Criminal Procedure Cases

G.R. No. 149472.
October 15, 2002

JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was charged with
estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The information reads:
That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the Vice President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from Olivier
Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of
$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture
of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to
said complainant, and the accused once in possession of the same, far from complying
from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said
complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated
demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of
$41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.|
Contrary to law.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. (Skiva) is a New York-based corporation which
imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines)
Inc. (Olivier). Aurora Manufacturing & Development Corporation (Aurora) and Uni-Group
Inc. (Uni-Group) are domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva.
Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner,
Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a consultant of
Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from Aurora
and Uni-Group. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier, issues to the
local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a Purchase Contract and Olivier issues to Skiva a Sales
Contract. In these transactions, payment is usually made by way of a letter of credit
wherein the supplier is paid only upon the presentation of the proper shipping documents
to the designated bank.[2]
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered
sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita
Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the jeans. [3] Thus, a Purchase Contract
dated December 18, 1985 was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was to
supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill
Jeans payable by means of a letter of credit at sight. [4] The Purchase Contract was
confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985 .[5] A Sales Contract was also issued by
Olivier to Skiva containing the same terms and conditions as the Purchase Contract and
was confirmed by Mr. Jack Chehebar of Skiva.[6]
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group the
amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of P20.59
to US$1.00) as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw materials to
manufacture the jeans.[7] It was also agreed that the amount advanced by Skiva represents
advance payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. [8] Skiva then issued a check
in the said amount payable to Uni-Group. [9] However, due to the length of time needed for
the check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to remit the funds instead by way
of telegraphic transfer. [10] Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr.
Lettmayr[11] and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in New York, the
Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs.
Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.[12]
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of the
said joint account, withdrew the amount of US$21,675.21 [13] and on January 22, 1986,
petitioner withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00. [14] The prosecution also presented
evidence that subsequent to said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99
were deducted from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the
remittance of the funds to another account.[15]
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the production of
the jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics
required for the order were purchased from Litton Mills by the petitioner.[16] 3,000 meters of
Litton fabrics are enough to produce only 200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount
insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva of 700 dozens of ladies twill jeans. [17] Upon inquiry
with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the query be directed to petitioner as
petitioner is in charge of securing the materials. [18] However, Ms. Tujan could not locate
the petitioner.[19]
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon Aurora/UniGroup through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money advanced in the amount of
US$41,300.00.[20]
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the
US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan,
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary
investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and
information was filed against petitioner.[21]
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315 paragraph
1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the
maximum and to pay Uni-Group and Aurora the amount of P595,259.00. [22] On March 13,
1997, the lower court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [23] On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[24]
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files the instant petition for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code: a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt;
c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and d)
there is demand made by the offended party to the offender.[25]
We agree with the trial courts finding that the contract between Skiva and Aurora/UniGroup was one of sale.[26] Thus, upon remittance by Skiva of its advance payment in the
amount of US$41,300.00, ownership thereof was transferred to Aurora/Uni-Group and
Aurora/Uni-Group had no obligation to account or deliver the money to Skiva, its only
obligation under the contract of sale being to deliver the 700 dozens of ladies
jeans. However, petitioner, as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of the
specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt of the amount, had the obligation to
account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora/Uni-Group.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of US$41,300.00 was remitted by telegraphic
transfer to the joint account of the petitioner and his wife and Mr. and Mrs. Werner
Lettmayr;[27] 2) the said amount was remitted as advance payment by Skiva for the jeans it
ordered;[28] and 3) the amount of US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by petitioner on January
16, 1986 and the amount of US$20,000.00 was withdrawn by petitioner on January 22,
1986.[29] In fact, petitioner himself admits having withdrawn from the joint account on two
occasions after the remittance was made.[30] Petitioner further admits having made such
withdrawal for the purpose of purchasing materials to be used for the jeans ordered by
Skiva and a portion thereof to be given to Aurora. [31] Thus, upon withdrawal by petitioner of
the amounts advanced by Skiva, petitioner received the same in trust with an obligation to
return the funds or account for the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or misappropriation of the amount received,
petitioner claims that a portion of the amount was used to purchase 3,000 meters of Litton
fabrics and the balance was returned to Aurora. [32] However, upon cross-examination,
petitioner was unable to recall the amount paid for the purchase of the fabrics or the
amount given to Aurora nor was petitioner able to identify whether payment for the
purchase of fabric or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash or in check. [33]
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his
defense that payment for the purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance of the
amount received by petitioner was given to Aurora. The only reason why the Court is
inclined to believe that 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics were purchased for the manufacture
of the jeans is because the witness for the prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified
the purchase of the said materials from Litton Mills. [34]
To support petitioners claim that the remainder of the amount withdrawn was returned to
Aurora, petitioner presents a letter dated October 15, 1986 from the Philippine Veterans
Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) addressed to Mr. Werner Lettmayr,
President of Aurora, regarding the financial audit of Aurora, wherein the amount of
P850,780.00 is indicated as an amount due to Uni-Group. [35] Atty. Cesar Singson, witness
for the defense, testified that the amount of P850,780.00 indicated in the said letter
represents the peso equivalent of the advance payment of US$41,300.00 made by Skiva
to Uni-Group.[36]
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the said letter is nil. The trial court
correctly ruled:
The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the letter] because the person who
testified thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar Singson, was not the one who prepared the
document. He was only one [of] those who was furnished a copy thereof. Moreover, when
said piece of evidence was presented, there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the
[petitioner] as to how he was able to procure said documents. In a hearing he testified that
he personally procured said letter from the records of PHIVIDEC and the person who
certified said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross examination, he testified that
he did not personally obtain said letter and he was not there when the person who
authenticated said letter signed it and that it was only given to him by his former counsel.
This is further muddled when Atty. Singson testified that he was the one who authenticated
said document on December 7, 1987 from his copy upon the request of the accused. Atty.
Singson has already severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the year
1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no longer connected with PHIVIDEC when he
authenticated said document based on his copy which implies that the document was not
obtained from the records of PHIVIDEC. [37]
Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence, we are unable to see
any indication that the amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion thereof (assuming that
the said amount represents the advance payment made by Skiva) has been received by
Aurora and/or Uni-Group from petitioner. At most, what said letter indicates is that Aurora
acknowledges liability to Uni-Group in the said amount or that said amount has been
received by Uni-Group from Skiva as advance payment which Uni-Group may have, in
turn, assigned to Aurora. The glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be seen from the
said letter that there was actual receipt by Aurora from petitioner of the amount indicated
therein, or at least a portion thereof, after deduction of the cost of the materials purchased
to manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon withdrawal of the said
amounts, petitioner caused the telegraphic transfer of the amount to another account prior
to petitioners receipt of the amount in pesos. [38] In fact, upon being confronted by the
prosecution with Exhibits R and T which are account debit forms showing that certain
amounts were deducted by Citibank N.A. from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee
for the amounts withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon withdrawal, the
dollars was converted by the bank, remitted abroad, and given to me in pesos.[39] The act
committed by petitioner of remitting the funds abroad constitutes an act of conversion or
misappropriation. This Court has previously held that even a temporary disturbance of
property rights constitutes misappropriation. [40] The words convert and misappropriate as
used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or
disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate a thing of value for ones own use
includes, not only conversion to ones personal advantage but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. [41] Thus, when petitioner caused the
remittance of the amount withdrawn to another account, such act constituted conversion or
misappropriation or unauthorized disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for
which the property was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is not present as the party
prejudiced, in accordance with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is
Skiva, when petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount
withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is
the owner of the sum remitted as advance payment, petitioner had the obligation to
account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. [42] Thus, petitioner maintains
that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora was alleged in the
information nor did the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co,[43] in estafa, the
person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods
misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person
who shall defraud another by any means mentioned [in Article 315] may be held liable for
estafa. The use by the law of the word another instead of the word owner means that as
an element of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the
perpetrator of the crime. [44] Thus, the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party
prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the
petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent as no demand was made by
Skiva on petitioner. Petitioner argues that although demand was made by Skiva to
Aurora/Uni-Group and/or Mr. Lettmayr, no demand was shown to have been made on
petitioner himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when demand was made upon
Aurora/Uni-Group. To require Skiva to make a demand on petitioner himself would be
superfluous and would serve no other additional purpose. We note that at the time when
Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of the jeans, except for the advice of Mr.
Lettmayr to direct her queries to petitioner who was in charge of procuring the materials for
the jeans, Ms. Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be primarily responsible for
the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the obligation
of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not complied
with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the
return of the amount advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner
himself to uphold the conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind application of the
law. In the case of United States v. Ramirez,[45] this Court held:
The consummation of the crime of estafa does not depend on the fact that a request for
the return of the money is first made and refused in order that the author of the crime
should comply with the obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or
conversion of money received to the prejudice of the owner thereof are the sole essential
facts which constitute the crime of estafa, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the
penalty imposed by the Penal Code.
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals [46] this Court ruled that the law
does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds and property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,[47] we also held that in a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action
as estafa was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of
the finding that the transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of
sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[48] the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the
offended party contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to
Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account. [49]
The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to
commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is
required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. [50] It is not
necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for
preliminary investigation.[51]
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information,
both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be
filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the
fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any
person.[52] Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the
finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of the
court a quo finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000]

SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO
and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, respondents
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 47089 promulgated on March 01, 1999 and the subsequent
Resolution[3]dated May 11, 1999 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:
On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for libel against
petitioners before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that the latter
circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter containing malicious imputations against them.
An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on
May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to

Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order dated
November 9, 1996 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and ordered that the case
be forwarded to the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to branch 215 Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case in an
Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed, ordered the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the Information for Libel with the RTC.
On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent court docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The
motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 3, 1997.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed Order dated
December 4, 1997.[4]
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of whether or not public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in the instant
case has not yet prescribed.[5] The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999,
upheld the contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and
consequently, dismissed the said petition. The appellate court likewise denied herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 11, 1999. [6]
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals and contending that I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL HAS NOT
YET PRESCRIBED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN
DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.[7]
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel prescribes
in one (1) year, to wit:
ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with the exception
of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. (underscoring
supplied)
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly occurred on December 21, 1993
when petitioner circulated a letter containing allegedly malicious imputations against
private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine Juarez. At this point, the period of
prescription for the alleged crime had already started to run.
The one-year period of prescription for the crime was interrupted on February 2, 1994
when respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit [8] for libel against petitioner before the
Office of the city Prosecutor in Quezon city. At this point, the prescription period had
already run for forty-two (42) days.
A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City prosecutor was thus conducted. On
April 27, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos issued a Resolution
stating that probable cause exists against petitioner and recommended the filing of an
information for libel against her. Consequently, an information[9] for libel was filed against
petitioner on May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 32 [10]
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime of
libel, the said court proceeded to conduct trial on the merits. After the prosecution had
rested, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated September 18, 1996. However,
instead of acting on the said demurrer, the Metropolitan Trial court, on November 08, 1996,
issued an Order[11]ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the crime of libel as the same falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case
outright, the MTC ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings. The case was eventually raffled off to Branch 215 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[12]
On the basis of a Motion to Dismiss [13] filed by petitioner, Branch 215 of the Regional
Trial Court dismissed the case on April 2, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the
information against petitioner should have been re-filed anew. The court ruled, however,
that the crime had not yet prescribed and ordered the re-filling of the case [14]. On April 27,
1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor re-filed the case with the Regional Trial Court and
eventually the same was raffled to Branch 218 of the said court [15]. Petitioner tried to have
this case dismissed on the ground of prescription but her motion to quash [16]the information
was denied by Branch 218 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in a Resolution [17]dated
October 3, 1997. The denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioners motion to quash was
subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period for the crime of libel
charged against her commenced to run again when the Assistant City prosecutor
recommended the filing of the information for libel. Petitioner further argues that the
prescriptive period could have been interrupted again had the information been filed with
the Regional Trial Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for
libel. Considering however that the case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
which under the law does not have jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the period of
prescription continued to run its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that when the
information for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had already
prescribed and the State can no longer pursue the case against her.
In support of her arguments, petitioner questions the reliance made by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the landmark case of People vs. Olarte[18]Petitioner
submits that the adherence to the Olarte case must be examined considering that in the
said case, the principal issue was whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Municipal
Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation, interrupts the period of prescription of
a crime. Petitioner argues that the cited case is inapplicable as it is not disputed in the
case at bench that the period of prescription was interrupted during the process of
preliminary investigation.
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation suspends
the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the correct and
prevailing doctrine, as follows:
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and
Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at
the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, in declaring
that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second , even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third,
it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate
the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or
information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the
trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the
court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without
conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie
case had been shown.
Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals[19], broadened the scope
of Olarte by holding that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner insists that the ruling in Olarte with respect to the interruption of the
prescriptive period is not applicable. In the case at bench, the fact that the period of
prescription was interrupted by the filing of private respondents joint affidavit with the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office is not disputed. The Olarte case, however, makes several
other pronouncements that are determinative of the issues raised by petitioner.
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or information for
purposes of preliminary investigation represents the initial step of the proceedings against
the offender.This is one of the reasons why such filing is deemed as having interrupted the
period of prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This period of prescription
commences to run again when the proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, if
the court (or prosecutor) should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has
been shown.[20]
It is thus evident that petitioners first premise that the period of prescription
commenced to run again when the Quezon City prosecutors Office recommended the filing
of a criminal complaint against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her were not
terminated, precisely because a prima facie case for libel was found against her. Instead of
terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the resolution of the city prosecutor actually
directed the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing of the
appropriate information against her and by the holding of trial on the merits. As such, when
the information for libel was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, the period of
prescription for the crime was still suspended.
Another important teaching in Olarte is that it is unjust to deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. This is
because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of the offense may do on
his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek
grievance against respondent as they filed their complaint before the city prosecutor fortytwo days after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of the City Prosecutor
that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of
libel brought about by the passage of R.A. 7691 [21] which took effect on April 15,
1994. Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. However, libel, which
is punishable by imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years [22] is not
covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts[23]. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the
information for libel should be filed with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial
Court. The confusion was cleared up when this Court issued Administrative Order No. 10496 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that LIBEL CASES SHALL BE
TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO
THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS.[24]
Evidently, branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City was not spared
the confusion brought about by R.A. 7691, as its dismissal of the case then pending before
it was made only on November 8, 1996 or more than two years after it had taken
cognizance of the case. Notably, the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took place a
mere eighteen (18) days after the issuance of S.C. Administrative Order No. 104-96.
The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in taking cognizance of the case was thus understandable. The
error was immediately rectified by the said court upon realizing its mistake when it ruled it
was the Regional Trial Court which had the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake
should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and,
more importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain grievance.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not meant
to apply solely to cases where the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court or the
prosecutors office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution of a
crime.
In People vs. Galano[25], an information was filed with the Batangas Regional Trial
Court even though the evidence of both the prosecution and defense shows that the crime
was committed in Manila. This Court, applying People vs. Olarte, held that it was only
when the trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction that the proceedings
therein terminated without conviction and acquittal and it was only then that the
prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the during the pendency of the case in
the Batangas Court) commenced to run again.
In People vs. Enrile[26], informations were filed against civilians before military tribunals
which had no jurisdiction over the persons of these civilians. These civilians questioned the
re-filing of the cases against them before the civil courts raising, among others, that the
crimes for which they are being charged have already prescribed. This Court, applying by
analogy the ruling in the Olarte case, threw out the defense of prescription and held that
the filing of the first indictments suspended the running of the prescriptive period, and the
prosecutions under the informations to be filed should be regarded as mere continuations
of the previous proceedings. At the very least, the Court ruled, the filing of the first charges
should be considered as having interrupted the prescriptive period notwithstanding the lack
of jurisdiction of the military tribunal in which they were filed.
More recently, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals[27], an information for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries was filed
with the Regional Trial Court even though the offense was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the municipal trial court. The Court, even as it dismissed the cases pending before the
Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction, disregarded the defense of prescription raised
by the accused. The Court, citing Olarte and the subsequent cases of Francisco vs. Court
of Appeals[28] andPeople vs. Cuaresma[29], ruled that the prescriptive period for the quasi
offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the
case.
From these cases, it is clear that the Apellate Court committed no reversible error in
ruling that the offense of libel charged against petitioner had not yet prescribed. The period
of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the complaint was lodged with the Office
of the City Prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of the case against
petitioner. Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, therefore, correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case of petitioner as the offense of libel for which she was
being charged has not yet prescribed.
Petitioners other argument that she has been denied her right to a speedy trial
deserves scant consideration. Well-established is the doctrine that the right to a speedy
trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay
without participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time [30]. In the case at bench, besides
the filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and this Court, petitioner had likewise
filed a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear that petitioner is not without fault in the delay
in the prosecution of the case against her.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 1, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.
The key issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is whether the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a
government official for grave oral defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit our attention. We thus resolved to give
due course to the petition, consider the private respondent's comment on the petition [1] as
the answer thereto, and decide it on the basis of the pleadings which have sufficiently
discussed the issue.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.

On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then officer-in-charge of the
Physical Education and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of Region
VII in Cebu City of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a
complaint for grave oral defamation[2] allegedly committed on 23 September 1993 by
petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994, [3] Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of the
said office, recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu City for the filing of the necessary information against the petitioner. This resolution
was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) in Cebu City an information[4] for grave oral defamation against the petitioner. This
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash [5] the information on the ground
that the "criminal action or liability" has been extinguished. She contended that under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of grave oral defamation prescribes in
months and that since the information was filed only on 28 March 1994, or 186 days or 6
months and 6 days after its alleged commission, the crime had then already prescribed. In
support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia[6] vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July
3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the filing of an information at the
fiscal's office will not stop the running of the prescriptive period for crimes.
In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court which provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases and which fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the complaint directly with the said court or
with the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. The filing
of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of the Deputy OmbudsmanVisayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office
under said Section 1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The private respondent further claimed
that Zaldivia is inapplicable because it involves an offense covered by the rule on summary
procedure and it explicitly stated that Section 1 of Rule 110 excludes cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge Bajarias, denied the motion to
quash in the order of 18 July 1994. [8] It fully agreed with the stand of the private
respondent.
Her motion to reconsider[9] the above order having been denied on 29 November 1994,
the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil action
forcertiorari,[11] which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. CEB-16988. The case was
assigned to Branch 11.
[10]
In its decision of 3 July 1995, [12] the RTC, per public respondent Judge Isaias P.
Dicdican, affirmed the challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and 29
November 1994. It ruled that the order denying the motion to quash is interlocutory and
that the petitioner's remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,[13] reiterated in People vs. Bans,
[14]
was to go to trial without prejudice on her part to reiterate the special defense she had
invoked in her motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Besides, the petitioner has
not satisfactorily and convincingly shown that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the orders considering that the ground invoked by her does not
appear to be indubitable. And even assuming that the MTC erred in venturing an opinion
that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman is equivalent to the filing
of a complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is merely one of judgment. For, there is no
decided case on the matter, and the substantive laws have not clearly stated as to what
bodies or agencies of government should complaints or informations be filed in order that
the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should be considered interrupted. Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code simply states that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by
the "filing of the complaint or information" and has not specified further where such
complaint or information should be filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to reconsider [15] the decision in the
order of 23 August 1995, [16] the petitioner filed this special civil action wherein she
reiterates the arguments she adduced before the two courts below. The private respondent
likewise did nothing more in her responsive pleading than reiterate what she had raised
before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for
those penalized by special laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
grave oral defamation, which is the subject of the information in Criminal Case No. 35684R of the MTC of Cebu, prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides
that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave
oral defamation prescribes in 180 days. [17] Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the presence
of the offended party on 23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense
started to run on that date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint or
information had been the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People vs. Tayco,
[18]
People vs. Del Rosario,[19] and People vs. Coquia,[20] this Court held that it is the filing of
the complaint or information with the proper court, viz., the court having jurisdiction over
the crime, which interrupts the running of the period of prescription. On the other hand, in
the first case of People vs. Olarte,[21] a case for libel, this Court held that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace court even for preliminary investigation purposes
only interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the second case of People
vs. Olarte[22] resolved once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the
complaint with the municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary investigation only
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of
decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been
interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of
the peace (now municipal judge) does interrupt the course of the prescriptive term:
People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of
decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits:
People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June
29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar,
this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the
period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"
without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination
or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or
information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused. Precisely, the trial on
the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without
conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima
faciecase has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases of
People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456,
promulgated June 29, 1963.
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[23] this Court
not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of
the complaint in the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. Thus:
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the complaint
or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not
the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so,
according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall
commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or
information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the
accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in the
Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte
case, there was diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. One view declares
that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does
interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This view is found-in People v. Olarte, L-13027,
June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People v. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959;
People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to produce
interruption, the complainant or information must have been filed in the proper court that
has jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L15140, December 29, 1960; People v.Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the
Solicitor General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar
read:
xxx xxx xxx
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary
investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling
also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint
or denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to
conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In
chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally
initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary
investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal
judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal
judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x.
Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the
offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the
Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or
discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription. (Italics supplied)
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas
vs. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila.[24]
The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110
(Prosecution of Offenses) of the Rules of Court. We quote the entire Section for a better
understanding of the last paragraph:
SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:
(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, by
filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation therein;
(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or information
directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.
However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense
charged. (Italics supplied)
The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as amended, whose
Section 2 explicitly provides that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the complaint or information with the
court. The said section reads:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.(Italics supplied)
And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,[25] this Court held that the proceedings referred to in said
Section 2 are "judicial proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or information
with the proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the petitioner, and her invocation thereof
is misplaced. In the first place, it involved a violation of an ordinance, which is covered by
the Rule on Summary Procedure. By its express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Second, since the ordinance in question partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326 is
then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper court of the complaint or information
which suspends the running of the period of prescription. In Zaldivia, this Court
categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure to mean that "the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that," which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No.
3326.
What is then left to be determined is whether the filing of the private respondent's
complaint for grave oral defamation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is
equivalent to filing the complaint in the prosecutor's office such that it interrupted the
prescriptive period for grave oral defamation.
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide:
SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result thereof.
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8 [26] of the
aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, provide as follows:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage
from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation of
such cases.
SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure in office.
Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory provisions vest upon the
Ombudsman and his Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in
criminal cases filed against public officers or employees, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,[27] this Court held:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty
"to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec.
12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1]) The
Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special
Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal
act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It
does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from,
the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any
illegal act or omission of any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a
"shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged." [28]
A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose
duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government.
[29]
The petitioner, being an Education Supervisor II of the Regional Office of Region VII of
the DECS, is a public officer. The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the petitioner for
grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the first Olarte case, reiterated as the
controlling doctrine in the second Olarte case, which was broadened in Francisco and
reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman against public officers and employees for purposes of preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of the
period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13 October
1993, or barely twenty days from the commission of the crime charged, the filing then of
the information on 28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARLON DELA CRUZ, ET AL.G.R. No. 174658,
February 24, 2009
Criminal Case Digest / Digested Case
Anti-Carnapping; Robbery with Homicide (Can one absorb the other?)
FACTS:
Two Informations, one for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping Law),
and the other for Robbery with Homicide, were filed against 1) appellant Marlon dela Cruz
(DELA CRUZ), together with 2) Adriano Melecio (Melecio), 3) Jessie Reyes (REYES), and
4) Jepoy Obello (Obello) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. Melecio
and Obello have remained at large.
From information gathered from bystanders, the police learned that de la Cruz, a
notorious thief who had previously been convicted for theft, and an unidentified man were
seen riding on a red Yamaha motorcycle on June 4, 2001, that from a surveillance
conducted, de la Cruz was not in his Dagupan residence; and that his mother Maria
Rosario (Maria) is living in the municipality of San Quintin. The carnapped motorcycle was
owned by a certain Juliana Tamin.
De la Cruzs friends Angelica Perez (Angelica) and Anna Datlag (Anna), who were at the
time staying at Marias house, were invited for questioning. Anna further related: On June
6, 2001, she asked de la Cruz who owns the red motorcycle to which he replied that he
took it from an old man who was sleeping after he hit the old man with a stone and Melecio
stabbed him at the right side of his body, following which they took the money of the old
man.
Upon the other hand, de la Cruz put up alibi, claiming that he was asleep in his house at
Callejon Extension, Dagupan City on the night of January 3, 2001; that on waking up the
following day, January 4, 2001, Obello and Melecio arrived and invited him to, as he did
join them to San Quintin on board a motorcycle which the two claimed belongs to their
uncle; that the group went first to Lupao, Nueva Ecija where they met Anna and Angelica
who, on his invitation, joined them in San Quintin where they stayed for a few days.
After trial, Branch 43 of the Dagupan City RTC convicted DELA CRUZ of both charges. It
acquitted Reyes. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Among others, DELA CRUZ argues that even if the allegation on the loss of some cash
were true, the same should be absorbed in carnapping since carnapping and robbery have
the same element of taking with intent to gain.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of DELA CRUZ tenable?
HELD:
No. Carnapping refers specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It does not cover the
taking of cash or personal property which is not a motor vehicle. As the Court of Appeals
noted:
x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR., his tricycle and some cash. The
taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the anti-carnapping law, RA 6539, while the
taking of the cash from tEOFILO, SR. by hitting him with a stone and stabbing him in the
chest constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO CODILLA, GERMAN LUCAAS and MARCELO PUTULIN, accusedappellants.
Margarita Alpos, Helen Pepito and Letecia Pepito instituted four separate complaints with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City, for rape against accused-appellants
Rolando Codilla, German Lucanas and Marcelo Putulin. Two separate complaints were
filed by Helen Pepito and Margarita Alpos against Rolando Codilla in Criminal Cases Nos.
3739-0 and 3740-0, respectively. German Lucaas was charged with the same offense of
rape by the same Margarita Alpos in Criminal Case No. 3742-0, while Marcelo Putulin was
also charged with the same crime of rape by Letecia Pepito, sister of Helen, in criminal
Case No. 3741-0.
These complaints 1 were of the following tenor:
Criminal Case No. 3739-0
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, ROLANDO CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a small pointed
bolo, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein, HELEN PEPITO y Maglinte,
against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City. December 19, 1990.
(SGD.) HELEN M. PEPITO
Complainant
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning at
Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, ROLANDO CODILLA y Dumalan, being then armed with a
handgun with unknown caliber, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein,
MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
the offense.
Ormoc City, December 21, 1990.
(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS
Complainant
That on or about the 24th day of May, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, MARCELO PUTULIN y Genoguin, being then armed with a small pointed
bolo, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LETECIA PEPITO y Maglinte,
against her will and in her own house.
the offense.
(SGD.) LETECIA PEPITO

Complainant
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1990, at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, at
Brgy. Concepcion. Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused GERMAN LUCAAS y dela Cruz, being then armed with a
handgun with unknown caliber, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein,
MARGARITA ALPOS, against her will and in her own house.
the offense.
(SGD.) MARGARITA ALPOS
Complainant
The factual milieu of these cases, as correctly and succinctly summarized by the Solicitor
General with page references to the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
trial, is in concordance with the findings of the trial court, and we adopt and reproduce the
same hereunder:
In Criminal Case No. 3739-0, the private offended party, Helen Pepito, testified that she is
thirteen (13) years old, single and a student (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 13). At about 3:00
o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 1990, at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City, she
and her sister Letecia were awakened from their sleep by a heavy rain (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991,
p. 15). When she opened her eyes, she was surprised to see two men wearing briefs and
sleeveless shirts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.16). The men were carrying bolos and a flashlight
(tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p.15).
One of the men asked her if they had money. When she replied that she had none, she
was ordered to go down to the kitchen with him. She obeyed the man out of overwhelming
fear (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 18).
In the kitchen, one of the two men ordered her to remove her clothes. She initially refused,
but when the man pointed his bolo at her, she undressed herself. The men then held both
her hands, inserted his penis in her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her (tsn, Feb.
19, 1991, p. 19-20). When the carnal act was consummated, she felt pain, in her private
parts (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, p. 20).
Helen Pepito identified the man who ravished her as Rolando Codilla (Ibid.).
Dr. Nelson Udtajan, Senior Resident Physician of the Ormoc District Hospital, testified that
he examined Helen Pepito on May 25, 1990. His findings, contained in Exhibit "A" of
Criminal Case No. 3739-0, show that Helen Pepito sustained lacerations in her hymen and
indubitably indicated consummation of the carnal act (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 7-9).
In Criminal Case No. 3741-0, the private offended party, Letecia Pepito, testified that she is
fifteen (15) years old, single and a student (tsn, March. 4, 1991, p. 3). In the early morning
of May 24, 1990, she was awakened from her sleep by a light coming from a flashlight
being focused on her face (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p. 4). When she opened her eyes, she saw
two men who pointed bolos at her and her sister, Helen Pepito. One man ordered her
sister to go down to the kitchen while the other brought her to the sala where he ordered
her to remove her panty (tsn, Mar. 1991, pp. 6-7). When she refused to comply, the man
pushed her to the ground, removed her panty himself and sexually abused her (tsn, Mar. 4,
1991, p. 8).
Letecia Pepito identified the man who raped her as Marcelo Putulin (tsn, Mar. 4, 1991, p.
10).
The defense admitted the authenticity of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nelson
Udtajan which found that Letecia Pepito's hymen sustained lacerations that indubitably
indicated the consummation of the carnal act (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 2-4).
Criminal Cases Nos. 3740-0 and 3742-0 involve the same private offended party,
Margarita Alpos, and the offenses were committed under the same circumstances and
time.
Margarita Alpos testified that at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 27,
1990, she was sleeping in her house at Barangay Concepcion, Ormoc City when she was
awakened by the fall of her gallon containing water (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 5). She stood up
to go to the kitchen but was met by two men on the stairs who pointed a flashlight on her
face (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 5-6). The two men asked her to give some money, but since
she had no money at that time, the two men brought her upstairs. Once upstairs, the two
men put out the light coming from an oil lamp. One of the men then put himself on top of
Margarita and succeeded in having sexual with her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 7-8). When he
was through, the other man took his turn in sexually abusing Margarita (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991,
p. 8).
Margarita Alpos identified the two men who sexually abused her as Rolando Codilla and
German Lucaas (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 7).
Dr. Edilberto Calipayan, Medical Officer IV of the Ormoc City Health Office, testified that he
examined Margarita Alpos at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. on November 27, 1990 and he found
that the victim had carnal intercourse with at least two men about thirteen (13) hours prior
to examination (tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 4-7).
Sgt. Romeo Pearanda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to
Ormoc City, testified that at around 2:30 p.m. on November 27, 1990, he was at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, responding to a rape case. Together with him were PFC
Mamerto Sarcol, Jr., PFC Diosdado Tagalog, Pat. Eduardo Bituin and CVO Manuel Pepito
(tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, p. 32). They proceeded to the house of the Barangay Captain
who provided them with a guide to show them the place where the rape suspects were
hiding. The police were able to apprehend the suspects and brought them to the Ormoc
City Police Station. Margarita Alpos was able to identify two of the three suspects (Codilla
and Lucaas) during the custodial investigation of the case, as the persons who sexually
assaulted her (tsn, Feb. 28, 1991, pp. 35-36).
Helen and Letecia Pepito likewise identified the persons who raped them as Codilla and
Putulin, respectively, at the Police Station during the custodial investigation of the case
(tsn, Feb. 19, 1991, pp. 30-31; 60). 2
Accused-appellants, anchoring their defense on denial and alibi, present different versions
which, as culled from the joint decision of the court a quo, are respectively of the
substantial import recounted in the succeeding paragraphs. 3
Appellant Rolando Codilla asserts that on the fateful day of May 24, 1990, at around 3:00
A.M., he was at San Isidro, Leyte, working in the four-hectare cornland of Ernesto de la
Cruz, having done so since the middle part of March of the same year. He claims that he
never left the place until August 6, 1990 when he stopped working on the aforesaid land.
This was corroborated by Ernesto de la Cruz who confirmed having hired Codilla to
harvest his corn from March, 1990 to August 6, 1990, and who supported Codilla's claim
that he never left San Isidro during this time.
Codilla also denies having had carnal knowledge of Margarita Alpos, claiming that on
November 27, 1990, at about 3:00 A.M., when the alleged rape occurred, he was sleeping
in their house at Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City.
Appellant German Lucaas, on his part, avers that having stayed in Manila for twelve (12)
years, he came home to Ormoc City on November 11, 1990 on board the M/V Cebuano
Princess with appellant Marcelo Putulin. On November 27, 1990, at about 3:00 A.M., he
was at Sitio Tipik II, Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City, visiting his uncle, Gaudioso Potot.
Witness Gregoria Genoguin was presented by the defense to prove that she has known
appellants Codilla and Lucaas for fourteen years; that she was a resident of Sitio Tipik II,
Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City; and that Codilla and Lucaas stayed in the barracks of Del
Socorro at Brgy. Concepcion, Ormoc City.
As for appellant Marcelo Putulin, he alleges that she was in Manila on January 10, 1989
and he stayed there until November 11, 1990 when he returned to Ormoc City with
appellant Lucaas. While in Manila, he sustained himself by selling hotcakes. Florentina
Putulin, Marcelo's mother, was also called to the witness stand to testify to the fact that her
son was in Manila from January, 1990 to November, 1990 and that he never left Manila
during this period.
At the arraignment, appellants Codilla and Lucaas, assisted by Atty. Crisologo S.
Bitas, 4 and appellant Putulin, assisted by Atty. Pablo Oliver, entered pleas of not
guilty 5 and, after a joint trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a joint decision, with
the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered:
1. In Crim. Case No. 3739-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the court
imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the sentence of RECLUSION

PERPETUA and to indemnify HELEN PEPITO (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
2. In Crim. Case No. 3740-0, finding the accused ROLANDO CODILLA guilty beyond
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court
imposes upon the same ROLANDO CODILLA the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
3. In Crim. Case No. 3741-0, finding the accused MARCELO PUTULIN guilty beyond
imposes upon the same MARCELO PUTULIN the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify LETECIA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
4. In Crim. Case No. 3742-0, finding the accused GERMAN LUCAAS guilty beyond
imposes upon the same GERMAN LUCAAS the sentence of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify MARGARITA ALPOS (in) the sum of P20,000.00;
As all three (3) accused are detention prisoners, the period of their detention shall be
credited in full if they conform in writing to the rules and conditions of convicted prisoners,
otherwise only 4/5 thereof. In the case of ROLANDO CODILLA, by reason of the two
sentences of Reclusion Perpetua, the two penalties shall be served successively in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
Appellants now invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review and reverse the decision of the
court a quo, contending that the latter supposedly erred: (1) in not considering the dubious
circumstances surrounding their arrest which is violative of their constitutional rights, and
by indicating fabrication of charges against them; (2) in not considering the conduct of the
police investigators during the pre-trial identification of appellants which was calculated to
induce positive identification; (3) in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses despite their incredibility and unworthiness, and (4) in not considering
acceptable jurisprudence that identification arising from suggestive police behavior is
unreliabe and inadmissible for being violative of an accused's right against selfincrimination. 7
During the pendency of this appeal, after it was proven that appellant Rolando Codilla
escaped from the Ormoc City Jail on July 27, 1991, the Court issued a resolution on April
6, 1992 8 dismissing his appeal pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which
provides, inter alia, that "(t)he court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or flees to
a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." It is a judicial dictum that where the
accused escapes from custody or jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the
appellate court has the discretion to either postpone the resolution of his case until his
recapture or to dismiss the appeal. 9
Meanwhile, the Jail Warden of the Ormoc City Jail, Rodolfo D. Sonon, also manifested in a
letter dated August 11, 1992, that appellant German Lucaas was missing and the latter's
whereabouts is unknown up to the present. He expressed the belief that Lucaas was one
of the victims of the flash flood which hit Ormoc City last November 5, 1991. 10 In a
resolution dated September 14, 1992, 11 the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was
ordered by this Court to investigate Lucaas' whereabouts. In response to NBI queries,
Jail Warden Sonon again manifested, in a letter dated September 22, 1992, 12 that
Lucaas is still missing.
After this investigation, the NBI submitted a report to this Court dated November 4, 1992,
containing the following excerpts:
03. . . . An interview was conducted at Ormoc City to determine the veracity of the report
submitted by the former City Jail Warden JUANITO CATIPAY. In an interview with
JUANITO CATIPAY he averred that because of the growing water occupying the ground
floor at around 11:30 in the morning, he decided to open the cell at the ground floor so that
the prisoners could take refuge at the second floor or other elevated portion of the jail.
Minutes later, several people took shelter at the second floor making it unmanageable
coupled with the circumstance that everybody was in panic and concerned with his own
safety. . . .
04. . . . In view thereof, based on the interview and the spot inspection conducted by this
Command coupled with the fact that nobody was ever recovered after the calamity which
was positively identified as that of GERMAN LUCAAS, plus the fact that no witness could
either confirm or deny the fact of death of herein subject, nor could this command safely
conclude the fact that he might still be alive, this Command after a careful search for
herein subject (in) in depth study of this matter respectively finds the following:
1. That as to GERMAN LUCAAS being one of the victims of the flashflood which hit
Ormoc City last November 5, 1991, this Command based on the foregoing premises had
found no basis to adopt such a conclusion.
2. That as to his present whereabouts, the same remains unknown.
13
Atty. Erlich V. Barraquias, counsel of the record for appellant Lucaas, manifested that he
does not have sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the whereabouts of his client, and
that Juanito Lucaas, father of said appellant, informed him that there has been no
communication between him and his son since the Ormoc City flash flood. 14
From the foregoing, it is not clear whether Lucaas died or merely escaped and is now
hiding. At any rate, in either case, his appeal will have to be dismissed and declared
abandoned. If he has indeed escaped, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal in line
with our pronouncement in People vs. Quiritan, et al., 15 to the effect that if an accusedappellant escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper authorities, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal, and so his appeal should be dismissed. Moreover, he is guilty of
evasion of service of sentence under Article 158 of the Revised Penal Code. If, on the
other hand, he was indeed one of the victims of the Ormoc City tragedy, under Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code his criminal liability, with respect to the personal penalties, is
totally extinguished and as to the pecuniary penalties, since his death occurred while this
case is pending appeal, the civil indemnity to be paid subsists and must be charged
against his estate. 16
The conviction of both appellants Codilla and Lucaas must, therefore be affirmed, with
the modification that their respective civil liabilities should be increased to an indemnity of
P30,000.00 for each offended party, respectively raped by them. The circumstances of
nighttime, dwelling and use of a deadly weapon shall hereinafter be discussed as matters
of law involved in these cases and our disposition thereof, although the imposable penalty
ofreclusion perpetua has to be maintained.
As for appellant Putulin, his appeal from his conviction for the rape of Letecia Pepito
stands and his liability wherefore we shall now resolve, the discussion which follows being
with reference to his criminal liability alone.
This appellant starts his defense by challenging his warrantless arrest and detention for
two days without any charges being filed against him. 17 We have of necessity to reject this
argument for the simple reason that he is estopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 18 Besides, this issue is being raised for
the first time by appellant before this Court. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Hence, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial. 19
After considering the factual findings on which the impugned decision is based, we do not
descry any cogent reason to depart from the holding of the lower court. As has often been
emphasized, on the matter of credibility of witnesses the findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect, if not conclusive effect, because it has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying. Such findings may only
be disturbed on appeal if there is any showing that the trial court overlooked some material
or substantial fact which if given consideration will alter the assailed decision 20 and, as we
have just stated, we do not find any such arbitrary oversight or omission by the court
below.
Letecia's account regarding the rape committed upon her was given full faith and credit by
the trial court. 21 We agree with the latter that Letecia is a credible witness, having testified
in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and having remained
consistent on cross-examination. 22 Her story finds ample support in the testimony of her
sister, Helen, who was likewise deflowered on that fateful day of May 24, 1990. The two
sisters were able to identify their abusers through the "lamparilla" which was then lighted
inside their house. 23 Moreover, their claims that they were raped that early morning have
been corroborated by Anita Royeras, the wife of the barangay captain of Barangay
Catayum, Ormoc City, who had been conducting a surveillance in their community and had
observed that the three suspicious-looking appellants used to go home at around 3:00
o'clock in the morning. 24
Although Letecia could recognize her abuser, as shown by the fact that she was able to
describe the latter's physical features at the police station a day after the incident, she did
not know his name nor his whereabouts. 25Nevertheless, on November 28, 1990, she was
able to identify her defiler, who turned to be appellant Putulin, when the latter was picked
up and placed in a police line-up together with the other two appellants herein. 26 This
positive identification was reiterated in open court during the trial. 27
The scenario and details of the sexual abuse were fully established by the evidence for the
prosecution. After barging into Letecia's room, appellant Putulin threatened her with a knife
and ordered her to go to the sala. Along the way, appellant continuously pushed her,
causing her to fall to the ground and sustain bruises on her elbow. Upon reaching the sala,
appellant Putulin commanded her to remove her underwear and, when she refused, he
remove it himself and then satisfied his bestial desire. Despite the struggle put up by the
overpowered victim, the sexual abuse was consummated. 28 Letecia was paralyzed with
fear, causing her to succumb to appellant's animal instinct.
Considering her tender age, the force and intimidation exerted upon her suffice to
constitute that requisite element of rape. It is well settled that the force or violence required
in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. 29 It
need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of
whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point.
So it must likewise be for intimidation, which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is,
therefore, subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is
therefore enough that it produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the
lecherous demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or
even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.
Intimidation includes the moral kind, as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife.
When such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof,
thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to
expect the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel; or to act like
an adult or a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under the
circumstances, or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 30
For an innocent girl who was then only fifteen years old, we are satisfied that the threats
made by appellant against this complainant engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if
she dared resist or frustrate his lustful advances, she would be killed. 31
The defense attempts to discredit her testimony on the theory that she, together with her
sister Helen, did not immediately reveal the incident to their parents who were just sleeping
in the room nearby and, instead, just let the time pass crying and sobbing in one
corner. 32 This specious contention cannot pass judicial muster.
The fact that she and her sister did not immediately divulge their ravishment does not
necessarily mean that they were not sexually desecrated. Being then of very tender ages
and utterly innocent of the ways of the world, their temporary silence is easily
understandable. They could have been terrified by the threats of their ravishers and
shocked into insensibility by the satyric acts they were subjected to. Young and naive as
they were, they ingenuously opted to momentarily suffer in silence if only to avoid
humiliation and embarrassment that may be brought about by the public disclosure of such
dastardly acts. 33
It is likewise of no moment that the rape occurred with the complainant's parents, brothers
and sisters just sleeping in the nearby room. 34 It is not impossible nor incredible for her
family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault was
being committed. As we have repeatedly pointed out, rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the school premises
and even inside a house where there are other occupants. Lust is no respecter of time or
place. 35
We are convinced, in line with our previous rulings which we now repeat, that what
motivated complainant to come out in the open is her desire to obtain justice. It is
unthinkable that a rural-bred and minor victim like her would endure the embarrassment
and humiliation of public disclosure that she had been ravished, allow an examination of
her private parts, and undergo the ordeal and expense of a court proceeding if her story is
a lie. 36 Considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to the airing in public of
things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would assume and
admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. 37 Besides, by testifying, she
made public a painful and humiliating secret which others would have simply kept to
themselves forever, jeopardizing her chances of marriage or foreclosing the possibility of a
blissful married life as her husband may not fully understand the excruciatingly painful
experience which would always haunt her. 38
Appellant's alibi is too superficial and transparent to merit this Court's consideration, as he
was even caught fabricating stories to suit his defense. As correctly pointed out by the
lower court, the fact that she was in Manila since January 10, 1989 and returned to Ormoc
City on November 11, 1990 does not prevent him from being in Ormoc City on May 24,
1990 when the crime occurred. He was an unable to present any witness who could prove
to the satisfaction of this Court that on the precise date of May 24, 1990, at 3:00 o'clock in
the morning, he was indeed in Manila.
On this point, we give credit to and quote with approval this observation of the court below:
On the claim of Marcelo Putulin that he was in Manila at the time Letecia and Helen Pepito
were raped on May 24, 1990, the accused's evidence does not inspire belief. The
assertion by accused Marcelo Putulin that he took a jeepney from Pier 17 to Makati and he
found the place where his mother lives by just asking people when he did not even have
the address of (his) mother is too incredible to be true. The court take judicial notice that
there are no jeepneys in the pier area of Manila that have a direct route to Makati and it is
absolutely impossible to find the place in Makati where his mother lives if he did not even
know the address. Marcelo Putulin's claim that he came to know Rolando Codilla only in
November 11, 1990, through German Lucaas, is belied by the fact that the three of them
were at one place at the barracks of (D)el Socorro in Brgy. Concepcion, at the time of their
arrest and their claim that they worked in the farm of (D)el Socorro is too shallow. Marcelo
Putulin and German Lucaas told the court that they had work in Manila and came to
Ormoc City in November 1990 to take a vacation. If true, why did they have to work as
farm laborers when their purpose in coming to Ormoc was to take a vacation? 39
Being aware of appellant's prevarications, the trial court had to advise the former's counsel
not to ask appellant any more re-direct questions, with the warning that he would "just be
exposing this witness to perjury." 40 Not even appellant's mother, Florentina, could sustain
his fabricated defense, for when asked how she was able to say that her son never left
Manila for Ormoc City from January to November, 1990, all she could say was: "Because
every Sunday I have to visit him in his place because Sunday is my day-off." 41 The rape
occurred on May 24, 1990 which was a Thursday. It is, therefore, possible for appellant to
have arrived in Manila before Sunday, that is, before May 27, 1990, just in time for his
mother's visit.
Besides, mother and son rendered conflicting testimonies on the witness stand, to which
the former's attention had to be called by the trial court:
Q Do you know if that was the first time that your son Marcelo Putulin arrived in Manila,
that is January, 1990?
A Last January 15, 1990, it was the third time that Marcelo Putulin have gone (sic) to
Manila, and the first time he went to Manila he was yet single; the second time he was
already married. 42
xxx xxx xxx
Q But you are not aware that your son testified that it was the first time, on January 10,
1990, that he left for Manila, no other date and year when he has gone to Manila?
A Maybe he was just frightened because he is innocent and
illiterate. 43
xxx xxx xxx
Q When your son Marcelo Putulin arrived in Manila in January 1990, did he go direct(ly) to
your house or did you meet him at the pier?
A No. sir, because he went direct(ly) to my uncle and there he called by telephone.
COURT
Q Your son testified in court that he went direct(ly) to you, as a matter of fact the court was
rather surprised with the way he testified that he just took a jeepney from the pier to Makati
and the court takes judicial notice that there are no jeepneys to Makati. What can you say
about this?
A. Maybe he was frightened because he was not used to testify before the court because
he is illiterate. 44
The foregoing testimonial colloquy clearly does violence to what we have held in a number
of cases that evidence, to be worthy or credit, must not only proceed from a credible
source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be
natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. 45
Appellant also asserts that the police investigators induced positive identification by
placing him and the two other appellants in a police line-up by themselves only and by
having them undress, thus violating their right against self-incrimination. 46 We disagree.
The right against self-incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion. 47 It prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material. 48 Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition
and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or
any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 49
With the passage of time, this has been extended to any evidence "communicative in
nature acquired under circumstances of duress." An act, whether testimonial or passive,
that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the
Constitution. This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the
accused is made to execute which are not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation, like requiring him to take
part in a police line-up. 50 In fact, it has been held that to require a person to remove his
garments would not be violative of the right against self-incrimination. To require the
accused to put on a pair of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for
measuring or photographing of a party, or the removal or replacement of garments or
shoes, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination too. 51
Contrary to appellant's asseverations, there was no undue influence exerted by the police
upon the complainant which induced the latter to positively identify him. As already noted,
even right after the incident, complainant was able to describe the features of her rapist at
the police headquarters, and upon being given the chance to identify the malefactor at the
police line-up, she did so without faltering.
The cases to which appellant clings for his protection, far from favoring his cause, actually
work against him. First, in People vs. Cruz, 52 the lighting situation in the house was wholly
uncertain and rendered highly suspect and questionable, if not altogether infirm, the ability
of the two girls to shape out a positive identification of the appellant therein. Moreover, the
identification at the police station was attended by a great deal of whispered
conversations, as well as by at least one unexplained conference elsewhere in the
municipal building, at which they were present immediately prior to their being confronted
by the accused. Furthermore, the witnesses there were unable to identify the accused at
sight.
In the cases of People vs. Hassan 53 and People vs. Domingo, et al., 54 the eyewitnesses
were not positive enough as to the identity of the assailant. In fact, in the latter case, the
witness even declared that he would not be able to recognize the assailant, even if he
were to see him again. In Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 55 there was no issue as to
proper identification, but only as to the accused being called by the prosecution to the
witness stand.
In the instant case, the environs were conducive enough for complainant to recognize her
debaucher at the time of the incident. As earlier stated, the "lamparilla" was still lighted
when herein appellant barged into her room. Moreover, upon seeing the suspect at the
police line-up, she immediately identified him without even the least prodding from the law
enforcers.
As we have heretofore observed, a consideration of the modifying circumstances attendant
to this case would be virtually of academic value insofar as the aggravation of appellants'
criminal liability and the corresponding penalty therefor are concerned, 56 in view of the
constitutional constraint thereon. It is felt, however, that a disquisition is in order for future
guidance as a sub silentio treatment may be misconstrued as implying the nonapplicability of said circumstances to these cases.
We rule that the court a quo erred in not appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and dwelling. Nighttime, according to Viada, is that period of darkness beginning
at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. 57 Our Civil Code defines nights as from sunset to
sunrise. 58 When the rapes were committed at 3:00 A.M. on May 24, 1990, it was still
"nighttime," and this aggravating circumstance can be considered as long as it is proved,
even if not alleged in the information. 59 It is obvious that appellant Putulin and his two
other co-appellants specially sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of
the crimes without their being recognized, aside from ensuring their unmolested escape.
They chose to unleash their evil deeds at the unholy hour of 3:00 o'clock in the morning,
taking advantage of the stillness of a sleeping world. 60
The crime having been perpetrated in the house of the complainant, there can be no
serious debate that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should properly be
appreciated, considering the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to a human abode.
The use of a deadly weapon which is considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime
of rape 61 is likewise to be appreciated to constitute the offenses charged in these cases
into what are jurisprudentially referred as qualified rapes, such circumstance being alleged
in each of the complaints in these cases and it being uncontroverted that herein appellant
was armed with a pointed bolo, appellant Codilla with a bolo and a handgun, while
appellant Lucaas used a handgun, to realize their criminal objectives. Nevertheless, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court on appellants shall remain
because of the death penalty until the restoration thereof by congressional fiat.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the civil indemnity, which accusedappellants Rolando Codilla, German Lucaas and Marcelo Putulin must pay to each of
their victims for every crime of rape committed by them against the latter, is hereby
increased to P30,000.00; and that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
dwelling, together with the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, are duly
taken account of in point of law as above explained and are hereby made of judicial record
in these cases, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is consequently AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 116259-60. February 20, 1996]

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Third Division, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 118896-97. February 20, 1996]
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, petitioner assails the
legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying petitioners Amended and
Consolidated Motion to Quash the Informations;1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the order dated July 20,
1994 denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the
other hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97 petitioner seeks the annulment of the Resolution
dated December 23, 19944 ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial
Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from
enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the Solicitor General in
G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said
province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he
was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor
after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez
ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992
synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post;
and this time, it was petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members
of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both
dated December 5,1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged
petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with
several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law
(Annexes A & A-I , respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Preliminary investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of
the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary
investigation (Annex C, ibid).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia YapFernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself from handling the
preliminary investigation of the present case considering that petitioner appears to be her
co-principal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988 (Annex C-3, ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from Rodriguez, who
was then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about the present status of
TBP No. 86-01 119 (Annex D, ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement dated February 7, 1989, the
Ombudsman referred the matter of continuing and terminating the investigation of the
present case to the newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (Annex D-1, ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th
Indorsement dated February 27, 1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case
be reassigned to another Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and
compadre of petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who
was formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial
Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior (Annex D-2, ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the lettermanifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be
effected on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes E & E-2, ibid.). No comment
having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an even date,
was again directed to comment thereon (Annex E-1, ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his
required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex E-3, ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell
Barreras-Sulit (Annex F-2, ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21, 1992
rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of
appropriate charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on
September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law
(Annexes F & F-1, ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an Urgent Motion for Quashal
of Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts. However, when
the said motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioners counsel was made to
choose which of the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with
respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993, petitioner filed an Amended and
Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in the Above-entitled Cases. After an
Opposition and a Reply were filed by the prosecution and petitioner, respectively,
respondent court issued its first assailed Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the
same (Annex G, ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,
which was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second assailed Resolution
issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex H-1 , ibid.).5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 11625960, challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was
likewise prayed that respondent court be enjoined from taking cognizance of and from
proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner and the trial and hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027-28 pending before it. Respondents thereafter filed their Comment to which a
Reply was submitted by petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of herein petitioner
on October 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for him by the court after he
refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial of petitioners motion to quash the
informations, the prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before respondent court a Motion
to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite6 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioner opposed said motion on the ground that the validity of the informations filed
against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein
that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is
unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue delegation of executive power and is
arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed on October 14, 1994 in
G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental Petition7 questioning the veracity of and seeking to
restrain respondent court from acting on said motion to suspend pendente lite, the hearing
of which was scheduled on October 17, 1994. However, before respondents could file their
comment thereto as required by this Court, petitioner, who initially sought the holding in
abeyance of further action on his supplemental petition until after respondent court shall
have resolved the motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to withdraw the
same purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main petition. Hence,
on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw the
supplemental petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted for
resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28, 1994 an amended
motion to include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel in
question; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors of ERA Technology
and Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with the Province of
Palawan.9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these co-principals violates his right
to due process and equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the informations null
and void. It appears that the prosecution did not oppose nor object to this amended
motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to include
co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to suspend pendente
lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a
period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order was filed by petitioner on
February 20, 1995 against the same respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-97, and
which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin respondent court from enforcing its resolution
dated December 23, 1994 ordering his suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the
Court resolved to consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos. 116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected therein, the following
pattern of contentious issues has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years
between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the
informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed
before the Tanodbayan are different from the charges contained in the informations,
another preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which
there is a denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension order in that:
(1) he may not be suspended while the issue on the validity of the informations filed
against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court; and (2) Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the order of suspension, is
unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue delegation of the authority to
suspend which is essentially an executive power. Petitioner contends that the
jurisprudential doctrines relied upon by respondent court in upholding the constitutionality
of Section 13 are not applicable to the cases at bar which involve an issue not yet passed
upon by this Court. In addition, petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject
informations for having been filed in violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses by reason of the non-inclusion therein, as co-principals, of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who approved the purchase of the vessel, as well as the board
of directors of ERA Technology and Resource Corporation which entered into a contract
with the Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason of the
unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the filing of the informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the leading
case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 In said case, all the affidavits and counteraffidavits had already been filed with the Tanodbayan for final disposition as of
October 25, 1982 but it was only on June 12, 1985, or three (3) years thereafter, that the
informations accusing Tatad of a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The Court held there that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the
conduct and termination of the preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of his case, by reason of
which the informations filed against the accused therein were ordered dismissed. It must
be emphasized, however, that in the Tatad case, no explanation or ratiocination was
advanced by the prosecution therein as to the cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining in Tatad, respondent
court found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation was
caused by petitioners own acts.
Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in these
cases was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the
accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on
account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates, entitled Motion to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation. Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as provided in
Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then Governor
Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation correcting the
complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the Office of the
Ombudsman a reply to complainants manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary investigation of these
cases was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the
accused herein, were required to submit counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates,
on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent;
and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within which to
oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after
protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an Appearance and Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appropriate Pleading. Counsel prayed that respondents be

granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to comply with the order
of March 11, 1991;
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a motion to
quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the prosecution to
resolve the motion and there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the
accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him. The
motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January
20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the Informations in these
cases were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the
prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss.11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of respondent court,
could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary investigation did
not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary investigation really started on
February 18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the
motion to dismiss/quash the complaints was purposely for the early termination of the
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may
be gleaned from the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days
from the time the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the factual situation
in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by herein petitioner were not
present in the latter case. Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was
politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of the informations where the
existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence
presented in support thereof. The situation in Tatadwas quite to the contrary since the
accused therein successfully proved that the charges were filed against him only after it
became widely known that he actually had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that prosecutors should
not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak
or strong, powerless or mighty. Such an exigency apparently does not obtain in the case at
bar. There is nothing in the records from which it can be conclusively inferred, expressly or
impliedly, that the investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even coerced into
filing these criminal charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioners asseveration that the orders issued by Branches
51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing the informations for
technical malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the ground that the inordinate
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation constitutes a violation of petitioners
right to due process and speedy disposition of his case which thereby ousted said courts
of jurisdiction thereover, have become final and conclusive by reason of the prosecutions
failure to file an appeal therefrom. We have carefully scrutinized the orders adverted to and
we find and so hold that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution herein from
proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said Regional Trial Court
are different from the charges for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The former is covered by a general law while the latter involves a special
law, with variant elements of the offenses being required, hence double jeopardy cannot
set in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that the trial court in the malversation
case hastily concluded that there was an inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination
of the preliminary investigation through the mere expedient of counting the number of
years that had elapsed from the institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the
filing of the informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual
considerations and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself strictly to a
mathematical reckoning of the time involved, instead of undertaking a more substantive
appreciation of the circumstances and particulars which could have possibly caused the
delay. On the contrary, herein respondent court has convincingly shown that the
preliminary investigation dragged on for several years owing, ironically, to petitioners
evident propensity to resort to dilatory tactics. In the cases now before us, it cannot be
successfully and validly contended that petitioners right to speedy trial has been violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the
application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
It is palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely
solely on the length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be
accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be deduced from a
complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-year delay was
specifically considered vis--vis all the facts and circumstances which obtained therein.
Perforce, even on this ground alone, the instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 12 In the cases at bar, while
there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation
of which he now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations in that
the same do not constitute an offense supposedly because (a) in Criminal Case No.
18027, there is no statement that herein petitioner actually intervened and participated, as
a board member of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, in the latters contract
with the Province of Palawan, which is allegedly an element necessary to constitute a
violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the
information failed to show a causal relation between the act done by the accused and the
undue injury caused to the provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027
for violation of Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the ruling in the case
of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 13 where it was held that what is contemplated in Section
3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has
financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. In the cited case, however,
the Court found that the petitioner therein did not, in any way, intervene in making the
awards and payment of the purchases in question since he signed the voucher only after
all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the municipal
treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the municipal treasurer
without the knowledge and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were subsequently
delivered by the supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the
knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only participation of the accused mayor in the
transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the disbursement vouchers for record
purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the act therein of the accused mayor to be
covered by the prohibition under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a violation
of Section 3(h) for intervening in his official capacity as Governor of Palawan in reviewing
and approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2, 1982 for payment in favor of
ERA Technology Resources Corporation where he was one of the incorporators and
members of the board of directors. Such allegation clearly indicates the nature and extent
of petitioners participation in the questioned transaction. Without petitioners approval,
payment could not possibly have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18028,
for violation of Section 3(e), which would warrant the dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts
need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations
need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the information which would prove the
causal relation between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to
the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to petitioners contention, a reading of the information in
Criminal Case No. 18028 will readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charged have been sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the
charges right at the outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a
fuller ventilation and examination. Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it would
be unwarranted to cut off the prosecutory process at this stage of the proceedings and to
dismiss the information.15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses charged in the
complaints are different from those stated in the informations which were filed before the
Sandiganbayan, and that since there was no preliminary investigation conducted with
respect to the latter, such informations should be declared null and void for lack of due
process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the filing of an
information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is
accused of intervening in his official capacity as Provincial Governor in the contracts for
the installation and construction of waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a member of the board of
directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said transactions. In Criminal Case
No. 18028, petitioner was charged with a violation of Section 3(e) as a result of the
complaint filed against him and several others for a violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In
both instances, petitioner is charged with the disbursement of public funds for the
purchase of a motor launch which was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
provincial government of Palawan because the same broke down only after its maiden
voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are based on
substantially the same factual settings, except that the respective designations are
different. Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its
description in the complaint or information. 16 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given
by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. 17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set
forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to
apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous
designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate it. In
such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation of the
offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of facts.
The erroneous designation may be disregarded as surplusage. 18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law which is involved
in the present case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it defines several
modes of committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled rule in the appreciation
of indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes,
and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or
more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed through any
one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a
judgment of conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that
the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense. 19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary to
conduct a new one, affect the validity of the informations filed against petitioner. It has
been consistently held that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the
remedy.20 It is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information. The proper
course of action that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the
proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to the office of the
Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation, 21 if
the accused actually makes out a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold that the
informations filed against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the petitioners
preventive suspension, which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact that the validity of the informations
filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court. In support thereof, he
invokes the rule laid down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.22 that even if no temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained from taking any action while the petition
for certiorari was pending with the Supreme Court. Petitioner insists that this is what
respondent court should have done. Under this particular issue, petitioner is in effect
seeking a review of the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994,
denying his amended and consolidated motion to quash the information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion to quash
is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial.23 In other words, it cannot be the subject of appeal until the
judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event
is to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment.24 Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in
case there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not
attendant in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. 25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a presuspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted
to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis
to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or
withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as
a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al.27 we have set out the
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension
under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery, pursuant to Section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of
such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the
accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either
the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn
files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the
trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or
suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in
the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity
of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed
by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for
violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same
time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the
prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground
alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the
suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for
trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a
proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court
to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold
in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying
the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only
during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the
accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds
provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court
must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about
it. This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not
stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event
that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the
case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in
preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection
of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. 29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to
determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the instant case do not
show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against petitioner were
tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, the informations show
that the allegations contained therein meet the essential elements of the offense as
defined by the substantive law. The record is also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the
quashal of the informations under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court.31 Finally, a cursory reading of the order dated February 9, 1994 issued
by respondent court will show that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his
motion to quash. Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on which the
order of suspension was based, are null and void in view of the non-inclusion of his coprincipals which thus constitutes a violation of petitioners right to due process and equal
protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the board of directors of ERA
Technology Corporation should have been included as principals by indispensable
cooperation because without them he could not possibly have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor
launch should likewise have been included as principals by inducement or indispensable
cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly merely implementing their
resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations are null and void, the
suspension order which is based thereon should necessarily also be declared null and
void. We find no merit in petitioners arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in
Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved. The
law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever
the evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean, however,
that they shall have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the
evidence submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.
What the rule demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the
information, which conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of
guilt exists are not required to be included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to include
the other public officials who appear to be responsible for the offense charged as coaccused in the information filed against the accused does not in any way vitiate the validity
of the information under the Rules. 33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the crime
charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion
to quash the information against the accused may be filed, most especially in the case at
bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is probably guilty of the
offense charged, aside from the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in the
informations. Besides, such an infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing or
mitigating petitioners liability if he is subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No
one would contend that if for lack of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other
reason the prosecuting officer fails to include the names of one or more persons in an
information filed by him, who were in fact guilty participants in the commission of the crime
charged therein, such persons will be relieved of criminal liability; or that those accused
who have been charged with the offense, brought to trial, and found guilty will be permitted
to escape punishment merely because it develops in the course of the trial, or after the
trial, that there were other guilty participants in the crime. 34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a ground for the
quashal of the informations, the motion to quash must still be denied for having been filed
only after petitioner had been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that (t)he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. The
failure to include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is
deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an information or
to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly
warrants such action, the offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave
abuse of discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file
such information; (2) he may lodge a new complaint against the offenders before the
Ombudsman and have a new examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may
institute administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under
Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may
institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioners strategy that from the inception
of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman and during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, until the filing of the informations before the Sandiganbayan and up to the
denial of his amended and consolidated motion to quash, herein petitioner has not been
heard to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of the other supposed offenders.
Indeed, it is now much too late for petitioner to invoke and exploit this particular unfounded
issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information, from the facts
and evidence of record, we do not deem it necessary to include the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members of the ERA Technology
and Resources Corporation as co-accused in the informations filed against
herein petitioner. Insofar as the board members of said corporation are concerned, they
may be prosecuted only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides that
(i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 thereof. In the information filed in Criminal
Case No. 18027, petitioner stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not
contain any allegation to the effect that the board members knowingly induced or caused
herein petitioner to commit the offense defined therein, which is an essential element of
the crime in Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot be included as
co-principals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot likewise be
included in the information for violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for
the simple reason that it is not the validity of their resolution which is in issue here. While it
is true that said sanggunian passed a resolution authorizing the allocation of funds for the
purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner merely acted on the strength thereof, it is
not the fact of such authorization which is the subject of the charges against petitioner but
rather the manner by which that resolution was implemented by the latter. There is nothing
in the averments in the information from which it could be inferentially deduced that the
members of the sanggunian participated, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of the
vessel, and which fact could be the basis for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground that Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of executive power to the Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power
of suspension, which is an incident of the power of removal, is basically administrative and
executive in nature. He further submits that the power of removal vested in the court under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 is an incident of conviction, that is, it can only be
exercised after a conviction has been handed down. Hence, according to petitioner, since
the power to suspend is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be
exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13 authorizes the
court to exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot
be considered as an exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of the
courts power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that Section 13 is arbitrary and
discriminatory because it serves no purpose at all, in that it does not require a proceeding
to determine if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the fact that it is required by
law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the courts power of suspension under
Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised and adjudicated in the case of Luciano
vs. Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the pronouncements wherein we quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who should exercise the
mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension - where a
criminal case has already been filed in court - still is with the Provincial Governor, relying
on Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that, following the ruling
in Sarcos vs. Castillo x x x, because the main respondents are elective municipal officials,
that power of suspension must be held to repose in the Provincial Board, under
Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act 5185). The third is that, by
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, solely the court in which the criminal
case has been filed shall wield the power of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act grants with
specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an official charged with a
violation thereof. It would seem to us though that suspensions by virtue of criminal
proceedings are separate and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An
accurate reading of Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one separate from the
other: one criminal before the courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the
plain import of the last sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Our interpretation but preserves,
as it should, the substantial symmetry between the first part of Section 13 and the last part
thereof just quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all
other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - which here include suspension
- should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any public official committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the law, amongst
others, to perpetual disqualification from public office. Here, the Makati elective officials
heretofore named have been charged with and found guilty of a violation of Section 3(g) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and were sentenced by the court below, amongst
others to be perpetually disqualified to hold office. Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code
declares that the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails (t)he deprivation of
the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election. No stretch of the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual
absolute disqualification - which, in effect, is encompassed in the punishment set forth in
Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act - covers that of removal from the
office which each of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of judicial
legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is without doubt that
Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court
proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is not violative of the separation
of powers. For, our Constitution being silent, we are not to say that from Congress is
withheld the power to decide the mode or procedure of suspension and removal of public
officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme, convinces us the more
that the power of suspension should be lodged with the court. While the law may not be a
model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition
of the power to suspend that there be a valid information. Validity of information, of course,
is determined by the Court of First Instance where the criminal case is pending. That is
essentially a judicial function. Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the
criminal proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who knows
the facts upon which suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque,
supra, at page 469: We are certain that no authority or good reason can be found in
support of a proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal
charges for the sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of justice.
Independent of the other branches of the Government, the courts can well take care of
their own administration of the law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should not be
artificially construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to suspend - a prime tool
designed by Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from frustrating the
purity and certainty of the administration of justice. Surely, we should not be pedantically
exacting in reading its provisions. We should rather say that if the courts power of
suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be withheld or narrowed by construction,
Congress should have spelled it out in no uncertain terms x x x.
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an
encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the
process that a line should be drawn between administrative proceedings and criminal
actions in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating further on the possible danger
which may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a criminal action under
Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger should
the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court. Quite apart from the
fact that the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is,
the rights of the person accused. The court could very well serve as a lever to balance in
one equation the public interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And then,
there is the danger that partisan politics may creep in. The hand of political oppression
cannot just be ignored especially if the majority members of the Provincial Board and the
defendant public local elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power
may be abused. Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the suspending
authority will display reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is thus that the
statute should catch up with the realities of political life. There is indeed the dispiriting
lesson that in a clash between political considerations and conscience it is the latter that
quite often gets dented. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one who
should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness
must have been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and
rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid
information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court
has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their logical
parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time, ironically in fairness to
petitioner himself, that the same be now calcined in the judicial crucible into their ultimate
configuration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and
118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005]

SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of
Bulacan, respondent.
The zeal to uphold justice, albeit an admirable and desirable trait must never be allowed to
blind judges to the limits of judicial power or to obscure the boundaries set by the law.
The facts are as follows:
On May 10, 2003, in the municipality of Paombong, Bulacan, a wedding party was being
celebrated behind the house of the newly-married couple. At the party and drinking
together at the same table were SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo (SPO4 Alonzo), Jun Rances
(Rances), Zoilo Salamat (Salamat) and Rey Santos (Santos). While waiting to be seated,
Pedrito Alonzo (Pedrito) was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as
the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and
his companions took their seats and started drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzos
table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of the house. Santos passed
a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise followed them. A shot rang
out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he hurriedly left. The wedding
guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle being driven by
Santos. Pedritos uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits.
He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo
and a certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation 1 was conducted by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified. Upon review of
the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended
that Salamat be charged with murder as principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories.
With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found that no sufficient
evidence was adduced to establish their conspiracy with Salamat. 2 Thereafter, under the
direction of the Officer-in-Charge,3 an Information4 was prepared, charging Salamat as
principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories, for the murder of Pedrito. No bail was
recommended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4767-M-2003 with Branch
12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, under presiding judge Crisanto C.
Concepcion. On December 17, 2003, Judge Concepcion issued an Order,5 where he
stated:
The assassination of the victim has all the color of a planned liquidation. Zoilo Salamat, not
known in that place, appears to be a hired killer with Rey Santos as the supplier of the
death gun. SPO4 Alonzo appears to be the brain or mastermind, pointing Pedrito to the
assassin as the target of the planned killing. Jun Rances appears to be the back-up of
Salamat in executing and gunslaying. A conspiracy clearly appears among them with the
common design to kill the victim. Their respective actions were concerted to attest to that.
Jun Rances and Rey Santos are not merely accessories-after-the[-] fact, but as principals
themselves who should be charged as such along with gunman Zoilo Salamat and
mastermind SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo. This is very apparent from the facts on record as
borned [sic] out by the statements of witnesses given to the police.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice that should be given the victim in this case and
prosecute all the persons against whom probable cause exists as principals in this case of
murder, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby directed to amend the
information, so as to include all the aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as
principals, within five (5) days from notice hereof. 6
On January 5, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed his Motion for Reconsideration 7 to the Order, on
the ground that the court had no authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for the purpose
of amending the Information. SPO4 Alonzo averred that the prosecutors resolution can
only be reviewed by the Department of Justice, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme
Court, when a case for certiorari is filed.
On January 12, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibitation [sic], 8 alleging
that by issuing the aforementioned Order, Judge Concepcion has shown his prejudice
against him and bias in favor of private complainant Jose Alonzo. He prayed that the case
be re-raffled to another judge.
On January 13, 2004, Judge Concepcion issued an Order 9 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Motion for Inhibition. Judge Concepcion stated that SPO4 Alonzo
had no personality to file the said motions as he was not an accused in that case.
Respondent held that only the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor could question the first
Order.
On January 16, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed a verified affidavit-complaint 10 against Judge
Concepcion for rendering the December 17, 2003 Order. Complainant averred that
respondent x x x clearly acted without any authority of law as the same clearly violated
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 constitution [sic] and Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which only authorizes him to determine if probable cause
exist [sic] against those accused impleaded in the information before issuing a warrant of
arrest against them. He accused respondent judge of: a) gross ignorance of the law; b)
violation of Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution; 11 c) abuse of authority under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;12 d) knowingly rendering an unjust order; e)
conduct unbecoming of a judge; and f) oppression and partiality.13
On February 26, 2004, respondent received the First Indorsement 14 from the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), requiring him to file his comment to the complaint within ten
days from receipt thereof. On March 4, 2004, respondent filed his Comment. 15 Respondent
attached copies of the sworn statements of the prosecution witnesses. 16 He claimed that
while evaluating the records of the case, his curiosity was piqued as to why no bail was
recommended for the three accused. He noticed that the five witnesses 17 who testified
during the preliminary investigation had consistent accounts of the incidents leading to the
death of Pedrito. From these accounts, respondent concluded that SPO4 Alonzo and all
the accused conspired to kill Pedrito, thus the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor erred
when it merely charged Salamat as principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories,
while complainant was exonerated. Respondent averred that [c]ourts speak thru order
issuances [sic].18 Hence, on December 17, 2003, he issued the Order, directing the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the Information to include complainant, Rances and
Santos as principal participants in the murder of Pedrito. Respondent stressed that he
bade the prosecution to amend the Information xxx without any sanction even hinted,
should it fail to do so.19 After respondent issued the Order, the prosecution stood pat on its
position that there was no compelling reason to disturb its original resolution or to amend
the Information.
The OCA recommended that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the Order and
the acts complained of were done by respondent in his judicial capacity and were not
actuated by bad faith, dishonesty or similar motive. In addition, the proper remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and not an administrative complaint.
The Court cannot follow the recommendation of the OCA. Respondent clearly erred when
he rendered the assailed Order. The rules set the proper procedure 20 for the investigation
of complaints and designate the prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation. 21 The
function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 22 It is through the conduct of a
preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere
with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 23 The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 24 However, while prosecuting
officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime, 25 they have
equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced
is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.26 Judges should not unduly interfere with
the exercise of the power to prosecute on the part of fiscals.
It is not a sufficient excuse for respondent to aver that he did not impose any sanction for
non-compliance with his Order. In itself, his Order does violence to the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in our Constitution. In a clash of views between the judge
who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or between the fiscal and the offended
party or the accused, that of the prosecutor's should normally prevail. 27 Thus, we held
in People vs. Pineda,28 viz.:
x x x A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up
the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is
not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor.
But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled
to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A
contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious
cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play
may be transgressed. x x x
The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of
the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of
instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating
Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought
about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and
the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this
regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying
that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity may be
availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for
the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute
relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.
We understand respondents zeal in trying to uphold the ends of justice. However,
respondent overlooked the fact that there is a remedy where a prosecutor errs in not
charging a person in an Information. The recourse is to appeal to the Secretary of
Justice.29 By ordering the prosecutor to include complainant, Rances and Santos as
principals in the Information, respondent arrogated unto himself the executive power of
supervision and control over public prosecutors. His conduct is not only unbecoming of a
judge; more importantly, it transgresses our Constitution.
Yet, this is not all. Respondent judge also erred when he issued warrants of arrest for
Rances and Santos without bail. As the Information has not yet been amended charging
these two accused as principals to the crime of murder, they are still entitled, as mere
accessories, to bail under Rule 114, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.30 The Court notes with approval that respondent corrected this error by
allowing Rances and Santos, with the recommendation of the prosecution, to post bail.
For lack of evidence, respondent is exonerated of the other charges brought against
him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion is found liable for
conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED. He is sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a
copy of this resolution be entered upon his record.
[G.R. No. 149472. October 15, 2002]
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was charged with
estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The information reads:
That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the Vice President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from Olivier
Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of
$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture
of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to
said complainant, and the accused once in possession of the same, far from complying
from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said
complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated
demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of
$41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. (Skiva) is a New York-based corporation which
imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines)
Inc. (Olivier).Aurora Manufacturing & Development Corporation (Aurora) and Uni-Group
Inc. (Uni-Group) are domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva.
Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner,
Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a consultant of
Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from
Aurora and Uni-Group. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier,
issues to the local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a Purchase Contract and Olivier issues to
Skiva a Sales Contract. In these transactions, payment is usually made by way of a letter
of credit wherein the supplier is paid only upon the presentation of the proper shipping
documents to the designated bank.[2]
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered
sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita
Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the jeans. [3] Thus, a Purchase Contract
dated December 18, 1985 was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was to
supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill
Jeans payable by means of a letter of credit at sight. [4] The Purchase Contract was
confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985 . [5] A Sales Contract was also issued by
Olivier to Skiva containing the same terms and conditions as the Purchase Contract and
was confirmed by Mr. Jack Chehebar of Skiva.[6]
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group
the amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of
P20.59 to US$1.00) as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw
materials to manufacture the jeans.[7] It was also agreed that the amount advanced by
Skiva represents advance payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. [8] Skiva then
issued a check in the said amount payable to Uni-Group. [9] However, due to the length of
time needed for the check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to remit the funds
instead by way of telegraphic transfer. [10] Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by
Mr. Lettmayr[11] and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in New York,
the Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and
Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.[12]
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of
the said joint account, withdrew the amount of US$21,675.21 [13] and on January 22, 1986,
petitioner withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00. [14] The prosecution also presented
evidence that subsequent to said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99
were deducted from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the
remittance of the funds to another account.[15]
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the production
of the jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics
required for the order were purchased from Litton Mills by the petitioner. [16] 3,000 meters of
Litton fabrics are enough to produce only 200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount
insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva of 700 dozens of ladies twill jeans. [17] Upon inquiry
with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the query be directed to petitioner as
petitioner is in charge of securing the materials. [18] However, Ms. Tujan could not locate
the petitioner.[19]
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon Aurora/UniGroup through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money advanced in the amount of
US$41,300.00.[20]
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the
US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan,
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary
investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and an
information was filed against petitioner.[21]
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
the maximum and to pay Uni-Group and Aurora the amount of P595,259.00. [22] On March
13, 1997, the lower court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [23] On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[24]
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files the instant petition for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code: a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender; or denial on his
part of such receipt; c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and d) there is demand made by the offended party to the offender. [25]
We agree with the trial courts finding that the contract between Skiva and Aurora/UniGroup was one of sale.[26] Thus, upon remittance by Skiva of its advance payment in the
amount of US$41,300.00, ownership thereof was transferred to Aurora/Uni-Group and
Aurora/Uni-Group had no obligation to account or deliver the money to Skiva, its only
obligation under the contract of sale being to deliver the 700 dozens of ladies
jeans. However, petitioner, as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of the
specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt of the amount, had the obligation to
account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora/Uni-Group.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of US$41,300.00 was remitted by
telegraphic transfer to the joint account of the petitioner and his wife and Mr. and Mrs.
Werner Lettmayr;[27]2) the said amount was remitted as advance payment by Skiva for the
jeans it ordered;[28] and 3) the amount of US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by petitioner on
January 16, 1986 and the amount of US$20,000.00 was withdrawn by petitioner on
January 22, 1986.[29] In fact, petitioner himself admits having withdrawn from the joint
account on two occasions after the remittance was made. [30] Petitioner further admits
having made such withdrawal for the purpose of purchasing materials to be used for the
jeans ordered by Skiva and a portion thereof to be given to Aurora. [31] Thus, upon
withdrawal by petitioner of the amounts advanced by Skiva, petitioner received the same in
trust with an obligation to return the funds or account for the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or misappropriation of the amount received,
petitioner claims that a portion of the amount was used to purchase 3,000 meters of Litton
fabrics and the balance was returned to Aurora. [32] However, upon cross-examination,
petitioner was unable to recall the amount paid for the purchase of the fabrics or the
amount given to Aurora nor was petitioner able to identify whether payment for the
purchase of fabric or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash or in check. [33]
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to present evidence to support
his defense that payment for the purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance of
the amount received by petitioner was given to Aurora. The only reason why the Court is
inclined to believe that 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics were purchased for the manufacture
of the jeans is because the witness for the prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified
the purchase of the said materials from Litton Mills. [34]
To support petitioners claim that the remainder of the amount withdrawn was returned
to Aurora, petitioner presents a letter dated October 15, 1986 from the Philippine Veterans
Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) addressed to Mr. Werner Lettmayr,
President of Aurora, regarding the financial audit of Aurora, wherein the amount of
P850,780.00 is indicated as an amount due to Uni-Group. [35] Atty. Cesar Singson, witness
for the defense, testified that the amount of P850,780.00 indicated in the said letter
represents the peso equivalent of the advance payment of US$41,300.00 made by Skiva
to Uni-Group.[36]
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the said letter is nil. The trial
court correctly ruled:
The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the letter] because the person who
testified thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar Singson, was not the one who prepared the
document. He was only one [of] those who was furnished a copy thereof. Moreover, when
said piece of evidence was presented, there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the
[petitioner] as to how he was able to procure said documents. In a hearing he testified that
he personally procured said letter from the records of PHIVIDEC and the person who
certified said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross examination, he testified that
he did not personally obtain said letter and he was not there when the person who
authenticated said letter signed it and that it was only given to him by his former counsel.
This is further muddled when Atty. Singson testified that he was the one who authenticated
said document on December 7, 1987 from his copy upon the request of the accused. Atty.
Singson has already severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the year
1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no longer connected with PHIVIDEC when he
authenticated said document based on his copy which implies that the document was not
obtained from the records of PHIVIDEC. [37]
Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence, we are unable to see
any indication that the amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion thereof (assuming that
the said amount represents the advance payment made by Skiva) has been received by
Aurora and/or Uni-Group from petitioner. At most, what said letter indicates is that Aurora
acknowledges liability to Uni-Group in the said amount or that said amount has been
received by Uni-Group from Skiva as advance payment which Uni-Group may have, in
turn, assigned to Aurora. The glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be seen from the
said letter that there was actual receipt by Aurora from petitioner of the amount indicated
therein, or at least a portion thereof, after deduction of the cost of the materials purchased
to manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon withdrawal of the said
amounts, petitioner caused the telegraphic transfer of the amount to another account prior
to petitioners receipt of the amount in pesos. [38] In fact, upon being confronted by the
prosecution with Exhibits R and T which are account debit forms showing that certain
amounts were deducted by Citibank N.A. from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee
for the amounts withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon withdrawal, the
dollars was converted by the bank, remitted abroad, and given to me in pesos.[39] The act
committed by petitioner of remitting the funds abroad constitutes an act of conversion or
misappropriation. This Court has previously held that even a temporary disturbance of
property rights constitutes misappropriation. [40] The words convert and misappropriate as
used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or
disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate a thing of value for ones own use
includes, not only conversion to ones personal advantage but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. [41]Thus, when petitioner caused the
remittance of the amount withdrawn to another account, such act constituted conversion or
misappropriation or unauthorized disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for
which the property was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is not present as the party
prejudiced, in accordance with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is
Skiva, when petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount
withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent with the ruling of the lower court that Aurora is
the owner of the sum remitted as advance payment, petitioner had the obligation to
account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. [42] Thus, petitioner maintains
that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora was alleged in the
information nor did the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co,[43] in estafa, the
person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods
misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person
who shall defraud another by any means mentioned [in Article 315] may be held liable for
estafa.The use by the law of the word another instead of the word owner means that as an
element of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of
the crime.[44] Thus, the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party prejudiced, is not the
owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent as no demand was made by
Skiva on petitioner. Petitioner argues that although demand was made by Skiva to
Aurora/Uni-Group and/or Mr. Lettmayr, no demand was shown to have been made on
petitioner himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when demand was made upon
Aurora/Uni-Group. To require Skiva to make a demand on petitioner himself would be
superfluous and would serve no other additional purpose. We note that at the time when
Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of the jeans, except for the advice of Mr.
Lettmayr to direct her queries to petitioner who was in charge of procuring the materials for
the jeans, Ms. Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be primarily responsible for
the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the obligation
of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not complied
with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the
return of the amount advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner
himself to uphold the conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind application of the
law. In the case of United States v. Ramirez,[45] this Court held:
The consummation of the crime of estafa does not depend on the fact that a request for
the return of the money is first made and refused in order that the author of the crime
should comply with the obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or
conversion of money received to the prejudice of the owner thereof are the sole essential
facts which constitute the crime of estafa, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the
penalty imposed by the Penal Code.
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals [46] this Court ruled that the law
does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds and property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,[47] we also held that in a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present action
as estafa was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of
the finding that the transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of
sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure,[48] the complaint should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the
offended party contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to
Skiva the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account. [49]
The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to
commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the offended party is
required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by a fiscal. [50] It is not
necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for
preliminary investigation.[51]
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information,
both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be
filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the
fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any
person.[52] Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the
finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of the
court a quo finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

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October 15, 2002

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