Second Report of Commonwealth Games Village

HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE
COMMONWEALT
H GAMES
Commonwealth Games
VILLAGEVillage
2/11/201
1
Second Report of HLC
Second Report of
Second Report of HLC
Vigyan Bhawan Annexe, New Delhi
2011
VIGYAN
BHAWAN ANNEXE, NEW DELHI
Commonwealth Games Village
Contents
Chapter
Particulars
Page No.
Acronyms
Executive Summary
Introduction
Location of Games Village
14
Planning and Bidding
21
Project Development Agreement and Execution
31
Bailout Package and Release of Funds
41
Completion and Handover
69
Main Findings
75
Recommendations
81
Appendix 1: List of Documents Reviewed
82
Appendix 2: List of persons interviewed
85
Annexures
Page 1
Acronyms
AGL
ACIL
BSES
CGV
CGF
CFO
CPWD
COS
CW&PRS
DDA
DJB
DPCC
DUAC
Emaar MGF
FM
FAR
GoM
GoI
HLC
HIG
ITDC
LIG
LG
MCD
MIG
MoYAS
MoUD
MoEF
NDMC
NEERI
NOC
OC
PIL
PPP
PDA
PD
PWD
RFP
RFQ
SBI
SC
YJA
Above Ground Level

M/s Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd.
Bombay Sub-urban Electric Supply
Commonwealth Games Federation
Chief Financial Officer.
Central Public Works Department
Committee of Secretaries
Central Water and Power Research Station
Delhi Development Authority
Delhi Jal Board
Delhi Pollution Control Committee
Delhi Urban Art Commission
M/s Emaar MGF Construction Private Limited
Finance Member
Floor Area Ratio
Group of Ministers
Government of India
High Level Committee
High Income group
Indian Tourism Development Corporation
Lower Income Group
Lieutenant Governor of Delhi
Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Middle Income Group
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
Ministry of Urban Development
Ministry of Environment and Forests
New Delhi Municipal Council
National Environmental Engineering Research Institute
No Objection Certificate
Organizing Committee
Public Interest Litigation
Public Private Partnership
Project Development Agreement
Project Developer
Public Works Department
Request For Proposal
Request For Qualification
State Bank of India
Supreme Court of India
Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan
Page 2
Executive Summary
Nodal Agency for Games Village
1. Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is the nodal agency for urban planning and its implementation
in Delhi. It has been the primary organization for undertaking urban development projects in Delhi
since 1957.
2. DDA was assigned the responsibility for development of the Games Village, arguably the most
important infrastructure necessary for holding the Commonwealth Games, 2010. It was designed
to accommodate about 8000 athletes and Team officials during the Games.
3. The Games Villages residential zone was developed by M/s Emaar MGF Construction Private
Limited (Emaar MGF). The residential zone consisted of 34 residential towers and 1168 apartments.
The unit mix of the total apartments constructed was as under:
Particulars
2 Bedroom
3 bedroom
4 Bedroom
5 Bedroom
Total
Number of
apartments
31
765
209
163
1168*
*Source Data submitted by Emaar MGF to DDA (March-April 2009)
Loss of Precious Time

4. While the Games were awarded to India on 13th November, 2003, by when the site for Games
Village had also been frozen, the decision on the mode of development of the Games village was
finally taken and agreed to by all stakeholders only by January 2006. This delay of over two years in
finalizing the development strategy proved costly to DDA in so far as it prevented DDA from
considering an alternative in the situation which emerged in 2008-09.
Development Costs associated with Site

5. The site selected for the development of the Games Village suffered from several shortcomings,
which got highlighted with the passage of time. Due to this particular location, the site necessitated
an expenditure of about 633.06 crore on construction of an elevated road over Barapullah Nullah
(linking CGV to JLN Sports complex), Flyover on NH 24 near the Games Village (to provide
Page 3

uninterrupted ingress and egress into and from CGV) and noise barriers along NH24 and adjacent
railway track. The details of the cost are in Chapter 2 of the Report.
Project Execution in Public Private Partnership mode

6. According to DDA documents, the decision to adopt the PPP mode for developing the
Commonwealth Games Village was taken keeping in view constraints of scale, time, quality,
specifications and the need for 4000 rooms during the Games period. Based on their
recommendation, Government approval for implementation of the project on a Public Private
Partnership mode (PPP) was granted. However, the PPP mode of execution, little understood by
DDA, was distorted to such an extent by the Project Developer and DDA that it virtually ceased to
be a PPP project. Instead it became a project implemented by DDA and constructed by the
Developer through a sub-contractor.
Deviations from Model Concession Agreement in PDA

7. DDA did not include certain key provisions of the Model Concession Agreement, in particular, those
relating to (a) establishing an escrow account and, (b) audit in the Project Development Agreement
(PDA) signed with the selected Project Developer. This significantly diluted the ability of DDA to
monitor the implementation of the CGV project and make a proper assessment of the fund
requirement of the Project Developer in 2009.
Failure to meet Contractual Obligations

8. Emaar MGF sought concessions / relaxations not contained in the PDA. These included, inter- alia,
extension on milestones and financial assistance. Emaar MGF contrived an emergency situation;
DDA chose neither to enforce contractual rights nor to resist Emaar MGF demands.
9. DDA spent substantial amount on items which were to be taken up by Emaar MGF and has to
recover the amount from the Project Developer. The total amount due from Emaar MGF on
account of quality issues and non-performance aggregates to
96.33 crore. However, this amount
is under dispute. Details are in Chapter 6 of the Report.
Page 4

Fallout of emergency situation
10. According to the Project Development Agreement signed on 14th September, 2007, DDA and
Emaar MGF were to share the residential apartments in the ratio of 1:2. This was effectively
changed to 1:0.63 with the decision to bail out the Project Developer through purchase of 333
apartments from Emaar MGFs share of the apartments. It should be noted that the Project
Developer had asked for
321 crore as loan at normal rate of interest or purchase of 250
apartments. It was DDAs decision to purchase 333 apartments.

11. The Bailout package was premeditated, suggestive of the outcome preceding the process. DDA
formed a Valuation Committee which, in turn, appointed two Independent Consultants to

determine fund requirement of Emaar MGF and the value of apartments (in March 2009) for
arriving at the number of additional apartments to be purchased by DDA. A Negotiation
Committee, which was set up with the approval of LG, was unable to reach a mutually acceptable
sale price with Emaar MGF. Emaar MGF, then addressed a letter to LG dated 22.04.2009 stating
their readiness to accept a rate of 11,000 per sft which was endorsed with alacrity on 24.04.2009
at a meeting chaired by LG, attended by Secretary and Joint Secretary, Ministry of Urban
Development, Vice Chairman, DDA and Finance Member and Engineer Member, DDA. The locus
standii of this Group to take such an important decision is not known. It is surprising that such a
decision was not taken by the competent Authority: DDA. Such a major decision with large financial
implications, not being taken by the competent authority, renders it suspect. It was referred to the
Authority only in June 2009 after the Bailout Agreement had been signed in May, 2009.
12. The Technical consultants, based on the project specifications, estimated the cost price of the
project at 934.49 crore (excluding the land cost). This estimation was later ignored. In the process
of finalizing a sale price, which was also agreeable to Emaar MGF, the sale price recommended by
the Financial Consultants was revised several times to finally accommodate 10% cost of capital and
15% Developers margin. It may be noted that as per industry norms, cost of capital is borne by the
Developer. In the calculations, the sub-contract price of 1168.21 crore was accepted at face value
even though no signed contract was shown to the Financial consultant.
13. A copy of the sub contract between Emaar MGF and M/s Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd., which
was apparently not earlier available to the DDA, was obtained and referred to a Consultant of the
Page 5

HLC. Based on this document, the TDS returns filed by Emaar MGF and the Project Report
submitted to SBI by the PD, the Consultant has calculated that the total estimated Project Cost was
1368.42 crore and the per sft. Cost, inclusive of Developers margin, should not have been more
than 7829 per sft.
14. Expert analysis of the cash flow statements of Emaar MGF Constructions Pvt. Ltd., Emaar MGF Land
Ltd. and the Group for the years 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 reveal that the Project Developer
did not really require the fund infusion from DDA for completion of the project and it was just a
ruse for selling off a huge chunk of its share of unsold flats to a bulk buyer at a price that was
acceptable to them and at a time when the real estate market was sluggish!
Undue Favours to Project Developer

15. Some of the undue favours that were bestowed on the Project Developer by DDA are as under:
(a) Purchase of apartments
DDA purchased the apartments from Emaar MGF at the rate of
higher than the rate of
11,000 per sft, which was way
7829 per sft. arrived at by the Consultant of HLC based on assessed
cost of the Project or the market price of 9068 per sft arrived at by HLC. The sale price paid
by DDA was also much higher than what had been recommended by the experts of DDA and
the highest price initially recommended by the Valuation Committee, which was 9,720 per sft.
Whether based on the assessed cost of the Project or the market price determined by HLC,
the purchase of 333 apartments by DDA @ 11,000 per sft. caused undue financial gain for
the Project Developer of an amount ranging between 134 crore to 220 crore.
(b) Recovery from Customers

The Valuation Committee based on the advice of the experts recommended to the Negotiation
Committee that the funding by DDA to the Developer under the Bailout package should be net
of the funds received by Emaar MGF from the sale of apartments. While this advice was noted,
the Negotiation Committee failed to include any definitive clause in the Bailout package to
ensure that cognizance of this stream of funds was taken while deciding the installment
amount to be released by DDA to the PD.
Page 6

(c ) Unauthorized payments
The Bailout Agreement specified the expenditure which could be met through the funds
received from the bailout package aggregating to
766.89 crore. Emaar MGF made payments
to other Group companies, incurred marketing expenditure etc. (as indicated in their utilization
certificate) which was not authorized and hence has been termed unauthorized expenditure
by the Financial Consultant. As per the utilization certificate for the period ending 3 rd March
2010, such payments aggregated to
64 crore. Further, excess funds aggregating to
192.71
crore from the Bailout package with Emaar MGF as on 31st March, 2010 were parked by the
Developer in a short term investment fund.
16. The summary of the financial favours/ loss to DDA by a series of decisions taken to support Emaar
MGF are set out in the following Table:
S.NO.
I
Particulars
Claim ( Crore)
Reference
Non levy of Liquidated Damages on the Emaar MGF as per

the Agreement terms DDA waived the damages
Bailout Package
81.45
Chapter 4
134.00 220.00
Chapter 5
686.34
Chapter 5
Purchase of apartments at a very high rate of 11,000 per

sft
Recovery from customers and sale of new apartments not
reduced from the fund requirement for the project (as
recommended by the Financial consultants to the Valuation
Committee)
Unauthorized payments contrary to the Agreement
64.00
Chapter 5
Investments (as on 31st March, 2010)
192.71
Chapter 5
II
A
B
Poor Monitoring
17. Although DDA had an oversight and monitoring responsibility, it failed to detect contract violations
/ other problems. Records reveal that on several occasions the Monitoring Committee discussed
the significant delays and other related issues but the same were documented in a very
perfunctory manner.
Page 7
Box: 1 Games Village Saga

DDA was the chosen agency for development of the Games Village for CWG, 2010. The Village was overdesigned to accommodate 8000 athletes and officials while provision for 6000 would have been
adequate. This was mentioned in the Report of the Evaluation Commission set up by CGF in October 2003
itself.
Over two years were frittered away in deciding the development strategy. Ultimately, it was decided to
adopt the Public Private Partnership model for development of Games Village in January 2006 and the
Project Development Agreement could be signed only in September, 2007.
Trouble began to brew by early 2008 and in February, 2009, the Project Developer (Emaar MGF) formally
sought financial assistance from DDA/Government. Bailout package was given to the Developer on his
terms and conditions as by then DDA had concluded that it had no other viable option left if the Games
Village was to be ready in time. So, as with other CWG projects, in the national interest DDA decided to
forego terms and conditions of a valid legal document the Project Development Agreement and
sacrifice its own interests.
DDAs decision to purchase 333 apartments from Emaar MGFs share in 2009 only helped the Project
Developer to offload his share of unsold flats in bulk at a price that was acceptable to him and was way
above the prevailing market price. Funds made available by DDA in 2009-10 enabled the Project
Developer to divert funds to various applications other than the CGV Project such as repayment of interest
bearing loans, investment of surplus funds into mutual funds and transferring funds to other Group
companies.
Finally the Games Village was ready but at a huge cost. Key principles of PPP model were ignored and the
only principle that remained was that risk and loss would be borne by DDA while profit would be of
Emaar MGF.
Page 8
Chapter 1: Introduction
Bidding for the Games
1.1
In May 2003 Government of India gave its nod to the Indian Olympic Association (IOA) to bid for
the Commonwealth Games 2010 (CWG) at an estimated expenditure of
296 crore towards sports
infrastructure and conduct of games, with expenditure on security and Games Village to be incurred by
the Government and Delhi Development Authority (DDA)
1.2
India was awarded the rights to host the Commonwealth Games (CWG) for 2010 by the
Commonwealth Games Federation in November 2003.

1.3
Indian Olympic Association/ Organizing Committee together with the Government of National
Capital Territory of Delhi and Government of India entered into the Host City Contract with the
Commonwealth Games Federation on 13th November, 2003 for holding of XIX Commonwealth Games
in Delhi during 03-14 October 2010.
1.4
The major responsibilities regarding the successful delivery of the XIX Commonwealth Games
were of the OC, GNCTD and GOI. The major responsibilities of the stakeholders were as follows:
Key Activities
Stakeholders
Sports Infrastructure
Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports; Govt. Of Delhi; Delhi

Development Authority (DDA) and New Delhi Municipal
Council (NDMC)
City Infrastructure
City Government; Municipal Council of Delhi (MCD) and

NDMC
Games Village
Delhi Development Authority (DDA)
Conduct and Delivery of Games
Organizing Committee (OC)
Host Broadcasting and Media Press

Centre
Prasar Bharati and Ministry of Information &

Broadcasting
Tourism and Accommodation for

Tourists
Security
Ministry of Tourism
Ministry of Home Affairs
Page 9

Role of DDA
1.5
DDA was created in 1957 under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 to promote
and secure the planned development of Delhi. The charter lists the following objectives as incidental
and ancillary to the working and functioning of DDA:
To formulate a Master Plan for covering the present and future growth of Delhi and to
promote and secure the development of Delhi according to the plan covering all possible
activities.
1.6
To acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property.
To carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations.
To provide services and amenities incidental to the above
DDA was given the following mandate with respect to the XIX Commonwealth Games:
Development of the Games Village for the accommodation of the participants during the
Games;
Development of the Yamuna Sports Complex;
Development (including up-gradation) of the Siri Fort Sports Complex;
Development of Vasant Kunj flats to accommodate tourists during the Games; and
Development of 33 hotels to accommodate the projected tourists during the Games.
Organizational Structure
1.7
The present organization structure of DDA is illustrated in the following chart:
Page 10
Finance
Member
Engineer
Member
Principal
Commissioner
Principal
Commissioner
Chairman,
DDA (LG of
Delhi)
Vice
Chairman
Chief Officers,
Engineers ,
Commissioners, &
Directors
Principal
Commissioner
cum Secretary
Chief Legal
Advisor
Principal
Commissioner
(CWG)
Commissioner
Planning
Chief Vigilance Officer
1.8
To ensure timely completion of the CWG projects, various divisions were created by DDA under
the supervision of Director (Sports) and entrusted with the responsibility of construction of the same.
Under this format, 13 divisions were formed.
a. Division 1 - 9 : Responsible for civil work at various projects
b. Division 10 - 13: Responsible for electrical work at various projects
Governance Structure for CWG projects - DDA

1.9
Various committees were constituted by DDA to monitor the progress and provide constant
quality assurance with regards to the CWG project. Four major committees were constituted for this
purpose, namely:
Monitoring Committee (CGV)
The Monitoring Committee was formed under the chairmanship of an Independent engineer,
(who was unanimously elected by the two parties to the Agreement) and had Chief Engineer,
SEZ, DDA and a representative of the Project Developer for the Games Village project, as
members. The committee was mandated to meet every month to review the progress of work
at the Commonwealth Games Village
Page 11

Stadia Committee
The mandate prescribed for the Stadia Committee was to conduct regular meetings to address
all issues relating to the development of the Games Village site. Weekly meetings were to be
held to assess the progress of the project and resolve all project related issues relating to
flyover, residential facility, temporary overlays, practice venues etc.
Weekly Site Coordination Committee
This committee was formed on 27th May 2009 by the Principal Commissioner (CWG) to facilitate
internal co-ordination amongst the contractors, consultants and the DDA engineers and
resolution of issues of mutual interest.
High Powered Committee (HPC)
The Vice Chairman, DDA constituted a HPC to monitor the progress regarding preparation for
the Commonwealth Games. The committee was empowered to monitor and ensure early
solutions of all issues relating to the Commonwealth Games. Following were the committee
members:
Finance Member, DDA - Chairman
Engineer Member, DDA
Pr. Commissioner (CWG), DDA
Director Sports (Member Secretary), DDA
Representative of Delhi Govt. (GNCTD)
Representative of Organizing Committee, Commonwealth Games 2010
Copies of orders constituting the above mentioned Committees are at Relevant Document 1.
Scope of Report
1.10
This Report reflects the findings and conclusions of the High Level Committee (HLC) on various
aspects relating to the development of the Commonwealth Games Village for providing
accommodation to the participating athletes and Team officials.
1.11
The HLC through its team of officers / experts examined the performance of the DDA against
the Terms of Reference of the Committee, with special focus on:
Page 12
Planning and execution of development of Games Village execution and delivery with
reference to time, cost and quality
The effectiveness of the organizational structure and governance, in particular, within DDA
Weakness in management, alleged irregularities, wasteful expenditure and wrongdoing in

performance of the tasks assigned to DDA
Criteria
1.12
The HLC evaluated the management and performance of the key functions carried out by DDA
in the background of reasonable timelines for initiating and completing the projects in accordance with
established standards, generally accepted best practices and conformity to good governance.
Methodology
1.13
The key procedures carried out for the purpose of review were:
a.
Identification and examination of relevant file notes of DDA, Ministry of Urban
Development, extracts of the Notes for Cabinet, records of the meetings of GoM, and
correspondence on the subject matter. The list of documents reviewed is at Appendix 1.
b.
Interview with officers and functionaries responsible for planning, execution and
monitoring of the CGV project. The list is placed at Appendix 2.
Page 13
Chapter 2: Location of the Commonwealth

Games Village
2.1
The Games Village is located in Pocket III of Sub-Zone 6 of the River Yamuna, developed on an
area of 59.28 hectare between river Yamuna and the flood protection bund on the eastern side.
2.2
The HLC has been informed by DDA that the location of the Games Village was identified by the
Planning Department of DDA in consultation with the then LG, Shri Vijai Kapoor, in the year 2003.
However, there is no documentary evidence to suggest the type of inputs that were taken into account
before it was concluded that the present location of the Games Village is the best available site.
2.3
On 14th May, 2003, the LG in his letter addressed to the Chairman, Commonwealth Games
Federation (CGF) mentioned that we have set aside land for building a brand new Games Village. A
copy of the letter is at Annexure 1.
2.4
Further, in his letter dated 22nd August 2003 to the Secretary, Department of Youth Affairs and
Sports, Government of India (GOI), the LG stated that the site was showcased to the Evaluation
Commission of the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) that had visited New Delhi in August 2003
to evaluate the citys bid for Commonwealth Games 2010. There is a mention in the said letter that the
site was liked immensely keeping in view its salubrious environs, its location vis-a-vis the competition
sites and its location on the transportation map which will include metro line from NOIDA to the
centre of the city by the year 2010. A copy of the letter is at Relevant Document 2.
Box: 2 Excerpts from the Report of the CGF Evaluation Commission (October 2003)
The DDA (Government) is constructing the Village on a pleasant and high quality site. No
detailed architectural planning has been undertaken to date. A design competition will be
conducted. 40 hectares of land has been reserved in the heart of Delhi.
The proposed Village site adjoins the National Highway-24 and will be connected with the
Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) and Electric Magnetic Unit (EMU) Trains.
The estimated cost of construction of the Commonwealth Games Village will be Rs.185.8 crore
(USD 38.8 million).
Page 14

2.5
Subsequently, on 11th September 2003, Union Cabinet approved the site of the Games Village
at the current location based on the proposal of LG.

2.6
The HLC, based on the records made available to it, finds that the Union Cabinet was not
provided with all the information regarding the pros and cons of the location of the Games Village. The
Cabinet approval, therefore, seems to be based solely on the assertions made by the LG. Moreover,
the Group of Ministers (GoM) merely acknowledged the decision of the Cabinet and asked DDA to
make available strategy options for development of the Games Village in its 4th meeting held on 17th
March, 2005.
2.7
Once the site had the seal of approval of various authorities, what followed was a series of
steps undertaken by DDA to regularize the decision.
Change in Land Use

2.8
The first step towards regularization of the site for development of the Games Village was in
the form of change of land use of the earmarked area. Vide notification dated 2nd March, 20061, the
land use of area measuring 42.5 hectares (105.0 acres) was sought to be changed from agricultural
and water body to public and semi-public facilities. Further, vide notification dated 18 th August,
20062 (a modification of the earlier notification), the land use of an area of 16.5 hectares was changed
to Residential for 11 hectares and 5.5 hectares to Commercial/ Hotel.
2.9
Initially, DDA had proposed that hotels would also come up at the same site. However, this was
opposed by Chairman, OC on the ground that it would be discriminatory to put up some athletes and
Team officials in hotels and others in Games Village. On 19.11.2006 GoM agreed, in principle with the
model where the residential accommodation for the athletes may be developed on a PPP model in the
form of a residential complex with additional hotel accommodation being provided in close proximity
to the Games Village which would assist OC officials in making arrangements for technical officials.
1
2
See Relevant Document 3

Page 15

2.10
Through February-August 2007, a NGO named Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan (YJA) in its
communication to several GOI ministries including MoUD, MoEF, and MYA&S had raised many
pertinent issues relating to the location of the Games Village. YJA sought an appointment with these
agencies, including the GoM, to discuss their submission of the issues highlighted; however, they were
only given an audience by GoM during the 12th meeting held on 12th November 2007. By this time the
GoM had taken all major decisions relating to the development of the Games Village at the site
selected and the PDA had also been signed by DDA and Emaar MGF. Thereafter, any appeal to change
the location of the Games Village could be brushed aside stating that the current time frame to
develop the Games Village did not permit any deliberation on the matter.
Alternative Sites
2.11
Perusal of the presentation made by YJA to the GoM, indicates that it had suggested certain
alternative sites, which included

(a) Safdarjung airport
(b) Jasola Sports complex and
(c) Dwarka - Sector 20.
While the HLC has not examined the suitability of such sites vis a vis the current site, it may be stated
that the Government and DDA ought to have examined various options before zeroing in on the
location of the Games Village. It may be pertinent to note that the Asian Games Village in 1982 was
located within two kms. of the Jawahar Lal Nehru Stadium and hence faced minimal transportation
problems. HLC has been informed that during the run up to the CWG 2010, there were suggestions for
an alternative location close to Jawahar Lal Nehru Sports complex which, unfortunately, was never
considered.
Environmental Clearance
2.12
At the first instance, MoEF granted conditional clearances vide its letter dated 14 th December,
20063. MoEF insisted that a study needs to be conducted to assess the impact of Akshardham bund on
Page 16

the area of flood plain in the upstream reaches of river Yamuna. Accordingly Central Water Power
Research Station (CW&PRS) was entrusted with the study. CW&PRS submitted its report to MoEF in
March 20074. The report indicated that the bund would cause insignificant flood problem upstream as
well as in the region of the bund. Accordingly, MoEF amended its environmental clearance of 14 th
December 2006 and issued an amended letter on 29th March 20075.
2.13
In January 2008, DDA made a reference to National Environmental Engineering Research
Institute (NEERI) seeking their opinion on whether the proposed site for Games Village was part of the
Yamuna Flood Plain and whether having complied with the MoEF conditions for environmental
clearance, there would be any further threat of environmental degradation / loss of ground water
recharge and /or if there are any additional abatement / measures required to be undertaken. The
opinion indicated that the project posed insignificant risk6.
2.14
Environmental clearances /reports, in particular NEERI Report, ought to be viewed in context of
what happened during August September, 2010. It rained as it should; unfortunately for these
agencies, more heavily than usual. Yamuna water including seepage compromised the site to a point
where its use was in question unless the monsoon abated. Vestiges remain; the jury is still out on
remedial measures, costs, responsibility et al.
2.15
While the process of compliance with environmental issues may appear transparent at first
glance, the HLC noted that DDA did not inform the following agencies / statutory authorities, which
have regulatory role vis--vis the river Yamuna. These include:
Yamuna Standing Committee (YSC) of Central Water Commission No approval

accorded by the concerned authority with respect to the development of the Games
Village as this project was never referred to it.7

6
7
It may be noted that since October 2003, 19 projects had been cleared by the Yamuna Standing Committee
including construction of elevated road over Barapullah Nallah but the Games Village Project was never referred
to YSC of Central Water Commission for their approval. See Relevant Document 8.
5
Page 17
Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA)
Yamuna Removal of Encroachments Monitoring Committee
Public Interest Litigation

2.16
Thereafter, a plethora of objections were raised and a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was also
filed. The issues addressed in the PIL were finally dismissed by the Supreme Court judgment dated 30th
July 20098. The judgment was largely based on expert opinion. However, this case took considerable
time of the various government authorities including MoEF, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports,
Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, Government of Delhi and DDA as all had to file
separate counter affidavits dealing with all the subjects including the apprehensions about the alleged
damage to the ecology of the Yamuna riverbed, floodplain and other environmental hazards.
Avoidable Development Cost

2.17
As brought out in the preceding paragraphs, the process of regularization of the current site
for development of the Games Village took considerable time and Government also had to bear
possibly avoidable development cost of about
633.06 crore towards removing/mitigating inter alia
transportation bottlenecks and noise pollution, which was highlighted by Mr. Mark Fennel, President,
CGF. Details of such expenditure are as under:
Particulars
Additional Land requirement
Expenditure
( in crore)
Comments
21.34 DDA/ Ministry of Urban Development negotiated

with the Government of Uttar Pradesh the purchase
of land measuring 31.542 acres
Bund Road
13.39 Widening and strengthening of the bund road

between NH-24, Railway line near Akshardham
temple
Construction of flyover on the

intersection of NH-24 and
bund road near the Games
Village
90.77 The proposal for construction of the flyover was
th
rejected by DUAC vide their letter dated 29

October, 2007 stating that keeping in view the short
duration of the games with the volume of traffic and
also with the Noida mode interchange which was
Page 18
Noise Barrier
Elevated road over Barapulla

Nullah
Extra Piles driven

(proportionate cost)
TOTAL
2.17
4.84
approved and likely to be commissioned by 2010, the

traffic during the games could be managed with
suitable traffic management interventions.
A copy of the Letter from DUAC is at Relevant
Document 10.
The CGF COCOM raised issue related to noise
management at the selected site on account of
railway line running close to the proposed village and
the construction of flyover at the proposed
th
intersection. OC had raised this issue in the 8 GOM
meeting and recommended change of Games Village
location. LG indicated that the change of site would
not be possible. However, it was agreed that the
issue of noise pollution would be taken care of.
In order to mitigate the issue of noise, noise barriers
were constructed on the side of the flyover and
temporary noise barrier was constructed along the
railway line.
A copy of the relevant minutes of the GoM meeting is
at Relevant Document 11.
440.00 As per the Chief Minister, Delhis submission to the

GOM, the said flyover did not have any legacy value
after it ceased to achieve its objective of connectivity
of the Games Village to the Jawaharlal Nehru
Stadium. However, the same was constructed as the
decision for locating the Games Village was cited as
an irreversible decision on account of limited time
available before the commencement of the Games.
A Copy of the letter from the Chief Minister is at
Relevant Document 12.
62.72 This expenditure relates to the extra piling work done

by the project developer (M/s Emaar MGF
Construction Pvt. Ltd.) due to soil conditions of the
selected site. As against an approximate figure of
2850 piles, approximately 14060 piles were driven for
the structure of the residential complex.
A copy of the letter from Emaar MGF giving the piles
actually driven as against the estimates is at Relevant
Document 13.
633.06
Based on the review of the documents and discussions with the DDA officials, the HLC is of the
view that various options regarding suitable site for Games Village were not adequately examined and
Page 19

documented, which indicates lack of informed decision making process. The site recommended by the
then LG was accepted by OC, CGF, Cabinet and GoM at its face value. In fact, several steps had to be
taken later to regularize the site for the purpose of development of the Games Village.
2.18
The site, inter alia, had a number of constraints with respect to zoning, land ownership,
Akshardham temple interface and transportation / access issues apart from the fact that it was located
close to the Yamuna river. The flooding of the basements of the newly constructed residential towers
in August September 2010, following heavy rainfall in Delhi served to highlight the potential danger
that could be posed by Natures fury to buildings constructed in this fragile and vulnerable location.
Page 20
Chapter 3: Planning and Bidding

Planning
3.1
It is evident from records that the site for the Games Village had been identified in May 2003
itself and had been favourably commented upon by the Evaluation Commission of the CGF in its Report
forwarded to all Commonwealth Games Associations in October 2003 ahead of the crucial vote for
selection of Host City for CWG 2010 in November 2003. However, there is nothing on record to suggest
that DDA undertook any activity relating to the development of Games Village at the identified site
during the entire year 2004.
Box: 3 Conclusions of Evaluation Commission regarding Games Village
Based on the information provided by Delhi and independent expert analysis the Evaluation
Commission has concluded the following in relation to the Village Plans.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
More detailed planning is required. However, the undertakings of Delhi provide sufficient
comfort at this stage that a suitable Village will be developed.
When constructing a new site to act as a Village the planning for Games Operations Overlay is
a major undertaking and is a significant financial commitment. The Village will require a large
amount of physical space to support the operations of offices, logistical, and athlete service
areas. The supply and fitout of these spaces will be additional to the cost of constructing the
actual housing stock. The Commission, while provided comfort by the role of the DDA,
stressed the need for Delhi to ensure that there is sufficient clarity as between the DDA and
the future Organising Committee (and now the Bid Committee) to ensure that the Games
times Operations Overlay is adequately financed.
Having an extra capacity of upto 2,500 bed spaces does not adversely affect the operation of
the Village providing it does not cause excessive operational expenditure. It may be possible
to use some of the surplus spaces for supporting CGA offices and other Village operational
functions.
Some services (dining facility/capacity) may be over-scoped however this can be adjusted
during more detailed planning.
The configuration of bedrooms will be critical to determining if these housing requirements
can be met in an operationally sound manner and needs to be contemplated in the planning
process.
The proximity of the Village to the airport, city and the venues is excellent and will allow all
athletes to live in one Village.
Page 21

Delay in finalizing Development Strategy
3.2
GOM in its 4th meeting held on 17th March, 2005 instructed DDA to make available two or three
strategy options to develop the Games Village for the consideration of the GOM. Accordingly, DDA on
19th April, 2005 submitted the concept paper which provided for the accommodation for 7000 athletes
and officials in the residential zone which could be utilized post Games as hotels, hostels / apartments.
A copy of the concept paper is set out as Relevant Document 14.
3.3
It has been stated that DDA held detailed deliberations with almost all major real estate
developers, NHAI, Ministry of Urban Development and Planning Commission before they finalized the
PPP structure of the project. According to DDA officials, the decision to adopt the PPP mode for
developing the Commonwealth Games Village was taken keeping in view constraints of scale, time,
quality, specifications and availability of 4000 rooms during the Games period. DDA was of the view
that it was not possible to develop the residential facility through other options such as auction of land
or self development.
3.4
Subsequently, GOM in its 6th meeting held on 8th September, 2005 directed DDA to prepare
three options for the Games Village including the option relating to its possible use as Games Village
for Asian Games 2014, in consultation with Organizing Committee (OC). Vice Chairman, DDA made a
presentation to the GOM in its 7th meeting held on 27th September, 2005 wherein it was proposed that
the facilities would be developed under the Public-Private-Partnership framework to ensure
commercial viability. Further, the OC was asked to complete the consultation process with regard to
the Games Village and venues by 15th October 2005, after discussion with the stakeholders and submit
their views to the Ministry for placing them before the GOM for consideration.
3.5
GOM finally decided in the 9th meeting held on 4th January, 2006 that the Games Village would
be developed on the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model. A copy of the GoM decision is at
Annexure 2.
3.6
Thereafter, DDA engaged M/s. Pricewaterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. (PwC) on 16th June 2006 to
provide expert advice and consultation services with respect to the development of the Games Village
under the PPP model. The report was submitted by the consultants in August 2006.
Page 22
Box: 4 Why PPP?

The reasons for taking the decision to develop Commonwealth Games Village in Public Private Partnership
mode by DDA are unclear.
DDA was and is the premier agency undertaking Housing schemes in Delhi and reportedly has a 2/3 rd market
share. Its specialization lies in design, development and construction of housing projects for all sections of
society. It had developed the Asian Games Village for accommodating athletes and officials during 1982 Asian
Games.
DDA reportedly had huge cash reserves. Thus, it had the expertise and the funds to develop the
Commonwealth Games Village. It had zeroed in on the site and had also been identified as the Nodal Agency
for developing the Games Village by the Union Cabinet in September 2003 itself.
Thus, it defies logic why it did not initiate action in this regard in early 2004 and decided to adopt PPP mode
when there was no precedent in the real estate sector and wherein DDA had no expertise.
3.7
Thus, it is clear that there was unacceptable delay in formulating a strategy to develop the
Games Village and almost three years were lost even after the site had been finalized in the year 2003
itself.
3.8
This delay in planning for the Games Village did not leave any room for addressing
contingencies in an effective manner. As the subsequent events revealed, grave consequence of poor
planning was witnessed in more areas than one. Some instances are
Even when there was extremely poor response to the RFP from reputed developers who
felt that the time period for project completion was too tight, DDA could not explore
alternatives;
DDA had to be content with selection of a project developer even when there was only
a single successful bidder who had no past record of actual completion of any
residential project in India.
3.9
DDA had to succumb to the demands of the Project Developer for funding the project.
Based on the planned timeline, the total time available for the project development from the
date of signing of the Agreement was 30 months (September 2007 March 2010).
Page 23

An Artists impression of the Residential Towers in Commonwealth Games Village, Delhi
Bidding Process for selection of the Project Developer

3.11
The selection of the Project Developer (PD) under the PPP model was based on a two-stage
tendering process.
(1) Short-listing of the qualified developers through inviting expression of interest from
interested parties
(2) Inviting detailed proposal from shortlisted developers
3.12
The timelines for the bidding process and selection of the project developer is set out below:
Particulars
Date
Comments
Request for Qualification (RFQ)
4th Dec., 2006
During the process a pre-bid meeting was

conducted by DDA to clarify any doubts of
developers and invite suggestions Over 30
developers participated.
Last Date for submission of RFQ
12th
2007
January, 15 bidders submitted their response by the
Page 24

Particulars
Date
Comments
last date and time.

Short listing of Bidders
19th
2007
Request for Proposal (RFP)
24th April, 2007
RFP issued. A Copy of the RFP is at Relevant

Document 15.
Pre Bid Meeting
15th May, 2007
Pre Bid meeting with Qualified Parties.
Last Date for receiving Bids
25th May, 2007
Relaxation of terms of RFP
7th June, 2007
Addendum to RFP document
8th June, 2007
No bid was submitted by the submission

date. Last date extended to 15th June, 2007
Relaxation of some of the terms of the RFP by
the High Powered Committee
Addendum to RFP document issued by DDA
incorporating the relaxations agreed to in the
meeting of HPC on 7th June.
January, After evaluation by the committee formed

for this purpose, 11 parties were qualified
and notified by DDA.
Revised Last Date for submission 15th June, 2007

of Bids
Opening of Bids & Report of
Technical Evaluation Committee
15th June, 2007
Issue of LOI
5th July, 2007
Signing of PDA
14th September,
2007
Two bids submitted post the relaxation

M/s DLF Ltd. And M/s Emaar MGF
Construction Pvt. Ltd.;
Bid of M/s DLF Ltd. Bid was found nonresponsive and hence disqualified. Only ONE
developer qualified Consortium of Emaar
MGF
DDA issued LOI to Emaar MGF.
DDA signed the PDA with Emaar MGF
The above stated sequence of events highlights the poor response to the proposed project by
experienced Developers and, finally, there was only a single valid bid for the project.
3.13
During the Pre Bid Meeting held on 15th May, 2007, several queries were raised by the
prospective Bidders and the clarifications issued by DDA on the same during the Pre-Bid Meeting along
with concessions announced in the Addendum are represented in the Table below and in Para 3.13:
Page 25
S.No. Question Raised
Clarifications
provided
Subsequent changes
incorporated in
Addendum to RFP/
concession provided to
Emaar MGF
Compensation for delay in Specific

reference
milestone completion should made to Annexure - 3
be based on fair assessment
of delay & causes &
Developer alone should not
be held liable
Compensation for delay

was lowered and was
refundable to the PD after
completion
of
the
milestone.
Suggestion to lower the No specific reply given Lowered thereafter vide

penalty amounts as per by
DDA,
only Addendum to RFP issued
suggestions
reference is made to by DDA on 8.6.2007.
the
concerned
Annexure & Clauses
Request to extend the first

milestone considering the
extensive work involved &
the delay that could occur
due to the monsoon season.
Further the request clearly
laid out that such extension
may not delay any further
milestones.
DDA extended the

time for completion of
first milestone from
D+120 days to D+150
days.
Timelines were extended

further after starting the
construction
of
the
Project.
Request for extension of

time limit of the milestone
for
construction
&
completion of the Mock-up
Unit.
DDA extended the

time for completion of
first milestone from
D+120 days to D+150
days.
The level of achievement

of first 2 Milestones was
relaxed by the Addendum
to RFP.
Clarifications
regarding
layout and construction work
w.r.t filling of earth &
conceptual clarity
DDA specified no
earth filling is required
&
referred
to
structural
drawings
and
other
architectural material.
Page 26
S.No. Question Raised
Clarifications
provided
Subsequent changes
incorporated in
Addendum to RFP/
concession provided to
Emaar MGF
Number
of
returning Please refer to Section Approved thereafter vide
performance
security II, Instructions to Addendum to RFP issued
payments may be increased Bidders, Clause E
by DDA.
in terms of achieving every 2
milestones, so that it reduces
the burden on the PD in
terms of paying interest to
the banks.
It will be noticed from the Table above that several critical suggestions made at the time of the Pre-Bid
meeting with 11 selected / qualified bidders were later relaxed and the Addendum was issued on 8th
June, 2007, which was just seven days prior to the revised last date for submission of bid. The period
provided for submission of bids, after the Addendum had been issued, appears to be inadequate.
Changes in Request for Proposal (RFP)

3.14 In its meeting dated 7 t h June, 2007, following important relaxations were made
by the High Powered Committee (HPC) and major modifications were made in the RFP
document, which are as under :
Percentage share of DDA in the total number of apartments was reduced from 50% to
33.3%
Sharing methodology block by block
Bank guarantee for performance security reduced to 400 crore from 500 crore
Upfront amount remained at minimum of 300 crore but payment schedule relaxed.
First two Milestones relaxed.
Penalty for delay in achievement of Milestones was relaxed from 25 lakh to 20 lakh
per day after first 15 days of delay.
Deletion of third penalty slab of 50 lakh per day after 30 days of delay
Page 27

A copy of the minutes of the HPC is set out as Annexure 3.
3.15
It may be noted that even the modified provisions in the RFP did not lead to active participation
and only two bids were received. One of the two bids received from M/s DLF Ltd. (DLF) was found to
be non-responsive on grounds of it being conditional and, hence, rejected by the Evaluation
committee. A copy of the bid (letter) submitted by DLF is set out as Annexure 4. It is pertinent to note
that against the reserve price of 300 crore for the land in the RFP, the amount quoted by the single
bidder was only 321 crore. It is very likely that in case competitive bidding had taken place, this
amount would have been substantially higher. To that extent, DDA has been a loser.
3.16
At this stage there was no serious deliberation in the DDA for evaluating the capability of the
project developer to deliver on the contractual obligations considering the fact that Emaar MGF had no
past record to demonstrate the delivery of any successful residential project in India. Based on the
Draft Red Herring prospectus issued by Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. (Parent company) on 30th
September, 20109, the company was at that time yet to complete any residential project in India.
3.17
A due diligence exercise based on common sense and financial prudence was of prime
importance as the timely completion of this project was critical to the organization of the
Commonwealth Games. The HLC was informed by the Finance Member, DDA that most developers
having extensive experience in the Indian market were of the opinion that the timelines were very
tight and the financial terms were not attractive, the penalty clauses were very severe and not in line
with market practice.
3.18
Given the circumstances described above, it was imperative that DDA should have put in place
a contingency plan to mitigate the risk of the developer failing to deliver on the Agreement.
3.19
The HLC, based on the sequence of events, finds that while the entire competitive bidding
process evoked poor response, no other option for the development of Games Village was seriously
explored before 2006. Even within the selected solution, further options to attract a larger base of
experienced developers were not explored. The HLC also finds it intriguing that DDA did not deliberate
Extracts are at Relevant Document 16.
Page 28

or seriously consider the option of developing the Games village by itself, one of the two options
recommended by its consultants.
3.20
If the objective was not to take on the financial burden or financial risk of the project, then DDA
failed to achieve its objectives as they ended up doing both infusing funds to complete the project
and carrying the financial risks of the project as explained in subsequent chapters.
Page 29
Page 30
Chapter 4: Project Development Agreement

and Execution
Public Private Partnership (PPP)
4.1
The Report of the PPP Sub-Group on Social Sector by Planning Commission states that a Public-
Private-Partnership (PPP) provides an opportunity for private sector participation in financing,

designing, construction and operation & maintenance of public sector programmes and projects.
4.2
Public-Private-Partnership or PPP is a mode of implementing government programmes /
schemes in partnership with the private sector. The term private in PPP encompasses all nongovernment agencies such as the corporate sector, voluntary organizations, self-help groups,
partnership firms, individuals and community based organizations. PPP, moreover, subsumes all the
objectives of the service being provided earlier by the Government, and is not intended to compromise
on them10.
4.3
PPP is an approach, under which services are delivered by the private sector (non-profit / for-
profit organizations) while the responsibility for providing the service rests with the Government11.
4.4
To sum up, for this project the defining element of a PPP model is that the private party would
bring in technical, financial and project management skills and the public agency would monitor,
ensure accountability and timely completion of the project. The financial risk was to be carried by the
private party.
Project Development Agreement (PDA)

4.5
The PDA, which was said to have been modeled on the approved PPP concession agreement,
was signed on 14th September, 200712 between DDA and M/s Emaar MGF Construction Private
Limited.
10
11
Report of the PPP Sub-Group on Social Sector by Planning Commission, GoI; published in 2004
Report of the PPP Sub-Group on Social Sector by Planning Commission, GoI; published in 2004
Page 31

4.6
The HLCs review of the PDA showed that several key clauses related to accountability of the
private developer and subsequent monitoring mechanisms were not included in the PDA. Such clauses
form a part of the standard Model Concession Agreement as prescribed by the Planning Commission
and are extensively used in most infrastructure projects (port, railways etc.) executed on the PPP
model. Considering the fact that this project was the first of its kind in the real estate sector and
especially for DDA, prudence demanded inclusion of risk mitigation norms in the Agreement. The
exclusion of such clauses provided little or no recourse to DDA to detect early signals of problems in
the development of Games Village. Ironically, the PDA included a non-intrusion clause that prevented
the DDA from effectively monitoring this critical project for the Commonwealth Games 2010.
Deviations from Model Concession Agreement

4.7
The key clauses in accordance with the Model Concession Agreement which were not included
in the PDA and its implications are set out below:
Escrow account The clause for maintaining an Escrow account is understood to be

critical for all PPP agreements. An escrow account plays a critical role to ring fence the
funds for the project. This was particularly important in this project as the PDA allowed
the sale of apartments during the period of construction, the proceeds of which were to
be used to fund the project. Therefore, a sound monitoring system should have been
provided to ensure that all revenues accruing from the sale of apartments were
available for completion of the project.
Absence of an escrow account effectively restricted the ability of the DDA to monitor
financial parameters and periodic transfers of funds by PD to Emaar MGF Land, the
parent company.
Audit and Accounts - The importance of the Audit and Accounts clause is that it enables
the public party to have access to the books of accounts of the project and if required to
12
A copy of PDA is at Relevant Document 17
Page 32

audit the accounts of the project. This is a tool used for effective monitoring and control
over the project executed under the PPP model. Also, in the CGV project this would
have enabled DDA to get the actual cost of construction when fixing the price for
purchase of apartments.
A copy of the Model Concession Agreement recommended by the Planning Commission with respect
to the two clauses is at Relevant Document 18.
Box: 5 Public Private Partnership in Commonwealth Games Village Project?

DDA decided to develop the Commonwealth Games Village Project in the PPP mode. The Project
Development Agreement was signed with the selected Project Developer, Emaar MGF on 14 th
September, 2007.
The way this PDA was executed by DDA accorded a new meaning to Public Private Partnership
altogether. Here, finally
all risk was borne by DDA;

all comforts, legal and financial, were provided to Project Developer by DDA;
the Developer was able to recoup his investment even before completion of the project;
defects had to be rectified by the DDA;
DDA had to bear the cost of blocked capital.
Risk Assessment & Mitigation

4.8
Risk assessment and mitigation measures are standard pre-requisites in Project Management
especially where outputs have to be delivered within a prescribed time frame.

4.9
DDA failed to undertake risk assessment exercise at several stages of decision making related to
the development of the Games Village including evaluation of options, selection of a credible
Developer and ensuring accountability of the Developer.
4.10
The execution of a PPP contract does not reduce the responsibility and accountability of the
public agency and public servants concerned. On the other hand, it places substantial responsibility on
them to see that the arrangement succeeds in safeguarding public interest by managing the PPP
economically, efficiently and effectively. The absence of the monitoring provisions in the PDA reflects
Page 33

the lack of understanding of the risks involved as evidenced by inadequate risk management process
on the part of DDA. It may be noted that the occurrence of certain future events, primarily the Bailout
package to the PD, could have been anticipated and pre-empted. To illustrate, the Project
Development Agreement could have included the clause regarding escrow account. Such an account
normally requires maintaining of a defined average fund over a period of time. Absence of this
account resulted in DDA not detecting early signs of possible financial crisis faced by the PD and
thereby afforded inadequate time for a more deliberated option under the situation. Further, the
escrow account would have ensured transparency in the project financing as all project related
revenue and expenditures could have been properly monitored.
4.11
In the absence of risk assessment and mitigation strategy, DDA could not take remedial steps
for any potential or actual failure of the developer. Instead, at every instance, the Developer stage
managed situations exerting pressure on DDA to take decisions that eventually turned out to be
weighed in favor of the PD.
Execution of the PDA

4.12
The PDA recognized 9 milestones in the execution of the Project. Various committees were
constituted to monitor the progress and provide constant quality assurance with regards to the
project. Three major committees were constituted by DDA namely:
Monitoring Committee
Stadia Committee
High Powered Committee
Third Party Quality Assurance by CBRI, Roorkee was also put in place.
Monitoring Committee
4.13
The Monitoring Committee formed by DDA included representatives of Emaar MGF and DDA as
members and was chaired by an Independent Engineer who was unanimously elected by the two
members.
Page 34

4.14
The committee held 32 meetings over a span of 29 months from its inception on 30 th January,
2008 till the last meeting held on 31st July 2010. The committee was mandated to meet every month to
review the progress of the project, resolve any issues, and facilitate work on the project and record
completion of milestones.
Stadia Committee
4.15
The mandate prescribed for the Stadia Committee was to conduct regular meetings to address
all issues relating to the development of the Games Village site. The meetings were held weekly to
assess the progress of the project and to resolve issues relating to the project site and flyover,
residential facility, temporary overlays, practice venues etc.
4.16
These meetings were held on a weekly basis till August 2010, after which daily meetings were
held in view of the directive given by DDA.

4.17
The committee was constituted by the VC, DDA and was empowered to find and ensure rapid
resolution of all issues relating to the Commonwealth Games.

Third Party Quality Assurance by CBRI, Roorkee
4.18
The PDA also prescribed regular inspection and supervision of the project by a Third Party
Quality Assurer (QA) to verify the quality of construction and carry out regular supervision of
construction work carried out by the PD independently of both parties to the Agreement. The PDA
required that such appointment be within 6 months of entering into the Agreement, and accordingly
CBRI, Roorkee were appointed.
4.19
As per contract, the QA was required to inspect the site on a monthly basis and thereafter
provide Monthly Quality Assurance Reports to DDA and the PD. These reports served as a benchmark
for DDA engineers and were forwarded to the PD, who was required to comply with the specific issues
raised therein. In response, the PD was required to furnish Action-Taken reports on such issues and
to rectify the structural & quality lapses. The reports were supported by photographs & other
technical data.
Page 35

Ineffective Monitoring
4.20
Based on the documentation available it has been noted that there was a delay of 2 months
from the date of signing of PDA and the actual date of appointment of the QA. Further, the frequency
of the reports was reduced from monthly to quarterly effective January 2009 without any formal
communication to this effect from DDA.
4.21
Review of the Minutes of the Meetings held reveal that the issues and concerns regarding the
development of the Games Village were documented in a perfunctory manner. The first meeting of the
Monitoring Committee took place on 5th April 2008, after the Project Developer had missed his first
milestone and sought revisions13.
4.22
The oversight and monitoring functions by the committees set up by DDA were ineffective as
several defects and quality issues relating to the construction of the residential zone by the Project
Developer continued to persist.
Milestones
4.23
The Project Milestones were laid down in the RFP issued for the project. It was stipulated that
these timelines need to be adhered to and severe liability/ penalty shall be levied in case of default or
deviation from such dates. However, as the project execution progressed, the project timelines were
regularly revised at the behest of the PD and these were approved by DDA without documentary
support or evidentiary proof necessitating such revisions.
Non Levy of Liquidated Damages

4.24
Although PDA did not provide for extension of milestones, DDA extended timelines for
achievement of milestones and did not impose penalty as per the PDA. On account of such decisions,
DDA has foregone 81.45 crore in favor of Emaar MGF. Details are set out in the Table below:
13
See Minutes of the First Meeting of Monitoring Committee placed at Relevant Document 19.
Page 36
S.No.
Milestone
Original Date
of
completion
Actual Date of
completion
Foundation work (including

Plinth Level) up to Plinth
level for 33% of blocks
Structure work up to G+2
level
Structure work up to terrace
level, with associated
electrical works & B.W. up to
G+4 level
Completion of brick work up
to terrace level & internal
plaster, flooring, etc. for 5
levels,
with
associated
electrical works
Completion of flooring &
furnishing, with associated
electrical works of all blocks
all levels upto terrace level
External finish of all blocks &
all levels
Completion of all electric
work including lifts, ESS etc.
& completion of UGR/ Pump
Rooms/ Lifts/ Pump sets etc.
Completion
of
all
development work including
landscaping
11th Feb,
2008
11th May,
2008
90
17.25
11th May,
2008
07th Nov,
2008
10th Aug,2008
91
17.40
29th Jan.,
2009
83
15.85
06th May,
2009
15th Sept,
2009
132
25.65
02nd Nov,
2009
02nd Dec, 2009
30
5.25
01st Jan,
2010
31st Jan, 2010
01st Jan, 2010
31st Jan, 2010
02nd Mar,
2010
13th Dec, 2010
286 DDA has filed

for recovery as
the extension
was
not
approved
Project Completion Date
01st April,
2010
13th Dec 2010
254 DDA has filed

for recovery as
the extension
was
not
approved
2
3
6
7
TOTAL
Delay
(Number
of days)
Liquidated
damages
foregone ( in
crore)
81.45
Page 37

4.25
It is evident from above that nearly all achievement dates were delayed barring Milestones 6 &
7. It is pertinent to note that all delays, except Milestones 8 & 9, were permitted by DDA without
levying liquidated damages as provided in the PDA. DDA has issued a claim letter to Emaar MGF in
October 2010 setting out the recovery of liquidated damages on account of delays related to
milestones 8 and 9 alone as per the PDA14.
Construction of excess FAR
4.26
The site selected for the CWG Village had an approved FAR of 1.67 initially, which was increased
to an FAR of 2.00 by the Delhi City Master Plan 2021 which came into force effective 07 th February,
2007. The Project was thus approved with a built up FAR of 2,05,140 square meters by the Building
Section of DDA on 18th March, 200815.
4.27
However, an actual FAR of 2,30,689.33 square meters was built as per the plan submitted by
Emaar MGF for obtaining Completion certificate from DDA. The Developer, therefore, constructed an
FAR of 25,549.33 square meters in excess of the approved plans. This was almost 12.5% more than the
approved FAR. This was in the knowledge of the Monitoring Committee of DDA at least from January
2009 (See item 3 in Table above) and also the top officers of DDA including Vice Chairman and LG
from April, 2009 when the Bailout Package was being finalized.
4.28
Again, belatedly DDA took a stand on this matter by issuing a Sealing - cum- Demolition notice
only on 20th August, 2010 in respect of the excess constructed area. Reacting to this notice, the PD had
filed a case with the Appellate Tribunal of MCD (Order dated 26 th October, 2010 of Appeal No. 549 &
550/ATMCD/2010) which ruled in favour of the PD and advised them to file for a new completion
certificate. The Tribunal also stated that such lapse is compoundable by DDA within a limit of 5% of the
permissible FAR on payment of prescribed charges by the PD. A copy of the judgment is at Relevant
14
15
See Annexure 5.
See Relevant Document 20.
Page 38

Document 21. DDA has filed an appeal against the Order of the Tribunal in the Court of LG and the case
is still pending.
4.29
The issue of delayed milestones, approvals to waive liquidated damages without justification on
record and construction of excess FAR point to the ineffectiveness of the monitoring regime set up by
the DDA and complicity of DDA officials. These issues incidentally were NEVER placed on the agenda of
any of the meetings of the Monitoring Committee by any of the several officers specifically stationed at
the project site by DDA.
Box: 6 Actual Ground Coverage & Floor Area of Commonwealth Games Village
(in sq. m.)
A. Total (Residential Towers + Club /Community Centre
i.
Permitted Ground Coverage (as per PDA) =
36,663.89
ii.
Sanctioned Ground Coverage (27,664.19 + 1438.13) =
29,102.32
iii.
Sanctioned Floor Area (203087.25 + 2052.75) =
2,05,140.00
iv.
Existing Ground Coverage (225900.70 + 3032.06) =
2,28,932.76
v.
Extra Floor Area constructed beyond sanction limit =
23,792.76
B. Residential Towers:
i.
Existing Floor Area (considered in FAR calculation) at site =
2,25,900.70
ii.
Sanctioned Floor Area (FAR) =
2,03,087.25
iii.
Constructed Floor Area (FAR) under DDAs possession =
1,34,819.48
Constructed FAR in respect of 11 Towers (1/3rd ) as per PDA =
73,771.90
Constructed FAR in respect of 333 flats purchased by DDA subsequently =61,047.53
iv.
Total Floor Area in possession of Developer:
Balance sanctioned FAR under Developers possession (ii iii) = 68,267.77
v.
Extra Floor Area =
22,813.45
C. Club / Community Area
i.
Existing Floor Area of the Club =
3032.06
ii.
Sanctioned Floor Area =
2052.75
iii.
Extra Floor Area =
979.31
(Source: Data provided by DDA)
Page 39
Box: 7 Salient Features of the Games Village at a Glance
No. of residential towers - 34
No. of 2/3/4/5 bedroom apartments 1168
Date of signing Project Development Agreement 14.09.2007
Scheduled Date for Completion 31st March, 2010
Actual Date of Completion 13th December, 2010
No. of residential apartments to be shared between DDA and Emaar

MGF as per PDA in the ratio 1:2
Ratio of flats to be shared between DDA & Emaar MGF after Bailout
Package 1:0.63
No. of apartments finally allocated to DDA after Bailout Package 715
No. of apartments finally remained with Emaar MGF 453
Total cash infusion by DDA in Games Village Project
Total cash infusion by Emaar MGF in Games Village Project
728.89 crore
595
crore
No. of apartments sold by Emaar MGF till 28th December, 2010 - 426
Money raised through sale of 426 apartments by Emaar MGF 1354

crore
Page 40
Chapter 5: Bailout Package and Release of

Funds
Background
5.1
The PDA did not provide for any financial assistance to the PD. However, on the persistent pleas
of the PD and in order to ensure that the Games Village project could be completed within the planned
timeframe, DDA entered into a separate Agreement with Emaar MGF to provide financial assistance.
Brewing Trouble
5.2
The signs of inability of Emaar MGF to complete the Games Village surfaced as early as January
2008. These included:

a. According to the PDA the lead partner of the consortium (Emaar PJSC) was required to
bring in the equity (26%) within six months from the date of issue of Letter of Intent
(LOI); while the LOI is dated 4th July 200716, the equity was brought in only on 8th
February 2008, a delay of 31 days from the agreed deadline date.
b. According to the PDA, the date for achievement of first milestone was 11 th February
2008. Emaar MGF sought extension till 11th May, 08 and the same was granted by the
HPC on 21st April 2008. The first milestone was achieved on 11th May 2008. This
situation was more worrisome considering DDA had extended a relaxation to the
Developer in the form of permission to begin the construction work at the site while the
PDA was not executed. Even though the PDA was signed only on 14.09.2007, DDA
handed over the site to Emaar MGF on 20th August 2007. A copy of the minutes of HPC
meeting dated 21st April, 2008 is set out as Annexure 6.
16
Page 41

c. In April 2008, Emaar MGF indicated financial problems to DDA and requested pre-
ponement of allocation of flats. The key premise of Emaar MGF for assistance at this
stage was its inability to raise funds via advances from the sale of apartments to
customers, due to non-allotment of the flats. It may be highlighted that the allotment of
apartments between DDA and Emaar MGF based on the apportionment formula as per
the PDA was scheduled for 14th June 2008 and such a demand for early allotment was
therefore not warranted.
Chronology of Events leading to Bailout Package

5.3
A chronology of events leading to the signing of the Bailout Agreement between DDA and the
Project Developer, Emaar MGF, is as under:
S. No.
Date
Event
3 r d November, 2008
Decision of Delhi High Court 17
5 t h December, 2008
Letter of Emaar MGF to DDA seeking financial

assistance 18
Meeting of Emaar MGF with Secretary, MoUD
Shri Sanjay Malhotra , on behalf of Emaar MGF

addressed a letter 19 to Secretary, MoUD wherein they,
inter alia, mentioned that due to the recent directions
given by the Honble High Court of Delhi in the matter
of the CGV project, there has been an adverse fallout
on the project in terms of banks/lenders to the projects
and the customers (present and potential) raising
concerns on the further development of the project.
DDA was requested to assist the project by provid ing
funding support, which is most critical for further
17
See extracts at Annexure 7

See Annexure 8
19
See Annexure 9
18
Page 42
progress.
4
10 t h
2008
December,
Shri Sanjay Malhotra , on behalf of Emaar MGF

addressed another letter 20 to Secretary, MoUD
enclosing requests made to DDA as requested by your
office
10 t h
2008
December,
Secretary, MoUD forward ed details of assistance sought

by Emaar MGF group to Shri Arun Ramanathan, Finance
Secretary, GoI for appropriate facilitation. 21
11 t h
2008
December,
Director (DD), MoUD sought comments of DDA on issues

raised in letters of Sanjay Malhotra, Chief Operating
Officer, Emaar MGF. 22
18 t h
2008
December,
Pr. Comm.(CWG) inform ed COO, Emaar MGF that in the

light of Clause 8.8 of the Project Development
Agreement, their request for financial assistance cannot
be accepted . 23
10 t h February, 2009
17 t h February, 2009
Issue discussed in Meeting of COS.
10
12 t h March, 2009
LG provided in principle approval for 25
Emaar MGF in its letter to DDA sought return of 321 crore as loan
at nominal rate of interest or suggested that DDA buy 250
apartments keeping in view the requirement of funds at that
stage24.
Outright purchase of apartments by DDA from PD

Constitution of Committee with experts from NBCC, CPWD,
SBI Capital and DDA to determine the total funding
requirement and the purchase price of the apartments.
In response to the PDs request, vide letter dated February 27,
20
See Annexure 10
See Annexure 11
22
See Annexure 12
23
See Annexure 13
24
25
See Annexure 14
21
Page 43
2009 of advance of Rs.150 crore, a part payment of Rs.100

crore may be made under a MoU, which would be adjusted at
a later stage once the cost of the apartments to be bought as
determined.
11
16 t h March, 2009
PC (CWG) wrote a letter to Secretary, MoUD on the

issue of financial assistance to the Project Developer. 26
Reference is made to economic slowdown.
12
18 t h March, 2009
Constitution of Valuation Committee
13
19 t h March, 2009
Valuation Committee briefed by PC (CWG), DDA
14
25 t h March, 2009
LG ordered that in providing the advance of Rs.100

crore, financial interest of DDA should be fully secured
15
26 t h March, 2009
DDA asked the PD to provide a Bank Guarantee of

Rs.100 crore valid till the date of finalization of the
purchase agreement, in addition to providing an
unconditional corporate guarantee, encumberance
certificate from ROC for 75 apartments proposed to be
kept at the disposal of DDA and action plan for utilizing
the advance amount.
16
26 t h March, 2009
PD expressed its inability to provide a BG of Rs.100

crore and offer unconditional corporate guarantee to
DDA
17
30 t h March, 2009
Shri Mukesh Dham, wrote to Secretary, MoUD wherein

he referred to their previous discussions and the
funding challenges being faced by the CGV Project due
to the litigation on the project as well as economic
slowdown. He also complained thatA committee was
formed on 21 s t March 2009 to submit its report within 7
days. We have been providing all the information
required by them, but to date report has not been
submitted by the Committee. 27
26
27
See Annexure 15
See Annexure 16
Page 44
18
30 t h March 2009
Note sent by Secretary, MoUD to VC, DDA seeking

details of resolution worked out so that timely
implementation of project does not suffer. 28
19
6 t h April, 2009
VC, DDA sent a detailed Note to Secretary, MoUD. 29
20
9 t h April, 2009
Recommendation of Valuation Committee received.
21
15 t h April, 2009
Constitution of Negotiation Committee
22
22 n d April, 2009
Emaar MGF wrote to LG 30
23
23 r d April, 2009
Meeting held in chamber of VC where Financial experts

were called and asked to provide for 15% Developers
margin on total Project Cost and 10% as cost of capital
towards the funds invested by Emaar MGF and finally
arrived at a rate of Rs.11,055.64/ - per sft . 31
24
24 t h April, 2009
Meeting held under chairmanship of LG which is

attended by Secretary and Joint Secretary, MoUD and
VC, Finance Member & Engineer Member, DDA which
decided the purchase price of flats under Bailout
Package.
25
5 t h May, 2009
Bailout Agreement signed.
No CWG Village Bogey

5.4
In November - December 2008 and January February 2009, Emaar MGF made repeated
requests to DDA as well as Ministry of Urban Development to provide financial assistance for
completion of the project. Such requests were rejected by DDA as the PDA did not provide for financial
assistance. However, in February 2009 Emaar MGF exerted pressure on DDA and cited consequence of
non-completion of the Games Village within the stipulated time period i.e. 31 st March 2010. This led to
28
See Annexure 17
See Annexure 18
30
See Annexure 19
31
See Detailed Background Note at Annexure 20
29
Page 45

a situation termed by DDA as critical which, according to the LG and Cabinet Secretary, required an
out of box solution.
5.5
In its submission to DDA and MoUD in December 2008, Emaar MGF referred to the PIL filed in
the court against the location of the Games Village stating that the litigation had caused negative
impact on the project and thereby affected its ability to raise funds for the project.
5.6
A PIL had been filed and the High Court had issued a notice on 17th July, 2007. The case came
up for hearing in the High Court only on 9th June, 2008. The High Court passed its judgment on
3.11.2008. The Court observed that any construction made or third party rights created are at the
peril and risk of the organizers / Government. DDA filed a SLP in the Supreme Court against this order.
The interim stay of the Supreme Court was dated 5 th December, 2008 which was finally disposed off on
30th July, 2009. However, at no stage did the High Court or the Supreme Court order suspension of
the work at the project site.
5.7
While HLC took note of this submission, it is of the opinion that the entire risk of execution of
the project was on the Developer and transferring the onus to DDA merely exhibited its inability to
manage the project.
5.8
In February 2009, DDA finally took serious note of the developers financial situation and its
inability to complete the project within the stipulated time. At this stage DDA, in consultation with LG
and COS, agreed to explore the possibility of financing the project. The COS in its meeting on 17 th
February, 2009 agreed that DDA could explore the option of purchase of flats with due approvals from
the competent authority.
Box: 8 Meeting of COS held on 17.02.2009
At the COS meeting held on 17th February, 2009 to review arrangements related to CWG 2010, it was noted by the
COS that the LG, Delhi had already given approval to DDA for making purchase of flats out of its own funds. Cabinet
Secretary observed that an out of box solution may have to be resorted to. It was inter alia decided that
Option of purchase of flats in the Games Village by DDA may be explored with due approvals duly obtained
from competent authorities, to help the private developer in overcoming working capital shortfall, as the
ongoing economic slowdown warrants unconventional options to be given consideration on merits. However,
proper valuation of flats should be arranged through an independent agency in a transparent manner.
It is worthwhile noting that the COS considered a decision already taken by the LG and correctly pointed out that in
such a transaction the proper valuation of flats in a transparent manner would be extremely important.
Unfortunately, this operational portion of COS decision was not ensured by DDA.
Page 46

5.9
Based on the decision taken by LG on 12th March, 2009, a Valuation Committee comprising of
representatives from HUDCO, NBCC, CPWD and DDA was formed on 18th March, 200932 to recommend
within 7 days the rate at which the flats could be purchased and the funding requirement of the
project. The Valuation Committee, in turn, engaged a Technical consultant (M/s Garg & Associates) and
a Financial consultant (M/s K N Goyal & Associates) to give expert advice on these matters. It is
observed that the Financial Consultant engaged by DDA was also the Taxation Consultant of DDA.
Hence, M/s K N Goyal & Associates cannot be regarded as independent valuer and there appears to
be a conflict of interest.
5.10
Reviewing the mandate given to the two firms appointed as the Technical and Financial
consultants, HLC is of the view that time made available was inadequate to carry out a meaningful
exercise. The Technical consultant stated to the HLC that they had to compromise on key procedures
to achieve the results within the prescribed time frame. This included independent verification of the
data provided by Emaar MGF. According to the consultants, an exercise with such a mandate would
have required a minimum time frame of two weeks.
Quantum of Bailout Package

5.11
It has been noted that the total project cost stated by the two consultants vary substantially.
The Technical expert had estimated the total construction cost at
934 crore. The rates
used were on the basis of CPWD plinth area rates which include the contractors profit and
overhead costing.
32
Expenditure on
in crore
Piling
Basement
315.00
Towers
389.00
Elevators/ Lifts
16.683
66.25
See Annexure 21
Page 47
Expenditure on
in crore
Air Conditioning
27.65
Fire Fighting
12.74
Others
16.66
Cost Escalation
63.29
Consultancy and Miscellaneous expenses
27.22
10
Total Cost of Construction
934.49
11
Development Rights to DDA
321.00
12
Total Project cost (excluding finance cost)
1255.49
The Financial consultant stated that their estimate of the total construction cost at 1266 crore was
based on the documentation made available by Emaar MGF.
#
Expenditure on
in crore
Cost of Designs, Drawings, Quality etc.
Construction Contract (*)
Land Rental to DDA
3.03
Project Overheads
34.07
Other Expenditure contribution to Resident Welfare

Association, Composition Fee for increased FAR, Post
Games repairs & maintenance etc.
24.28
Pre-construction, Project Infra, Models, Mock Unit, etc.
Total Construction Cost
Development Rights to DDA
Total Project Cost (excluding financing cost)
10
Financial cost
11
Total Project Cost (including financing cost)
31.70
1168.21
4.64
1265.93
321.00
1586.93
52.93
1639.86
Page 48

(*)The Financial consultant had stated during interview with experts of HLC that the contract of ACIL verified
by them was unsigned.
5.12 The HLC is of the opinion that project cost estimated by the two experts varied substantially;
actual cost submitted by Emaar MGF was approximately 35% higher than the valuation of the
Technical expert. This is especially important since the financial consultants submitted their project
cost based on the estimated rates as per the civil construction contract, which constituted
approximately 74% of the total project cost (excluding financial charges). The contents of the signed
copy of sub contract dated 10th July, 2008 executed by the PD with ACIL and supplied by DDA to HLC
negate the veracity /authenticity of the documentation provided to the financial consultants by
Emaar MGF to arrive at the fund requirement of the project. It is also strange that DDA did not ask
the Project Developer to provide signed copies of contracts to the Financial Consultant or to
themselves!
5.13
The summary of the Technical and Financial expert is set out below:
Particulars
Market Rate per sft (Average
selling price adjusted for 35%
increase on account of
better specifications)
Technical Expert
Financial Expert
9,720
Cost per square feet
9,382
It is interesting to note on the above summation that the cost of construction of the project is in close
proximity of the market rate duly supported by the micro market analysis and post 35% increase on
account of better specifications as available in the market!
Recommendation of Valuation Committee

5.14
The Valuation Committee, based on the reports of the consultants, recommended in their
report submitted on 9th April, 2009 that:
The apartments should be purchased at a rate within the range of
9,382
9,720 per
square feet (psf)
The total funding requirement to complete the project would be 762.26 crore
Page 49
Due cognizance should be taken of the future receipt from Emaar MGF customers.
DDA may consider providing financial assistance to Emaar MGF by way of loan which
form of funding has been requested by them.
A copy of the main report of the Valuation Committee is at Annexure 22. The Annexures and
remaining part of the report is at Relevant Document 23.
Negotiation Committee
5.15
Following the recommendations of the consultants, a Negotiation Committee comprising of
Member Finance, Chief Engineer (CWG) and Chief Accounts Officer, DDA was formed with the approval
of LG on 15.4.09 to negotiate the recommended terms of the Valuation Committee with Emaar MGF33.
5.16
The purchase rate recommended by the Valuation Committee was offered to the Developer by
the Negotiation Committee which was rejected by them. This was followed by a series of revised
rate(s) being offered to the Developer and his rejection of the same. Apparently, the Negotiation
Committee failed to achieve its objectives.
Intervention by LG
5.17
The developer, at this stage, approached the LG. Shri Shravan Gupta, Vice Chairman, Emaar
MGF, vide his letter dated 22nd April, 2009 addressed to the LG, suggested an acceptable rate of
11,000 per sft even while they rejected the rate of
10,100 per sft offered by the Negotiation
Committee. To quote:
We had a meeting with DDA today wherein they have offered a price of Rs.10,100/- per sq.ft.
against our current selling average price of Rs.13,500/- per sq.ft.
We again reiterate our request that DDA should consider a fair and reasonable margin of
overheads and profit, as is allowed to any other project developer by government agencies like
the CPWD, DDA etc. The current price of Rs.10,100/- suggests a very nominal margin of
overheads and profits being offered to us as a project developer.
Considering the critical stage of the project and our ultimate objective of ensuring timely
completion of the project in national interest, we would request for a price of Rs.11,000/- per
sq.ft. We have also submitted a staggered payment plan over the project period to the DDA.
33
Page 50

This was 1,280 higher than the rate (maximum of the range) initially recommended by the Valuation
Committee.
5.18
The HLC observed that Emaar MGF had conceded in their letter quoted above that the rate of
Rs.10,100/- per sft offered by the Negotiation Committee had a very nominal margin of overheads and
profits for them as a project developer. They indicated that a rate of Rs.11000/- per sft would be
acceptable to them. In order to accommodate the demands of Emaar MGF, Vice Chairman, DDA held a
meeting on 23.04.2009 wherein the Financial experts were also called. It was decided in the meeting
that it would be appropriate to provide for 15% Developers margin as per the industry practice on the
total project cost as had also been indicated by the Financial experts and also allow 10% return on the
cost of capital deployed. The Financial experts, furnished a revised working of Recommended Plinth
Area Rate after allowing Developers Margin @15% on total project cost and 10% towards the cost of
capital deployed.
S.No. Particulars
1
Total Project Cost
1639.86 crore
Project Overheads
34.07 crore
Sub Total (1 - 2)
1605.79 crore
Allowance towards Developers margin, overheads and 240.87 crore

Project Management Charges -15%
Total (3 + 4)
1846.66 crore
Cost of capital invested by Emaar @10%
85.78 crore
Total estimated Project Cost
1932.44 crore
Total Plinth Area
1747919.07 sft
PAR
Rs.11055.64 per sft
Source: Document from MoUD File No.3388/DDR/2007-DD VI (Vol. V)
Page 51

5.19
In the meeting held under the chairmanship of LG on 24 th April, 2009, which was attended by
the Secretary and Joint Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development among others, the following
decisions were taken:
i.
DDA may go ahead with the purchase of flats at the rate of 11,000/- per sft.
ii.
The number of flats to be purchased may accordingly be worked out keeping in view the
cash flow requirement of the project developer, so that timely completion of the entire
work as per schedule is facilitated.
iii.
Release of funds should be made on staggered monthly basis depending upon the
progress of work and actual requirement of funds.
iv.
A suitable agreement may be entered into within the project development by the DDA
to ensure that the funds released are utilized only for this project.
v.
The release of first installment to the Project Developer be done at the earliest so that
the pace of work is expedited for timely completion.
vi.
All requirements such as quality, specifications, adhering to timelines etc. will continue
to be met.
The Minutes of the Meeting are placed at Annexure 23.

5.20
The rationale for assembling selected officers and securing their endorsement to what Emaar
MGF wanted has no basis in law or administration. LG ought to have taken this matter to a meeting of
the Authority instead of securing the endorsement of his subordinates to a foregone conclusion.
Bailout Agreement
5.21
This Bailout Agreement was executed on 5th May 2009. The key covenants of the Agreement
are set out below:

DDA to purchase 333 apartments from Emaar MGF at the purchase rate of 11,000 per sft
Total consideration = 766.89 crore
Area = 697,174.55 square feet
Funds to be given in 5 installments on or before the dates agreed
Funds to be deposited in an Escrow account opened for monitoring of these funds
Page 52

Funds to be released only after certification from a financial consultant and an Independent
engineer.
A copy of the Agreement is set out as Annexure 24.
Release of Bailout Funds

5.22
The status of release of Bailout funds to Emaar MGF upto 31st May, 2010, as mentioned in their
letter of 4th June, 2010 addressed to PC (CWG), DDA34, is as under:

Installment
Due Date
Installment
Amount ( in
crore)
Payment Received Payment Received

Date
( in crore)
First
5 May, 2009
200
6 May, 2009
200
Second
15 June, 2009
150
10 July, 2009
100
2 Sept., 2009
50
19 Nov., 2009
50
5 Jan., 2010
100
Third
31 July, 2009
150
Fourth
30 Sept.,2009
150
27 March, 2010
150
Fifth
30 Nov., 2009
116.89
27 March, 2010
78.89
Total
766.89
728.89
In this letter, Emaar MGF have mentioned that they were yet to receive the balance amount of 38
crore and even sought interest payment from DDA of 43.35 crore @21% p.a. due to delay in payment
on part of DDA!
34
Page 53

Project Cost calculation
5.23
HLC was of the view that considerable light on the whole project cost would be thrown by the
sub-contract between Emaar MGF and M/s Ahluwalia Construction (India) Ltd.(Henceforth referred to
as ACIL). DDA was requested to obtain a copy from the Project Developer and this was examined by a
Consultant of HLC. The TDS returns and the Project Report submitted by the Developer to SBI while
seeking loans were also examined. The following important facts have emerged from this study:
i.
The entire construction and development work was assigned to ACIL on a Cost price basis with
a Target Price cap of 2875 per sft.
ii.
If Emaar MGF supplied certain materials, the per sft rate would get proportionately reduced.
iii.
At this rate and for a total plinth area of 26,16,878 sft , the total construction cost would work
out to
752.35 crore and with other costs like land, overheads, interest etc. the total project
cost would be 1224 crore.

iv.
The per sft cost of 2875 corresponds favourably with the rate of 2600 per sft cited by the
Project Developer in the Project Report submitted to the Bank. The amount paid to the ACIL as
reflected in the TDS returns corresponds to a construction cost of 752 crore as against 1168
crore taken into consideration by the Financial Consultant of DDA to determine the fund
requirement for completion of the CGV.
A copy of the HLC consultants report is at Annexure 25.

5.24
The following conclusions can be drawn from a review of the events leading to the DDAs
decision to purchase the apartments at the rate of 11,000 per sft. :-
Bailout Package decision not of Authority

5.25
From a perusal of the chronology of events set out above it is evident that the Bailout package
was taken to the Authority only in June 2009 after the Bailout Agreement had been signed on 5 th May,
2009 and the first tranche of 200 crore had been released. Perusal of the Agenda Notes and Minutes
of the meeting of the Authority held on 3 rd June, 2009 reveals that the Authority, which includes nonofficial members and is the competent body to take such decisions, was informed that an Agreement
has been drawn between Delhi Development Authority and Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. under
Page 54

which the Agency has agreed to yield and give up its marketing rights in respect of 333 unbooked
apartments at CWG Village (2010) in favour of DDA absolutely and unconditionally forever in
consideration of Rs.7,66,89,25,000/- The Authority was informed that as there is no budget provision
in compiled budget estimate for the year 2009-10 appropriation of funds of Rs.256.94 crs. has been
approved by VC, DDA in terms of provisions contained in Rule 17 of DDA Budget and Account Rules...
The case was submitted before the Authority for approval of appropriation of funds to the tune of
Rs.256.94 crs. and payment of Rs.200 crores made for purchase of apartments at CWG Village.
Approval of Authority for payment of remaining four installments to Project Developer was also
obtained35. HLC is of the view that since the meetings of Authority were being organized on a regular
basis, it would have been appropriate if the matter had been placed before the Authority for decision
rather than presenting it with a fait accompli. It may be noted that while this matter was taken to the
COS by MoUD way back in February 2009, DDA did not care to take the matter before the Authority till
the whole deal had been sealed.
Full Government approval

5.26
It is also clear that the contour of the Bailout Package was finalized by DDA in consultation with
MoUD and the LG and the decision had full support of the Ministry. The decisions taken in the meeting
held on 24th April, 2009 were also communicated to the Cabinet Secretary vide Secretarys D.O. letter
dated 6th May, 200936 and Minister, Urban Development was also apprised of the position on file in
June 200937.
Lack of Due Diligence by DDA

5.27
Emaar MGF made assertions and aggressively supported their submission that no project was
available to make a direct comparison with the Games Village project. This was not challenged by DDA.
The Technical consultants, while reviewing the market price for the Games Village, cited DLF property
Shivaji Marg (near Karol Bagh) as direct comparable property with similar (if not superior)
35
Documents placed before Authority in its meeting of 3rd June, 2009 are at Relevant Document 26
A copy of the letter is placed at Annexure 26.
37
See File notings at Annexure 27
36
Page 55

specifications on many grounds. A copy of the letter from the Technical consultant drawing the
comparison between the two properties is set out as Annexure 28.
5.28
It is relevant to note that at about the same time, DLF was offering similarly placed property
(Shivaji Marg) with similar specifications at a price of 6,000 per sft with a further launch discount of
1000 per sft. DDA apparently did not conduct due diligence exercise while making the purchase
decision.
Summary of comparison between the DLF Property Shivaji Park and CGV developed by Emaar MGF
S.No.
Particulars
Comparison
CVG (Emaar MGF)

1
Location
Next to
Akshardham
temple, near
Yamuna river
Land Cost
Comments
Technical Experts
Shivaji Park (DLF)

DLF Better
At Concession
In the heart of the city,

on main Shivaji Marg,
surrounded by 181 acres
of green area, 34 acres of
commercial
establishment, school
and other facilities
At Market Rate
Structure
RCC Framework
RCC Framework
Similar
Piling
Yes
Yes
Similar
Flooring
Imported marble in
Drawing cum
dining, Lobby
Vitrified Tiles in Drawing

cum dining, Lobby
Emaar MGF Better
DLF Better
Flooring in other
areas similar
6
Walls
Living/ Bedroom
Fixtures
Kitchen
POP with Acrylic

Emulsion
VRV Airconditioning
Modular Kitchen,
with HOB and
Chimney
Acrylic Emulsion
Emaar MGF Better
None
Emaar MGF Better
None
Emaar MGF Better
Other aspects similar
Page 56
specifications
including Granite
counter top, stainless
steel sink etc.
9
Electric backup
100%
7 KVA
Emmar MGF better
10
Exterior
Security
12
Club house
13
Terms of payment
Time linked
Powder coated, single

glass
Proximity Access control.
CCTV in basement,
entrance lobby, boom
barriers at exit and entry
Air conditioned club
house with party room,
gymnasium, swimming
pool, card room, reading
room, shopping centre
etc
Construction linked
DLF Better
11
Powder coated,
double glass
CCTV in basement,
entrance lobby,
boom barriers at
exit and entry
Swimming, pool ,
gymnasium and
shopping centre
14
Basic rate per sft
9,720
6,000-7,000
DLF better
DLF Better
DLF better
DLF better
Myth of inability to sell apartments

5.29
Emaar MGF approached DDA for financial assistance as it ostensibly could not sell any of its
share of flats in the market! This does not appear to be true. Data made available by Emaar MGF to
HLC giving names and address of the customers, date of purchase and the value of transaction of CGV
apartments reveal the following:
S. No.
Year
No. of
sold*
Apartments Total Value of Sold

Apartments ( in crore)
2008
231
719.87
2009
74
218.90
2010
121
415.53
Total
426
1354.30
*Note: These apartments have been sold till 28th December, 2010 & does not include 333 apartments
sold to DDA for 766.89 crore in 2009.
Page 57

Thus, it is not true that Emaar MGF could not sell any apartments in the market due to the
recessionary trend in the real estate sector and, hence, required Bailout Package from DDA! In any
case PDA was not predicated on advance sale of apartments by PD.
Analysis of sales
5.30
The HLC has also done a month wise analysis of sales by Emaar MGF.
140
120
100
80
60
Series1
40
20
0
The aforesaid chart clearly shows that Emaar MGF made brisk sales in June 2008 when booking of flats
was opened. There was a brief lull between December 2008 and April 2009. In May 2009, Emaar MGF
made a bulk sale of 333 unsold apartments to DDA and received 728.89 crore from DDA upto
March 2010 which is about 95% of the total cost. Even from retail customers, Emaar MGF received 95%
of the payment within 120 days of booking of flats. Balance 5% is to be paid at the time of handing
over / possession.
5.31
HLC has also noted that Emaar MGF had informed the Financial Consultant that 263 flats had
been sold till April 2009 while data made available by them to HLC shows that only 236 flats had been
Page 58

sold. If their contention in April 2009 is correct, then by December 2010 Emaar MGF have completed
sale of all 786 apartments allotted to them in June 2008 as part of PDA.
Utilization of Bailout Package Funds

5.32
In light of the above premise, the HLC reviewed the funds utilizations by Emaar MGF out of the
bailout funds provided by DDA.

S .No. Date of
Release of
Funds by DDA
Amount
Released
( Crs.)
Cumulative
Funds
Released
Date of
Utilization
Certificate
Certified Till
Date
Cumulative
amt. Utilized
as per
Utilization
Certificate (
Crs.)
Cumulative
Funds
Unutilized (
Crs.)
Cumulative
Unauthorized
Payments
6-May-09
200
200.00 02 Jul-09
30-Jun-09
155.13
44.87
10-Jul-09
100
31-Jul-09
216.06
83.94
20.72
2-Sep-09
50
30-Sep-09
277.16
72.84
38.67
19-Nov-09
50
30-Nov-09
358.88
41.12
52.17
5-Jan-10
100
14-Feb-10
466.23
33.77
63.80
29-Mar-10
300.00 14-Aug09
350.00 03-Oct09
400.00 05-Dec09
500.00 03-Mar10
728.89 Not
Issued
Not
Available
5.33
228.89
Not
Available
Movement of funds (first tranche of 200 crore)
On 6th May, 2009 DDA remitted
200 crore to the Emaar MGFs SBI account (a/c
30304457459)
On 8th May, 2009, Emaar MGF transferred
200 crore to another SBI account of Emaar
MGF (a/c number 30219496586)
On 14th May, 2009 only
165 crore of the above funds were transferred to the
monitoring account opened (SBI a/c number 30761365338). The remaining amount of
35 crore was not transferred to the account under monitoring.
On the same day, i.e., 14th May 2009, Emaar MGF invested 165 crore in short-term
mutual fund.
Page 59

Copy of the bank statements are set out as Relevant Document 27.
5.34
Based on the schedule 2 of the agreement, out of the first installment of
200 crore of the
Bailout package, a sum of 165 crore was to go to various parties to settle overdue and immediate
payments which included
110 crore towards the civil and other structure works. Balance
35 crore
was towards project related payments due between 15th May and 31st May, 2009.
Fund Diversion
5.35
The first utilization certificate issued by the Financial consultant states that Emaar MGF paid
only
65.48 crore to the civil contractor against the bills. Additionally, it paid
22 crore as ad-hoc
advance to the contractor. In short, the amount utilized for civil and structure works totalled
87.48
crore only. A copy of the first fund utilization statement is at Annexure 29.
5.36
On further analysis it has been observed that even 55 days after receipt of the first tranche,
substantial funds were lying unutilized in the bank account and mutual funds. Hence, the overdue and
immediate payments aggregating to
165 crore as stated by Emaar MGF in its submission to get the
funds released in an accelerated manner from DDA appear to be largely overstated.

5.37
It has also been noticed that as a part of the urgency situation created by the Developer, the
first and third installment was transferred into an existing bank account of Emaar MGF and not into the
monitoring bank account as per the Agreement.
5.38
The Financial consultant stated that for the purpose of issuing the fund utilization certificate,
Emaar MGF presented the project related invoices/ bills aggregating to
35 crore; however need of
the payments and their subsequent realization /clearance was not sought to be established by them.
5.39
The payment of 35 crore outside the Monitoring Bank Account raises questions regarding the
end-use of funds released by DDA as part of the Bailout package.
No need for Bailout Package

5.40
Further analysis of the fund utilization reports and the bank statement of Emaar MGF (the
account set up to monitor the utilization of funds under the bailout package) shows that Emaar MGF
Page 60

did not need the bailout funds, their assertions of imminent financial constraints were not correct and
they used the emergency situation to get DDA to purchase the apartments in bulk.
5.41
The entire process of funding including action by DDA to obtain opinion of Technical and
Financial consultants within one week and ignoring the same seems staged.
Undue Revenue Stream

5.42
The following table lists out undue revenue streams for Emaar MGF with the release of first
tranche under the Bailout package. :

S.No.
Particulars
Amount
Comments
( crore)
Purchase of apartments at a
rate higher than the rate
recommended by Valuation
Committee
Sale proceeds due from sales
made in the year 2008 -2010
(after reducing the proceeds
received - 348 crore- from
customers prior to the
Bailout package invested in
the project)
Unauthorized Payments as
per the Agreement terms
Expenditure
Investments (As on 31st
March 2010)
89.00* Rate of purchase of apartment above the

recommended price (differential of
11,000 per sft and 9720 per sft)
686.34 Based on the Financial consultants report
As per the utilization certificate issued by

the Financial consultant (**refer note
below)
64.00
192.71
Note: * This amount ranges between 134 to 220 crore if the sale price of 11,000 per sft is
compared to price determined by Consultant of HLC.
**A copy of the fund utilization statement is at Relevant Document 28.
Improper use of Funds received under Bailout Package

5.43
The HLC, based on the analysis of Balance sheets of the Project Developer, finds that the total
funds infused into the project as on 31 st March 2010 were

project stated by the financial consultant at
2,358.23 crore as against the cost of the
1,639.86 crore. From the funds received under the
Page 61

Bailout package substantial amounts were transferred to Group Company as profits, used for
repayment of interest bearing loans and investment of surplus funds in short-term mutual funds.
S.No.
Particulars
Amount
Amount
( crore)
( crore)
Total Project Cost (as per Emaar MGF

certified by financial consultants)
1,639.86
Project Funding
(i)
Funds by way of capital and loans from

parent company + Funds from Banks
(ii)
Sale of Apartments (proceeds from sale of

336 apartments out of the total share of
453)
1,034.34
(iii)
Release of funds by DDA under the Bailout

package
728.89
595.00
TOTAL FUNDS (As of 31st March, 2010)
2,358.23
Examination of Balance Sheets

5.44
Summary of fund movement of the project is set out below:
Particulars
2008-0938
2007-08
2009-1039
Funds invested
(Capital +
Borrowings)
529
66
Repayment of
Holding
Company Loan
(73)
Additional
Bank loan/
(Repayment of
(111)
38
39

Page 62
Particulars
2008-0938
2007-08
2009-1039
Bank loan)
Mutual Fund
Investment
Payment to
EMLL under
terms of
collaboration
Agreement
Comments
5.45
(193)
(298)
No revenue sharing with 1. Emaar MGF Land did 1. Invested around

Holding Company (Emaar
not
infuse
any
193 crore in mutual
MGF
entered
into
additional
funds
funds (based on year
revenue
sharing
during this year. Only
end position). During
th
agreement dated 8 May
their
loan
was
the
year,
the
2008 with Emaar MGF
converted into equity
Company kept on
Land)
and, thus, remained
investing
cash
almost cash neutral.
aggregating
880
2. Entire funding and
crore in short term
money
circulation
mutual funds and
happened out of the
redeemed to the
realizations from the
extent of 690 crore
sale of project. Even
depending, probably,
inventory was built
on operation needs.
out of this money
only.
3. 106
crore
of
revenue from sale of
project was passed
on to the MGF Land
and not recorded by
MGF Construction.
However, at the year
end this remained
unpaid and, thus, no
cash outflow.
On the scrutiny of the audited accounts of Emaar MGF as on 31st March, 2010, it is apparent
that substantial sale proceeds were received by Emaar MGF which primarily funded the project during
the financial year 2009-10. During the period May 2009 to March 2010 substantial funds were invested
in short-term mutual funds. The investments held at year ended 31st March 2010 were
192.71 crore,
which is the holding of the equity from the parent company. Further, the profits of Emaar MGF,
Page 63

equivalent to 210 crore (paid
73 crore) during the year 2009-2010, were transferred to holding
company and they ceased to invest the funds in the project after receipt of Bailout Package. The low
outstanding of the debtors reflect that the primary source of funding was customer advances
(including DDA as customer for the 333 apartments).
5.46
Based on the above information it can be stated that Investment by the Developer in the
project was primarily in the first year of operations; the subsequent years were funded out of the
customer advances with DDA being the bulk purchaser of 333 apartments in an all cash deal. Receipt of
funds by DDA significantly increased the project liquidity which was largely parked in mutual funds and
utilized to repay the funds of other stakeholders thereby significantly de-risking their position in the
CGV.
Raison detre?
5.47
From the chain of events described above, a question which emerges is whether there was any
need to bail out Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd., the Project Developer. Their case was that as in
December 2008 they required 1067 crore to complete the project, the sale of flats had stopped and
therefore they needed cash injection to complete the project. It is accepted that sale of apartments
had fallen steeply in November December 2008 as illustrated in the chart at Para 5.30 above.
5.48
However, from this it does not necessarily follow that Emaar MGF needed cash; more
particularly, that Emaar MGF Land needed cash because Emaar MGF Construction was described as
one of the entities of Emaar MGF Land in the application to State Bank of India for credit sanction to
finance the project. Examination of relevant documents shows that Emaar MGF Land and Emaar MGF
Construction are two sides of the same coin and therefore, in trying to establish the need, cash flows
of both companies need to be considered. At the behest of HLC, KPMG have prepared the cash flow
statements of these two companies separately and together based on their Balance Sheets for 200910. Their opinion is at Annexure 30.
No cash flow problem

5.49
It clearly shows that during 2009-10 these entities did not need cash to complete the project.
The funding from DDA enabled them to repay bank loans, to meet other liabilities not connected with
Page 64

the project and finally to build up considerable cash balances which were invested in mutual funds. It is
pertinent to note that investment in mutual funds was a regular phenomena and not a year-end
consequence. Even when the first installment of 200 crore was released in May 2009, this was
credited to general bank account of Emaar MGF Construction and of this only
165 crore was
transferred to the Monitoring Account. The usage of the balance 35 crore remains blurred. It would
be clear from Annexure 30 and from what has been stated above that Emaar MGF did not need money
to complete the project.
5.50
The question then is why did they ask DDA for assistance? The analysis of sales shows that
there had been a decline in monthly sales of apartments and there were uncertainties regarding
future sales. Hence, Emaar MGF perhaps wanted to dispose off built up inventory of apartments as
quickly as possible but without resorting to any discount sales! The Bailout Agreement was really
intended to reduce Emaar MGFs inventory of unsold flats to less than 5% of the total project. This
would enable Emaar MGF (this refers to the joint interests of both entities) to inform SEBI in
September 2009 that their Games Village project had been sold. In fact, what had taken place was that
the unsold inventory of the Project Developer had been transferred at one go to DDA at terms highly
advantageous to the Project Developer.
5.51
HLC, therefore, cannot but conclude that the demand for funds for project completion was a
charade enacted by Emaar MGF; they misrepresented facts in terms of non-disclosure of their true
cash flow, made out a case for infusion of funds and persuaded the DDA to buy bulk of their unsold
inventory, in a depressed market. DDA and MoUD failed to see through this subterfuge and DDA
ended up with two thirds of the unsold apartments with all attendant risks. The financial and technical
expertise secured by DDA was of little consequence; the Project Developer was the unqualified
beneficiary of this transaction.
5.52
Based on these facts and analysis, the HLC is of the view that Emaar MGF did not require the
funds ( 766.89) under the Bailout package as a substantial part of these funds remained invested and
the receipt of sale proceeds from the customers would have met the project cost. Ways and means
accommodation from Banks was also an option as and when required.
Page 65

Governance Issues
5.53
While the PDA did not provide for any financial assistance to the Developer and the entire
financial risk associated with the project was to be borne by the Developer; Emaar MGF successfully
coerced DDA to fund the project. As a consequence, the condition of the PPP that 100% financial risk
would vest with the Developer ceased to exist and a major part of the financial risk related to the 333
flats was transferred from Emaar MGF to DDA.
5.54
DDA in its submission stated that its sole objective was to ensure timely completion of the
project as failure to develop the Games Village could have led to cancellation of the CWG 2010.
5.55
DDA in their Bailout Agreement with the PD dated 5th May, 2009 stipulated the setting up of an
escrow account with State Bank of India to monitor the end use of the funds provided under the
bailout package. The funds, to be released at fixed intervals, were subject to verification by an
independent Chartered Accountant and an Independent Engineer.
5.56
Yet once again DDA did not set up an escrow account to monitor the funds provided under the
Bailout package; only a separate bank account, without any control of DDA, was opened.
5.57
It was recommended to DDA by the Financial consultant that the funds should be successively
released to Emaar MGF on the basis of the detailed payment schedule drawn up by them till November
2010 and upon verification of the work done. However, the HLC finds that the DDA did not take any
cognizance of the said recommendation.
5.58
The Financial consultants had clearly stated that in the calculation of the fund requirement for
the project completion, they had not included the balance receipts of funds from the existing
customers or the future sale of apartments by Emaar MGF. They had recommended that DDA should
consider such cash inflows and the same should be reduced from the funds provided. They had
reported that while the future sales by the Developer cannot be predicted, however, the pending
receipt of 472.26 crore from the existing customers should be adjusted while arriving at the future
fund requirements. But this was totally ignored by the DDA for reasons best known to them!
Page 66

5.59
The reply of the Member Finance on the above governance issues is set out as Relevant
Document 33. It is not being commented upon as it does not address the issues described above.
5.60 DDA officials have stated that the Authority had evaluated various options available to it under
PDA, viz.
a. To file a legal suit for specific performance against the Project Developer;
b. To revoke the PDA, forfeit the upfront fee of 321 crore given by the Project Developer
and invoke the Performance Guarantee of 300 crore and find a new Developer to
complete the Project;
c. To revoke the PDA and find alternate venues for accommodating the participants;
d. Terminate the agreement and develop the Project by itself;
e. To provide financial support to the Project Developer to help complete the Project.
After deliberations, DDA came to the conclusion that the only option left with DDA was to support the
Project by putting in its financial resources. DDA reportedly examined two options of providing an
interest bearing loan to the Project Developer or to purchase the Apartments from the PD at an agreed
price. The option of providing loan to the PD was discarded on the grounds that the PD could provide
no security as the Project land and ownership in the Apartments rested with DDA until the conveyance
of the Apartments by DDA post Games; repayment of loan being doubtful and chances of the PD not
pushing the sales of the Apartments. Purchase of Apartments from the PD at an agreed price was
expected to safeguard DDAs interests. However, as has been explained in the preceding paragraphs,
the justification offered by DDA appears to be convoluted and lacking in conviction. DDA could well
have funded PD by agreeing to advance a loan for 321 crore on the security of the land, ownership of
which, remained to be transferred to Emaar MGF. This could have been a less expensive out of box
solution.
5.61
From the aforesaid analysis it is clear that:

i.
The Project Developer did not require any financial assistance for completion of the CGV.
Page 67

ii.
Even if there was temporary requirement of fund infusion, the project work could have
continued uninterrupted if DDA had provided a loan of 321 crore on normal interest rates
to the PD.
iii.
The sale price determined by DDA was neither based on assessed cost of the project nor
on market price.
iv.
The Project Development Agreement, which was a legally binding document, was virtually
discarded when the Bailout Agreement was signed.
v.
The interests of DDA were compromised in favour of those of the Project Developer.
vi.
DDA may well dispose off these apartments at a price significantly higher than paid to
Emaar MGF, but that would not detract from the fact that by paying a higher rate to Emaar
MGF they thereby reduced their own profitability to that extent.
Box 9: How Emaar MGF virtually rescinded key provisions of Project Development
Agreement?
Para 8.8 of the Project Development Agreement reads as under:
The Project Developer shall be solely responsible for arranging all the funds for the construction
and development of the Project in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and in
accordance with the Good Industry Practice. DDA confirms that the Project Developer has the full
right and authority, without requiring any further consent, authorization or no-objection from
DDA, to enter into Financing Agreements.
Para 1.1.19 of the PDA defines Project thus:
Project means complete construction and development of the ready-to-use Residential Facility at
the Project Site under a public private partnership model wherein the Project Developer pays an
upfront bid amount to DDA and DDA transfers the two-third (2/3rd) of the Residential Apartments
along with the rights in the undivided underlying land for onward transfer to the individual buyers
by the Project Developer.
The Project Developer very cleverly, in order to avoid the borrowing costs, repaid interest bearing
borrowings and invested cash surplus in market securities and transferred funds to other Group
companies out of the funds received from DDA and thus violated key provisions of the Project
Development Agreement.
Page 68
Chapter 6: Completion and Handover

6.1
The stipulated completion date of the Games Village project as per the PDA was 31 st March
2010. According to the provisions of the PDA, the project was deemed to be complete when the
Residential facility is completely developed in all respects (including landscaping), technically fit to be
occupied and ready-to-use/ livable, with no pending construction, unfinished work, construction
equipments, debris, construction material etc. on the project site and certified as complete in writing
by DDA.
6.2
This date of completion of project has been a topic of debate between the PD and DDA. Emaar
MGF vide various letters to DDA insists that the project was completed well within the stipulated
timeline of the PDA.
Emaar MGF submitted that the project was complete as on 29 th March, 2010
except for minor work of landscaping and construction of certain roads that was delayed because of
work carried out by other agencies employed by DDA. It was insisted by Emaar MGF that the work
being executed by various agencies such as BSES, DJB, sewerage, storm water drains and construction
of boundary wall, delayed the project and therefore they were not responsible for consequent delays.
6.3
Emaar MGF, in this regard, filed its application for the completion certificate with the Building
Department of DDA on 29th March, 201040.
Handing Over of residential towers

6.4
While the assertions have been made as regards the timely completion of the Games Village,
the handing over of building towers to DDA started only from 21 st June, 2010, a delay of nearly 3
months in comparison with the initial stipulated date of completion of 31 st March, 2010.
6.5
Simultaneously by 15thMay, 2010, ITDC started the process of supply of hard and soft
furnishings for the residential apartments. The documentation of handing over of the residential
40
Page 69

towers was not done by DDA while the work of furnishing was initiated by ITDC. The furnishing of the
apartments was completed by ITDC on 30th August, 2010.
6.6
The furnished apartments were in-turn handed over to OC by DDA over a period of one and half
months starting 24th July, 2010 till the final handover on 30th August, 2010.
A furnished Model Apartment in Games Village in October 2009
Temporary Occupancy Certificate

6.7
Only after the towers were furnished and handed over to OC, DDA issued a Temporary
Occupancy Certificate to Emaar MGF on 30th August, 2010; while the completion certificate was at
that time withheld on account of violations of Building bye-laws.
6.8
These events are a clear indication of mis-management on the part of DDA. The independent
activities which were planned to be carried out in a sequential manner were undertaken
simultaneously and overlapped. Such a situation facilitated assertions by agencies to pass the blame to
others thereby severely diluting accountability of each in meeting their respective contractual
obligations.
Page 70

6.9
It has been noted that by 29th March, 2010, DDA was in the process of preparing a list of defects
in terms of quality of construction. Given the urgency, several stop-gap arrangements were put in
place to make the village ready for the athletes in time. As such Emaar MGFs filing of an application
for issue of completion certificate with the statutory authorities, at best could be termed premature
given the level of physical progress of the project.
Quality Issues
6.10
It has been widely published in the media and there exists a strong public perception that the
quality of the Games Village was sub-standard. On this issue, Minister, Urban Development also sent a
Note to the Secretary, MoUD on 7th October, 2010 wherein he mentioned that
It has been widely reported that Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd, the project developer
entrusted with the project, has not executed the Commonwealth Games Residential Project
near Akshardham Temple diligently and efficiently. There are serious complaints against the
Project Developer including complaints of construction against the provisions of sanctioned
plan as well as not adhering to the obligations as the Project Development Agreement. There
have also been reports of delay as well as deficiency in the execution of the project not only
adversely affecting the image of DDA but also the Commonwealth Games 2010 as a whole.
6.11
DDA issued a letter to Emaar MGF regarding the non completion of the project and list of
defects and quality issues noted by DDA. The defects included:

a. No flooring done in the basement for some sections
b. Water treatment has not been done in the lift pits as there are leakages from the
ground water
c. Rain water is penetrating from the shafts as they have not been covered.
6.12
The letter dated 18th October, 2010 from DDA to MoUD41, mentions that there are a number of
defects and delays in the execution of the project by Emaar MGF which attracts penalties as per the
PDA and it was proposed that immediate action is required against Emaar MGF for non execution of
the project in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions.
41
Page 71

6.13
Officials of HLC during their visit to the project site on 16th November, 2010 also noticed severe
seepage in the basement of the residential building which is fallout of the above mentioned defects.
The photographs taken during the visit support the observations.
A view of seepage water in the Basement of Residential Towers of CGV
6.14
HLC was also informed that the lower basement of the buildings is 10 meters below the river
bed and seepage in the basement was due to the poor quality of water-proofing done by the
Developer.
6.15
Emaar MGFs assertion that the contract was completed within the stipulated time is
substantiated neither by documentary nor evidentiary proof that the project was completed within the
prescribed timelines. Mere filing for completion certificate with the statutory authorities does not
tantamount to meeting the contractual obligations even while the list of defects and quality issues are
being drawn and resolved.
Page 72

Additional Expenditure by DDA
6.16
Apart from the above defects, DDA also completed a number of unfinished works inside the
Games Village after handover of apartments from the Emaar MGF related to the cleanliness/
maintenance of the Games Village.
6.17
The claim of DDA on Emaar MGF on account of quality defects aggregates to
30.43 crore as
indicated below:
Particulars
Claim ( in crore)
Expenditure incurred for cleaning/ maintenance of CWG Village 2010

Rectification of water proofing treatment in the basement
Cost of raising the boundary wall
30.00
0.22
TOTAL
6.18
0.21
30.43
Other claims made by DDA on Emaar MGF on account of various costs incurred on their behalf
and damages pending levy aggregates to 65.90 crore. A summary of the same is described as below:
Particulars
6.19
Claim ( in crore)
Outstanding Land Rental DDA
0.38
Cost of Signages
0.11
Non-payment of dues related to the Games Village residential project including statutory dues to various Government/ Civic Agencies which were
paid by DDA on behalf of the developer (BSES, DJB etc.)
Liquidated Damages For milestones 8 & 9 per the PDA
48.51
TOTAL
65.90
16.90
While the above costs are self explanatory; it is pertinent to note that the above amount
aggregating to a claim of
96.33 ( 30.43 +
forfeited by DDA to the tune of
65.90 crore) is after adjustment of the Bank Guarantee
90 crore. The balance Bank Guarantee of
93 crore is the subject
matter of litigation between the PD and DDA pending in the Honble High Court of Delhi. Hence, while
Page 73

the DDA released the bank guarantee as per the Agreement, it failed to enforce its due on the
Developer.
6.20
The HLC is of the view that Emaar MGF did not complete the project in time before handing it
over to DDA. DDA and Delhi Government had to deploy considerable resources and funds to get the
Games village ready and inhabitable for hosting the athletes.
Page 74
Chapter 7: Main Findings

Games Village site
7.1
The selection of site for the Games Village in 2003 was a priori and no exercise was undertaken
to compare the selected site with alternate sites available with DDA. HLC was also informed of the
possibility of constructing the Games Village in close proximity to Jawahar Lal Nehru Sports Complex on
land belonging to L&DO, which remained unexplored because of an implicit desire to construct next to
Akshardham and at no other site.
7.2
The selected site had several drawbacks in terms of uncertainties including securing from Uttar
Pradesh Government a portion of the land owned by them, obtaining environmental clearances,
change in land use, pressure from Akshardham as to the height of the buildings and litigation because
of the decision to construct in the flood plain of Yamuna River.
7.3
This decision entailed auxiliary cost of about
633.06 crore on infrastructure i.e. the Flyover on
NH 24 near the Games Village (to provide uninterrupted ingress and egress into and from CGV),
construction of an elevated road over Barapulla Nallah (linking CGV to JLN Sports complex), and noise
suppression measures along NH24 and adjacent railway track.
Delay in commencing work

7.4
Even though the site for the Commonwealth Games Village had been frozen as early as
September, 2003 and DDA had been named the Nodal Agency for development of Games Village, it
took DDA nearly 27 months to secure GOM approval for the manner of its development. This delay
had serious consequences in 2009 when progress was stalled with the paucity of time and spectre of
no Games Village becoming the main plea for ruling out all other options for DDA other than agreeing
to a Bailout package.
7.5
Even after the approval by GOM in January, 2006, DDA took 19 months to sign the Project
Development Agreement with the Project Developer in September, 2007.
Page 75

PPP mode
7.6
The construction of the Games Village was envisaged as a DDA project in the year 2003. DDA
staff believed it was capable of doing so, DDA had more than sufficient funds to do so and yet, by
sometime in 2005, there seemed to be a strong desire in the top echelons of DDA to follow the PPP
mode.
7.7
DDA did not understand PPP, never understood PPP and ended up virtually getting the Village
constructed through a contractor with the additional complication of a Project Developer in between.
7.8
The decision of the GOM taken on 4th January, 2006 cannot be construed as a direction of
Government. The DDA also did not follow the statutory process of securing the approval of the
Authority. A Status Note on Commonwealth Games Projects to be developed by DDA was presented
before the Authority on 3rd June, 2006 wherein it was resolved that Information given in the agenda
was noted by the Authority.
Selection of Project Developer

7.9
A review of the selection process reveals that, for what should have been a prestigious and
profitable project, the response was unusually poor. A large number of bidders, who had evinced
interest at the EOI stage and were pre-qualified, were reduced to two at the stage of submission of
Bids. By the time queries raised by potential bidders in the Pre-Bid meeting were clarified and
Addendum to RFP issued, there was very little time (7 days) left for submission of bids even on revised
last date. Disqualification of one bidder during technical evaluation left only one valid bid for the
project.
7.10
As against the reserve price of 300 crore for the land in the RFP, the sole bidder quoted just
321 crore. If truly participative bidding had taken place, DDA would have definitely obtained a higher
bid.
No need for financial assistance

7.11
There was no accurate assessment of the financial assistance demanded by the Project
Developer. Examination of the cash flow statements of Emaar MGF Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and Emaar
Page 76

MGF Land Ltd. reveal that, both on stand alone basis as well as on consolidated Group basis, they
had sufficient funds available for completion of the project and there was no need for DDA funds in
2009-10.
Bulk Purchase by DDA

7.12
Bulk purchase of additional 333 apartments by DDA at the rate of 11,000 per sft under
depressed market conditions was only intended to provide undue benefit to the Project Developer.
Cash infusion of 728.89 crore into the Project by DDA in 2009-10 was unnecessary.
Box 10: Complicity
At Annexure25 a comparison has been made between the per sft rate of various
items as given in the sub contract signed between Emaar MGF and ACIL and the
rates given in the BOQ prepared in March 2009. These BOQ figures were also
presented to the Financial Consultant appointed by DDA.
In the BOQ, the earlier rate of 2875 per sft has been hiked to 4478.27 per sft. This
is the basis for estimating total construction cost at about 1175 crore. This entire
exercise was undertaken to artificially jack up the construction cost to enable the
Project Developer to demand a higher rate from DDA for sale of 333 apartments. It
must be remembered that the sub contract between Emaar MGF and ACIL put a cap
of 2875 on the per sft construction cost. This target price, determined in July 2007
and referred to in the LOI (see Relevant Document 36) as well as the sub contract,
was sacrosanct.
These facts point towards complicity of the Financial Consultant with Emaar MGF to
engender a price which was acceptable to both DDA as well as the Project
Developer.
Loan to PD
7.13
Project Developer had sought a sum of 321 crore and that too as a loan from the DDA. The
Project Developer had also expressed his willingness to pay interest as admissible on this amount. DDA
took the stand that the PDA had no provision for advancing such a loan and on this ground itself this
proposal was rejected. The same DDA, however, agreed to purchase 333 apartments at a very high
price from the Project Developer. The PDA had no provision for such a purchase as well. HLC is of the
Page 77

view that if at all any financial assistance was required by the Project Developer, a loan would have
been a much neater out of box solution.
Undue gain from Bailout Package

7.14
HLC is of the view that if DDA had done due diligence, it would have come to the conclusion
that the PD did not need any financial assistance. Even if some help was required, advancing an
interest bearing loan would have been more appropriate. The HLC is also of the considered opinion
that the amount of 11,000 per sft. approved by a group of officers chaired by LG is unjustified. If the
assessed cost of the project were to be considered, a rate of
7829 per sft. would have been fair.
Even if the market price option was favoured, DDA should have demanded and got the following
discounts:
a) 2% discount which Emaar paid to all agents as commission;
b) 8% discount towards down payment this was actually given to retail purchasers;
c) 10% discount for bulk purchase is a normal practice and should have been applicable to the
purchase of 333 apartments in one go
A selling price of 11335 per sft was taken into consideration by the Technical Consultant while
determining his recommendation to the Valuation Committee. A 20% discount on that price would give
a figure of 9068 per sft. Therefore, the purchase price should have ranged between 7829 to 9068
per sft. The HLC has no hesitation in recording that the actual price of 11,000 per sft paid by DDA
resulted in an undue gain ranging between 134 to 220 crore to the Project Developer.
Inappropriate Decision making body

7.15
The participants in the Meeting convened by the LG on 24 th April, 2009, in which major
decisions relating to the Bailout Package were taken, had no authority to take such a decision as it was
neither a meeting of Delhi Development Authority nor of the MoUD, Government of India. This matter
ought to have taken to a meeting of the Authority, which is the body empowered to decide such
issues. Instead, the Authority was informed on 3rd June, 2009 about the Agreement signed between
DDA and Project Developer on 5th May, 2009 and to accord post facto approval to appropriation of
Page 78

funds of 256.94 crore and payment of 200 crore made for purchase of apartments by VC, DDA in
accordance with Rule 17 of DDA Budget and Account Rules.
Role of MoUD
7.16
Senior officers of the Ministry of Urban Development, including the then Secretary, were fully
aware of the Bailout Package and played a major role in finalizing the rate acceptable to Emaar MGF
along with senior functionaries of DDA and causing a loss of anything between
134 to 220 crore to
DDA.
Role of Emaar MGF

7.17
The Games Village saga will remain incomplete without mentioning the role of Emaar MGF, the
Project Developer. They failed to perform as per the legally binding Project Development Agreement.
They deliberately withheld relevant documents such as the signed sub contract with ACIL from DDA
and their consultants. They generated documents of questionable veracity through their architect
which were relied upon by the Financial Consultant of DDA. They appear to have had the intent to
build excess FAR right from the beginning. They exploited the paucity of time available before the
commencement of CWG in October 2010 to their advantage and did not let go of any opportunity to
safeguard their interests. They had ready access to the senior office bearers of DDA and MoUD.
Box 10: Loan Application of Emaar MGF to State Bank of India

Document submitted by Emaar MGF to SBI for obtaining Bank finance for the
Commonwealth Games Village Project reveals the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Project Cost including cost of land was 1264 crore

Per sft construction cost was estimated at 2600 for residential areas
Total Super Area was to be 2,599,893.50 sq.ft.
Average Sale Price was expected to range between 10,500 to 11,500/- per
sft.
Role of Consultants
7.18
The consultant chosen by DDA (PwC) to advise them on execution of the Games Village Project
in the PPP mode failed to perform their assigned task satisfactorily. Certain critical omissions in the
Page 79

PDA such as those pertaining to provisions for escrow account and supply of audited statement of
accounts created conditions where the PD could submit unauthenticated documents and figures to the
Financial Consultants of DDA.
7.19
The Financial Consultant selected by DDA was also their Taxation Consultant and hence could
not be regarded as an independent valuation expert. They did not exercise due care and caution while
recommending the value of the apartments to DDA.
Loss to DDA
7.20
It has been brought out that the estimated loss to DDA can be categorized under the following
heads:
Estimated loss due to purchase of 333 flats at a higher rate -
Unauthorized payments to Emaar MGF contrary to PDA
Non-levy of Liquidated Damages -
Carrying cost of unsold apartments with DDA -
134 to 220 crore

64 crore
81.45 crore
35-40 crore per annum42
Responsibility
7.21
The responsibility for the various acts of omission and commission which brought undue gains
to Emaar MGF primarily lies with LG, Shri Tejendra Khanna, ex-officio Chairman of DDA; Shri Ashok
Kumar, Vice Chairman, DDA; Shri Nand Lal, Member (Finance) and Shri A.K.Bajaj, then Member
(Engineering) of DDA. Dr. M. Ramachandran, then Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development also
played a key role in determining the contours of the Bailout package including high valuation, etc.
7.22
There may well be other officials responsible in different degrees whose acts of omission and
commission contributed to the loss to DDA and that can be separately assessed.
42
This includes the likely expenditure on security, maintenance, electricity, water & sewerage charges etc.
Page 80
Chapter 8: Recommendations
8.1.
Government may decide on action against the public servants responsible for doling out
largesse to the Project Developer.

8.2
Government may examine the governance structure of DDA including the continuance of the Lt.
Governor as the ex-officio Chairman of DDA and evolve measures to strengthen the accountability
systems in DDA.
8.3
GoI / DDA may take appropriate action against Emaar MGF, Project Developer, for knowingly
supplying incorrect information and for its various acts of omission and commission.
8.4
A more detailed inquiry by investigating agencies (including Income Tax) may throw greater
light on deliberate acts of omission and commission of different parties involved.

8.5
It is given to understand that certain outstanding issues between DDA and the Project
Developer are yet to be resolved and that certain matters are under litigation. In the interest of the
DDA and the bonafide purchasers of the apartments, it is necessary to end the impasse so that the
process of transfer of apartments / fresh sales can start.
Page 81
Appendix 1: List of Documents examined

S.No. File No.
Description
F 9(72)SW/Coordn/06/DDA
File pertaining to CGF
F9(73)SW/Coordn/06/DDA
File pertaining to EKS Games village brief
DDA Budgets
Financial Year 2003-2004
10
CAG Audit Report
11
WAB (76)/Vol-40/Secy
Record of WAB w.e.f 2006-2010
12
PS/FA (H)/DDA/2006
Selection of Financial Consultant for CWG
13
F9(66)/SW/Coordn/06/DDA
Meetings at LG office
14
F9(66)SW/Coord/06/ DDA
Meetings at LG office 19N/238C
15
F9(67)SW/Coordn/06/DDA
Evaluation of Technical Bid for

Design/Financial consultants 9N and 206/C
16
F9(67)SW/Coord/06/DDA/Part II
Evaluation of Technical Bid for

Design/Financial Consultant 20/N and
283/C
17
F9(18)SW/Coord/2005/DDA
GOM meetings- CWG 2010
18
PS/FA(H)DDA/Valuation committee/09/07
Report of Committee Constituted by

Honble Lt. Governor, Delhi for CWG
village project
Page 82
19
PS/FA(H)DDA/Pt Files
Release of funds to M/S Emaar MGF for

purchase of apartments
20
F9(31)SW/coord/2005/DDA/Pt II
21
F9(31)SW/coord/2005/DDA Pt I
DDA Core Group Meetings (High Powered

Committee) Pg. Nos. 463 to 1039
22
F 1 (33) PC/ CWG/08/DDA
Minutes of Dhindsa Committee
23
F 1 (24)/2006/LSR (R)
RFQ and RFP docs justification of

disqualification of Technical Bid of DLF Ltd
24
F 9 (43) SW/05/DDA
Venue Appraisal Study by the EKS
25
F5(49)2007-08/EE/CWGD1/A/DDA
Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Part I)
26
Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Part II)
27
Emaar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Part III)
28
F5(29)2006-07/EE/CWGD1/A/DDA
M/s Suresh Goel & Associates (Part I)
29
M/s Suresh Goel & Associates (Part II)
30
M/s Suresh Goel & Associates (Part III)
31
File pertaining to documents received

from Director (CWG)
32
Agreement No. 03/EE/CGD.1/DDA/200809
33
Third party Quality inspection agency

(CBRI, Roorkee) for CGV residential project
of CWG-2010
Quality Assurance reports from CBRI
34
Agreement No. 1/EE/CWGD/DDA/2007-08
Copy of PDA for Construction of

Residential project of Common Wealth
Games Village on PPP Mode
35
F-5(126)2010 /EE/CGD1/A/DDA
M/s Access Plus; Supply of Shower of

residential apartment
36
Minutes of Monitoring Committee for

monitoring the progress of CGV
37
F 8(23)/79/1L/Pt I
Bochanwasi Akshardham Sansth
Page 83
38
TN 03 18/01/11
Ownership status of the land utilized for

CWG village
39
File No.3388/DDR/2007-DD VI (Vol. V)
File of MoUD relating to Games Village
Page 84
Appendix 2: List of persons interviewed

S.No. Names
Designation
Shri Vijai Kapoor
Ex LG, Delhi
Shri Dinesh Rai
Ex VC, DDA
Shri Ashok Kumar Nigam
VC, DDA
Shri Nand Lal
Finance Member
Shri Ashok Khurana
Engineer Member
Ms. Veena Ish
Principal Comm. (CWG)
Shri Alok Swarup
Director (Sports)
Shri Amar Singh
Executive Engineer (CGD-1)
Shri A.K. Suneja
10
Shri K.G. Gupta
11
Shri A.K. Sarin
Advisor (Ex-EM)
12
Shri Nitin Garg
Representatives from Garg A. Associates
13
Shri Ashok Garg
Representatives from Garg A. Associates
14
Shri K.N. Goyal
Representatives from K.N. Goyal & Co.
15
Ms. Mala Rajan
Representatives from K.N. Goyal & Co.
16
Shri Neel Kamal
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Page 85

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HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE

Second Report of HLC

BHAWAN ANNEXE, NEW DELHI

Commonwealth Games Village

Location of Games Village

Planning and Bidding

Project Development Agreement and Execution

Bailout Package and Release of Funds

Completion and Handover

Appendix 1: List of Documents Reviewed

Appendix 2: List of persons interviewed

Commonwealth Games Village

Above Ground Level

Commonwealth Games Village

*Source Data submitted by Emaar MGF to DDA (March-April 2009)

Loss of Precious Time

Development Costs associated with Site

Commonwealth Games Village

Project Execution in Public Private Partnership mode

Deviations from Model Concession Agreement in PDA

Failure to meet Contractual Obligations

96.33 crore. However, this amount

is under dispute. Details are in Chapter 6 of the Report.

Commonwealth Games Village

321 crore as loan at normal rate of interest or purchase of 250

apartments. It was DDAs decision to purchase 333 apartments.

formed a Valuation Committee which, in turn, appointed two Independent Consultants to

Commonwealth Games Village

Undue Favours to Project Developer

11,000 per sft, which was way

7829 per sft. arrived at by the Consultant of HLC based on assessed

(b) Recovery from Customers

Commonwealth Games Village

766.89 crore. Emaar MGF made payments

64 crore. Further, excess funds aggregating to

Non levy of Liquidated Damages on the Emaar MGF as per

Purchase of apartments at a very high rate of 11,000 per

Investments (as on 31st March, 2010)

Commonwealth Games Village

Box: 1 Games Village Saga

Commonwealth Games Village

the Commonwealth Games 2010 (CWG) at an estimated expenditure of

296 crore towards sports

Commonwealth Games Federation in November 2003.

Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports; Govt. Of Delhi; Delhi

City Government; Municipal Council of Delhi (MCD) and

Delhi Development Authority (DDA)

Conduct and Delivery of Games

Organizing Committee (OC)

Host Broadcasting and Media Press

Prasar Bharati and Ministry of Information &

Tourism and Accommodation for

Commonwealth Games Village

To acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property.

To carry out building, engineering, mining and other operations.

To provide services and amenities incidental to the above

Development of the Yamuna Sports Complex;

Development (including up-gradation) of the Siri Fort Sports Complex;

Development of 33 hotels to accommodate the projected tourists during the Games.

The present organization structure of DDA is illustrated in the following chart:

Commonwealth Games Village

Governance Structure for CWG projects - DDA

Commonwealth Games Village

the Terms of Reference of the Committee, with special focus on: