Saydamin Mauntol

Block A

Chiang Kai Shek College, vs.

Court Of Appeals
G.R. NO. 152988

August 24, 2004

Facts:
Private respondent was employed as a teacher by petitioner for 15 years.
Belo took leave of absence for the S.Y. 1992 - 1993 due to personal reasons.
Petitioner informed her that they could not guarantee her a teaching load when she would
return and that only teachers in service may enjoy the privilege and benefits provided by
the school.
Petitioner hired non-permanent teachers to take her load in her absence.
Private respondent filed with the Labor Arbitration Office a complaint for illegal
dismissal; non-payment of salaries, 13th month pay, living allowance, teacher's day pay;
loss of income; and moral damages when her return was refused due to the nanavailability of working load.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that she was not dismissed but
there was simply no available teaching load for her.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision and ordered her reinstatement
with full back wages.
The Court of Appeals declared that Belo was constructively dismissed; the dismissal,
illegal, for being violative of her security of tenure.
Issue:
Was the private respondent illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to reinstatement and
back wages?
Ruling:
Yes, the court held that Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a
private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of employment and, therefore, be
entitled to a security of tenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a fulltime teacher; (b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c)
such service must have been satisfactory.
Since Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys security of
tenure. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
notice and hearing.
Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in

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rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain

by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
It, therefore, blows our mind why the petitioners would require Ms. Belo, a
permanent teacher since 1977 with a satisfactory service record, to signify her intention to
teach in March 1993. Plainly, the petitioners violated their avowed policies. Since Ms. Belo
was not retiring, resigning or filing another leave of absence after the school year 1992-1993,
the petitioners should have considered her as consenting to teach for the incoming school
year 1993-1994. In fact, they should not have required her to re-apply to teach. In accordance
with the written statement of policies dated 12 March 1993, only probationary teachers are
required by the petitioners to re-apply in March. Failure of probationary teachers to re-apply
in March is an indication of their lack of interest to teach again at the school.
Petitioners invocation of the third policy that of giving teaching assignments to
probationary teachers in April to justify their refusal to provide Ms. Belo a teaching load is,
therefore, a lame excuse that rings of untruth and dishonesty. Patently clear is the illegal
manner by which the petitioners eased out Ms. Belo from the teaching corps.

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Block A

Globe Telecom, Inc vs.

Joan Florendo-Flores
G.R. No. 150092

September 27, 2002

Facts:

Issue:

Joan Florendo-Flores filed Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor

Relations Commission an amended complaint for constructive dismissal against
GLOBE, Lazaro, Galang, and Cacholo M. Santos, her immediate superior, Luzon
Head-Regional Sales.

Respondent bares that Cacholo M. Santos never accomplished and submitted her
performance evaluation report thereby depriving her of salary increases, bonuses
and other incentives and withheld all her other benefits.

GLOBE and its co-petitioners claimed that after receiving her salary in the second
week of May 1998 Florendo-Flores went AWOL without signifying through letter
or any other means that she was resigning from her position. That notwithstanding
her absence and the filing of her case, Florendo-Flores' employment was not
terminated as shown by the fact that salary was still provided her until July 1998

Labor Arbiter Monroe declared Florendo-Flores to have been illegally dismissed

and ordered petitioners to reinstate her without loss of seniority rights and full
benefits; and to pay full back wages, inclusive of basic pay, allowances and
bonuses as prayed for in the complaint

Upon appeal, the NLRC ruled that petitioners did not dismiss Florendo-Flores but
that the latter actually abandoned her employment because of a disagreement with
her immediate superior which she failed to bring to the attention of GLOBE and
its officers, particularly petitioners Lazaro and Galang. However, the NLRC
declared that if only as an act of grace for the latter's past services with the
company, GLOBE, Lazaro and Galang should be held accountable for the back
wages of Florendo-Flores.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals who found that Florendo-Flores was
constructively dismissed and that payment of back wages and damages was in
order. On 21 June 2001 GLOBE, Lazaro and Galang filed a motion for
reconsideration but the motion was denied hence this recourse.

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May the petitioner be held liable for payment of back wages as an act of grace in
view of the express finding that respondent abandoned her employment because of a
personal rift with her immediate superior and not due to any act attributable to them.

Ruling:
Yes, the court held that contrary to the observation of the NLRC, the dispute was
not a mere private spat between respondent Florendo-Flores and her immediate
superior Santos. Granting that this was the case, it had exceeded the periphery of
simple personal affairs that overflowed into the realm of respondent's employment.
Far from pointing to Santos alone as the source of her woes, respondent attributes her
degraded state to petitioners as well. Florendo-Flores cited petitioners' apathy or
indifference to her plight as she was twice left out in a salary increase in August 1987
and May 1998, without petitioners giving her any reason. It is highly improbable that
the exclusion of respondent had escaped petitioners' notice. The absence of an
evaluation report from Santos should have been noted by petitioners and looked into
for proper action to have been made. If a salary increase was unwarranted, then it
should have been sufficiently explained by petitioners to respondent.
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." [16] All these are discernible in
respondent's situation. She was singularly edged out of employment by the
unbearable or undesirable treatment she received from her immediate superior
Cacholo M. Santos who discriminated against her without reason - not preparing and
submitting her performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her
increased salary; not forwarding her project proposals to management that would
have been the source of commendation; diminishing her supervisor stature by
assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and withholding from her the
enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar benefits that were necessary for
her efficient sales performance.Although respondent continued to have the rank of a
supervisor, her functions were reduced to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct
sales agent. This was tantamount to a demotion. She might not have suffered any
diminution in her basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she
was deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits which
she apparently used to receive.
The unauthorized absence of respondent should not lead to the drastic conclusion
that she had chosen to abandon her work. To constitute abandonment, there must be:
(a) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) a
clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee
relationship,[23] requisites that are negated by the immediate filing by respondent

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Florendo-Flores of a complaint for constructive dismissal against petitioners. A

charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with theimmediate filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal; more so, when it includes a prayer for reinstatement. In
constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and
demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such as genuine business
necessity. It should be noted that the award of back wages in the instant case is
justified upon the finding of illegal dismissal, and not under the principle of "act of
grace" for past services rendered.

Philippine Appliance Corporation vs.

Court Of Appeals
G.R. NO. 149434

June 3, 2004

Facts:

Philippine Appliance Corporation entered into a collective bargaining negotiation

between with the respondent union in 1997.

Petitioner offered the amount of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) to each

employee as an early conclusion bonus. Petitioner claims that this bonus was
promised as a unilateral incentive for the speeding up of negotiations between the
parties and to encourage respondent union to exert their best efforts to conclude a
CBA. Upon conclusion of the CBA negotiations, petitioner accordingly gave this
early signing bonus.

In view of the expiration of this CBA, respondent union sent notice to petitioner
of its desire to negotiate a new CBA. Petitioner and respondent union began their
negotiations.

In view of the expiration of this CBA, respondent union sent notice to petitioner
of its desire to negotiate a new CBA. Petitioner and respondent union began their
negotiations. After eleven meetings, respondent union expressed dissatisfaction at
the outcome of the negotiations and declared a deadlock. A few days later,

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respondent union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.

Petitioner and respondent union failed to arrive at an agreement concerning four

items: wages, rice subsidy, signing, and retroactive bonus. Respondent union went
on strike at the petitioners plant. The strike lasted for eleven days and resulted in
the stoppage of manufacturing operations as well as losses for petitioner, which
constrained it to file a petition before the Department of Labor and Employment.
Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and, on January 2000,
ordered the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four hours from
notice and directed petitioner to accept back the said employees. It rendered
decision fixing the amount of wage increase and directed to conclude a CBA to
include the items granted in the conference. Petitioner contested on the awarding
of signing bonus.

Issue:
Was the signing bonus covered under the maintenance of existing benefits?

Ruling:
No, the payment of signing bonus is not covered under the existing benefits. The
Court has consistently ruled that a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable
obligation. True, it may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when
the giving of such bonus has been the companys long and regular practice.
To be considered a regular practice, however, the giving of the bonus should
have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate. The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an
indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing
fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof.
Respondent does not contest the fact that petitioner initially offered a signing
bonus only during the previous CBA negotiation. Previous to that, there is no
evidence on record that petitioner ever offered the same or that the parties included a
signing bonus among the items to be resolved in the CBA negotiation. Hence, the
giving of such bonus cannot be deemed as an established practice considering that the
same was given only once, that is, during the 1997 CBA negotiation.

Saydamin Mauntol

Block A

National Sugar Refineries Corporation vs.

National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 101761 March 24, 1993
Facts:

The National Sugar Refineries Corporation implemented a Job Evaluation

Program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file to department heads. The Job
Evaluation Program was designed to rationalized the duties and functions of all

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positions, reestablish levels of responsibility, and recognize both wage and

operational structures.

Prior to the Job Evaluation Program, the members of respondent union were
treated in the same manner as rank-and file employees. As such, they used to be
paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay.

Two years after the implementation of the Job Evaluation Program, the NBSR
Supervisory Union filed a complainant with the executive labor arbiter for nonpayment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article
100 of the Labor Code.

In its decision, the labor arbiter directed the petitioner to pay overtime pay, rest
day pay and holiday pay as well as pay the individual members of complainant
union the difference in money value between the P100.00 special allowance and
the overtime pay, rest day pay and holiday pay that they ought to have received.

The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the labor arbiters decision
on the ground that the members of respondent union are not managerial
employees, as defined under Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code and, therefore,
they are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay. Respondent NLRC
declared that these supervisory employees are merely exercising recommendatory
powers subject to the evaluation, review and final action by their department
heads; their responsibilities do not require the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment; they do not participate in the formulation of management
policies nor in the hiring or firing of employees; and their main function is to
carry out the ready policies and plans of the corporation. Motion for
reconsideration was denied hence this petitition for certiorari.

Issue:
1.) Are the members of respondent union officers of the managerial staff who are exempt
from the coverage entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay?
2.) Did the payment of the questioned benefits to the union members ripen into a
contractual obligation?

Ruling:

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1. Yes, it is apparent that the members of respondent union discharge duties and
responsibilities which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the
managerial staff, as defined in Section 2, Rule I Book III of the aforestated Rules to
Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1) their primary duty consists of the performance of
work directly related to management policies of their employer; (2) they customarily
and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; (3) they regularly and
directly assist the managerial employee whose primary duty consist of the
management of a department of the establishment in which they are employed (4)
they execute, under general supervision, work along specialized or technical lines
requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; (5) they execute, under general
supervision, special assignments and tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than 20%
of their hours worked in a work-week to activities which are not directly and clearly
related to the performance of their work hereinbefore described.
Under the facts obtaining in this case, we are constrained to agree with petitioner
that the union members should be considered as officers and members of the
managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82. Perforce,
they are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.
2. No, the test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing
that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowingly fully well that
said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof. In the case at
bar, respondent union failed to sufficiently establish that petitioner has been
motivated or is wont to give these benefits out of pure generosity.
If the union members really wanted to continue receiving the benefits which
attach to their former positions, there was nothing to prevent them from refusing to
accept their promotions and their corresponding benefits. As the sating goes by, they
cannot have their cake and eat it too or, as petitioner suggests, they could not, as a
simple matter of law and fairness, get the best of both worlds at the expense of
NASUREFCO.
Promotion of its employees is one of the jurisprudentially-recognized exclusive
prerogatives of management, provided it is done in good faith. In the case at bar,
private respondent union has miserably failed to convince this Court that the
petitioner acted implementing the JE Program. There is no showing that the JE
Program was intended to circumvent the law and deprive the members of respondent
union of the benefits they used to receive.

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Block A

SEVILLA TRADING COMPANY vs

SEMANA
G.R. No. 152456

April 28, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner claimed that it entrusted the preparation of the payroll to its office staff,
including the computation and payment of the 13th month pay and other benefits.

Later, after changing the payroll officer, they discovered an error of including
non-basic and other benefits in the base figure, petitioner then effected the
computation of the 13th month pay hence the new computation reduced the 13th
month pay.

The union then contested the new computation. Parties failed to resolve the issue,
so they submitted it to Semana, the Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator for
consideration and resolution.

The Union alleged that petitioner violated the rule prohibiting the elimination or
diminution of employees benefits as provided for in Art. 100 of the Labor Code,
as amended. They claimed that paid leaves, like sick leave, vacation leave,
paternity leave, union leave, bereavement leave, holiday pay and other leaves with
pay in the CBA should be included in the base figure in the computation of their
13th-month pay.

Petitioner insisted that the computation of the 13th-month pay is based on basic
salary, excluding benefits such as leaves with pay, as per P.D. No. 851, as
amended. It maintained that, in adjusting its computation of the 13th-month pay, it
merely rectified the mistake its personnel committed in the previous years.

A.V.A. Semana decided in favor of the Union.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was dismissed hence this
recourse.

Issues:
Was there a legal basis for the diminution of benefits?
Ruling:
No, so that the rule against diminution of supplements or benefits may apply, it
must be shown that 1.) the grant of the benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened
into a practice over a long period; 2.) the practice is consistent and deliberate; 3.) the

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practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult

question of law; and 4.) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the
employer.
In line with Article 100, it has been held that cash conversion of unused sick leave
paid by the company to its intermittent wokers has ripened into a practice after three
years and may no longer be withdrawn or diminished by the employer unilaterally.
With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been
exercised to constitute voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally
withdrawn by the employer, we hold that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule
requiring a specific minimum number of years. In the above quoted case of Davao
Fruits Corporation vs. Associated Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six
(6) years. In another case,Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs.
Abarquez, the employer, for three (3) years and nine (9) months, approved the
commutation to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of
its intermittent workers. While in Tiangco vs. Leogardo, Jr., the employer carried on
the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to
February 1980, or three (3) years and four (4) months. In all these cases, this Court
held that the grant of these benefits has ripened into company practice or policy
which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. In the case at bar, petitioner Sevilla Trading
kept the practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick
leave and vacation leave in the computation of their 13th-month pay for at least two
(2) years. This, we rule likewise constitutes voluntary employer practice which cannot
be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer without violating Art. 100 of the Labor
Code