Rule 103

Rule 103
Case No. 1
Republic vs Marcos
G.R. 31065. February 15, 1990
Ponente: Grio-Aquino.: J
Facts: Private respondent Pang Cha Quen, a citizen of Nationalist China, is the mother of May Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her child
under the name of Mary Pang, i.e. bearing the maternal surname, because the childs biological father allegedly abandoned them. A few years
later, she married Alfredo de la Cruz, a filipino citizen.
Pang Cha Quen later on filed a petition for change of name for her daughter on the grounds that her daughter grew up with, and
learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father and, to afford the child a feeling of security. Moreover, she alleges that
Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to the petition, and even signified his conformity at the foot of the pleading.
Respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos granted the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and issued an order
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. The
Government, through the Solicitor General, filed the present petition for review before the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order
is contrary to law.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case
(2) Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and reasonable
cause for changing the name of the minor.
(3) Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition.
Ruling:
Issue No.(1 ) Whether or not the respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968
read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN,
Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In
view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the
petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
Issue No. 2 Whether or not respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent failed to adduce proper and
reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966;
Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina AngChay vs.
Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L22712, November 29, 1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that
"her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of
security; and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading".
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a
false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs.
Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963).
In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person
not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their
paternity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification and the
same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29, 1965). A change of name is a
mere privilege and not a matter of right (OngPengOan vs. Republic, L-8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29,
1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting
it.
Issue No. 3 Whether or not Pang Cha Quen is the property party to file the petition.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:
SECTION 1.Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he
resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
SEC. 2.Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by
some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to
change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers
alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she
may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chose
Rule 103
Case No. 2
Republic vs Wong
G.R. No. 97906. May 21, 1992
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Maximo Wong petitioned for the change of his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong.
Maximo Alcala, Jr. (2 years old) was adopted by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized Filipino citizens) with the consent of
their parents.
Maximo Wong (22 years old) then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to change
his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese
ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community,
he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;
that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;
and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE (having complied with the necessary requisites)
OSG appealed the decision
CA Ruling: AFFIRMED RTC decision in full
1 | SpecPro Case Digests 103-109
OSGs Contentions:
Maximo's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of
name.
For Maximo to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and his adoptive mother who is still
alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name.
The reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adoptive child to use the
surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with
his adoptive parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maximo Wong may change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
HELD: YES
Change of name is a privilege, given the proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason.
SC: We are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of
identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced
and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or
compelling reason therefor.
SC: We find unacceptable the assertion of the SolGen that Maximo's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present
surname is unsubstantiated.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d)
Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings.
CA Ruling is AFFIRMED in toto.
Rule 103
Case No. 3
Yasinvs Judge, Sharia Judicial District
G.R. No. 94986
Ponenete: Bidin, J.:
FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.
The respondent court issued an order which ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance
Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof
which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name
and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of
her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to
be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name.
HELD: NO
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004
[1956
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the
only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register.
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs."
before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name
as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her
name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as
no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband
is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary
proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce
from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the
procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and
surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by
competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to
resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
Rule 103
Case No. 4
Ponente : Reyes
ONG PENG OAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
-OngPengOan filed an application with the CFI of Manila to change his name to Vicente Chan Bon Lay, by which he allegedly is and has been
better known in social and business circles, since 1946. However, his application was declined for the following reasons:
-In a certificate issued by Justice of the Peace Geronimo J. Garcia of Navotas, Rizal, it appears that the herein petitioner, with the name of Ong
Pin Can, was convicted for a violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code. And in a decision of Judge Conrado Barrios, this same
petitioner, with the name of OngPengOan alias Vicente Chan was fined P20 for a violation of section 2698.
- The certificate issued by the Justice of the Peace above referred to, shows that the petitioner has not been using the name Vicente Chan Bon
Lay, as he claims, because the name appearing therein is Ong Pin Can, and in the decision of Judge Barrios it appears that his name is Ong Pen
Oan alias Vicente Chan, which belies his pretension that he has been using the name Vicente Chan Bon Lay ever since his arrival in the
Philippines, because, if it were true, the inescapable conclusion would that he changes his name to Ong Pin Can or Ong Pen Oan whenever it
suits his convenience.
Issue:
Whether or not OngPengOan shall be allowed to change his name to Vicente Chan Bon Lay.
Held: No.
OngPengOan shall not be allowed to change his name. A person with a criminal record will have evident interest in the use of a name other
than his own, in an attempt to obliterate an unsavory record; hence, the mere fact that the applicant has been using a different name and has
become known by it does not per se alone constitute "proper and reasonable cause", or justification, to legally authorize a change of name.
There being no showing that petitioner will be prejudice by the continued use of his true name, for in fact he has been using it all along
together with the other names he has assumed on different occasions, we fail to see any error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in denying the petition. Where prior convictions exist, it is the court's duty to consider carefully the consequences of the change of
name, and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. It must not be forgotten that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
Rule 103
Case No. 5
Ponente : Mendoza
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLYN MERCADERA
Facts:
- Merlyn Mercadera represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048.
- The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because
the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before
their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.
- Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC)
- The RTC granted Mercadera's petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her
certificate of live birth, Marilyn LacquiaoMercadera, to MERLYN LacquiaoMercadera.
-The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the
availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. The OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a
correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
- But the CA was not persuaded, the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order.
Issue:
Whether or not the filling of name correction under Rule 108 instead of Rule 103 was proper.
Held:
Yes. The filling of name correction under Rule 108 was proper.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's
name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a
proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess
the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that
the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108.
Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under
Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a
summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship,
civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule
108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the
lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the
one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical
error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the
expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. I
RA NO. 9048
Case No. 1
Ponente: Tinga
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG.
Facts:
-Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because
in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person's name, the parents of the petitioner anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and
his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. And Carulasan sounds funny in
Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L."
-The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition
that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an
interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
-Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied. Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages,
there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for
consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of the child." It is argued that convenience of the child is
a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition to drop the middle name should be granted.
Held: No.
The petition to drop the middle name should not be granted. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed,
unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname,
and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his
rights under our laws.
RA NO. 9048
Case No. 2
Ponente: Ynares -Santiago
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. In her
petition, she alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries (as enumerated below) and prays
that they be corrected.
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father's name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
- The trial court granted respondent's petition.
-The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. In its second
assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals' decision in allowing respondent to use her father's surname despite its finding
that she is illegitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for a court pronouncement in order for the respondent to use her father's surname.
Held: No.
The Republic's submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father's surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her father's misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not
need a court pronouncement for her to use her father's surname.
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a
person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent
that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general.
In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In
respondent's case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.
CASE 3 - Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007
Case Doctrines:
A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot be decided through a summary proceeding
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it. All the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to
contest the petition.
Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni
NadoresGallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and
DiosdadoGallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the
natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take
up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands
with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname; Giovannis mother might eventually petition him
to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status
as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition
was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the
petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting
through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court
rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the
petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for
change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her
child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the
cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not
alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting
erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is
also required to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of
the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including
the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the
proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a
copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including
petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A.
Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).
CASE 4 - Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines
October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473
Ponente: Justice Corona
Facts: Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses MelecioPetinesSilverio and Anita Aquino Dantes
on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial hearing.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru
the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Issues:
(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Whether or not a persons first name be change because of sex reassignment?
Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?
Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of
Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex
reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it was denied. The SC held that a persons first name cannot be change
because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them.
Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but
clear to state that a persons status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
CASE 5 - RP VS CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer
Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in
court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has
organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme
Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil
registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private
respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a
disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render
judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In
determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will
not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court
force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court
affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
CASE 6 - SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in
his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is
anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by
reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or
difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his
name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his
true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
CASE 7
G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
PERALTA, DIOSDADO J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
RULING: In this case, Dr. Norma Lugsanay Uy (respondent) sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining
to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of
her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes,
however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is
the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to
illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the
changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. The
pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows: One having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the
publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure
was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through
mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. READ
RULE 108 for the provisions :D
FACTS: Respondent filed the petition impleading as the only respondent the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog City. In her petition she alleged the
following: That her full name is in fact Norma S. Lugsanay and not Anita Sy as shown by her birth certificate; that she is an illegitimate child of
her parents and thus she should follow her mother's surname; and that she is Filipino and not Chinese. The RTC granted the petition and
concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party.
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was
cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and
by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. As to whether the petition is a collateral
attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her
siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied.
RULE 106
CASE 1 RULE 106 *Please read with Article 153 of the Family Code
Sps. Kelley vs Planters Products, Inc. and Ragutana
Ponente: Justice Renato Corona
FACTS:
Petitioner Auther Kelley Jr. acquired products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. in 1989. Auther failed to pay despite
demand, prompting PPI to file an action for sum of money in the RTC. The RTC decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution.
Respondent Sheriff Ragutana sold the property on execution. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI.
Petitioners Auther and his wife Doris filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the
subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied. The petitioners then filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home in the RTC of Naga City. This too was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. CA upheld the dismissal. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not subject property is considered a family home and thus exempt from execution.
RULING:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The exemption (from execution) is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to
have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
xxx
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum
amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property
under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed
by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or
owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
xxx
We (The Court) grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that the property is in fact
their family home as constituted in accordance with the requirements of law. *The case is reinstated and remanded to the RTC Naga City for
determination whether or not the property in question is a duly constituted family home.
CASE 2 Rule 106

Spouses De Mesa vs. Spouses Acero, Sheriff Samonte and Registrar Santos
Ponente: Bienvenido L. Reyes
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land registered under petitioner Aracelis name. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17,
1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the
petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, (respondent) in the amount of P100,000.00, which was secured
by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check payable to Claudio. When the check was presented for payment,
it was dishonored as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudios subsequent
demand for payment.
On April 26, 1990 Claudio filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioners. On October 21, 1992 the RTC acquitted petitioners but
ordered them to pay Claudio the amount of the obligation.
On March 15, 1993 a writ of execution was issued and Sherrif Samonte levied upon the subject property. The subject property was sold on
public auction, Claudio was the highest bidder. In 1995, Claudio leased the subject property to petitioners for a monthly rent of P5,500.
Petitioners defaulted and by 1998 their total accountabilities to Claudio amounted to P170,500. A Final Deed of Sale over the subject property
was issued to Claudio and title to the property was thereafter issued in his favor.
Unable to collect the rentals due, Claudio and his wife filed a complaint for ejectment with MTC Meycauayan against petitioners. In their
defense petitioners claimed that the Acero's have no right over the property and they also claim that they are the lawful owners of the
property thus, they cannot be evicted therefrom.
The MTC rendered a Decision giving due course to the Acero's complaint and ordering petitioners to vacate the property. The MTC stated that
from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and
the legitimacy of Claudios Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
On October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint to nullify title and other documents with damages with the RTC
of Malolos. Petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus,
could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, which dismissed the petitioners complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the
RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does not apply. A mortgage was
constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied upon as payment therefor.
On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, which dismissed the petitioners complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the
RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject property is a family home, the exemption from execution does not apply. A mortgage was
constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied upon as payment therefor.
The petitioners sought reconsideration of the RTCs Decision but this was denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs disposition. The CA ratiocinated that the exemption of a family home from execution, attachment or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic and should accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to the
execution, forced sale or attachment. The appellate court noted that at no time did the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the
subject property from execution on account of the same being a family home.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review, praying for the cancellation of title. They insist that the execution sale that was
conducted is a nullity considering that the subject property is a family home. The petitioners assert that, contrary to the disposition of the CA,
a prior demonstration that the subject property is a family home is not required before it can be exempted from execution.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the property is a family home.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not it is exempt from execution.
HELD: 1.) Yes
2.) No
RULING:
The constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home
either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution *Judicial constitution
of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of
Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and
involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of
these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
(In the case at bar), the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the
same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from
execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
However, the family home's exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction.
Despite fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, We (the Supreme Court)
nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for nullification of title.
As the CA aptly pointed out:
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration
of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the
property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of
execution to put an end to litigation. x x x
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v.
Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless,
well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter;
"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if
the debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step
involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the
sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority."
We said before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties
under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the
sherif.
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of Appeals, this Court stated that:
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sherif, but by the debtor
himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sherif. xxx
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public auction, the
petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estops them from later claiming the said exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is
likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family
home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family
home and its exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon
and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to
Claudio and, later, Aracelis Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudios name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact,
it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that
the petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption
that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise
the status of the subject property as a family home.
The petitioners negligence or omission renders their present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and artifice that
cannot be countenanced without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple justice
and fairness and equitable considerations demand that Claudios title to the property be respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are
made to suffer the consequences of their unexplained negligence.
RULE 108
CASE 1 RULE 108
TY KON TING vs REPUBLIC
Ponente: Baustista Angelo, J.:
RULING:
What is contemplated under the provisions of Article 412 of the Civil Code are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not
those which may affect the civil status or the nationality or the citizenship of the person involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely to
correct a clerical error then the court may issue an order to correct the error or mistake. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the
status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.
It is our (the Supreme Court) opinion that the petition under consideration does not merely call for a correction of a clerical error. It involves a
matter which concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his children. It is therefore an important controversial matter which can and
should only be threshed out in an appropriate action. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that "the books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts thereon contained" (Article 410, new Civil Code), and
if the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through a mere summary proceeding, and not through an appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, we would set wide open the door to fraud or other mischief
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. It is for these reasons that the law has placed the necessary safeguards to
forestall such eventuality that even on matters which call for a correction of clerical mistakes the intervention of the courts was found
necessary. This is an innovation not originally found in the law which placed this matter exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of
the civil registrars. This was found by Congress unwise and risky in view of the far reaching importance of the subjects covered by the civil
register. And under the present innovation the law even exacts civil liability from the civil registrar for any unauthorized alteration, which
shows the concern of Congress in maintaining the integrity and genuineness of the entries contained in our civil registers.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change or correction in citizenship can be done through Article 412 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with CFI Manila a petition to correct mistakes which had allegedly been committed in the civil register of the City Registrar of
the City of Manila concerning his citizenship.
Petitioner alleges that he is a Filipino citizen; that all his children were born in the City of Manila whose births were duly reported to the civil
registrar by the midwife or doctor who had attended their births but in submitting the report it was made to appear therein that the citizenship
of the petitioner was "Chinese" instead of "Filipino"; that these mistakes were committed without his knowledge or consent. Therefore, he
prays that an order be issued directing the civil registrar to correct the pertinent portion of the civil register by making it appear therein that
the petitioner as well as his children are Filipino citizens and not Chinese cititzens, as authorized by article 412 of the new Civil Code.
Rule 108
Case2
G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON.
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article
412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and
correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and
controversial.
TC: issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes
involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted,
either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the
present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and
that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of
their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks to change the
nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and
changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as
they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of
Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following entries:
A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE instead of
LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';
B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of 'LEGITIMATE'
and father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and
C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change the entry on Petitioner's Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.
Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE
CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO. (NO)
HELD:
In REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA (141 SCRA 462), the Supreme Court held that corrections involving the nationality or citizenship of a person were
substantial and could not be effected except in adversarial proceedings.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving the nationality or citizenship, which is undisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. The SC adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.
Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing, not
merely a summary proceeding, be conducted.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p.
716, 718, 110 Was. 39).
Also the court granted the substantial change in their birth cert. for there are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter
and had always exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the national elections immediately preceding the
filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage.
An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of
Victorias, Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land. These allegations are well
documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the lower court.
The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The evidence
further shows that her children had been allowed to take the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens only.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born
of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure"
not specified or even intimated has not been followed.
Case 3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.
June 29, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts;
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Kho petitioned for
(1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino;
(2) delete John from his name; and
(3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which allows first name and nickname in birth
certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved of the change.
The Solicitor General objected contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted
through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should have been notified or
impleaded
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name Carlito John Kho to Carlito Kho for non-compliance with
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.( the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior
three-year bona fide residence inButuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos aliases and his true name as Carlito John
I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.)
The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Khos request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial proceeding. Yes
2. whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial
courts judgment void. no
HELD:
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate
and delete the married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage
of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail
substantial and controversial amendments.
10 | S p e c P r o C a s e D i g e s t s 1 0 3 - 1 0 9
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a
bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate,
with significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 12explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil
status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial courts Order 19 setting the petition for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the
petition to oppose it was posted 20 as well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor
General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public
prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
2. Failure to implead and indispensable party is not void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. [21] Court held that the publication of the order of hearing under
Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be
established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on
the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision
on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [22]
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage [25] shows that indeed they were married
on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April 27, 1989 was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. [26] Given
the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no
change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died
in 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name
falls under letter o of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
Section 2.
Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
(o) changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for. More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record
from the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration record satisfactorily
show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is
the fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to
oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the
proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as Filipino. To
disallow the correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the
siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel. The
mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding [considering that the
name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is Marivel.
Petition denied.
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each
other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file
a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated
against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is
not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the
State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken
from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping
his middle name, added the RTC.
Issues: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have
the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle
name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his
rights under our laws.

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