ISIDRO CARIO VS THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

204 SCRA 483 Political Law Constitutional Law The Constitutional Commissions
Commission on Human Rights Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and
decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were
suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990,
DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the
suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the
meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting
the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to
Secretary Cario.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only
investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and
should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then
barred from proceeding with the trial.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June
2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed
by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and
was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice

voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first
impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated
by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do
away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature.
In re: Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively.
These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15
of the Constitution:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the
constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998
Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council
and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had
no application to the CA based on the Commissions records. This hypothesis was then
submitted to the President for consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8
vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed
on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments),
which implies that the Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of
the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution
(from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6
that no session has been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently
did not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly
dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the
other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to
call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the
May 6 letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to
executive appointments, the whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that
appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the
RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the
Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela
took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations.
It should be noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and
received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had not been transmitted yet.
According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacaang copy of his
appointment.

In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall
apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be
considered where the President shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the
reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight
appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in
view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can make appointments to the judiciary
during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Held:
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for,
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution (t)wo months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term the President
is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not
noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to
those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or
anything of value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or
private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to
induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote
in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for thenomination or choice of a candidate
in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary
increases. During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing
officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee,
whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon
prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless,
it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the
election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the socalled midnight appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions
which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so
long as they are few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be
made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight
appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the
time of their making but also appointments of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making
oftemporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of
the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
and the restriction on the Presidents power of appointments, it is the Supreme Courts view
that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of
court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of
the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six
years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation.
But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as
earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.

To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment,

during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may
be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or
should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly
divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1)
and 9 of Article VIII.