationofsuchadocument.Ifin
factthatdocumentcontainstheexpressionofthewillofthevastmajorityofthepeople,thenthe
remedyforcorrectingsuchaviolationwillliewiththepeopleandnotwiththejudiciary.Itfollowsfrom
thisthatunderourownsystemtootheObjectivesResolutionof1949,eventhoughitisadocument
whichhasbeengenerallyacceptedandhasneverbeenrepealedorrenounced,willnothavethesame
statusorauthorityastheConstitutionitselfuntilitisincorporatedwithinitormadepartofit.Ifit
appearsonlyasapreambletotheConstitution,thenitwillservethesamepurposeasanyother
preambleserves,namely,thatinthecaseofanydoubtastotheintentofthelawmaker,itmaybe
lookedattoascertainthetrueintent,butitcannotcontrolthesubstantiveprovisionsthereof.
35.Theabovequotedparagraphofthejudgmentcannotbeconstruedtodilutethevalueofthe
ObjectivesResolutionoreventhepreambleoftheConstitutionof1973asitwasannouncedbeforethe
framingoftheConstitution.
36.InthecaseofHakimKhanand3othersvs.GovernmentofPakistanthroughSecretaryInterior
andothers(PLD1992SC595),thisCourtwhiledealingwiththescopeofObjectiveResolution,
preambleandArticle2AoftheConstitutionobservedasunder:
ThisruleofinterpretationdoesnotappeartohavebeengiveneffecttointhejudgmentoftheHigh
CourtonitsviewthatArticle2AisasupraConstitutionalprovision.Because,ifthisbeitstruestatus
thentheabovequotedclausewouldrequiretheframingofanentirelynewConstitution.Andevenif
Article2Areallymeantthatafteritsintroductionitistobecomeincontroloftheotherprovisionsofthe
Constitution,thenmostoftheArticlesoftheexistingConstitutionwillbecomequestionableonthe
groundoftheirallegedinconsistencywiththeprovisionsoftheObjectivesResolution.Accordingtothe
openingclauseofthisResolutiontheauthoritywhichAlmightyAllahhasdelegatedtotheStateof
Pakistanistobeexercisedthroughitspeopleonly"withinthelimitsprescribedbyHim".Thusallthe
provisionsoftheexistingConstitutionwillbechallengeablebeforeCourtsoflawonthegroundthat
theseprovisionsarenot"withinthelimitsofAllah"andareintransgressionthereof.Thus,thelaw
regardingpoliticalparties,modeofelection,theentirestructureofGovernmentasembodiedinthe
Constitution,thepowersandprivilegesofthePresidentandotherfunctionariesoftheGovernmentwill
beopentoquestion.Indeed,theverybasisonwhichtheConstitutionisfoundednamelythetrichotomy
ofpowersi.e.thatthethreegreatorgansoftheStatehavetheirownparticularspheresofauthority
whereintheyexercisetheirrespectivepowersorthesystemofchecksandbalancescouldbe
challenged,alongwithalltheancillaryprovisionsembodiedinthe1973Constitutioninrelationthereto.
Thus,insteadofmakingthe1973Constitutionmorepurposeful,suchaninterpretationofArticle2A,
namelythatitisincontrolofalltheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionwouldresultinunderminingit
andpavethewayforitseventualdestructionoratleastitscontinuanceinitspresentform.This
presumablywasnottheintentionofGeneralMuhammadZiaulHaqwhileaddingArticle2Ainthe
ConstitutionundertheRevivaloftheConstitutionOrder,1985(President'sOrderNo.14/1985).It
certainlywasnottheintentionofthelawmakerswhoenactedArticle270A(videsection19ofthe
Constitution(EighthAmendment)Act,1985]whichprovisionaffirmedandadopted,interalia,
P.0.14/1985(wherebyArticle2AwasinsertedintheConstitution).Theirintentionsimplywasthatthe
ObjectivesResolutionshouldnolongerbetreatedmerelyasadeclarationofintentbutshouldenjoythe
statusofasubstantiveprovisionandbecomeequalinweightandstatusastheothersubstantive
provisionsoftheConstitution.Incaseanyinconsistencywasfoundtoexistbetweentheprovisionsof
the1973Constitutionandthose'oftheObjectivesResolutionwould,theyexpected,beharmonizedby
theCourtsinaccordancewiththewellestablishedrulesofinterpretationoftheConstitutional
documentsalreadymentioned.BeingcreaturesoftheConstitutionitwasnotvisualizedthattheycould
notannulanyexistingConstitutionalprovisions(onthepleaofitsrepugnancywiththeprovisionsof
Article2A)asnoCourt,operatingunderaConstitution,candoso.TousethepicturesquewordsofMr.
Justice(Rtd.)Sh.AftabHussain,formerChiefJusticeoftheFederalShariatCourt,inhisdiscourseonthe
subjectof"theShariatBillanditsimplications"PLD1986Journal327,"TheCourtsarethecreationof
theConstitutionandonnoprincipleoflawcantheybeallowedtocutthetreeonwhichtheyarc
perched".ThelearnedChiefJustice,inthesamediscourse,inwhichhemadetheaboveobservation,
proceededtoobservethat"theobjectioninrespectoftheunIslamiccharacteroftheConstitutionis
moreilladvised.ItwaspassedbyaParliamentconsistingofrenownedUlemarepresentingallour'
politicoreligiousorganizationsallofwhomapprovedit.ThisissufficientcertificateforitsIslamic
character.IfsomeonethinksthatsomeofitsprovisionsarecontrarytoSharia,heshouldraisetheissue
intheMajlisiShoora(Parliament)
37.Anotherparagraphofthesaidjudgmentisalsorelevantinthisconnectionwhichreadsas
under:
TheroleoftheObjectivesResolution,accordinglyinmyhumbleview,notwithstandingtheinsertionof
Article2AintheConstitution(wherebythesaidObjectivesResolutionhasbeenmadeasubstantivepart
thereof)hasnotbeenfundamentallytransformedfromtheroleenvisagedforitattheoutset;namely
thatitshouldserveasbeaconlightfortheConstitutionmakersandguidethemtoformulatesuch
provisionsfortheConstitutionwhichreflectidealsandtheobjectivessetforththerein.Thus,whereas
aftertheadoptionoftheObjectivesresolutionon12thMarch,1949,theConstitutionmakerswere
expectedtodraftsuchprovisionsfortheConstitutionwhichweretoconformtoitsdirectivesandthe
idealsenunciatedbythemintheObjectivesResolutionandincaseofanydeviationfromthese
directives,whiledraftingtheproposedprovisionsfortheConstitutiontheConstituentAssembly,before
whomthesedraftprovisionsweretobeplaced,wouldtakethenecessaryremedialstepsitselftoensure
compliancewiththeprincipleslaiddownintheObjectivesResolution.However,whenaConstitution
alreadystandsframed(itt1973)bytheNationalAssemblyofPakistanexercisingplenarypowersinthis
behalfwhereindetailedprovisionsinrespect.ofallmattersreferredtointheObjectivesResolution
havealreadybeenmadeandArticle2Awasmadeamandatorypartthereofmuchlateri.e.after1985
accordinglynowwhenaquestionariseswhetheranyoftheprovisionsofthe1973Constitutionexceeds
toanyparticularrespect,thelimitsprescribedbyAllahAlmighty(withinwhichHispeoplealonecanact)
andsomeinconsistencyisshowntoexistbetweentheexistingprovisionoftheConstitutionandthe
limitstowhichthemanmadelawcanextend;thisinconsistencywillberesolvedinthesamemanneras
wasoriginallyenvisagedbytheauthorsandmoversoftheObjectivesResolutionnamelybytheNational
Assemblyitself.Inpracticalterms,thisimpliesinthechangedcontext,thattheimpugnedprovisionof
theConstitutionshallbecorrectedbysuitablyamendingitthroughtheamendmentprocesslaiddown
intheConstitutionitself.
Intheparagraphsreproducedabove,hislordshipMr.JusticeNasimHassanShahashethenwaswhile
speakingforthebenchcommentedontheObjectivesResolution,preambleandArticle2Aofthe
ConstitutionbutwhathislordshiplostsightofwasthattheframersoftheConstitutionwhileframingit
notonlyincorporatedtheObjectivesResolutioninitspreamblebutframedallofitsprovisionsin
generalandthoseofPartI,PartII,PartVIIandPartIXinparticularinlinewiththepreamble.Insertion
ofArticle2AintheConstitutionafteritshavingbeenframed,inourview,wasneithercalledfor,nor
couldbesaidtohavemucheffect.
38.InthecaseofMst.KaneezFatimavs.WaliMuhammadandanother(PLD1993SC901),his
lordshipMr.JusticeSaleemAkhtarashethenwasalsolookedattheObjectivesResolution,preamble
andArticle2AoftheConstitutionfromthesameangleofvisionaswasdoneinthecaseofHakimKhan
and3othersvs.GovernmentofPakistanthroughSecretaryInteriorandothers(Supra)asisevident
fromtheparagraphreadingasunder:
5.ThequestionariseswhethertheprinciplesofHakimKhan'scase(supra)canbeappliedtocases
wheretheprovisionofanyenactmentandnottheConstitutionistobeconsideredandchallengedon
thepleathatitishitbyArticle2A.AsisobviousfromtheaforestatedweightyobservationsArticle2A
cannotbepressedintoserviceforstrikingdownanyprovisionoftheConstitutiononthegroundsthatit
isnotselfexecutoryandalsothatanotherprovisionoftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownbeingin
conflictwithanyotherprovisionoftheConstitution.Thelastprincipleenunciatedmaynotbeapplicable
whiledealingwiththeprovisionsofanyenactmentwhichmaybeinconflictwiththeprovisionsofthe
Constitution.ThedifferentConstitutionalprovisionswhicharenotselfexecutingandwhichareself
executinghasbeenlaiddownbyourlearnedbrotherShafiurRahman,J.,iiiHakimKhan'scaseand
reliancehasbeenplacedonBindra'sInterpretationofStatutes,7thEdition.Theselfexecutingprovision
notonlyconfersarightbutitprovidesforitsprotectionandafurtherdutyiscasttoenforceitwithout
theaidoflegislativeenactment.Theremaybesupportinglegislativeenactmentwhichmayflowfrom
suchselfexecutingprovisionsoftheConstitution,buttheywillnotchangethecharacteroftheself
executingprovisionsoftheConstitutionnorwilltheybedependentuponsuchsupportinglegislation.
Butwheremerelya"policyhasbeenlaiddownorsomeguidelineshavebeenprovided",theyare
dependentuponsupportinglegislationsandenactmentsbecausewithoutthemthesamecannotbe
enforcedbythemselves.Sometimes,asinourConstitution,procedureisprovidedforenforcingor
makingsuchnonselfexecutingprovisionsoperative.Therefore,insuchcircumstances,thenonself
executingprovisionsoftheConstitutionserveasabeaconlightfortheenactmentoflawsbythe
legislatureandalsoformakingrulesandregulationswhichhavetheforceoflaw.vesResolutionnamely
bytheNationalAssemblyitself.Inpracticalterms,thisimpliesinthechangedcontext,thatthe
impugnedprovisionoftheConstitutionshallbecorrectedbysuitablyamendingitthroughthe
amendmentprocesslaiddownintheConstitutionitself.
39.InthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaivs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1997SC
426),Mr.JusticeSajjadAliShahwhileconsideringthescopeofObjectivesResolutionanditsplaceinthe
schemeoftheConstitutionheldasunder:
23.Ittherefore,appearsfromwhatisstatedintheaboveparagraphthatwithinaperiodof50years
historyofPakistanisthatwehavehadthreeConstitutionsandthreecompleteMartialLawsandin
betweenwehavebeenstrugglingtomakeupourmindwhetherPresidentialorParliamentaryFormof
Governmentsuitsus.OnethingisbeyonddisputethatinallthethreeConstitutionsObjectives
ResolutioniscommonandthesamehasbeenincorporatedaspreambleinallthethreeConstitutions
includingtheConstitutionof1973.SincethisObjectivesResolutionisveryimportantandisthe
sheetanchorofourConstitutionbecauseitreflectsaspirationsofthepeopleofPakistanastowhat
theywantandhowtheywanttobegoverned.
26.ItisnotnecessarytodilateuponthecaseofZiaurRahmananyfurtherforthereasonthatat
presentweareconcernedonlywithObjectivesResolutionintheConstitutionappendedaspreamble.
EveninthatcapacityitinvariablyhasremainedpreambleinallthefourConstitutionsincludingthe
InterimConstitutionof1972andtherefore,ithastobereadforthepurposeofproperinterpretationin
ordertofindoutastowhatschemeofgovernancehasbeencontemplated.Letusassumethatitdoes
notauthoritativelyprovidegrundnormandalsoitdoesnotdescribespecificallythebasicstructureof
theConstitution,eventhenalsoitdoeshelpininterpretingandunderstandingtheschemeof
governanceandsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionwhicharedescribedthereinincludingIslamic
provisions,federalismandparliamentaryformofGovernmentandfullysecuringindependenceof
judiciary.IslamicprovisionsareverymuchembeddedintheConstitutionof1973asArticle2thereof
envisagesthatIslamshallbetheState,religionofPakistanandArticle227providesthatallexistinglaws
shallbebroughtinconformitywiththeInjunctionsofIslamaslaiddownintheHolyQur'anandSunnah.
Further.Article228providesforsettingupCouncilofIslamicIdeology.Similarprovisionsexistedin
Articles197and198oftheConstitutionof1956andArticles199to207oftheConstitutionof1962.
Similar,IslamicprovisionsexistedintheInterimConstitutionof1972fromArticles251to259.In
nutshellitcanbesaidthatbasicstructureassuchisnotspecificallymentionedintheConstitutionof
1973butObjectivesResolutionaspreambleoftheConstitutionandnowinsertedasthesubstantive
partintheshapeofArticle2AwhenreadwithotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionreflectssalient
featuresoftheConstitutionhighlightingfederalism,parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwith
Islamicprovisions.
40.Mr.JusticeSaleemAkhtarhavingdiscussedtheObjectivesResolution,PreambleandArticle2A
oftheConstitutionobservedasunder:
11.ThepoliticalhistoryoftheConstitutionischeckeredandmarredbydeviationsandConstitutional
breakdownswhichbayonetedtwoConstitutionsandthethirdoneremainedsuspendedfornineyears.
Thedarkshadowsofmilitaryinterventionhadbecomeacommonphenomenonwhichhascastits
influenceonthedeathandbirthoftheConstitutions.Thehistorydoesnotspeakofconsistentadoption
ofanybasicstructurefortheConstitution.
19.InordertoascertainwhetherthereexistsaninviolablebasicstructureoftheConstitution,Mr.Khalid
AnwarhastakenustotheConstitutionalandlegalhistoryleadinguptotheformationofthe
Constitutionof1973'.Beforeweembarkuponthisexercise,itmaybenotedthattheObjectives
ResolutionstatesthatsovereigntyovertheentireUniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andthe
authoritytobeexercisedbythepeopleofPakistanwithinthelimitsprescribedbyHimisasacredtrust;
Stateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentativesofthepeople;the
principlesofdemocracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjustice,asenunciatedbyIslam,shallbe
observed.ItcontemplatesaFederalformofGovernmentwithautonomousunits,guarantees
fundamentalrightsincluding"equalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbeforelaw,socialeconomicand
politicaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipandassociation,subjectto
lawandpublicmorality".Theindependenceofjudiciaryhasbeenfullysecured.Italsoconfirmsitsfaith
tothedeclarationmadebytheFounderofPakistan,QuaideAzamMuhammadAliJinnah,thatPakistan
wouldbeademocraticStatebasedonIslamicprinciplesofsocialjustice.InthiscontextMr.Ismail
Qureshi,AdvocatehasreferredtoaspeechmadebyQuaideAzamMuhammadAliJinnahreportedin
the"PakistanTimes"dated2611948,whichreadsasfollows:
"Freedomanditsidealismhavetaughtdemocracy.Islamhastaughtequality,justiceandfairplayto
everybody.Butreasonisthereforanyonetofeardemocracy,equality,freedomonthehigheststandard
ofintegrityandtothebasisoffairplayandjusticeforeverybody."
TheObjectivesResolutionandthespeechofQuaideAzamquotedaboveclearlyshowthatthe
ConstitutionwastobebasedonIslamicprinciplesofdemocracy,equality,freedom,justiceandfairplay.
TheseweretheguidingprincipleswhichweretobemouldedintheformofConstitution.Thesewere
interaliathebasicfeaturesonwhichtheConstitutionwastobeframed.
34.ItcanthusbesaidthatinPakistanthereisaconsistentviewfromtheverybeginningthataprovision
oftheConstitutioncannotbestruckdownholdingthatitisviolativeofanyprominentfeature,
impliedlyacceptthetheoryofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Ithasonlybeenreferredto
illustratethateveryConstitutionhasitsowncharacteristics.
35.Mr.IsmailQureshicontendedthattheObjectivesResolutionwhichwasincludedinthe1956
ConstitutionasaPreambleisthekeytotheConstitution.ThisResolutionwasamovedintheFirst
ConstituentAssemblyandhascontinuedtobeadoptedasa.PreambletotheConstitution.ByEighth
Amendment,Article2Awasadded,whichhasmadetheObjectivesResolutionasubstantivepartofthe
Constitution,buttosaythatitisthebasicstructureinthesensetheIndianSupremeCourthas
adopted,doesnotholdforce.Mr.IsmailQureshiIrancontendedthateverybuildinghasastructure.He
hasreferredtothemeaningofstructureasgiveninBlack'sLawDictionaryandcontendedthatstructural
alterationorchangeaffectsthevitalantisubstantialportionofathingwhichchangesitscharacteristics
whichdestroysthefundamentalpurposeofitserectionandcontemplateduses.Asobservedearlier,
therearesomecharacteristicfeaturesineveryConstitutionwhichareembeddedinthehistorical,
religiousandsocialbackgroundofthepeopleforwhomitisframed.Itcannotbedeniedthatevery
Constitutionhasprominentfeatures,characteristicsandpictureframestuddedwithpublicaspiration,
historicalinspiration,geographicalrecognition,politicalformulationsandpeople'sexpectation.These
windingpathswhichrollintothestream,withthepassageoftimeandtidedoaffecttheflowintheir
ownperspectivewhichtotherigidtheorywouldamounttounpardonablechangebuttoaflexible
theoryitwouldbeanaturalresultofsuchconfluenceandinfluence.Doubtless,Pakistanowesits
creationtoideologicalbeliefwhichissomanifestlyreflectedintheObjectivesResolutionthatithas
alwaysremainedthePreambleofalmostallourConstitutionsandhasbeenasourceofguidancetoall.
TheprovisionsoftheConstitutionthoughnotrigidlyencircledbyit,alwaysremainwithinitshorizon
subjecttoallsuchchangeswhichmanifestdifferentshadesofthesamecolour.AConstitutionisthe
aspirationofthepeople.Itistheexperienceofthepast,thedesiresofthepresentnationandlastbut
nottheleastahopeforthefuture.AConstitutionisadocumentforalltimestocome.Itcannotbe
maderigidbecausesuchrigidityifconfrontedwiththesocialandpoliticalneedsofthetimeislikelyto
createcracksinit.TheconsistentviewofthesuperiorCourtsofPakistanismorerealandshouldbe
followedandmaintained.
IntheparagraphsquotedabovehislordshipMr.JusticeSaleemAkhtardespiterecognizingthesalient
featuresoftheConstitutionproceededtorejectthetheoryofthebasicstructurebyholdingthatthe
Constitutionbeingadocumentforalltimestocomecannotbemaderigid.Butwhathislordship
omittedtoconsiderwasthatthepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionarebasedon
eternalandunalterablevalueswhichdonotchangewiththechangesaround.Independenceof
judiciary,forinstance,isoneofthevalueswhichdoesnotchangewiththeeffluxoftime.Sanctityof
fundamentalrightshasbeeninviolablethroughoutandshallremainassuchtomorrow.Islam,asa
systemoflife,hasthecapacitytoguideustodayandinalltimestocomeasithadfourteenthcentury
before.Timeintermsofpast,presentandfuturecannothaveanyimpactmuchlessadverseonthese
values.
41.InthecaseofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanothervs.FederationofPakistanand
others(PLD1998SC1263),almosteachmemberofthebenchhearingthecaseafterconsideringthe
theoryofbasicstructurefromdifferentanglesobserveddifferently.HislordshipMr.JusticeAjmalMian,
CJasthethenwasafterexaminingdifferentjudgmentsofthisCourtandForeignCourtsconcludedthe
paragraphbyposingarhetoricalquestionwhichreadsasunder:
12.Fromtheabovecaselaw,itisevidentthatinPakistanthebasicstructuretheoryconsistentlyhad
notbeenaccepted.However,itmaybepointedoutthatinnoneoftheabovereportstheimpugned
Articlewassuchwhichcouldhavebeentreatedasalteringthebasicfeature/structureofthe
Constitution.IftheParliamentbyaConstitutionalAmendmentmakesPakistanasasecularState,
thoughPakistanisfoundedasanIslamicIdeologicalState,canitbearguedthatthisCourtwillhaveno
powertoexaminetheviresofsuchanamendment.
42.HislordshipMr.JusticeSaeeduzZamanSiddiquiinhisseparatenoteafteranalyzingtheviews
expressedindifferentjudgmentsandseparatenotesdesistedfromdefiningthebasicstructureofthe
Constitutionassuchattempt,inhisview,wasmorelikelytoconfusetheissue.He,however,observed
thatapoliticalpartyvotedtopowercannotbringaboutachangeinthesalientfeaturesofthe
Constitutionifitdidnotseekamandatetodosofromtheelectorate.Areferencetotherelevant
paragraphwould,thus,beadvantageouswhichreadsasunder:
ThedecisioninZiaurRehman'scasewasdeliveredbythisCourton811973whentheConstitutionhad
notcomeintoforce.InSaeedAhmad'scasethisCourtthoughgaveitsjudgmentonadatewhenthe
Constitutionhadcomeintoforce,butitconsideredtheamendmentofArticle281oftheInterim
Constitutionof1972bythePresidentinexerciseofhispowerunderArticle279(1)(c)oftheInterim
Constitution.InWaliKhan'scasethisCourtafterreferringtothedecisionofIndianSupremeCourtin
Kesvananda'scase,whichpropoundedthetheoryofbasicstructureofConstitution,refusedtogointo
thecontroversyanyfurtherandreiterateditsearlierviewexpressedinZiaurRehman'scase,butoneof
thereasonsstatedbytheCourtfornotexaminingthisaspectofthecaseanyfurtherwas,thatthe
amendmentmadeinArticle17oftheConstitutionin1974neitheramountedtototalabrogationofthe
righttoformapoliticalpartynorinanymanneranunreasonablerestrictionofsucharight.The
observationsofthisCourtinUnitedSugarMillsLtd.'scasewillshowthatthetwoamendmentsof
Constitutioninthatcase,werenotquestionedforwantofcompetencyoranyotherformaldefect.The
decisioninFaujiFoundation'scaserelatedtothequestionoflegislativemalafides.SharafFaradi'scase
didnotinvolveanyamendmentoftheConstitution.MahmoodKhanAchakzai'scase,was,therefore,the
firstcaseinwhichtheamendmentmadeintheConstitutionthroughtheConstitution(Eighth
Amendment)ActXVIIIof1985wasexaminedatsomelength.TheBenchinMahmoodKhanAchakzai's
caseconsistedofsevenlearnedJudgesofthisCourt.Theshortorderwhichwassignedbyallthelearned
sevenlearnedJudgesoftheBench,showsthatthequestionrelatingtobasicstructureofthe
Constitutionwasnotansweredauthoritativelyandfinallyasitwasconsideredtobeacademicinnature
butsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionreflectedinArticle2AwerepointedoutasFederalismand
ParliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.
IndetailedreasonsrecordedinsupportoftheshortorderinAchakzai'scasewhichreflectedthe
majorityopinioninthecase,SajjadAliShah,C.J.(ashethenwas)however,observedthatafter
incorporationofArticle2AintheConstitution,thesalientandbasicfeaturesoftheConstitution,
namely;federalism,ParliamentarydemocracyandIslamicprovisionscannotbetouchedwithbythe
ParliamentwhileamendingtheConstitution.SaleemAkhtar,J.anotherlearnedJudgeoftheBenchin
Achakzai'scasewhorecordedseparateopinioninsupportoftheshortorderandwhichalsoformedpart
ofthemajorityviewinthatcase,thoughdidnotacceptthebasicstructuretheoryoftheConstitution
andreferredtotheviewsofthisCourtinearliercasesasrealisticbutinthefinalanalysisalsoobserved
asfollows:
"HowevertherearefactorswhichrestrictthepoweroftheLegislaturetoamendtheConstitution.Itis
themoralorpoliticalsentiment,whichbindsthebarriersofLegislatureandformstheConstitutional
understandings.Thepressureofpublicopinionisanotherfactorwhichrestrictsandresiststheunlimited
powertoamendtheConstitution.InPakistanalthoughArticle239confersunlimitedpowertothe
Legislature,yetitcannotbysheerforceofmoralityandpublicopinionmakelawsamendingthe
onlywiththeConstitution."
ApartfromthereasonsgiveninthemajorityopinioninAchakzai'scaseinsupportoftheconclusionthat
poweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutiondidextendtochangeordestroythebasicand
salientfeaturesoftheConstitution,I'amoftheviewthatthepoliticalpartiestakepartintheprocessof
electiononthebasisoftheirelectionmanifestoortheprogrammegivenoutbythemduringelection
campaign.Apoliticalparty.electedtopoweronthebasisofitselectionmanifestoortheprogramme
givenoutbyittotheelectorateduringtheelectioncampaignhasthemandateofthepoliticalsovereign
onlytogiveeffecttothoseprogrammesandpromiseswhichitcommittedtotheelectoratesinthe
electionmanifestoorintheformofpromisesgivenoutduringtheelectioncampaign.Therefore,a
politicalpartyvotedtopower,ifduringitselectioncampaign,orinitselectionmanifesto,didnotseek
mandatefromtheelectoratetobringaboutchangesintheessentialandbasicfeaturesofthe
Constitution,itwouldlacknecessaryauthoritytobringaboutthosechangesintheConstitutionby
movingamendmentsintheParliamentImay,however,statethatnoattemptshouldbemadetodefine
andlaydownwithprecisionthebasicandsalientfeaturesoftheConstitution.Anyattemptinthis
regardinmyopinionismorelikelytoconfusetheissuethantodefineit.Referenceinthisbehalfmaybe
madetoKesavananda'scasewheretheSupremeCourtofIndiaattemptedtodefinethebasicstructure
ofIndianConstitution,butthelearnedJudgesfailedtoevolveaconsensusdefinitionofbasicstructure
ofIndianConstitution,andassucheachlearnedJudgeoftheBenchformingthemajorityinthecase
providedthedefinitionofbasicstructureofIndianConstitution,accordingtohisownperception.Iam,
therefore,oftheviewthatasandwhenanyamendmentintheConstitutionischallengedontheground
thatitaffectedoralteredanyofthebasicfeatureoftheConstitution,suchfeatureoftheConstitution
maybeexaminedindividuallytodetermineitsplaceintheSchemeoftheConstitution,itsobjectand
purposeandtheconsequencesofitsdenialontheintegrityoftheConstitutionasafundamental
instrumentofthecountry'sgovernance,asobservedbyChandrachud,J.inKesavananda'scase.
43.Mr.JusticeIrshadHassanKhanasthethenwasafterexaminingthejudgmentsofIndianand
Pakistanijurisdictionsastothedoctrineofbasicstructureheldasunder:
25.Astoapplicabilityofthedoctrineof"basicstructure"inPakistanthelearnedChiefJusticehastaken
greatpainsinpointingoutrelevantpassagesfromvariousdecisionsofthisCourtinthisbehalfviz.The
Statev.ZiaurRehman(PLD1973SC49),FederationofPakistanv.SaeedAhmedKhan(PLD1974SC
151),IslamicRepublicofPakistanv.WaliKhan,M.N.A.(PLD1976SC57),FederationofPakistanthrough
theSecretary,MinistryofFinance,GovernmentofPakistan,Islamabad,etc.v.UnitedSugarMillsLtd.,
Karachi(PLD1977SC397),FaujiFoundationandanotherv.ShamimurRehman(PLD1983SC457),
KhawajaMuhammadSharifv.FederationofPakistanthroughSecretary,CabinetDivision,Government
ofPakistan,Islamabad(PLD1988Lah.725),SharafFaridiv.TheFederationofIslamicRepublicof
PakistanthroughPrimeMinisterofPakistan(PLD1989Kar.404),PirSabirShahv.FederationofPakistan
(PLD1994SC738)andFederationofPakistanv.GhulamMustafaKhar(PLD1989SC26),vide
paragraphs11and12oftheproposedjudgmenttoshowthatthe"basicstructure"theoryconsistently
hadnotbeenaccepted.Iaminrespectfulagreementwithhimonthisissue.
44.Mr.JusticeRajaAfrasiabKhanafterexaminingtheObjectivesResolution,andpreambleofthe
Constitutionof1973intheirhistoricalperspectiveandrecountingtheeventsleadingtothepartitionof
Indiaheldasunder:
10.TheverybasisforcreationofPakistanis,therefore,Islam.Islamcannotbedivorced/separatedfrom
theideaofPakistan.IftherewerenoMuslimsinthesubcontinent,noquestionforcreationofPakistan
couldhaveariseninthispartoftheworld.Thisbeingso,provisionofArticles2,2Aandotherswill
reflectthehistoricalbackgroundofthecreationofPakistan.Inotherwords,thesubcontinenthasbeen
dividedonthebasisoftwonationtheorywhicheventodayisverymuchimportantandrelevantforall
intentsandpurposes.Likewise,theterritorieswhichhavebeenincluded(videArticle1)intheIslamic
RepublicofPakistancannotbeexcludedbyanyamendmenttotheConstitution.Apartfromtheabove,
aspecificArticle257hasbeenenactedbytheParliamentwhichrelatestothepeopleofStateofJammu
andKashmir.Article1hastobereadwithArticle257oftheConstitution.Incase,peopleoftheStateof
JammuandKashmirdecidetoaccedetoPakistantherelationshipbetweenPakistanandthatStateshall
havetobedeterminedinaccordancewiththewishesofthepeopleofthatState.Pakistanisthe
championforthecauseofliberationofthepeopleofJammuandKashmirprimarilyonthebasisoftwo
nationtheory.Inthesecircumstances,theParliamentofPakistanshallnotbecompetentto
change/amendtheaforesaidprovisionsoftheConstitutionforthereasonthat,incase,itisallowedto
doso,theveryfoundationofPakistanshallaltogetherbeshaken.Thewholesuperstructurehavingbeen
raisedonthestrengthofPakistanResolutionadoptedon23rdofMarch,1940maycollapselikeahouse
ofcards.Apartfromtheabove,Article3hasforbiddenallformsofexploitation.Toenjoytheprotection
oflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlawistheinalienablerightofeverycitizenunderArticle4.In
return,everycitizenisboundtobeloyaltotheStateunderArticle5.OurConstitutionhasgiven
guaranteeunderArticle9thatnocitizenshallbedeprivedofhislifeorlibertysaveinaccordancewith
law.Inanyform,slaveryandforcedlabourhavebeenforbiddenunderArticle11.Thedignityofman,of
course,subjecttolawandtheprivacyofhome,shallbeinviolableunderArticle14.Thisrightthatallare
equalbeforelawhasbeengiventoallcitizensonthebasisofArticle25.Theseprovisionsalongwiththe
abovenoted'IslamicprovisionsaretheveryfoundationonwhichtheConstitutionalstructurehasbeen
raised.Inmyhumbleview,theParliamenthasnopowerstorepealoraltertheseprovisionsbecauseof
theirimportance,especially,keepinginviewthebackgroundofPakistanMovementandthinkingon
humanrightsinthemodernworld.
45.InthecaseofPakistanLawyersForumandothersvs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD
2005SC719),thisCourthavingdiscussedsalientfeaturesoftheConstitutionreiteratedtheviewthatno
Constitutionalamendmentcouldbestruckdownbythesuperiorjudiciaryasbeingviolativeofthesaid
featuresandthattheremedylayinthepoliticalandnotthejudicialprocess.Therelevantparagraph
readsasunder:
Courtsofthiscountryhaveconsistentlyacknowledgedthatwhiletheremaybeabasicstructuretothe
tosuchbasic'structure,suchlimitationsaretobeexercisedandenforcednotbythejudiciary(asinthe
caseofconflictbetweenastatuteandArticle8),butbythebodypolitic,.i.e.,thepeopleofPakistan.In
thiscontext,itmaybenotedthatwhileSajjadAliShah,C.J.observedthat"thereisabasicstructureof
theConstitutionwhichmaynotbeamendedbyParliament",henowhereobservesthatthepowerto
theoryofbasicstructureorsalientfeatures,insofarasPakistanisconcerned,hasbeenusedonlyasa
doctrinetoidentifysuchfeatures.
58.Itmayfinallybenotedthatthebasicstructuretheory,particularlyasappliedbytheSupremeCourt
ofIndia,isnotanewconceptsofarasPakistanijurisprudenceisconcernedbuthasbeenalready
mayalsobenotedthatthebasicstructuretheoryhasnotfoundsignificantacceptanceoutsideIndia,as
alsodiscussedandnotedintheAchakzai'scase.Morespecifically,theSupremeCourtofSriLanka
refusedtoapplythesaid.theoryinacase,reportedasInretheThirteenthAmendmenttothe
bytheSupremeCourtofMalaysiainacasetitlePhangChinHockv.PublicProsecutor(1980)1MLJ70.
Intheparagraphquotedabove,whatescapedtheattentionofhislordshipwasthatruleoflaw
withoutbasicstructureisjustinconceivable.
46.InthecaseofWatanPartyandanothervs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2011SC
997),thisCourtalsoshedlightonthepreambleoftheConstitutioninthewordsrunningbelow:
2.ThisaspectoftheIslamicteachings,aswellfindsitsreflectionintheConstitutionoftheIslamic
RepublicofPakistan1973.TheConstitution,initsveryPreamble,postulatesthattheprinciplesof
democracy,freedom,equality,toleranceandsocialjustice,asenunciatedbyIslam,shallbefully
observedandthefundamentalrights,includingequalityofstatus,ofopportunityandbeforethelaw,
social,economicandpoliticaljustice,andfreedomofthought,expression,belief,faith,worshipand
association,subjecttolawandpublicmorality;shallbefullyguaranteed.Theseveryprincipleshave
beenmadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitutionunderArticle2A.Thus,itisthedutyoftheStateto
protectandsafeguardalltheseFundamentalRightsincludingtherighttolifeandlibertyasenvisagedby
Article9oftheConstitution,whichhasbeeninterpretedbythisCourtinShehlaZia'scase(PLD1994SC
693)asunder:
"Article9oftheConstitutionprovidesthatnopersonshallbedeprivedoflifeorlibertysavein
accordancewithlaw.Theword"life"isverysignificantasitcoversallfactsofhumanexistence.The
word"life"hasnotbeendefinedintheConstitutionbutitdoesnotmeannorcanitberestrictedonlyto
thevegetativeoranimallifeormereexistencefromconceptiontodeath.Lifeincludesallsuchamenities
andfacilitieswhichapersonborninafreecountryisentitledtoenjoywithdignity,legallyand
constitutionally.Forthepurposesofpresentcontroversysufficetosaythatapersonisentitledto
protectionoflawfrombeingexposedtohazardsofelectromagneticfieldsoranyothersuchhazards
whichmaybeduetoinstallationandconstructionofanygridstation,anyfactory,powerstationorsuch
likeinstallations.Underthecommonlawapersonwhoserightofeasement,propertyorhealthis
adverselyaffectedbyanyactofomissionorcommissionofathirdpersonintheneighbourhoodorata
faroffplace,heisentitledtoseekaninjunctionandalsoclaimdamages,buttheConstitutionalrights
arehigherthanthelegalrightsconferredbylawbeitmunicipallaworthecommonlaw.Suchadanger
asdepicted,thepossibilityofwhichcannotbeexcluded,isboundtoaffectalargenumberofpeople
whomaysufferfromitunknowinglybecauseoflackofawareness,informationandeducationandalso
becausesuchsufferanceissilentandfatalandmostofthepeoplewhowouldberesidingnear,underor
atadangerousdistanceofthegridstationorsuchinstallationdonotknowthattheyarefacinganyrisk
orarelikelytosufferbysuchrisk.Therefore,Article184canbeinvokedbecausealargenumberof
citizensthroughoutthecountrycannotmakesuchrepresentationandmaynotliketomakeitdueto
ignorance,povertyanddisability.Onlysomeconscientiouscitizensawareoftheirrightsandthe
possibilityofdangercomeforward."
47.InthecaseofWatanPartyandothersvs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD2012SC
292),thisCourtwhilethrowinglightonthepreambleobservedasunder:
38.ItisobservedthatthepreamblewhichisnowthesubstantivepartoftheConstitutionbymeansof
Article2A,commandsthatitisthewillofthepeopleofPakistantoestablishanorderwhereinthe
integrityoftheterritoriesoftheFederation,itsindependenceandallitsrights,includingitssovereign
rightsonland,seaandair,shallbesafeguarded;sothatthepeopleofPakistanmayprosperandattain
theirrightfulandhonouredplaceamongstthenationsoftheWorldandmadetheirfullcontribution
towardsinternationalpeaceandprogressandhappinessofhumanity.ThesewordsoftheConstitution
comprehensivelydefinethestatureofanindependentPakistanwherethepeopleofPakistanmay
prosperandattaintheirrightfulandhonouredplaceamongstthenationsoftheworld.Undoubtedly,
thisprovisionofConstitutionhasoverwhelmingnexuswiththefundamentalrightsofthecitizensof
Pakistan(people)specificallyguaranteedunderArticles9and14ofChapter1,PartIIofthe
Constitution.
48.HowdoestheSupremeCourtofIndialookatthebasicstructureorsalientfeaturesofthe
Constitutionandtheirimmunityfrombeingalteredisalsoaninterestingreading.InthecaseofShankari
PrasadSinghDeo.Vs.UnionofIndia(supra)amendmentintheConstitutionwasnottreatedas
amendmentinlawintermsofArticle13oftheConstitutionofIndia.InthecaseofSajjanSingh.Vs.
StateofRajasthan,(supra)thedecisiongiveninShankariPrasadSinghDeo.Vs.UnionofIndia(supra)
wasapproved.Withtheinsertionofclause(4)inArticle13,providingthatnothinginthisArticleshall
applytoanyamendmentoftheConstitutionunderArticle368andinsertionofClause(3)inArticle368
providingthatnothinginArticle13shallapplytoanyamendmentmadeunderthisArticle,throughthe
Constitution(TwentyfourthAmendment)Act,1971,aclearlineofdistinctionwasdrawnbetween
amendmentinlawandamendmentintheConstitution.NotwithstandingamendmentinArticle13and
Article368,theratioofGolakNath.Vs.StateofPunjab(supra),stillholdsthefieldinsofarasitheld
thattheParliamenthasnopowertotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrightsenshrinedinpartIIIof
theConstitutionasthiscouldbedoneonlybytheConstituentAssembly.Therelevantparagraphofthe
judgmentdeservesalookwhichrunsasunder:
(1)ThepoweroftheParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionisderivedfromArts.245,246and248of
theConstitutionandnotfromArt.368thereofwhichonlydealswithprocedure.Amendmentisa
legislativeprocess.
(2)Amendmentis'law'withinthemeaningofArt.13oftheConstitutionand,therefore,ifittakesaway
orabridgestherightsconferredbyPartIIIthereof,itisvoid.
(3)TheConstitution(FirstAmendment)Act,1951,Constitution(FourthAmendment)Act,1955,and,the
Constitution(SeventeenthAmendment)Act,1964,abridgethescope.ofthefundamentalrights.But,on
thebasisofearlierdecisionsofthisCourt,theywerevalid.
(4)Ontheapplicationofthedoctrineof'prospectiveoverruling',asexplainedbyusearlier,ourdecision
willhaveonlyprospectiveoperationand,therefore,thesaidamendmentswillcontinuetobevalid.
(5)WedeclarethattheParliamentwillhavenopowerfromthedateofthisdecisiontoamendanyof
theprovisionsofPartIIIoftheConstitutionsoastotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrights
enshrinedtherein.
49.Anotherparagraphwhichisalsorelevantreadsasunder:
WehavenotsaidthattheprovisionsoftheConstitutioncannotbeamendedbutwhatwehavesaidis
thattheycannotbeamendedsoastotakeawayorabridgethefundamentalrights.Norcanwe
appreciatetheargumentthatalltheagrarianreformswhichtheParliamentinpowerwantsto
effectuatecannotbebroughtaboutwithoutamendingthefundamentalrights.Itwasexactlytoprevent
thisattitudeandtoprojecttherightsofthepeoplethatthefundamentalrightswereinsertedinthe
Constitution.IfitisthedutyoftheParliamenttoenforcethedirectiveprinciples,itisequallyitsdutyto
enforcethemwithoutinfringingthefundamentalrights.
50.InyetanotherparagraphofthejudgmentHidayatullahJ.observedasunder:
Myconclusionsare
(i)thattheFundamentalRightsareoutsidetheamendatoryprocessiftheamendmentseekstoabridge
ortakeawayanyoftherights;
(ii)thatShankariPrasad'scase(andSajjanSingh'scasewhichfollowedit)concededthepowerof
amendmentoverPartIIIoftheConstitutiononanerroneousviewofArts.13(2)and368;
(iii)thattheFirst,FourthandSeventhAmendmentsbeingpartoftheConstitutionbyacquiescencefora
longtime,cannotnowbechallengedandtheycontainauthorityfortheSeventeenthAmendment;
(iv)thatthisCourthavingnowlaiddownthatFundamentalRightscannotbeabridgedortakenawayby
theexerciseofamendatoryprocessinArt.368,anyfurtherinroadintotheserightsastheyexisttoday
willbeillegalandunconstitutionalunlessitcomplieswithPartIIIingeneralandArt.
13(2)inparticular,
(v)thatforabridgingortakingawayFundamentalRights,aConstituentbodywillhavetobe,convoked;
and
51.InthecaseofKesavanandaBharati.Vs.StateofKerala(Supra),itwasheldthatthereare
impliedlimitationsonthepoweroftheParliamentandthateveryprovisionoftheConstitutioncanbe
amendedprovidedthatsuchamendmentdoesnotupsetitsbasicstructure.Therelevantparagraphs
readasunder:
292.ItseemstomethatreadingthePreamble,thefundamentalimportanceofthefreedomofthe
individual,indeeditsinalienability,andtheimportanceoftheeconomic,socialandpoliticaljustice
mentionedinthePreamble,theimportanceofdirectiveprinciples,thenoninclusioninArticle368of
provisionslikeArticles52,53andvariousotherprovisionstowhichreferencehasalreadybeenmadean
irresistibleconclusionemergesthatitwasnottheintentiontousetheword"amendment"inthewidest
sense.
293.Itwasthecommonunderstandingthatfundamentalrightswouldremaininsubstanceastheyare
andtheywouldnotbeamendedoutofexistence.Itseemsalsotohavebeenacommonunderstanding
thatthefundamentalfeaturesoftheConstitution,namely,secularism,democracyandthefreedomof
theindividualwouldalwayssubsistinthewelfarestate.
294.Inviewoftheabovereasons,anecessaryimplicationarisesthatthereareimpliedlimitationson
thepowerofParliamentthattheexpression"amendmentofthisConstitution"hasconsequentlya
limitedmeaninginourConstitutionandnotthemeaningsuggestedbytherespondents.
302.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralsaidthateveryprovisionoftheConstitutionisessential;otherwiseit
wouldnothavebeenputintheConstitution.Thisistrue.Butthisdoesnotplaceeveryprovisionofthe
Constitutioninthesameposition.ThetruepositionisthateveryprovisionoftheConstitutioncanbe
amendedprovidedintheresultthebasicfoundationandstructureoftheConstitutionremainsthe
same.Thebasicstructuremaybesaidtoconsistofthefollowingfeatures:
(1)SupremacyoftheConstitution;
(2)RepublicanandDemocraticformofGovernment.
(3)SecularcharacteroftheConstitution;
(4)SeparationofpowersbetweentheLegislature,theexecutiveandthejudiciary;
(5)FederalcharacteroftheConstitution..
Anotherparagraphisalsorelevantwhichreadsasunder:
692.Itwascontendedthatbymeansofthe24thAmendmentParliamentintendedtoandinfact
purportedtoenlargeitsamendingpower.Inthisconnectionreliancewasplacedonthestatementof
objectsandreasonsattachedtotheBillwhichresultedinthe24thAmendment.Thepowerof
Parliamentdoesnotrestuponitsprofessedintention.Itcannotacquireapowerwhichitotherwisedid
notpossess.WeareunabletoacceptthecontentionthatClause(e)totheprovisotoArticle368confers
poweronParliamenttoenlargeitsownpower.InourjudgmentthepowertoamendtheConstitutionas
wellastheordinaryproceduretoamendanypartoftheConstitutionwasandiscontainedinthemain
partoftheArticle.Theprovisomerelyplacesfurtherrestrictionsontheproceduretoamendthearticles
mentionedtherein.Clause(e)totheprovisostipulatesthatArticle368cannotbeamendedexceptin
themannerprovidedintheproviso.Intheabsenceofthatclause,Article368couldhavebeenamended
byfollowingtheprocedurelaiddowninthemainpart.AtbestClause(e)oftheprovisomerelyindicates
thatArticle368itselfcomeswithinitsownpurview.Aswehavealreadyseen,themainpartofArticle
368asitstoodearlier,expresslylaysdownonlytheproceduretobefollowedinamendingthe
Constitution.Thepowertoamendisonlyimpliedtherein.
KhannaJ.inanotherparagraphwhichisalsorelevantheldasunder:
1437.Wemaynowdealwiththequestionastowhatisthescopeofthepowerofamendmentunder
Article368.Thiswoulddependupontheconnotationoftheword"amendment".Questionhasbeen
posedduringargumentsastowhetherthepowertoamendundertheabovearticleincludesthepower
tocompletelyabrogatetheConstitutionandreplaceitbyanentirelynewConstitution.Theanswerto
theabovequestion,inmyopinion,shouldbeinthenegative.Iamfurtheroftheopinionthat
amendmentoftheConstitutionnecessarilycontemplatesthattheConstitutionhasnottobeabrogated
butonlychangeshavetobemadeinit.Theword"amendment"postulatesthattheoldConstitution
surviveswithoutlossofitsidentitydespitethechangeandcontinueseventhoughithasbeensubjected
toalterations.Asaresultoftheamendment,theoldConstitutioncannotbedestroyedanddoneaway
with;itisretainedthoughintheamendedform.Whatthenismeantbytheretentionoftheold
Constitution?ItmeanstheretentionofthebasicstructureorframeworkoftheoldConstitution.Amere
retentionofsomeprovisionsoftheoldConstitutioneventhoughthebasicstructureorframeworkof
theConstitutionhasbeendestroyedwouldnotamounttotheretentionoftheoldConstitution.
Althoughitispermissibleunderthepowerofamendmenttoeffectchanges,"howsoeverimportant,and
toadaptthesystemtotherequirementsofchangingconditions,itisnotpermissibletotouchthe
foundationortoalterthebasicinstitutionalpattern.Thewords"amendmentoftheConstitution"with
alltheirwidesweepandamplitudecannothavetheeffectofdestroyingorabrogatingthebasic
structureorframeworkoftheConstitution.Itwouldnotbecompetentunderthegarbofamendment,
forinstance,tochangethedemocraticgovernmentintodictatorshiporhereditarymonarchynorwould
itbepermissibletoabolishtheLokSabhaandtheRajyaSabha.Thesecularcharacterofthestate
accordingtowhichthestateshallnotdiscriminateagainstanycitizenonthegroundofreligiononly
cannotlikewisebedoneawaywith.ProvisionregardingtheamendmentoftheConstitutiondoesnot
furnishapretenceforsubvertingthestructureoftheConstitutionnorcanArticle368besoconstruedas
toembodythedeathwishoftheConstitutionorprovidesanctionforwhatmayperhapsbecalledits
lawfulharakiri.Suchsubversionordestructioncannotbedescribedtobeamendmentofthe
ConstitutionascontemplatedbyArticle368.
Hefurtherobservedasunder:
1441.Ithasnotbeendisputedduringthecourseofargumentsthatthepowerofamendmentunder
Article368doesnotcarrywithinitselfthepowertorepealtheentireConstitutionandreplaceitbya
newConstitution.Ifthepowerofamendmentdoesnotcomprehendthedoingawayoftheentire
ConstitutionbutpostulatesretentionorcontinuityoftheexistingConstitution,thoughinanamended
form,questionarisesastowhatistheminimumoftheexistingConstitutionwhichshouldbeleftintact
inordertoholdthattheexistingConstitutionhasbeenretainedinanamendedformandnotdoneaway
with.Inmyopinion,theminimumrequiredisthatwhichrelatestothebasicstructureorframeworkof
theConstitution.Ifthebasicstructureisretained,theoldConstitutionwouldbeconsideredtocontinue
eventhoughotherprovisionshaveundergonechange.Onthecontrary,ifthebasicstructureischanged,
mereretentionofsomearticlesoftheexistingConstitutionwouldnotwarrantaconclusionthatthe
existingConstitutioncontinuesandsurvives.
52.HowthisaspectislookedatintheUnitedKingdomwhere,accordingtoA.V.Dicey,whoisthe
chiefexponentofthedoctrineofsupremacyofParliament,theParliamenthastherighttomakeor
unmakeanylawwhatsoever;andfurther,thatnopersonorbodyisrecognizedbythelawofEnglandas
havingarighttooverrideorsetasidethelegislationoftheParliament.InthecaseofStella
Madzimbamuto.Vs.D.W.LardnerBurkeandAnother(PrivyCouncilAppealNo.13of1968),LordReid
identifiedtheconspicuousaspectoftheParliamentarysovereigntythatlaiddownthefoundationofthe
BritishPoliticalsystem.Hestatedasfollows:
ItisoftensaidthatitwouldbeunconstitutionalfortheUnitedKingdomParliamenttodo
certainthings,meaningthatthemoral,politicalandotherreasonsagainstdoingthemaresostrongthat
mostpeoplewouldregarditashighlyimproperifparliamentdidthesethings.Butthatdoesnotmean
thatitisbeyondthepowerofParliamenttodosuchthings.Ifparliamentchosetodoanyofthemthe
CourtswouldnotholdtheactofParliamentinvalid.
InmarkedcontrasttothatLordWoolf(thethenChiefJusticeofEnglandandWales)had
writtenthatifParliamentdidtheunthinkable,thenIwouldsaythatcourtswouldalsoberequiredto
actinamannerwhichwaswithoutprecedent.
LordSteyninthecaseofJacksonandothersv.HerMajestysAttorneyGeneral[2005]UKHL56,
whileacknowledgingthatthesupremacyofParliamentisstillthegeneralprincipleofourconstitution,
labeleditaconstructofthecommonlaw.Relevantparagraphreadsasunder:
Moreover,theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsasincorporatedintoourlawbythe
HumanRightsAct,1998,createdanewlegalorder.OnemustnotassimilatetheECHRwithmultilateral
treatiesofthetraditionaltype.InsteaditisalegalorderinwhichtheUnitedKingdomassumes
obligationstoprotectfundamentalrights,notinrelationtootherstates,buttowardsallindividuals
withinitsjurisdiction.TheclassicaccountgivenbyDiceyofthedoctrineofthesupremacyofParliament,
pureandabsoluteasitwas,cannowbeseentobeoutofplaceinthemodernUnitedKingdom.
Nevertheless,thesupremacyofParliamentisstillthegeneralprincipleofourconstitution.Itisa
constructofthecommonlaw.Thejudgescreatedthisprinciple.Ifthatisso,itisnotunthinkablethat
circumstancescouldarisewherethecourtsmayhavetoqualifyaprincipleestablishedondifferent
hypothesisofconstitutionalism.Inexceptionalcircumstancesinvolvinganattempttoabolishjudicial
reviewortheordinaryroleofthecourts,theAppellateCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsoranew
SupremeCourtmayhavetoconsiderwhetherthisisaconstitutionalfundamentalwhichevena
sovereignParliamentactingatthebehestofacomplaisantHouseofCommonscannotabolish.Itisnot
necessarytoexploretheramificationsofthisquestioninthisopinion
LordHopefollowedonfromLordSteynbyobservingasunder:
OurconstitutionisdominatedbythesovereigntyofParliament.ButParliamentarysovereignty
isnolonger,ifiteverwas,absoluteItisnolongerrighttosaythatitsfreedomtolegislateadmitsofno
qualificationwhatever.Stepbystep,graduallybutsurely,theEnglishprincipleoftheabsolutelegislative
sovereigntyofParliament...isbeingqualifiedTheruleoflawenforcedbythecourtsistheultimate
controllingfactoronwhichourconstitutionisbased.ThefactthatyourLordshipshavebeenwillingto
hearthisappealandtogivejudgmentuponitisanotherindicationthatthecourtshaveaparttoplayin
definingthelimitsofParliamentslegislativesovereignty.
BaronessHaleinherseparatenote,inthesamecase,suggestedthattheremaybelimitsto
Parliamentslegislativecompetencebyobservingasunder:
Thecourtswill,ofcourse,declinetoholdthatParliamenthasinterferedwithfundamentalrightsunless
ithasmadeitsintentionscrystalclear.Thecourtswilltreatwithparticularsuspicion(andmighteven
reject)anyattempttosubverttheruleoflawbyremovinggovernmentalactionaffectingtherightsof
theindividualfromalljudicialscrutiny.Parliamenthasalso,forthetimebeingatleast,limiteditsown
powersbytheEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972and,inadifferentway,bytheHumanRightsAct1998.
Itispossiblethatotherqualificationsmayemergeinduecourse.Ingeneral,however,theconstraints
uponwhatParliamentcandoarepoliticalanddiplomaticratherthanconstitutional.
LordCokeattheadventof17thcenturyinBonhamscasepronouncedthatinmanycasesthecommon
lawwillcontrolactsofParliamentandsometimeadjudgethemtobeutterlyvoid:forwhenanactof
Parliamentisagainstcommonrightorreason,orrepugnant,orimpossibletobeperformed,the
commonlawwillcontrolitandadjudgesuchanActtobevoid.Whatcanthusbededucedfromthe
foregoingdiscussion,isthatsovereigntyofParliamentevenintheU.K.isnotasabsoluteashasbeen
thought.We,thus,whileinterpretingourConstitutionneednotbeswayedbythedoctrineof
sovereigntyofParliamentwhich,aspointedoutbyMr.AbdulHafeezPirzada,thelearnedSr.ASC,isno
longeracceptedintheU.K.
53.WhatisthemodeofamendingtheConstitution,howfarcanthepartsformingitsbasic
structurerestricttheamendatorypoweroftheParliamentandhowfarcanclauses5and6ofArticle
239curtailthepowerofthisCourttoexaminetheviresandvalidityofanamendmenttothe
Constitution?Beforewedealwiththesequestions,itisworthwhiletorefertotherelevantprovisions
whichreadasunder:
238.AmendmentofConstitution.SubjecttothisPart,theConstitutionmaybeamendedbyActof
Parliament.
239.ConstitutionamendmentBill.(1)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionshalloriginateintheNational
AssemblyandwhentheBillhasbeenpassedbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotal
membershipoftheAssemblyitshallbetransmittedtotheSenate.
(2)IftheBillispassedbytheSenatebyamajorityofthetotalmembershipoftheSenateitshallbe
presentedtothePresidentforassent.
(3)IftheBillispassedbytheSenatewithamendments,itshallbereconsideredbytheNational
Assembly;andiftheBillasamendedbytheSenateispassedbytheAssemblybythevotesofnotless
thantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheAssembly,itshallbepresentedtothePresidentfor
assent.
(4)IftheBillisnotpassedbytheSenatewithinninetydaysfromthedayofitsreceipttheBillshall
bedeemedtohavebeenrejectedbytheSenate.
(5)ThePresidentshallassenttotheBillwithinsevendaysofthepresentationoftheBilltohim,and
ifhefailstodosoheshallbedeemedtohaveassentedtheretoattheexpirationofthatperiod.
(6)WhenthePresidenthasassentedtoorisdeemedtohaveassentedtotheBill,theBillshall
becomeActofParliamentandtheConstitutionshallstandamendedinaccordancewiththeterms
thereof.
(7)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionwhichwouldhavetheeffectofalteringthelimitsofaProvince
shallnotbepassedbytheNationalAssemblyunlessithasbeenapprovedbyaresolutionofthe
ProvincialAssemblyofthatProvincepassedbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotal
membershipofthatAssembly.
54.TheaforesaidArticleswereamendedbytheConstitution(SecondAmendmentOrder
1985)andafteramendmenttheyreadasunder:
AmendmentofConstitution
238.SubjecttothisPart,theConstitutionmaybeamendedbyActof1[MajliseShoora
(Parliament)].
239.(1)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionmayoriginateineitherHouseand,whentheBillhasbeen
passedbythevotesofnotlessthan
twothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheHouse,itshallbetransmittedtotheotherHouse.
(2)IftheBillispassedwithoutamendmentbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotal
membershipoftheHousetowhichitistransmittedunderclause(1),itshall,subjecttotheprovisionsof
(3)IftheBillispassedwithamendmentbythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotal
membershipoftheHousetowhichitistransmittedunderclause(1),itshallbereconsideredbythe
Houseinwhichithadoriginated,andiftheBillasamendedbytheformerHouseispassedbythelatter
bythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofitstotalmembershipitshall,subjecttotheprovisionsof
(4)ABilltoamendtheConstitutionwhichwouldhavetheeffectofalteringthelimitsofaProvince
shallnotbepresentedtothePresidentforassentunlessithasbeenpassedbytheProvincialAssembly
ofthatProvincebythevotesofnotlessthantwothirdsofitstotalmembership.
whatsoever.
(6)Fortheremovalofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthe
poweroftheMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.
55.Article368oftheConstitutionofIndiaisalmostinparimateriawithArticle239ofthe
ConstitutionofPakistanwhichasitstoodintheoriginalConstitutionreadsasunder:
368.AnamendmentofthisConstitutionmaybeinitiatedonlybytheintroductionofaBillforthe
purposeineitherHouseofParliament,andwhentheBillismembershipofthatHouseandbyamajority
ofnotlessthantwothirdsofthemembersofthatHousepresentandvoting,itshallbepresentedtothe
PresidentforhisassentanduponsuchassentbeinggiventotheBill,theConstitutionshallstand
amendedinaccordancewiththetermsoftheBill:
Providedthatifsuchamendmentseekstomakeanychangein
a)article54,article55,article73,article162orarticle241,or
b)ChapterIVofPartV,ChapterVofPartVI,orChapterIofPartXI,or
c)anyoftheListsintheSeventhSchedule,or
d)therepresentationofStatesinParliament,or
e)theprovisionsofthisarticle,
theamendmentshallalsorequiretoberatifiedbytheLegislaturesofnotlessthanonehalfoftheStates
specifiedinPartsAandBoftheFirstSchedulebyresolutionstotheeffectpassedbythoseLegislatures
beforetheBillmakingprovisionforsuchamendmentispresentedtothePresidentforassent.
ThisArticlewasamendedthroughvariousamendmentsanditasitstandstodayreadsasunder
:
368.PowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionandproceduretherefor.___(1)Notwithstanding
anythinginthisconstitution,Parliamentmayinexerciseofitsconstituentpoweramendbywayof
addition,variationorrepealanyprovisionofthisConstitutioninaccordancewiththeprocedurelaid
downinthisarticle.
2)AnamendmentofthisConstitutionmaybeinitiatedonlybytheintroductionofaBillforthe
purposeineitherHouseofParliament,andwhentheBillispassedineachHousebyamajorityofthe
totalmembershipofthatHouseandbyamajorityofnotlessthantwothirdsofthemembersofthat
Housepresentandvoting,itshallbepresentedtothePresidentwhoshallamendedinaccordancewith
thetermsoftheBill:
a)Article54,Article55,Article73,Article162orArticle241,or
b)ChapterIVofPartV,ChapterVofPartVI,orChapterIofPartXI,or
c)anyoftheListsintheSeventhSchedule,or
d)therepresentationofStatesinParliament,or
e)theprovisionsofthisarticle,
theamendmentshallalsorequiretoberatifiedbytheLegislatureofnotlessthanonehalfoftheStates
byresolutionstothateffectpassedbythoseLegislaturesbeforetheBillmakingprovisionforsuch
amendmentispresentedtothePresidentforassent.
3)NothinginArticle13shallapplytoanyamendmentmadeunderthisarticle.
4)NoamendmentofthisConstitution(includingtheprovisionsofPartIII)madeorpurportingto
havebeenmadeunderthisarticle(whetherbeforeorafterthecommencementofSection55ofthe
Constitution(FortysecondAmendment)Act,1976)shallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonany
ground.
5)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveron
theconstituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealtheprovisionsof
thisConstitutionunderthisarticle.
56.Thereis,ofcourse,adifferencebetweentheamendingArticlesoftheConstitutionofPakistan
andthoseoftheConstitutionofIndiaasinClause6oftheformerthewordsPoweroftheParliament
havebeenusedwhileinclause4ofthelatterthewordsConstituentpoweroftheParliamenthave
beenusedwiththeadditionoftheclausedefiningtheexpressionamendmentasaddition,variationor
repealoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution,butareviewofthejudgmentsrenderedinthecasesof
ShankariPrasadSinghDeo.Vs.UnionofIndia(AIR1951S.C.458),SajjanSingh.Vs.StateofRajasthan,
(AIR1965S.C.845),KesavanandaBharati.Vs.StateofKerala(AIR1973S.C.1461)andIndiraNehru
Gandhi.Vs.RajNarain(AIR1975S.C.2299)showsthatthereispracticallynodifferencebetweenPower
andConstituentPowerasneithertheParliamentundertheConstitutionnortheParliamentunderthe
ConstitutionofIndiaprovidesforappealtotheelectorateforamendmentineitheroftheConstitutions.
TheConstitutionofPakistan,however,after18thAmendmentstandsonadifferentpedestalasithas
nowprovidedforReferendumtocaterforasituationofthistype.
57.Letusseewhatistheoriginofclauses5and6ofArticle239oftheConstitutionofPakistanand
howfardotheycurtailthepowerofthisCourttoexaminetheviresandvalidityofanamendment
alteringthebasicstructureoftheConstitution?Theseclausesasisevidentfromthefootnoteswere
insertedbytheConstitution(SecondAmendment)Order,1985byapartylesshousewhosemembers
neverwenttotheelectoratetoseekamandateinthisbehalf.They,asamatteroffact,wereelectedon
accountofeithertheirinfluenceintheConstituencyorperformanceinthelocalcouncils.Theynever
canvassedtheirprogrammebeforethepeoplenordidtheyhaveanyevenintheirmindswhile
canvassingfortheirelection.Whattheycanvassedforduringtheirelectionwastobeelectedas
membersoftheParliament.TheyassuchhadnomandatetoamendtheConstitutionorbringaboutany
structuralchangethereinortomakeitimmunefrombeingchallenged.Suchamendmentcanneither
impairanyofthepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionnorcanitoverrideanyofits
provisionsenactedbytheoriginalframersoftheConstitutionespeciallywhenitisinconflictwiththe
latter.ThisCourtinthecaseofWukalaMahazBaraiTahafazDastoorandanotherv.Federationof
Pakistanandothers(Supra)whiledealingwithanidenticalpropositionreiteratedtheviewexpressedin
thecaseofAlJehadTrust.Vs.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996S.C.324)byholdingasunder:
16.WemayobservethatinPakistaninsteadofadoptingthebasicstructuretheoryordeclaringa
provisionoftheConstitutionasultravirestoanyoftheFundamentalRights,thisCourthaspressedinto
servicetheruleofinterpretationthatifthereisaconflictbetweenthetwoprovisionsofthe
Constitutionwhichisnotreconcilable,theprovisionwhichcontainslesserrightmustyieldinfavourofa
provisionwhichprovideshigherrights.ThiswasadoptedfirsttimebymeinthecaseofAlJehadTrust
(PLD1996SC324)whereinthefollowingwasheldwithreferencetoconflictbetweenArticle203Cand
Article209(7)oftheConstitution:
"SincethereisaconflictbetweentheabovetwoArticles,effortsaretobemadetoresolvethesameby
reconcilingit.TheConstitutionistobereadasawholeasanorganicdocument.Aclosescrutinyofthe
variousprovisionsoftheConstitutionhighlightsthatitenvisagesthattheindependenceofJudiciary
shouldbesecuredasprovidedbythefounderfatherofthecountrybypassingObjectivesResolution
andbyprovidingsecurityoftenure.TheConstitutionalsoenvisagesseparationofJudiciaryfromthe
Executive.KeepinginviewthevariousprovisionsoftheConstitution,itisnotpossibleto'reconcilethe
aboveprovisionsofArticle203CandArticle209.Insuchasituation,thequestionarises,whichofthe
Articlesshouldprevail.OneviewcanbethatsinceArticle203CwasincorporatedsubsequenttoArticle
209,theformershouldprevail.TheotherviewcanbethatsinceArticle209wasincorporatedby
consensusbytheframersoftheConstitutionandwhereasArticle203Cwasincorporatedbythethen
ChiefMartialLawAdministratorandasthesameisdetrimentaltothebasicconceptofindependenceof
JudiciaryandtheseparationofJudiciary,theformershouldprevail.Iaminclinedtopreferthelatter
interpretationasitwillbemoreinconsonancewiththevariousprovisionsoftheConstitutionandin
accordwithjusticeandfairplay.ApersoncannotbeappointedonadversetermsinanewCourtwithout
hisconsent.
ThesamewasexplainedbymeinthecaseofShahidNabiMalikv.ChiefElectionCommissioner,
Islamabadand7others(PLD1997SC32).1afterquotingthefollowingextractsfromCorpusJuris
Secundum,Vol.16,page97;andHalsbury'sLawsofEngland,FourthEdition,Vol.44,page532,para.
872:
HislordshipinsupportofhisviewalsocitedfromCorpusJurisSecundum.Vol.16,nape97:
24.Conflictingprovisionsingeneral.Althoughapparentlyconflictingprovisionswillbereconciled
whereverpossible,incaseofaconflictintheprovisionsofaConstitution,,ifoneortheothermustyield,
theonewhich,underthelaw,isthelesserrightwillyield.,
WithrespecttoConstitutionalconstruction,distinctConstitutionalprovisionsarerepugnanttoeach
otheronlywhentheyrelatetothesamesubject,areadoptedforthesamepurpose,andcannotbe
enforcedwithoutsubstantialconflict.WhileapparentlyconflictingprovisionsofaConstitutionwillbe
reconciledwhereverpossible,ifoneortheothermustyield,thatonewhich,underthelaw,isthelesser
rightwillyieldtotheother."
AndthenfromHalsbury'sLawsofEnglandFourthEdition,Vo1.44,12.532:
"872.Statutetobeconstruedasawhole.Forthepurposesofconstruction,thecontextofwords
whicharetobeconstruedincludesnotonlytheparticularphraseorsectioninwhichtheyoccur,but
alsotheotherpartsofthestatute.
Thusastatuteshouldbeconstruedasawholesoas,sofaraspossible,toavoidanyinconsistencyor
repugnancyeitherwithinthesectiontobeconstruedorasbetweenthatsectionandotherpartsofthe
statute.Theliteralmeaningofaparticularsectionmayinthiswaybeextendedorrestrictedby
referencetoothersectionsandtothegeneralpurviewofthestatute.Wherethemeaningofsweeping
generalwordsisindispute,anditisfoundthatsimilarexpressionsinotherpartsofthestatutehaveall
tobesubjectedtoaparticularlimitationorqualification,itisastrongargumentforsubjectingthe
expressionindisputetothesamelimitationorqualification.
Itissometimessaidthatwherethereisanirreconcilableinconsistencybetweentwoprovisionsinthe
samestatute,thelatterprevails;butthisisdoubtful,andthebetterviewappearsto.bethattheCourts
mustdeterminewhichistheleadingprovisionandwhichthesubordinateprovision,andwhichmust
givewaytotheother."
58.InthecaseofMahmoodKhanAchakzaivs.FederationofPakistanandothers(supra)his
lordshipMr.JusticeSajjadAliShahalsodealtwiththisissueinparagraphNo.27ofthejudgmentwhich
isreproducedasbelow:
27.IntheConstitutionof1973initsoriginalformArticle238providesforamendmentofthe
ConstitutionandArticle239laysdowntheprocedureforsuchamendmentandiscomposedofseven
clauses.Clause(7)providedthataBilltoamendthe"Constitutionwhichwouldhaveeffectofaltering
thelimitsofaProvincecouldnottiepassedbytheNationalAssemblyunlessapprovedbyresolutionof
ProvincialAssemblyofthatProvincebyvotesofnotlessthantwothirdsoftotalmembershipofthat
Assembly.ThisshowsanxietyoftheConstitutionmakersofthattimenottomakeiteasytoalterthe
limitsorboundariesofaProvinceunlessAssemblyofthatProvinceconsentedwithvotesofnotless
thantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipofthatAssembly.Thisanxietywasjustifiedintheaftermathof
lossofEastPakistan.Article239wasamendedbyP.O.No.20of1985andsubstitutedbyP.O.No.14of
1985whichareprotectedforvaliditybyConstitution(EighthAmendment)ActNo.XVIIIof1985.Apart
fromotheramendmentsinArticle239,themajoramendmentisinclause(6)whichissubstitutedby
freshprovisionprovidingthatforremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitation
whateveronthepowerofMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamendanyprovisionoftheConstitution.We
aregoingintothequestionofvalidityoftheConstitution(EighthAmendment)Act,1985,laterbutfor
thetimebeingitwouldsufficetosaythatfreedom,bestowedupontheparliamentinclause,(6)of
Article239afteramendmentdoesnotincludepowertoamendthoseprovisionsoftheConstitutionby
whichwouldbealteredsalientfeaturesoftheConstitution,namelyfederalism,ParliamentaryFormof
GovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Aslongasthesesalientfeaturesreflectedinthe
ObjectivesResolutionareretainedandnotalteredinsubstance,amendmentscanbemadeasper
procedureprescribedinArticle239oftheConstitution.
59.HowfarcanthejurisdictionandpoweroftheSupremeCourtbecurtailedandwheredoesthe
amendmentcurtailingsuchjurisdictionandpowerstandinviewofentryNo.55oftheFederal
LegislativeList,whichprovidesforenlargementandnotcurtailmentthereof,wasalsoaddressedinthe
caseofSheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,Justice
andParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(supra)inthefollowingwords:
TheperusaloftheabovequotedEntryNo.1indicatesthatnoneoftheitemsmentionedthereincan
justifythelegislationofastatuteforsettingupor~!,conveningtheMilitaryCourtsforthetrialof
civiliansforciviloffences.TheresiduaryEntryNo.59alsoquotedhereinaboveprovidingformatters
incidentalandancillarytoanymatterenumeratedintheabovepartcannotbetreatedasa,sourceof
powerconferringcompetencyontheLegislaturetolegislatetheimpugnedOrdinance.Itmaybepointed
outthatfactuallyEntryNo.55intheaboveFederalLegislativeListdealswiththesubjectofCourtsby
providingthat"JurisdictionandpowersofallCourts,excepttheSupremeCourt,withrespecttoanyof
themattersinthisListand,tosuchextentasisexpresslyauthorisedbyorundertheConstitution,the
enlargementofthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,andtheconferringthereonofsupplemental
powers.
TheaboveentryindicatesthattheParliamentcanlegislateinrespectofjurisdictionandpowerofall
CourtsexcepttheSupremeCourtwithrespecttoanyofthemattersintheaforesaidlistbuttosuch
extentasisexpresslyauthorisedbyorundertheConstitution.Italsoindicatesthatthejurisdictionof
theSupremeCourtcanbeenlargedbutitcannotbecurtailed.
60.InthecaseofIndiraNehruGandhi.Vs.RajNarain(supra),theSupremeCourtofIndiastruck
downclause4ofArticle329AoftheConstitutionofIndiaeveninthepresenceofclause4and5ofthe
Article368oftheConstitutionofIndiawhenfoundthatitviolatedtheprincipleoffreeandfair
elections,byholdingasunder:
210.Ithasbeenarguedinsupportoftheconstitutionalvalidityofclause(4)thatasaresultofthis
amendment,thevalidityofoneelectionhasbeenpreserved.Sincethebasicstructureofthe
Constitution,accordingtothesubmission,continuestobethesame,clause(4)cannotbesaidtobean
impermissiblepieceofconstitutionalamendment.Theargumenthasaseemingplausibilityaboutit,but
adeeperreflectionwouldshowthatitisvitiatedbyabasicfallacy.Lawnormallyconnotesaruleor
normwhichisofgeneralapplication.Itmayapplytoallthepersonsorclassofpersonsoreven
individualsofaparticulardescription.Lawprescribestheabstractprinciplesbytheapplicationofwhich
individualcasesaredecided.Law,however,isnotwhatBlackstonecalled"asentence".Accordingto
RoscoePound,law,asdistinguishedfromlaws,isthesystemofauthoritativematerialsforgroundingor
guidingjudicialandadministrativeactionrecognizedorestablishedinapoliticallyorganizedsociety(see
page106Jurisprudence,Vol.III).Lawisnotthesameasjudgment.Lawlaysdownthenorminabstract
termswithacoercivepowerandsanctionagainstthoseguiltyofviolatingthenorm,whilejudgment
representsthedecisionarrivedatbytheapplicationoflawtotheconcretefactsofacase.Constitutional
lawrelatestothevariousorgansofaState;itdealswiththestructureofthegovernment,theextentof
distributionofitspowersandthemodesandprinciplesofitsoperation.TheConstitutionofIndiaisso
detailedthatsomeofthematterswhichinabriefconstitutionlikethatoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica
aredealtwithbystatutesformthesubjectmatterofvariousArticlesofourConstitution.Thereis,
however,inaconstitutionallaw,asthereisintheveryideaoflaw,someelementofgeneralityor
generalapplication.Ifalsocarrieswithitaconceptofitsapplicabilityinfuturetosituationswhichmay
ariseinthatcontext.IfthereisamendmentofsomeprovisionoftheConstitutionandtheamendment
dealswithmatterswhichconstituteconstitutionallawinthenormallyacceptedsense,thecourtwhile
decidingthequestionofthevalidityoftheamendmentwouldhavetofindout,inviewofthemajority
opinioninKesavanandaBharatiscase(AIR1973SC1461)(supra),astowhethertheamendmentaffects
thebasicstructureoftheConstitution.TheConstitutionalamendmentcontainedinClause(4)with
whichweareconcernedinthepresentcaseis,however,ofanaltogetherdifferentnature.Itsavowed
objectistoconfervalidityontheelectionoftheappellanttotheLokSabhain1971afterthatelection
hadbeendeclaredtobevoidbytheHighCourtandanappealagainstthejudgmentoftheHighCourt
waspendingin.thisCourt.Inspiteofourquery,wewerenotreferredtoanyprecedentofasimilar
amendmentofanyConstitutionoftheworld.TheuniquenessoftheimpugnedConstitutional
amendmentwouldnot,however,affectitsvalidity.Iftheconstituentauthorityinitswisdomhaschosen
thevalidityofadisputedelectionasthesubjectmatterofaConstitutionalamendment,thisCourt
cannotgobehindthatwisdom.AllthatthisCourtisconcernedwithisthevalidityoftheamendment.I
neednotgointothequestionastowhethersuchamatter,inviewofthenormalconceptof
Constitutionallaw,canstrictlybethesubjectofaConstitutionalamendment.Ishallforthepurposeof
thiscaseassumethatsuchamattercanvalidlybethesubjectmatterofaConstitutionalamendment.
ThequestiontobedecidedisthatiftheimpugnedamendmentoftheConstitutionviolatesaprinciple
whichispartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,canitenjoyimmunityfromanattackonits
validitybecauseofthefactthatforthefuture,thebasicstructureoftheConstitutionremains
unaffected.Theanswertotheabovequestion,inmyopinion,shouldbeinthenegative.Whathastobe
seeninsuchamatteriswhethertheamendmentcontravenesorrunscountertoanimperativeruleor
postulatewhichisanintegralpartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Ifso,itwouldbean
impermissibleamendmentanditwouldmakenodifferencewhetheritrelatestoonecaseoralarge
numberofcases.IfanamendmentstrikingatthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisnotpermissible,it
wouldnotacquirevaliditybybeingrelatedonlytoonecase.Toaccedetotheargumentadvancedin
supportofthevalidityoftheamendmentwouldbetantamounttoholdingthateventhoughitisnot
permissibletochangethebasicstructureoftheConstitution,whenevertheauthorityconcerneddeems
itpropertomakesuchanamendment,itcandosoandcircumventthebartothemakingofsuchan
amendmentbyconfiningittoonecase.Whatisprohibitedcannotbecomepermissiblebecauseofits
beingconfinedtoonematter.
Twootherparagraphsrelevantinthisbehalfarealsousefulwhichreadasunder:
264.InHisHolinessKesawanandaBharatiSripadagalavaruv.StateofKerala(hereinafterreferredtoas
'Bharati'scase'),amajorityofsevenjudgesheldthatthepowerconferredunderArticle368ofthe
Constitutionwasnotabsolute.Theytooktheviewthat,byanamendment,thebasicstructureofthe
Constitutioncannotbedamagedordestroyed.And,astowhatarethebasicstructuresofthe
Constitution,illustrationshavebeengivenbyeachofthesejudges.Theyincludesupremacyofthe
Constitution,democraticrepublicanformofgovernment,secularcharacteroftheConstitution,
separationofpowersamongtheLegislature,ExecutiveandJudiciary,thefederalcharacterofthe
Constitution,ruleoflaw,equalityofstatusandofopportunity;justice,social,economicandpolitical;
unityandintegrityofthenationandthedignityoftheindividualsecuredbythevariousprovisionsofthe
Constitution.Therewasconsensusamongthesejudgesthatdemocracyisabasicstructureofthe
Constitution.Iproceedontheassumptionthatthelawaslaiddownbythemajorityinthatcaseshould
governthedecisionhere,althoughIdidnotsharetheviewofthemajority.
347.Ithinktheinhibitiontodestroyordamagethebasicstructurebyanamendmentofthe
ConstitutionflowsfromthelimitationonthepowerofamendmentunderArticle368readintoitbythe
majorityinBharati'scaseAIR1973SC1461becauseoftheirassumptionthattherearecertain
fundamentalfeaturesintheConstitutionwhichitsmakersintendedtoremainthereinperpetuity.ButI
donotfindanysuchinhibitionsofarasthepowerofparliamentorstatelegislaturestopasslawsis
concerned.Articles245and246givethepowerandalsoprovidethelimitationuponthepowerofthese
organstopasslaws.ItisonlythespecificprovisionsenactedintheConstitutionwhichcouldoperateas
limitationuponthatpower.Thepreamble,thoughapartoftheConstitution,isneitherasourceof
powernoralimitationuponthatpower.Thepreamblesetsouttheideologicalaspirationsofthepeople.
Theessentialfeaturesofthegreatconceptssetoutinthepreamblearedelineatedinthevarious
provisionsoftheConstitution.ItisthesespecificprovisionsinthebodyoftheConstitutionwhich
determinethetypeofdemocracywhichthefoundersofthatinstrumentestablished,thequalityand
natureofjustice,political,socialandeconomicwhichwastheirdesideratum,thecontentoflibertyof
thoughtandexpressionwhichtheyentrenchedinthatdocument,thescopeofequalityofstatusandof
opportunitywhichtheyenshrinedinit.ThesespecificprovisionsenactedintheConstitutionalonecan
determinethebasicstructureoftheConstitutionasestablished.Thesespecificprovisions,either
separatelyorincombinationdeterminethecontentofthegreatconceptssetoutinthepreamble.Itis
impossibletospinoutanyconcreteconceptofbasicstructureoutofthegossamerconceptssetoutin
thepreamble.ThespecificprovisionsoftheConstitutionarethestufffromwhichthebasicstructurehas
tobewoven.Theargumentofcounselfortherespondentproceededontheassumptionthatthereare
certainnormsforfreeandfairelectioninanidealdemocracyandthelawlaiddownbyparliamentor
statelegislaturesmustbetestedonthosenormsand,iffoundwanting,mustbestruckdown.Thenorms
ofelectionsetoutbyparliamentorstatelegislaturestestedinthelightoftheprovisionsofthe
Constitutionornecessaryimplicationstherefromconstitutethelawoftheland.Thatlawcannotbe
subjecttoanyothertest,likethetestoffreeandfairelectioninanidealdemocracy.
61.InthecaseofMinervaMillsLtd.Vs.UnionofIndia(AIR1980S.C.1789),theSupremeCourtof
Indiastruckdownclauses4and5ofArticle368oftheConstitutionofIndiawhenfoundthattheyturned
alimitedpoweroftheParliamentintoanabsolutepower,byholdingasunder:
SincetheConstitutionhadconferredalimitedamendingpowerontheParliament,theParliament
cannotundertheexerciseofthatlimitedpowerenlargethatverypowerintoanabsolutepower.
Indeed,alimitedamendingpowerisoneofthebasicfeaturesofourConstitutionandtherefore,the
limitationsonthatpowercannotbedestroyed.Inotherwords,Parliamentcannot,underArticle368,
expanditsamendingpowersoastoacquireforitselftherighttorepealorabrogatetheConstitutionor
todestroyitsbasicandessentialfeatures.Thedoneeofalimitedpowercannotbytheexerciseofthat
powerconvertthelimitedpowerintoanunlimitedone.
Thevery42ndAmendmentwhichintroducedclauses4and5inArticle368madeamendmentstothe
preambletowhichnoexceptioncanbetaken.Thoseamendmentsarenotonlywithintheframeworkof
theConstitutionbuttheygivevitalitytoitsphilosophytheyaffordstrengthandsuccortoitsfoundation.
Bytheaforesaidamendments,whatwasoriginallydescribedasa'SovereignDemocraticRepublic'
becamea"SovereignSocialistSecularDemocraticRepublic"andtheresolutiontopromotethe`unityof
theNation'waselevatedintoapromisetopromotethe"unityandintegrityoftheNation".These
amendmentsfurnishthemosteloquentexampleofhowtheamendingpowercanbeexercised
consistentlywiththecreedoftheConstitution.Theyofferpromiseofmore,theydonotscuttlea
preciousheritage.
Since,forthereasonsabovementioned,clause5ofArticle368,transgressesthelimitationsonthe
amendingpower,itmustbeheldtobeunconstitutional.
Thenewlyintroducedclause4ofArticle368mustsufferthesamefateasclause5becausethetwo
clausesareinterlinked.Clause5purportstoremovealllimitationsontheamendingpowerwhileclause
4deprivesthecourtsoftheirpowertocallinquestionanyamendmentoftheConstitution.Our
ConstitutionisfoundedonanicebalanceofpoweramongthethreewingsoftheState,namelythe
Executive,theLegislatureandtheJudiciary.ItisthefunctionoftheJudges,naytheirduty,topronounce
uponthevalidityoflaws.Ifcourtsaretotallydeprivedofthatpower,thefundamentalrightsconferred
uponthepeoplewillbecomeamereadornmentbecauserightswithoutremediesareaswritinwater.A
controlledConstitutionwillthenbecomeuncontrolled.Clause(4)ofArticle368totallydeprivesthe
citizensofoneofthemostvaluablemodesofredresswhichisguaranteedbyArticle32.Theconferment
oftherighttodestroytheidentityoftheConstitutioncoupledwiththeprovisionthatnocourtoflaw
shallpronounceuponthevalidityofsuchdestructionseemstousatransparentcaseoftransgressionof
thelimitationsontheamendingpower.
Ifaconstitutionalamendmentcannotbepronouncedtobeinvalidevenifitdestroysthebasicstructure
oftheConstitution,alawpassedinpursuanceofsuchanamendmentwillbebeyondthepaleofjudicial
reviewbecauseitwillreceivetheprotectionoftheconstitutionalamendmentwhichthecourtswillbe
powerlesstostrikedown.Article13oftheConstitutionwillthenbecomeadeadletterbecauseeven
ordinarylawswillescapethescrutinyofthecourtsonthegroundthattheyarepassedonthestrength
ofaconstitutionalamendmentwhichisnotopentochallenge.
Clause4ofArticle368isinonesenseanappendageofClause5,thoughwedonotliketodescribeitas
alogicalconsequenceofClause5.Ifitbetrue,asstatedinclause5,thattheParliamenthasunlimited
powertoamendtheConstitution,courtscanhavenojurisdictiontostrikedownanyconstitutional
amendmentasunconstitutional.Clause4,therefore,saysnothingmoreorlessthanwhatclause5
postulates.Ifclause5isbeyondtheamendingpoweroftheParliament,clause4mustbeequally
beyondthatpowerandmustbestruckdownassuch.
We,therefore,holdthatwehavejurisdictiontoexaminetheviresofanyamendmentinthe
Constitutionandannulit,ifitimpairs,underminesoraltersanyofthepartsformingbasicstructureof
theConstitutionandthatclauses5and6ofArticle239oftheConstitutioncannotcurtailsuchpower
andjurisdictionofthisCourt.
62.Nowwearetoseehowfardotheamendmentsunderchallengeimpingeuponthe
independenceofjudiciaryorimpairanyofthepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.The
firstinthesequenceisthe18thAmendment.ThelearnedASCchallengingitcouldnotpointout
anythingintheamendmentascouldeitherimpingeupontheindependenceofjudiciaryorimpairanyof
thepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,therefore,wedontthinkitmeritsannulment
onanyofthegroundsmentionedbythelearnedASCsforthepetitionersintheirargumentsaddressed
atthebar.
63.Thenextinthesequenceisthe21stAmendmentwhichreadsasunder:
Constitution(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,2015
PassedbytheNationalAssembly:January6,2015
PassedbytheSenate:January6,2015
PresidentialAssentReceived:January7,2015
AnActfurthertoamendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan;
trialofcertainoffencesrelativetoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainstPakistanand
preventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbytheterroristgroupsusingthenameofreligion
orasectandalsobythemembersofarmedgroups,wingsandmilitas;
byraisingofarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameofreligionorasect,orfromtheforeignandlocally
fundedantistateelements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristsgroupsincludinganysuchterroristsfightingwhile
representativesintheallpartiesconferencesheldinaftermathofthesadandterribleterroristattackon
theArmyPublicSchoolatPeshawaron16December2014topermanentlywipeoutanderadicate
terroristsfromPakistan,itisexpedienttoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothenecessarymeasures
takenhereunderintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan;
1.Shorttitleandcommencement:
(1)ThisActmaybecalledtheConstitution(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,2015.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisAmendmentActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthe
dateofitscommencementandshallceasetoformpartoftheConstitutionandshallstandrepealedon
theexpirationofthesaidperiod.
2.AmendmentofArticle175oftheConstitution:
IntheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan,hereinaftercalledtheConstitution,inArticle175,
inclause(3),forthefullstopattheendacolonshallbesubstitutedandthereafter,thefollowing
provisoshallbeinserted,namely:
religiousorpoliticalpartyregulatedunderthePoliticalPartiesOrder,2002."
3.AmendmentofFirstScheduleoftheConstitution:
IntheConstitution,intheFirstSchedule,insubpartIIIofPartI,afterentry5,thefollowingnewentries
shallbeadded,namely:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXXIXof1952).
64.Alookattheamendmentreproducedaboveshowsthatitinthefirstinstanceaddedprovisoto
Article175oftheConstitutionandthenthefollowingentriesafterSr.No.5:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXXIXof1952).
tosubpartIIIofpartIoftheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.HowfartheprovisoaddedtoArticle175
oftheConstitutionjustifiestrialofthepersonsundertheActslistedabove;whethertheexpression
specifiedinArticle8(3)(a)(b)(ii)couldbeextendedtoincludealawtobespecifiedinfutureand
whethersuchlawcanbeheldtobeimmunefrombeingdeclaredvoidintermsofClause(3)(a)(b)(ii)of
Article8arethequestionsunderlyingtheviresorotherwiseoftheamendmentinquestion.
65.Beforewedealwiththequestion,itisworthwhiletorefertoArticle175oftheConstitution
whichreadsasunder:
PartVII:TheJudicature
Chapter1:TheCourts.
175EstablishmentandJurisdictionofCourts.
(1)ThereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,aHighCourtforeachProvince[andaHighCourtfor
theIslamabadCapitalTerritory]andsuchothercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.
[Explanation.Unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,thewords"HighCourt"whereveroccurringinthe
Constitutionshallinclude"IslamabadHighCourt.]
(2)NocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionor
byorunderanylaw.
(3)TheJudiciaryshallbeseparatedprogressivelyfromtheExecutivewithin[fourteen]yearsfrom
thecommencingday.
[ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisArticleshallhavenoapplicationtothetrialofpersonsunderanyof
66.TheArticlereproducedabove,dealswithestablishmentoftheSupremeCourt,HighCourtsand
otherCourts,confermentofjurisdictionandrestraintonexerciseofjurisdictionnotconferredonthem.
ItisthisprovisionwhichensuresIndependenceofjudiciary,itsseparationfromtheexecutiveand
therebylaysbasisfortricotomyofpower.Itisthisprovisionwhichprovidesanimpenetrablebulwark
againstassumptionofpowerbytheexecutiveandthelegislatureoutsidetheirrespectivedomains.A
provisohasbeenaddedtotheaforesaidprovisionbytheConstitution(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,
2015whichseekstoexcludethelattersapplicationtothetrialofthepersonwhobelongstoany
terroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligionhereinaftercalledthepersonundertheActs
listedatSrl.No.6to9ofsubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstSchedulehereinaftercalledtheActs.Buthow
theCourtsconstitutedundertheActscantrythepersonwhennojurisdictionhasbeenconferredon
themintermsofArticle175oftheConstitution?HowcansuchCourtsbesaidtohavebeenfoundedin
theprovisionsoftheConstitutionwhentheprovisiondealingwiththeestablishmentofCourtsand
confermentofjurisdictionbytheConstitutionorbyorunderanylawhasbeenrenderednugatoryby
theadditionoftheprovisothereto?Doesthismeanthathenceforthanyforumbearingtheformor
pretenceofaCourtcantryanypersonanddecideanyliswithoutbeingestablishedandwithoutbeing
vestedwiththerequisitejurisdictionbytheConstitutionorbyorunderthelaw?Wherewillthe
independenceofjudiciaryandseparationofpowergowhentheexecutiveisagaindraggedintoshare
judicialpowerwiththeCourtsmentionedinArticle175and203oftheConstitutionofPakistan.Wont
theruleoflawinsuchastateofthingsbereducedtojustamythespeciallywhentheprovisionofthe
ConstitutionregulatingtheestablishmentofCourtsandconfermentofjurisdictionhasbeenputonthe
backburner?Isitnotananathemaandaffronttotheruleoflawandanoutrightdeparturefromthe
coursesetoutbythepreambleandmandatoryprovisionsoftheConstitution?Isitastepforwardora
giantstridebackwardandanattempttotaketheStatetowardslawlessnessinthegarbofamendments
inthelawandtheConstitution?IsitnotanattempttoturnademocraticStateintoamonarchyof
medievaltimes?Isitnotanattempttodestroywhatwehaveachievedthroughthecenturiesold
struggle?Arewenotliketheoldwomanwho,inthewordsofHolyQuran,labouredhardtospinayarn
andthenpulleditintopieces?TruethataccordingtothedictumrenderedinthecaseofMehramAli
andothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1998S.C.1445),noparallelJudicialSystem
couldbecreatedinviolationofArticle175,202and203oftheConstitution.Andaccordingtothe
dictumlaiddowninthecaseofSheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthrough
MinistryofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(supra),noCourtorTribunal
canlawfullysharejudicialpowerwiththeCourtsreferredtoinArticles175and203oftheConstitution
unlessfoundedontheprovisionsoftheConstitution.ButdoesthismeanthattheCourtsbefoundedby
nullifyingtheprovisionoftheConstitutionwhichisthebedrockoftheruleoflaw?IfCourtsareallowed
tobefoundedinderogationofArticle175oftheConstitutionthesuperstructuretogetherwiththe
infrastructureofruleoflawwouldinevitablycrumbleintoruins.Noamountofhumaneffortor
ingenuitywouldbeabletorepairandreerectthesame.ItwouldbeworsethanthefalloftheHumpty
Dumpty,asreferredtobyLordAtkininthecaseofLiversidge.Vs.Anderson(1942A.C.206),whereall
theKingshorsesandalltheKingsmencouldnotputHumptyDumptytogetheragain.We,therefore,
holdthatadditionoftheprovisotoArticle175oftheConstitutionexcludingitsapplicationtothetrialof
thepersonbytheCourtsundertheActsisagainstthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionandthedicta
ofthisCourtrenderedinthecasesofMehramAliandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanandothers
(supra)andSheikhLiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,
JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(supra)andthusnonest.
67.Beallthatasitmay,additionoftheActsmadeinsubpartIIIofpartIoftheFirstScheduleof
theConstitutionhasabsolutelynoeffectwhenthewordspecifiedusedinArticle8(3)(b)(ii)cannotbe
extendedtoincludealawtobespecifiedinfuture.TheargumentofthelearnedAttorneyGeneralwas
thatthewordspecifiedusedintheArticlewouldincludethelawtobespecifiedinfutureasdoesthe
wordspecifiedusedinpara3oftheFifthScheduleoftheConstitution.Butthisparallel,tosaythe
least,ismisconceivedonthefaceofitbecauseitisnotthewordspecifiedusedinthesaidparawhich
enablesthePresidenttoraisetheminimumormaximumamountofthepensionsospecified.Itis
indeedtheprovisotopara3oftheFifthSchedulewhichenablesthePresidenttoraisefromtimetotime
theminimumormaximumamountofthepensionsospecified.Theamountofthepensionremains
muchthesamesolongasitisnotraisedbythePresident.Therefore,itisnotcorrecttosaythatthe
wordspecifiedwouldincludethelawtobespecifiedinfutureunlessthewordstobespecifiedin
futureorthewordspermittingadditioninlinewiththeprovisotopara3oftheFifthSchedule,are
addedafterthewordspecified.WealsocannotreadinthetrialofthepersonundertheActsinsub
clause(ii)ofArticle8(3)(b)onthegroundofitsbeingrenderedredundant,whenithasbeenandisbeing
readvizavizthelawsspecifiedatSrl.No.4,5and6ofsubpartIIofpartIoftheSchedule.The
additionthusmadeintheScheduleoftheConstitutionbeingoutsidethescopeofthewordspecified
isofnoeffectwhatsoever.It,therefore,byvirtueoftheprovisioncontainedinArticle8(2),shallbevoid
abinitio.
68.AssumingthattheadditionofActsmentionedatSrl.No.6to9ofsubpartIIIofpartIofthe
FirstScheduleiscoveredbythewordspecifiedusedinArticle8(3)(b)(ii)oftheConstitution,itatits
bestmaymakeitimmunefrombeingdeclaredvoidintermsofArticle8(2)oftheConstitution,butitby
nomeansconfersjurisdictionforthetrialofthepersonontheCourtsconstitutedthereunder.We,
therefore,holdthatCourtsconstitutedundertheActsbeingcoramnonjudicecannottrytheperson
mentionedabove.
69.TheotherquestionsrequiringexaminationarethatwhenAntiTerrorismCourtsundertheAnti
TerrorismAct,1997andCourtsunderProtectionofPakistanAct2014arealreadyinplacewhat
necessitatedtrialofthepersonbytheCourtsconstitutedundertheActs;whatthisclassificationis
basedon,howfaritisreasonableandwhatnexusithaswiththepurposesoughttobeachieved;when
thepersoncouldbetriedbytheCourtsundertheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014whichcoversevery
conceivablecrime,whyshouldhebeclassifiedforthepurposeoftrialandpunishmentswiththe
personshavingnonexuswithhisclassandbackground;whatnexushehaswiththemembersofthe
ArmedForcesorPoliceorsuchotherForcesasarechargedwiththemaintenanceofpublicorderforthe
purposeofexercisingtheproperdischargeoftheirdutiesorthemaintenanceofdisciplineamongst
them;andwhyshouldhebedeprivedofthedueprocessoflawandfairtrialasisenvisagedbyArticle4,
8,9,10,and10AoftheConstitution?Whileansweringthequestions,thelearnedAttorneyGeneral
heavilyreliedonthecaseofBrig.(Retd).F.B.Aliandanotherv.TheState(supra)butitdoeslittleto
justifytheclassificationinquestion.ThereasonadvancedbyMr.KhalidAnwar,thelearnedSr.ASCfor
justifyingtheclassificationwasthatcriminaljusticesysteminplaceatthemomenthasfailedtodeliver
goodsasmanycriminalsdespitehavingbeenhookedwereletoffattheendofthedaywiththeresult
thateverypartofthecountryis,now,inthegripofterrorism.Alrightifcriminalshookedwereletoff
duetofaultoftheCourt,thereiseveryjustificationforthechangeoftheCourt.Butthisargument
standsbeliedbythedatacollectedinthisbehalfshowingthatletoffofthecriminalswasduetolackof
evidence,lackofproperinvestigationandlackofproperprosecution.Lackofevidenceisduetolackof
willonthepartofthewitnessestogiveevidence.Lackofwillonthepartofthewitnessesisduetolack
oftheirpropersecurity.Evenifawitnessmakesuphismindtogiveevidenceagainstanaccused,lackof
properinvestigationturnsouttobeacauseforhisletoff.Incasethewitnesshasawilltogiveevidence
andtheinvestigatingagencyhastheprowesstoinvestigatethecaseandunearththehandbehindthe
crime,lackofprosecutorialskillsleavesmanylacunasandloopholesinthecasewhichbecome
instrumentalinfailureofthecase.Themostshockingpartofthesubjectisthatneitherthepeoplehave
beenenlightenedaboutthesignificanceofdeposingtruthfullynorhavetheybeenempoweredto
protectthemselvesagainstthewrathofthecriminalstheydeposedagainst.InthecaseofSheikh
LiaquatHussainandothers.Vs.FederationofPakistanthroughMinistryofLaw,Justiceand
ParliamentaryAffairs,Islamabadandothers(supra),thisCourtbytakingstockofthesefactsheldas
under:
Imaypointoutthat,unfortunately,inourcountrywehaveaweakagencyfordetectionofcrimesand
aninefficientmachineryforprosecutionwhichareinteraliathecauseofdelayindisposalofcriminal
casesandhigherpercentageofacquittalorders.Nodoubt,thatdelayalsooccursindisposalofcriminal
casesonaccountoflapsesonthepartofsomeofthePresidingOfficers,butthemainreasonseemsto
beheavypendencywhichwarrantsincreaseinthestrengthoftheCourts.Wewillhavetostreamline
andmakemoreefficienttheagencyfordetectionofcrimes,themachineryforprosecutionandthe
CourtsinIordertohavebetterdeterrenteffectoncriminals.
70.Inthepastandevenatpresent,wehaveneverthoughtovertheproblemholistically.We
resortedtoshortcutsandpalliativesbuttheydonotprovideanenduringsolutiontotheproblem.We
eventhoughtaboutcompoundingthestandardsofproofbutittendstodomoreharmthangood.We,
thushavetomoveintherightdirection,lock,stockandbarrelbymakingupthedeficiencies,
empoweringandprotectingthewitnesses,equippingtheinvestigatingagencieswiththerequisite
expertiseandenhancingprosecutorialskillstomakeescapeofthecriminalsdifficultifnotimpossible.In
H.R.C.No.1Kof1992,wewhileexaminingthelawandordersituationprevailinginthecountry
observedasunder:
Alookatthepara6ofCMAandthereportreproducedaboveshowsthatthedepartmenthaswoken
upfromtheslumberandisouttodosomethingnotonlytofaceandbracetheproblemsbuttofind
remedialmeasurestherefor.Inanycasetheproblemshavenotbeenlookedatintheirtotality.Oneof
thereasonsthereforisthatitisnotthejobofonedepartment.Allthedepartmentsofthegovernment
includingpolicearetojointheirheadstogethertoworkoutaneffectivestrategytofindsolutiontothe
problems.OneoftheproblemshighlightedinCMAmentionedaboveisthatcomplainant,kidnapee,the
incident,nordotheydeposeagainsttheaccused,nordotheyfollowitupduringthephaseof
investigationortrial,witnesseseveniftheyarerelateddonotcomeforwardtoreportacaseagainstthe
accusedortofollowitup.Thecomplainant,kidnapeeandwitnessescanbeblamedanddamnedforit
butthisisnotallbecauseofthis.Asamatteroffactitisduetothefailureofthepolicetoprovidethem
necessaryprotection.Hadpoliceoperatedeffectivelyandassuredtheprotectionofthewitnessesthey
wouldhavebeenencouragedtodotheircivicaswellasreligiousdutiesofreportingthecrimeand
givingevidence.Anotherworrisomephenomenonisthatwitnessesorforthatmatterthepolice
considerthemselvestobeisolatedentitiesasbothofthemthinkthattheirdomainsareexclusiveand
havenobearingoneachother.CriminalProcedureCodewaspromulgatedin1898.Itdespitebeingold
andobsoletelawhasthetoolstocaterforthesituationwhichhaschangedagreatdealdueto
urbanizationandmassivemigrationsofthepopulationtothecities.Crime,duetolackofvigilance,has
increasedmanifold.Notonlythatitscommissionhasbecomemuchmoresophisticatedthanever
before.Butthepolicewhichweretheretocurbandcontrolitarestillinthe19thCentury.Theyhave
notequippedthemselvesorupdatedandrevampedtheirtechniquestotraceandtrackdownthecrime
andnabthepersonbehindthat.Giventhatwitnesseswhomusterupcouragetogiveevidencebefore
thepoliceagainstthecriminalcannotkeepitupduetofearoftheaccusedandmanyotherattending
factorsofsimilarilk.TheydonotturnupintheCourtstodepose.Incasetheydo,theyarepressurized
tomakeconcessionobligingtheaccusedorturnhostiletotheprosecution.Thissituationisnot
somethingneworunheardof.ThishasbeeninexistenceeversincethepromulgationoftheCode.But
thishasbeeneffectivelydealtwithbymakinguseofthetoolsprovidedbytheoldandobsoletelaw
underthesameCode.Policeinvestigatingthecaseusedtoproducethewitnessesforrecording
magisterialstatementsundersection164Cr.P.C.ifandwhentheyapprehendedthatthewitnesses
wouldresiletherefromorhavingbeensuccumbedtopressurewouldnotdeposeagainsttheperson
behindthecrime.Wedontunderstandwhythosetoolsarenotemployedtodaywhichwereemployed
adecadeorsobefore.VideoCamerascouldbeusedforpreservingthepolicestatementofthe
witnessesormagisterialstatementsofthewitnesses.Wherehasgonetheinventive,creative,and
ingeniousmindoftheinvestigatingagencieswhichcouldunearththecrimenotwithstandingthelawin
voguewastheonelegislatedandpromulgatedatthecloseof19thCentury.Complianceofprovisionof
section103Cr.P.C.isconsideredoneofthehurdlesinprovingrecoveryofincriminatingmaterial,
weaponofcrimeoranyotherdiscoverymadepursuanttotheinformationfurnishedbytheaccusedbut
weobservewithpainthatthishurdleisnomoreahurdleasjudgmentsofthisCourtwhicharegalore
haveruledthatstrictcompliancewithsection103isnotamust.
Whypolicearecharyofusingthelatestdevicesinpreservingtherecoveryofincriminatingmaterialor
discoveryintermsofArticle40ofQanooneShahadatOrder.WehavebeentoldthatForensic
Laboratorieshavebeenupdatedandthepersonsmanningthemaremenofcompetenceandintegrity.
Thisnewsmaybegladdeningandevenencouragingbutourexperienceatthebaraswellasbench
showsthatineverycriminalcaseresultsintheLaboratoriesaremaneuveredandmanipulatedbythose
havingrichesandresources.Inmanycaseswehavenoticedthatthepersongivingreportisnoteven
equippedtodothatinspiteofthefactthatquestionsoflifeanddeatharedecidedonthebasisofsuch
reports.Useoffingerprintstechnologyhasneverbeenseriouslythoughtaboutwhenevenchildren
watchingmoviesonT.V.commentifandwhenacriminalistrackeddownonsuchbasis.Installationof
videocamerasinalltheplaceswherecrimesarecommittedwithsickeningfrequencycoulddecrease
theirnumberifnotbringtoendtothatbutitisthoughttobeaforbiddentreewhoseeatingwillresult
intheousterofafewfromthefoolsparadisewhich,witheverypassingday,isturningtoaterriblehell.
WeareencouragedbythestatementofSSPInvestigation.Wewishitwereso.Evenwehaveassuredby
thelearnedAdditionalA.G.thatpolicehavebeendepoliticizedbutitappearstobeahoarsecryifnota
cryinthewilderness,becauseeventodaypolicepersonnelareposted,transferredandappointedon
thebiddingofthosewhowieldinfluenceintheloungesandcorridorsofpower.Wellthismayservethe
purposeofachosenfewbutthisistakingtheentiresocietywitharapidityhithertounknowntoa
catastropheifnotcompleteannihilation.IngoodolddaysanSHOoftheareacouldeffectivelyworkto
reachthehandcommittingthecrimebuttodaywewithallourmeansandresourcesandredoubtibility
ofthecivilsuperiorserviceareeitherinthelurchorinablindalleywhereneitherthevictimsnorthe
policeinvestigatingthecasecanmovebackandforthexceptthecriminalswhonotonlymovewith
unprecedentedagilitybutescapethelongarmoflaw.HistorysheetsmaintainedinthePoliceStation
werealsooneoftheeffectivetoolstokeepsurveillanceofthehabitual,hardened,dangerousand
desperatecriminalsbuttheytooarenotseentodayevenwithmicroscopiceye.Thegianttreeofthe
societyisdiseased.AfewmeasuressuggestedintheCMAorthereportoftheSSPInvestigationmay
tendtotreatitsleavesorafewofitsbranchesbutnotitstrunkandroots.Withthistreatmentwe
cannotcurethedisease.Thisproblemhastobethoughtclosely,criticallyandcomprehensivelybytaking
stockoftheentirespectrumofthecrimestartingfromcausetoeffect.Wewould,therefore,alsolike
theLawDepartmentoftheProvince,LawDepartmentoftheFederationandLaw&JusticeCommission
ofPakistantobeonboardandappriseusastowhathavetheydonesofartodealwiththeseaspectsof
thecaseandwhattheyhaveuptheirsleeves.
Weareatthethresholdofagoldenerabutunfortunatelyourwaytoprogressisblockedbythedragons
ofcrimeandterrorism.Asincereandwholeheartedefforttoslaythesedragonshastobemade.Wedo
notwanttodisposeofHRCsonthebasisofwhathasbeenstatedintheCMAandthereportofSSP
Investigation.Weimportwatches,allthearticlesofluxuriesincludingourtiesanddresses.Whydont
weimporttechnicalknowhowtomeetthecrimedespitethefactthatourcivilsuperiorservicehas
beentrainedalongsidethelineoftheservicestructureoftheU.K,.WewoulddirectMr.QasimMeer
Jat,Addl.A.G.,NaeemSheikh,SSP.,MalikAltaf,S.P.Dr.MazakAliShah,AIG.andJanMuhammad,SHO
DumbaGhoat,theofficerspresentintheCourttogivetheirinputastowhathavetheythoughtwithall
theirexperience,expertiseandingenuitytodealwiththeseproblems.IssuenoticestoLawDepartment
oftheProvince,HomeDepartmentsoftheProvince,LawDepartmentoftheFederationandLaw&
JusticeCommissionofPakistantoapprisetheCourtastohowmaladministrationinthepoliceandLaw
Departmentcanbeeliminatedandwhatstepscouldbetakentoweedoutnotonlythecriminalsbut
criminalpsycheandcriminalstateofmind.Letusthinktocomeoutofadhocism,letusdoawaywith
myopicandcockeyedapproachwhichhasnotyieldedanyfruitthusfar.
71.Letsseehowdoesthesystemweshirkandshrinkfromdealwithasituationwhere
enforcementofrightsorliabilitiesinanyformcannotbethoughtaboutwithoutevidence.TheHoly
Quran,whichisthefountainofthesystem,enjoinsinclearandcategoricaltermswhenitsays:
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Othosewhobelieve,beupholdersofjusticewitnessesforAllah,eventhoughagainst(theinterestof)
yourselvesortheparents,andthekinsmen.Onemayberichorpoor,Allahisbettercaretakerofboth.
Sodonotfollowdesires,lestyoushouldserve.Andifyoutwistoravoid(theevidence),then,Allahisall
awareofwhatyoudo.
(4:135)
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????
Oyouwhohavebelieved,bepersistentlystandingfirmforAllah,witnessesinjustice,anddonotletthe
hatredofapeoplepreventyoufrombeingjust.Bejust;thatisnearertorighteousness.AndfearAllah;
indeed,AllahisAcquaintedwithwhatyoudo.
(5:8)
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Thatismostsuitable:thattheymaygivetheevidenceinitstruenatureandshape,orelsetheywould
fearthatotheroathswouldbetakenaftertheiroaths.ButfearAllah,andlisten:forAllahguidesnota
rebelliouspeople.
(5:108)
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Anddonotconfoundtruthbyoverlayingitwithfalsehood,norknowinglyconcealthetruth.
(2:42)
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????

Indeed,Allahcommandsyoutorendertruststowhomtheyaredueandwhenyoujudgebetween
peopletojudgewithjustice.ExcellentisthatwhichAllahinstructsyou.Indeed,AllahiseverHearingand
Seeing.(4:58)
72.Thesystemwhichissostrongandstringentinthemattersofgivingevidenceanddispensing
justicebetweenthepartiesatdisputehastostaysuperiorintheaffairsoftheState.Itsworthshould
notbedilutedonthebiddingofthosewhoopposeitonthebasisoftheirprejudicesorpreconceived
notions.Itisalsoalessonfromthissystemwhichdeclaresthat:
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Anyoneslewapersonunlessitbeformurderorforspreadingmischiefinthelanditwouldbeasif
heslewthewholepeople:Andifanyonesavedalife,itwouldbeasifhesavedthelifeofthewhole
people.
(5:32)
Forceofanymagnitudehasnoplaceinthissystemasitinvitesthepeopletoitsfoldnotbyforcebut
wisdomandbeautifulpreachingasisenjoinedbytheHolyQuran:
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????
Invite(all)totheWayofthyLordwithwisdomandbeautifulpreaching;andarguewiththem.Inways
thatarebestandmostgracious:ForthyLordknowethbest,whohavestrayedfromhisPath
(16:125)
HowdoestheHolyBookkeepaneyeoncreatingequilibriumineverysphereoflifecanwellbe
seenfromtheversereadingasunder:
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Allahcommandsjustice,thedoingofgood,andliberalitytokithandkin,andheforbidsallshameful
deeds,andinjusticeandrebellion.Heinstructsyouthatyemayreceiveadmonition.
(16:90)
Howtheweakistobedealtwithagainstthestrongandviceversahavebeenbeautifullyportrayedby
theFirstCaliphofIslaminhisfirstspeech.Therelevantpartofthespeechdeservesverbatim
reproductionwhichreadsasunder:
Opeople,IhavebeenputinchargeofyouraffairsthoughIamnotthebestamongyou.SoifIdogood
assistme.IfIgowrongresistandrectifyme.Standingbytruthisatrustandslidingtowardfalsehoodis
abreachoftrust.
TheweakamongyouisstronginmyestimationuntilIrestoretohimhisdueandthestrongamongyou
isweakinmysightuntilIretrievebythewillofAllahwhatheusurped.
NocommunityabandonsjihadinthecauseofAllahwithoutbeingvisiteduponbyhumiliationasa
DivineRetribution;andifobscenityprevailsamongsomepeople,thentheyareenvelopedbyAllahinan
allpervasiveadversity.
FollowmesolongasIobeyAllahandHisProphet.IfIdisobeyAllahandHisProphet,thenyouare
absolvedofyourobligationtofollowme.
73.BringusbooksfromAngloSaxon,English,Americanoranyotherjurisprudenceoftheworld,
showingsoclearacomprehensionoftheaffairsoftheStateingeneralandadministrationofjusticein
particular,ashasbeenportrayedabove.ThosewhoopposedObjectivesResolutionneitherreadthe
principlesincorporatedthereinnorthesystemtheyhavebeenculledfrom.Theiroppositiontothe
systemisnothingbutanoppositionforthesakeofopposition.Attimes,thenameofIslamhasbeen
misusedbyafewbigoted,semilearnedandpseudoscholarsbutforthattheyandnotthesystembe
blamed.Therefore,thecritiqueofMs.AsmaJehangirbeingmorepedanticthanscholarly,hasleftus
unmoved.
74.Whattypeofpolitywassoughttobeestablishedbythevisionariesandfoundingfathersofthis
country;werethefeudallordstoholdtheirswayoverthelandsandindustrialistsovertheirindustries;
wastherichtogrowricherintheRepublicestablishedinthenameofIslam;isreligion,assaidbyKarl
Marx,anopiumwhichmakesthepeopleinsensibleandpersuadesthemtoresigntotheirunhappylot
orisit,assaidbyProfessorWhitehead,asystemofgeneraltruthshavingtheeffectoftransforming
characterifvividlyapprehendedandsincerelyactedupon;isIslamupholderofcapitalisticeconomyor
egalitarianorderwhereeachworksaccordingtohiscapacityandgetsaccordingtohisneeds;whatis
theschemeoftheDivineBookandwhatpatternhasbeenprojectedbythelifeoftheProphet(PBUH),
aretheissueswhichhadallalongbeeninthemindsofthevisionariesandfoundingfathersofthe
country.Dr.MuhammadIqbalinoneofhislettersaddressedtoSirFrancisYounghusbandwrote:
SinceBolshevismplusGodisalmostidenticalwithIslam,Ishouldnotbesurprisedif,inthecourseof
time,eitherIslamwoulddevourRussiaorRussiaIslam.Theresultwilldepend,Ithink,toaconsiderable
extentonthepositionwhichisgiventotheIndianMuslimsunderthenewconstitution.
HeonmanyoccasionshighlightedthatMuslimleadershipshouldnotbeobliviousoftheegalitarian
aspectofIslamwhichatnostageinthehistoryrecognizedunrestrictedownershipofmeansof
production.HehavingbeeninspiredbytheHolyQuranandthelifeofProphet(PBUH)ardently
professedestablishmentofanegalitariansocietyasisevidentfromhisletterdated28thMay,1937
addressedtoJinnahwhichhasalreadybeenreproducedabove.Healsohighlightedthisaspectinhis
versesreadingasfollows:
(FromwontandwaysofnationsallthesefactssoclearwitheaseIlearn,
TheRussiansseemtobeinhastetogainthegoalforwhichtheyyearn.)
(Theworldisredtipwiththemodesthataren'tinvogueandareoutworn;
Myintellect,thatwastameandmildmuchpertandinsolenthasgrown.)
(Thesemysterieswhichthegreedofmanhadkeptinveilsofstuffsocoarse
Arestepbystepemergingnowandcomingforthbydintofforce.)
(OMuslim,divedeepintheBook,WhichwasrevealedtoProphets'Seal;
MayGod,bygraceonyoubestowpoliteness,forgooddeedsmuchzeal!)
(Thefactconcealedinwordssofar,spendwhatissurplusandisspare,"
Maycometolightinmodernageandmakethemeaningsclearandbare.)
(ZarbeKaleem151)SiasiyateMashriqoMaghribIshtarakiat
Theownerofthefactoryisauselessman.
Heisverypleasureloving,hardworkdoesnotsuithim
GodscommandisLaisalilInsaniIllaMaSaa.
Fruitoflaborersworkshouldnotbeusurpedbythecapitalist
(BangeDra197)
It,asamatteroffact,isthedutyoftheIslamicStatetoprovidemeansofsustenancetoitscitizens.The
HolyQurangivesguaranteeinthisbehalfinthewordsasfollows:
???????????????????????????????
Wewillprovideforyouandyourchildren.
(6:151)
Eventhebelieversarenotonlysupposedtopartwithwhatissurplusbutaredutyboundtoreachoutto
theneedytogivehisduewhetherheasksforitornotasisenjoinedbytheversesreadingasunder:
Theyasktheehowmuchtheyaretospend;Say:Whatisbeyondyourneeds."ThusdothAllahMake
cleartoyouHisSigns:Inorderthatyemayconsider
(2:219)
???????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
NotsothosedevotedtoPrayer;Thosewhoremainsteadfasttotheirprayer;Andthoseinwhose
wealthisarecognizedright.Forthe(needy)whoasksandhimwhoisprevented(forsomereasonfrom
asking);
(70:22,23,24,25)
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????

BynomeansshallyeattainrighteousnessunlessYegive(freely)orthatWhichyelove;andwhatever
Yegive,ofatruthAllahknowethitwell.
(3:92)
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????
AndtherearethosewhoburygoldandsilverandspenditnotinthewayofAllah:announceuntothem
amostgrievouspenalty.
(9:34)
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
TheypreferothersbeforethemselvesthoughtheythemselvesareinaStateofpoverty.And
whosoeverarepreservedfromtheirowngreedsucharetheonesthatwillprosper.
(59:9)
SeehowtheDivineBookaimsatmaintainingbalancebystirringeffortatStateaswellasindividual
level.Thesystemthusoperatingwouldessentiallybeclosetoandevenaheadofcommunisticeconomy.
75.TheFounderofthenationinhisspeechdeliveredon26thMarch,1948alsopointedto
thesocialorderheintendedtoestablishinthenewlyfoundedhomelandwhenhesaid:
YouareonlyvoicingmysentimentsandthesentimentsofmillionsofMussalmanswhenyousaythat
PakistanshouldbebasedonsurefoundationsofsocialjusticeandIslamicsocialism,which,emphasiss
equalityandbrotherhoodofman.Similarlyyouarevoicingmythoughtsinaskingandinaspiringfor
equalopportunitiesforall.
76.QuaideMillatLiaqatAliKhanalsoreiteratedthesamethemeinAugust1949bysaying:
Thereareanumberofissuesbeingtalkedaboutnowadays.Butweareconvincedthatforusthereis
onlyoneissue,namely,Islamicsocialismwhich,inanutshell,meansthateverypersoninthislandhas
equalrightstobeprovidedwithfood,shelter,clothing,educationandmedicalfacilities.
ProfessorArnoldToynbeeinhiscelebratedtreatiseonCivilizationonTrial(Chapter2,Page21)
whilehighlightingthisaspectofIslamobservedasunder:
Centuriesbeforecommunismwasheardof,ourancestorsfoundtheirbugbearinIslam.Aslateasthe
16thcentury,Islaminspiredthesamehysteriainthewesternheartsascommunisminthe20thcentury.
Likecommunism,itwieldedaswordofthespirit,againstwhichtherewasnodefenceinmaterial
armaments.
We,therefore,donotagreewithMr.KhalidAnwarthatArticle3projectssocialisticratherthan
Islamicpolity,forthesolereasonthatitslatterpartisareplicaofArticle12oftheConstitutionofUSSR,
1936.
77.Havingthusconsideredwhathasbeenaddressedatthebarandlaiddowninthecases
citedbeforeus,weholdthat:

i)Wehavejurisdictiontoexaminetheviresofanyamendmentandannulitifitimpairs,
underminesoraltersanyofthepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution;
ii)ThereisnothingintheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act,2010ascould
impair,undermine,oralteranyofthepartsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,therefore,
thepetitionsquestioningitsviresbeingdevoidofmeritaredismissed.
iii)MereinsertionoftheprovisotoArticle175,excludingitsapplicationtothetrialofthe
personbytheCourtsconstitutedundertheActslistedatSrl.No.6to9insubpartIIIofpartIofthe
FirstScheduleoftheConstitution,cannotconferjurisdictiononthemnorcanthewordspecifiedused
inArticle8(3)(a)(b)(ii)beextendedtoincludethesaidActsintheSchedule;
iv)TheConstitution(TwentyFirstAmendment)Act,2015impairing,underminingandalteringthe
partsformingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutionisultraviresandthusnonest;and
v)ThatoncetheamendmentintheConstitutionenablingamendmentintheActsis
declaredultraviresandnonest,thelatterautomaticallybecomesultraviresandnonest.
We,therefore,allowtheConstitutionPetitionsinthetermsmentionedabove.
Sd/
(EjazAfzalKhan)
Judge
Sd/
(IjazAhmedChaudhry)
Judge
DostMuhammadKhan,J.Throughthesepetitions,thepetitioners,includingthepremierbarcouncils
andbarassociationsofPakistanhavechallengedtheConstitution(18thAmendment)Act,2010andthe
Constitution(21stAmendment)Act,2015alongwiththeamendmentsmadeinthePakistanArmyAct,
1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961.
TheCreationofPakistan:
2.Onehasessentiallytolookbackatthehistoricalstruggle,whichwaslaunchedbyour
forefathers,ingainingindependencefromtheBritishRuleofcolonizationandtogetanindependent
sovereignStatefromtheoverwhelming,dominatingreligiousmajorityofSubContinent.
3.Enslavedandsubjectedtotyrannicalrule,byouralienmasters,theMuslimsofSub
Continentlaunchedacrusadetoachievethenoblecause.ThedreamofnoblepoetDr.Allama
MuhammadIqbalcouldnothavebeenachieved,ifthedynamicleadershipofQuaideAzam,who
foughtthebattleforindependence,notwiththegunsorfireballsofcannons,ratherwithmassive
supportoftheMuslimsoftheSubContinent,thepowerfultool,heutilizedsuccessfully,hadnotbeen
there.
4.Beforepartition,thevariousspeechesofQuaideAzamwouldshowthat,hein
unequivocalwordsanddeclarations,championedthebasichumanrights.Thegistofhisspeechesis
reproducedbelow:
WeneedanindependentandsovereignState,tobebasedonIslamicideologyandreligioustolerance,
particularlyoffaith,dignityofman,ensuringsocialjustice,principleofdemocracy,freedomofworship
andbeliefsofmajorityandminoritiesboth,ruleoflaw,sanctityofhomes,equalityofmankind,equal
treatmentofeachbeforelaw,protectionoflife,libertyandpropertyrightsandwherestrictdemocratic
principlesshallbeobserved.
ThecrusadelaunchedbytheMuslims,undertheleadershipofQuaideAzam,resultedincreationofthe
sovereignStateofPakistanon14thAugust,1947.Theuntoldstoryofsacrifices,renderedbythe
Muslims,shallalwaysbekeptinmind,whilemakingstruggleforestablishingegalitariansociety
CONSTITUTIONMAKING
5.AfterhavingbeenelectedthePresidentofthefirstConstituentAssembly,onAugust
11,1947,inthenextdayssessionaCommitteeformakingtheConstitutionwasconstituted,followed
bytwoSubCommittees.Thefirstwasassignedthetaskofsubmittingreportonfundamentalrightsof
thecitizens,tobemadethebasesoftheConstitution,whilethesecondCommitteewasgivenmandate
tosubmitrecommendations,protectingrightsoftheminorities.Unfortunately,whenthisimportant
processwasunderway,QuaideAzamleftusandhissouldepartedforheavenlyabode.However,
beforethat,hepreciselyandconciselyprovidedguidancetotheCommitteesaboutthebasic
features/structureofourFirstConstitution,tobeenacted.
OBJECTIVESRESOLUTION:
6.InthefifthsessionoftheConstituentAssembly,Mr.LiaquatAliKhan(late),movedthe
ObjectivesResolution.TheHeadNotethereofisreproducedbelow:
Mr.President,Sir,IbegtomovethefollowingObjectivesResolution,embodyingthemainprinciple,on
whichtheConstitutionistobebased.
Itwasbasedontencommands,reflectingaspirationsandwillofthepeople,whorenderedgreat
sacrificesforthesovereignStateofPakistan.Afterfewdaysdebate,thesamewasadoptedby
overwhelmingmajority.Oneofthecommandscontainedthereiniscitedbelow:
Wherein,theindependenceofthejudiciaryshallbefullysecured.
Mr.LiaquatAliKhan(late)inhisspeech,ontheFloorofConstituentAssembly,emphaticallystatedthat:
Heconsideredthistobethemostimportantoccasioninlifeofthiscountry,nextinimportancetothe
achievementofindependencebecausebyachievingthatweonlywonanopportunityofbuildingupa
countryanditspolityinaccordancewithourideals.Headded,bysaying,Iwouldliketoremindthe
HousethatfoundingfatherofthenationQuaideAzamexpressedthesefeelingsanddesireditatso
manyoccasionsandhisviewswereendorsedbythenationinunmistakableterms.
UltimatelythesovereignStateofPakistangottheFirstConstitutionin1956,thebasicfeaturesofwhich
were,thatthePreambletheretowasbasedentirelyontheObjectivesResolution,earlieradopted.
CONSTITUTIONALCRISES:
7.TothegreatmisfortuneoftheNation,Mr.SikandarMirza(late)theGovernorGeneral
oftheday,withoutjustcauseabrogatedtheFirstConstitutionof1956andproclaimedMartialLaw
withinthenextfewdaysthroughoutthecountry.However,withinnotime,hewasremovedfromthe
powercorridorsbythethenDictator,whoruledthecountrywithoutConstitutionforfiveyearsandin
theyear1962,hegotenactedhisselfstyledConstitution.Thefundamentalrightsofthepeoplewere
placedunderclog.Albeitthesameweresubsequentlyconcededtoonthereportofselectcommittee
butwerenotjusticiabletobeenforcedthroughindependentJudiciary.Hisdictatorialrulecametoan
endwhenagitation,ortosayarevoltofthepeoplewasatthepeak,however,againsttheprovisionsof
hisownConstitution,insteadofhandingoverpowerstotheSpeakerofNationalAssembly,thesame
wereunconstitutionallygiventothenextDictator.
ELECTIONOF1970ANDREVOLTINEASTPAKISTAN:
8.Afterlivingasuffocatedlifeunderlongdictatorialrule,thepeopleofEastPakistanin
particularandalsoinWestPakistaningeneral,intheGeneralElectionsheldin1970gaveasplit
mandate.ThemanifestobasedonSixPointsofAwamiLeagueheadedbySh.MujeeburRehman(late)
wasthesolereason,winningtheoverwhelmingmajorityinEastPakistan(nowBangladesh),whileinthe
thenWestPakistan,thePakistanPeoplesParty(PPP),freshlyfounded,headedbyMr.ZulfiqarAli
Bhutto(late)gotthemajority.WhenalleffortsofreconciliationfailedasSh.MujeeburRehman(late)
wasnotreadytoconcedeontheSixPointsagenda,theDictatorofthedayunlawfullyrefusedto
summontheSessionoftheAssembly.
DACCAFALL:
9.Duetothestatusquo,aseparatistmovementwaslaunchedinEastPakistan
(Bangladesh).Tosuppressit,Militaryoperationwaslaunched,however,duetoinvolvementofthe
neighbouringcountry,thesameturnedintofullfledgedwar.OnDecember16,1971theshockingand
infamousincidentofFallofDaccatookplaceandthepeopleofEastPakistandeclaredanindependent
State(Bangladesh).
INTERIMCONSTITUTIONOF1972:
10.Confrontedwithunmanageablegraveemergency,thethenDictatorhandedover
powertoMr.ZulfiqarAliBhutto(late),whobecamethePresidentoftheremainingPakistan(West
Wing).Heafterdueconsultation,gavetheinterimConstitutionof1972butwiththesamePreamble,the
integralpartof1956Constitution.Atthesametime,aConstitutionMakingCommittee,consistingof
eminentlegalbrains/luminariesandpoliticiansofhighstatureandmaturity,wasconstituted.The
CommitteeworkedonthecontoursofthenewConstitutionformanymonths.
CONSTITUTIONOF1973:
11.TheParliamentofthattimewasconsistingofSocialists(PPP),Seculars(ANP)and
Fundamentalists/Religiousparties,however,thenationsdestinywasinsafehandstherefore,allthe
threeforcesintheParliamentconcededconsiderablyontheirstandpoints,asaresult,the1973
Constitutionwasunanimouslyadoptedon10thApril,1973anditcameintoforceon14thAugust,1973.
ThePreamble,withoneamendment,almostthereproductionoftheObjectivesResolution,wasmade
themasterkeyforthenewConstitution.
12.ThenewConstitutionsuccessfullywithstoodtheruthlessonslaughtsofthetwo
successiveDictators,however,someofitsprovisionsweredistortedbythemandsomenewwere
insertedtherein.BoththeDictators,whilehandingpowerstotheelectedGovernments,firstgot
validationforalloftheirunconstitutionalactstoavoidprosecutionforthecrimeofhightreason,
providedinArticle6oftheConstitution.
ATTACKSONDEMOCRACY/
LEGALORDERUNDERARTICLE58(2)(B):
13.WhensecondtothelastDictatormetunnaturalandmysteriousdeathinanaircrash,
GeneralElectionswereheld,however,successiveelectedGovernmentswereshortlivedasthe
PresidentspressedintoservicelethaldeviceofArticle58(2)(b),dismissingthoseGovernmentsand
dissolvingtheAssemblies,whileonewasdismissedearlierbytheDictatorin1988.Forthesereasons
democraticpolitycouldnotachievematuritywiththerequiredvirtuesandvalues.Ifthedemocratic
processwasallowedtoflourish,likeintheneighbouringcountrywhichgotindependence
simultaneouslywithPakistan,thenewgenerationcouldbreatheinawelfarestateandnotasecurity
state.
ADVERSEEFFECTSONRULEOFLAW,
CONSTITUTIONALCRISES:
14.Theruleoflaw,theconstitutionalityandproperlegalorderattheveryinception
receivedamajorsetback,whenruleofgunsandcannonswaspreferredovertheruleoflawbythethen
learnedChiefJusticeoftheFederalCourtonthefallaciouspremiseofeffectivenessofthesocallednew
legalorder(MartialLaw)of1958andhisselfassumedsubordinationofthepeopletothenewlegal
order.This,IamsayingwithallhumilityandreverencetothelearnedChiefJustice,ashisviewhasnot
beenacknowledgedoracceptedbythelegalfraternityandthesocietyatlargeratherithasbeenthe
subjectofcriticism.
15.Themostsublimeviewwasrenderedinthesamecase,FederationofPakistanVs.
MaulviTameezudDin(PLD1955FC435)byHonbleMr.JusticeCornelius(J.).Hislordshipmade
struggleandsacrificesrenderedforindependence,bytheMuslimsofSubContinent,thebaselinefor
reachingatadifferentconclusion.
16.InthecaseoftheStatevs.Doso(PLD1958SC533)theillfamedKelsentheory,
doctrineofnecessitywasintroduced,whichwasnotapprovedrathercriticizedbytheoverwhelming
majorityofjuristsandsuperiorCourtsofallcivilizednations.Thiswastheerawheretheruleoflaw
begantoerodeandwasrenderedsubsidiaryandsubordinatetothelawofruleofdictatorialregime.
17.InthecaseofMissAsmaJilaniv.theGovernmentofthePunjab(PLD1972SC139)this
infamousandunjustdoctrineofnecessitywasburiedhowever,itwasreborninBegumNusratBhuttov.
ChiefofArmyStaffandFederationofPakistan(PLD1977SC657)andlastlyinthecaseofSyedZafarAli
Shahv.GeneralPervezMusharraf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistan(PLD2000SC869),however,ithasnow
beenpermanentlyburied,bythisCourtinthefamousdictagiveninthecaseofSindhHighCourtBar
Associationv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2009SC879).Inviewofthisjudgment,drasticamendments
weremadeinthecodeofconductofJudgesoftheSuperiorCourts,almostthereproductionofArticle6
oftheConstitution.Thus,itismyfirmbeliefthatonnofutureoccasion,thisdetestabledoctrinewould
bereinventedorreappliedunderanycircumstance,bytheSuperiorJudiciary.
18.HavingsaidmuchabouttheroleoftheJudiciaryduringtheperiodofconstitutional
crises,thenegativeroleofthepoliticians,whomadetheirwaytotheParliamentwiththeblessingsof
eachsuccessiveDictator,cannotbeoverlooked.Probablyitwasthatsupportofsocalledpoliticians,
whichconstrainedtheJudiciaryatdifferentoccasions,toactonthedoctrineofnecessity.Inmyhumble
view,thisshouldnotprovidealicenseofexonerationtoanyone.
EMERGENCYRULEOf1999:
19.ThelastDictator,actingincontemptofhisswornoath,causingirreparableharmtothe
aspirationsandresolveofthepeopletolivealifeofdignityinademocraticpolity,fullyenjoyingthe
fundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution,toppledtheelectedgovernmentin1999;prolonged
hisdictatorialrulethroughunconstitutionalmeansandwhengeneralelectionswereheldintheyear,
2002,healsousedthesameoldcontrivedstrategyandgotvalidatedallhisillegalandunconstitutional
actsfromthenewParliamenttoavoidprosecutionunderArticle6oftheConstitution.Heretaineddual
positionofpowerasaPresidentofPakistan,whilewearingtheArmyuniform,retainingtheslotofChief
ofArmyStaff.Hiswishforpowerdidnotendordiminishashedecidedtocontestelectionsforthe
Presidentialslotwhile,wearingmilitaryuniform.Whenhiseligibility,asacandidatefortheslotwas
challengedbeforethisCourtandthecasewaspendingadjudication,perceivingunfavorabledecision,he
againinutterdisregardoftheConstitution,imposedEmergencyPlus(MartialLaw)however,thistime,it
wasfocusedontheSuperiorJudiciaryforwhomnewoathofofficewasprescribed,however,mostof
theJudgesoftheSuperiorCourtsrefusedtotakethisnewoathwhichwasviolativeoftheConstitution.
Thus,theywereunlawfullyremovedandwereputinsolitaryconfinementtilltheEmergencywaslifted
andthenewdemocraticgovernmentliftedtheban.
20.Confrontingtheruthlessdictatorialrule,formorethanthreedecades,this
unconstitutionaleventgaveanewdimensiontothepeopleswill.Thelegalfraternityspearheadedthe
movementagainsttheDictator,stronglysupportedbythecivilsociety,themediaandthepolitical
parties,ultimately,hewasshownthedoorandafterashortintervalthesackedindependentJudiciary
wasrestored.
21.Asreferredto,intheprecedingparainSindhHighCourtBarcase(supra),aFullCourt
BenchofSupremeCourtdeclaredtheactofthethenDictatorofNovember3,2007,asunconstitutional
alongwithsomeotherorders.Duetowrongpolicies,bothoninternalandexternalfronts,adopted
duringtheconstitutionalcrises,notonlythesovereigntyoftheStatewascompromisedatmany
occasionsbuttheStateitselfwasplungedintodeepestcrisesoflawandorderandofeconomy,the
nationisnowconfrontedwithtoday.
Albeit,tosomeextent,theabovehistoryofnationallegalorderofthepastandundemocratic
policies,appeartobepoliticalquestions,however,insubstancethesearelegalandconstitutional
questions,asallthesedictatorialrulesandunconstitutionaladventures,haveinflictedablowonthe
nationallegalorder,basedoninstrumentality/constitutionalismandwhyitisthoughtnecessarytolook
atthesame.
CONSTITUTIONAL18TH,19THAND21STAMENDMENTS/
EFFECTSONFUNDAMENTALRIGHTSANDINDEPENDENCEOFJUDICIARY:
22.IntheGeneralElections,2008,onepoliticalpartygotaslimmajorityintheParliament
andformedthegovernment.ItconstitutedaConstitutionReformsCommittee,headedbythepresent
ChairmanoftheSenateofPakistan.Thecommitteetabledthepackageofconstitutionalamendments
beforetheParliamenthowever,Iwillrestrictmydiscussionandultimateconclusionstotheinsertionof
Article175Aunder18thand19thConstitutionalAmendmentsandalsothe21stConstitutional
Amendment,whichhasconsiderablydisturbedthelegalfoundationsoftheConstitutioninparticular
andthepeopleofPakistaningeneral.
JUDICIALCOMMISSION:
23.UnderthenewArticle[175A]aJudicialCommission,tobechairedbytheChiefJustice
ofPakistanwasconstitutedhowever,theExecutivei.e.theLawMinisters,theAttorneyGeneralfor
Pakistanweremadeitsmemberswitharightofvote.Ontheotherhand,aParliamentaryCommittee,
consistingofeightmembers,fourfromtheTreasuryBenches,nominatedbytheChiefExecutiveand
fourfromtheOpposition,wasconstituted.IntheunamendedArticle175A,itwasgivenvetopowersto
superimposeitsowndecisionoverthatoftheCommission,byrejectingitsnomination.Inthisway,the
independenceofJudiciarywascurtailedandtheentireprocessofappointmentandelevationofthe
JudgestotheSuperiorJudiciarywasgivensubstantiallyinthehandsoftheParliamentaryCommittee.
24.Intheabovebackdrop,thesepetitionswerefiledincludingthose,filedbythepremier
BarAssociations/BarCouncilsofthecountry,challengingtheviresofArticle175Aconsideringitaclear
encroachmentontheindependenceofJudiciarybytheExecutive.
25.Undeniably,theCabinetMinisters/ExecutivehasdominantroleovertheLegislature
underthepresentschemeoftheConstitutionbecauseallimportantbills,includingMoneyBillsare
movedbytheGovernment.ThemajoritypartyheadisthePrimeMinister,whoenjoysauthorityinthe
ParliamentovermembersofhispartybyvirtueofthedefectionprovisionsofArticle63Aasamendedby
the18thAmendment.
TheParliamentssovereigntyhasthusbeendiminishedandcompromisedtogreat
extent,inviewoftheprovisionsofArticle63AoftheConstitution,asforanydissentorvotingbyany
memberagainstthewhimsandwishesofthepartyheadonthematterssetouttherein,hecanloosehis
seatasMemberoftheParliament.Thus,allvitaldecisionsaretakenoutsidetheParliamentandinthe
processofanyBillintroducedintheParliamentorintheothermattersenumeratedabove,the
membersoftheParliamentcannotexercisetheirindependentrightofvoteortoraisevoiceagainst
specifiedLegislationevenifitmaybeultraviresoftheConstitution.Inviewoftheseconstitutional
constraints,theParliamentaryCommitteeisalsoinfluencedbytheChiefExecutive/P.M.ortheleaderof
theOpposition.Consideringthisconstitutionalaspect,theExecutivehasmadeseriousinroadsandhas
encroachedupontheindependenceofJudiciaryunderawellcontrivedstrategy.Thispractice,ifis
permitted,theJudiciarywouldbeonceagainpoliticizedlikeitwasdoneinthepasttillthetimewhena
firmdictawasdeliveredbythisCourtinthecasesofAlJihadTrustv.FederationofPakistan[(PLD1996
SC324),(PLD1997SC84)]andSharafFaridiscase(PLD1994SC105).Inthelattercase,inviewofthe
firmcommandcontainedinSubArticle(3)ofArticle175oftheConstitution,duringthependencyofthe
case,theFederalGovernmentandthefourProvincialGovernments,ultimatelyrealizedtheir
constitutionalobligationandconcededfranklyandfairlytoseparatetheJudiciaryfromtheExecutive
andtofullysecureitsindependence,thus,withinmonthsallnecessaryactionsweretakenwhere
independenceofJudiciaryrightfromtheDistrictleveluptotheSupremeCourtwasfullysecured.Each
successivegovernmentnotonlyacceptedthisconstitutionalpositionbutalsofaithfullycompliedwith
thesametillthetimewhentheoffendingArticle175AwasinsertedintheConstitution.
26.TheFederationscasehasbeenbasedmainlyonSubArticles(5)and(6)ofArticle239
oftheConstitution,investingpowerintheLegislature/Parliamenttomakeanyamendmentinthe
ConstitutionandthatsuchamendmentcannotbecalledinquestioninanyCourt.Inadditionthereto,
thelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanandMr.KhalidAnwar,Sr.ASCwithgreatvehemenceplaced
relianceonthedictagiveninDewanTextileMillsCase(PLD1976SC1363)andsomeotherprecedents.
EXTENTOFAUTHORITYOFPARLIAMENTTOAMENDTHECONSTITUTION:
27.Truethat,undertheprovisionofSubArticle(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionitis
provided,thatthereisnolimitationwhatsoeveronthepoweroftheParliamenttoamendanyprovision
oftheConstitutionhowever,attemptsweremadeonthepartoftheFederation,toreadthisprovision
exclusivelyandinisolation,disregardingtheentireschemeoftheConstitution.
Itisdecadesolduniversalprinciple,consistentlyfollowedthat,Constitutionbeingasupreme
andorganiclawofState,therefore,noneofitsprovisionshallbeconstruedandinterpretedwithout
havingregardtotheotherrelevantprovisionsortheentireschemeoftheConstitution.
28.NotwithstandingthefactthattheParliament,itselfhasacceptedandacknowledged
thepowerofJudicialReviewofthisCourtwhile,complyingwiththeshortorderonthesameissue,
giveninthecaseofNadeemAhmedAdvocatev.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SC1165),inthepast
too,whentheNationalAssemblywasdissolvedbythePresidentundertheunamendedprovisionof
Article58(2)(b),appropriatepetitionswerebroughtbeforethisCourttodeclaretheproclamationultra
viresoftheConstitution.Thus,thepowerofJudicialReviewsurelyandundoubtedlyisvestedinthis
CourttoseeandcheckthatanyactoftheExecutiveorthatoftheLegislatureiswithinthesphereof
theirjurisdictionallottedtothembytheConstitutionoristothecontrary.
29.ThePresident,underArticle50oftheConstitution,isintegralpartofthetwoHousesof
theParliament,thus,hisactionsweresubjectedtoJudicialReviewbythisCourtonmanyoccasionsand
thattoo,attheinstanceoftheParliamentarians,SpeakersofAssembliesetc.andbindingverdictswere
given,inmanycases.
30.ReadingtheschemeofourwrittenConstitution,asystemoftrichotomyisprovided
where,thepowersofExecutive,theLegislatureandtheJudiciaryhasbeenclearlyandsquarelydefined
anddemarcated.Allthethreeorgansarecoordinatebodiesandcollectivelyacttoruntheaffairsofthe
State,strictlyaccordingtotheprovisionsoftheConstitution,withoutencroachinguponthepowerand
authorityofoneanother.Ifsuchpleaisallowedandthispracticeisfaithfullyadopted,therewouldbe
nodisorderamongstthethreeorgans,rather,harmonywouldestablishtrueruleoflawandsupremacy
oftheConstitution.
31.Asdiscussed,intheearlierpartofthisjudgmentthat,ObjectivesResolutionwasmade
thebasisoftheConstitutionof1956,wasreproducedintheConstitutionof1962intheshapeof
Preamble.ItwasrepeatedintheinterimConstitutionof1972andultimatelyinthepresentConstitution.
Itclearlyprovidesthat,theindependenceofJudiciaryshallbefullysecured,theObjectivesResolution
wasmadeasubstantivepartoftheConstitution(Article2A)andfinallyitwasincorporatedintonext
substantiveprovisionofArticle175(3).TheFramersoftheConstitutionof1973,rightlyperceivedthis
vitalConstitutionalrequirement,therefore,withstrongcommitment,aperiodoffiveyearswasfixed
withinwhich,theJudiciarywastobeseparatedfromtheExecutiveandtomakeitfullyindependent.
However,theDictatorthroughPresidentialOrderNo.14of1985extendedtheperiodto15years.
32.Theoretically,itmaybeheldthatonexpirationof15years,theJudiciarystood
separatedandbecameindependenthowever,nomeaningfulattemptwasmadetocomplywiththe
command,containedinSubArticle(3)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionanditwasthroughjudicial
verdictandtheclearconsentgivenbytheFederalGovernmentandtheFederatingUnits,thatthe
bindingdictaofthisCourtandthecommandcontainedintheConstitutionwasfullycompliedwith,in
theyear1996/1997.
33.AbarereadingoftheoffendingArticle175Awouldshowthatitwasnotprecededby
nonobstanteclause,providingnotwithstanding,anythingcontainedinSubArticle(3)ofArticle175,
therefore,inthepresentform,inviewoforiginalArticleinsertedintheConstitutionbyitsframers,
Article175Abeinginconflicttherewithandtheformerbeingbasedonthewillofthepeople,rightly
perceivedbytheframersoftheConstitution,thusshallreignsupremeandArticle175Acannotstandin
itswayandbeingultraviresoftheentireschemeoftheConstitution,itis,liabletobestruckdown.
34.Onacomparison,Article368oftheIndianConstitutionandArticle239ofours,an
ordinarymanofprudencewouldfindalotofdifferencebetweenthetwoasunderArticle368,the
ParliamentofIndiaisinvestedwithdualauthorityandcapacityasaLegislatureandConstituentbody,
whichisnotthecaseinPakistan.
35.TheIndianParliament,despitehavingoverwhelmingpower,whenevermadeany
attempttochangethebasicstructureoftheIndianConstitution,theIndianSupremeCourtinquick
successiondeclaredsuchamendment,distortingordestroyingitsbasicstructure,tobeultravires,
beyondthescopeofamendingpowersoftheIndianParliament.AmongsttheseveralIndianprecedents,
somemaybequotedasfollows:
(1)RaghunathraoGanpatraoVs.U.O.I.
(AIR1991SC1267),
(2)L.ChandraKumarv.U.O.I.
[(1997)3SCC261:AIR1997SC1125]and
(3).KeshavanandaBharativ.StateofKerala
[(1973)4SCC225]
36.TomovetheSuperiorCourtsthroughappropriateprocess,forenforcementof
fundamentalrightsbyitselfisafundamentalright,whichcannotbedefeatedthroughanymeans,bythe
LegislatureortheExecutive.Thepeopleofthecountryarepoliticallyandlegallysovereigninviewofthe
constitutionalscheme.
37.ThefundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution,occupymuchhigherpedestal
andbeingsupersupremefundamentallaw,thesamecannotbeinfringed,violated,harmedor
destroyedbytheLegislatureoranyotherorganoftheState.IthasgotapermanentberthinChapter1,
PartIIoftheConstitution;thesehavebeendeclaredinalienableandinviolable,therefore,areabsolutely
protectedandarebeyondthescopeofamendingpoweroftheLegislaturetoinfringe,takeaway,
diminishordestroyitinanymannerwhatsoever.
38.TheConstitution,itselfprovidesthroughinbuiltmechanism(Articles232233),thatin
thestateofemergencyproclaimedbythePresident,onlyspecifiedfundamentalrights,inthelarger
interestoftheStateshallremainsuspendedhowever,theinviolableandinalienablerightsliketheright
tolife,toliberty,topropertyandsanctityofhomesetc.cannotbesuspendedeveninthestateof
emergency,proclaimedbythePresidentduetoexternalaggressionorinternalwarordisturbances.
39.Toprotect,preserve,ensureandenforcethesefundamentalrights,theSuperior
JudiciaryalonehasbeenvestedwithauthorityundertheConstitution,particularlytheSupremeCourt,
inviewofArticle184(3)readwithArticle199oftheConstitution.
40.IftheindependenceofJudiciaryiscurtailedinthepresentmannerbytheExecutivein
concertwithLegislature,thefundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitutionwouldberendered
meretextualpromisesofordinarytextbooks.Thesupremelawoftheland(Constitution)wouldbe
broughtdowntothelevelofordinarylaw,thepeoplewouldbedeprivedoftherighttoenforcethe
guaranteedfundamentalrights.Itwasinthisbackgroundthatrightfromthetime,theObjectives
Resolutionwasadopted,whichwasincorporatedintothePreamblesofthesuccessiveConstitutions,
theframersofConstitutionof1973insertedtheprovisionofArticle175(3),aselfexecutoryprovision
andbeingenactedbytheConstituentAssembly,muchhigherinrankandauthoritythantheOrdinary
Parliament/Legislature,SubArticle(3)undeniably,hassuperimposingeffectonArticle175Ain
question.Thus,inviewoftheirreconcilableclashbetweenthetwoArticles,whichcannotbe
harmonizedonanylawfulpremise,Article175AcannotstandinthewayofArticle175andonthisscore
too,itisliabletobestruckdownandshallbedeletedfromtheConstitutionasawhole.
Otherwisetoo,keepinginviewtheprovisionofArticle68,theParliamenthasbeenprohibited
todiscusstheconductofanyJudgeoftheSupremeCourtorofaHighCourtindischargeofhisduties.
TheparliamentaryCommittee,undertheRulesofBusinessofthetwoHouses,representsbothand
proceedingsbeforesuchCommitteeshallbedeemedtobetheproceedingsbeforetheParliament.In
case,theParliamentaryCommitteediscusstheconductofanysittingJudge,whoistobefurther
elevatedorofAdditionalJudgetobeconfirmed,theywouldclearlyviolatetheprohibitioncontainedin
Article68oftheConstitution.Therefore,theParliamentaryCommitteeisequallydeclaredultraviresof
theConstitutionandshallhavenorolewhatsoeverintheprocessofappointmentandconfirmationof
theJudgestotheSuperiorJudiciary.
41.Inviewoftheabovediscussion,itisheld,thatnotwithstandingthewordsusedin
Article239(5)and(6),theParliamenthasnoauthoritytoreversetheprocessofindependenceof
Judiciary,whichhasattainedfinalityandthattoothroughsuchstrategyasisprovidedunderArticle
175A,whichwouldalsopoliticizetheJudiciaryintheend.Thesameisagainstthewillofthepeopleand
theentireschemeoftheConstitutionbasedontrichotomyofpowers,theequaldivisionthereof,
providedtherein.
IftheParliamentsodesireanddeemappropriate,tomaketheJudicialCommissionan
extensivelyconsultativebody,bymakingtheappointmentandconfirmationofJudgesmore
transparent,itissuggestedthatitmaymakesuitableamendmentintherelevantprovisionsofthe
ConstitutiontoestablishJudicialCommission.BesidestheChiefJustice,theseniorPuisneJudge,four
seniorJudgesfromallthefourFederatingUnitsandIslamabadCapitalTerritory,shallbeincluded
therein.Inviewofthedevolutionplan,providedunder18thConstitutionalAmendment,fourProvincial
JudicialCommissionsandoneintheIslamabadHighCourtshallbeconstituted,tobechairedbythe
ChiefJusticesoftherespectiveHighCourts,whileSeniorPuisneJudgeandallthoseJudgesshallbe
includedthereininrotation,fromwhoseregion/area,JudgestotheHighCourtareproposedtobe
appointed,oralreadyelevatedJudgesaretobeconfirmed.TheProvincialJudicialCommissionshall
makerecommendationtotheNationalJudicialCommission.Thiswillserve,toagreatextent,theobject
oftransparencyintheappointment/elevationofJudges.
Conclusion:
42.Accordingly,Article175A,insertedthroughConstitution(18thAmendment)Act,2010
andtheConstitution(19thAmendment)Act,2010,isdeclaredultraviresandbeinginconflictwiththe
provisionofArticle175,carryingafirmcommandwithregardtoindependenceofJudiciary,ishereby
struckdownandshallremainnomorethepartoftheConstitution,subjecttotheexceptionthat
whatsoeverhasbeendoneinthepastbytheJudicialCommissioninfestedbytheExecutiveandthe
ParliamentaryCommittee,shallbedeemedtobepastandclosedtransactionsandaredeclaredvalidto
avoidconstitutionalcrises.
21stConstitutionalAmendment:
43.Asdiscussedearlier,duetotheunwise,irrationalandwrongpoliciesbothonthe
externalandinternalfronts,madeandfollowedduringthelongdictatorialrule,whichwere
unfortunatelynotlargelydisapprovedbythesuccessivedemocraticgovernments,haveplungedthe
country/nationintounmanageablecrises,thewarwagedagainsttheStatebythenonStateactorson
theirillperceivednotions,thecallingofArmedForcestoactinaidoftheCivilAdministrationinstateof
graveemergencywithinthecontemplationofArticle245oftheConstitution,wasaninevitableacton
thepartoftheFederalGovernmenttocounterthemenaceofbrutalmilitancy.AftercallingtheArmed
Forces,inaidoftheCivilAdministration,thegravethreatsandabnormalsituationhasgradually
diminishedandthemischiefofthebrutalityhasbeensuppressedtoagreatextenttherefore,the
FederalGovernmentwasjustifiedtothatextentbeingapermissiblecourse,inviewofArticle245ofthe
Constitution,hence,thesamecannotbedeclaredultravires.
44.Thefundamentalquestionwhichrequiresproperdeterminationiswhetherthe
Parliament,inexercisingtheamendingpowersunderArticle239oftheConstitutionhasactedwithin
thescopeofitsauthorityinestablishingaparallelJudiciarytotheestablishedone,recognizedand
permittedbyChapter1,Part7oftheConstitution.Thesureanswertoitis,NO.
45.BeforedealingwiththeconstitutionalityoftheActoftheParliament,investingthe
MilitaryCourtstotryciviliansforspecifiedoffences,itwouldnotbeoutofcontexttopointoutthatthe
nation,particularly,thecivilianpopulationhasbeenmadevictimofbrutalterrorismofmilitancyforthe
last13/14years.Theindiscriminateviolenceagainstcivilianpopulationbythemilitantshadbeenthe
orderoftheday.Onthebasisofinformativeestimates,morethanfortyfivethousandscivilianshave
beenkilledsofarinthebrutalactivities,carriedoutbythemilitantsthroughoutthecountryandin
particularintheProvinceofKPK,itsadjoiningF.RandTribalAreas,ProvinceofBalochistanandin
Karachi,theportcityofPakistan.Thesectariankillingapart,however,notimelyactionwastakento
protectlifeandpropertiesofcitizens.
46.Keepinginviewtheenormouslossoflivesandpropertiesofthecitizensatalarge
scale,nostrategicpolicyorplanwasmadebyeachsuccessivegovernment,howtocounterand
suppressthemenaceofterrorism,whichhasalsoplayedhavoc,evenwiththeeconomyofthecountry,
thus,theStatefailedinitsobligationtoprotectthelivesandpropertiesofthecitizens,commandedby
theConstitution.
47.TheexistingSpecialCourts,establishedundertheprovisionofAntiTerrorismAct,
1997,particularlyintheProvinceofKPK,flashpointandsofttargetforthemilitants,besidestherestof
thecountry,nocomprehensiveandstrategicpolicywasadoptedorenforcedtoenhancethecapacity
andskilloftheinvestigative,prosecutionandforensicagencies,noranyarrangementwasputinplace
toprotectthePresidingJudgesoftheseCourts,theirfamilies,theinvestigatingofficers,theprosecutors
andthewitnesses.ExceptfortheoneinPunjab(Lahore)noforensiclaboratory,equippedwithmodern
forensicequipments/tools,toberunbyhighlyqualifiedstaffintherelevantfield,wasestablishedinKPK
ortherestofthecountry,tocollectconcreteevidenceandprovideittotheSpecialCourts,ensuringthe
convictionofterrorists,sofararrested,tomeetapropersentenceafterconviction.Majorityofthe
SpecialCourtsinKPKareeitherhousedinrentedbuildingsortheyhavebeenmixedupwithordinary
CriminalCourtswithleastsecuritymeasures.Theaboveapathyapart,noconcreteeffortwasmadeto
traceout,identifyandtodestroytheinfrastructureofthemilitants.
48.Despite,alltheseshortcomingsandlackoffacilities,inmanycases,Judgesofthe
SpecialCourts,undeterred,awardedmajorpenaltiestotheterrorists,however,forunknownreasons,
moratoriumwaspressedintoserviceandexecutionofterrorists,condemnedtodeath,washeldin
abeyanceformanyyears,whichencouragedtheterroriststocarryouttheiractivitieswithoutanyfear
ofbeingexecutedafterconviction.
49.Duringashortdebateon21stConstitutionalAmendment,inbothHousesofthe
Parliament,nosinglewordwasutteredbyanyHonblememberthattheJudiciaryhasfailedtomeetthe
challengesofterrorists.Thenegligentomissiononthepartofthegovernmenttoenhancethecapacity
andskillsofallthestakeholdersofthisparticularjusticesystem,donotprovideanyjustificationto
divesttheestablishedJudiciary,theonlyonerecognizedandacknowledgedbytheConstitutionandto
create/establishaparalleljudiciarywithabsoluteandexclusivejurisdictiontotryciviliansforsuch
offences.ThisactoftheParliamentclearlyviolatestheexplicitschemeoftheConstitutionononehand
andontheothertheMilitaryCourts,thusestablished,couldbesubjectedtoseriouscriticism,bothon
nationalandinternationallevelwhereminimumstandardsofjusticeanddueprocessarenotobserved
andthetrialofaccusedisheldbehindcloseddoors,inviolationofArticles10Aand10(1)ofthe
Constitution.
Ourapprehension,cametruewhenthelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanwasdirectedby
theCourttoproduceminutesoftheproceedings/trialofsixcondemnedaccused,towhomsentences
wereawardedbyMilitaryCourtsandweresuspendedbythisCourtonthefirstdayofhearinginthese
cases,buthefailedfornoreason,muchlessplausibletoproducethesameThestrongpresumption
wouldbe,thattrialheldinthesecases,inasummarymanner,violatedthemandatoryprovisionsoflaw
andthatofConstitution,otherwisetheywouldnothavebeenwithheld.
50.Thecasualtiesoflivesandlossofpropertiessufferedbythenation/peopleduringlast
about14years,didnotshaketheconscienceofeachsuccessivegovernment.Itisamatterofrecord
thatnumerousshockingincidentsofterroristactivitieswerecarriedoutandamongstthese,the
bombingofMinaBazar,Peshawar,theAssemblyofeldersinDaraAdamKhel,thedevastatingbombing
ofvillageHassanKhelofLakkiMarwat,thekillingofpersonnelofArmedForcesandparticularly,ofthe
policeinPeshawarrightfromtherankofDIGsdowntotheconstablelevelinhundreds,didnotgivea
wakeupcalltotheGovernmentratherthesetragicincidentswereconvenientlyignoredwhilethe
gruesomeactivitiesofkillingthecivilians,membersofarmedforces,civilarmedforcesand,inparticular,
policeofficers/officialsinKPK,BalochistanandKarachiandalsointhePunjabProvincewentunabated.
51.ItwastheheartbreakingandshockingincidentofAPS,Peshawarwhere142innocent
childrenwerebutcheredbytheterrorists,whichservedasawakeupcallforallthestakeholders
includingthegovernmentoftheday.AlthoughtheshockingimpactofthebrutalincidentofAPS,
Peshawarjoltedallsegmentsofthesocietyhowever,wehavetodealwiththecaseinhandonthebasis
oftheConstitutiononly.
52.Asdiscussedearlier,thattheschemeoftheConstitution,particularlyArticle175
thereofclearlyprovidesfortheestablishmentofoneJudiciary,theSupremeCourtisplacedatthehelm
ofthehierarchy.
Allmatters,inconnectionwiththetermsandconditionsofservice,oroffencescommittedby
thepersonneloftheArmedForces,semiArmedForcesandthePoliceinconnectiontherewith,whilein
activeservice,throughaspecificprovisioni.e.SubArticle(3)ofArticle199oftheConstitution,have
beenkeptoutofthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,theHighCourtsandtheDistrictJudiciary.This
exceptionisbasedonsoundrationaleandreasonabledifferentia.Thedemarcationline,sodrawnbythe
Constitutiontotheaboveeffect,investingpowerindifferentCourtsMartialforthetrialoftheaccused,
whobelongtoArmedForces,maybedeclaredasvalidbutatthesametime,thejurisdictionofthese
differentCourtsMartialcouldnotbeextendedtotrytheciviliansfortheoffences,specifiedinthe
provisotoArticle175oftheConstitution.TheamendmentsbroughtinthePakistanArmyAct,1952,the
2014forallintentsandpurposes,keepinginviewthespecificdivisionofpowersofthetwohierarchies
ofCourtsi.e.theConstitutionallyrecognizedJudiciaryontheonehandandtheCourtsMartial,thus,
investingpowerintheMilitaryCourtstotrycivilians,amountstointroducingaltogetheradifferent
hierarchyofCourtsintotheestablishedsystem,ordainedbytheConstitution.Whether,basedon
doctrineofnecessityorotherwise,theParliamentinexerciseofitsamendingpowersunderArticle239
oftheConstitution,hasdefinitelyexceededitsauthorityandactedinviolationofstrictcommandofthe
Constitution.
53.TheProviso,insertedinArticle175isinthenatureofacarrierStatute,afterservingits
purpose,byinsertingtheproposedamendments,inPart1,SubPart3ofthe1stSchedule,investing
powerinCourtsMartialtotrycivilians,ithasbecomeadeadandexcisedStatuteandnolongerisapart
ofArticle175oftheConstitution.
54.ItiswellsettledprincipleofconstructionofStatute/ConstitutionthatSchedulethereto
isalwayssubservienttothesubstantiveprovisionofthelawandtheConstitution.Itcannot
independentlyoperatenorcanbeeffective.Onthisgroundtoo,theimpugnedamendments,investing
MilitaryCourtstotrytheciviliansforspecifiedoffences,nowpartoftheaboveSchedule,areultravires
andliabletobestruckdown.Whilediscussingtheconstitutionalityof18thAmendment,intheearlier
partofthisjudgment,soundreasonhasbeengiventhattheentireschemeoftheConstitutionisbased
ontrichotomyofpowerstherefore,theLegislaturehasactedbeyondthescopeofitsallottedauthority
bymakingthequestionedamendmentsthroughtheaboveprovisoandinScheduleIbyestablishinga
separatehierarchyofTribunals(CourtsMartial)totrytheciviliansbecausethatistheexclusivedomain
oftheestablishedJudiciaryincludingtheSpecialCourts,constitutedforthatpurpose.
Itis,undeniablefactthat,thisdecisionwastakeninaConferenceattendedbytheHeadsofthe
ParliamentaryParrties,whereafter,thealreadydraftedBillwastabledbeforetheParliament.The
Constitutionalityoftheproposedamendmentswerenotsubjectedtotherequireddebate,keepingin
viewitsimportanceandeffectsontheexistinglegalorder,ratheritwashurriedlypassedbecausethe
MembersoftheParliamentwereleftwithnooptionexcepttogiveconsentthereto,apprehendingthe
penaltyofdisqualificationprovidedinArticle63AoftheConstitution.
55.Withrespect,itmaybementionedherethat,itwasakindof
imposed/coercedlegislation,superimposedontheParliament.Theclaimthat,ithadpowerswithinits
domain,wasthus,deniedtoit.Theimpugnedlawforthisreasontoo,isnotavalidconstitutional
amendment.SeniorParliamentarians,acquaintedwiththeschemeoftheConstitution,ontheFloorof
eachHouseexpressedseriousreservationsandrepentance,whilevotinginfavourofthequestioned
amendments.This,inmyhumbleview,isastrongevidencetoreinforcetheviewthattheActin
questionwasnotbasedonthewilloftheParliamentariansbutoftheHeadsoftheParliamentary
Parties,thus,itsconstitutionalvaliditystandsvitiated.
56.Towriggleoutofthisconstitutionaldilemma,theFederationslawyersvehemently
arguedthat,manyprovisionsintroducedintheAntiTerrorismsAct,wherecertainaccusedwereliable
tobetriedbyMilitaryCourts,werestuckdowninMehramAliscase(supra),however,thebaselineof
theDictawasthattheMilitaryCourts,investedwithsuchpowersthroughstatutorylaw,werehavingno
constitutionalprotection.Thus,onthataccount,thesameweredeclarednullandvoid.
57.AftergoingthroughthefactsofthecaseofMehramAli(ibid),theratiolaiddownand
thedictadelivered,leavesnoroomfordoubtthatcivilianscouldnotbetriedbytheMilitaryCourtsfor
certainoffencesundertheAntiTerrorismAct.Therefore,thestanceoftheFederationisbasedon
misconception,henceuntenable.
58.Apartfromtheabove,theamendmentsmadeinthePakistanArmyAct,1952,the
2014,amountstoenactinganewlaw;thesamewasdoneinclearviolationoftheabsoluteprohibition,
containedinArticle8oftheConstitution,anintegralpartofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
Therefore,thenewlawintroducedthroughthequestionedamendmentsandthroughaproviso,
insertedinArticle175,amountstodistortingthefundamental/basicstructureoftheConstitutionanda
clearviolationofArticle8,hence,areabinitovoidandofnolegaleffect,thesamewascertainlybeyond
theamendingpowersoftheLegislature.
59.UndertheprovisionsofArticle190,theexecutiveauthoritiesthroughoutthecountry
arerequiredtoactinaidofSupremeCourt.TheArmedForcesarethepartoftheExecutivetherefore,
theseTribunals,beingquasijudicial,establishedforspecificpurpose,couldnotbeplacedonahigher
pedestalthantheSuperiorJudiciaryofthecountry,ashasbeendoneinthepresentcase.
60.TheprinciplesoflawlaiddowninMehramAlicase(supra)havebeenviolatedbythe
Legislatureunderthecoverofsocalledconstitutionalprotectionthus,giventotheseTribunals,onthis
groundtoo,thequestionedamendmentsarevoidandliabletobestruckdown.
61.Thefundamentalrights,asheldearlierareaninalienablepartofthesupremelaw,
whichcannotbeencroacheduponordestroyedbytheExecutive,theLegislatureorevenbythe
Judiciaryinanymanner,evenonbasisofthedoctrineofnecessity,whichtheParliamenthaspressed
intoservice.
62.TheprovisionofArticle247(3)providesthatnoActofParliamentshallapplytoany
FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)ortoanypartthereof,unlessthePresidentsodirects,and
noActofParliamentoraProvincialAssemblyshallapplyaProvinciallyAdministeredTribalArea(PATA)
ortoanypartthereofunlesstheGovernoroftheProvince,inwhichtheTribalAreaissituate,withthe
approvalofthePresident,sodirects..Duringthecourseofproceedings,thelearnedAttorneyGeneral
forPakistanwasaskedthisquestionastowhetheranyregulation/notificationhasbeenissuedbythe
President,extendingtheActoftheParliamentinquestiontotheseareas,asrequiredunderArticle
247(3),hecouldnotproduceorshowusthesame.Onthisaccounttoo,thequestionedAct/amendment
calledthe21stConstitutionalAmendmentActshallhavenooperationintheseareasnorthelawso
amended,shallbeeffectivetothatextent.
63.AstheArmedForcesaredirectlyengagedinafightwiththeTerrorists,anyperson
capturedinthecourseofcombat,theinvestigatorintothecrimeandtheJudgepresidingtheMilitary
CourtwouldcertainlybelongtotheArmedForcesandbeingpartytotheconflicttherefore,theymaybe
heldtobeJudgesintheirowncause.Thus,trialofsuchciviliansbytheMilitaryCourtswouldcertainly
violatethisinviolableuniversalprincipleofindependentjustice.Onthisaccounttoo,suchtrialwouldbe
abinitiovoid.
64.Thereisanotherseriouslegalanomaly,fraughtwiththemischiefofserious
discriminationbecauseanotifiedteamoffunctionariesoftheFederalGovernmentalonewould
determinethefateoftheciviliansaccused,referringtheircasesfortrialbytheMilitaryCourts.Thisisa
clearencroachmentonthepoweroftheJudiciaryas,suchdeterminationbeingjudicialone,isbeyond
thescope/authorityoftheExecutive,therefore,fairplayandjusticewouldcertainlybethecasualty.
SimilarviewwastakenbythisCourtinMehramAlicase(supra),thus,investingthepowersinthehands
offewindividualswithlittleknowledgeoflawandprinciplesofjusticetodecidethefateofaparticular
civilian,tobetriedbytheMilitaryCourt,wouldbeaclearviolationofArticle190andArticle203ofthe
Constitution.
TheConstitutionitselfprovidesthatallbeforethelawshallbetreatedequally.WhileArticle5ofthe
Constitutionprovidesasfollows:
Art.5:(1)Loyaltytothestateisthebasicdutyofeverycitizen.
(2)ObediencetotheConstitutionandlawisthe[inviolable]obligationofeverycitizenwhereverhe
maybeandofeveryotherpersonforthetimebeingwithinPakistan.
65.Thustheguaranteeofequaltreatmentbeforelawisaqualifiedoneandanyperson,
whohimselfforfeitsuchrightsbyhisownconductandconsistentbehaviourliketerrorist/militantsthey,
ofcoursemaybedifferentlytreatedfromtherestoftheciviliansandwhytheSuperiorCourtshave
watchfullymonitoredtheprogress,proceedingsofterrorismcasesandconductoftheJudges,presiding
overAntiTerrorismCourtsthroughoutPakistan.Suggestionsandrecommendationswereforwardedto
theFederalGovernmentbyLaw&JusticeCommissionforbringingsuitableamendmentinthelawto
makeitaneffectivetoolofdeterrenceformilitants/terroristsinvolvedinbrutalities.Itisstillopento
thegovernmenttoconferuponsuchCourtsmorepowersmakingreasonableamendmentsintheAnti
TerrorismAct,theevidenceActandotherlawsrelevanttothesubject.Atthesametimequickmeasures
shallbetaken,establishingmodernForensicLaboratorieswithhighlyqualifiedstaffintherelevantfield
andequippedwithmodernfacilitiestolendsupporttotheinvestigatingagencyandthelattertoo,must
beimpartedsufficientskill,trainingandknowledgeinthefieldofinvestigationtoeffectivelycounter
andconfrontterrorismandterrorists,enablingthemtobringonrecordsufficientevidence,ensuringthe
convictionofthoseguiltyofthecrimesofterrorismandaffiliatedmatters.Also,fullprotectionshallbe
giventothePresidingJudgesoftheSpecialCourts,alreadyestablishedundertheAct,1997,itsparalegal
staff,thewitnesses,theinvestigatingofficers,theprosecutors,thelawyers,etc.asrequiredunderthe
law.
66.ThelegislaturealsoviolatedtheprohibitioncontainedinArticle12,making
subsequentamendmentinthePakistanArmyAct,1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistan
NavyOrdinance,1961,investingtheMilitaryCourts,alsototrythoseaccusedpersons,whowere
arrestedmanyyearsbackanddetainedforindefiniteperiodsincelong.
Order/Conclusion:
67.Inviewoftheabovediscussion,thefindingsrecorded,theconclusiondrawnbasedon
theinterpretationofthevariousprovisionsoftheConstitutionandthelaw,the18thConstitutional
amendmentand19thConstitutionalamendmentinsertingArticle175A,the21stConstitutional
amendmentinsertingaprovisoinArticle175andamendmentintheArmyAct,1952,thePakistanAir
ForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014andall
subsequentamendments,madethroughordinarylegislationaredeclarednullandvoidbeing
unconstitutionalandshallbedeletedfromtheConstitutionasawhole.
68.Alltheproceedings,inquiries,trials,investigations,andconvictionsaswellsentences
recordedbythemilitarycourtssoestablishedunderthe21stamendmentaredeclaredillegaland
unconstitutional.Thesamearetherefore,setasideandallthecasespendingthereshallstand
transferredtotheordinarycriminalcourtsinparticularAntiTerroristCourtsestablishedundertheAct,
1997,fortrialorforthepurposeofinvestigationbythespecialteamconstitutedtherefor.Thecharge
sheetsbesubmittedtothesaidSpecialCourts.
69.However,allappointments,confirmationandelevationofJudgestotheSuperior
judiciary,madeinthepastundertheoffendingArticle175Aaredeclaredvalidforallintentsand
purposestoavoidConstitutionalcrises.
70.Accordingly,thefirstsetofpetitionswithregardto18thAmendmentsi.e.Article175A
oftheConstitutionareacceptedandthesaidArticleisstruckdownasawhole.Similarly,whileaccepting
thesecondsetofthepetitionsthrowingchallengetothe21stConstitutionalAmendmentalongwiththe
allamendmentsmadeinthePakistanArmyAct,1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistan
NavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014arealsodeclaredultraviresandare
herebystruckdown.
Sd/
(DostMuhammadKhan,J13)
UmarAtaBandial,J.Ihavehadtheprivilegeofreadingtheeruditeandconsideredopinionrendered
bymylearnedbrotherSh.AzmatSaeed,J.whichcomprehensivelydealswiththedifferentfacetsofthe
controversyraisedbeforetheCourtinrelationtothevalidityorotherwiseoftheConstitution(18th
Amendment)Act,2010;Constitution(21stAmendment)Act,2015(21stAmendment)andPakistan
Army(Amendment)Act,2015(ArmyAmendmentAct).Theanalysisoflawundertakenbythesaid
judgmentwithrespecttotheaforementionedconstitutionalamendmentsandthestatutory
amendmentanswertheobjectionsraisedonbehalfofthepetitionersoncogentandconvincing
grounds.Withrespect,Iagreewiththeappreciationofrelevantfactsandthegroundsandreasons
sustainingthefindingsgivenonallthepointsaddressedintheaforementionedopinion.
2.Oneofthethresholdfindingsgivenintheopinionrenderedbymylearnedbrotheris
thatnotwithstandingthebarcontainedinsubArticle(5)and(6)ofArticle239oftheConstitutionof
IslamicRepublicofPakistan(theConstitution)thisCourthasjurisdictiontoexaminethevalidityof
Constitutionalamendmentsonthetouchstoneoflimitationsimposedontheamendingpowerofthe
ParliamentbythesalientfeaturesoftheConstitution.Inthebackgroundofthesaidfinding,Ihave
anxiouslydeliberatedtheobjectionthatthe21stAmendmentandthecorrespondingamendments
madebytheArmyAmendmentAct,inthePakistanArmyAct,1952(PAA)substantiallyaltersoneof
thesalientandsacrosanctfeaturesofourConstitution,namely,independenceoftheJudiciaryandits
separationfromtheExecutive.ThisfeatureisboldlyenshrinedinArticle175oftheConstitutionand
echoedinitsArticles202,203212anditsPreamble.ItisthisfeatureoftheConstitutionthatprotects
andnurturesthefundamentalrightofaccesstojusticeofthecitizensofPakistan.Thequalityofjustice
assuredincludesarighttofairtrialanddueprocessunderArticle10AoftheConstitutionandsafeguard
toenjoyequalitybeforelawandequalprotectionoflawisguaranteedinArticle25oftheConstitution.
Hastheaforenoted21stAmendmentchangedoneofthecherishedfeaturesoftheConstitution,
namely,provisionofjusticethroughanindependentjudiciary,tothepointthattheConstitutionhas
substantiallylostthatessentialcharacteristic?
3.ItiscommongroundthatinrelationtotheoffencesaddedtothePAAbytheArmy
AmendmentAct,civiliancitizensofPakistanmaybecomeaccusedpersonsbeforetheCourtsMartial
constitutedunderthePAA.TheprimaryoffenceincludedbyArmyAmendmentActinthePAAenvisages
itscommissionbyapersonclaimingorknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationwhouses
thenameofreligionorasectto,raisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,orattacktheArmedForces
ofPakistanorlawenforcementagencies,orattackanycivilormilitaryinstallationsinPakistan[Section
2(1)(d)(iii)(a)].Inadditiontotheforegoingoffence,anumberofothercognateandrelatedoffencesare
alsoaddedtothePAAbythesaidamendinglaw.Tomyunderstanding,theseoffencesareapplicable
onlyinthecontextcontemplatedbythe
21stAmendmentandtheArmyAmendmentAct.Thisviewfindssupportfromthefactthattheoffences
addedbytheArmyAmendmentActtothePAAarenotnewbutexist,interalia,inthePakistanPenal
Code,1877.PursuanttotheimpugnedAmendmentsaccusedpersonswhoallegedlybelongtoaterrorist
groupthatusesthenameofreligionorasectandareallegedtohavecommittedaSection2(1)(d)(iii)
offenceareliabletobetriedbyCourtMartialunderthePAA.Previouslysuchaccusedpersonswere
triablebytheAntiTerrorismCourts(ATCs)establishedundertheAntiTerrorismAct,1997andmore
recentlytheSpecialCourtssetupundertheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014.Itisnecessarytoestablish
theobjectandscopeoftheamendmentsmadeintheConstitutionandthePAAinordertodetermine
whetherthe21stAmendment,thatisenactedunanimouslybytheParliamenttoprotectthe
amendmentsinthePAA,hasatallviolatedasalientfeatureoftheConstitution.
4.Tounderstandtheobject,scopeandlegaleffectoftheimpugnedamendmentsinthe
Constitutionandinthelaw,itisusefultofirstreadtheprovisionsof21stAmendment:
SENATESECRETARIAT
No.F.9(2)/2015Legis.ThefollowingActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)receivedtheassentofthe
Presidenton7thJanuary,2015isherebypublishedforinformation:
ACTNo.Iof2015
AnActfurthertoamendtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan;

preventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristorterroristgroup,armedgroup,
wingandmilitiaortheirmembersusingthenameofreligionorasect;
byraisingofarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameofreligionorasectorfromtheforeignandlocally
fundedantiStateelements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristsgroupincludinganysuchterroristsfightingwhile
representativesinallpartiesconferencesheldinaftermathofthesadandterribleterroristattackonthe
ArmyPublicSchoolatPeshawaron16December2014topermanentlywipeoutanderadicateterrorists
fromPakistan,itisexpedienttoprovideconstitutionalprotectiontothenecessarymeasurestaken
hereunderintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan;
1.Shorttitleandcommencement.(1)ThisActmaybecalledtheConstitution(Twentyfirst
Amendment)Act,2015.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedateofits
commencementandshallceasetoformpartoftheConstitutionandshallstandrepealedonthe
2.AmendmentofArticle175oftheConstitution.IntheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicof
Pakistan,hereinaftercalledtheConstitution,inArticle175,inclause(3),forthefullstopattheenda
colonshallbesubstitutedandthereafter,thefollowingprovisoshallbeinserted,namely:
ProvidedthattheprovisionsofthisArticleshallhavenoapplicationtothe
trialofpersonsunderanyoftheActsmentionedatserialNo.6,7,8and9ofsubpartIIIofPartI
oftheFirstSchedule,whoclaims,orisknown,tobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganization
usingthenameofreligionorsect.
Explanation:Inthisproviso,theexpressionsectmeansasectofreligionanddoesnot
includeanyreligiousorpoliticalpartyregulatedunderthePoliticalPartiesOrder,2002.
3.AmendmentintheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.IntheConstitution,intheFirstSchedule,in
subpartIIIofPartI,afterserialNo.5,thefollowingnewentriesshallbeadded,namely:
6.ThePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXIXof1952).
5.Forthesakeofcompletenessitwouldbeappropriateatthisstagetoalsoreadthrough
theArmyAmendmentActsinceitisenactedaspartandparcelofthenewlegaldispensationenforced
undertheumbrellaofthe21stAmendment:
SENATESECRETARIAT
No.F.9(3)/2015Legis.ThefollowingActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)receivedtheassentof
thePresidenton7thJanuary,2015,isherebypublishedforinformation:
ACTNo.IIof2015
AnActfurthertoamendthePakistanArmyAct,1952;
preventionofactsthreateningthesecurityofPakistanbyanyterroristgroup,armedgroup,wingand
militiaortheirmembersusingthenameofreligionorasect;
ANDWHEREASthereexistsgraveandunprecedentedthreattotheintegrityofPakistanbyraisingof
armsandinsurrectionusingthenameofreligionorasectbygroupsofforeignandlocallyfunded
elements;
ANDWHEREASitisexpedientthatthesaidterroristsgroupsincludinganysuchterroristsfightingwhile
usingthenameofreligionorasectcapturedortobecapturedincombatwiththeArmedForcesand
otherlawenforcementagenciesorotherwisearetriedunderthisAct;
ANDWHEREASArticle245oftheConstitutionofIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973enjoinsuponthe
ArmedForcestoactinconsonancewiththeprovisionsofthesaidArticle;
1.Shorttitleandcommencement.(1)ThisActmaybecalledthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,
2015.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisActshallremaininforceforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedateofits
commencement.
2.Amendmentofsection2,ActXXXIXof1952.InthePakistanArmyAct,1952(XXXIXof1952),
hereinafterreferredtoasthesaidAct,insection2,
(l)insubsection(1),inclause(d),aftersubclause(ii),thefollowingnewsubclauses,shallbe
inserted,namely:
(iii)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthe
nameofreligionorasect;and
(a)raisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,orattacktheArmed
ForcesofPakistanorlawenforcementagencies,orattackanycivilormilitary
installationsinPakistan;or
(c)possess,store,fabricateortransporttheexplosives,firearms,
instruments,articles,suicidejackets;or
(e)provideorreceivefundingfromanyforeignorlocalsourcefortheillegal
activitiesunderthisclause;or
(f)acttooverawetheStateoranysectionofthepublicorsector
religiousminority;or
(g)createterrororinsecurityinPakistanorattempttocommitany
ofthesaidactswithinoroutsidePakistan,
(iv)claimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthename
ofreligionorasectandraisearmsorwagewaragainstPakistan,commitanoffencementionedatserial
Nos.(i),(ii),(iii),(v),(vi),(vii),(viii),(ix),(x),(xi),(xii),(xiii),(xv),(xvi),(xvii)and(xx)intheScheduleto
theProtectionofPakistanAct,2014(Xof2014):
Providedthatanypersonwhoisallegedtohaveabetted,aidedorconspiredin
thecommissionofanyoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)shallbetried
underthisActwhereverhemayhavecommittedthatoffence:
Providedfurtherthatnopersonaccusedofanoffencefallingundersub
clause(iii)orsubclause(iv)shallbeprosecutedwithoutthepriorsanctionoftheFederal
Government.
Explanation:Inthisclause,theexpressionsectmeansasectofreligionanddoesnot
includeanyreligiousorpoliticalpartyregulatedunderthePoliticalPartiesOrder,2002.
(4)TheFederalGovernmentshallhavethepowertotransferanyproceedingsin
respectofanypersonwhoisaccusedofanyoffencefallingundersubclause(iii)orsubclause(iv)
ofclause(d)ofsubsection(1),pendinginanycourtforatrialunderthisAct.
(5)Anyproceedingstransferredundersubsection(4)shallbedeemedtohave
beeninstitutedunderthisAct.
(6)Whereacaseistransferredundersubsection(4)itshallnotbenecessaryto
recallanywitnessoragainrecordanyevidencethatmayhavebeenrecorded..
3.Amendmentofsection60,ActXXXIXof1952.InthesaidAct,insection60,inclause(k),after
thewordlawoccurringattheend,thewordsandanyotherlawforthetimebeinginforce,shallbe
added.
(2)IncasethereisanyconflictbetweentheprovisionsofthisActandanyotherlawfor
thetimebeinginforce,theprovisionsofthisActshallprevailtotheextentofinconsistency.
6.The21stAmendmentsetsoutinitsPreamblethefactualimperativesthathave
occasioneditsenactment.Itisstatedthatagraveandunprecedentedthreattotheintegrityof
PakistanandobjectivessetoutinthePreambletotheConstitutionconfrontstheStatepresently.This
threatisposedbyterroristgroupswhohavebyraisingofarmsandinsurgencyusingthenameof
religionorasectorfromtheforeignandlocallyfundedantiStateelementshavecommitted
offencesrelatingtoterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainstPakistanthreateningthesecurity
ofPakistan.Specialmeasuresnecessarytopreventthecommissionofthesaidoffencesincludethe
trialofthoseoftheaforementionedterroristswhoarecapturedortobecapturedincombatwiththe
ArmedForcesorotherwise.Inordertoimplementthesaidspecialmeasureadoptedtopermanently
wipeoutanderadicateterroristsfromPakistanconstitutionalprotectionhasbeengiventothe
necessarymeasurestakenintheinterestofsecurityandintegrityofPakistan.
7.Thespecificmeasurethathasbeengivenconstitutionalprotectionbythe21st
AmendmentisthetrialbyCourtsMartialofterroristmilitantswhousethenameofreligionorasectto
interaliawagewaragainstPakistanandwhothreatenthesecurityofPakistan.CourtsMartial
constitutedfortrialofthesaidterroristsunderthePAA,PakistanAirForceAct,1953(PAFA),Pakistan
NavyOrdinance,1961(PNO)andbytheSpecialCourtsundertheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014have
bythe21stAmendmentbeengivenconstitutionalimmunityfromchallengeforviolationoffundamental
rightsoroftheindependenceoftheJudiciary.
8.CourtMartialofterroristmilitantsisameasurebywhichParliamenthassoughtto
addressagraveandseriousexistentialthreattotheintegrityandsecurityofPakistan.Fromthe
provisionsofthe21stAmendment,itisobviousthattheParliamentisconsciousthattheamendment
madebytheArmyAmendmentAct,enablingtrialofcivilianterroristmilitantsbyCourtsMartialisan
extraordinarystepthatmaydeviatefromthepristineprincipleofjudicialpowerbeingexercisedbythe
independentJudiciaryofthecountryandunderitsoversight.Tosafeguardthatprinciple,the21st
AmendmentrestrictstheconstitutionalimmunitygiventoCourtMartialtrialsofcertainterrorist
militantsspecifiedintheArmyAmendmentActtobeatemporarymeasurethatshallremaininforce
foraperiodoftwoyearsfromthedateofitscommencementandshallstandrepealedontheexpiration
ofthesaidperiod.Nevertheless,foraperiodof2yearsParliamenthasunambiguouslyendorsedthe
impugnedCourtMartialtrialsbyexemptingthesefromtherequirementsofasacrosanctsalientfeature
oftheConstitution.MylearnedbrotherSh.AzmatSaeed,J.hasrightlyheldthatconstitutionalimmunity
giventothelegalvalidityandstatusoftheimpugnedCourtsMartialsurvivesthesalientfeatures
thresholdoftheConstitution.Indeedtheexistentialistthreatposedbyterroristmilitantsbywagingwar
againstPakistan,therestrictiononCourtMartialtrialsofterroristmilitantstoanarrowclassofpersons,
whoarecapturedortobecapturedincombatwiththelawenforcementagenciesofPakistan,andthe
timelimitationonconstitutionalimmunitygiventothelegalstatusofsuchCourtMartialtrialssurvive
thesalientfeaturesthresholdupheldbymylearnedbrotherSh.AzmatSaeedJ.
9.Asurveyofourlawregardingtherightoffairtrial,dueprocessandaccesstojusticefor
all,leadsustoaseminalandprofounddiscourseonthepresentissuerenderedbyChiefJusticeAjmal
Mian(ashethenwas)inthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussainv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1999SC504).It
washeldunanimouslythereinbytheCourtthatthePakistanArmedForces(ActinginAidofCivil
Powers)Ordinance,1998,thatestablishedMilitaryCourtsfortrialofcivilianscharged,interalia,with
offencesofterrorismmentionedintheOrdinance,wasunconstitutionalandtherefore,ofnolegal
effect.Thegroundsforsuchdeclarationwerefirstly,thattheMilitaryCourtspresidedbyArmyOfficers
whobelongtotheExecutivefailedtheconstitutionaltestofindependenceofjudiciary;secondly,that
lackofoversightbythesuperiorconstitutionaljudiciarydeprivedsuchCourtsoftheirfoundationinthe
provisionsoftheConstitution;thirdly,inpithandsubstancetheimpugnedOrdinancelackednexuswith
theDefenceofPakistanorwiththeArmedForces,renderingitultraviresthelegislativecompetenceof
theParliamentundertheFederalLegislativeList.Forthesakeofconvenience,therelevantextractsfrom
Sh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)arereproducedbelow.Atpage609,itisobservedthat:
Thequestionatissuebeforeusis,astowhetherbyvirtueoftheimpugnedOrdinancethefourtypes
ofCourtsenvisagedundertheArmyActreferredtohereinabovecanbesubstitutedforordinarycriminal
CourtscreatedundertheConstitutionforthetrialofciviliansforciviloffenceshavingnonexuswiththe
ArmedForcesordefenceofthecountry.ThereisnodoubtthatintermsoftheArmyActevencertain
civilianscanbetriedfortheoffencescoveredundertheArmyAct.Inthisregardreferencemaybemade
totherelevantportionfromtheopinionofHamoodurRahman,C.J.inthecaseofBrig.(Rtd.)F.B.Ali
(supra)quotedhereinabove,whereinHamoodurRahman,C.J.observedthatthenexuswiththe
defenceofPakistanwasnotonlyclosebutalsodirect.Itisdifficulttoconceiveofanobjectmore
intimatelylinkedtherewith.ThepreventionofthesubversionoftheloyaltyofamemberoftheDefence
ServicesofPakistanisasessentialastheprovisionofarmsandammunitiontotheDefenceServiceor
theirtraining.(emphasisprovided)
OnthepointthatlegislativeincompetenceofParliamentinthatcasewasfatalfortheOrdinanceof
1998,itwasheldatpage613that:
Itmaybepointedoutthat,thisCourtinthecasesofGovernmentofBalochistanv.AzizullahMemon
(supra),AlJehadTrust(supra)andMehramAli(supra)hasheldthattherighttohaveaccesstojustice
throughindependentCourtsisaFundamentalRightand,therefore,anylawwhichmakesacivilian
triableforaciviloffence,whichhasnonexuswiththeArmedForcesordefenceofthecountry,bya
forumwhichdoesnotqualifyasaCourtintermsofthelawenunciatedparticularlyinMehramAliscase
(supra)willbeviolativeofArticles9,25,175and203oftheConstitution.(emphasisprovided)
Againatpage620,itisruledthat:
IntheabsenceofnexusbetweentheallegedoffenceandthedisciplineoftheArmedForcesor
defence,acitizenofPakistanisentitledtothetrialbyordinarycriminalCourtsinviewofthechange
broughtaboutinthepresentConstitutionof1973,whichaspecthasalreadybeendiscussed
hereinabove.(emphasisprovided)
Finallyonthelimitationofactinginaidofcivilpowermeantassistingratherthaneffacingcivilpower
underArticle245oftheConstitution,itwasheldatpage626that:
TheabovecontentionisnottenableasconveningofMilitaryCourtsfortrialofciviliansforciviloffences
havingnonexuswiththeArmedForcesordefenceofPakistancannotbetreatedasanactincidental
andancillaryunderclause(1)ofArticle245oftheConstitution.(emphasisprovided)
10.Inthepresentcaseoftheimpugned21stAmendmentandtheArmyAmendmentAct,
theobjectionsupheldinSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)andnotedabovehavebeenraisedforcefully
bythelearnedcounselforthepetitioners.However,thefactsinthepresentcasedifferconsiderably
fromthoseintheSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra).Presently,theparliamentaryacknowledgment
madeintheimpugnedamendmentsaboutcombatofArmedForcesandlawenforcementagenciesof
PakistanwithterroristmilitantswagingwaragainstPakistaninthenameofreligionorasectamountsto
adeclarationofastateofarmedconflictinPakistan.SeveralmeasuresincludingforcefulMilitaryaction
takentoreversethatonslaughthavebeenapprovedbyallparliamentarypartiesandareunder
implementationbytheFederalGovernment.Allthesemeasuresareclaimedtohavenexuswiththe
DefenceofPakistanunderArticle245oftheConstitution;inparticulartheCourtMartialtrialsofthe
abovementionednarrowclassofterroristmilitants.Ontheotherhand,theSh.LiaquatHussainscase
(supra)concernedtheroleoftheArmedForcesinactinginaidofcivilpower.Theabovenotedjudicial
pronouncementsmadeinthatcasearereliedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneraltoadvancethepleathat
theimpugnedAmendmentsintheConstitutionandthelawarecompetentandvalidunderthe
Constitution.
11.ItmayberecapitulatedthattheimpugnedAmendmentinthePAAhastheprotective
backingofaconstitutionalamendment.Suchconstitutionalamendmentconfersonlyatemporary
immunityuponCourtsMartialconstitutedfortrialofoffencesaddedbythesaidamendmenttothe
PAA.Theseoffencesareintimatelyrelatedtoinsurrectionandterrorism;actionsaimedagainstthe
integrityandsecurityofPakistan.Actsinvolvingterrorism,wagingofwarorinsurrectionagainst
Pakistanthatarecommittedbyaterroristusingthenameofreligionorsectandwhohasbeen
capturedortobecapturedincombatwithArmedForcesorotherwiseconstitutethedefiningfactual
facetsofacasethatcanbeputupfortrialbeforetheCourtsMartial.Thesefactualingredientsare
reflectedintheoffencesfreshlyaddedbysubclause(iii)inSection2(1)(d)ofthePAA.Thepurposesfor
bringingtheimpugnedamendmentsareexpressedincommontermsbythePreamblestoboththe21st
AmendmentandtheArmyAmendmentAct.Inordertoderiveguidanceaboutthepurpose,meaning
andeffectofimpugnedstatutoryamendmentswhichmayseemdisparateandunrelatedtoArticles175
and245oftheConstitution,thelawpermitsreferencetobemadetotheprovisionsofthePreambleof
anamendingstatuteforseekingguidanceaboutthepurpose,scopeandmeaningoftheamendments
underreview.
12.Readingthe21stAmendmentandtheArmyAmendmentActinthelightoftheir
Preambles,itiscrystalclearthatboththeimpugnedamendmentshavebeenmadesolelyforthe
purposeofensuringthedefenceoftheintegrityandsecurityofPakistanagainstarmedgroupsof
terroristsandmilitantsthathavebygruesomeactsofphysicalviolencedulypropagatedbydigital
communicationsopenlyattackedandthreatenedtheexistenceofPakistan.Thescaleandseverityofthe
terroristonslaughtisclearfromtheattacksconductedagainsttheStateinstitutions,agencies,service
personnelandordinarycitizenofPakistan.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanhaspresented
dataofhumanandeconomiclossessufferedbythenationin12yearssincetheyear2002.Thesefigures
paintagrimpictureofStateinabilitytocombattheevergrowingmenaceofextremistviolenceagainst
Stateandsociety.Itisreportedthatduringthesaidperiodapproximately50,000civiliancitizensof
PakistanhavelosttheirlivesinterroristattacksconductedindifferentpartsofPakistan.Ofthese,4879
aresoldierswholaiddowntheirlivesinbattleswithorattacksbyterroristmilitants.Nearly400officers
ofthePakistanArmylaiddowntheirliveswhilstleadingoperationsagainstsuchterroristmilitants.The
civilianswhohavebeenkilledinterroristattacksduringthesameperiodinclude400journalists,230
lawyersand321doctors.Morethan1000schoolshavebeenattackedanddestroyedinFATA,Swatand
otherareasoftheProvinceofKhyberPakhtonkhwa.Equally,morethan100mosquesandotherplaces
ofworshiphavebeenattackedanddestroyedbyterroristsindifferentpartsofthecountry.The
estimatedeconomictollonaccountoftheongoingarmedconflictwithterroristsandmilitantsexceeds
US$100billion.Thenationhaspaidahugepriceintermsofhumanlife,economiclosses,erosionof
Statewritandauthorityandcontinuousflightofcapitalandskilledhumanresourceowingtothe
growinginsecurityandlawlessnessthathasbeleagueredtheState.
13.AccordingtothelearnedAttorneyGeneral,hardlyanyofthemilitantsthatare
engagedincombatwiththelawenforcementagencies,hasbeenprosecuted.Someelementsoperating
inthesettledareasofPakistan,whohavebeenfacilitating,aiding,abetting,financingorotherwise
connectedwithsuchterroristmilitantshavebeenprosecutedforvariousterroristoffencesintheATCs
ofthecountry.17,596criminalcaseswereputupfortrialbytheATCsinPakistanduringtheperiod
2008toJune,2014.Duringthisperiod,7,565caseshavebeendecidedbytheATCs,resultinginthe
acquittalofaccusedin5,841cases,thatisin77%ofthedecidedcases.Itisacknowledgedthatthe
PoliceinvestigatorsandStateprosecutorsarehandicappedinthecollectionofincriminatingevidence
becausetheprincipalplayersintheexecutionofterrorismactsescapetothehavensoftheirsponsors
orcommanders,whoareinturntheterroristmilitantsengagedincombatwiththelawenforcement
agenciesinwagingtheirwaragainstPakistan.Logisticalshortcomingsandlegallacunaeexpose
witnesses,policeinvestigators,ProsecutorsandJudgestoviolencethatimpairstheworkingofthe
criminaljusticesystem.Moresafeguardarethereforerequired.
14.TheshockingattackonchildrenstudentsintheArmyPublicSchool,Peshawarin
December,2014,inwhich143minorchildrenwerebrutallyexecuted,hasjoltedtheExecutiveand
Parliamentintofurtheractiontocurbterroristactivities.Allparliamentaryleadershipincludingthe
ExecutiveunanimouslyadoptedaNationalActionPlanon24.12.2014comprehendingavarietyof
actionsaimedatcurbingandeliminatingterroristmilitancyinPakistan,includingtrialofterrorist
militantsbyCourtsMartial.TheimpugnedAmendmentswhichdealwiththespecificmeasureofCourt
MartialtrialofterroristmilitantsproposedintheNationalActionPlanwereadoptedunanimouslyby
bothhousesofParliamentthroughthe21stAmendmentandtheArmyAmendmentAct.Thelanguage
oftheseAmendmentshavealreadybeenconsideredabove;thedatanotedaboveshowsanunabated
spateofterroristandmilitantactivitythroughoutPakistancausingtensofthousandsofciviliansdeaths
andthelossofnearly5000servicemeninaction;executiveincapacitytobringsuccessfulprosecutions
ofdeadlyterroristmilitantsmakesoutacaseforcomprehensive,concertedandconsistentactionbythe
StatetocurbandeliminatethemenaceofterrorismcurrentlyfacingPakistan.Thenatureandtypesof
actiontobetakenforachievingthesaidpurposeisamatterofexecutivedecision.Notwithstandingthe
21stAmendment,thestatutoryamendmenttoholdCourtMartialtrialsofterroristmilitantsfalling
withinthenarrowclassmentionedintheArmyAmendmentActwouldbeliabletoquashmentifit
substantiallyaltersthesalientfeatureofindependenceofJudiciaryanditsseparationfromthe
Executive.
15.TheopinionrenderedbymylearnedbrotherSh.AzmatSaeed,J.hascarefully
examinedandrejectedtheobjectiontothevalidityofthe21stAmendmentonthetouchstoneof
independenceoftheJudiciaryasasalientfeatureoftheConstitution.Iwouldonlyaddthatalimited
classofterroristmilitantsbearingattributesthathavealreadybeendescribedabovearemadethe
subjectofCourtMartialtrialsundertheArmyAmendmentAct.Inacasewhereexecutiveactionis
occasionedbythedutyoftheFederalGovernmenttodefendPakistan,theCourtsexerciserestraint
becausenationalsuccessinthewaristobeensuredinordertoescapefromnationalplunderor
enslavementTheabovementionedjudicialobservationmadeinthecaseofFarooqAhmedKhan
Leghariv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1999SC57),justifiesjudicialrestraintinsuchcircumstances.
However,evenheretheCourtneverthelesslookstotheproportionalityoftheexecutiveactiontakenin
retaliationtotheseverityofthewarbeingwaged;inthepresentcase,byterroristmilitantsagainst
Pakistan.Thesaidjudgmentatpage191ofthelawreportmakesthefollowingstatementoflaw:
Inmyview,adistinctionistobemadebetweenanemergencywhichisimposedwhenacountryis
engagedinanactualwarorissubjectedtoactualexternalaggressionandwhenthesameisimposedon
accountofimminentdangerthereofforthepurposeofsuspensionoffundamentalrightsand
continuationoftheemergency.Intheformercase,theaboveLatinmaximinterarmasilentleges(i.e.
whenthereisanarmedconflict,thelawremainssilent)orthatthenationalsuccessinthewaristobe
ensuredinordertoescapefromnationalplunderorenslavementevenifthepersonallibertyandother
rightsofthecitizensaresacrificedasobservedbyLordAtkinsoninthecaseofKingv.Halliday(supra)
wouldbeapplicable.Butinthelattercasetheruleofproportionalityistobefollowedaspropoundedby
someoftheeminentauthorsandadoptedunderaboveArticle4oftheInternationalConventionsof
CivilandPoliticalRights.
16.ThenarrowclassofpersonsaffectedbytheArmyAmendmentAct,thereviewabilityto
theExecutivedecisiontoselectpersonsonthebasisofstatutorycriteriaandlimiteddurationofthe
constitutionalimmunitygiventosuchCourtsMartialimposelimitationsthatindicateproportionalityin
thelegislativemeasuresadoptedbytheParliament.
17.Needlesstosay,theprincipleslaiddowninSh.LiaquatHussainscase(supra)pertain
totheArmedForcesbeingcalledtoactinaidofcivilpower.TheMilitaryForcescanassistbutnot
replacecivilpower.ThepresentcaseoftheArmedForcesdefendingPakistanfrombelligerentmilitancy
expandstheambitofmilitaryactionbutsubjecttothedirectionoftheFederalGovernmentandinthe
presentcasealsosubjecttothelawenactedbyParliament.
18.Whilstconstruingthepresentsituationinthecountryasastateofwardeclaredby
terroristmilitantsagainstPakistan,thereareseveralindicatorsapartfromthelossesinflictedonthe
Stateandthenationwhichexemplifywartimeconditions.Thelevelofcoordination,organizationand
networkingofterroristorganizationswithinandoutsidePakistan,theirdeclaredobjectivesfor
undertakingterroristactivitiesasgatheredfromtheirprofileonthesocialmediaandfromtheirprinted
literature,thevastareaandscaleoftheiroperationsinthecountrywhereinterroristoperationshave
beenexecuted,thedegreeandscaleofviolencethathasbeenperpetratedtoshatterStateresistance.
DataontheforgoingfactorsshowntotheCourtbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralforPakistanreveals
increasingboldnessoftheterroristmilitantstodebilitateandtherebycrumbletheState.Thissituation
ismademoreseriousbythetheatreofwarextendingacrossallmajorcitiesofthecountry.
19.Theterroristmilitantsoperatinginthecountrybelongtodifferentgroupsand
organizations.Sometimestheiractionsmaybecoordinated,however,thesegroupsdonothavea
unifiedcommand,nordotheywearanidentifiableuniformordistinctivesigninordertoberecognized;
theyoperatebyresorttosubterfuge,perfidyanddisguisewithoutregardtotherulesgoverningwar.
Thesaidelementsandcharacteristicsmakethecaseofterroristmilitancymoresinisterthanenemy
Statecombatantswhoabidetheaforementionedinternationalnorms.Thetreatmentofbelligerent
citizenandunlawfulcombatantsincustodywhohavewagedwaragainsttheStateisnotjustamatterof
municipallaw.Thesubjectalsoattractstheprinciplesofpublicinternationallawonarmedconflictand
war.
20.TherewasatimewhenciviliansandcombatantsbelongingtoanenemyStatewere
treatedmercilesslyandinhumanelybyadetainingStatetoexactvengeanceorextractworkor
advantage.Thehumanrightslawsinrelationtoprisonersofwarandciviliansincaptivityofadetaining
StatecametobeexpressedthroughfourGenevaConventionsconcludedintheyear1949underthe
aegisoftheUnitedNations.Pakistanhasratifiedtheseinternationalconventions,whicharementioned
below:
i)1stGenevaConventionfortheAmeliorationoftheWoundedandSickinArmedForcesand
Field;
ii)2ndGenevaConventionfortheAmeliorationoftheConditionofWoundedSickand
ShipwreckedMembersofArmedForcesatSea;
iii)3rdGenevaConventionRelativetotheTreatmentofPrisonersofWar;
iv)4thGenevaConventionrelativetotheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWar;
ThetwoConventionsrelevantforourpresentdiscussionarethe3rdGenevaConventionrelativetothe
TreatmentofPrisonersofWarandthe4thGenevaConventionrelativetotheProtectionofCivilPersons
inTimeofWar.AccordingtoArticle4ofthe3rdGenevaConvention:
Prisonersofwararepersons,whohavefallenintothepoweroftheenemyStateandwhoaremembers
ofthearmedforcesofapartytotheconflictormembersofmilitiasorvolunteercorpsformingpartof
sucharmedforces;membersofothermilitiasandmembersofothervolunteercorps,thatdonotform
partoftheregulararmedforcesmayalsoqualifyforthestatusofprisonersofwar,providedthemilitia
orvolunteercorpsis:
a)commandedbyapersonresponsibleforhissubordinates;
b)suchmilitiaorvolunteercorpshasfixeddistinctivesignrecognizableatadistance;
c)suchmilitiaorvolunteercorpscarryarmsopenly;
d)suchmilitiaorvolunteercorpsconductsitsoperationinaccordancewithlawsandcustomsof
war.
21.Inthefactsofthepresentcase,thepersonsengagedinwagingwaragainstPakistan
througharmedconflict,insurrection,terrorismandmilitancydonotbelongtotheArmedForcesofany
State.Althoughthecombatantsarememberofterroristgroupsormilitiayetthesegroupslackthe
abovenotedfourelementsthatqualifysuchgroupsforprotectionasprisonersofwar.Consequently,the
terroristmilitantsfightingagainstPakistanandcapturedbytheArmedForcesofPakistanmaybe
consideredforprotectionunderthe4thGenevaConventiondealingwithciviliansinthecaptivityofa
partytotheconflictofwhichtheyarenotnationals.Article3ofthesaidConventionenumeratesthe
essentialhumanrightsrestraintsimposedinthisrespectonadetainingpower.Theseincludenon
discriminatorytreatmentofcivilianswithoutdistinctionfoundedonrace,colour,religionorfaith,
genderorothersimilarcriteria.Inthisrespectaprohibitionisimposedagainstviolencetothelifeand
personofthecaptiveciviliansinparticularmurderofallkinds,mutilation,crueltreatmentandtorture,
takingofhostages,outragesuponpersonaldignityinparticularhumiliatinganddegradingtreatment.
Finallyandmoreimportantly,passingofsentencesandcarryingoutofexecutionswithoutprevious
judgmentpronouncedbyaregularlyconstitutedcourt,affordingallthejudicialguaranteeswhichare
recognizedasindispensablebycivilizedpeoples.
22.Beforedealingwiththemodeandmanneroftrialofcivilianswhoareinthecustodyof
adetainingState,itisimportanttohighlightthosecivilianpersonsthatareexcludedfromthehuman
rightsdispensationaccordedbythe4thGenevaConvention.SuchpersonsarelistedinArticle5ofthe
saidConventionwhichprovidesthat:
Where,intheterritoryofaPartytotheconflict,thelatterissatisfiedthatanindividual
protectedpersonisdefinitelysuspectedoforengagedinactivitieshostiletothesecurityoftheState,
suchindividualpersonshallnotbeentitledtoclaimsuchrightsandprivilegesunderthepresent
Conventionaswould,ifexercisedinthefavourofsuchindividualperson,beprejudicialtothesecurityof
suchState.
Whereinoccupiedterritoryanindividualprotectedpersonisdetainedasaspyorsaboteur,orasa
personunderdefinitesuspicionofactivityhostiletothesecurityoftheOccupyingPower,suchperson
shall,inthosecaseswhereabsolutemilitarysecuritysorequires,beregardedashavingforfeitedrights
ofcommunicationunderthepresentConvention.
Ineachcase,suchpersonsshallneverthelessbetreatedwithhumanity,andincaseoftrial,shallnotbe
deprivedoftherightsoffairandregulartrialprescribedbythepresentConvention.Theyshallalsobe
grantedthefullrightsandprivilegesofaprotectedpersonunderthepresentConventionattheearliest
dateconsistentwiththesecurityoftheStateorOccupyingPower,asthecasemaybe.(emphasis
provided)
ItisclearlynoticeablefromtheaboveexclusionaryArticle5ofthe4thGenevaConventionthata
belligerentcivilianwhohascommittedhostileactsagainstthedetainingStatemayforfeitcertainhuman
rightsprivilegesunderthesaidConvention;however,heremainsentitledtoafairandregulartrial
prescribedbythesaidConvention.
23.Articles66of4thGenevaConventionprovidesthatanaccusedcivilianshallbetriedby
aproperlyconstitutednonpoliticalMilitaryCourt,whichshallapplyonlythoseprovisionsoflawwhich
wereapplicablepriortotheoffence,andwhichareinparticular,inaccordancewiththeprinciplethat
thepenaltyshallbeproportionatetotheoffence(Article67).Article71oftheConventionprovidesthat
anaccusedcivilianpersonshallbepromptlyinformedinwritingoftheparticularsofthecharges
preferredagainsthim,inalanguagethathecanunderstand.Article72ofthesaidConventionprovides
thatanaccusedcivilianpersonshallhavearighttopresentevidencenecessaryforhisdefenceandmay
callwitnesses;heshallhavearighttobeassistedbyaqualifiedadvocatewhoshallbeabletovisithim
freely.Article73oftheConventionprovidesthattheconvictedpersonshallhavearightofappealabout
whichheshallbefullyinformedincludingthetimelimitforavailingsuchremedy.
24.Theprovisionsofthe3rdGenevaConventionrelativetothetreatmentofprisonersof
waralsoassuressimilarrightstoaprisonerundertrialandthatitsArticle99specifiesthataprisoner
maynotbetriedorsentencedforanewoffenceenforcedretrospectively.Article102ofthesaid
Conventionhowevermakesasubstantivelawprovisionthataprisonerofwarcanbevalidlysentenced
onlyifsentencehasbeenpronouncedbythesameCourtaccordingtothesameprocedureasinthecase
ofmembersofArmedForceofthedetainingState.Itisnoticedthatunliketrialofabelligerentcivilian
byaMilitaryCourt,theinternationallawensuresthataprisonerofwaristriedbyaCourtMartial.Inthe
instantcasebeforetheCourt,theArmyAmendmentActassuresaterroristmilitantfallingwithinthe
qualifyingclass,totrialbyCourtMartial.Thedueprocessextendedtoawarringterroristmilitantwho
doesevennotmeetthecriteriaofprisonerofwar,isthesameasthatgrantedtoaloyalservicemanof
theArmedForces.Theprinciplesofinternationallawbroadlycapitulatedaboverepresenttheessence
oftheguaranteeofdueprocessextendedtoadetainedbelligerentcivilianortoaprisonerofwar.Two
Protocolsonthesubjectoftreatmentofprisonersofwarandonthetreatmentofcivilianpersonsin
timeofwarwereconcludedpursuanttotheaforementionedGenevaConventionsintheyear1977.
Withoutmakingsignificantchanges,theseProtocolsarenotmateriallydifferentfromtheConventions
andfurtherelaboratetheprinciplesenshrinedinthelatter.However,Pakistanhasnotratifiedthesaid
Protocolsandtherefore,referencetheretoisunnecessary.
25.Beforeundertakingacomparisonofthethresholdconditionsoftrialassuredbythe
aforenotedGenevaConventions,withthetermsoftrialbeforetheCourtsMartialunderthePAA,itis
usefultoexaminethelegalprecedentsaboutthetrialofaciviliancitizencommittinghostileactivities
againsthisownState.InthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussain(supra),thisCourthasreferredtoanumberof
internationalprecedents,drawnfromtheCommonwealthjurisdictionandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica
(US).InthecaseofExParteMilligan[71US281](1866),theUSSupremeCourtallowedthepleaona
habeascorpuspetitiontoreleaseaUScitizen,whowasallegedduringtheAmericancivilwartohave
conspiredtodoactsagainsttheUSGovernmentanditsarsenal.HewasputtotrialbeforeaMilitary
Commissionandwassentencedtodeathforcommittingtheallegedoffences.TheUSSupremeCourt
observedthat:
ItisthebirthrightofeveryAmericancitizenwhenchargedwithcrimetobetriedandpunished
accordingtolaweverytrialinvolvestheexerciseofjudicialpowerandfromthatsourcedidnot
militarycommissionthattriedhimderivetheirauthority?Certainlynopartofjudicialpowerofthe
countrywasconferredonthem;becausetheConstitutionexpresslyvestsitinoneSupremeCourtand
suchinferiorCourtsastheCongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish,anditsisnot
pretendedthatthecommissionwasaCourtordainedandestablishedbyCongress.
ItwasheldthatthePresidentcouldnotintheexerciseofhisexecutiveauthorityorderthetrialofan
AmericancitizenbyMilitaryCommission.ThesaidAmericanprecedentiswidelyhailedforprotecting
civiliansrighttocriminaltrialbeforethecivilCourtsoftheState.Thisjudgment,however,gavethe
abovefindingbasedupontheconclusionthatthecircumstancesandconditionsofthecasedidnot
attractthelawofwar.
26.InthematterofExParteQuirin[317US1](1942),thepetitionersfiledapplicationsfor
leavetofilepetitionsofhabeascorpusbeforetheUSSupremeCourt.Oneofthepetitioners,namely,
HauptclaimedtobeaUScitizenwhilsttheremainingpetitionerswereGermannationalswhohadbeen
capturedwithintheterritoryoftheUSandwereputtotrialbeforeaMilitaryCommissiononchargesof
possessingexplosivesforthedestructionofwarindustrialsupply.TheUSSupremeCourtdealtwiththe
consequencesofhostileactscommittedbyacitizenoftheUSinthefollowingterms:
CitizenshipintheUnitedStatesofanenemybelligerentdoesnotrelievehimfromtheconsequencesof
abelligerencywhichisunlawfulbecauseinviolationofthelawofwar.Citizenswhoassociate
themselveswiththemilitaryarmoftheenemygovernment,and,withitsaid,guidanceanddirection,
enterthiscountrybentonhostileacts,areenemybelligerentswithinthemeaningoftheHague
Conventionandthelawofwar.ItisasanenemybelligerentthatpetitionerHauptischargedwith
enteringtheUnitedStates,andunlawfulbelligerencyisthegravamenoftheoffenseofwhichheis
accused.
WithrespecttothefindingsofbelligerencycommittedbythepetitionerHaupt,theUSSupremeCourt
adoptedadistinctionbetweenlawfulandunlawfulcombatantsappliedinthepublicinternationallawin
situationsofarmedconflictwithaState.Itwasobservedthat:
Byuniversalagreementandpractice,thelawofwardrawsadistinctionbetweenthearmedforcesand
thepeacefulpopulationsofbelligerentnations,andalsobetweenthosewhoarelawfulandunlawful
combatants.Lawfulcombatantsaresubjecttocaptureanddetentionasprisonersofwarbyopposing
militaryforces.Unlawfulcombatantsarelikewisesubjecttocaptureanddetention,but,inaddition,
theyaresubjecttotrialandpunishmentbymilitarytribunalsforactswhichrendertheirbelligerency
unlawful.Thespywhosecretlyandwithoutuniformpassesthemilitarylinesofabelligerentintimeof
war,seekingtogathermilitaryinformationandcommunicateittotheenemy,oranenemycombatant
whowithoutuniformcomessecretlythroughthelinesforthepurposeofwagingwarbydestructionof
lifeorproperty,arefamiliarexamplesofbelligerentswhoaregenerallydeemednottobeentitledtothe
statusofprisonersofwar,buttobeoffendersagainstthelawofwarsubjecttotrialandpunishmentby
militarytribunals.
Whilstdismissingthepetitionsforhabeascorpusrelief,theUSSupremeCourtaddressedthelawlaidin
ExParteMilligan[71US281](1866)andexplaineditsinapplicabilitytothecasesofunlawfulcombatants
actingonbehalfofabelligerentenemyinthefollowingterms:
Petitioners,andespeciallypetitionerHaupt,stressthepronouncementofthisCourtintheMilligan
case,supra,
p.71U.S.121,thatthelawofwarcanneverbeappliedtocitizensinstateswhichhaveupheldthe
authorityofthegovernment,andwherethecourtsareopen,andtheirprocessunobstructed."
Elsewhereinitsopinion,atpp.71U.S.118,71U.S.121122and71U.S.131,theCourtwasatpainsto
pointoutthatMilligan,acitizentwentyyearsresidentinIndiana,whohadneverbeenaresidentofany
ofthestatesinrebellion,wasnotanenemybelligerenteitherentitledtothestatusofaprisonerofwar
orsubjecttothepenaltiesimposeduponunlawfulbelligerents.WeconstruetheCourt'sstatementasto
theinapplicabilityofthelawofwartoMilligan'scaseashavingparticularreferencetothefactsbefore
it.Fromthem,theCourtconcludedthatMilligan,notbeingapartoforassociatedwiththearmedforces
oftheenemy,wasanonbelligerent,notsubjecttothelawofwarsaveasincircumstancesfoundnot
theretobepresent,andnotinvolvedheremartiallawmightbeconstitutionallyestablished.
27.Theforegoingdecisiononthelawregardingabelligerentcitizeninarmedconflictwith
hisownStatefirstlyyieldstheconclusionthatsuchpersonsareliabletobetreatedunderthelawofwar
andfortheoffencescommittedbythemasbelligerents,thecompetentforafortheirtrialareMilitary
Tribunals.Theircasesaredistinguishablefromdelinquentcivilianswhodonotviolatethelawofwar.
TheywouldremainentitledtoprosecutionandtrialbeforethecriminalCourtsofthecountryin
accordancewiththeordinarycriminallaw.Areadingofthe3rd&4thGenevaConventionsandthe
aforementionedtwodecisionsoftheUSSupremeCourtbringtolightanimportantdistinctionwhich
wasnevercanvassedbeforeorconsideredbythisCourtinthecaseofSh.LiaquatHussain(supra).That
judgmentreiteratestheprincipleslaiddowninthecaseofMehramAliv.FederationofPakistan(PLD
1998SC1445)abouttheconditionstobemetbyaCourtoflawforgrantofafairtrialtoanaccused.
ThesaidrequisitesinaCourtoflawwereexploredinthecaseofMehramAli(ibid)whichlaysdownfar
reachinglawonthesubject.PursuanttoArticles175,202and203oftheConstitution,thetwo
judgmentsemphasizeinparticular,theseparationofJudiciaryfromtheExecutiveandhenceassert
independenceoftheJudiciary,including,itspowerofJudicialReviewoverallsubordinateforaexercising
judicialpower,tobeahallmarkofourConstitution.Equally,theMehramAli(supra)judgment
emphasizestherightofaccesstojusticetoallasafundamentalright,whichismeaninglessinthe
absenceofindependenceofJudiciarythatprovidesimpartial,justandfairadjudicationbyahierarchyof
judicialforacomprisingjudges,enjoyingsecurityoftenure,appointedandsupervisedbytheHighCourt
ofeachProvince.
28.WithutmostrespecttotheilluminatingjurisprudencelaiddownbothinMehramAli
andSh.LiaquatHussaincases(supra),itmaybeobservedthatthesaidprinciplesapplytocriminal
administrationofjusticebythecivilCourtsoftheland.Theseconstitutionalprinciplescannotbe
adoptedacrosstheboardforthetrialofterroristmilitants,whoareengagedinwagingwaragainst
Pakistan,interalia,throughbelligerentandhostilearmedconflictwiththeArmedForcesandlaw
enforcementagenciesofPakistan.Trialofsuchoffencesissubjecttotheminimumguaranteesafforded
bythe1949GenevaConventions,byapplicationofthelawofwar.Thisclassificationappealstocommon
senseandisalsojustifiedbythefailureoftheExecutivetoputupcasesofsuchpersonsfortrialbythe
ordinarycivilCourtsofthecountry.Deficienciesinthepoliceinvestigationorthecriminalprosecutionin
accordancewithapplicablemunicipallawshavefailedtoyieldresultsthatcanhaveapenalordeterrent
effect.Theacquittalrateofnearly80%ofallcasestriedanddecidedbytheAntiTerrorismCourtsis
predominantly,ifnotwholly,attributabletotheincapacityofthecivilianexecutiveauthoritiestodeal
withterroristoffencesinvolvingheinouscrimes.
29.ThejudgmentinExParteQuirin[317US1](1942)cameunderreviewoftheUS
SupremeCourtinnumberofcases.Inrecentyears,inthematterofHamdiv.Rumsfeld[542US507]
(2004),aUScitizennamedYaserEsamHamdiwasdetainedasanenemycombatanthavingbeen
capturedinanarmedconflictzone.Onahabeascorpuspetitionfiledbythedetaineesfather,theUS
SupremeCourtconsidered:
ThethresholdquestionbeforeusiswhethertheExecutivehastheauthoritytodetaincitizenswho
qualifyasenemycombatants.
AfterapprovingthejudgmentinExParteQuirin[317US1](1942),theUSSupremeCourtobservedthat:
Ontheothersideofthescalearetheweightyandsensitivegovernmentalinterestsinensuringthat
thosewhohaveinfactfoughtwiththeenemyduringawardonotreturntobattleagainsttheUnited
States.strikingtheproperconstitutionalbalancehereisofgreatimportancetotheNationduringthis
periodofongoingcombat.Butitisequallyvitalthatourcalculusnotgiveshortshrifttothevaluesthat
thiscountryholdsdearortotheprivilegethatisAmericancitizenship.Wethereforeholdthata
citizendetaineeseekingtochallengehisclassificationasanenemycombatantmustreceivenoticeof
thefactualbasisforhisclassificationandafairopportunitytorebuttheGovernmentsfactualassertions
beforeaneutraldecisionmaker.Atthesametime,theexigenciesofthecircumstancesmaydemand
that,asidefromthesecoreelements,enemycombatantproceedingsmaybetailoredtoalleviatetheir
uncommonpotentialtoburdentheExecutiveatatimeofongoingmilitaryconflict.Hearsay,for
example,mayneedtobeacceptedasthemostreliableavailableevidencefromtheGovernmentinsuch
aproceeding.Likewise,theConstitutionwouldnotbeoffendedbyapresumptioninfavorofthe
Governmentsevidence,solongasthatpresumptionremainedarebuttableoneandfairopportunityfor
rebuttalwereprovided.Thus,oncetheGovernmentputsforthcredibleevidencethatthehabeas
petitionermeetstheenemycombatantcriteria,theonuscouldshifttothepetitionertorebutthat
evidencewithmorepersuasiveevidencethathefallsoutsidethecriteria.Aburdenshiftingschemeof
thissortwouldmeetthegoalofensuringthattheerranttourist,embeddedjournalist,orlocalaid
workerhasachancetoprovemilitaryerrorwhilegivingdueregardtotheExecutiveonceithasput
forthmeaningfulsupportforitsconclusionthatthedetaineeisinfactanenemycombatant.
Havinglaiddownthecriteriatomakedetentionjusticiable,theUSSupremeCourtproceeded
neverthelesstoentrustthedeterminationofanenemycombatantsstatustoadulyauthorizedand
competentlyconstitutedMilitaryTribunalinthefollowingterms:
Thereremainsthepossibilitythatthestandardswehavearticulatedcouldbemetbyanappropriately
authorizedandproperlyconstitutedmilitarytribunal.Indeed,itisnotablethatmilitaryregulations
alreadyprovideforsuchprocessinrelatedinstances,dictatingthattribunalsbemadeavailableto
determinethestatusofenemydetaineeswhoassertprisonerofwarstatusundertheGeneva
Convention.
30.ThecaseofHamdiv.Rumsfeld[542US507](2004)upholdsthatanenemycombatant
whoisabelligerentcitizendescribedasanunlawfulcombatantinExParteQuirin[317US1](1942)is
liabletotrialbyaMilitaryTribunalunderthelawofwar.Thecaseisalsosignificantbecauseitmakes
themilitaryauthoritiesaccountableforsettingoutthecriteriaonthebasisofwhichacivilianisdetained
ontheallegationofbeinganenemycombatant.Inthecasebeforeus,theprovisionsofthesecond
provisotoamendedSection2(1)(d)(iii)ofthePAAplacestheselectionoftheterroristmilitantstobe
prosecutedandtriedbyCourtsMartialinthehandoftheFederalGovernment.Thecompetent
executiveauthorityisobligatedbylawtotakeitsdecisionjustly,fairlyandreasonablyinthematterof
selectingthecaseofaterroristmilitantfortrialbyCourtMartial.
31.Consequently,theFederalGovernmentisunderadutytodecideeachcaseselected
fortrialbyCourtMartialafterconsciousapplicationofmindtotherelevantstatutorycriteriaandfor
reasonsthatarereflectedontherecord.TheselectionofpersonsfortrialbyCourtsMartialisguidedby
thecriterialaiddownintheArmyAmendmentActcontainingingredientsofspecifiedoffences.The
principaloffenceamongstthesebeingtheraisingofarmorwagingwaragainstPakistanorattackingthe
ArmedForcesofPakistanorlawenforcementagenciesorattackinganycivilormilitaryinstallationin
Pakistan.Anotherattributeisthecommissionofthespecifiedoffencebyterroristmilitantscapturedin
combatorotherwise,orthecommissionoftheseoffencesbytheaiders,abettors,conspiratorsofsuch
capturedpersons.ThejudicialscrutinyofExecutivereasonsandrecordselectingacaseforCourtMartial
trialisoutsidetheprohibitioncontainedinArticle199(3)oftheConstitutionand,therefore,maybe
judiciallyreviewedinachallengefiledbyanallegedbelligerentcombatantwhoisaccusedofbeinga
terroristmilitantwithinthemeaningofSection2(1)(a)(iii)ofthePAA.Assuchapersonfallingwithinthe
mischiefofthesaidprovisionhasajudicialremedyavailabletohimbeforethecompetentconstitutional
CourtsofPakistanforchallengingtheexecutivedecisiontoselecthimasabelligerentcombatantoras
anaider,abettororconspiratorofsuchcombatant,fortrialbyCourtMartial.
32.Inthecaseofanunsuccessfulchallengetoanentrustmentoftrialofabelligerent
combatanttoaCourtMartial,whetherunderthesecondprovisotoSection2(1)(d)(iii)ofthePAAorin
exerciseofthepoweroftransferconferredontheFederalGovernmentunderSection2(4)ofthesaid
Act,theaffectedpersonisliabletobetriedbyaCourtMartial.Article199(3)oftheConstitutionbars
thejurisdictionoftheCourtinrespectofanyactiontakeninrelationtoapersonsubjecttothePAA.In
thelightoftheaforementionedinternationalhumanrightslawandjudicialopinionbasedthereonthe
natureofarmedconflictinwhichterroristmilitantcombatantsareengagedinwagingwaragainst
PakistanwiththeArmedForcesandthelawenforcementagenciesofPakistan,itiscrystalclearthat
suchcombatantshavenexuswiththedefenceofPakistanandarefitsubjectsforinclusionwithinthe
ambitofthePAAforthepurposeoftheirdetention,trialorpunishmentinaccordancewiththelawsof
PakistanbyCourtsMartialconstitutedunderthePAA.Consequently,theproceedingsofsuchCourts
Martialcannotbeinterruptedorchallenged.However,ifsuchproceedingshaveconcludedina
convictionandsentence,achallengetothesameisavailable,consistentwiththelawlaiddowninF.B.
Aliv.State(PLD1975SC506),ShahidaZahirAbbasiv.PresidentofPakistan(PLD1996SC632)and
MushtaqAhmedv.Secy.MinistryofDefence(PLD2007SC405)onthegroundsofproceedingsunder
thePAAbeingcorumnonjudice,withoutjurisdictionormalafide.
33.Themandategiven,interalia,totrialunderthePAAnecessarilyraisesthequestion
whetheraCourtMartialtrialconformsthejudiciallyrecognizedprinciplesoffairadjudicationby
providingrequisitedueprocess.Theinternationallawaspectofthismatterhasbeendiscussedabove
andtherecanbenodisputethatCourtMartialprocedureunderthePAAcompliestheminimum
safeguardsexpectedbytheGenevaConventions,1949.Bethatasitmay,thestandardandadequacyof
dueprocessprovidedbyCourtsMartialunderthePAAhasbeenconsideredandapprovedbythisCourt
asbeingsufficientandsatisfactoryinthecaseofShahidaZahirAbbasi(ibid).TheCourtdealtwiththis
issueinthelightofexistinglawandquotedatlengthfromthecaseofF.B.Ali(ibid).Referenceismade
tothefollowingpassage:
WhetherthetrialofapersonaccusedofacriminaloffencebyaCourtMartialcouldbeconsidereda
faircriminaltrial,wasconsideredatlengthbythisCourtinthecaseofF.B.Aliv.State(PLD1975SC506).
AnwarulHaq,J.(ashislordshipthenwas)whileconsideringthevalidityofatrialbyaMilitaryTribunalin
thecontextofafairtrial,observedasfollows:
Itseemstome,therefore,that,asheldinCh.ManzoorEllahiscasetheinjunctionasembodiedin
FundamentalRightNo.1ofthe1962ConstitutionrequiredtheCourttoensurethat:
(a)thedeprivationoflifeandlibertyofapersonisunderandinaccordancewithlaw;and
(b)thatthelawinquestionisavalidlawintermoftheConstitutionaswellastheacceptedforms
oflegalprocessobtaininginthecountry.
IfthelawviolatesacceptedlegalandjudicialnormsitwouldberepugnanttoArticle9ofthe
ConstitutioneventhoughitmayhavebeenenactedbyacompetentLegislature.
Comingnowtothesubstanceofthecontentionraisedonbehalfoftheappellantswithreferenceto
FundamentalRightNo.1ourattentionwasdrawnbyMr.M.Anwartothecriteriaofafairtrialas
enumeratedonpage197oftheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan(1962)byMr.M.Monir,
aformerChiefJusticeofPakistan.Accordingtothelearnedauthor,inacriminaltrial,anaccusedperson
hasunderthegenerallawsomeimportantrights.
Theyare:
(1)therighttoknowbeforethetrialthechargeandtheevidenceagainsthim;
(2)therighttocrossexaminetheprosecutionwitnesses;
(3)therighttoproduceevidenceindefence;
(4)therighttoappealortoapplyforrevision;
(5)therighttoberepresentedbycounsel;
(6)therighttohavethecasedecidedbytheJudgewhoheardtheevidence;
(7)therighttotrialbyjuryorwiththeaidofassessors;
(8)therighttocertainpresumptionsanddefences;and
(9)therighttoapplyfortransferofthecasetoanotherCourt.
TherightmentionedatNo.7isnolongeroperativeinPakistanastherequirementofatrialbyjuryor
withtheaidofassessorswasdispensedwithlongago.TheotherrightsenumeratedbyMr.Munirare
clearlyavailableinatrialbyaCourtMartial.AlthoughthereisnoappealtoahigherCourt,yetthe
convictedaccusedhasarightofrevisiontotheCommanderinChiefofthePakistanArmyortothe
FederalGovernmentundersection131and167ofthePakistanArmyAct.ItistruethataCourtMartial
isnotrequiredtowriteadetailedjudgment,asiscommonlydonebytheordinaryCriminalCourtsofthe
country,yetthisisobviouslynotoneoftheessentialsofafairtrial,itbeingintendedmoreforthe
benefitoftheAppellateCourtratherthanforthatoftheaccused.
Imayaddthat,asobservedbyHalsburyonpage825,theCourtsMartialarepartsofthe
ordinarylawoftheland,andmustnotbeconfusedwithMartialLawCourtswhicharebroughtinto
existenceonsuspensionoftheordinarylaw.Anycriticismormisgivingsattachingtothefunctioningof
militaryCourtsunderMartialLawcannotbeimportedintoaconsiderationofthefairnessoftrialheldby
CourtsMartialestablishedundertherelevantActsfortheArmy,NavyandAirforce.TheseCourts
Martialareintendedtoregulatethedisciplineandconductofthepersonneloftherespectiveforces,
andofallotherpersonswhomaybemadesubjecttotheselawsincertaincircumstances.Theyarethus
establishedinstitutionswithwellknownprocedures,whichcannotbedescribedasarbitrary,perverse
orlackinginfairnessinanymanner.
Iam,therefore,oftheviewthatthereisnomeritinthecontentionthatatrialbycourtMartialviolates
theacceptedjudicialprinciplegoverningafairtrialasobtaininginPakistan.
Fromtheabovequotedpassage,itisquiteclearthattherulesofprocedureapplicablefortrialofa
personinacriminalcasebeforeaMilitaryCourtdonotviolateanyacceptedjudicialprinciplegoverning
trialofanaccusedperson.WiththeassistanceoflearnedAttorneyGeneralandthelearnedcounselfor
thepetitionerswehavegonethroughvariousprovisionsoftheActgoverningtheprocedureoftrial
beforeaMilitaryCourtandaftergoingthroughthesame,Iamoftheviewthattheprocedure
prescribedfortrialbeforeMilitaryCourtsisinnowaycontrarytotheconceptofafairtrialinacriminal
case.Imayalsoaddhere,thatunlikethepreviouspositionwhennoappealwasprovidedagainstthe
convictionandsentenceawardedbyaMilitaryCourt,theActnowprovidesanappealagainstthe
convictionandsentenceawardedbyaMilitaryCourtbeforeanappellateforum.
ThereaftertheCourtreferredtothePakistanArmyActRulestonotethatalongwithanabstractof
evidencemadebytheCommandingOfficer,copyofsignedstatementsgivenonoathbywitnesses
necessarytoprovethecharge,statementmadebytheaccusedafterreadingtheabstractofevidence,
aretobeprovidedtotheaccused,whoisentitledtoberepresentedbyacounsel,tostatehisdefence.
Section133BofthePAAincorporatedbyamendmentmadein1992providesasubstantiverightof
appealtoaconvictagainstanadversefindingandsentencegivenbyaCourtMartial.Thesaidlawwhich
hasbeenheldtoprovidesufficientlegalsafeguardsforafairtrialofthosecitizenwhoaremembersof
theArmedForceseveninrelationtooffencesfallingundertheordinarycriminallawofthecountry,
cannotsurelybesaidtobedeficientforthetrialofoffencesallegedtohavebeencommittedbyterrorist
militants,whofallinthecategoryofunlawfulcombatantengagedinarmedconflictwiththeArmed
ForcesandthelawenforcementagenciesofPakistanintheirbidtowagewaragainstPakistan.
34.IthasremainedacrucialconcernoftheCourtinthiscasethatnociviliancitizenof
PakistanshouldbeputtotrialbeforeaCourtMartialinthepurportedimplementationoftheimpugned
constitutionalandstatutoryamendments,wheninfacthedoesnotfallwithinthecategoryofoffenders
assignedforsuchtrialintheArmyAmendmentAct.Onthatscore,boththeExecutiveandJudicialfora
ofthecountrymustremainvigilanttopreventinjusticetoapersonwhofallsoutsidetheboundaries
definedfortheoffencesliabletotrialbyCourtMartialundertheArmyAmendmentAct.Thatsafeguard
mustbefaithfullyimplementedinPakistantoensurethatguaranteeofruleoflaw,independent
JudiciaryandaccesstojusticetoanaffectedcitizenbeforeanindependentJudiciaryisfullyperformed.
35.Revertingtothequestionwhethertheimpugnedamendmentssubstantiallyalterthe
salientfeatureofanindependentJudiciary,separationofJudiciaryandexerciseofjudicialpowerfrom
thehandsoftheExecutive,theanswerisanunambiguousno.Thatsalientfeatureisstillintactforall
citizenofPakistanexceptaminisculeclassofpersonscomprisingterroristmilitantswhohaveforsaken
theirdutyofloyaltytoPakistanandobediencetoitsConstitutionunderArticle5oftheConstitution.
ThereisnoprohibitioninourConstitutionagainsttreatingsuchterroristmilitantsasunlawful
combatantsorenemycombatantsandprovidingthemdueprocessunderthelawofwar.Even
otherwise,suchterroristmilitantshaveanadequateopportunitytochallengethedecisionofthe
executiveentrustingtheirtrialtoCourtsMartial.TheymayapproachtheHighCourtsofthecountry
presidedbyanindependentjudiciarytodeterminesuchchallenge.Inaccordancewithearlierlawlaid
downbythisCourt,eventhefindingandsentencegivenbytheappellateCourtunderthePAAmay
againbeassailedbyaconvictbeforetheHighCourtsofthecountryonthegroundthattheordersand
proceedingsunderthePAAarecorumnonjudice,withoutjurisdictionormalafide.TheConstitution
permitsvalidclassificationofpersonsformingsubjectmatterofalaw.Inthelightoflawdeclaredin
F.B.Aliscase(supra),theseparateclassificationofterroristmilitantsraisingarmsagainstorwagingwar
againstPakistanisbasedonintelligibledifferentiahavingnexustotheobjectoftrialofsuchunlawful
andbelligerentcombatants.Consequently,theseparationofthesaidclassofterroristmilitantsfortrial
byCourtsMartialassuresthemtherequisitesafeguardsapplicabletotheirclass.Assuchforthe
specifiedpersonsconnected,interalia,withnationaldefence,trialunderthePAAenjoysconstitutional
protectioninArticle8(3)oftheConstitution.The21stAmendmenthasaccordinglylawfullyextended
trialunderthePAAtoterroristmilitantswhoareunlawfulcombatants.
36.Alsofortheadditionalgroundsgivenabove,Irespectfullyagreewithfindingsand
resultoftheopinionrenderedbymylearnedbrotherSh.AzmatSaeed,J.
Sd/
(UmarAtaBandial)
Judge
QaziFaezIsa,J.ThepetitionershaveassailedcertainprovisionsoftheConstitution(Eighteenth
Amendment)Act,2010,ActXof2010(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on
20thApril2010)andtheConstitution(NineteenthAmendment)Act,2010,ActIof2011(publishedin
theGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on4thJanuary2011),andConstitution(Twentyfirst
Amendment)Act,2015,ActIof2015(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on8th
January2015),(hereinafterreferredtoasthe18thAmendment,19thAmendmentand21st
Amendment)whichamendedtheConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistan(hereinafterreferred
toastheConstitutionorthe1973Constitution).
OusterofJurisdictionArticle239(5)

2.ThepreliminaryobjectiontakenbyMr.SalmanAslamButt,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralfor
Pakistan,andMr.KhalidAnwer,thelearnedcounselfortheGovernmentofPakistan,isthatsucha
challengecannotbemadeletaloneheard;andinthisregardtheyreliedonclause(5)ofArticle239of
theConstitution,reproducedhereunder:
whatsoever.
Itisfurthercontendedthatclause(6)ofArticle239reinforcestheplainlanguageofthesaid
clause(5)asParliamenthasabsolutepowertoamendtheConstitutionashasbeenmadeclearby
Article239(6),reproducedhereunder:
(6)Fortheremovalofdoubt,itisherebydeclaredthatthereisnolimitationwhateveronthe
poweroftheMajliseShoora(Parliament)toamendanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitution.
Therefore,thefirstandforemostquestionrequiringexaminationiswhetherthestated
restrictioncontainedintheaforesaidclause(5)ofArticle239isapplicableandabsolute;needlessto
state,ifitis,thenthematterwouldpeacefullycometorestunderthecrushingweightofthisjuggernaut
provision.
OtherTypesofOusterofJurisdictionArticles203Fand247(7)
3.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralandthelearnedcounselfortheGovernmentcontendedthat
clause(5)ofArticle239stipulatesthatnoamendmenttotheConstitutionshallbecalledinquestion
inanycourtonanygroundwhatsoever.Therefore,itrequiresexaminationwhetheranycourt
includestheSupremeCourt.And,whethertheSupremeCourthasjurisdictiontoexaminea
constitutionalamendment?LetusproceedbyexaminingotherArticlesoftheConstitutionwhichalso
purporttooustthejurisdictionofthecourts.InArticle203G,reproducedhereunder,thebarof
jurisdictionspecificallyincludesSupremeCourtandHighCourts:
203G.SaveasprovidedinArticle203F,nocourtortribunal,includingtheSupremeCourtandaHigh
Court,shallentertainanyproceedingsorexerciseanypowerorjurisdictioninrespectofanymatter
withinthepowerorjurisdictionoftheCourt.[emphasisadded]
Additionally,inclause(7)ofArticle247,reproducedhereunder,boththeSupremeCourtand
theHighCourtarespecificallymentionedwithregardtoexerciseofjurisdiction:
NeithertheSupremeCourtnoraHighCourtshallexerciseanyjurisdictionundertheConstitutionin
relationtoaTribalArea,unlessMajliseShoora(Parliament)bylawotherwiseprovides.[emphasis
added]
OusterofJurisdictioninArticle236(2),whichisSimilartoArticle239(5),anditsInterpretation
4.LetusproceedtoexamineaprovisionoftheConstitutionthatuseslanguagesimilartotheone
usedinArticle239(5)andhowtheSupremeCourthasinterpretedit.Article239(5),whichissimilarly
wordedtoArticle236(2),reproducedhereunder:
ThevalidityofanyProclamationissuedorOrdermadeunderthispartshallnotbecalledinquestionin
anycourt.
TheabovementionedProclamationreferstotheProclamationofEmergencyissuedunderPart
XoftheConstitution,entitledEmergencyProvisions.InthereportedcaseofFarooqAhmadKhan
Leghariv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1999SupremeCourt57),asevenMemberBenchofthisCourt
consideredtheconstitutionalityoftheProclamationofEmergencydated28thMay1998issuedbythe
thenPresidentMuhammadRafiqTararinexerciseofpowersconferredbyArticle232ofthe
Constitution.Emergencywasimposedonthesameday,i.e.28thMay1998,thatPakistan,inresponse
totheIndiantestingofitsnucleardevices,alsocarriedoutnucleartests.TheProclamationinitially
suspendedallFundamentalRights,however,theorderimposingEmergencywasvariedon28thJuly
1998andthenceforthonlyFundamentalRightsprescribedinArticles10,15,16,17,18,19,23,24and
25weresuspended.Ch.MuhammadFarooq,thethenAttorneyGeneral,tooktheobjectionthatthe
SupremeCourtdidnothavejurisdictiontohearachallengetotheProclamation.Theobjectionofthe
AttorneyGeneralrecordedinthejudgment(atpage68)was:
Thattheabovepetitionsarenotonlybarredbyvirtueofclause(2)ofArticle236oftheConstitution
butalsoonaccountofthefactthattheenforcementoftherelevantFundamentalRightsstood
suspendedandhencethisCourthasnojurisdictiontopressintoserviceclause(3)ofArticle184ofthe
ConstitutionwhichrelatestotheenforcementofanyoftheFundamentalRightsconferredbyChapter1
ofPartIIoftheConstitution.
5.TheSupremeCourtheldthat,petitionsassailingtheProclamationofEmergencywere
maintainableandthattheSupremeCourtalsohadthejurisdictiontoexaminethecontinuationof
Emergencyatanystage.TheSupremeCourtdeterminedthat,primafacietherewassomematerialon
thebasisofwhichthePresidentcouldissuetheimpugnedProclamationofEmergencyonaccountof
imminentdangerofexternalaggression.However,thesamedidnotwarrantpassingofanorderunder
clause(2)ofArticle233oftheConstitutionsuspendingtheenforcementoftheFundamentalRights.
ThereasonsfornotallowingthesuspensionofFundamentalRightswerethefollowing(paragraph48,
page193):
(i)Thattheaboveviewfitsinwiththeabovemodernjurisprudentialtheoryofproportionality.
(ii)Thatasaruleofinterpretation,theCourtsshouldmakeeffortstopreservetheFundamental
RightsofthecitizenswhileconstruingtheConstitutionalprovisions.Thisaspect,Iintendtodealwith
hereinafterwhiletouchingupontheaforesaidsecondquestioninissue.
(iii)ThatthosewhohavetakenoathtoprotecttheConstitution,particularly,theJudgesofthe
SupremeCourtandtheHighCourtsareboundbytheiroathanddutiestoactsoastokeepthe
provisionsoftheConstitutionfullyaliveandoperative,topreserveitinallrespects,savefromall
defectsorharmandtostandfirmindefenceofitsprovisionsagainstattackofanykindasheldbythis
CourtinthecaseofFazlulQuaderChaudhry(supra),inwhichtheviewtakenisinlinewiththeabove
Constitutionalmandate.
(iv)ThateveninspiteofsuspensionoftheenforcementofcertainFundamentalRightsunderclause
(2)ofArticle233oftheConstitution,Article4thereofremainsfullyoperativewhichlaysdownthatto
enjoytheprotectionoflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlawistheinalienablerightofevery
citizenwhereverhemaybe,andofeveryotherpersonforthetimebeingwithinPakistan.
Inparticular
(a)noactiondetrimentaltothelife,liberty,body,reputationorpropertyofanypersonshallbe
takenexceptinaccordancewithlaw;
(b)nopersonshallbepreventedfromorbehinderedindoingthatwhichisnotprohibitedbylaw;
and
(c)nopersonshallbecompelledtodothatwhichthelawdoesnotrequiredhimtodo.
EstablishedPrinciplesofInterpretation
6.Itiswellsettledthatwheneverthereisaparticularenactmentandageneralenactment,which,
takeninitsmostcomprehensivesensewouldoverruletheformer,theparticularenactmentwould
prevail.TheConstitutionspecificallymentionstheSupremeCourtandoustsitsjurisdictioninsome
Articles,butinotherplaces,itsimplymentionsanycourt.Undersuchcircumstanceswhenaclear
distinctionbetweentermsisbeingdrawn,thegeneralousterclause(anycourt)cannotbeconstruedto
includetheSupremeCourt.
ThereisanotherestablishedprinciplethateverypartandeverywordoftheConstitutionis
significantandaninterpretationthatrendersanywordorprovisionmeaninglessmustbeavoided;
therefore,ifwediscardthewordsSupremeCourt(mentionedinArticle203Gandclause(7)ofArticle
247)and/orimportthesameintoArticle239(5),whichusesthewordsanycourtthestatedprinciple
ofinterpretationstandsviolated.TheConstitutionhasatplacesoustedthejurisdictionofanycourt
andinotherplacesexcludedthejurisdictionofallcourtsincludingtheSupremeCourt(Article203G)or
specificallyrestrainedtheSupremeCourtfromexercisingjurisdiction(clause(7)ofArticle247),
therefore,wemustgiveeffecttothisclearintentoftheConstitution.
WhenweexaminetheConstitutionasawhole,toascertainthecorrectmeaningofArticle239
(5),nodoubtisleftthatitdoesnotoustthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt.
(ReferencebythePresident,PLD1957SupremeCourt219,FazlulQuaderChowdhryv.Muhammad
AbdulHaque,PLD1963SupremeCourt486,FederationofPakistanv.GhulamMustafaKhar,PLD1989
SupremeCourt26,andHakimKhanv.GovernmentofPakistan,PLD1992SupremeCourt595areonlya
fewprecedentsamongstnumerousothersthatrecognizetheaforestatedrulesofinterpretation)
ConclusiononJurisdiction
7.TheConstitutionmentionstheSupremeCourtbynamewhenthejurisdictionoftheSupreme
Courtistobeousted,butwhenitdoesnotmentiontheSupremeCourt,jurisdictionisnotousted.The
learnedAttorneyGeneral,however,wantstounderminetheperspicuousskillsofthosewhodraftedthe
Constitution,butwemustnotinanymannerattributetotheframersoftheConstitutionlackofclarity
orapropensitytoobfuscatemeaning.Thus,theanswertothefirstquestion,whetherthetermany
courtusedinArticle239(5)includestheSupremeCourt,standsansweredinthenegative.
HistoricalContextofthe1973Constitution
8.Theaboveconclusionisalsosupportedifclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239areexaminedintheir
historicalcontexts.ThefreedomandindependencemovementspearheadedbytheAllIndiaMuslim
LeagueculminatedintheestablishmentofthesovereignstateofPakistanonthe14thdayofAugust
1947.ThefirstconstitutionaldocumentthatemergedwastheObjectivesResolutionadoptedby
Parliamenton12thMarch1949.Thisdocument,withminorvariations,hasadornedeachandevery
Constitutionthatwasframed:the1956Constitution,the1962Constitution,theinterim1972
Constitutionandfinallythe1973Constitution.The1956Constitutionlastedallof2yearsand7months
asitwasabrogatedbyPresidentIskanderMirzaon7thOctober1958.The1962Constitutionwasaone
mandocument,whichdepartedwithitspromulgatorGeneralAyubKhan.However,the1973
Constitutionwasrobustenoughtosustainitself.Theraisondetreofitsendurancemaywelllieinthe
factthatitwasadoptedunanimouslybythedirectlyelectedrepresentativesofthepeopleinafreeand
fairelection.The1973Constitutionhasgrowninstatureandhasfoundacceptanceintheheartsand
mindsofthepeopleofPakistansomuchsothateventheonslaughtsondemocracyandtheJudiciaryby
GeneralZiaulHaq(19771985)andGeneralPervezMusharraf(19992002)couldnotdislodgeit.The
1973Constitutionhascelebratedits42ndyearhavingsuccessfullyseenthebackofselfproclaimed
saviours.Thedictatorshoweverlefttheirimprintonthe1973Constitution.
InsertionofArticle239(5)&(6)intotheConstitutionandtheirPurpose
9.Clauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239wereinsertedbyGeneralZiaulHaqvidePresidentsOrderNo.
20of1985Constitution(SecondAmendment)Order,1985(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,
Extraordinary,PartI,on17thMarch1985)whichreceivedprotectionbyArticle270A,introducedbythe
Constitution(EighthAmendment)Act,1985,ActNo.XVIIIof1985(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,
Extraordinary,PartIon11thNovember1985).Parliamentarianswerepresentedwiththeproverbial
Hobsonschoice,eitheraccepttheGeneralinthepresidentialchairandbringthederaileddemocratic
carriagebackontotherailsorleaveittorust.Thelesserofthetwoevilswaschosen;andwhenaman
iscompelledtochooseoneoftwoevils,noonewillchoosethegreaterwhenhemighthavetheless
(Plato,TheRepublic).
10.Clauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239hadnoplaceintheoriginal1973Constitution.Thedevice
throughwhichtheseclauseswereinsertedalsoproclaimedthatthePresidentofPakistanshallbe
GeneralMuhammadZiaulHaqforaperiodoffiveyears;anewclause(7)wasaddedtoArticle41ofthe
ConstitutionthroughPresidentsOrder14of1985RevivaloftheConstitutionof1973Order,1985
(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on2ndMarch1985),whichisreproduced
hereunder:
(7)NotwithstandinganythingcontainedinthisArticleorArticle43oranyotherArticleofthe
Constitutionoranyotherlaw,GeneralMuhammadZiaulHaq,inconsequenceoftheresultofthe
referendumheldonthenineteenthdayofDecember,1984,shallbecomethePresidentofPakistanon
thedayofthefirstmeetingofMajliseShoora(Parliament)injointsittingsummonedaftertheelections
totheHousesofMajliseShoora(Parliament)andshallholdofficeforatermoffiveyearsfromthatday,
andArticle44andotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionshallapplyaccordingly.
Theinsertionofclauses(4)and(5)toArticle239ergowastosustainGeneralZiaulHaqinthe
usurpedofficeoftheRepublicsPresident.IronicallytheprovisionoftheConstitutionstipulatingthat
GeneralMuhammadZiaulHaq,shallholdtheofficeforatermoffiveyears,wasderidedbyhisdeath
beforetheendofhisterm.
SimilarProvisionsintheIndianConstitutionwereStruckDown
11.Thewordingofclauses(5)and(6)ofArticle239wasborrowedfromtheIndianConstitution
(42nd(Amendment)Actof1976),whichamendedArticle368oftheConstitutionofIndia.Thiswasdone
tosavethePrimeMinisterofIndia,Mrs.IndiraGandhi,fromdisqualification.Theparimateria
provisionsintheIndianConstitutionarereproducedhereinbelow:
Art.368.PowerofParliamenttoamendtheConstitutionandproceduretherefor:
(4)NoamendmentofthisConstitution(includingtheprovisionsofPartIII)madeorpurportingto
havebeenmadeunderthisarticle[whetherbeforeorafterthecommencementofSection55ofthe
Constitution(FortysecondAmendment)Act,1976]shallbecalledinquestioninanycourtonany
ground.
(5)Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveron
theconstituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealtheprovisionsof
thisConstitutionunderthisarticle.[Emphasisadded]
Pakistansmilitarydictatorfoundcommongroundwiththeperemptoryautocratictendency
fromacrosstheborder.TheSupremeCourtofIndia,inthecaseofMinervaMillsLtd.v.UnionofIndia
(AIR1980SupremeCourt1789)declaredthesaidamendmentstotheConstitutionofIndiaas
unconstitutionalandvoid.TheChiefJusticeofIndia,Y.V.Chandrachurdheld,that:
Clause(5)purportstoremovealllimitationsontheamendingpowerwhileClause(4)deprivesthe
courtsof,theirpowertocallinquestionanyamendmentoftheConstitution.OurConstitutionis
foundedonanicebalanceofpoweramongthethreewingsoftheState,namely,theExecutive,the
LegislatureandtheJudiciary.ItisthefunctionoftheJudges,naytheirduty,topronounceuponthe
validityoflaws.Ifcourtsaretotallydeprivedofthatpowerthefundamentalrightsconferreduponthe
peoplewillbecomeamereadornmentbecauserightswithoutremediesareaswritinwater.A
controlledConstitutionwillthenbecomeuncontrolled.Clause(4)ofArticle368totallydeprivesthe
citizensofoneofthemostvaluablemodesofredresswhichisguaranteedbyArt.32.Theconfermentof
therighttodestroytheidentityoftheConstitutioncoupledwiththeprovisionthatnocourtoflawshall
pronounceuponthevalidityofsuchdestructionseemstousatransparentcaseoftransgressionofthe
limitationsontheamendingpower.(page1799,paragraph26)
12.Sinceconsiderabletimewasspentbyanumberofcounselonthebasicstructuredoctrine,itis
appropriatetobrieflyexaminetheconcept.Toclarify,thisisnotbeingdonetovesttheSupremeCourt
withjurisdictionthroughthisdoctrine.IthasalreadybeendeterminedthatArticle239(5)doesnotoust
thejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtinexaminingthevalidityofaconstitutionalamendment.In
dismantlingtheaforementionedamendmentstheSupremeCourtofIndiadiscernedanimmutablebasic
structureintheIndianConstitution.Inaseriesofjudgments,startingfromKesavanandav.Stateof
Kerala(AIR1973SupremeCourt1461),ithasconsistentlyupheldthebasicstructuredoctrine;someof
therecentjudgmentsrecognizingthisbasicstructuredoctrineareI.R.Coelhov.StateofTamilNadu(AIR
2007SupremeCourt861),AshokKumarThakurv.UnionofIndia(AIR2008SC(Supp)1)andStateof
W.B.v.CommitteeforProtectionofDemocraticRights(AIR2010SupremeCourt1476).
13.TheSupremeCourtofBangladeshinthecaseofAnwarHossainv.Bangladesh(1989BW(Spl)1)
hasadheredtothetheoryofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution,alsocallingitthebasicfeatures,
structuralpillars,andfundamentalprinciples.InAnwarHossaintheSupremeCourtofBangladesh
held,that:
SupremacyoftheConstitutionasthesolemnexpressionofthewillofthepeople,Democracy,
RepublicanGovernment,UnitaryState,SeparationofPowers,IndependenceoftheJudiciary,
FundamentalRightsarebasicstructuresoftheConstitution.Thereisnodisputeabouttheiridentity.By
amendingtheConstitutiontheRepubliccannotbereplacedbyMonarchy,DemocracybyOligarchyor
theJudiciarycannotbeabolished,althoughthereisnoexpressbartotheamendingpowergiveninthe
Constitution.Principleofseparationofpowersmeansthatthesovereignauthorityisequallydistributed
amongthethreeOrgansandassuchoneOrgancannotdestroytheothers:Thesearestructuralpillarsof
theConstitutionandtheystandbeyondanychangebyamendatoryprocess.Sometimesitisarguedthat
thisdoctrineofbartochangeofbasicstructuresisbasedonthefearthatunlimitedpowerof
amendmentmaybeusedinatyrannicalmannersoastodamagethebasicstructures.Inviewofthefact
that"powercorruptsandabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely",Ithinkthedoctrineofbartochangeof
basicstructureisaneffectiveguaranteeagainstfrequentamendmentsoftheConstitutioninsectarian
orpartyinterestincountrieswheredemocracyisnotgivenanychancetodevelop.(page156,
paragraph377)
Pakistan:ReferencestoBasic/SalientFeaturesintheConstitution
14.ThefirsthintoftheSupremeCourtofPakistanidentifyingsomebasicfeaturesinthe
ConstitutionofPakistanwasinthecaseofFazlulQuaderChowdhryv.MuhammadAbdulHaque(PLD
1963SupremeCourt486)whereintheSupremeCourtconsideredthe1962Constitutionanddeclared
thatithadsomebasicprovisionsandheldthat,Themajordutyuponallconcernedincludingthe
Presidentwastobringthesefundamentalprovisionsintooperation(Cornelius,CJ,page511B).Justice
HamoodurRahmanconcurredwiththejudgmentofChiefJusticeCorneliusandbothheandJusticeB.Z.
Kaikausalsowroteseparatesupportingopinions.
15.WethencometothecaseofMissAsmaJillaniv.GovernmentofPunjab(PLD1972Supreme
Court139).JusticeHamoodurRahman,whohadbythenattainedthepositionofChiefJustice,heldthat,
Pakistansowngrundnormisenshrinedinitsowndoctrinethatthelegalsovereigntyovertheentire
universebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthorityexercisablebythepeoplewithinthelimits
prescribedbyHimisasacredtrust.Thisisanimmutableandunalterablenormwhichwasclearly
acceptedintheObjectivesResolutionpassedbytheConstituentAssemblyofPakistanonthe7thof
March,1949.However,thefollowingyearHamoodurRahman,CJ,inthecaseofStatev.ZiaurRehman
(PLD1973SupremeCourt49)surprisinglyinterpretedhisownjudgmentinAsmaJillaniandstatedthat
hehadnotsaid,thattheObjectivesResolutionisthegrundnormofPakistanbutthatthegrundnorm
isthedoctrineoflegalsovereigntyacceptedbythepeopleofPakistanandtheconsequencesthatflow
fromit.
16.InAlJehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996SupremeCourt324)theSupremeCourt
heldthat,whentherewasaconflictbetweentwoarticlesoftheConstitutioneffortshouldbemadeto
reconcilethembyreadingtheConstitutionasanorganicwhole.Aclosescrutinyofthevarious
provisionsoftheConstitutionhighlightsthatitenvisagesthattheindependenceofjudiciaryshouldbe
securedasprovidedbythefounderfathersofthecountrybypassingObjectivesResolutionThe
Constitutionalsoenvisagesseparationofjudiciaryfromtheexecutive(perAjmalMian,J,pages5156
LLLL).ThisjudgmentalsoreiteratedtheprinciplethatiftwoprovisionsoftheConstitutioncannotbe
reconciledthenprovisionsoftheoriginal1973Constitutionwouldprevailoverthoseincorporatedbya
dictator(pages365366G).
17.ThefollowingyeartheSupremeCourtonceagain,inMahmoodKhanAchakzaiv.Federationof
Pakistan(PLD1997SupremeCourt426),recognizedthesingularpositionoftheObjectivesResolutionin
theConstitution.ChiefJusticeSajjadAliShahstatedthattheObjectivesResolutionhad,remained
preambleinallthefourConstitutionsincludingtheInterimConstitutionof1972andtherefore,ithasto
bereadforthepurposeofproperinterpretationinordertofindoutastowhatschemeofgovernance
hasbeencontemplated(page458G).Heconcluded,aslongasthesesalientfeaturesreflectedinthe
ObjectivesResolutionareretainedandnotalteredinsubstance,amendmentscanbemadeasper
procedureprescribedinArticle239oftheConstitution(page459H).JusticeSaleemAkhtarina
separatejudgmentcategorisedtheObjectivesResolutionandtheprinciplesofdemocracy,equality,
freedom,justiceandfairplayas,theguidingprincipleswhichweretobemouldedintheformof
Constitution(page495O),andthatifreconciliationbetweentwoprovisionsoftheConstitutionwas
difficult,thensuchinterpretationshouldbeadoptedwhichismoreinconsonanceornearertothe
provisionsofConstitutionguaranteeingfundamentalrights,independenceofjudiciaryanddemocratic
principlesblendedwithIslamicprovisions(page511Y).Hefurtherheldthat,ifanyprovisionsoughtto
negatetheindependenceoftheJudiciary,thehigherrightwhichpreservedtheindependenceofthe
JudiciarywouldprevailoverArticle203Cwhichnegatedthesame(paragraph43,page511).
18.WenextcometothecaseofZafarAliShahv.PervezMusharraf,ChiefExecutiveofPakistan
(PLD2000SupremeCourt869).ThejudgesoftheSupremeCourtwhoheardthiscasewerethe
remnantsofatruncatedCourtasnearlyhalfofthetotalnumberofjudgeshadrefusedtotaketheoath
to,abidebytheprovisionsoftheProclamationofEmergency(OathofOffice(Judges)Order1of2000)
(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on25thJanuary2000)wherebyGeneral
PervezMusharrafinstalledhimselftogovernPakistan.Itmaybementionedthateveryjudgebeforehe
assumesofficeisrequiredtotaketheoathprescribedintheThirdScheduletotheConstitution,and
therefore,ifheweretotakeadifferentoathheviolatestheoathalreadytaken.Nonetheless,those
judgeswhodeclinedtotaketheoathmanufacturedbyGeneralMusharraf,wereunconstitutionally
removedfromoffice,includingChiefJusticeSaeeduzzamanSiddiqui,JusticeNasirAslamZahid,Justice
KhalilurRehmanKhan,JusticeMamoonKazi,JusticeWajihuddinAhmedandJusticeKamalMansoor
Alam.Thesemensacrificedtheircareerstospeaktruthtopower.Onanearlieroccasion,themoral
bankruptcyofanotherGeneralwasrevealedwhenJusticeDorabPateldeclinedtotakeanillegaloath.A
diminishedSupremeCourtpresidedoverbyJusticeIrshadHasanKhanheardZafarAliShahscaseand
presentedGeneralMusharrafwiththepowertoalsoamendtheConstitutionwhilstplacingalimitation,
thatnoamendmentshallbemadeinthesalientfeaturesoftheConstitutioni.e.independenceof
Judiciary,federalism,parliamentaryformofGovernmentblendedwithIslamicprovisions.Mr.Khalid
AnwercategorisedthisjudgmentasthesinglemostshamefuljudgmentinthehistoryofPakistan.He
correctlypointedoutthattheConstitutiondoesnotenvisageanindividualamendingtheConstitution
norcouldtheSupremeCourtbestowuponhimsuchpower.Theaberrationofgrantingdictatorspower
toamendtheConstitutionwasputtorestbytheSupremeCourtinSindhHighCourtBarAssociationv.
FederationofPakistan(PLD2009SupremeCourt879).AfterspecificallyreferringtotheZafarAliShah
caseafourteenMemberBenchoftheSupremeCourtunanimouslyheldthattheConstitutioncanonly
beamendedbyParliamentintheprescribedmannerand,bynoothermeans,innoothermanner,and
bynooneelse(page1064FF).ItwasfurtherclarifiedthatamendmentsmadebyGeneralPervez
MusharrafhadabrogatedandsubvertedtheConstitutionandnosanctitycanbeattachedtheretoeven
iftheSupremeCourthadpermittedausurpertomakeamendments;Nosanctityattachestothem
[constitutionalamendments]iftheyaremadeafteradeclarationtothateffectismadebytheCourt
whileadjudgingthevalidityofsuchassumptionofpower.Equallybereftofsanctityremainthe
amendmentsofanysuchauthority,whichareratified,affirmedoradoptedbytheParliament
subsequentlyanddeemedtohavebeenmadebythecompetentauthority.
19.ThejudgmentinthecaseofPakistanLawyersForumv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2005
SupremeCourt719)wasadecisionbyafivememberBenchofthisCourt;itwasauthoredbythethen
ChiefJusticeNazimHussainSiddiqui.ThechallengeinteraliawasagainsttheLegalFrameWorkOrder,
2002enactedthroughtheConstitution(SeventeenthAmendment)Act,2003,byGeneralPervez
MusharrafasChiefofArmyStaff/PresidentofPakistan.NazimHussainSiddiqui,CJ,observed
(paragraph56)that,thesuperiorCourtsofthiscountryhaveconsistentlyacknowledgedthatwhile
theremaybeabasicstructuretotheConstitution,butsuchlimitations[toamendtheConstitution]
aretobeexercisedandenforcednotbythejudiciary,butbythebodypolitic,i.e.,thepeopleof
Pakistan.ItisnotclearwhathemeantbyenforcementthroughthepeopleofPakistan.Wasa
referendumcontemplated?Orwasenforcementtobethroughaconstituentassembly?However,ifby
thepeopleofPakistanhehadParliamentinmindthenaselfimposedlimitationwouldbeentirely
meaningless.ToconfoundmattersfurtherNazimHussainSiddiqui,CJ,statedthatthebasicstructure
theorywasalreadyconsideredandrejected(paragraph58),buthedidnotrevealastowhohad
consideredandthenrejectedit.
Basic/SalientFeaturesDerivedfromthePreamble
20.FromtheaforesaidreviewoftheprecedentsoftheSupremeCourtitisnoticeablethatthe
Constitutionisstatedtohavecertainbasicorsalientfeatures,allofwhicharederivedfromthetextof
thePreambleoftheConstitution;referencehasalsobeenmadethereintotheObjectivesResolution
whichcontainssimilarwords.ThePreamblehasbeenderivedfromtheObjectivesResolution,butwith
averyimportantdifference.TheopeningwordsoftheObjectivesResolutionstatethat,Sovereignty
overtheentireuniversebelongstoAllahAlmightyaloneandtheauthoritywhichHehasdelegatedto
theStateofPakistan,throughitspeoplewhereasthePreamblestatesthat,Sovereigntyoverthe
entireUniversebelongstoAlmightyAllahalone,andtheauthoritytobeexercisedbythepeopleof
Pakistan[emphasisadded].ThesubstitutionoftheinanimateStatewiththepeopleisimmensely
significantandrevealsthenucleusoftheConstitution.Andthepeopletakeprecedenceovertheir
representativesbecausewhatfollows(inthePreamble)isthewillofthepeopleofPakistantoestablish
anorderwhereintheStateshallexerciseitspowersandauthoritythroughthechosenrepresentatives
ofthepeople.Thepeople,eachandeverymemberofthenation,effectuallyenactedthePreamble
andthengrantedtotheirchosenrepresentatives,some,andnotalloftheStatespowersandauthority.
Thepeoplemadeitabsolutelyclearthattheydidnotwanttheirrepresentativestodilutetheir
fundamentalrights.Itwascategoricallystatedthatthefundamentalrightsshallbeguaranteed.My
distinguishedcolleagueJusticeJawwadKhawajahascomprehensivelyarticulatedthesignificanceofthe
PreambletotheConstitutionandIamincompleteagreementwithhisopinion.
WhichInstitutionInterpretstheConstitutionandWhetheritsJurisdictioncanbeOusted
21.HamoodurRahman,J.inFazlulQauderChowdhry(above)stated,thatitisacardinalprinciple
thatineverysystemofGovernmentoperatingunderawrittenConstitutionthefunctionoffinally
determiningitsmeaningmustbelocatedinsomebodyorauthorityandtheorganofGovernmentwhich
isnormallyconsideredmostcompetenttoexercisethisfunctionistheJudiciary.Hefurtherstated,
theconsistentruleofconstructionadoptedbyallCourtsisthatprovisionseekingtooustthe
jurisdictionofsuperiorCourtsaretobeconstruedstrictlywithapronouncedleaningagainstouster
(page539QQ).InMehmoodKhanAchakzai(above)ChiefJusticeSajjadAliShahheldthat,Article239
cannotbeinterpretedsoliberallytosaythatitisopenendedprovisionwithoutanylimitsunderwhich
anyamendmentunderthesunofwhatevernaturecanbemadetoprovideforanyothersystemof
governance,forexample,monarchyorsecular,whichisnotcontemplatedbytheObjectivesResolution.
Clause(6)ofArticle239providesforremovalofdoubtthatthereisnolimitationwhatsoeveronthe
powerofParliamenttoamendanyprovision/provisionsoftheConstitution.Ittherefore,followsthat
ParliamenthasfullfreedomtomakeanyamendmentintheConstitutionaslongassalientfeaturesand
basiccharacteristicsoftheConstitutionprovidingforFederalism,ParliamentaryDemocracyandIslamic
provisionsareuntouchedandareallowedtoremainintactastheyare(page480K).
TheSupremeCourtalsomadeseriousinroadsintoArticle270AoftheConstitution,whichhad
soughttoprovidecompleteinsulationtotheproclamationofthe5thdayofJuly1977andallactsof
ChiefMartialLawAdministrator/President(GeneralMuhammadZiaulHaq).Clauses(1)and(2)of
Article270Arespectivelyconcludedinthefollowingterms:
(1)notwithstandinganyjudgmentofanycourt,tohavebeenvalidlymadebycompetent
authorityand,notwithstandinganythingcontainedintheConstitution,shallnotbecalledinquestionin
anycourtonanygroundwhatsoever.
(2)notwithstandinganyjudgmentofanycourt,bedeemedtobeandalwaystohavebeen
validlymade,takenordoneandshallnotbecalledinquestioninanycourtonanygroundwhatsoever.
Despitethefactthattheaforementionedprovisionsappeartobeallencompassingandthe
wordnotwithstanding(nonobstanteclause)wasused,butstillJusticeSaleemAkhtarheldthattheacts
andactionssoughttobeprotectedbyArticle270Acouldbe,challengedongroundsofcoramnon
judice,malafideandlackofjurisdiction(page515BB).JusticeSaleemAkhtarspronouncementwas
undeterredbytheabovequotedprovisionsandclause(5)ofArticle270AoftheConstitution,which
statedthat,allordersmade,proceedingstaken,actsdoneorpurportingtobemade,takenordoneby
anyauthorityorpersonshallbedeemedtohavebeenmade,takenordoneingoodfaithandforthe
purposeintendedtobeservedthereby.HeheldthatthesuperiorCourtswerethedefenders,
protectorsandpreserversoftheConstitution:
Thepowerandjurisdictionofjudicialreviewcannotbecontrolledandfetteredonthisbasis.The
JudgesofthesuperiorCourtshavetakenoathtodefend,preserveandprotecttheConstitution.Ifany
illegalamendmentismadeorhasbeenmadeintheConstitution,theCourtiscompetenttoexamineit
andmakeinterpretationtoreconcileitsprovisionsinwhichinferiorrightsmustyieldtohigherrights.
ThesalarypaidtotheJudgesisnotabountyorfavour.ItisaConstitutionaldutytoprovidesalaryand
benefitstotheJudgesbywhichindependenceofjudiciaryisguaranteed.Whilestrikingdownanyillegal
andunconstitutionalprovisionorinterpretingtheConstitutioninthemannerstatedabove,theCourt
defends,protectsandpreservestheConstitution.(page517EE)
22.TheviewtakenbytheSupremeCourtinAlJehadTrust(above)regardingtheseparation,
independenceandjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtwasfollowedinthecaseofWukalaMahazBarai
TahafazDastoorv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1998SupremeCourt1263).JusticeSaeeduzzaman
SiddiquiagreedwithChiefJusticeAjmalMianandalsowrotehisseparatereasons.Hestatedthat
ParliamentunderArticle239oftheConstitutiondoesnotenjoyunlimitedandunbridledpowerto
amendtheConstitution(page1359W).JusticeRajaAfrasiabKhanwasalsooftheopinionthatthe
superiorCourtswerecompetenttolookintothevalidityofanamendmentmadeintheConstitutionand
that,thisauthorityoftheJudiciarycannotbeabridged/oustedbecauseitisitsinherentright/powerto
doso(page1405HHandII).
ThePowerofParliamentandthatoftheSupremeCourtConclusion
23.Therefore,itcanbestatedunequivocallythatParliamentdoesnothaveunbridledor
unfetteredpowertoamendtheConstitution,andifanamendmentismadetheSupremeCourthasthe
jurisdictiontoexamineitand,ifnecessary,strikedowntheoffendingwholeorpartthereof.The
SupremeCourtexercisesthispowernotbecauseitseekstoundermineParliamentortravelbeyondits
domain,butbecausetheConstitutionitselfhasgranteditsuchpower.TheSupremeCourtspowerof
judicialreviewcannotbenegatedinanymannerwhatsoeverbecauseitisprovidedintheoriginal1973
ConstitutionandinitsPreamble.
TrichotomyofPowers
24.TheConstitutionisbothpremisedandstructuredonatrichotomy,i.e.theLegislature,the
ExecutiveandtheJudiciary.TheJudicatureisattendedtoinPartVIIoftheConstitution.Inthecaseof
SindhHighCourtBarAssociation(above)theSupremeCourtconcludedthatthejurisprudenceof
Pakistanhasrecognized,theprincipleoftrichotomyofpowersandthepowerofjudicialreviewvested
inthesuperiorCourts(paragraph167,page1174).TheIndianSupremeCourtsjudgmentinthe
Minervacase(above)held,thatthejudiciarywastheinterpreteroftheConstitutionandwasassigned
thedelicatetaskofdeterminingtheextentofthepowerconferredoneachbranchofthegovernment,
itslimitsandwhetheranyactionofthatbranchtransgressedsuchlimits(paragraph167NNN,page
1174)andthisjudgmentwascitedwithapprovalbytheSupremeCourtofPakistan.Ch.IjazAhmed,J.
whileconcurringwiththejudgmentauthoredbytheChiefJusticegaveadditionalreasonswhereinhe
opinedthatthe,ConstitutionmaybeamendedbyParliamentvideArticle238whereasArticle239
prescribesprocedureforamendingtheConstitution.EventheParliamentcannotchangethesalient
featuresoftheConstitutiontodestroyoneorganofthejudiciaryonthebasisofArticles238or239of
theConstitution(paragraph22,age1231PPPP).
ThecaseofMobashirHassanv.FederationofPakistan(PLD2010SupremeCourt265)was
decidedbyaFullCourtcomprisingoftheChiefJusticeandsixteenJudges,whereinitwasreiteratedthat
theConstitutionenvisagedatrichotomyofpoweramongstthethreeorgansoftheState,namelythe
Legislature,theExecutiveandtheJudiciaryandnoneoftheorgansoftheStatecouldencroachuponthe
fieldoftheother(paragraph34,page347).
JurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtandHowitistobeExercised
25.The1973ConstitutionhasbestowedtheSupremeCourtwithjurisdiction.Theappellate
jurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtisspecificallyconferredbyArticle185.TheSupremeCourtalsohas
advisoryjurisdictionpursuanttoArticle186.Additionally,theSupremeCourthasoriginaljurisdiction
underclause(1)ofArticle184oftheConstitutioninrespectofdisputesbetweentwogovernments.In
mattersofpublicimportancethatinvolvetheenforcementofanyoftheFundamentalRightsthe
SupremeCourthasbeengrantedoriginaljurisdictionbyclause(3)ofArticle184,andsignificantly,the
jurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttoreviewanamendmentmadetotheConstitutionhasnotbeen
excludedeitherinthisclauseorinanyotherclauseorarticleofPartVIIoftheConstitutiontitledThe
Judicature.WehavealreadyscrutinizedanddeterminedthatthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtin
respectofaconstitutionalamendmentisnotoustedunderclause(5)ofArticle239,andthejurisdiction
oftheSupremeCourtcannotbecurtailedbyinsinuatingsucharestriction,becausetheConstitution
itselfdoesnotpermitit.Itmayfurtherbeadded,thatevenifanattempttocurtailthejurisdictionof
theSupremeCourtwastobemadeitwouldnotbesustainableastheoriginal1973Constitutiondoes
notenvisageit.
OathTakenbyJudges
26.Theabovementionedinterpretationisreinforcedwhenweexaminethewordingoftheoath
thatthejudgesofthesuperiorCourtsuponenteringofficehavetotake.Theysolemnlyswearto,
preserve,protectanddefendtheConstitution.ThesamewordsalsoappearintheotherOathsof
Office(ThirdScheduleoftheConstitution).Theinclusionofthewordpreserveisnotwithout
significanceorimportance;preservemeanstosafeguardandtopreventfrominjuryordestruction.
Thewordpreservemaymeananythingfrommaintainingsomethinginitsstatusquotopreventing
thetotaldestructionofsomething.Doev.Scott,D.C.III.321F.Supp.1385,1389.
Topreservesomethingistokeepitinexistenceortokeeporsaveitfrominjuryordestruction,to
protectit,tosaveit,ortomaintainorkeepitup.Peoplev.Belous,80Cal.Rptr.354,358,458P.2d
133,135,100N.H.513.
(WordsandPhrases,St.Paul,Minn:WestPublishingCo.,PermanentEdition,1971,Volume33Apage
4748)
SupremeCourtsRoleasGuardianoftheConstitutionandthePeoplesRight
27.TheSupremeCourthasbeenassignedthemomentousresponsibilitytoactastheguardianof
theConstitution,tosafeguardtheConstitutionandthepeoplesFundamentalRights.TheConstitution
statesthat,toenjoytheprotectionoflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlawistheinalienable
rightofeverycitizen;theuseofthewordinalienableinArticle4isofimmensesignificance.Parliament
throughaconstitutionalamendmentcannottakeawayinalienablerights,becauseifthiswere
permitted,thenthewordinalienablewouldbeleftbereftofmeaning.
InalienableRight:Arightthatcannotbetransferredorsurrendered;esp.,anaturalrightsuchasthe
righttoownproperty.Alsotermedinherentright.
(BlacksLawDictionarySt.Paul,Minn:ThomsonReuters,TenthEdition,2014,page1518)
Inalienable,meansincapableofbeingsurrenderedortransferred,atleastwithoutonesconsent.
Morrisonv.State,Mo.App.,252S.W.2d97,101.
(WordsandPhrasesSt.Paul,Minn:WestPublishingCo.,PermanentEdition,1971,Volume20A,page
45)
ThemajesticcrownoftheConstitution,itsPreamble,referstoFundamentalRightswhichshall
beguaranteed,i.e.itpresupposestheirsubsistenceandlistssomeofthem.Thesignificanceand
importanceofFundamentalRightscontainedinChapter1ofPartIIisprovidedbyArticle8ofthe
Constitution,whichstatesthatnolawshallbemade,whichtakesawayorabridgesthesame.And,as
wehavealreadyseen,evenaProclamationofEmergencyandthetemporarysuspensionofcertain
FundamentalRightsisopentojudicialreview(FarooqAhmadKhanLeghari,above).Toclarifythepoint
further,letusconsidersomehypotheses:ifanamendmenttotheConstitutionismadethatintroduces
slavery(forbiddenbyArticle11oftheConstitution),orrestrictsprofessing,practicingorpropagating
onesfaith(inviolationofArticle20),ordeprivinggirlsfromseekingeducation(incontraventionof
Article25and25A),theSupremeCourt,astheguardianoftheConstitutionandthepeoplesrights,
wouldpreventthisbecauseithasbeenmandatedbytheConstitution.
Conclusion
28.WecanthereforeconcludethattheConstitutiondoesnotplaceanylimitationontheSupreme
CourttoexaminethevalidityofaconstitutionalamendmentmadeunderArticle239.Butsuchan
exercisemustnotbeundertakenlightly.Greatcareandcautionshouldbetakenbecauseany
amendmentunderchallengewouldhavebeenmadebyatleasttwothirdsofthepeopleschosen
representatives.However,itneedstoberememberedthatparliamentariansareelectedfora
prescribedperiod,i.e.everyParliamentbyitsverynatureistransient,whereastheConstitutionabides
andisrequiredtobepreserved,protectedanddefendedforalltimes.Certainfeaturesmentionedin
thePreambleoftheConstitutioncannotbeabrogated.JudgesmustfulfilltheirOathtopreserve,
protectanddefendtheConstitutionfrominjuryordestructionandtoensurethesurvivalofthe
guaranteedFundamentalRightsofthepeoplebecausetheConstitutionitselfexpectsnoless.Thisdoes
notmeanthattheConstitutioncannotbeamended.TheConstitutionneitherisastaticdocumentnor
thewordsthereinetchedinstone,immutable.
18thAmendment
NonMuslim(Minorities)RepresentationinParliamentandProvincialAssemblies
29.InrespectofthemannerinwhichnonMuslims(minorities)areelectedIconcurwiththe
judgmentauthoredbyJusticeJawwadKhawajawhohaspreciselyanalysedthematterintermsofthe
Constitution.
ValidityofArticle63AtotheExtentitDisqualifiesMemberswhoVoteContrarytotheDictateoftheir
Party
30.Mr.AbidZuberi,representingtheSindhHighCourtBarAssociationcanvassedaninteresting
proposition.HereferredtothemethodologyofmakingamendmentstotheConstitutioncontainedin
clauses(1)to(3)ofArticle239,whichstipulatethataBilltoamendtheConstitutionmustpassbythe
votesofnotlessthantwothirdsofthetotalmembershipoftheHouse.Theabilityhowevertovote
independentlyhasbeencompromisedasmembersarenowrequiredtovote(pursuanttothe
amendmentmadeinArticle63A),iftheybelongtoapoliticalparty,asperthedictatesoftheirParty
Head.HeproceededtostatethatahandfulofPartyHeadsarenowinactualcontrolofboththe
legislativeandconstituentpoweroftheHousesasopposedtothemembers,thechosenrepresentatives
ofthepeople.Toappreciatethelearnedcounselssubmission,therelevantportionofArticle63Aofthe
Constitutionisreproducedhereunder:
63A.Disqualificationongroundsofdefection,etc.
(l)IfamemberofaParliamentaryPartycomposedofasinglepoliticalpartyinaHouse
(a)resignsfrommembershipofhispoliticalpartyorjoinsanotherParliamentaryParty;or
(b)votesorabstainsfromvotingintheHousecontrarytoanydirectionissuedbytheParliamentary
Partytowhichhebelongs,inrelationto
(iii)aMoneyBilloraConstitution(Amendment)Bill;[emphasisadded]

Providedthatbeforemakingthedeclaration,thePartyHeadshallprovidesuchmemberwithan
opportunitytoshowcauseastowhysuchdeclarationmaynotbemadeagainsthim.
Explanation.PartyHeadmeansanyperson,bywhatevernamecalled,declaredassuchbytheParty.
(2)AmemberofaHouseshallbedeemedtobeamemberofaParliamentaryPartyifhe,havingbeen
electedasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalpartywhichconstitutestheParliamentaryPartyinthe
Houseor,havingbeenelectedotherwisethanasacandidateornomineeofapoliticalparty,has
becomeamemberofsuchParliamentaryPartyaftersuchelectionbymeansofadeclarationinwriting.
(3)Uponreceiptofthedeclarationunderclause(1),thePresidingOfficeroftheHouseshallwithintwo
daysrefer,andincasehefailstodosoitshallbedeemedthathehasreferred,thedeclarationtothe
ChiefElectionCommissionerwhoshalllaythedeclarationbeforetheElectionCommissionforits
(4)WheretheElectionCommissionconfirmsthedeclaration,thememberreferredtoinclause(1)shall
ceasetobeamemberoftheHouseandhisseatshallbecomevacant.
(5)AnypartyaggrievedbythedecisionoftheElectionCommissionmay,withinthirtydays,preferan
appealtotheSupremeCourtwhichshalldecidethematterwithinninetydaysfromthedateofthefiling
oftheappeal.
(a)HousemeanstheNationalAssemblyortheSenate,inrelationtotheFederation;andaProvincial
AssemblyinrelationtotheProvince,asthecasemaybe;
(b)PresidingOfficermeanstheSpeakeroftheNationalAssembly,theChairmanoftheSenateorthe
SpeakeroftheProvincialAssembly,asthecasemaybe.
31.Article63oftheoriginal1973ConstitutionprovidedfortheDisqualificationformembershipof
Parliament,andtherewasnoprovisioninrespectofthedefectionofamemberfromhis/herpolitical
party.TheConstitution(FourteenthAmendment)Act,1997(publishedinGazetteofPakistan,
Extraordinary,PartI,4thApril,1997)(the14thAmendment)introducedArticle63ADisqualification
ongroundofdefectionfromapoliticalparty.Thepreambleofthe14thAmendmentstatedthatthe
Constitutionwasbeingamendedto,preventinstabilityinrelationtotheformationoffunctioningof
Government.Theanxietywasunderstandablebecauseamemberwhohadbeenelectedasacandidate
ofapoliticalpartywoulddefecttoanother,andnotnecessarilyforaltruisticreasons.JusticeSaiduzzman
SiddiquirecalledthehistoryoftheantidefectionlawsinWukalaMahaz(above,pages13201328).The
SupremeCourtinthesamecasealsoconsideredwhetherArticle63AwasultravirestheConstitution
and,byamajorityof6to1,concludedthatitwasnot.
JusticiabilityofDisqualificationUnderArticle63A
32.TheSupremeCourtinWukalaMahazheldthat,the14thamendmentwasintraviresthe
Constitution,however,itrejectedthenonobstanteclausepertainingtotheousterofjurisdictionofthe
superiorcourtsasprovidedinclause(6)ofArticle63A(asitthenstood),reproducedhereunder:
(6)NotwithstandinganythingcontainedintheConstitution,noCourtincludingtheSupremeCourtand
aHighCourtshallentertainanylegalproceedingsexerciseanyjurisdictionor,makeanyorderinrelation
totheactionunderthisArticle.
ChiefJusticeAjmalMianheldthat,ithasbeenconsistentlyheldbythisCourtthatthe
question,astowhetherasuperiorCourthasjurisdictioninaparticularmatterornot,istobedecidedby
theCourtitself.Noprovisionofwhatsoeveramplitudecantakeawaythejurisdictionofthesuperior
CourtsFurthermore,thesimpliciterfactumthataparticularprovisionoftheConstitutioncontainsa
nonobstanteclausewillnotitselfbesufficienttodenythejurisdictionofthesuperiorCourtsifthe
impugnedaction/orderiswithoutjurisdiction,coramnonjudiceormalafide"(page1315L).
33.WukalaMahazwasconcernedwiththescopeandinterpretationofthephrase,votescontrary
toanydirectionissuedbytheParliamentaryPartytowhichhebelongs(Article63A(1)(b)).Thesaid
phrasehowever,wasnotexaminedtoconsiderwhetheritalsoincludedadirectioninrespectofa
constitutionalamendmenteventhoughthewordsanydirectionmayseemtosuggestsuchinclusion.
Article63A,asitpresentlystands,haslimitedthescopeofthedirectiontospecificmattersmentionedin
subparagraphs(i)to(iii)ofparagraph(b)ofclause(1)ofArticle63A.Thedirectionsbyparliamentary
leaderswithregardtotheelectionofPrimeMinisterorChiefMinister,voteofconfidenceorno
confidenceoraMoneyBillappeartobereasonableandmayalsobenecessaryforthemaintenanceof
partydiscipline,stabilityandthesmoothfunctioningofdemocracyandParliament.
TheonlypointofcontentioniswithregardtothewordsoraConstitution(Amendment)Bill,
addedtothesubparagraph(iii)ofparagraph(b)ofclause(1)ofArticle63A.Itisnoteworthythat
Article63Adirectsonlythevotingbehaviorofmembers.Itdoesnotinfringeupontheirrighttodebate
orraiseapointoforderintheHouse.Moreover,votingagainstthepartypositiondoesnot
automaticallydeseatamember.Incaseofagenuineapprehensionorforlegalreasonoronmoral
groundsamembercouldstillexercisehis/herindependentdiscretiononhowtovote,evenifhis/her
politicalpartyoritsPartyHeadisnotpleased.
34.Clause(6)ofArticle63A(quotedabove),hasbeendeletedandthepresentArticle63Ahasa
safeguardmechanismbeforedisqualifyingamember.Firstly,thePartyHeadhastoprovidean
opportunitytoshowcausewhyadeclarationthathe/shehasdefectedfromthepartymaynotbemade.
Secondly,thedeclarationissenttothePresidingOfficeroftheconcernedHouseandcopiedtothe
ElectionCommission.Thirdly,theElectionCommissionisrequiredtodecideit.Fourthly,anyparty
aggrievedbythedecisionoftheElectionCommissioncanfileanappealintheSupremeCourt.The
decisionofthePartyHeadthereforeisjusticiablebeforetwoforums.Therearethusamplesafeguards
againstanapprehensionofavindictiveorunreasonablePartyHead.Therefore,thesaidprovision
cannotbecategorizedasundermininganyoftheprinciplesofdemocracymentionedinthePreamble
totheConstitutionoranyofthestatedFundamentalRightsofthechosenrepresentativesofthepeople.

35.Mr.AbidZuberialsoraisedanotherissue.Beforethe21stAmendmentBillwaspresentedin
Parliamentanallpartiesconferencewasheldonthesamesubjectanditwasthisconference,andnot
Parliament,whichdecidedthematter.Tosupporthisstatementhereferredtothefourthrecitalofthe
21stAmendmentActwhichcommencesbystating:ANDWHEREASthepeopleofPakistanhave
expressedtheirfirmresolvethroughtheirchosenrepresentativesintheallpartiesconference
[emphasisadded].Hewasalsocorrectinstatingthatthechosenrepresentativesofthepeople,sitin
theNationalAssembly,SenateortheProvincialAssemblies,ofwhichaPartyHeadmaynotevenbea
member.
36.Parliamentarydemocracyflourisheswhendiscussionstakeplaceintheforumsofthechosen
representativesofthepeople.Thereareanumberofpoliticalpartiesthathavenorepresentationin
anyHouse,oranegligibleone,yettheymaybeabletoparticipateinandevendominatesuch
conferences;thenationaldiscourseshouldbesetbypoliticalpartieswhohavethepeoplesmandate
andnotdivertedordeterminedbythosewhohavebeenrejectedbythepeopleinelections.Thepeople
arebestservedwhentheNationalAssembly,theSenateandtheProvincialAssembliesarefully
functional,debatinginthefullviewofthepeople,andonlyafterduedeliberationlawsand
constitutionalamendmentsaremade.Parliamentarydebatesalsomouldandhelptodevelopanational
consensusonimportantmatters.Insuchanenvironmentthepeoplebecomestakeholdersanddevelop
akeensenseofparticipationintheaffairsoftheState.Theyaregalvanizedandstandfirmwiththeir
chosenrepresentativeswheneverthereisathreattoderaildemocracy.Insuchanenvironmentthose
whoaudaciouslyusethesealoftheProphet(PeaceandBlessingbeUponHim)orhistitleorthoseof
theRightlyGuidedCaliphs,anddemandallegianceonthestrengthofabarrelofgun,standexposedfor
thepettyandmeanmentheytrulyare.Theantidotefornonelectedterroristorganizations
commandingallegiancebyfearisnotanallpartiesconference,hurriedlyconvenedandequallyhurriedly
dispersed,butratheranundilutedandflourishingparliamentarydemocracyworkingthroughthe
peopleschosenrepresentativesinfullpublicview.
MannerofSelectingandAppointingJudgesArticle175A
37.Atthetimewhensomeofthesepetitionswerefiledthismatterhadattainedconsiderable
interest,however,thesubsequentamendmentsmadetoArticle175Abythe19thAmendment,appears
tohaveaddressedtheapprehensionsthatwereearlierexpressed;confirmedbythefactthatnoneof
thepetitionerscouldseriouslypointoutthatArticle175A,asitpresentlystands,inanymannerviolates
theindependenceofjudiciary,thepreambletotheConstitutionoranyotherprovisionofthe
Constitution.Therefore,thereisnoneedtoexaminethematter.
38.Imay,however,makeanobservationwithregardtotheworkingoftheParliamentary
Committee(theCommittee),referredtoinclauses(8)to(17)ofArticle175A.WhentheJudicial
CommissionofPakistan(theCommission)nominatesapersonforappointmentasaJudgeinthe
SupremeCourt,aHighCourtortheFederalShariatCourtitsendshis/hernominationforconsideration
totheCommittee.TheCommitteethenproceedspursuanttoclauses(12)and(13)ofArticle175A,
reproducedhereunder:
havebeenconfirmed:

ProvidedthattheCommittee,forreasonstoberecorded,maynotconfirmthenominationby
threefourthmajorityofitstotalmembershipwithinthesaidperiod:
ProvidedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmedbytheCommitteeitshallforwardits
decisionwithreasonssorecordedtotheCommissionthroughthePrimeMinister:
Providedfurtherthatifanominationisnotconfirmed,theCommissionshallsendanother
nomination.
(13)TheCommitteeshallsendthenameofthenomineeconfirmedbyitordeemedtohavebeen
confirmedtothePrimeMinisterwhoshallforwardthesametothePresidentforappointment.
39.ItisobservedfromtheaboveprovisionsthattheCommitteecan:
(a)confirmthenomineesentbytheCommissionwithin14days;
(b)notconfirmthenomineesentbytheCommissionwithin14dayswhereuponthenomineeshall
bedeemedtohavebeenconfirmed;or
(c)notconfirmthenomineeforreasonsthatarerecordedandforwardedtotheCommission
throughthePrimeMinister.
Asregardsthenominationmentionedin(a)and(b)abovethematterisclear.However,as
regard(c)itissomewhatambiguous.Theambiguityarisesbecauseitisnotstatedastowhatthen
becomesofthenominationsentbytheCommission.Doesitstandrejected?Thefirstprovisotoclause
(12)requirestheCommitteetorecordreasonsifitisnotconfirmingthenominationandsuchreasons
aresenttotheCommission.WhatIunderstandisthattheCommitteeprovidesitsinput.Itmayhave
knowledgeorinformationaboutthenonsuitabilityofaparticularnomineewhichitshareswiththe
Commission,otherwisetherewouldbenopurposeforsendingitsreasonstotheCommission.The
ConstitutionmandatesthattheCommitteesdecisionwithreasonsbesenttotheCommission,which
leadsmetounderstandthatthesameisforthereconsiderationbytheCommission.Thethirdproviso
toclause(12)ofArticle175ArequirestheCommissiontosendanothernominationincasethe
nominationearliersenthasnotbeenconfirmed.ThematterthuscomestorestwiththeCommission
andnottheCommittee.
40.TheaforesaidinterpretationdoesnotinanymannerunderminetheCommitteesimportance.
Ithasanimportantroleinexaminingthesuitabilityofnominees.TheCommitteesmemberswhoare
thechosenrepresentativesofthepeoplemayhaveknowledgeorinformationaboutanominees
characterorconduct,whichwouldmakehim/herunsuitabletoholdjudicialoffices.Andwhenthe
Commissionismadeawareofthesame,itwouldsurelywithdrawitsnomination.Neitherdoesthe
ConstitutiongivenoristhereanyreasontoprovidetheCommitteewithvetopowers.Ifthereisavalid
objectiontothenomineeoftheCommission,theCommitteewillgiveitsreasonsandtheCommission
uponreceiptthereofreconsidersthenomineessuitabilitytoholdjudicialoffice.
21stAmendment:
AdditionofProviso,itsExplanation&LawsaddedtotheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution
41.The21stAmendmentaddedaprovisoandanExplanationtoclause(3)ofArticle175ofthe
Constitution.ItwillbeappropriatetoreproduceArticle175asitexistedpriortotheamendmentand
theadditionsmadetheretopursuanttothe21stAmendment:
Article175oftheConstitutionPriortothe21stAmendment:
175.(1)ThereshallbeaSupremeCourtofPakistan,aHighCourtforeachProvinceandaHighCourtfor
Explanation.Unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,thewords"HighCourt"whereveroccurringinthe
Constitutionshallinclude"IslamabadHighCourt.
(2)NocourtshallhaveanyjurisdictionsaveasisormaybeconferredonitbytheConstitutionorbyor
underanylaw.
commencingday.
ChangesinsertedinClause(3)ofArticle175pursuanttothe21stAmendment:
42.Article175oftheConstitutionhasthreecomponents.Firstly,itprovidesforasystemoflaw
courts;secondly,itattendstothejurisdictionofsuchcourts;thirdly,itmandatesthattheexerciseof
judicialpowerbytheExecutiveshallstopbythestipulateddate,andthatjudicialpowerhenceforthshall
beexclusivelyexercisedbytheJudiciary.
The21stAmendmentsubstitutedthefullstopwithacolonafterclause(3)ofArticle175and
addedaproviso(hereinaftertheProviso)whichrequiresinterpretation.Whatalsoneedstobe
considerediswhether,withtheadditionoftheProviso,aneworparallelsystemofcourtscanbe
establishedforthetrialofcivilians?TheProvisostatesthattheprovisionsofthisArticlewillhaveno
applicationtotrialsundercertainlawsthathavebeenaddedtotheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution
throughtheProviso.Throughsuchamechanism,personswhoarenotmembersoftheArmedForcesof
PakistancanbetriedundertheArmyAct,theAirForceActortheNavyOrdinance(theLawsofthe
ArmedForces),whicharecomprehensivelawsgoverningtheArmedForces,includingtrialsby
summary,district,fieldgeneralandgeneralcourtsmartial.Thereisalsoanotheraspecttoconsider,
trialstakeplaceincourts,however,hasanycourtbeencreatedforthepurposeoftryingciviliansby
themilitaryeitherintheConstitutionorunderanylegislation?
43.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralsubmittedthataregimeofmilitarycourtsalreadyexistunder
theLawsoftheArmedForces,therefore,thereisnoneedtoreestablishthemundertheConstitution.
Moreover,thesameresulthasbeenachievedbyinsertingtheLawsoftheArmedForcesinthe
ConstitutionsFirstSchedule,whichthroughthedeviceofclause(3)ofArticle8,areexemptedfromthe
operationofArticle8(1)and(2)thatrenderalllawsinconsistentorinderogationofFundamental
Rightstobevoid.Withregardstotheconstitutionalmandate,whichstatestheJudiciarybeseparated
fromtheExecutive,thesamehasbeenovercomebyaddingtheProvisotoclause(3)ofArticle175of
theConstitution.

44.Previouslywhenmilitarycourtswereestablishedtotryciviliansitwascategoricallystated.
Article212AwasinsertedintotheConstitutionwhichstipulated:
212A.EstablishmentofMilitaryCourtsorTribunals.
(1)Notwithstandinganythinghereinbeforecontained,theChiefMartialLawAdministratormay,bya
MartialLawOrder,providefortheestablishmentofoneormoreMilitaryCourtsorTribunalsforthetrial
ofoffencespunishableundertheMartialLawRegulationsorMartialLawOrdersoranyotherlaw,
includingaspeciallaw,forthetimebeinginforcespecifiedinthesaidMartialLawOrderandforthe
transferofcasestosuchCourtsorTribunals.
(2)ThejurisdictionandpowersofaMilitaryCourtorTribunalshallbesuchasmaybespecifiedina
MartialLawOrderissuedbytheChiefMartialLawAdministrator.
(3)Notwithstandinganythinghereinbeforecontained,whereanyMilitaryCourtorTribunalis
established,nootherCourt,includingaHighCourt,shallgrantaninjunction,makeanyorderor
entertainanyproceedingsinrespectofanymattertowhichthejurisdictionoftheMilitaryCourtor
Tribunalextendsandofwhichcognizancehasbeentakenby,orwhichhasbeentransferredto,the
MilitaryCourtorTribunalandallproceedingsinrespectofanysuchmatterwhichmaybepending
beforesuchotherCourt,otherthananappealpendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,shallabate.
Article212AcameintoforceatonceandwasdeemedtohavetakeneffectonthefifthdayofJuly
1977(subsection(2)ofsection1oftheConstitution(SecondAmendment)Order,1979publishedin
theGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,on18thOctober1979)(the2ndAmendmentOrder).
Themilitarycourtslastedforaperiodofsevenyears,fivemonthsandtwentyfivedaysandwere
abolishedbytheProclamationofWithdrawalofMartialLaw(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,
Extraordinary,PartI,on30thDecember1985).
Additionally,whenspecialcourtsweremadeimpervioustotheordinaryappellateprocedure
andthejurisdictionoftheordinarycourtswasexcluded,itwasdonebyamendingtheConstitutionand
theamendmentexplicitlystatedthis.TheConstitution(TwelfthAmendment)Act,1991(publishedin
theGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,28thJuly1991)(the12thAmendment)addedArticle
212BtotheConstitution.Clauses(1)and(8)ofArticle212B,whicharerelevantforourpurposes,are
reproducedhereunder:
212B.EstablishmentofSpecialCourtsfortrialofheinousoffences.
(1)Inordertoensurespeedytrialofcasesofpersonsaccusedofsuchoftheheinousoffencesspecified
bylawasarereferredtothembytheFederalGovernment,oranauthorityorpersonauthorizedbyit,in
viewoftheirbeinggruesome,brutalandsensationalincharacterorshockingtopublicmorality,the
FederalGovernmentmaybylawconstituteasmanySpecialCourtsasitmayconsidernecessary.
(8)NotwithstandinganythingcontainedintheConstitution,noCourtshallexerciseanyjurisdiction
whatsoeverinrelationtoanyproceedingspendingbefore,ororderorsentencepassedbyaSpecial
CourtoraSupremeAppellateCourtconstitutedunderalawreferredtoinclause(1),exceptasprovided
insuchlaw.
However,the21stAmendmentdoesnotestablishmilitarycourtsforthetrialofcivilians;
instead,thedefinitionclausesintheLawsoftheArmedForceshasbeenchangedtoincludeparticular
typeofciviliansaccusedofcertainkindsofterroristacts.The21stAmendmentdoesnottreadthetime
testedmethodologyoftheConstitution2ndAmendmentOrderthathadestablishedmilitarycourtsand
ofthe12thAmendmentthathadestablishedspecialcourts.Insteaditsetsouttobreaknewground.
45.The21stAmendmentsubstitutesthefullstopattheendofclause(3)ofArticle175witha
colonandthereafterinsertstheProviso.Clause(3)ofArticle175hadsetoutacleargoalofachievinga
progressiveseparationoftheExecutivefromtheJudiciary,whichinitiallywastobedonewithinthree
years,but,suchperiodwasextendedtofourteenyearsfromthecommencingdate,i.e.14thAugust
1973(clause(2)ofArticle265).Thefourteenyearsmilestonewasreachedon14thAugust1987,on
whichdatetheExecutiveandtheJudiciarystoodseparated,irrevocablyandabsolutely.TheProviso
seekstoundowhathasalreadybeenattained,i.e.theseparationoftheJudiciaryfromtheExecutive,
andasitisnotconceivabletoforceaflowerbackintoabuditisnotpossibletoyokeoragglutinatethe
ExecutivewiththeJudiciary.
46.TheProviso,withoutstatingasmuch,presumesthattheseparationoftheExecutivefromthe
Judiciaryhasasyetnotbeeneffected.Itthenseekstocarveoutanexception.Thepremiseonwhich
theProvisoisbuiltdoesnotexistliketheidiomaticcastlesinthesky;therefore,thepurportedexception
isutterlymeaningless.UponaspecificqueryregardingtheProviso,thelearnedcounselforthe
GovernmentofPakistanstatedthatitreferredtothisArticle,i.e.theentireArticle175,andnotjustto
itsclause(3),towhichitwasappended.Hefurtherstatedthatthewordscontainedthereinshouldbe
giventheirfulleffectanditwasimmaterialwhetheritstartswiththewordProvidedorthatitis
referredtoasthisprovisointheExplanation.However,thelearnedcounseldidnotsupportsucha
novelmethodofinterpretationbyreferencetoanylegaldictionary,bookoflegalinterpretationoreven
asinglejudgment.Bethatasitmay,theProvisoandthemannerinwhichthelearnedcounseldesired
tointerpretithasbeenconsidered.
47.Provisoshavebeendefinedas,Aclauseorpartofaclauseinastatute,theofficeofwhichis
eithertoexceptsomethingfromtheenactingclause,ortoqualifyorrestrainitsgenerality,ortoexclude
somepossiblegroundofmisinterpretationofitsextent(BlacksLawDictionary,St.Paul,Minnesota:
WestPublishingCo.,Revised4thEdition,1968).Aprovisothereforeexcepts,qualifiesorrestrainsand,
assuchhasnoexistenceapartfromtheprovisionwhichitisdesignedtolimitortoqualify.Itshould
alsobeconstructedinharmonywiththerestofthestatuteaprovisosubsequentlyfollowing,shouldbe
construedstrictly(EarlCrawfordsTheConstructionofStatutesSt.Louis,Missouri:ThomasLawBook
Company,1940,page605).Theprovisocannotbeinterpretedinamannerwhichwoulddefeatthe
mainprovision,i.e.,toexclude,byimplication,whattheenactmentexpressivelysayswouldbecovered
bythemainprovisionsTotreattheprovisoasifitwereanindependentenactingclauseinsteadof
beingdependentonthemainenactmentistosinagainstthefundamentalruleofconstructionProvisos
andsubclausesshouldbegovernedbytheoperatingportionofthesectionAprovisoshouldnotby
mereimplicationwithdrawanypartofwhatthemainprovisionhasgiven(N.SBindrasThe
InterpretationofStatutesAllahabad:LawBookCompany,6thEdition,1975,pages6970).Aproviso
cannotbeconstructedasenlargingthescopeofanenactmentwhenitcanbefairlyandproperly
construedwithoutattributingtoitthateffect.InWestDerbyUnionv.MetropolitanLifeAssuranceCo.
LordWatsonsaid:Iamperfectlyclearthatifthelanguageoftheenactingpartofthestatutedoesnot
containtheprovisionswhicharesaidtooccurinit,youcannotderivetheseprovisionsbyimplication
fromaproviso.Whenoneregardsthenaturalhistoryandobjectsofprovisos,andthemannerinwhich
theyfindtheirwayintoActsofParliament,Ithinkyourlordshipswillbeadoptingaverydangerousand
certainlyunusualcourseifyouweretoimportlegislationfromaprovisowholesaleintothebodyofthe
statute.InR.v.DibdinMoultonL.J.said:thefallacyoftheproposedmethodofinterpretationisnot
fartoseek.Itsinsagainstthefundamentalruleofconstructionthataprovisomustbeconsideredwith
relationtotheprincipalmattertowhichitstandsasaproviso(CraiesonStatuteLawLondon:Sweet
andMaxwell,7thedition,1971,page217).
48.LegalprecedentsalsodonotsupportthelearnedcounselscontentionsregardingtheProviso.
ItwasheldinDunnv.Bryan(77Utah604)that,Sincetheofficeoftheprovisoisnottorepealthemain
provisionsoftheactbuttolimittheirapplication,noprovisoshouldbesoconstruedastodestroythose
provisions.Similarly,inKeshavLalv.CommissionerofIncometax(AIR1957Bom20)itwas
determinedthat,"itisperfectlytruethatbeforeaprovisocanhaveanyapplicationthesectionitself
mustapply.InCommissionerofIncomeTaxv.NasirAli(1999SCMR563)theSupremeCourtheld,that,
Theprovisoonlycarvesoutanexceptionwhich,butfortheproviso,wouldfallwithinthelanguageand
meaningoftheenactingpart.Aproviso,therefore,hastobeinterpretedstrictly,andwherethe
languageofmainenactingpartisclearandunambiguous,theprovisocannotbyimplicationexclude
fromitspurviewwhatclearlyfallswithintheexpresstermsofthemainenactingpart.InEnmayZed
Publications(Pvt.)Limitedv.SindhLabourAppellateTribunal(2001SCPLC(CS)368),theSupremeCourt
statedthat,Accordingtothewellestablishedprinciplesofinterpretationofstatutes,andinparticular
provisoattachedtothemainsectionisthatthesameoperatesasanexceptionandcannotrender
redundantorineffectivethesubstantialprovisionsofthemainsection.
CanTherebeaParallelSystemofCourtstoConductCriminalTrials?
49.Eventhoughitisclearthatthepurportedobjectofsubjectingcivilianswhohaveallegedly
committedterroristactstotrialsundertheLawsoftheArmedForceshasnotbeenachievedbythe
Provisoand/orbytheinsertionofthesaidlawsintheFirstSchedule,letusstillconsiderwhethercertain
kindsofciviliansaccusedofcertainterroristactscanbetriedbyaparallelsystemofcourts.These
courtshavenotbeenestablishedbyamendingtheConstitution,butbysubterfuge.Aparallelcourt
systemisnotenvisagedbyArticle175.InMehramAliv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1998SC1445),the
SupremeCourtheld,Thatthewords"suchotherCourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw"employedin
clause(1)ofArticle175oftheConstitutionarerelatabletothesubordinateCourtsreferredtoinArticle
203thereof.Itwasfurtherheld,thattheconstitutionalframeworkrelatingtojudiciarydoesnot
admit/permittheestablishmentofaparallelsystemoftheCourtsorTribunals,whicharenotunderthe
judicialreviewandadministrativecontrolandsupervisionoftheHighCourt.Itmaybepointedoutthat
wheretheConstitutionmakerswantedtoprovidejudicialforumsotherthanwhatisenvisagedby
Articles175,202and203,theyhaveexpresslyprovidedforthesameintheConstitutionsuchas
AdministrativeCourtsandTribunalsestablishedunderArticle212oftheConstitutionortheFederal
ShariatCourtestablishedunderArticle203CoftheConstitution.
50.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralsoughttorescuethe21stAmendmentbyalternatively
contendingthatunderArticle245oftheConstitutiontheArmedForcesarerequiredtocombata
threatofwarandtoactinaidofcivilpowerwhenevercalledupontodosobytheFederal
Government,andthatclause(3)ofArticle245oftheConstitutionexcludedthejurisdictionoftheHigh
CourtsunderArticle199oftheConstitution,inrelationtoanyareainwhichtheArmedForcesof
Pakistanare,forthetimebeing,actinginaidofcivilpower.ThejurisdictionoftheHighCourtswasalso
excludedunderclause(3)ofArticle199oftheConstitutionwithregardtoanyactiontakeninrelationto
amemberoftheArmedForcesorapersonsubjecttosuchlaw.
HenextstatedthatParliamentcouldestablishmilitarycourtsasentryNo.1oftheFederal
LegislativeList(PartIoftheFourthSchedule)includedthe,securityofPakistanoranypartthereof
andentryNo.59thereofwidenedthescopeofthepowerofParliamenttolegislateinrespectof,
MattersincidentalorancillarytoanymatterenumeratedinthisPart.
51.ThecontentionsputforwardbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralareidenticaltothoseofa
predecessorofhis,whichtheSupremeCourtunequivocallyrejected,inthecaseofLiaquatHussainv.
FederationofPakistan(PLD1999SC504).TheBenchhearingthesaidcasecomprisedofninejudgesof
thisCourtandthejudgmentoftheCourtwasauthoredbyChiefJusticeAjmalMian.Fiveconstitutional
petitionshadbeenfiledunderArticle184(3)oftheConstitutionchallengingthePakistanArmedForces
(ActinginAidoftheCivilPower)Ordinance,1998thatpermittedthetrialofciviliansbymilitarycourts
forcriminaloffencesmentionedinsection6andtheScheduletothesaidOrdinance.TheSupreme
Courtconcludedthattheestablishmentofmilitarycourtsfortrialofcivilianschargedwiththeoffences
mentionedinsection6andtheScheduletothesaidOrdinancewasunconstitutional,withoutlawful
authorityandofnolegaleffect;consequently,thedecisionsofthemilitarycourtsweresetasideand
thecasestransferredtotheAntiTerroristCourtsalreadyinexistenceundertheAntiTerrorismAct.
52.ItwasheldinLiaquatHussainthat,Itmayagainbepointedoutthatbyvirtueofclause(1)of
Article245oftheConstitutionquotedhereinaboveinpara.11,theArmedForcesaremandated,subject
tolaw,toactinaidofcivilpowerwhencalledupontodosobytheFederalGovernment.The
constructionsplacedontheaboveimportantexpressions,namely,'subjecttolaw'and'actinaidofcivil
power'havebeenveryablyinterpretedbythelearnedJudgesoftheFullBenchesoftheSindhand
LahoreHighCourtsinthecaseofNiazAhmedKhan(supra)andDarvesh.M.Arbey(supra),respectively
(page588).ChiefJusticeAjmalMianwritingforthecourtheld,that:
(i)ThatthescopeandpurposeofArticle245isrestricted,namely,itiscalledinaidofcivilpower
subjecttolawanditsscopemayfurtherbelimitedorcontrolledbylawbutcannotbeincreasedbyany
subsidiarylawbeyondthepurviewofArticle245;
(ii)Thatthewords"actinaid"havetheirownconnotation,namely,tocometohelporassistance
ofthecivilpowerformaintaininglawandorderandsecurity;
(iii)Thatthewords"actinaid"employedinclause(1)ofArticle245dispelalldoubtsaboutthe
scopeoftheaboveConstitutionalprovisioninasmuchasitpresupposesthatthecivilpowerisstillthere
whiletheArmedForcesactinaidofcivilpower;
(iv)ThatincaseofinvocationofArticle245oftheConstitutionthecivilpowerisneithersupplanted
noreffacedoutbutitispreservedandinvigoratedthroughtheinstrumentalityoftheArmedForces;
(v)ThatsincethescopeandsphereofactionofArmyunderArticle245isstrictlylimitedtoaidinga
civilpower,itdisqualifiestheArmytoactinsupersessionoftheCivilCourtsandevenanActof
Parliamentcannotenablethemtoperformsuchjudicialfunctions;
(vi)ThatthelanguageemployedinArticle190that"allExecutiveandJudicialAuthorities
throughoutPakistanshallactinaidoftheSupremeCourt"reinforcestheconclusionthatthecivilpower
isneithertobesupplantednortobeeffacedout;
(vii)ThattheuseofArmedForcesinaidofcivilpowerincaseoffailureofthemachineryofcivil
powermaybeneededbytheCivilCourtsthemselvesforthepurposeofperformingtheirownfunctions;

(viii)Thatthequantumofaidtobegivenandthemannerinwhichthisassistanceistoberendered
bytheArmedForcesasamatterofConstitutionaldutydependsuponthenatureofthedirectionissued
bytheFederalGovernmentinthisbehalfandsuchdirectionshouldalsotobewithintheambitofthe
lawandtheConstitution;
(ix)ThattoenabletheArmedForcestoperformtheiraforesaidlimitedfunction/duty,theymustof
necessitybeclothedwithPolicePowersandtoconstitutevalidexerciseofsuchpower,itmustneither
bearbitrarynorexcessiveasitissubjecttolaw;
(x)ThattheargumentthattheMilitaryTribunalwillensurepromptpunishmentasanexamplefor
othersoverlooksthedisadvantagesofmilitarytrialandunderestimatestheimportanceofatrialbyan
ordinaryCivilCourt;
(xi)ThatArticle245oftheConstitutioncannotbeinvokedbyaPoliticalGovernmenttorulethrough
theArmedForcessoastoclothethemwithsuchpowersandjurisdictionwhichpurportstoreplacethe
civilpowers;and
(xii)ThatthelanguageemployedinArticle245ofthepresentConstitutionascomparedtothe
language,whichwasusedinthecorrespondingArticlesofthelateConstitutions,namely,Article199of
1956Constitution,Article223Aof1962ConstitutionandArticle278oftheInterimConstitution,1972,
clearlyindicatesthatthepresentConstitutiondoesnotenvisagetheimpositionofMartialLaw.(pages
581582)
53.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralscontentionregardingtheFourthScheduleandtheentries
thereinwasalsorepudiated.TheSupremeCourtheldthat,neitherArticle245oftheConstitutionnor
EntryNo.1oftheFederalLegislativeListreadwithEntryNo.59empowerstheLegislaturetolegislatea
statutewhichmayestablishorconveneMilitaryCourtsinsubstitutionoftheordinaryCriminalandCivil
Courts(page632LL).ThedecisionsinthecasesofGovernmentofBaluchistanv.AzizullahMemon(PLD
1993SC341)andAlJehadTrustv.FederationofPakistan(PLD1996SC324)werealsoreferredandit
was,emphasizedthatseparationandindependenceofjudiciaryarethehallmarkofthepresent
Constitution(page612V).Thereisnoreasontotakeaviewdifferentfromtheoneearliertakenbythe
SupremeCourtinLiaquatHussainscase.
InAccountantGeneralv.AhmedAliU.Qureshi(PLD2008SupremeCourt522)theSupremeCourt
reiterated,theconceptofindependenceofjudiciaryiscompleteseparationfromexecutiveauthorities
oftheState(page541).TheConstitutioncontemplates,notabatchofunconnectedcourtsbuta
judiciarycomposedofsuperiorcourtsandsubordinatecourtsMuhammadManshav.State(PLD1996
SupremeCourt229,at233).
54.Militarypersonnel,whowillpresideoverthetrials,arepartoftheExecutive,anditgoes
withoutsayingthattheyarenotpartoftheJudiciary.IthasbeenrepeatedlyheldbythesuperiorCourts
ofPakistanthattheExecutivecannotdecidecases.InAzizullahMemon(above)theSupremeCourtin
clearandcategoricalterms,held:
"Infacttheadministrationofjusticecannotbemadesubjecttoorcontrolledbytheexecutive
authorities.TheConstitutionprovidesforseparationofjudiciaryfromtheexecutive.Itaimsatan
independentjudiciarywhichisanimportantorganoftheStatewithintheConstitutionalsphere.The
Constitutionprovidesforprogressiveseparationofthejudiciaryandhadfixedatimelimitforsuch
separation.Itexpiredintheyear1987andfromthenonwards,irrespectiveofthefactwhethersteps
havebeentakenornot,judiciarystandsseparatedanddoesnotandshouldnotseekaidofexecutive
authoritiesforitsseparation.Separationofjudiciaryisthecornerstoneofindependenceofjudiciary
andunlessjudiciaryisindependent,thefundamentalrightofaccesstojusticecannotbeguaranteed.
Oneofthemodesforblockingtheroadoffreeaccesstojusticeistoappointorhandoverthe
adjudicationofrightsandtrialofoffenceinthehandsoftheexecutiveofficers.Thisismerelya
semblanceofestablishingCourtswhichareauthorizedtodecidecasesandadjudicatetherights,butin
factsuchCourtswhicharemannedandrunbyexecutiveauthoritieswithoutbeingunderthecontrol
andsupervisionofthejudiciarycanhardlymeetthedemandsofConstitution.(page369)[emphasis
added]
55.ALawReformCommissionwassetupon27thMay1967undertheChairmanshipofJustice
HamoodurRahman,anditsreportisentitled,TheReportoftheLawReformCommission196770.The
CommissiontracedtheadministrationofjusticefromearliestIslamictimes.Itnoted(inparagraphs42
and45,pages1156oftheReport)thatjusticeduringthecaliphateofHazratUmar(mayAllahbe
pleasedwithhim)wasadministeredbyciviljudgeswhowereindependentofthegovernorsandhealso
madetheofficeofjudgesindependentfromtheexecutiveofficers.ThustheIslamiteadministration
eveninitsinfancy,proclaimsinwordandindeedthenecessaryseparationbetweenjudicialand
executivepower.AftermentioningaparticularincidenttheCommissionnoted,thatthejudiciarywas
independentandthateventheCaliphwassubjecttodisciplineoftheCourt.Theveryfirst
recommendationoftheCommissionwasthat,Thereshouldbecompleteseparationofthejudiciary
fromtheexecutive(SummaryofRecommendationsbytheCommission(page252oftheReport).
56.Itwouldbeappropriatetoconcludethisportionofthejudgmentbyquotingfromaspeechthat
thefounderofPakistan,MuhammadAliJinnahdeliveredintheImperialLegislativeCouncilon6th
February1919,whentheCriminalLaw(EmergencyPowers)Billwasintroduced.TheQuaid
systematicallydissectedtheproposedpieceoflegislation;Hestatedthathecouldnotenvisageatrial
saveajudicialtrialinaccordancewiththeacceptedrulesofevidenceandprocedure:
MyLord,toanymanwhobelievesinlawandjustice,thesemeasuresmustseemabhorrentand
shockingNow,beforeIdealwiththesebillsandthespeechoftheHonbleHomeMember,Ishall
placebeforetheCouncilthegroundsonwhichIamopposedtotheseBills.Myfirstgroundisthis,that
itisagainstthefundamentalprinciplesoflawandjustice,namely,thatnomanshouldlosehislibertyor
bedeprivedofhisliberty,withoutajudicialtrialinaccordancewiththeacceptedrulesofevidenceand
procedure.Mysecondreasonis,thatthisisawrongremedyforthedisease,namely,these
revolutionarycrimes,althoughIforoneampreparedtoacceptascorrectthefindingsoffactsofthe
RowlattCommitteethatthecrimesofthenatureindicatedhavebeencommitted.Mythirdgroundis
thatthepowerswhicharegoingtobeassumedbytheexecutive,whichmeanssubstitutionofexecutive
forjudicial,suchpowersarelikelytobeabusedandinthepastwehaveinstanceswheresuchpowers
havebeenabused.MyfourthgroundisthatthereisnoprecedentorparallelthatIknowofinanyother
civilizedcountrywhereyouhavelawsofthischaracterenacted.Myfifthgroundisthatthisisamost
inopportunemoment.AtthismomentIcantellyouthathighhopeshavebeenraisedamongthe
peopleofthiscountrybecauseweareontheeveofgreatandmomentousreformsbeingintroduced.
Mysixthgroundisthattheproposedmeasuresintendedonlytodealwithanemergencyofatemporary
character.AndthelastgroundwhyIopposethismeasureisthat,myLord,Idonotwishtostateitby
swayofanythreatorintimidationtoGovernment,butIwishtostateitbecauseitismydutytotellyou
that,ifthesemeasuresarepassed,youwillcreateinthiscountryfromoneendtotheotheradiscontent
andagitation,thelikeofwhichyouhavenotwitnessed,anditwillhave,believeme,amostdisastrous
effectuponthegoodrelationsthathaveexistedbetweentheGovernmentandthepeople

Therefore,myLord,itisnouseshirkingtheissue,itisnousehedgingroundthewholeofthis
question.Itisquiteclearanditisobviousthatthismeasureisofamostseriouscharacter.Itis
dangerous.Itimperilsthelibertyofthesubjectandfundamentalrightsofacitizenand,myLord,
standinghereasIdo,Isaythatnomanwhobelievesinthefreedomandlibertyofthepeoplecan
possiblygivehisconsenttoameasureofthischaracter.
DoesArticle8(3)TakeAwaytheFundamentalRightsofCivilianswhohavebeenSubjectedtotheLaws
oftheArmedForces
57.WenextconsiderwhetherthelearnedAttorneyGeneralssubmissionthatlawsmaybemade
inderogationofFundamentalRightsprovidedtheyarespecifiedintheFirstSchedulepursuanttoclause
(3)ofArticle8.Ms.AsmaJehangir,thelearnedcounselfortheSupremeCourtBarAssociation,
contendedthattheinsertionoftheArmyAct,theAirForceAct,theNavyOrdinanceandtheProtection
ofPakistanActinsubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirstScheduletotheConstitutionwasnotsustainablein
viewofclauses(2)and(5)ofArticle8oftheConstitution.Shefurthersaidthattheambitofclause(3)of
Article8,whereuponthelearnedAttorneyGeneralplacedreliance,wasnotsuchtoenablethesaid
insertion.ThelearnedcounselsubmittedthatinanyeventArticle8(3)doesnotassistthelearned
AttorneyGeneralasitsscopeislimitedtotheFundamentalRightscontainedinChapter1ofPartIIof
theConstitution;therefore,noinroadscanbemadeintotherightsconferredbyArticle4.Toappreciate
thelearnedcounselssubmission,itwouldbeappropriatetoreproduceArticles4and8ofthe
Constitution:
Article4.Rightofindividualstobedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw,etc.
(1)Toenjoytheprotectionoflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlawistheinalienablerightof
everycitizen,whereverhemaybeandofeveryotherpersonforthetimebeingwithinPakistan.
(2)Inparticular
(a)noactiondetrimentaltothelife,liberty,body,reputationorpropertyofanypersonshallbetaken
exceptinaccordancewithlaw;
(b)nopersonshallbepreventedfromorbehinderedindoingthatwhichisnotprohibitedbylaw;and
(c)nopersonshallbecompelledtodothatwhichthelawdoesnotrequirehimtodo.
Article8.LawsinconsistentwithorinderogationofFundamentalRightstobevoid.
(1)Anylaw,oranycustomorusagehavingtheforceoflaw,insofarasitisinconsistentwiththerights
conferredbythisChapter,shall,totheextentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.
(2)TheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightssoconferredandanylaw
madeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofsuchcontravention,bevoid.
(3)TheprovisionsofthisArticleshallnotapplyto
(a)AnylawrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForces,orofthePoliceorofsuchotherforcesasare
(b)anyofthe
(ii)otherlawsspecifiedin,PartIoftheFirstSchedule;
andnosuchlawnoranyprovisionthereofshallbevoidonthegroundthatsuchlaworprovisionis
(4)Notwithstandinganythingcontainedinparagraph(b)ofclause(3)withinaperiodoftwoyearsfrom
thecommencingday,theappropriateLegislatureshallbringthelawsspecifiedinPartIIoftheFirst
ScheduleintoconformitywiththerightsconferredbythisChapter:
ProvidedthattheappropriateLegislaturemaybyresolutionextendthesaidperiodoftwo
yearsbyaperiodnotexceedingsixmonths.
Explanation.IfinrespectofanylawMajliseShoora(Parliament)istheappropriate
Legislature,suchresolutionshallbearesolutionoftheNationalAssembly.
(5)TherightsconferredbythisChaptershallnotbesuspendedexceptasexpresslyprovidedbythe
Constitution.
58.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralsoughttomeettheabovementionedsubmissionsbyreferringto
clause(3)ofArticle8andinparticularparagraph(a)andsubparagraph(ii)ofparagraph(b).Weneed
toexamineArticle8initsentiretybeforeattendingtothelearnedAttorneyGeneralsresponse.Clause
(1)ofArticle8referstothepast,i.e.thecommencementoftheConstitutionandthelawsthenexisting.
Clause(2)ofArticle8lookstothefutureshallnotmakealaw,itiscategoricalanddeclaresthatany
lawwhichtakesawayorabridgesanyFundamentalRightshallbevoidtosuchextent.Clause(3)of
Article8carvesoutcertainexceptionsfromtheaforementioned.Paragraph(a)ofclause(3)isrestricted
tolawsrelatingtomembersoftheArmedForcesorofthepoliceorofsuchotherforcesasarecharged
withthemaintenanceofpublicorder,dischargeoftheirdutiesandmaintenanceofdisciplineamongst
them;conductingthetrialofcivilianswhohavebeenaccusedofterroristactsdoesnotcomewithinits
parameters.
59.Therefore,theremainingprovisionofArticle8,i.e.paragraph(b)ofclause(3),islefttobe
examinedandwhethertheLawsoftheArmedForcesandthePakistanProtectionActhavebeenmade
impervioustoFundamentalRights.Article8(3)(b)hasundergoneafewchangessinceitsinceptionin
the1973Constitution,whenitsimplystated,(b)anyofthelawsspecifiedintheFirstScheduleasin
forceimmediatelybeforethecommencingday.Thereafter,bytheConstitution(FirstAmendment)Act,
1974(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,8thMay1974),thefollowingwords
wereadded,orasamendedbyanyofthelawsspecifiedinthatSchedule.BytheConstitution(Fourth
Amendment)Act,1975(publishedintheGazetteofPakistan,Extraordinary,PartI,25thNovember
1975)paragraph(b)wasfurtheralteredbysubdividingitintosubparagraphs(i)and(ii).The1st,4th
and5thAmendmentstotheConstitutionaddedcertainlawstotheFirstScheduleandnowthe21st
AmendmenthasaddedtheArmyAct,theAirForceAct,theNavyOrdinanceandtheProtectionof
PakistanActtoit.Thisisanunreasonableandretrogressivesteptakeninhastetocompromise
FundamentalRights,withoutevenacarefulconsiderationofthemeasuresthatcouldbeperformedby
theExecutiveundertheprevailingcircumstances(someofwhichareidentifiedbelow).Thelearned
AttorneyGeneralcontendsthatclause(3)ofArticle8excludedtheapplicabilityofFundamentalRights
tomembersoftheArmedForcesandlawsthathavebeenaddedtotheFirstSchedule.However,
amendingthesaidlawsbypermittingthetrialsofciviliansbythemilitaryisaltogetheradifferentmatter
andifthisispermitteditwouldrendertheentireFundamentalRightsChapteranillusion.Inthis
contextitwouldbeappropriatetoreproducethefollowingextractfromthejudgmentofAjmalMian,CJ,
inLiaquatHussain(above):
Itmaybepertinenttorefertoclause(2)andclause(5)ofaboveArticle8oftheConstitutionbefore
dilatinguponclause(3)relieduponbythelearnedAttorneyGeneral.Itmaybeobservedthatclause(2)
oftheaboveArticleenjoinsthattheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgesthe
rightssoconferredandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofsuch
contravention,bevoid.Whereasclause(5)thereofpostulatesthattherightsconferredbythisChapter
(i.e.ChapterrelatingtotheFundamentalRights)shallnotbesuspendedexceptasexpresslyprovidedby
theConstitution.Ifclause(3)ofaboveArticle8istobeviewedwithreferencetotheabovetwoclauses,
itbecomesevidentthatparagraph(a)ofclause(3)doesnotempowertheLegislaturetolegislatethe
impugnedOrdinanceforprovidingaparalleljudicialsystem.Theaboveparagraph(a)ofclause(3)
providesthattheprovisionoftheaboveArticle8shallnotapplytoanylawrelatingtomembersofthe
ArmedForces,orofthePoliceorofsuchotherforcesasarechargedwiththemaintenanceofpublic
order,forthepurposeofensuringtheproperdischargeoftheirdutiesorthemaintenanceofdiscipline
amongthem.Theaboveparagraphreferstoanylawwhichmaybeinexistenceorwhichmaybe
enactedinordertoenabletheArmedForcesorotherforcestodischargetheirdutiesandtomaintain
properdiscipline.Ithasnothingtodowiththequestion,astowhethertheMilitaryCourtscantry
civiliansforciviloffenceswhichhavenonexuswiththeArmedForces.(page633OO)[emphasisadded]
60.ThereisalsomeritinthesubmissionofMs.AsmaJehangir,thattheexceptioncontainedin
clause(3)ofArticle8doesnotwhittleawaythoserightsthathavebeenconferredbyArticle4,which
providestoeverypersontheprotectionoflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlaw,etc.The
generalityoftheprotectionreferredtoinclause(1)ofArticle4isparticularizedinclause(2)and
specificallyincludes,prohibitionagainstactiondetrimentaltolife,liberty,body,reputationand
propertyofanyperson.ThisaspectwasalsoconsideredinLiaquatHussain;thefollowingextractfrom
thejudgmentofChiefJusticeAjmalMianisreproduced:
Itwillnotbeoutofcontexttomentionthatclause(1)ofArticle4providesthattoenjoytheprotection
oflawandtobetreatedinaccordancewithlawistheinalienablerightofeverycitizen,whereverhe
maybe,andofeveryotherpersonforthetimebeingwithinPakistan.Whereasclause(2)thereoflays
downthatinparticularnoactiondetrimentaltothelife,liberty,body,reputationorpropertyofany
personshallbetakenexceptinaccordancewithlaw.TheaboveArticleistobereadwithArticle9ofthe
Constitutionwhichpostulatesthatnopersonshallbedeprivedoflifeorlibertysaveinaccordancewith
law.Ifapersonistobedeprivedofhislifeonaccountofexecutionofdeathsentenceawardedbya
TribunalwhichdoesnotfitinwithintheframeworkoftheConstitution,itwillbeviolativeofabove
FundamentalRightcontainedinArticle9.However,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralcontendedthatinfact
terroristswhokillinnocentpersonsviolatetheaboveArticle9bydeprivingthemoftheirlivesandnot
theFederalGovernmentwhichcausedthepromulgationoftheimpugnedOrdinancewiththeobjectto
punishterrorists.NopatrioticPakistanicanhaveanysympathywithterroristswhodeservesevere
punishment,buttheonlyquestionatissueis,whichforumistoawardpunishment,i.e.whetheraforum
asenvisagedbytheConstitutionorbyaMilitaryCourtwhichdoesnotfitinwithintheframeworkofthe
Constitution.Nodoubt,thatwhenaterroristtakesthelifeofaninnocentperson,heisviolatingArticle9
oftheConstitution,butiftheterrorist,asaretaliation,isdeprivedofhislifebyamechanismotherthan
throughdueprocessoflawwithintheframeworkoftheConstitution,itwillalsobeviolativeofabove
Article9.(pages633634PP)[emphasisadded]
JusticeAjmalMianhittheproverbialnailsquarelyonthehead.Indeednonormalpersoncan
sympathisewithkillerswhomustbeprosecutedandpunished,butinaccordancewiththelawandthe
Constitution.Ifwerushtoconvictterroriststhroughunconstitutionalmeanswestooptotheirlevel.
TheConstitutiondoesnotpermitthetrialofciviliansbythemilitaryasitwouldcontravene
FundamentalRights,whichcannotbeexcludedbyinvokingclause(3)ofArticle8andplacingtheArmy
Act,theAirForceAct,theNavyOrdinanceandtheProtectionofPakistanActintheFirstScheduletothe
Constitution.Moreover,Article4oftheConstitutionisastandaloneArticleandneithercanitbe
excluded(byinvokingArticle8oftheConstitution)norcantherightsencapsulatedthereinbeinfringed.
IstheCategorizationTerroristsUsingtheNameofReligionorSectaReasonableClassification
61.The21stAmendmentandtheamendmentsmadetotheLawsoftheArmedForcesneedtobe
testedagainsttheconstitutionaldirectivethat,Allcitizensareequalbeforelawandareentitledto
equalprotectionoflaw(clause(1)ofArticle25).TheSupremeCourthasinterpretedthisprovisionand
thatitdoesnotmeanthateverycitizen,mustbetreatedinthesamemanner.However,toensurethat
theprincipleisnotviolated,personssimilarlysituatedorinsimilarcircumstancesmustbetreatedinthe
samemanneror(inthepresentcase)whetherthosetobetriedarereasonablyclassifiedandhavenot
beendiscriminatedagainst.ThePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015extendedtheambitoftheArmy
Acttoparticularcivilianscommittingcertaintypesofterroristacts.Accordingtotheamendmentmade
insubclause(iii)and(iv)ofclause(d)ofsubsection(1)ofsection2oftheArmyAct,thosecivilianswho
areclaimingorareknowntobelongtoanyterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligionor
asectcanbetriedandcourtsmartialed,providedtheircaseshavebeensentfortrialbytheFederal
Governmentpursuanttosubsection(4)ofsection2.Nocriteriaormeasureisprescribedforthe
FederalGovernmenttofollowinchoosingthecasesthatitdecidestosendforsuchtrials;itthushas
absoluteandunfettereddiscretion.
62.Aclassificationorcategorizationthatisclearlyoutlinedanddefinedandwhichisreasonable
maybepermissible,butifitisnotproperlyclassifiedortheclassificationisunreasonablethenitwould
infringetheequalityrequirementprescribedinclause(1)ofArticle25oftheConstitution.ThisCourthas
attendedtothematterofclassificationandcategorizationinacivilmatterinI.A.Sherwaniv.
GovernmentofPakistan(1991SCMR1041)andinacriminalmatterinGovernmentofBaluchistanv.
AzizullahMemon(PLD1993SC341),whichpertainedtotheconstitutionalityofCriminalLaw(Special
Provisions),Ordinance(IIof1968).Itwouldbeappropriatetoreproducethefollowingextract,whichis
equallyapplicabletothepresentcase,fromthejudgmentofAzizullahMemon:
(i)thatequalprotectionoflawdoesnotenvisagethateverycitizenistobetreatedalikeinall
circumstances,butitcontemplatesthatpersonssimilarlysituatedorsimilarlyplacedaretobetreated
alike;
(ii)thatreasonableclassificationispermissiblebutitmustbefoundedonreasonabledistinctionor
reasonablebasis;
(iii)thatdifferentlawscanvalidlybeenactedfordifferentsexes,personsindifferentagegroups,
personshavingdifferentfinancialstandings,andpersonsaccusedofheinouscrimes;
(iv)thatnostandardofuniversalapplicationtotestreasonablenessofaclassificationcanbelaiddown
aswhatmaybereasonableclassificationinaparticularsetofcircumstancesmaybeunreasonableinthe
othersetofcircumstances;
(v)thatalawapplyingtoonepersonoroneclassofpersonsmaybeconstitutionallyvalidifthereis
sufficientbasisorreasonforit,butaclassificationwhichisarbitraryandisnotfoundedonanyrational
basisisnoclassificationastowarrantitsexclusionfromthemischiefofArticle25;
(vi)thatequalprotectionoflawmeansthatallpersonsequallyplacedbetreatedalikebothinprivileges
conferredandliabilitiesimposed;
(vii)thatinordertomakeaclassificationreasonable,itshouldbebased
(a)onanintelligibledifferentiawhichdistinguishespersonsorthingsthataregroupedtogetherfrom
thosewhohavebeenleftout;
(b)thatthedifferentiamusthaverationalnexustotheobjectsoughttobeachievedbysuch
classification.(page358)
Subsequently,inthecaseofMehramAli(above),afivememberBenchoftheSupremeCourt,
citedwithapprovalwhathadearlierbeenheldinthecaseofAzizullahMemon(above).
63.Thelistof61organizations,providedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneral,thathavebeen
proscribedbytheFederalGovernmentundersection11BoftheAntiTerrorismAct,include
organizationsthatbytheirverynamecanbeidentifiedasreligious,sectarian,ethnic,secessionistor
political.However,thenamesofcertainorganizationsdonotrevealtheirapparentobjectiveand
identity,andwhethertheyarereligiousorsectarian.Thenagain,andsignificantly,certainorganizations,
whichaccordingtothelearnedAttorneyGeneralareterroristorganizationshavenotbeenproscribed
undersection11BoftheAntiTerrorismAct.TheArmyActalsodoesnotenlightenastowhich
organizationsmembersinvolvedinterrorismwouldbesubjecttocourtsmartial.Thosesentfortrial
undertheArmyActmayalsostatethattheyarenotaffiliatedwithanyreligiousorsectarian
organization.Thestipulatedclassificationofterroristgroupororganizationusingthenameofreligion
orasect,doesnotdisclosewhowouldcomewithinitspurviewnordoesthestatedclassificationmeet
thetestofreasonableclassification.TheFederalGovernmenthavingabsoluteandunfettereddiscretion
topickandchoosecasestobetriedbythemilitary,furtherviolatesthereasonableclassificationcriteria.
64.Therearealsootherforeseeablecomplications.Aterroristorganizationwhichisnotreligious
orsectarian,mayabetareligiousorsectarianorganizationinthecommissionofanoffenceorinaseries
ofeventswhichculminateinaterroristact.Forinstance,anethnicorganizationmaysupplyexplosives
orgunstoareligiousorsectarianorganization,whichthenusesthesameinaterroristact;willthenthe
membersofthesaidethnicorganizationbetriedseparatelyinanAntiTerroristCourtorwilltheyalso
betriedbythemilitary?ThedefinitionofreligiousorsectarianorganizationsintheArmyAct,whichhas
alsobeenincorporatedintheAirForceActandtheNavyOrdinance,doesnotcontemplatesuch
scenarios.Thevaguenessofthedefinitionandlackofdetailsinthedefinitionclausegivesriseto
monumentaljurisdictionalandconstitutionalproblems.Anindividualwhoissenttobetriedbythe
militarymaydeclarethatheisnotareligiousorsectarianterroristandcontendthattheexerciseof
discretionbytheFederalGovernmentinsendinghiscasefortrialbythemilitarywasnotjustified.Every
lawshouldbeexplicitandameticulouseffortmustbemadebythedraftsmentoensurethatall
conceivableproblemsareattendedto.Unfortunately,therearenumerousdefectsandlacunaeinthe
law,someofwhicharenotedabove.Evenif,forthesakeofargument,itbeacceptedthatthe
categorisationofsuchtypeofterroristsdoesnotoffendthereasonableclassificationruleorany
provisionoftheConstitution,suchchallengeswouldundoubtedlydelaythetrialofterroristsratherthan
achievingtheprofessedobjectiveofensuringthattheterroristsarebroughttojusticepromptly.The
lawasframedisgivingthemanunnecessarylifeline.
65.ThepowervestingintheFederalGovernmenttopickandchoosecasesfortrialbymembersof
theArmedForcesfurtherviolatestheequalityrequirementstipulatedinArticle25oftheConstitution.
ThisveryquestionalsocameupforconsiderationbeforetheSupremeCourtinthecaseofLiaquat
Hussain(above)whereitwasheld,that:
43.AsregardstheviolationofArticle25oftheConstitution,itmaybeobservedthatthecontentionof
thelearnedcounselforthepetitionerswasthattheimpugnedOrdinancecontravenestheaboveArticle,
inasmuchasitgivesdiscretiontotheFederalGovernmenttopickandchoosecaseswhichmaybe
referredtotheMilitaryCourts.Ontheotherhand,thelearnedAttorneyGeneralhasurgedthatthe
offencestriableundertheimpugnedOrdinancearethosewhicharementionedinsection6andthe
ScheduletotheimpugnedOrdinanceandthatthisCourthasalreadyheldinmorethanonecasethat
differentlawscanbeenactedfordifferentsexes,personsofdifferentagegroup,personshaving
differentfinancialstandardsandpersonsaccusedofheinouscrimes.Nodoubt,thatthisCourtinteralia
inthecaseofI.A.Sharwaniv.GovernmentofPakistan(1991SCMR1041)hasheldso,whichhasbeen
reiteratedinthecaseofMehramAliandothersv.FederationofPakistanandothers(PLD1998SC1445)
(supra).However,inthepresentcasethebasicquestionisastotheviresoftheimpugnedOrdinanceon
thegroundofprovidingparalleljudicialsystem,butatthesametimetheimpugnedOrdinanceisalso
violativeofArticle25oftheConstitution,inasmuchasitgivesdiscretiontotheFederalGovernment
undersection3thereoftopickandchoosecasesforreferringtotheMilitaryCourtsashasbeenheldby
thisCourtinthecaseofBrig.(Retd.)F.B.Ali(supra).Thereisnomandatoryprovisionprovidingthatall
theoffencesmentionedinsection6andtheScheduleshallbetriablebytheMilitaryCourtsconvened
undersection3oftheimpugnedOrdinance(paragraph43,page634).[emphasisadded]
Theaforesaiddecisioncomprehensivelycapturestheessenceofthematterandincategorical
termsdeprecatesthegranttotheFederalGovernmentunfetteredpowerwithregardtodetermining
whichcasesaretobesenttobetriedbythemilitary.Italsorightlycastigatesestablishingaparallel
judicialsystem.Needlesstostate,thejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinLiaquatHussaincontinuesto
holdthefield,andthereisnoreasontosubscribetoanotherviewinvirtuallyidenticalcircumstances.
ConclusionofWhetherClassificationisReasonable
66.Therefore,fortheaforesaidreasonsthecategorisationanyterroristgroupororganization
usingthenameofreligionorsect,cannotbeacceptedtobeareasonableclassificationthatcouldbe
sustainedinthepresenceofclause(1)ofArticle25oftheConstitution.Thegrantofpowertothe
FederalGovernmenttopickandchoosecasesfortrialsbeforethemilitaryfurthererodesthepurported
classificationasthepowergrantedtotheGovernmentdoesnotprescribeanyparametersorcriteria;
consequently,sucharbitrarypowerfurtherviolatesclause(1)ofArticle25.Apersonwhocommitsan
actofterrorismisaterrorist.Hisreasonormotivationforcommittingtheterroristactisimmaterial.
Thosewhocommitterroristactsorspreadterrorismdosoinviolationofthelaw.Theymusttherefore
betreatedsimilarlyandprosecutedwiththefullvigourofthelaw.Itmayalsobeobservedthatneither
Islamnoranyotherreligionpermitsmurderoractsofterrorism,therefore,thephraseterrorisminthe
nameofreligionisanoxymoron,andonethatcannotbeaccepted.
TheSequenceofEnactingthe21stAmendmentandthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Actandits
Consequences
67.TheConstitution(TwentyfirstAmendment)Act,2015andthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,
2015bothcameintoeffecton7thJanuary2015.However,ittranspiresthatthe21stAmendmentwas
enactedfirstandthenthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,ascanbegatheredfromtheirrespective
numberingActIof2015andActIIof2015aswellasfromtheirrespectivenotificationnumbers,i.e.
No.F.9(2)/2015Legis.andNo.F.9(3)/2015Legis..Consequently,theinsertionofthePakistanArmy
Act,1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953andthePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961intotheFirst
ScheduleoftheConstitutionwouldhavetakenplacebeforethePakistanArmy(Amendment)Acthad
beenamendedtoincludethecourtsmartialofcivilians.Therefore,whateverconstitutionalcovermay
havebeenprovidedbyclause(3)ofArticle8fromtheapplicabilityofFundamentalRightsitwouldnot
extendtotherecentlyamendedversionoftheLawsoftheArmedForces.
68.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralrespondedbycontendingthatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)
Actisdeemedtohavecomeintoeffectonthestrokeofmidnightof6thJanuary2015becauseofsub
section(3)ofsection5oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897,reproducedbelow:
(3)Unlessthecontraryisexpressed,aCentralActorRegulationshallbeconstruedascominginto
operationimmediatelyontheexpirationofthedayprecedingitscommencement.
69.MymostdistinguishedcolleagueJusticeAsifSaeedKhosahoweverdetectedtheapparentflaw
inthelearnedAttorneyGeneralssubmissionanddrewhisattentiontoclause(3)ofArticle75and
Article12oftheConstitution.Clause(3)ofArticle75oftheConstitutionprovides,that,Whenthe
PresidenthasassentedorisdeemedtohaveassentedtoaBill,itshallbecomelawandbecalledanAct
ofMajliseShoora(Parliament).Therefore,nolawcanbeconstruedascomingintooperationbefore
thePresidentsassentthereto.ThispositionisreiteratedbythedefinitionofanActcontainedinArticle
260oftheConstitutionthat,ActofMajliseShoora(Parliament)meansanActpassedbyMajlise
Shoora(Parliament)ortheNationalAssemblyandassentedto,ordeemedtohavebeenassentedto,by
thePresident.ThefactthatwearedealingwithcriminallawwouldalsoattractArticle12ofthe
Constitutionwhichprohibitsretrospectiveapplicationofsubstantivelaw.
70.Subsection(3)ofsection5oftheGeneralClausesActcannotnegatetheConstitution,thus
renderingthelearnedAttorneyGeneralsargumentwithoutanylegalfoundation.Enactingthe21st
AmendmentfirstwouldprovideonlytheunamendedversionofArmyAct,1952withthebenefitof
clause(3)ofArticle8.Themistakethatwascommitted,byenactingthesetwoenactmentsinreverse
order,leavesthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Actwithouttheconstitutionalcoverthatclause(3)of
Article8mayhaveprovided.ThePakistanArmy(Amendment)Actwhichpurportedtowidentheambit
oftheArmyAct,tosubjectparticulartypesofcivilianstocourtsmartial,therefore,hasnoconstitutional
protection.Thisproceduralflawsimilarlyimpactsthethreeotherlawsinsertedbythe21stAmendment
intheFirstScheduleoftheConstitution.
IntheLawofCriminalProcedurebyJusticeFazalKarim(publishedbyPakistanLawHouse,
Karachi,2010,atpage143)thedistinguishedauthorwrites,that,theFundamentalRightsguaranteed
byArticles9to28oftheConstitutionofPakistan,almost16belongtocriminalprocedure,anditmayas
wellbedescribedasaminicodeofcriminalprocedure.TheFundamentalRightshavebothsubstantive
andproceduralcontents.
Itisclarifiedthattheaforesaiddetermination,thatthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Actdoes
nothaveconstitutionalprotection,doesnotmeanthatresortcouldbehadtoclause(3)ofArticle8asit
hasalreadybeendetermined(above)thattheConstitutiondoesnotpermitthis.
ConclusionwithRegardtothe21stAmendment
71.TheExecutivehasbeenseparatedfromtheJudiciaryandtheConstitutionprohibitsa
retrogressivesteptobetakeninthisregard.TheProvisodoesnotnegateclause(3)ofArticle175,nor
doesitconjureupthetrialofciviliansbythemilitaryormilitarycourtsunderArticle175.Since
provisosmerelylimitorqualifythemainenactment,theProvisocannotbeallowedtodestroyornullify
clause(3)ofArticle175.Clause(2)ofArticle175alsodoesnotpermitconfermentofjurisdictiononthe
militarytoconductthetrialofciviliansincriminalcases;thesameisalsonotcontemplatedbyArticle
245oftheConstitution.
TheinsertionoftheLawsoftheArmedForcesandtheProtectionofPakistanActintotheFirst
Schedulecontravenesclauses(2)and(5)ofArticle8.TheinsertionofsuchlawsintotheFirstSchedule
cannotbedonethroughtheaegisofclause(3)ofArticle8oftheConstitutioneither.Theguarantees
providedbyArticle4areinadditiontothoseprescribedintheFundamentalRightsChapterofthe
Constitution.
Thecategorizationofterroristswhousethenameofreligion/sectisnotareasonable
classification,andtheFederalGovernmentsabsolutediscretiontopickandchosefromamongstthem
furtheroffendsit;consequently,thesameisdiscriminatoryandoffendstheequalityprinciple
encapsulatedinArticle25oftheConstitution.
VideoRecordings
72.ThelearnedAttorneyGeneralsubjectedtheopencourttoanumberofvideorecordings;
includingarbitrarypronouncementsofdeathsentences,followedbybeheadingsandagameof
footballwithseveredheads.Suchhistrionicsandshocktacticsdemonstratedarecklessdisregardfor
peoplessensibilities,particularlythefaintofheartandchildrenwhowerepresent.Wefurthersaw
membersofanorganization,whoseselfproclaimedleaderdemandsallegiancetoaselfstyledversion
ofhimselfasKhalifa(Caliph)orAmirulmomineen(Leaderofthepious);theGovernmentstatesthatit
isinpossessionofevidencethatconfirmsthesaidgrouptobeanantistateterroristorganization.
FederalGovernmentsFailuretoProscribeTerroristOrganizations
73.TheAntiTerrorismAct,1997(theATA)enablestheFederalGovernmenttopublishanorder
intheofficialGazettedeclaringthataterroristorganizationhasbeenproscribedundersection11Bof
theATA.AsperthelistprovidedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneraltousinCourt,thereare61proscribed
organizations.YetastonishinglytheFederalGovernmenthasnotproscribedtheorganizationmentioned
intheforegoingparagraph.
ConsequencesofProscribingaTerroristOrganization
74.Theissuanceofanotificationundersection11Bhasconsequences;theproscribed
organizationsviewscannotbepropagated(section11WoftheATAmakesitacriminaloffenceentailing
amaximumoffiveyearsimprisonment),itbecomesacriminaloffencetojointheorganization(section
11FATAprescribesafiveyearsmaximumimprisonment)andtheraisingandgivingoffundstoitis
prohibited(section11Hto11KoftheATAmakesitanoffencepunishablewithamaximumoftenyears
imprisonment).However,apersonchargedislegallypermittedtoplead,thathedidnotknowandhad
noreasonablecausetosuspectthatthearrangementrelatedtoterroristproperty(subsection(2)of
section11KoftheATA).
Adisturbingfacthascometolight;thereappearstobenoofficialwebsitethatdisclosesthenamesof
eventhe61proscribedorganizations.Toverifyifalistoftheproscribedorganizationswasavailablein
thepublicdomaintheCourtassociateconductedaninternetsearchofthewebsitesoftheconcerned
authority,agencyandministries,butregretfullynonedisplayedtheinformation.TheNationalCounter
TerrorismAuthorityswebsitewasshowntobeunderconstruction(http://www.nacta.gov.pk/),the
GovernmentofPakistan,FederalInvestigationAgencyswebsitewasundermaintenance
(http://www.fia.gov.pk/resourcecenter.htm),andthewebsitesoftheGovernmentofPakistansMinistry
ofInterior,MinistryofDefenceandMinistryofLaw,JusticeandHumanRightsdidnotdisplaythesame.
Thegeneralpublicthereforemayhavenoknowledgewhetheraparticularorganizationhasbeen
proscribedandmayprovidemoneytoitorevenjoinitinallinnocence.Ironically,asdemonstratedby
thelearnedAttorneyGeneral,terroristorganizationsconducttheirpropagandaontheinternetwith
aplomb.
FlagsoftheSealoftheProphet(PBUH)&oftheKalimaTayyibah
75.TherecordingsproducedbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralshowedmencleavingthepathof
deathanddestructionholdingaloftflagsinscribedwiththesealofProphetMuhammad,Peaceand
BlessingsbeUponHim.TheProphetisRehmatulAalameen(MercytotheWorlds),theepitomeoflove
andaffection,butthereisanattempttobesmirchbothhisnameandmemory.Toaddinsulttoinjury,
flagswithKalimaTayyibahareflownbythosewhocommitmurder.Section11GoftheATAmakesitan
offencepunishablewithimprisonmentofupto5yearsifanyone,wears,carriesordisplaysanyarticle,
symbol,oranyflagorbannerconnectedwithorassociatedwithanyproscribedorganization.Itis
notedthatsymbolsextremelydeartoMuslimsthroughouttheworldareblatantlyusedaspropaganda
toolsbykillerswhoaudaciouslyassociateIslam(whichmeansPeace)withviolence;killingofschool
children,worshippers,usersofpublictransportandvirtuallyeveryonetheold,theinfirm,thesick,
men,womenandchildren.
CriminalCasesarenotRegisteredAgainstTerrorists
76.AnothervideoshownbythelearnedAttorneyGeneralclearlyidentifiedmembersofa
proscribedorganizationwhowereshowntobemurderingmembersoftheArmedForces.However,our
queryrevealedthatnocriminalcasehadbeenregisteredagainsttheperpetrators.Subsection(10)of
section19oftheATAenablestrialsinabsentia,aftercompliancewiththeprocedureprescribedtherein.
Therefore,eveniftheStatefailstoarresttheperpetratorstheycanbeconvictedandthuscategorized
asconvicts.Section27BoftheATAenablesconvictions,onthebasisofelectronicorforensicevidence
orsuchotherevidencethatmaybecomeavailablebecauseofmoderndevicesortechniques.
Additionally,anabsconderfromjusticecanalsobeproceededagainst,convictedandsentencedforup
totenyearsforremainingafugitiveundersection21LoftheATA.Aconviction,evenofthosewhohave
notbeenarrested,hasadvantages;extraditioncanbesought,propertycanbeconfiscated,andthe
terroristswillbeartheignominyofbeingconvictedforheinouscrimes;underminingtheirappealon
impressionableminds.
ImproperInvestigations,ProsecutionsandthePrevailingSituation
77.TheGovernment,undersection19(1)oftheATA,isalsoempoweredtoassociatemembersof
IntelligenceAgenciesandArmedForceswithinvestigations,butthisprovisionisrarely,ifever,used.It
appearsthatimportantmatterssuchastheproscribingofterrorists,lodgingofcasesagainstthem,
collectionofevidenceandconductingathoroughprosecutionhavebeenlargelyignored,andithas
somehowbeenconcludedthatthereasonterrorismcontinuesunabatedisbecausetrialsarebeing
conductedbytheAntiTerrorismCourts,thereby,necessitatingthemtobesupplantedwithmilitary
courts.TheAntiTerroristCourtshaveconvictedterroristsandsentencedthemtodeath,butthe
sentenceswerenotbeingcarriedouttillquiterecentlybecauseoftheGovernmentsselfimposed
moratorium.Jailbreakshavealsobeenreportedinwhichanumberofconvictedterroristsescaped.The
kneejerkreactioninenactingthe21stAmendmentandamendingtheLawsoftheArmedForces
appearsnottohavetakenintoaccounttheprevailingsituationandtheabovematters.
Perceptions
78.Inexplicably,theStateisnotutilizingtheprovisionsoftheATA.Insteadithasembarkedupona
precariousroadandonewhichisfraughtwithinnumerablepitfalls.Leavingasidetheconstitutionality
oftrialsconductedbythemilitary,wemaypausetopondertheconsequencesthereof.In
jurisprudence,theimmemorialadagestillringstrue:justicemustnotonlybedone,butmustalsobe
seentobedone.EveniftheArmedForcespersonnelconductingtrialshadcomprehensiveknowledge
ofthelawandtriedthecasesbeforethemwithfastidiousness,thoseconvictedwouldwearthemantle
ofvictimhoodifnotmartyrdom;forclosedtrialscreateanauraofmysteryandspeculation,whichsome
mayendeavourtoexploitandgalvanizeotherstotheircause.Ifwechoosetolearnanythingfromwhat
hashappenedinourneighborhood,andcontinuestohappen,itisthatthesenseofbeingwrongedor
persecutedisasignificantmotivator.
Wemaytakealessonfromourownhistory;betweenNovember1945toMay1946afewmembersof
theBritishIndianArmyinIndiawerecourtsmartialedforbeingmembersoftheIndianNationalArmy
(INA)setupbySubhashChandraBosewiththeobjectofliberatingIndiafromBritishrule.INAsdefence
teamcomprisedofthestalwartsofboththeIndianNationalCongressandtheAllIndiaMuslimLeague,
politicalpartiesthatgenerallyopposedeverythingtheotherespoused.CaptainShahNawaz,Captain
DhillonandCaptainSahgalweretriedinDelhisRedFortbyseniorBritishmilitaryofficersandallthree
werefoundguiltyofwagingwaragainsttheKingandsentencedtotransportationforlife.Aground
swellofsupportforthethreeofficersspreadwhichpersuadedGeneralAuchinleck,theCommanderin
ChiefoftheIndianArmy,toreleasethem.Thesymbolismattachedtocourtsmartialmayhaveaneffect
diametricallyoppositetowhatissought.MohanSinghanINAmembersaidabouttheRedFortcourts
martial,that,WhattheINAfailedtoaccomplishitself,thenarrowandvindictivepolicyoftheBritish
accomplisheditfortheINAandthusitsmaterialdefeatturnedouttobethegreatestspiritualvictoryfor
thecountry.ForthisserviceweareverygratefultotheBritish.Incidentally,internalBritishdebate
wasawareofthedangerofcreatingmartyrsinthenationalcause(WavellwritingtoPethickLawrence
on22ndOctober1945).
ResponsetoTerroristsandTerrorism
79.Thebestresponsetoterroriststoisolate,thwart,anddefeatthem,istoupholdtheprinciples
andrightsthatterroriststrampleunderfoot.Thoseaccusedofterroristactsmustbesubjectedtolegal
dueprocess,anindependentcourtandevidencebasedconvictions.Ifwesacrificeourprinciplesandslip
weshallcometofacethemintheirswampofinfamy.Letuslearnfromcountriesthathavesuccessfully
confrontedanddefeatedterroristsandavoidthepitfallsofthosewhohaveexacerbatedthedanger.
MembersofEuropeanterroristgroupssuchastheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA),EuskadiTaAskatasuna
(ETA)andtheBrigateRosse(RedBrigade)intheUnitedKingdom,SpainandItalyrespectivelywere
triedincourts:theCrownCourts,AudienciaNacionalCourtandtheCortedAssise.Insomewhatofa
contrasttheUnitedStatesofAmericahasresortedtodarkholeincarcerationcentresandallbutdenied
dueprocesstointernees.HistoryhasshownthesuccessoftheEuropeanmethodology.
InstitutionsMustbeStrengthenedandMustOperateintheirDesignatedSpheres
80.ThefocusoftheArmedForcesmustnotbeallowedtoshiftfromcombating,pursuingand
capturingterrorists.Theymustalsobeinsulatedfromanyallegationsofimproprietyinconducting
trials.Muslimmajoritycountries,fromAfghanistantoLibya,arerivenwithturmoil,andwillitnotbe
incorrecttoobservethattheyfalteredindevelopingindependentandstronginstitutions.
Thepeopleandthecountryarestrengthenedwheneveryinstitutionworkswithinits
designatedareaofjurisdiction;theLegislaturelegislates,theJudiciaryadjudicatesandexamineslaws
andtheConstitution,theExecutivemaintainslawandorderanddeliversgoodgovernance.Asfor
example,itdidnotaugurwellforthenationwhentheSupremeCourt,withouthavinganyjurisdiction,
validatedconstitutionaldeviationsandviolationsandgrantedindividualsthepowertoamendthe
Constitution.Historystandswitnesstothefactthatwheneveraninstitutionencroachesuponthe
domainofanotheritweakensthenation,forestallsdevelopment,andpreventspeoplefrom
accomplishingthegoalstheysetthemselves.
SynopsisandDecision
81.Thefollowingisasynopsisofthereasonsdetailedaboveandthesepetitionsareallowedinthe
followingterms:
(1)Article239(5)oftheConstitutiondoesnotoustthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtto
examineanamendmentmadetotheConstitution.
(2)TheSupremeCourtalsohasthejurisdictiontoexamineanamendmentmadetothe
Constitutionunderclause(3)ofArticle184readwithclause(2)ofArticle175oftheConstitution.
(3)IninterpretingtheConstitution,thefollowingrulesneedtobeparticularlyconsidered:
(a)TheConstitutionshouldbereadasawhole.
(b)Effectshouldbegiventoeveryword,paragraph,clauseandarticleoftheConstitutionand
redundancyshouldnotbeimportedthereto.
(c)IftherearetwoprovisionsoftheConstitutionattendingtosimilarmatters,theparticular
provisionexcludesthegeneralprovision.
(d)IfthereisaconflictbetweentwoprovisionsoftheConstitutionandoneofthemwasinserted
whentheConstitutionwasabrogated,subverted,suspendedorheldinabeyancethentheconflicting
provisionwhichwasintheConstitutionpriortothesaidabrogation,subversion,suspensionorabeyance
istobepreferredifitisclosertotheprovisionsofthePreamble.
(e)Parliamentarians,whoadorntheHouseafterthepromulgationofthe1973Constitutionorwill
dosointhefuture,donothavetheconstituentpowersofthefirstparliamentarians,therefore,they
cannotamendtheConstitutioninamannerthatcontravenestheprovisionsofthePreambletothe
Constitution,andinparticularanyamendmentthatmayabolish,takeawayorabridgeanyofthe
fundamentalrightsofthepeople.
(f)TheConstitutionanditsPreamblearebuiltonatrichotomythatseparatespowersbetweenthe
Legislature,theExecutiveandtheJudiciary,andeachonemustoperatewithinitsrespectivedomain.
Thus,whilsttheLegislatureisfullyempoweredtomakelawsoramendtheConstitutionitisthesuperior
CourtsthatwillascertaintheirconstitutionalityandinterpretthembecausetheConstitutionitselfhas
empoweredthem.
18thAmendmentand19thAmendmenttotheConstitution:
(4)(a)TheprovisionsrelatingtotheelectionsofnonMuslims(minorities)arecontrarytothe
provisionsofthePreambletotheConstitutionastheycontravenetheprinciplesofdemocracy,donot
safeguardthelegitimateinterestsofminoritiesanddeprivetheirrightofrepresentationthroughtheir
chosenrepresentatives.(IconcurwiththejudgmentofmydistinguishedcolleagueJusticeJawwadS.
Khawajainrespectofthismatter.)
(b)Theinsertionmadeinsubparagraph(iii)ofparagraph(b)ofclause(1)ofArticle63Awhereby
thewords,aConstitution(Amendment)Bill,wereaddeddoesnotcontravenetheConstitution.
(c)ThemodeandmannerprescribedinArticle175A(assubsequentlyamendedbythe19th
Amendment)fortheappointmentofJudgestotheSupremeCourt,HighCourts,andtheFederalShariat
CourtdonotcontravenetheConstitution.However,theParliamentaryCommitteedoesnothavethe
powertovetothenomineeoftheJudicialCommission;itmayhoweversendawrittenobjectionona
nominationforreconsiderationbytheJudicialCommission,asaninterpretationofclauses(12)and(13)
ofArticle175AoftheConstitutionreveals.
The21stAmendmenttotheConstitution
(5)(a)The21stAmendmentdoesnotsucceedinitsattempttotryciviliansbythe
military.
(b)Themilitary,whichisapartoftheExecutive,cannotconductcriminaltrialsbecausejudicial
powercanonlybeexercisedbytheJudiciary.
(c)Clause(3)ofArticle175nolongerenvisagestheexerciseofjudicialpowerbytheExecutiveand
theProvisoaddedtheretocannotundowhathasalreadytakenplace,i.e.theseparationoftheJudiciary
fromtheExecutive.
(d)Tobifurcatefromamongstthoseallegedtohavecommittedterrorismandwhoaretobetried
byAntiTerrorismCourtsundertheAntiTerrorismAct,1997aseparatesubcategoryofthoseusingthe
nameofreligionorsectisnotsufficientlypreciseandisalsonotareasonableclassification.Thesame,
therefore,offendstheprincipleofequalitybeforethelawandentitlementtoequalprotectionbefore
lawasmandatedbyclause(1)ofArticle25.
(e)TheplacementofthePakistanArmyAct,1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistan
NavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,2014insubpartIIIofPartIoftheFirst
ScheduletotheConstitutioncannotbedonepursuanttosubparagraph(ii)ofparagraph(b)ofclause
(3)ofArticle8.
(f)LawsrelatingtothedutiesandthemaintenanceofdisciplineintheArmedForces,thepoliceor
otherforcesmaybeexcludedfromtheapplicationofFundamentalRightsasstipulatedinparagraph(a)
ofclause(3)ofArticle8,butthesaidprovisioncannotbeextendedtoprovideforthetrialofciviliansby
themilitary.
ThePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015
(6)(a)Themilitary,whichisapartoftheExecutive,cannotconductcriminaltrialsofcivilians
becausejudicialpowercanonlybeexercisedbytheJudiciary.
(b)ThePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act,2015takesawayandabridgesFundamentalRights
mentionedinChapter1ofPartIItotheConstitutionthereforethesameisvoid.
(c)Allconvictions,sentencespassedoracquittalsmadeofcivilianstriedbythemilitarypursuantto
thePakistanArmyAct,1952,thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961and
theProtectionofPakistanAct,2014aresetasideandallsuchcasestobeadjudicatedafreshbytheAnti
TerrorismCourts.
(d)AllproceedingsofcivilianspendingbeforethemilitarypursuanttothePakistanArmyAct,1952,
thePakistanAirForceAct,1953,thePakistanNavyOrdinance,1961andtheProtectionofPakistanAct,
2014tobetransferredtotheAntiTerrorismCourts.
(7)ThereareimportantprovisionsintheAntiTerrorismAct,1997,whichifimplementedwould
helptostemterrorismandalsoensuretheconvictionofterrorists.
Sd/
(JusticeQaziFaezIsa)
Judge
Islamabad
17thJuly2015
(Zulfiqar)
JUDGMENTOFTHECOURT
Inviewoftherespectiveopinionsrecordedabove,byamajorityof13to04these
ConstitutionPetitionsareheldtobemaintainable.However,byamajorityof14to03theConstitution
PetitionschallengingtheConstitution(EighteenthAmendment)Act(ActXof2010)aredismissed,while
byamajorityof11to06theConstitutionPetitionschallengingtheConstitution(Twentyfirst
Amendment)Act(ActIof2015)andthePakistanArmy(Amendment)Act(ActIIof2015)aredismissed.
ChiefJustice
JudgeJudgeJudge
JudgeJudgeJudge
JudgeJudgeJudge
JudgeJudgeJudge
JudgeJudgeJudge
Judge
AnnouncedinopenCourt
Sd/
ChiefJustice
5thAugust,2015
APPROVEDFORREPORTING
SafdarShirazi/*

SC judgment details 18th, 21st amendments

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SC judgment details 18th, 21st amendments

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