List of Figures Ix Preface Xiii: Context

Copyrighted material 9781137406453
Contents
List of Figures
ix
Preface
Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber
xiii
Acknowledgments
xvii
Context
1 Introduction: Thoughts on Explanation
A Place in History
Alicia Juarrero
17
The Context of Our Query

Michael Lissack
25
Case Study
4
Case Study: Creationism

Zack Kopplin
59
Examining the Case

5
Scientific Realism on Historical Science and Creationism

Abraham Graber
6 A Pragmatic Constructivist Take on the Case

Michael Lissack
75
93
Dialogue
7
Robustness and Explanation

William Wimsatt
A Mode of Epi-Thinking Leads to the Exploration of

Vagueness and Finality
S. N. Salthe
109
115

viii
Contents
Complexity, Ockhams Razor, and Truth

Kevin T. Kelly and Konstantin Genin
121
10
Getting a Grip
Nancy J. Nersessian
133
11
Modes of Explanation: Complex Phenomena

Sandra Mitchell
143
12
Narrative as a Mode of Explanation: Evolution and Emergence

Rukmini Bhaya Nair
151
13
Economic Explanations
Paul Thagard
161
14
Narratives and Models in Complex Systems

Timothy F. H. Allen, Edmond Ramly, Samantha Paulsen,
Gregori Kanatzidis, and Nathan Miller
171
15
Evaluating Explanations through Their Conceptual Structures

Steven Wallis
197
16 Investigating the Lay and Scientific Norms for Using Explanation

Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Andrew Higgins, and Joseph Spino
203
Conclusion
215
Afterword 1: The Scientific Attitude Toward Explanation

Lee McIntyre
229
Afterword 2: Explanation Revisited

Jan Faye
233
Afterword 3: Is The World Completely Intelligible? A Very Short Course

Peter Achinstein
241
Afterword 4: Explanation and Pluralism

Beckett Sterner
249
Reprise
Michael Lissack
257
References
263
Suggestions for Further Reading
285
Notes on Contributors
289
Index
295
MODES OF EXPLANATION
Copyright Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber, 2014.

All rights reserved.
First published in 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN: 9781137406453
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Modes of explanation : affordances for action and prediction / edited by
Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9781137406453 (har : alk. paper)
1. Explanation. I. Lissack, Michael.
BD237.M63 2014
121.6dc23
2014026012
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: December 2014
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Thoughts on Explanation

his is a book about explanation. Its origins lie in the all too frequent
observation that our way of thinking often does not match the world.
Such mismatches give rise to ambiguity and uncertainty. The ambiguity, in turn, acts as both a constraint on possible actions (including the
action of reliable prediction) and the desire to explain what is going on.
Explanation is the name for the process we use to answer the questions raised
by observed ambiguities. Explanation is also the name for the product of such
processes. This process/product divergence is merely a hint of the many conf licting approaches to be found in the contemporary understanding of explanation. This book is the first in decades to attempt to bring these conf licting
approaches together and to offer a compelling narrative to explore how those
conf licts can converge.
Such convergence is important because explanation is important. Often we
work with an idiosyncratic conception of explanationa conception that may
not match those of our neighbors. In this dissonance lies both potential gain
and potential trauma. The lack of an explanation often leads to either creative
inquiry or troubling confrontations between holders of differing beliefs. Such
occurrences may be found even when some believe that an explanation has
been forthcomingan explanation that others find explains nothing.
Explanations are central to our way of navigating the world. Some explanations appear in the everyday life of the average person. Thus, the best explanation of the fact that there is dog food all over the kitchen f loor is that, while
we were away at work, Fido got into the food. Other explanations are more
rarified. For example, one might explain the blueness of the sky in terms of
the comparatively long wavelength of blue light and the comparative predilection of longer wavelengths to disperse when passing through the atmosphere.
There are important similarities and differences between these two sketches of
explanation.

4
Contemporary philosophy is characterized by a fascination with explanation. The philosophical literature on explanation is rapidly expanding; the
philosophical literature that attempts to use explanations is vast. This fascination with explanation appears to correspond with the contemporary trend
toward naturalized philosophy. More and more, philosophers are coming to
take their cues from the sciences. Thus, philosophers are increasingly expending energy on studying the methods and results of the sciences. Explanation
appears to be central to the practice of actual scientists; a brief glance at
scientific practice suggests that scientists are in the business of offering
explanations.
This focus on scientific practice, however, overlooks an important set of
practitioners who also rely heavily on explanation. Explanation is important
for managers, consultants, entrepreneurs, investors, and so on. The parallels
between the work of these practitioners and the work of scientists are notable.
Just as scientists construct explanations to make sense of observed phenomena, practitioners create explanations to make sense of the world around them.
Furthermore, just as scientists use accepted explanations to make the world
respond as they want it to, practitioners rely on explanation to navigate the
complicated social, financial, and political world that they inhabit. In each
case, explanations allow humans to manipulate the world successfully. Put
another way, explanations offer affordances (Gibson, 1977). Some of these may
be affordances for action; others are affordances for prediction.
There are, however, also important differences between the ways in which
scientists and practitioners construct and use explanations. The scientist aims
to use established explanations as a starting point for the production of further, true explanations. In practice, the scientist makes use of explanations
as the basis on which to make predictions. Successful predictions, in turn,
help to generate the theories that then become the basis for further explanations. The practitioners aims are more pragmatic. The practitioner relies
on explanations insofar as they are useful; that is, truth is incidental to the
practitioners aims. Explanations have value if they lead to affordances for
action. Explanations have little value if they do not create an affordance but
rather merely offer more description. For the scientific realist, an explanation
is good if it is accurate. Pragmatic success is, at best, a secondary desideratum.
Priorities are reversed for the practitioner: for the practitioner, an explanation
is good if reliance on the explanation leads to pragmatic success. Truth is, at
best, a secondary goal.
The distinction is perhaps best illustrated by considering two disciplines,
each of which is interested in offering explanations: physics and economics.
Physics offers reductive explanations in terms of the properties of the constituents and sub-constituents of matter. For the past century, Western thinking has
been guided by the physics paradigm: the world is organized around discrete
objects that aggregate and have simple relationships. Everything is explainable
through rules, laws, and algorithms. The observer is not a part of the observation but is external to the closed systems under consideration.

Introduction
Economics carries the mark of the last century of Western thought and so
is modeled on the physics paradigm. Physics has been strikingly successful;
economics, less so. There are at least two fundamental differences between
the object of study of physics and that of economics. While physics studies the
interactions of mindless particles, economics studies the interactions of autonomous and semiautonomous agents. Furthermore, while in the study of physics
the physicist stands outside of the closed system being studied, the same cannot
be said of the economist.
Despite the successes of the frame of thinking that characterized physics,
it has a serious deficiency: How can it be that the actions and behaviors of
reflexive, anticipatory creatures are best described by rules for nonthinking,
non-reflexive, non-anticipatory objects? How can it be that context is deemed
not to matter? And what about complexity or those relationships that cannot
be described by the simple? The physics-based frame has no answer and instead
discards these issues with the magic words ceteris paribus (all other things
being equal). Ceteris paribus clauses need not be problematic for the physicist,
for physics studies closed systems. However, we do not live in a closed system;
thus, the need arises for some other frame of thought to enable our tools for
understanding to be adequate for the world around us.
The philosophical literature suggests that explanation and understanding, while intertwined, are also different. Ricoeurs (1973, 1974) hermeneutical method, for example, unfolds through the dialectic of understanding,
explanation, and comprehension. Understanding seems to be better thought
of as the acceptance of a structure into which the target understanding can
be comfortably placed. Another way of saying this is that understanding
involves locating the target into a context in which it seems to be coherent. While contexts are often quite large, the frames we use when seeking
to explain need not be. If the mode of our explanation is to place the target
into a pre-given structure, then both context and frame will be as large or
small as the structure itself. If, by contrast, the mode of our explanation is
to detail a mechanism for how something happens or the conditions that
allow for action to occur, then the context will be large but the frame rather
small. This contrast between frame and context ref lects the notion that each
explanation we encounter contributes to the larger environment that in the
aggregate makes up our cognitive understanding. This contrast also sheds
some light on the role that recursive inquiry among description, explanation,
and understanding can have in constituting and revising our cognitive environs (cf. Runciman, 1983).
Forms of explanation are themselves context dependent. Social systems differ from physical systems in that the use of theories changes the behavior of
social systems. As participants in these systems act, they do so on the basis
of reflexive consideration of context, goals, and affordances drawing on their
own mental models (which are themselves the product of prior contexts and
current attention) in anticipation of possible outcomes. These recursive ref lexive considerations (or as Piaget (1929) would have called it, learning through

6
actions) have no parallel among the physical sciences. The additional considerations give rise to questions of objectivity, discovery, and the basis for scientific
explanation.
The basis for social sciences and design (pragmatic assumptions) is different from the hard sciences. There is a need to deal with ideas and communication in social systems. Thus, the philosophy of science needs expansion to
include paths to the potential logics of the social sciences. Example questions
might include asking What is the basic unit (individual, group, set, dynamic,
environment, etc.)? Sciences of the sentient will require different languages
and different frameworks of thinking than are commonly used in the hard
sciences of non-sentient beings. Meta-level thinking is an opportunity that
can create the need for new strategies of simplification so as to meet requisite
variety.
Objectivity and a goal of reliable predictivity are the hallmarks of what we
shall label Science 1. These are the hard sciences as traditionally taught and as
used as references by philosophers of science. Physics is the exemplar of Science
1. In the Science 1 world, we label and categorize via deduction, probabilistic
inference, and induction. Science 1 excludes context dependence; thus, when it
is forced to deal with the possibility instead asserts ceteris paribus.
Discovery and attunement to context are the hallmarks of what we shall
refer to as Science 2. In the Science 2 world, we instead seek to identify relationships, affordances, and potential actions. We ask questions rather than
seek to label or categorize. Science 2 explicitly makes room for the context
dependencies that Science 1 has excluded. These can be characterized as emergence, volition, ref lexive anticipation, heterogeneity, and design, among others. The philosophical sources necessary to understand the hermeneutics of
social experience can be found in the field known as systems sciences, with
a focus on the underlying models, feedback loops, ref lection, and anticipation that goes by the label of systems thinking. In the social science modeling
embraced by systems science, apparent inconsistencies raised by the inclusion
of the observer are replaced by a need to pay close attention to processes and
to multiple adjacent possibles. Once participants are admitted as part of the
process being modeled and their decision-making and design abilities are taken
into account, then the multiple possibilities to which they give rise must also
be taken into account and not seen as contradictory. The broad applicability
of context dependence and observer questions throughout the anticipatory sciences demands the exploration of both logical foundations and narrative application. The possibility for implementation or action lies in the reconciliation
of experience and models in the anticipatory science.
The inability of Science 1 models to capture the essence of Science 2 events
adequately has been well documented. For example, consider social science
domains where reflexivity and reflexive anticipation are characteristic traits of
actors. Actors can become reflexive by learning and by modifying their cognitive repertoire. More advanced forms of ref lexive anticipation at the actors
level occur when actor A possesses an image of actor Bs image of A, actor B
an image of actor As image of B, and so on (the explicit basis of interaction in

Introduction
Gordon Pasks (1976) Conversation Theory). Learning and the acceptance of

error as part of context add to the recursive reflexive loop. For example, the
dual function of DNA in a cell as a machine for maintaining and reproducing
an organism and as a code for reproducing an organism makes it highly selfref lexive. Likewise, the neural networks in the brain are also self-organized in
a ref lexive manner. A challenge arises whenever a researcher becomes part of
the domain of investigation itself. The act of observing systems poses a series of
challenges in terms of interactions, consensus-building, and results.
Concurrent but OrthogonalHow the Domains of
Science 1 and Science 2 Entwine
If we start from a puzzling action, the story we tell places that action in a temporal continuum, relating it to previous actions and events that led up to it; and
it places the action also in relation to a future scenario or set of possible futures.
The original action was puzzling in part because we didnt have its temporal context . . . we illuminate the unfamiliar by relating it to the familiar . . . Causality,
however, with which the early covering-law theorists tried to link the elements of
a narrative, is totally out of place here. A perceived situation, an emotional reaction, taking on a goal and initiating a plan for reaching it, these do not cause the
action but serve to motivate it . . . the causal account leaves out a conscious agent
whose relation to the antecedent situation is at least a subjective and practical,
if not a deliberative, one . . . Common-sense discourse about human behavior is
thus seen as a kind of aspiring but deficient explanatory endeavor, trying hard
but failing to do what real science is now presumably ableor soon will be
ableto do, namely to explain, predict, and control human behavior . . . One
thing that seems not to be considered is that the context of everyday interaction might have other motivations than the search for laws, causal explanations,
prediction, and control that we associate with the ideas of natural and biological
science. (Carr, 2008)
Human behaviorindeed, any behavior that occurs in the domain of Science

2is contingent and context dependent. Change the context or the cognitive environs and the behavior is likely to change. The domain of Science 1 is
quite different. In the hard sciences, contingency is an enemy of prediction and
control. The contingent is thus to be eliminated if possible and controlled for
(ceteris paribus) if not.
Given this role for contingency, the rough-and-ready distinction between
Science 1 and Science 2 is epistemic; it may or may not have an ontological correlate. At some point, the epistemic tools of the physicist cease to be helpful.
The world can no longer be treated as constituted by discrete closed systems,
describable solely in terms of simple relationships. This rough-and-ready distinction can be illustrated through the use of a continuuma Mobius strip
( Figure I.1).
In our continuum (pictured as a one-sided loop), the world as we encounter
it in the raw is undifferentiated, and it is we who do the differentiations who
allow for cognition. Along the simple and ordered side of the surface lies the

8
Figure I.1
Science I and Science 2.
world as we label and categorize it. Along the complex and attuned side of the
surface lies the world as we act in it.
These two sides of the surface have strikingly different characteristics despite
being part of a continuous surface. The simple and ordered side on the right
(Science 1) corresponds roughly to our traditional way of thinking. It excludes
context dependence. It is the world of reliable predictions, truth claims, and
invariants. The complex and attuned side on the left (Science 2) corresponds to
a more relationship way of thinking. It explicitly includes context dependence.
This is the world of affordances, anticipations, and actions. It is devoid of truth
claims in favor of abductive hypotheses.
The very notion of what counts as an explanation seems to differ between
these two worlds. Adherents of both worldviews in general agree that a description of a mechanism in response to a how? question constitutes an explanation. The disagreements arise over the kinds of answers offered in response to
a why? question, those that tend to arise when an expectation is not met.
While the Science 1 worldview inquires why as a means of revealing truth
and will keep asking until this criterion is met (an optimization strategy), the
Science 2 worldview inquires why as a foundation for further action (or nonaction) and will stop asking when a satisfactory narrative has been offered (a
satisficing strategy). The discussion that follows will attempt to outline the
basis for these orthogonal divergences.
Traditionally, Science 1 is concerned with regularities. Thus, observations
of individual events or occurrences are important only to the extent that the
occurrence of such an individual event is the basis for the falsification of a
claim about regularities. Within the Science 1 context, the answers to questions of why concern the placement of regularities (observed or conjectured)
within an overall schema of regularities. The relevant questions seem to be
those of order and of fit. Both further descriptions of regularities within an
ordered regime (functional explanation) and measurements of adherence to a
pure (noncontingency messed-with) regularity are both offered and accepted
as explanatory. The how? question implied by the why? questions is How

Introduction
does this fit within the established order? where the answer is a mechanism for
how fit happens.
Some of the unarticulated assumptions in the Science 1 worldview are the
pre-givenness of an established order, the idea that there should be fidelity to
that order, that the correct granularity for inquiry is at the level of regularities,
and that regularities can be referred to adequately by labels and models. Given
these assumptions, it is reasonable to eliminate contingency with a further
claim of ceteris paribus, to treat fit as measurable, to rely on noun forms, and
to posit truth as a justificatory variable. While each of these reasonable
approximations can be discarded in the pursuit of better explanation, our
human cognitive limits and our reliance on the least action principle enable
us to simplify why explanations in the Science 1 world as category membership questions, and allows a pragmatic scientific realism to guide the articulations of the abbreviated worldview that results.
In the Science 2 world, the focus is on individual actions and occurrences,
whereas the regularities of Science 1 are part of the context in which these individual events occur. In Science 2, the why? questions tend to demand answers
in the form of narrativehere are the constraints/affordances that given this
particular context allowed or prevented a particular action. Once again, the
least action principle combined with human cognitive limits means that
while a particular context includes an infinitude of variables, the observer/
actor is limited in what is attended to and processed. The regularities that are
the granular focus of Science 1 frequently are treated as assumed in the attention/cognition processing of Science 2. The granular focus of Science 2 is on
individual actions and events and the regularities are part of the context.
Some of the unarticulated assumptions in the Science 2 worldview are the
contingency and context dependence of any observed or assumed order, the
idea that fidelity to any particular order only has relevance as part of an
observation/expectation/further action feedback loop, that the correct granularity for inquiry is at the level of individuality, and that regularities can be
referred to only contingently by labels and models. Given these assumptions,
it is never reasonable to eliminate contingency with a further claim of ceteris
paribus (for in that claim one might eliminate the explanatory variables themselves), to treat measurement of deviance from expectations as a further contingent variable in the feedback loop, to rely on verb forms, or to posit actions
as a justificatory variable. While each of these reasonable approximations
can be discarded in the pursuit of better explanation, our human cognitive
limits and our reliance on the least action principle allow us to simplify
why explanations in the Science 2 world as narratives about affordances and
constraints, and allow a pragmatic constructivism to guide the articulations of
the abbreviated worldview that results.
The differences between Science 1 and Science 2 echo as we seek to answer:
What do we mean by explanations and how are we comfortable with them?
The two perspectives ask different questions that might affect what we believe
or do not believe about explanations. Are we looking at the right things? Are

10
Figure I.2
Differences between Science 1 and Science 2.
we self-aware of our beliefs? Do we have the right words? Do we know the

limitations of what we are talking about? The two perspectives also offer different typologies of kinds of explanations. In both perspectives, there are how
explanations or mechanisms. In both, there are why explanations, although
in Science 1 why is with reference to a pre-given structure, while in Science
2 why refers to a sense of purpose. Then there are contingent explanations,
which only happened because some context enabled them to happen, so when
you offer an explanation you say: Here was the context. There are but-for
explanationssomething else should have happened, but it did not, and this
filled the gap. Finally, there are two more explanatory types that, as Sandy
Mitchell (this volume) puts it, are not an explanation but nonetheless happen
all the time: coercive explanationsBecause my mother said so or some more
powerful forceand explain away explanations, where you explain the contingencies as a result of whose occurrence the expected observation/action did
not happen, or so we claim.
In Science 1 terms, explanations either describe a mechanism or suggest that
things belong to a category. The mechanism tells us the how, and the better we
can get in describing the mechanism, the better we think the explanation is.
Category membership in a way asserts a whyThis happened because she
was nice. Science 1 explanations are seldom satisfactory to either the explainer
or the recipient unless the explanation is causal. (There is more on causal explanations in later chapters.) By contrast, Science 2 explanations are seldom general
enough to assert causality in any kind of a reliably predictive way. Science 2 has
more room for the notion that how and why can collide with each other,
and that when they do sometimes you do not know what is going on. Science 2
explanations of the explain away varieties do make causal claims, but they are
claims about what might have/should have/would have/could have happened
had some set of contingencies not been present. The resulting explanation is
more of a descriptive narrative of those very contingencies along with the assertion of some more general (Hempels covering law? Woodwards general rule
regarding interventions?) structure or mechanism that, had ceteris paribus held,
would have cohered to the explainers perspective of how the world works.

Introduction
11
While Science 1 explanations allow for and are structured around predictions, Science 2 explanations suffer from the contingencies accompanying
explicit rejection of ceteris paribus. As such, these explanations by definition
allow for a series of possible errors that are seldom found or asserted in the
Science 1 world. These errors include the possibility of the wrong model being
used, the wrong contingencies happening or failing to happen, overlooked context, inadequate metaphor, inappropriate synecdoche, misdirected awareness or
attention, intervening volition or coercion, and incommensurable worldviews.
Despite these differences, we must remember that Science 1 and Science 2
are on the same surface and part of the same continuum (that Mobius strip in
Figure I.1). As such, our mission is trying to make sense of this giant muddle,
define what we mean, suggest where it might work and where it might not, and
then try to explore what it is that we are talking about.
Worldviews
Some of our contributors have suggested that the muddle of explanation and its
meaning that we describe above can be clarified when approached from the
perspective of scientific realism; still others suggested that the answer can be
found in the perspective known as pragmatic constructivism. The philosophy
of science literature often portrays these perspectives in opposition; much like
the worlds of Science 1 and Science 2. It can be very tempting to attempt an
overlay and then to suggest that Science 1 can be mapped to scientific realism
and Science 2 to pragmatic constructivism. However, as the collection of chapters in this book will reveal, such a mapping is far too simple and overlooks the
very nuances that make the question of explanation of interest.
Exploration requires perspective and the philosophy of science offers two
perspectives that seem to be helpful. Scientific realism is often modeled as
taking Newtonian physics to be the paradigm instance of science: other sciences are understood via assimilation to the Newtonian model; explanations
are understood to be reductionist and law driven. While the scientific realism
practiced by scientists and philosophers is much more nuanced, what it shares
with the common-sense version is an underlying belief in the independent
existence of reality and of the fundamental importance of truth. The takeaway
of importance here is that scientific realism makes truth claims, judges those
claims for coherence against a pre-given world, and affords as real entities
whose existence cannot be observed and can only be inferred.
The pragmatic constructivism approach begins by asking what actions are
being contemplated and how judgments regarding those actions can be arrived
at. The key to these observations lies in the recognition of the ontological
difference between natural entities and those that are the product of human
constructionwhile the natural entities can be referred to as pre-given
and thus described (functional explanation), human constructions are always
changing and requisite explanations demand mechanisms and explication of
relationships. This form of constructivism is less concerned with the idea that
man constructs reality and more with the notion that what matters is the

12
representation of a supposed reality with which we opt to deal at a given time.

Truth is thus irrelevant and reality is observer dependent.
Without taking a stance on the issue, this volume considers questions such
as: Is the philosophers focus on scientific explanation myopic? Are important
philosophical issues being overlooked by ignoring the use to which practitioners put explanations? Explanation as the focus of inquiry provides a fertile
arena for the exploration of these questions. And, at least with respect to the
domain of explanation, this book offers a compelling narrative on how the two
worldviews can be reconciled.
The narrative takes the form of an enacted hermeneutic circle. Because we
were holding a conference, those in attendance had the luxury of engaging in
dialogue, questioning authors of text on both content and intent, inquiring as
to the underlying context that gave rise to each of the intended and inferred
meanings, and engaging in recursive reflexive conversation. This is not to suggest that stable eigen values were reached regarding any of the myriad of topics
so discussed, but rather highlights the processes and routines in which the
participants engaged. In presenting this book, we aim similarly to engage both
authors and readers in a hermeneutic cycle. Our concept is to do so in as pragmatic a way as possible given that you the reader cannot (without significant
effort) directly engage with the authors themselves. Our pragmatic hermeneutics herein consists of presenting a multitude of authors speaking in their own
voice and then giving the reader the opportunity to engage and ref lect. As editors, we have restricted our voices to defined chapters, interjections before and
after the chapters of others, and the conclusion.
To keep our task within the definition of the scientific enterprise as suggested by Nagel (1979)the distinctive aim of the scientific enterprise as being
theories that offer systematic and responsibly supported explanationsour
hermeneutics is similar to that advocated by Gadamer:
Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics is that all understanding involves not
only interpretation, but also application. Against an older tradition that divided
up hermeneutics into subtilitas intelligendi (understanding), subtilitas explicandi (interpretation), and subtilitas applicandi (application), a primary thesis
of Truth and Method is that these are not three independent activities to be
relegated to different sub-disciplines, but rather they are internally related. They
are all moments of the single process of understanding. (Bernstein, 1982)
The best definition for hermeneutics is: to let what is alienated by the character
of the written word or by the character of being distantiated by cultural or historical distances speak again . . . the movement of understanding is constantly from
the whole to the part and back to the whole. Our task is to expand the unity of the
understood meaning centrifugally . . . Let us think of this structure in a dynamic
way; the effective unity of the anticipated meaning comes out as the comprehension is enlarged and renovated by concentric circles. The perfect coherence of the
global and final meaning is the criterion for the understanding. When coherence
is wanting, we say that understanding is deficient. The harmony of all the details
with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve
this harmony means that understanding has failed. (Gadamer)

Introduction
13
Approximately half of the authors in this volume hold one belief or the other
with respect to scientific realism and some form of pragmatic constructivism.
The interchange between these two worldviews formed the heart of the interesting dialogue during our event: Modes of Explanation. Both perspectives
have a concern for explanation by means of category membership. Still other
kinds of explanation raise concerns for one perspective and not the other. For
example, functional explanations are not explanatory from the perspective of
pragmatic constructivism, because a functional explanation fails to create any
kind of first-order affordance for action (descriptions may provide background
information, and thus create a second-order affordance, but fail to create an
enablement or a constraint on action in and of themselves). By contrast, the
two kinds of context-dependent explanations that play critical roles in pragmatic constructivismexplanations that point to aspects of the context that
enabled such-and-such and explanations that point to aspects of the context
such that, were these contexts absent, this-and-that would have come about
are similarly not considered to be explanatory from the perspective of the scientific realist, for each kind of explanation points to contingent features of the
world as opposed to bottoming out in robust, exceptionless laws.
Rich (2011), in his farewell column in the New York Times, noted that the
pressures of writing for a readership can push you to have stronger opinions
than you actually have, or contrived opinions about subjects you may not care
deeply about, or to run roughshod over nuance to reach an unambiguous conclusion. We believe that unambiguous conclusions about the nature of explanations are a mistake and thus have undertaken to find a way to preserve the
very ambiguity that gives nuance its due.
To accomplish this, a concept that we believe helps to reconcile the Science 1
and Science 2 perspectives is the notion of concurrent but orthogonal. Science
1 and Science 2 are indeed different, but they are not oppositional. They are
also not super-positional, where one would claim a status of truth only in the
light of a revealed contingency. Concurrent but orthogonal suggests a simultaneity that is perpendicular, much like the planes in Figure I.3.
Figure 1.3
Perpendicular planes.

14
Of course, these planes are not existing in their own space, but have a contextthus the shape we suggest looks more like the plane-crossed ellipsoid in
Figure I.4.
Initially we conjecture that the intersecting planes can be thought of as
the two Sciences (1 and 2) and the two philosophies of science (scientific
realism and pragmatic constructivism). This conception helped us shape the
conference, the workshops, and this book. Yet the exercise of organizing,
gathering, speaking, listening, transcribing, questioning, editing, and writing has led to a revision in this conception. We now are suggesting that the
two planes are those of ontologyrepresented by the Mobius strip of the two
Sciences and epistemologyrepresented by a model of question generation that we will further discuss in chapter 5 and beyond. This questiongeneration model represents a guide to the pragmatic hermeneutic process
(see Figures I.5 and I.6 ).
Figure I.4
Plane-crossed ellipsoid.
Figure I.5
Question-generation model.

Introduction
Figure I.6
15
Question-generation model.
This question-generation model allows the simple mappings of scientific

realism and Science 1 and pragmatic constructivism and Science 2 to be
avoided. What it does instead is to demand that framing issues be reexamined
and not merely assumed. It is designed to help avoid the errors described by
Kahneman (2011): We are ruined by our own biases. When making decisions,
we see what we want, ignore probabilities, and minimize risks that uproot our
hopes. By making assumptions (and in so doing restricting ourselves to a set of
labels and a model), we predetermine what might be learned, which will limit
the options that appear to be open to us. As Kahneman says: We often fail to
allow for the possibility that evidence that should be critical to our judgment is
missing. What we see is all there is. Goulds (2011) take is: We therefore fail
to note important items in plain sight, while we misread other facts by forcing them into preset mental channels, even when we retain a buried memory
of actual events. Further, Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) notes: we take up only
those actions and solutions that have an immediate effect on the situation, and
always as they have been framed for us.
Concurrent but orthogonal is a very different way of thought. It calls for
mapping the flow of ideas on the ellipsoid shown in Figure I.3. Given that
frame, the world can look very different. The following quotes help to frame
the idea. Dewey speaks of new thoughts and new perceptions, as does Gadamer.
Gould tells us that the framing takes place in stories, and Rorty reminds us of
our goal: coping with the reality in which we find ourselves.
No matter how ardently the artist might desire it, he cannot divest himself,
in his new perception, of meanings funded from his past intercourse with his
surroundings, nor can he free himself from the inf luence they exert upon the
substance and manner of his present being. If he could and did there would be
nothing left in the way of an object for him to see. (Dewey, 1934)

16
The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward new experiences.

That is why a person who is called experienced has become so not only through
experiences but is also open to new experiences. The consummation of his experience, the perfection that we call being experienced does not consist in the
fact that someone already knows everything better than anyone else. Rather
the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically
undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had, and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. (Gadamer, Truth and Method )
[S]ince we cannot observe everything in the blooming and buzzing confusion of
the worlds surrounding richness, the organizing power of canonical stories leads
us to ignore important facts readily within our potential sight, and to twist or
misread the information that we do manage to record. Canonical stories predictably drive facts into definite and distorted pathways that validate the outlines
and necessary components of these archetypal tales. (Gould, 2011)
Knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right . . . but rather a matter of
acquiring habits of action for coping with reality. (Rorty, 1991)
Index
abduction, 78, 223

accidentalism, 978, 102
Achinstein, 34, 206, 2412, 244, 246, 248,
263, 285, 293
affordance, 46, 89, 13, 356, 40, 53, 55,
81, 85, 956, 1014, 138, 141, 220, 225,
227, 249, 258, 269, 274
Allen, 38, 1712, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182
4, 186, 188, 192, 194, 198, 263, 271,
275, 279, 283, 292
alliances, 45
ambiguities, 3, 13, 44, 53, 89, 117, 151,
204, 209, 257
analog, 36, 49, 163, 1846, 260, 270, 286,
291
analogy, 27, 47, 49, 82, 125, 137, 164, 168
9, 1858, 219, 223, 2601, 292
Aristotle, 201, 144, 157, 186, 242, 263,
278
Ashby, xiv, 199, 263
Austin, 34, 978, 103, 263
Bakhtin, 38, 263
Barker, 37, 263
Barondes, 32, 264
Bauerlein, 49, 264
Beatty, 148, 264
Bechtel, 23, 28, 45, 135, 264
Beck, 222, 264
behavior, 5, 7, 18, 31, 34, 37, 3941, 43, 45,
48, 78, 87, 102, 110, 112, 1369, 1437,
154, 162, 175, 177, 188, 1989, 220,
22931, 233, 238, 2423, 268, 271, 274,
27780, 282, 287, 289, 291, 293
Behe, 75, 264
belief, 3, 1011, 13, 17, 20, 22, 25, 29, 32,

445, 51, 5960, 66, 68, 70, 77, 7980,
84, 90, 935, 978, 1024, 122, 1267,
130, 1345, 154, 1568, 1635, 167,
197, 204, 218, 230, 234, 236, 238, 260,
264, 266, 270, 273, 277, 281, 283, 291
Bernstein, 12, 218, 264
Bertalanffy, 202, 281
Bhaskar, 224, 264
biology, 7, 27, 301, 34, 44, 48, 61, 634,
69, 77, 91, 99, 11516, 11819, 1335,
13841, 1434, 14750, 1524, 156,
163, 16970, 1728, 181, 187, 1937,
199, 202, 215, 219, 2367, 255, 2636,
26971, 2736, 27883, 2867, 2901,
2934
Blunden, 225, 264
Boden, 25, 264
Bohm, 182, 217, 264
Braverman, 205, 265
Broad, 6, 116, 144, 205, 224, 255, 265, 292
Bruner, 456, 265
Buber, 217
Bunge, 47, 265
Bunzl, 30, 265
Cabrera, 197, 199, 265
Carnap, 267, 265
Caro, 39, 267
Carr, 7, 219, 265
Cartwright, 134, 148, 245, 2656
category, 6, 810, 13, 19, 21, 268, 356,
402, 78, 80, 1434, 151, 163, 2001,
2034, 216, 220, 231, 235, 238,
276, 287

296
Index
cause, 7, 10, 22, 256, 28, 307, 3940,

423, 4654, 635, 78, 84, 87, 91, 95,
97, 99, 105, 110, 11519, 122, 12730,
138, 1438, 1523, 165, 173, 1934,
199202, 204, 206, 21921, 225, 2301,
234, 238, 242, 246, 253, 2567, 265,
26870, 272, 2745, 2779, 2823, 286,
289, 291
Ceteris Paribus, 5, 7, 1011, 22, 48, 523,
148, 291
Checkland, 197
Chomsky, 155, 266
Churchland, 28, 46, 204, 266
codes, 40, 45, 104, 173
cognition, 57, 9, 18, 29, 31, 35, 45, 47, 49,
545, 834, 945, 99, 102, 1045, 119,
1523, 155, 1578, 1624, 16770, 197,
199, 220, 231, 2337, 239, 2647,
2701, 273, 2756, 27981, 2859,
2913
Cohen, 266, 270, 275
Coherence, xv, 1112, 23, 967, 164, 170,
199, 202, 238, 258, 273, 2801, 283,
287, 289
Colosi, 197, 265
complexity, 5, 8, 23, 31, 337, 39, 47,
502, 64, 88, 99, 102, 104, 112, 119,
1213, 125, 127, 129, 131, 135, 137, 139,
141, 1435, 14752, 1556, 161, 163,
16871, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 1835,
187, 1923, 1956, 198200, 2034,
208, 21516, 2256, 22931, 238, 245,
24950, 2537, 2635, 267, 269, 2713,
2756, 278, 2803, 28692
complicated, 4, 38, 54, 85, 111, 121, 130,
146, 158, 165, 169, 1767, 1835, 1989,
225, 253, 257
concept, 1213, 267, 29, 31, 412, 4652,
54, 57, 69, 812, 91, 956, 98, 1001,
119, 123, 129, 133, 136, 1479, 1512,
163, 166, 174, 185, 197202, 213,
21617, 219, 221, 225, 229, 24956,
2645, 26872, 2748, 2802, 2857,
2902, 294
Connell, 182, 266
constraint, 3, 9, 13, 378, 48, 53, 55,
11213, 11719, 137, 205, 233, 274
constructivism, 9, 11, 1315, 31, 3940,
449, 523, 73, 76, 79, 83, 867, 90,
939, 1015, 110, 11718, 1379, 152,
156, 178, 198, 2212, 2246, 230,

2345, 2378, 24951, 2578, 2601,
263, 266, 268, 273, 2757, 27982,
285, 288
context, 1, 514, 1923, 257, 2931,
3341, 435, 4753, 55, 57, 60, 66,
801, 83, 8890, 934, 96, 1023, 113,
127, 1335, 141, 143, 146, 1501, 153,
158, 164, 182, 192, 195, 217, 219, 2245,
2336, 242, 2468, 2503, 258, 2601,
265, 267, 274, 276, 2868
contingency, 7, 911, 13, 35, 37, 48, 51, 53,
55, 143, 14750, 21617, 2245, 235,
250, 264
Craik, 38, 46, 266
Craver, 28, 31, 55, 135, 2034, 254, 266,
274, 285
creationism, 45, 5970, 73, 757, 7980,
82, 848, 905, 978, 1014, 156, 162,
176, 200, 202, 217, 230, 2367, 250,
2634, 2712, 2745, 277, 290
Cummins, 205, 266
Cupchik, 39, 49, 94, 97, 266
cybernetics, 45, 261, 263, 270, 281, 283,
289
Dallmyr, 107, 266
Danto, 35, 266, 272
Darden, 28, 135, 266, 274
Darwin, 60, 67, 756, 7980, 868, 91,
153, 158, 199, 237, 264, 2678, 271,
276, 280, 283, 285, 290
Dennett, 1523, 157, 267
description, 45, 78, 20, 22, 28, 30, 32,
356, 43, 489, 813, 88, 96, 99101,
1034, 128, 163, 201, 208, 231, 234,
2378, 244, 2534, 257, 277
design, 6, 44, 47, 60, 62, 657, 6970,
767, 856, 99, 112, 198, 220, 230, 236,
26870, 274, 279, 283, 285
Devitt, 78, 101, 267
Dewey, 15, 50, 267
Dilthey, 30, 234, 252
Droysen, 30, 234
Dubin, 201, 267
Duhem, 25, 267
Eco, 21, 153, 267
ecological, 31, 36, 767, 99, 110, 175, 178,
193, 199, 263, 269, 283, 292

Index
economics, 45, 59, 1545, 157, 1615,
16770, 198, 215, 222, 22931, 268,
2734
Edmonds, 49, 267
Einstein, 104, 154, 267, 275, 280
Elgin, 135, 267
Ellerman, 115, 268
Elster, 166, 268
emerge, 6, 1819, 21, 23, 356, 38, 478,
501, 59, 94, 97, 99, 11819, 122, 126,
1437, 151, 163, 174, 176, 180, 201,
223, 2301, 238, 245, 250, 252, 255,
261, 26870, 2725, 278, 2812, 286,
28992
Emmeche, 48, 268
environment, 56, 29, 32, 367, 447, 55,
85, 946, 99, 1012, 112, 145, 152, 177,
199, 202, 216, 220, 2245, 238, 263,
279, 292
episteme, 7, 14, 212, 26, 301, 34, 36, 39,
414, 49, 55, 77, 846, 91, 94, 101, 122,
124, 135, 141, 143, 174, 177, 2034,
220, 2236, 233, 236, 238, 251, 254,
256, 2678, 270, 2767, 27981, 288,
291, 2934
Epstein, 105, 268
Erbele, 218, 268
evidence, 15, 29, 46, 501, 54, 57, 59, 65,
6970, 7680, 857, 93, 95, 100, 103,
121, 134, 145, 153, 1589, 162, 1657,
198, 205, 215, 219, 221, 22931, 236,
265, 269
evolution, 44, 46, 5970, 73, 757, 79,
8691, 935, 979, 1014, 110, 116,
119, 148, 1513, 1556, 158, 162, 167,
176, 178, 1812, 1878, 193, 199, 230,
2367, 256, 2634, 266, 26971, 273
4, 27880, 282, 285, 288, 2901
experience, 6, 16, 28, 38, 446, 4950, 63,
95, 1012, 1045, 126, 153, 155, 169,
1713, 1768, 181, 183, 1925, 21618,
220, 225, 229, 253, 267, 292
fact, 3, 1517, 1921, 25, 2831, 33, 412,
44, 46, 48, 501, 54, 59, 64, 669, 83,
878, 91, 94, 968, 1024, 107, 10910,
113, 119, 135, 138, 1513, 157, 164,
1703, 176, 182, 193, 203, 205, 21213,
21920, 223, 2368, 241, 2467, 249,
2556, 260, 26970, 275
297
falsifiability, 8, 61, 97, 100, 102, 104,

162, 273
Faye, 334, 100, 2334, 2368, 257, 260,
268, 293
Ferraris, 39, 267
foundation, 8, 17, 1920, 45, 66, 70, 82,
86, 96, 130, 153, 157, 275, 286, 290,
2923
Fraassen van, 33, 50, 93, 107, 237, 281
Franklin, 77, 268
Fundierung, 957, 1034, 227
Funtowicz, 171, 268
Gabriel, 54, 269
Gadamer, 12, 1516, 21718, 220, 252, 269
Gee, 77, 269
Gibson, 4, 101, 269
Giere, 107, 237, 286
Gilovich, 28, 269
Glasersfeld, 45, 97, 2812
Glennan, 34, 36, 48, 269
Glymour, 122, 128, 130, 269, 272, 280,
286
Goldstein, 144, 269
Goodman, 221, 269
Gould, 1516, 152, 269
Graber, 34, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 756, 78,
80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 21516, 218,
220, 222, 224, 226, 2347, 24952, 289
Graham, 51, 270
Griffiths, 205, 280
Guba, 48, 273
Habermas, 222, 270, 288
Hacking, 163, 270
Ham, 70, 767, 7980, 85, 92, 274, 277
Hanson, 33, 50, 270
Harmon, 203, 265, 282, 293
Hawking, 31, 270
Haynie, 116, 270
Heidegger, 219, 252
Hempel, 10, 22, 26, 28, 323, 545, 115,
134, 2034, 243, 254, 270
Henderson, 79, 270, 286
hermeneutics, 56, 12, 14, 25, 21619,
221, 2256, 252, 264, 268, 277, 279,
281, 286
Hesse, 39, 263, 270
heuristics, 43, 47, 226, 286, 290
Higgins, 203, 265, 279, 293

298
Index
Hiltzik, 69, 271

Hoekstra, 174, 178, 263
Hong, 95, 103, 105, 271
Horgan, 79, 270
Humphreys, 203, 271, 286
Husserl, 216
inference, 6, 202, 31, 4950, 57, 68,
7880, 91, 99, 117, 122, 127, 130, 153,
1649, 179, 182, 2001, 219, 252, 264,
276, 279, 286, 291
Juarrero, 1718, 20, 22, 27, 271, 28990
Kagan, 30, 271, 286
Kahneman, 15, 113, 271, 286
Kaidesoja, 42, 45, 52, 271
Kaiser, 223, 266, 269, 271, 275, 2801
Kanatzidis, 171, 292
Kant, 22, 235, 271
Karsenti, 144, 271
Keefe, 117, 199, 271, 276
Keil, 204, 272, 286
Kellert, 31, 272
Kelly, 34, 94, 1212, 124, 126, 128, 130,
272, 291
Kennedy, 51, 64, 287
Kesseboehmer, 38, 283
Keynes, 1623
Kim, 144, 241, 272
Kitcher, 28, 50, 122, 272, 278
Kleidon, 117, 272
Klochko, 198, 272
Kopplin, 5960, 62, 6470, 757, 79, 100,
104, 236, 290
Korzybski, 172, 272
Koslowski, 77, 273
Krummaker, 199, 279
Kuhn, 36, 83, 131, 177, 1823, 237, 273
Labov, 155, 273
Lakatos, 162, 273, 293
Lane, 197, 271, 273, 278
law, 4, 7, 1011, 13, 18, 212, 27, 2934,
36, 39, 43, 456, 489, 54, 604, 667,
71, 89, 93, 100, 103, 107, 109, 112,
11519, 121, 124, 127, 1345, 143,
14650, 154, 158, 1745, 177, 17981,
187, 1934, 199, 216, 21920, 233,
235, 237, 2428, 250, 255, 260, 2636,
2701, 2745, 279, 281, 283, 2857,

2901, 293
Leibniz, 121
level, 6, 9, 23, 29, 39, 52, 54, 61, 65, 67, 69,
10912, 119, 129, 136, 139, 141, 1447,
149, 153, 1613, 16772, 175, 17780,
1823, 1878, 192, 1945, 199201,
203, 217, 221, 231, 235, 238, 247, 252,
255, 268, 275
Levins, 37, 273
Lincoln, 48, 273
Lipton, 79, 245, 273
Lissack, xv, 34, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 256,
28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48,
50, 52, 54, 934, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104,
21516, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 2345,
237, 24952, 2578, 260, 273, 287, 289
Litt, 204, 281
Little, 4, 29, 33, 52, 623, 65, 68, 7780,
118, 124, 13840, 145, 151, 166, 192,
204, 224
Lobdell, 197, 265
Lombrozo, 204, 273
Lorand, 29, 273
Lucas, 173, 280
Lundberg, 47, 274
Luskin, 93, 274
Machamer, 28, 135, 274
Macklem, 99, 274
Mahabharata, 158
Maillat, 95, 274
Marx, 223, 274
Matsuno, 117, 274
Matthews, 105, 274
McGhee, 75, 274
McGrenere, 101, 274
mechanism, 5, 811, 21, 23, 26, 28, 301,
334, 367, 43, 48, 513, 63, 73, 75,
83, 989, 101, 111, 1356, 1389, 141,
1437, 1614, 16771, 177, 21516, 234,
2368, 2423, 245, 257, 261, 2646,
269, 2745, 27980, 2867
Meehl, 201, 274
Mele, 166, 274
memories, 15, 94, 154, 159, 20612, 265,
278, 286
metaphor, 11, 21, 36, 39, 102, 107, 156,
168, 1858, 197, 225, 250, 266, 270,
277, 285, 287

Index
method, 45, 12, 16, 21, 301, 357, 479,
55, 57, 601, 66, 68, 7880, 848, 92,
99100, 1025, 1215, 1279, 131, 153,
161, 16970, 172, 177, 180, 196, 1989,
203, 205, 212, 215, 217, 221, 22931,
2357, 248, 2502, 263, 26870, 273,
275, 2779, 282, 291, 293
Meyer, 75, 274
Mill, 144, 166, 274
Miller, 28, 32, 171, 275, 292
mind, 5, 18, 22, 26, 29, 41, 49, 54, 6870,
73, 79, 83, 85, 90, 94, 107, 119, 130,
1434, 1634, 170, 173, 192, 1979,
201, 235, 241, 251, 253, 257, 2646,
26870, 272, 2747, 27983, 2859,
292
Minsky, 168, 275
Mitchell, 10, 52, 1434, 146, 148, 150,
199, 222, 238, 2556, 2756, 286, 291
Mlodinow, 31, 270
mobius strip, 7, 11, 14, 225, 258, 261
model, 56, 9, 11, 1415, 223, 278,
313, 359, 41, 49, 513, 645,
845, 95, 99101, 1034, 107, 11517,
122, 13341, 14950, 164, 169, 17188,
1927, 200, 2034, 208, 210, 216,
218, 2223, 231, 2345, 2434, 249,
251, 2546, 258, 2601, 2647, 269,
2723, 2758, 2803, 2868, 2902,
294
Moreno, 48, 275
Morgan, 134, 144, 266, 275
Morris, 989, 275
Morrison, 134, 275
Mossio, 48, 275
Nagai, 52, 269
Nagel, 12, 34, 102, 161, 2414, 275
Nair, 1512, 154, 156, 158, 255, 275, 291
narrative, 3, 610, 12, 1718, 32, 38, 40,
45, 53, 69, 978, 1519, 171, 1737, 179,
1818, 1925, 199, 219, 234, 24950,
255, 261, 2656, 273, 275, 283
Nathan, 171, 292
Needham, 192, 275
Nersessian, 1334, 136, 138, 140, 204,
2223, 253, 2756, 282, 291
Neubert, 101, 275
Newton, 11, 21, 83, 111, 148, 177, 243,
2468, 263, 275
299
Nietzsche, 28, 275

Nor, 15, 20, 22, 38, 42, 81, 96, 99, 102,
148, 175, 177, 222, 2345, 237, 243,
2457
Nussbaum, 1667
Nye, 76, 274
observe, 34, 67, 910, 12, 16, 27, 37,
41, 55, 768, 80, 82, 85, 88, 90, 92,
1003, 127, 153, 1567, 17281,
1878, 1935, 202, 216, 237, 258,
2601, 279
ontology, 7, 11, 14, 17, 19, 212, 30, 33,
3941, 445, 489, 52, 80, 825, 97,
100, 121, 2246, 2358, 2501, 2667,
271, 280
order, 89, 13, 1819, 25, 289, 31, 35,
40, 43, 45, 47, 612, 68, 78, 81, 84, 101,
1034, 11011, 119, 122, 1267, 129,
131, 1335, 13940, 146, 14850, 159,
161, 167, 170, 172, 182, 200, 205, 210,
219, 230, 236, 241, 2435, 249, 2556,
261, 264, 268, 282
orthogonal, 78, 13, 15, 39, 47, 50, 52, 151,
2246, 24951, 258, 261
Orzack, 41, 276
Oulasvirta, 401, 44, 47, 276
Overton, 205, 276
Palmarini, 15, 268, 276
paradigm, 45, 11, 17, 81, 83, 102, 136,
153, 1778, 1823, 206, 2223, 237,
269, 273, 2756
Pask, 7, 276
Passmore, 27, 280
Pattee, 174, 177, 276
pattern, 1718, 278, 302, 37, 40, 42,
456, 501, 82, 945, 1035, 1278,
1378, 144, 157, 165, 179, 201, 248, 256,
271, 278
Paulsen, 171, 292
Pearl, 128, 276
Perino, 198, 282
phenomena, 4, 17, 1921, 23, 302,
356, 39, 424, 46, 4950, 52, 54,
73, 75, 79, 89, 967, 99, 1034, 110,
115, 1336, 13841, 143, 145, 147,
14951, 1535, 170, 223, 2301, 235,
238, 2434, 2467, 256, 2689,
274, 285

300
Index
physics, 47, 11, 302, 40, 48, 846,

8990, 109, 121, 127, 1334, 147,
14951, 154, 156, 170, 174, 192, 2223,
2312, 2378, 2415, 248, 250, 263,
265, 268, 279, 288
physiology, 30, 119, 168, 274
Piaget, 5, 45, 276
Piattelli, 15, 268, 276
Pinillos, 206, 277
Plato, 20, 130, 176
Poerksen, 95, 281
Poulton, 158, 277
Powell, 206, 277
Praetorius, 104, 277
pragmatics, 4, 6, 9, 1115, 26, 29, 33, 41,
445, 4851, 55, 66, 73, 81, 85, 93,
957, 99, 1015, 134, 14950, 152,
203, 21619, 221, 2246, 235, 2378,
24951, 2556, 258, 2634, 268, 271,
2746, 288, 291, 293
prediction, 34, 68, 1011, 16, 212, 26,
30, 326, 38, 43, 467, 49, 55, 76, 78,
99100, 1034, 1212, 127, 130, 1334,
140, 149, 1534, 157, 162, 170, 183,
1934, 2001, 21920, 223, 256, 261,
2668, 280, 283
principle, 9, 1819, 21, 29, 31, 34, 43, 59,
76, 83, 95, 100, 11011, 11719, 1212,
144, 236, 276
process, 3, 6, 12, 14, 27, 334, 36, 445,
50, 55, 73, 76, 78, 80, 945, 97, 99,
1035, 107, 111, 115, 11719, 135,
137, 139, 141, 144, 1523, 155, 1578,
169, 1768, 183, 1868, 1958, 204,
20810, 217, 234, 237, 249, 2513, 256,
25860, 271, 279, 288, 292, 294
Prometheus, 18, 279
properties, 4, 19, 23, 30, 39, 41, 43, 47,
51, 1001, 110, 1367, 1437, 163,
21920, 225, 238, 242, 246, 2556,
279, 289
Psillos, 54, 277
psychology, 44, 46, 834, 94, 104, 134,
143, 152, 1545, 162, 1647, 198,
2035, 208, 212, 237, 2535, 264, 266,
2689, 272, 274, 2768, 2812, 2867,
2903
Putnam, 237, 2767
Quine, 20, 28, 277
Raiffa, 1612
Rakover, 31, 35, 271, 273
Ravetz, 171, 268
Rawls, 221, 277
realism, 4, 9, 11, 1315, 279, 32, 37, 3945,
479, 514, 73, 75, 77, 7991, 93, 958,
1001, 1045, 1712, 175, 215, 2206,
2301, 235, 2378, 2491, 258, 261,
2647, 2691, 274, 27680, 285, 287
recursion, 5, 7, 12, 31, 151, 1545, 217
Regt de, 26, 141, 267, 288
regularities, 89, 22, 312, 36, 39, 43,
512, 110, 112, 21617, 224, 282
representation, 12, 14, 26, 28, 35, 37, 39,
413, 456, 97, 99102, 107, 116,
118, 135, 1379, 153, 1634, 167, 185,
2001, 2046, 21820, 222, 2345,
237, 2601, 277, 281, 283, 286, 2903
Rescher, 30, 277, 288
Reutlinger, 31, 277
Rich, 13, 49, 195, 260, 277
Ricoeur, 5, 277
Robertson, 93, 98, 277
Rorty, 1516, 21, 28, 49, 104, 220, 277, 281
Rosen, 39, 95, 99100, 172, 174, 177,
1845, 260, 266, 2778
Rosenberg, 40, 278
Rota, 967, 278
Runciman, 5, 278
Russell, 50, 286
Russo, 31, 269, 278, 286
Salmon, 22, 26, 30, 33, 43, 47, 51, 201,
2034, 243, 272, 278
Salthe, 11519, 222, 263, 274, 278, 290
Samarapungavan, 46, 265
Satish, 198, 278
Sayer, 32, 42, 53, 278
Schalk, 201, 266
Schank, 32, 46, 52, 54, 2789
Scheines, 128, 27980, 283
Schiele, 199, 279
Schruijer, 201, 266
Schueler, 38, 40, 279
Schutz, 218, 279
Scriven, 30, 32, 206, 279
Searle, 38, 43, 53, 153, 157, 279
sentience, 6, 45, 48, 188
Shakespeare, 166
Shermer, 29, 31, 279

Index
Shirvani, 198, 281
Shklar, 218, 279
Simon, 204, 275, 27980
simple, 6, 9, 345, 37, 39, 65, 76, 83, 90,
102, 110, 1213, 12531, 139, 177, 198,
219, 229, 231, 245, 251, 272
situated, 7, 15, 19, 25, 27, 356, 38, 47,
4950, 52, 80, 94, 1012, 104, 11719,
128, 140, 156, 161, 163, 169, 1723,
1856, 195, 216, 229, 233, 235, 245,
260, 270, 280
Smedt, 77, 267
Sober, 51, 148, 27980
Soros, 163, 170, 280
Souter, 39, 279
Sperber, 95, 270, 280
Sterelny, 99, 280
Stinchcombe, 200, 280
stories, 7, 1519, 23, 28, 31, 38, 45, 54, 67,
70, 82, 84, 93, 113, 121, 123, 128, 136,
145, 147, 1518, 168, 177, 1823, 187,
193, 208, 21920, 223, 225, 230, 255,
277, 285
Stotz, 205, 280
structure, 5, 10, 12, 257, 31, 33, 369,
412, 456, 49, 534, 68, 77, 81, 86, 91,
99, 104, 110, 119, 1356, 138, 1434,
14650, 1538, 1748, 180, 184, 186,
188, 197202, 216, 219, 222, 2334,
2515, 257, 260, 2667, 269, 2723,
2756, 2789, 286, 290, 292
Suchman, 27, 280
Suedfeld, 199, 280
synecdoche, 11, 95, 1024, 258
system, 47, 12, 27, 31, 34, 367, 43, 458,
54, 5960, 70, 89, 94, 97, 99100,
1034, 11012, 116, 119, 1224, 1267,
133, 13541, 1448, 150, 156, 163, 166,
16871, 173, 1757, 17981, 183, 1857,
1923, 195, 197202, 215, 238, 2423,
251, 2556, 2636, 269, 2712, 275,
27783, 285, 28792
Szathmary, 119, 27980
Tainter, 173, 263, 280
Tamminen, 401, 44, 47, 276
Tetlock, 199, 280
Thagard, 1612, 164, 166, 168, 170, 202,
2045, 219, 2801, 2912
Theiner, 45, 281
301
theorem, 27, 1257, 129, 218

theory, 45, 7, 12, 21, 23, 2932, 356,
389, 423, 456, 49, 51, 57, 59, 667,
6970, 7593, 95103, 107, 10910,
1212, 1246, 12931, 1345, 139,
1529, 1612, 164, 1667, 178, 1823,
198205, 208, 210, 21516, 21819,
2223, 22932, 234, 2378, 2412,
24452, 2546, 26383, 28593
think, 36, 8, 10, 12, 20, 28, 35, 4950,
602, 6470, 758, 803, 85, 87,
93, 97, 11517, 119, 122, 1245, 135,
1378, 140, 1434, 149, 1523, 1567,
1629, 171, 173, 182, 192, 195, 197,
202, 219, 2213, 227, 22930, 232,
2345, 2378, 241, 247, 252, 2567,
260, 2656, 268, 271, 2745, 279, 282,
2859, 292
truth, 4, 89, 1113, 16, 212, 334, 38,
413, 47, 55, 60, 68, 71, 756, 7885,
88, 90, 959, 1012, 1045, 107, 1215,
12731, 1489, 151, 193, 21617, 2201,
223, 2356, 238, 246, 250, 255, 258,
260, 265, 267, 26972, 277, 279, 281,
287, 291
Tucker, 51, 219, 281
Twining, 57, 281
Umpleby, 197, 281
uncertainty, 3, 36, 70, 152, 158, 183, 192,
223, 266, 270, 272, 2801, 286, 291
Vaihinger, 95, 258, 281
Varela, 95, 281
Verges, 220, 281
Viale, 42, 478, 51, 281
Vosniadou, 204, 282
Vygotsky, 198, 2245, 272, 282
Wallis, 197202, 282, 292
Walton, 78, 264
Warfield, 198, 282
Waskan, 2036, 208, 210, 212, 2536,
265, 282, 292
Waters, 148, 1934, 282
Weber, 2930, 216, 2678, 273, 2823
Weick, 199, 282
Weinberg, 244, 248, 283, 288
Wheeler, 119, 2823
White, 38, 194, 283

302
Index
Wiener, 46, 283

Wilkes, 25, 283
will, 58, 11, 1415, 1921, 25, 27, 35,
37, 39, 434, 46, 48, 50, 545, 601,
63, 71, 80, 823, 85, 87, 89, 91, 946,
99, 1015, 107, 11013, 11619,
1223, 129, 1356, 13840, 144, 146,
14950, 1557, 161, 1645, 173, 176,
17880, 182, 186, 1935, 197200,
204, 213, 21621, 2234, 227, 2301,
235, 238, 2437, 24950, 2525, 258,
260, 275
Williams, 21617, 2723, 283
Williamson, 90, 269, 283, 286
Wilson, 95, 128, 269, 272, 280, 286
Wimsatt, 37, 434, 55, 10910, 112,

283, 290
Windelband, 30, 234
Wixon, 173, 283
Woodward, 10, 523, 148, 283
Wright, 30, 282
Yang, 121, 202, 273, 282
Ylikoski, 38, 43, 52, 268, 276
Yolles, 202, 283
York, 13, 248, 26383, 2858, 290
Zellmer, 38, 174, 1769, 181, 183, 185,
1878, 192
Zizek, 152, 283

List of Figures Ix Preface Xiii: Context

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The Context of Our Query

Case Study: Creationism

Examining the Case

Scientific Realism on Historical Science and Creationism

6 A Pragmatic Constructivist Take on the Case

Robustness and Explanation

A Mode of Epi-Thinking Leads to the Exploration of

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Complexity, Ockhams Razor, and Truth

Modes of Explanation: Complex Phenomena

Narrative as a Mode of Explanation: Evolution and Emergence

Narratives and Models in Complex Systems

Evaluating Explanations through Their Conceptual Structures

16 Investigating the Lay and Scientific Norms for Using Explanation

Afterword 1: The Scientific Attitude Toward Explanation

Afterword 2: Explanation Revisited

Afterword 3: Is The World Completely Intelligible? A Very Short Course

Afterword 4: Explanation and Pluralism

Suggestions for Further Reading

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Copyright Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber, 2014.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

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Introduction: Thoughts on Explanation

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Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

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Michael Lissack and Abraham Graber

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Gordon Pasks (1976) Conversation Theory). Learning and the acceptance of

Human behaviorindeed, any behavior that occurs in the domain of Science

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Science I and Science 2.

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Differences between Science 1 and Science 2.

we self-aware of our beliefs? Do we have the right words? Do we know the

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representation of a supposed reality with which we opt to deal at a given time.

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