G.R. No.

165273 March 10, 2010

LEAH PALMA, Petitioner vs. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of
the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO,
Respondents
FACTS
Petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center
(PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault,
negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the
tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found,
petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody
else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC,
namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently
issued to them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias
summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent
thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the
country.
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was
out of the country and the Answer was already due.
On March 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File
Answer, and stating that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private
respondent for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed
for another 20 days to file the Answer.
On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not
acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of
the country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on
private respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14
was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service.
On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss. It
found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband,
such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the

summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was
not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that
private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her
by publication
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid service of summons on private respondent
HELD
Yes. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the
service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Private
respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of
summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country
at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of
suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the service
of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof.
Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was
competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was served
was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband.
In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer submitted by private
respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country
and that his service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion for another extension of time to file
answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a draft of the answer had already been prepared, which would
be submitted to private respondent, who was in Ireland for her clarification and/or verification before the
Philippine Consulate there. These statements establish the fact that private respondent had knowledge of the
case filed against her, and that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of
her counsel.

G.R. No. 167545 August 17, 2011

ATIKO TRANS, INC. and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO., LTD., Petitioners, vs. PRUDENTIAL
GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC., Respondent
FACTS
On December 11, 1998, 40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board M/S Katjana in
Kaohsiung, Taiwan for shipment to Manila. The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. KNMNI-15126[7]
issued by petitioner Cheng Lie Navigation Co., Ltd. (Cheng Lie) with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet
Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Oriental) as the notify party. The cargoes were insured against all risks per Marine
Insurance Policy No. 20RN-18749/99 issued by respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
(Prudential).
On December 14, 1998, M/S Katjana arrived in the port of Manila. Upon discharge of the cargoes, it
was found that one of the tinplates was damaged, crumpled and dented on the edges. The sea van in which it
was kept during the voyage was also damaged, presumably while still on board the vessel and during the course
of the voyage.
Oriental then filed its claim against the policy. Satisfied that Orientals claim was compensable,
Prudential paid Oriental P205,220.97 representing the amount of losses it suffered due to the damaged cargo.
Proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court
On March 20, 2000, Prudential filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging among others
that on March 1, 2000 a copy of the summons was served upon petitioners thru cashier Cristina Figueroa and
that despite receipt thereof petitioners failed to file any responsive pleading. Acting on the motion, the MeTC
issued an Order declaring Cheng Lie and Atiko in default and allowing Prudential to present its evidence exparte. On August 6, 2002, the MeTC rendered its judgment by default. Atiko then filed a Notice of Appeal
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
In its Memorandum of Appeal, Atiko argued that Prudential failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint. Atiko asserted that Prudential failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that it is a domestic
corporation with legal personality to file an action; that Cheng Lie is a private foreign juridical entity operating
its shipping business in the Philippines thru Atiko as its shipagent; that Cheng Lie is a common carrier, which
owns and operates M/S Katjana; that Prudential was subrogated to the rights of Oriental; and, that Atiko can be
held solidarily liable with Cheng Lie.
ISSUE
Whether the decision of Makati (MeTC) which was affirmed by Makati RTC and the CA is null and
void for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners-defendants considering that the
summons were not properly served on them as required by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

HELD
Yes. When the defendant is a domestic corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the
persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendants voluntary appearance
without expressly objecting to the courts jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the
jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to
voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez, this Court
reiterated the oft-repeated rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Moreover, petitioners contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum filed with this
Court where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with summons.
Petitioners likewise challenge the validity of the service of summons upon Cheng Lie, thru Atiko. They
claim that when the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service of summons may be made, among others, upon its resident agent. In this case, however,
there is no proof that Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie.
In fine, since the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie, its decision insofar as
Cheng Lie is concerned is void.

G.R. No. 106989 May 10, 1994

H.B. ZACHRY COMPANY INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
VINNEL-BELVOIR CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS
On 17 July 1987, VBC entered into a written Subcontract Agreement with Zachry, a foreign corporation.
The latter had been engaged by the United States Navy to design and construct 264 Family Housing Units at the
US Naval Base at Subic, Zambales. Under the agreement, specifically under Section 3 on Payment, VBC was to
perform all the construction work on the housing project and would be paid "for the performance of the work
the sum of Six Million Four Hundred Sixty-eight Thousand U.S. Dollars (U.S. $6,468,000.00), subject to
additions and deductions for changes as hereinafter provided." This "lump sum price is based on
CONTRACTOR'S proposal, dated 21 May 1987 (including drawings), submitted to OWNER for Alternate
Design-Apartments." It was also provided "that substantial differences between the proposal and the final
drawings and Specification approved by the OWNER may be grounds for an equitable adjustment in price
and/or time of performance if requested by either party in accordance with Section 6 on Changes.
When VBC had almost completed the project, Zachry complained of the quality of work, making it a
reason for its decision to take over the management of the project, which paragraph c, Section 7 of the
Subcontract Agreement authorized.
Hence, on 20 March 1990, VBC filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
against Zachry for the collection of the payments due it with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment over
Zachry's bank account in Subic Base and over the remaining thirty-one undelivered housing units which were to
be turned over to the US Navy by Zachry on 30 March 1990. Paragraph 2 of the Complaint alleges that
defendant Zachry "is a foreign corporation with address at 527 Longwood Street, San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
and has some of its officers working at U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Zambales where it may be served with
summons. On 6 April 1990, Zachry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over its person because the summons was not validly served on it.
ISSUE
Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment prior to the service of the summons and a
copy of the amended complaint on the respondent is valid.
HELD
VBC takes refuge in the ruling in Davao Light & Power Co. vs. Court of Appeals and argues that the
issuance of the writ of attachment on 21 March 1990, although before the service of the summons, was valid. Its
issuance and implementation are two different and separate things; the first is not affected by any defect in the
implementation which may be corrected. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the initial service of summons was

defective, it was cured by the numerous pleadings thereafter filed. Finally, whatever doubts existed on the
effectiveness of the implementation of the writ was erased by its re-service on the resident agent of Zachry.
It was error for the Court of Appeals to declare, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the nullity of
the writ of attachment issued by the trial court on 21 March 1990. In the first place, the writ was in fact issued
only on 26 March 1990 and served, together with the summons, copy of the complaint, the Order of 21 March
1990, and the bond, on 27 March 1990 on Zachry at its field office in Subic Bay, Zambales, through one Ruby
Apostol. In the second place, even granting arguendo that the Court of Appeals had indeed in mind the 26
March 1990 writ of attachment, its issuance, as well as the issuance of the 21 March 1990 Order, did not suffer
from any procedural or jurisdictional defect; the trial court could validly issue both.
The validity then of the order granting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment on 21 March
1990 and of the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment on 26 March 1990 is beyond dispute. However,
the enforcement of the preliminary attachment on 27 March 1990, although simultaneous with the service of the
summons and a copy of the complaint, did not bind Zachry because the service of the summons was not validly
made. When a foreign corporation has designated a person to receive service of summons pursuant to the
Corporation Code, that designation is exclusive and service of summons on any other person is inefficacious.
The valid service of summons and a copy of the amended complaint was only made upon it on 24 April 1990,
and it was only then that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Zachry's person. Accordingly, the levy on
attachment made by the sheriff on 27 April 1990 was invalid. However, the writ of preliminary attachment may
be validly served anew.