Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
RAMI SHMUELY,
Appellant,
vs.
SALOMON CONSTRUCTION &
ROOFING CORP.,
Appellee.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iii
PREFACE ................................................................................................................. v
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW ..................................................................................... 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 3
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
FACTS ....................................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 5
A. The Language1 Used By The Defendant Was Not Profane, Nor
Obscene ........................................................................................................ 6
B. The Language Used Is Protected By The First Amendment And The
Florida Constitution .................................................................................. 11
C. The FCCPA Was Never Intended To Regulate Pure Speech (Without
Further Abusive Collection Tactics) ......................................................13
D. Appellant Attempts To Mislead The Court As To The Reasons Why
The Trial Court Granted Defendants Motion For Summary
Judgment .................................................................................................... 16
E. The Court Should Ignore Appellants FCC Argument That Was Not
Raised Below .............................................................................................. 19
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 19
Counsel for Appellant apologizes to the Court to the extent that four letter words are used in this Answer Brief; however,
counsel wishes to be accurate. Counsel made the same apology to the trial court and Appellant now argues (in his Initial Brief)
that the apology is indicative that the language used by Mr. Susi is profanity per se. However, language used by a tradesman
(to a debtor/lawyer who refuses to pay a legitimate bill) cannot be held to the standard as language that lawyers use when
formally addressing a court of law.
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 2001) .................. 2
Brown v. State, 358 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1978) ................................................................. 6
Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct 2607 (U.S. 1972) .................................... 6
Meininger v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2012 WL 1166161 (M.D. Fla. 2012) ...... 7
Kelemen v. Professional Collections Systems, 2011 WL 31396 (M.D. Fla. 2011) ... 7
Montgomery v. Fla. First Fin. Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 3540374, at 6 (M.D. Fla.
Aug.12, 2008) ....................................................................................................... 7,15
Cohen v. California, 403 US 15 (1971) ................................................................ 7,11
Hagler v. Credit World Servs., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139241 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Kan.
2015) ..................................................................................................................8,9,18
Linko v. Natl Action Fin. Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 98718 (M.D. PA. 2007) ... 9
Luke Records v. Navarro, 960 F. 2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992) ...................................... 10
Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., 333 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. Ill. 2003) .......................10,16
L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ....................................... 11
W.L. v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)................................................ 11
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ............................................................. 11
State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1976) ........................................................ 11
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ...........................................................11,13
Harris v. Beneficial Finance Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976) .....................12,13,15
Reed v Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Crt. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015) ................... 12
iii
iv
PREFACE
Citation to the record is as follows: R,____, Citation to the Transcript of
the April 22, 2015 Hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment is as follows:
T:__. (which is attached hereto).
INTRODUCTION
Appellant admits he is a lawyer specializing in suing debt collectors under
the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act (the FCCPA). Appellant
contracted Appellee to put a new roof on his house. The roof was completed, but
yet, Appellant would not pay for it. In an effort to collect the debt, the owner of
the roofing company allegedly said to Appellant pay your fucking bill don't be
a fucking shlub.
Appellant then paid the bill and immediately filed suit under the FCCPA,
alleging that Appellees collection practices violated the FCCPA, even though he
suffered no damages, thereby forcing Appellee to incur unnecessary legal fees.
Although Appellee denied making the statements complained of, he did for
purposes of his summary judgment motion only, admit that the statements were
made, so there would be no issues of contested facts.
Appellee successfully argued that his alleged statements, would not, as a
matter of law violate the FCCPA because:
1.
2.
3.
turns on pure issues of law, the court should reverse Summary Judgment if the
slightest doubt exists.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Shmuely didn't want to pay for his roof and when the roofer used
language to emphasize his demand for money, Mr. Shmuely filed a specious
lawsuit, even though he had suffered no damage by Appellees collection
efforts. In his initial brief, Mr. Shmuely tries to portray himself as a victim and the
Appellee as a bully, but nothing could be further from the truth. The trial judge
characterized Mr. Shmuelys suit as absurd stating this is why people hate
lawyers. [T:14-15] This Court should affirm the summary judgment ruling below
because:
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
[R,42-46]. Appellants billing and collection department was unable to collect the
debt from Mr. Shmuely.
2.
placed a single phone call to Appellant (also a Jewish Man) in an effort to collect
the Debt that his billing & collections department was unable to collect. [T:18]
3.
On August 14, 2014, Appellant filed the instant action, claiming that
Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons stated on the record. [R,
78]
7.
8.
statements:
10.
A.
B.
C.
Mr. Shmuely did not pay for the roof 5 1/2 months prior to the
instant lawsuit, but rather less than 14 days later. (R, 5-7)
D.
Appellant misstates the reasons for the Trial Courts entry of the
ARGUMENT
A.
standards finds the material to appeal to the prurient interest and depicts in a
patently offensive way sexual conduct. Clearly using the word fucking as an
adjective (merely to emphasize the statement that follows) cannot be deemed
obscene under these standards because such common language fails both of the
Miller prongs.
No appellate court has considered what language violates F.S. 559.72 (8),
however the FCCPA was clearly intended to protect consumers against obscene
language as an inappropriate tactic to collect a debt. Under Florida law, the word
"fucking" (when used as an adjective) does not (as a matter of law) rise to the level
of profanity or obscenity required to violate such statute. Courts have held that
merely rude and/or unpleasant language is not enough to set forth a valid violation
of the federal version of the FCCPA. See Meininger v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
2012 WL 1166161 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that "loser" and "deadbeat" are rude
and unpleasant terms, but do not rise to the level of willfully abusive language
required by F.S. 559.72(8); Kelemen v. Professional Collections Systems, 2011
WL 31396 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that "pay your damn bills" does not fall
within the definition of profanity and does not violate Florida Statutes);
Montgomery v. Fla. First Fin. Grp., Inc., 2008 WL 3540374, at 6 (M.D. Fla.
Aug.12, 2008) (The term liar falls short of language akin to profanity or
obscenity and therefore, does not violate F.S. 559.72(8)).
In determining what is obscene or profane, courts are required to consider
the context of the language used. Here, the Trial Court properly considered the
nature of the parties, (one being a tradesmen (a roofer) who use words such as
fucking as part of their everyday parlance especially when used as an adjective
to emphasize a point and the other, being a sophisticated lawyer. See Cohen v.
California, 403 US 15 (1971); and Hagler v. Credit World Servs., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139241 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Kan. 2015). The FCCPA was not enacted to clean
up speech, nor to prevent the use of 4-letter words, but rather to address truly
abusive debt collection tactics and actions. Appellant does not even come close to
showing that the words schlub or fucking (when used as an adjective) is an
obscenity or profanity. A finding that words, alone, are actionable would promote a
storm of litigation, every time a colorful word is used during a business
communication, which would serve to further clog our court system and harm the
public interest.
When directly asked by the Trial Court to do so, Appellant failed to cite a
single case where the use of the word fucking and/or schlub during a single
phone call regarding a debt amounted to a violation of F.S. 559.72(8) or the
related Federal Statute. [T:10-11] None of the cases now cited by Appellant are on
point and Appellant has misstated the holdings in many of the cases that he relies
upon. Appellant did not claim in the Complaint or Amended Complaint, that
Appellees use of the word schlub was intended to be racist or fighting words.
Both parties are Jewish and Mr. Susi used common Jewish vernacular that cannot
possibly be deemed racist or fighting words. Appellant acknowledged the Yiddish
word schlub roughly translates to sloppy or slovenly. [R,67-77] Appellant,
likewise cited no case law to support his position that schlub is a word that is
racist, an ethnic slur, fighting words or obscene. In Hagler v. Credit World Servs.,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139241 (US Dist. Kan. 2014), the Court held that an
obscenity is to be viewed in the ears of the hearer and the standard is whether
the language is abusive. On this point, Appellant misstates the holding in Linko v.
Natl Action Fin. Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 98718 (M.D. PA. 2007). At page 14
of his brief, Appellant falsely asserts that the Linko court denied summary
judgment upon a finding that a debt collectors use of the term you are a fucking
liar a single time was a violation of the federal equivalent of the FCCPA. Almost
the opposite is true. In Linko, a debt collector called (not the debtor) but her former
daughter in law and said You people are garbage. You are a fucking liar. You are
garbage Then, the debt collector called back, using the false caller id financial
company. The court did deny summary judgment, but not as Appellant asserts
based upon the language used. Contrary to Appellants position, the court also
found even though the phone call was not appropriate the two comments do not
rise to the level of what a reasonable person would find highly offensive. Id.
The proper legal standard under Florida law is not whether Appellant was
merely offended by this single phone communication with Appellee, but rather
whether the words used are abusive or per se obscene and whether Appellee
willfully abused Appellant with the mere language. This is a far higher standard
than what Appellant asserts. Appellant cites to no case holding that the words
10
B.
The U.S. and the Florida Constitution does not allow for the punishment of
the exercise of free speech simply because its exercise is done in an offensive
manner. See L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Pure speech
is protected by the First Amendment if it does not threaten individual or public
safety. W.L. v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the
conduct for which respondent was punished - yelling offensive language at police
officers - was pure speech, and thus protected by the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(holding the fact that society may find speech offensive, is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it).
Remarks such as those alleged - "fucking bill" and "fucking shlub" - are
perhaps distasteful, perhaps even vulgar but, such words do not (as a matter of law)
threaten individual or public safety. Compare State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d 641
(Fla. 1976) (holding that only "fighting words" are not protected, which are "words
like shouts of 'fire' in a crowded theater" that do threaten public safety). In the
seminal case of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court held "while the particular four-letter word being litigated here
[fuck] is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless
often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." If this Court reverses the
11
Summary Judgment order, trial courts will be burdened with the responsibility of
acting as the language police whereby a lawsuit might arise any time an
individual uses a distasteful four-letter word in the collection of a debt, no matter
the context. Consider the following scenario: a longshoreman orders a beer in a
bar. The bar tender says hey Joe, give me fucking 2 dollars for the beer. By
Appellants argument, a law suit might ensue. The trial judge commented on
Appellants arguments in this regard calling them absurd. [T:14-15]
The fact that Mr. Susis conversation might be deemed commercial speech
does not change the ultimate analysis, because pure commercial speech still enjoys
first amendment constitutional protections. See Harris v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976) (calling a communication commercial does not
serve to strip it of all constitutional guarantees).
The distinction of limited first amendment protection over commercial
speech (as opposed to pure speech) is all but evaporated. Indeed, this year the U.S.
Supreme Court in an unanimous ruling in Reed v Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Crt.
2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015), considered the constitutionality of sign restriction
laws, finding notions of strict scrutiny requires every ordinance regulating
commercial speech to be narrowly tailored to ensure its compelling state interest
purposes.
12
It is well established law that use of the words fuck and fucking do not
rise to the level of unprotected speech; because such adjectives enjoy constitutional
protection. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970); see also Brown v. State, 358
So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1978) (only fighting words those not protected by the constitution
(and not including fuck) are only fighting words when spoken face-to-face (not
over a telephone are actionable.
C.
13
343 So. 2d 675 (Fla. DCA 1st 1977) stated, How frequent must communication
be to constitute harassment?....[F. S. 559.72] is not entirely without semblance of
objective, predictable standards. It requires willfulness, and thus recognizes that:
[u]nless some latitude is given the creditorwe may well end up with the result
that the creditor will find it preferable to proceed immediately with legal action
when a debt becomes in default, without any warning to the debtor, rather than run
the risk of being answerable to a supersensitive debtor" quoting Household
Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 543 (1969). Here, Appellant either is a
supersensitive debtor or more likely, a litigious lawyer looking to punish a roofer
who merely wanted to be paid for his work. Few district courts have interpreted
section 1692(d) of the Federal Act, (the equivalent of 559.72(8), but the courts that
have done so have construed it very narrowly. The leading case is Jeter v. Credit
Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985), where the Seventh Circuit held that a
collection letter stating that an account would be referred for legal action, and that
this may cause you embarrassment, inconvenience and further expense, did not
violate section 1692(d). Id. at 1178-79. The court found the mere words used did
not create a tone of intimidation. Id. at 1179; because subsection (d) was meant
to deter offensive language which is at least akin to profanity or obscenity.
Other district courts have read section 1692(d) narrowly, recognizing that it
prohibits only oppressive and outrageous conduct, and that it was not intended
14
to shield even the least sophisticated recipients of debt collection activities from
the inconvenience and embarrassment that are natural consequences of debt
collection. See Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 394 (D. Del.
1991) (attempts to collect debt from wrong individuals did not violate section
1692d); Montgomery v. Florida First Financial Group, Inc., 2008 WL 3540374
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (calling debtor a liar and her mother a liar not enough
to prove section 1692(d) claim). This case and others focused upon the
sophistication and offensiveness of the recipient. Here, the recipient is a lawyer
and the court must (and did) consider that fact in determining if the language used
rose to the level of an obscene ethnic slur. Appellant claims that Harris v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976), holds that the 1st Amendment
does not protect Appellant. However, the holding in Harris is inapposite to
Appellants position. In Harris, the court determined that portions of F.S.
559.72(4) of the FCCPA, constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of the
defendants
property
without
due
process
of
law.
Contrary
to
Appellants position, and consistent with the position advocated herein, the Harris
court noted that communications directed solely to the collection of the debt is
purely commercial speech which."Does not serve to strip it of all constitutional
guarantees.
15
Appellant argues at pages 6-10 of his Initial Brief that the Trial Court ruled
based upon its determination that:
a)
b)
c)
16
making these findings and Appellee did not even raise these arguments in the
Motion for Summary Judgment (R, 42-46) or at any time during the Hearing. [T:121]
Appellant misstates the holding in Drossin v. National Action Financial
Services Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fl. 2009). The Drossin holding was not
based upon pure language, as Appellant asserts. Drossin was a class-action case
and the court found that similar messages were sent to 30,139 Florida
residents. There was no issue in Drossin about the specific language that was used
by the debt collector, but rather whether or not the debt collector failed to advise
the debtors in those calls that the debt collector was in fact a debt collector.
Appellant also miscited Walker v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2012 US DIST.
LEXIS 95128 (D. NJ. 2012), which does not support Appellants position. In
Walker, the court never reached the issue as to whether or not the language used
was profanity or obscenity. Rather, the sole issue before the court was whether or
not evidence of an abusive voicemail message existed. In Walker, the plaintiff was
not claiming that the language used was obscene or profane, but rather that the
tactics of the debt collector was abusive. Here, there is no allegation by Appellants
that any actions on the part of Appellee was abusive or harassing, only that the
language used was an obscenity.
17
Appellant also miscited the holding in Hagler v. Credit World Services Inc.,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139241 (U.S. Dist. Kan. 2014). In Hagler, there was no
allegation that the debt collector simply used obscenity or profanity, rather the
issue was whether or not the debt collector used deceptive tactics when he failed to
identify himself as a debt collector, as is required.
Appellant tries to mislead the court by arguing at pages 21-24 of his Initial
Brief, that there is a least sophisticated consumer test for the court to apply when
the court is to consider the language used by a debt collector. Appellant is simply
wrong and no case supports Appellants position. In each of the cases cited by
Appellant, the issue turned on the behavior and actions of the debt collector and
whether or not "the debt collection practices had a tendency or capacity to
deceive". In the instant case, there is no issue regarding debt collection practices
actions by Appellee that is alleged to be deceptive, harassing or abusive; therefore,
the unsophisticated consumer test has no place in the instant lawsuit. See United
States v. Central Adjustment Bureau Inc., 667 F. SUPP. 370 (N.D. Texas 1986)
(yet another case miscited by Appellant). Appellant asserts that the Central
Adjustment court found language "the judge doesn't give a fuck about your
complaint" to be profanity or an obscenity. That did not occur in that decision. The
issue in Central Adjustment Bureau was not the specific language used by a debt
collector in a single phone call, but rather, whether a particular debt collector had
18
At pages 19- 20 of his Initial Brief, Appellant argues that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has held that the word fuck cannot be
broadcast over the public airways and hence, this Court should find likewise for
purposes of the FCCPA. Aside from the obvious distinction in language broadcast
over the regulated airways from non-regulated language spoken by individuals on
the street, Appellant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Hence, this
Court need not consider same. See Johnston v. Hudlett, 32 So. 3d 700 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2012).
CONCLUSION
19
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the Trial Courts order
granting Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment and award Appellee its
attorneys fees pursuant to F. S. 558.72(2), remanding same to the Trial Court for
a determination as to the proper amount.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
20
21