Crozier Appeal Brief

Case 15-572, Document 25, 07/16/2015, 1555985, Page1 of 57
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..1, 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................3
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................5
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.......................................................................6
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..........................................................7
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................9
A. Count One - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)
Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments.................................................9
B. Count Two - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder Monetary
Instruments............................................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................12
A. Facts as to Count One - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C.
1956(h) Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments............................13
B. Facts as to Count Two - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder
Monetary Instruments........................................................................................16
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS .................................................................18
ARGUMENTS........................................................................................................20
I. The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a
practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained private
attorney. ...............................................................................................................20
a. Standard of Review ...................................................................................20
b. Argument....................................................................................................21
II. The trial court erred by failing to grant Croziers Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal as to County I Conspiracy to Launder Monetary
Instruments, after the close of the Governments case, because the
Government failed to prove and the evidence was insufficient to show that:
1) a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments existed between Messrs.
1
Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik, Croziers alleged co-conspirator; 2) Mr.

Crozier had the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and
3) Mr. Crozier knew that the proceeds were from drug transactions. ..........25
a. Standard of Review ...................................................................................25
b. Argument Lack of Conspiracy and Specific Intent ............................26
c. Argument Lack of Knowledge concerning the source of the proceeds.
.....................................................................................................................39
III. The trial court erred by failing to grant Mr. Croziers Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II Attempt to Launder Monetary
Instruments, because the government failed to prove and the evidence was
insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was designed to disguise or
conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property
believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozier
had the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds.....................45
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................54
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................55
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................56
Table of Authority
Cases:
United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr113 (JCH)........................................................12, 23
United States v. Swinton, 400 F.Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).....20, 21, 22
United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 542, 2 L.Ed.2d 532 (1958)..20
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)...20
U.S. v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 96 S.Ct. 1676
(1976)...21
United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2dCir. 1988) .....................20, 21
OReilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 869 (2dCir.1982).21, 22
United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1059, 96 S.Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976).21
United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1996).........................................22
United States v. Parker, 2009 WL 5342774, 2 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)...........................22
United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d. Cir. 2004)..........................25, 26, 28
United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 2010)...................................25
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ................................................25, 26
United States v. Rodriquez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 2004)...26
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)26
United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180, (2d Cir. 2008)27, 50, 51
United States v. Monaco, 1964 F. 3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999)27
United States v. Geibel, 369 F.2d 682, 692 (2d Cir. 2004).27
United States v. Rosenblatt, 54 F.2d 36, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).27, 28
United States v. Rulido, 699 F.3d 192, 209 (7th Cir. 1995).27
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947).27
United States v. LaSpina, 229 F.3d 165, 174 (2d Cir. 2002)..27
United States v. Salamaeh, 152 F.3d 88, 147 (2d Cir 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1028 (1999)..27
United States. v. Carter, 966 F.Supp 336, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1997)..28
U.S. v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, (7th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913, 113
S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 259 (1993)....28, 39, 40
United States v. Saunders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991).28
United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993).29
United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.); cert. denied, 506 U.S. 858,
113 S.Ct. 171, 121 L.Ed.2d 118 (1992.).29
Glasser v United States, 315 U.S. 60,80,62 S.Ct. 457,86 L. Ed 680 (1942)30
United States v Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110,120-122 (2d Cir.1999)30,36,37,38,39
3
United States v. Dobbs, 63 F 3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1995) ..37

United States v. Rockelman, 49 F 3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1995)37
Mobil Oil Corp v. Karbowski, 879 F 2d 1052, 1055 92d Cir. 1989)..38
United States v. Yip, 930 F 2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991)..38
Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550,128 S Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942 (2008)...
49, 51
United States v. Garcia, 587 F. 3d 509, 517 (2d Cir.2009).50
United States v. Cromitie, 2011 WL 1842219 at p. 7 (2d Cir. 2011)..51
United States v. Ness, 565 F. 3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009) .51, 52
United States v. Roberts, 650 F. Supp. 2d 219 221(E.D. New York 2009)52
United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000) ..53
Statutes:
18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)...................................5, 7, 9, 16, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41
18 U.S.C. 1956 (h)...........................................................................................5, 7, 9
18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(3)(B).....................................................5, 7, 9, 10, 17, 19, 29, 46, 50
18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)...........................................................30, 31, 36, 38, 39
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a)......................................................4
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4 (b)(1)(A)(1).......................................6
28 U.S.C. 1291........................................................................................................6
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This brief is submitted in support of the appeal of Ralph Crozier from his
conviction after trial on one count of Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) and one count
of Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1956(a)(3)(B). This appeal by Mr. Crozier also includes an appeal from the order
of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.) to the
extent that this order denied Mr. Croziers motion made pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29(a) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. The
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was made at the close of the governments case.
Mr. Crozier was sentenced to a term of 30 months of incarceration followed by 36
months of supervised release.
There are no reported decisions in this case. After trial, judgment was filed
on 17 February 2015 (Appendix No. 1) and Mr. Crozier filed his notice of appeal
on 26 February 2015 (Appendix No. 2).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal from final judgment is timely pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellate jurisdiction from the final
decision of the United States District Court exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

After trial, Mr. Crozier was convicted of violating:
18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) Laundering of Monetary Instruments

(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts of attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity;
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000.00 or twice the value of the
property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. 1956(h) Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

(h) Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or
section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments

(a)(3) Whoever, with the intent
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control
of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property
represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to
conduct of facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years; or both.
7
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.
Did the trial court err in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a
practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained
private attorney?
II.
Did the trial court err by failing to grant Mr. Croziers Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal as to County I Conspiracy to Launder Monetary
Instruments, after the close of the Governments case, because the
Government failed to prove and the evidence was insufficient to show
that: 1) a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments existed between the
Messrs. Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik; 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite
specific intent to launder monetary instruments; and 3) Mr. Crozier knew
the proceeds were from drug trafficking?
III.
Did the trial court err by failing to grant Mr. Croziers Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II Attempt to Launder Monetary
Instruments, because the government failed to prove and the evidence
was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was designed to disguise
or conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property
believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr.
Crozier had the requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds?
8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant/Appellant Ralph Crozier is an attorney admitted to practice
in the State of Connecticut and in the Federal District Court for the District of
Connecticut. In his capacity as an attorney, Mr. Crozier represented Bruce
Yazdzik in several matters including the start-up of a limited liability company that
bought and sold automobiles and in an investment in Brightside Solar, LLC, an
energy company. It is Mr. Croziers representation of Mr. Yazdzik that forms the
crux of the Governments case against Mr. Crozier.
A. Count One - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)
Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments
As part of his investment in Brightside Solar, Mr. Crozier represented Mr.
Yazdzik in negotiating and entering into a promissory note and a written contract
with Brightside Solar that centered on Mr. Yazdziks investment of $30,000.00 in
the company. Based on these transactions, Mr. Crozier was indicted on June 11,
2013 under 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) Conspiracy to
Launder Monetary Instruments.
B. Count Two - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder Monetary
Instruments.
Sometime after Mr. Yazdziks investment in Brightside Solar, in a wholly
unrelated matter, Mr. Yazdzik was convicted in federal court of violating narcotics
9
trafficking laws and incarcerated. Subsequent to Mr. Yazdziks incarceration, Mr.

Yazdziks mother, Debra Rost, in an effort to curry favor for her son, began
working as a confidential informant for federal agents. In furtherance of her
efforts, Ms. Rost met with Mr. Crozier on two occasions. During the second
meeting, Ms. Rost produced $11,000.00 in cash that Mr. Crozier took receipt of.
Based on this transaction, Mr. Crozier was indicted on June 11, 2013, under 18
U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments.
Prior to the start of trial, Mr. Crozier filed an appearance so that he could
represent himself along with privately retained co-counsel, Attorney Michael S.
Hillis. Mr. Crozier has been practicing law for over 40 years and has extensive
trial experience. Mr. Crozier claimed that his unique trial experience was a
compelling reason for allowing the hybrid representation. The District Court (Hall,
J.) sua sponte struck Mr. Croziers appearance without a hearing, ruling that it
would be confusing to the jury.
Mr. Crozier went to trial in the Federal District Court for the District of
Connecticut at New Haven. At the conclusion of the Governments case, Mr.
Crozier through counsel made an oral Motion for a Judgement of Acquittal
claiming, as to Count One, that the government failed to establish that a conspiracy
existed between Mr. Crozier and Mr. Yazdzik and that Mr. Crozier had the
requisite specific intent to conceal or disguise the proceeds at issue. Also, as to
10
Count Two, that the government failed to establish that Mr. Crozier knew the
$11,000.00 to be drug proceeds and again that Mr. Crozier had the requisite
specific intent to conceal or disguise the money. This motion was also denied by
Judge Hall.
At the conclusion of the trial Mr. Crozier was found guilty of violating both
counts contained in the indictment. The trail court sentenced Mr. Crozier to a total
prison term of 30 months to be followed by 36 months of supervised release.
Mr. Crozier now appeals the striking of his Appearance to Appear as CoCounsel, the denial of his Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal, and his conviction.
11
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Mr. Ralph Crozier is an experienced attorney admitted to both
the Connecticut and Federal Bars. As part of his law practice, Mr. Crozier
represented Mr. Bruce Yazdzik in several matters, including the opening of several
businesses and Mr. Yazdziks investment in an energy company, Brightside Solar,
LLC. Mr. Croziers representation of Mr. Yazdzik in this investment in Brightside
Solar was the basis of Count One of Mr. Croziers conviction for Conspiring to
Launder Monetary Proceeds.
On June 11, 2013, Mr. Crozier was indicted on two criminal counts in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut at New Haven.
Attorney Michael S. Hillis (Hillis) filed an appearance on Mr. Croziers behalf.
Subsequently, Mr. Crozier also filed an appearance as co-counsel to Attorney
Hillis. Prior to trial, Attorney Hillis argued that Mr. Croziers substantial trial
experience was a compelling reason to allow this generally prohibited hybrid
representation. United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr113 (JCH), Trial Transcript, Day
one of Trial, Page 6, Lines 21 through 25 and Page 7, Lines 1 through 8
(September 16, 2014)(A 18 through 25). The District Court noted that Mr.
Crozier was not represent[ing] that hes dissatisfied with his counsel, (A-24), and
that if Mr. Crozier represented himself pro se . . . with representation by counsel,
12
it becomes more confusing to the jury . . . (A-24) The District Court then ruled
that, there is no Sixth Amendment right to be represented by retained counsel as
well as to represent yourself when you are an attorney or even non-attorney . . .
[and] the proper thing is to strike the appearance of Mr. Crozier. (A-25) (see also
A-21 and A-22. ) Mr. Croziers trial followed immediately.
A. Facts as to Count One - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18 U.S.C.
1956(h) Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments
Mr. Crozier represented Mr. Yazdzik in negotiations with Brightside Solar.
Brightside was seeking start-up funds in the amount of $30, 000.00 and Mr.
Yazdzik was willing to invest that sum of money in the company. Mr. Crozier
drafted a promissory note (A-92) and a contract (A-95) between Mr. Yazdzik,
Brightside Solar and the individual members of Brightside. The transaction was
open and notorious as both the note and contract were in the name of Bruce
Yazdzik (A-92 and 95) and during negotiations Mr. Yazdzik met with the
principals of Brightside and was introduced as Bruce Yazdzik. (A-47, 48) In fact,
Mr. Crozier even made the principals execute a personal guarantee to Mr. Yazdzik
in Mr. Yazdziks name. (A -38, 92 and 95)
Mr. Yazdziks testified concerning this contract and his intention in entering
into it as follows:
13
He explains to me that he was going to it was good, okay. This is

all here. Sign the contract. We did the whole deal. He told me he was
going to have to take the money down. He was going to have to put
$9,000.00 in his account. He was going to put the rest in a safety
deposit box. He couldnt pull out $30,000.00 to give to the company.
He couldnt deposit $30,000.00 into the account because the IRS
would start to notice the type of money coming in. He said he would
put nine grand. Take the $30,000 out of his account and put the rest of
the money into a safety deposit box and take the money out gradually
and put it into his account. (A-33)
On direct examination, Mr. Yazdzik testified:
A.
Yeah, we talked about the meeting and there was two ways for
the contract basically. I invested $30,000 and they had the option to
give me back $33,000 which would be a 10 percent on your 10 percent
that would come back or they have the option -- I have the option of
owning 10 percent of the company, keep
the revenue coming. I said
I wanted the revenue come in. I didnt want the $3,000 that wouldnt
do me no good. 30,000 and 3000 back wouldnt have did me any good.
I told them that. They said they can see what they can do. Either way it
was going to be good because even if they gave me back the $33,000. I
14
get that back in a check from the company so it will still be legitimate
money.
This testimony shows that the loan to Brightside Solar was a loan to make
money on an ordinary commercial transaction. Mr. Yazdzik testified that the
contract was in his name, with the appropriate commercial guarantee and that the
transaction was just the contract, no money was hidden. (A-40) The only
reference to conceal was the inference that Mr. Crozier didnt want the IRS
involved. (A-33)
Mr. Yazdzik testified that he purposefully portrayed himself as a used car
dealer to appear legitimate. Mr. Yazdzik also testified that he created false pay
stubs from the used car business to show legitimate income to both Mr. Crozier
and the Courts. Mr. Yazdzik testified that he hid his identity from Mr. Crozier as a
drug dealer.
Mr. Yazdzik never told Crozier that the $30,000.00 was drug proceeds. Mr.
Yazdzik testified that Mr. Crozier learned about his drug dealing when Mr.
Yazdzik turned in Mike (A-40).
In the governments case in-chief, no evidence was adduced to prove that
Mr. Crozier knew Mr. Yazdziks investment into Brightside were proceeds from
narcotics trafficking as charged in the indictment. The government has not set
15
forth sufficient evidence to support Mr. Croziers conviction under 18 U.S.C.

1956 (a)(1)(B)(i). As such, the District Court should have granted Mr. Croziers
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after the government rested.
B. Facts as to Count Two - 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to
Launder Monetary Instruments.
Sometime after his investment in Brightside Solar, Mr. Yazdzik was
convicted and incarcerated on federal drug charges. In an effort to curry favor for
her son, Ms. Rost began working as a confidential informant for federal agents. (A80, 81) Ms. Rost met with Mr. Crozier on two occasions and it is these two
meetings between Ms. Rost and Mr. Crozier that form the basis for Count Two of
Mr. Croziers conviction. During their second meeting, Ms. Rost claimed to have
found $11,000.00 of Mr. Yazdziks money hidden in the basement of her home.
Unbeknownst to Mr. Crozier, the $11,000.00 was provided to Ms. Rost by federal
agents as bait money in a sting operation designed to catch Mr. Crozier in a money
laundering case. Ms. Rost was wearing an electronic listening/recording device
when she met with Mr. Crozier and gave him the $11,000.00. (Transcripts from
recordings at A- 98, 106) At no time during this meeting did Ms. Rost ask Mr.
Crozier to launder the money or to otherwise conceal or disguise the source of the
funds. Mr. Crozier accepted the money, gave Ms. Rost a receipt in Mr. Yazdziks
name (Copy of receipt, A-112), and put the money in a desk drawer. Shortly after
16
Ms. Rost left, federal agents arrested Mr. Crozier for attempting to launder money
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B).
17
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

I.
The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr. Crozier, a
practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his retained
private attorney.
The District Court abused its discretionary power by striking Mr. Croziers
appearance as co-counsel to his privately retained counsel. Mr. Croziers extensive

experience as a trial attorney is a compelling reason to allow him a hybrid
representation. The trial courts concern of jury confusion could have been limited
or negated by limiting Mr. Croziers ability to cross-examine certain witnesses.
This error by the trial court violated Mr. Croziers right to counsel as contained in
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II.
The trial court erred by failing to grant Mr. Croziers Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count I, after the close of the Governments
case, because the Government failed to prove and the evidence was
insufficient to show that a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments
existed between Messrs. Crozier and Yazdzik; that Mr. Crozier had the
requisite specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and that Mr.
Crozier knew that the proceeds were from drug trafficking.
18
The government failed to prove that a conspiracy to conceal or hide

proceeds from unlawful activity existed between Messrs. Crozier and Yazdzik and
that Mr. Crozier possessed the specific intent to launder money. The government
also failed to prove that transaction was designed to hide or conceal the subject
proceeds.
III.
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II because the government failed to
prove and the evidence was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction
was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source,
ownership or control of property he believed to be the proceeds of
unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite specific intent to
launder monetary proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B).
The government failed to prove that Mr. Crozier had the intent to hide or
conceal the cash given to him by Ms. Rost or that Mr. Crozier had the intention of
hiding or concealing the money. In fact, Mr. Crozier put the money back into the
purported rightful owners name, Mr. Yazdzik and, in effect, publishing the
identity of the source and owner of the subject cash.
19
ARGUMENTS
I.
The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr.

Crozier, a practicing attorney, on his own behalf as co-counsel to his
retained private attorney.
a. Standard of Review
[T]he Second Circuits rule . . . is [that] it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to determine whether the defendant may act as his own counsel in
conjunction with representation by an attorney. United States v. Swinton, 400
F.Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d
554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957, 78 S.Ct. 542, 2 L.Ed.2d 532
(1958). Moreover, Faretta ratified a consensus within the federal judiciary
favoring a constitutional right to pro se status; and that consensus has existed side
by side with another finding that a defendants appearance as co-counsel lies
within the discretion of the trial court. Swinton, 400 F.Supp. at 806, referencing
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In
reviewing a trail courts striking of an appearance by a defendant to represent
himself and retain private counsel, the appellate court shall determine if the trial
court abused its discretion and if there was in fact a compelling reason to justify
an exception to the normal mode of representation in a criminal trial . . . Swinton,
20
400 F.Supp. at 807; see also U.S. v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 1975)
cert. denied 96 S.Ct. 1676 (1976)
b. Argument
It is well established that where a compelling reason exists a trial court may
permit a criminal defendant to utilize a hybrid representation where he both
represents himself and has co-counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d
1125 (2dCir. 1988); OReilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 869
(2dCir.1982); Swinton, 400 F.Supp. 805. In Swinton the Court noted that, [i]t is
settled law in this Circuit that a criminal defendant has no Sixth Amendment right
to act as his own counsel where he is also represented by an attorney. Id. at 807,
citing United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976). However, the Swinton Court did
note that in the Second Circuit it is within the discretion of the trial judge to
determine whether the defendant may act as his own counsel in conjunction with
representation by an attorney. Id. More recently in Tutino, 883 F.2d. 1125, 1141,
the Second Circuit Court also held that [t]he decision to grant or deny hybrid
representation lies solely within the discretion of the trial court. Id. citing
OReilly, 692 F.2d 863, 869.
21
In United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second
Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes a compelling reason to grant a
hybrid representation. In Stevens, the Court denied Stevens contention that the
trial court had abused its discretion by refusing his request for hybrid
representation holding that the trial court had properly concluded that 1) []
Stevens was not claiming either that his counsel was not adequately representing
him, or that he would be unduly prejudiced by not being permitted to serve as cocounsel, and 2) that Stevens appointment as co-counsel would be disruptive. Id.
Also, in a pretrial report and recommendation in United States v. Parker,
2009 WL 5342774, 2 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), the report of Payson, J. recommended the
District Court deny Parkers pro se motions because Parker was represented by
counsel. Judge Payson wrote, [a] court need not permit hybrid representation if a
defendant does not offer a compelling reason (citing OReilly, 692 F.2d at 869 and
Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1141), or show that the interests of justice [would be] served
by a defendants supplementation of legal services provided by his retained
counsel. (Citing Swinton, 400 F.Supp. at 806.)
In applying Swinton, Stevens, and Parker to the instant case, Mr. Crozier
stands well apart from these lay criminal defendants based on his extensive
experience as a practicing lawyer who has tried over 100 cases in his almost 38
years of practice. Mr. Croziers trial experience is likely unmatched in
22
Connecticut and the interests of justice certainly would have been served in
allowing him to use his experience to assist in his own defense. It is, after all, Mr.
Crozier who suffered the consequences of his conviction. Mr. Crozier is not only
familiar with the intricacies of the trial process, he likely could school both judges
and lawyers on the same. Even Judge Hall, while striking Mr. Croziers
appearance, stated, I have no reason to question Attorney Hillis representation
that his client is an extremely experienced trial attorney, who would be excellent at
representing someone in this court. I would be happy to have him with that
experience represent someone in this court. United States v. Crozier, 3:13cr 113
(JCH), Trial Transcript, Day one of Trial, P. 10, L. 12 -16 (emphasis supplied)(A24). Yet, incredulously, Judge Hall then stated that she could see no compelling
reason to allow Croziers hybrid representation. (A-24)
While it is true that Mr. Crozier did not allege that Attorney Hillis was not
adequately representing him, certainly Mr. Croziers unprecedented experience as
a trial attorney would have benefitted his private counsel in this case. This is a
compelling reason to allow Mr. Crozier a hybrid representation. The trial courts
concern that such a hybrid representation would be confusing to the jury is
misplaced. The District Court could have allowed Mr. Croziers hybrid
representation and perhaps limited it in areas where such confusion might have
been greater, as in cross examining Mr. Yazdzik, a former client, and Ms. Rost.
23
But the court did not do that and instead struck the appearance sua sponte based
solely on some perceived jury confusion. (A-19)
By striking his appearance without a factual basis, Judge Hall abused her
discretionary power and violated Mr. Croziers Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel. Mr. Croziers unprecedented legal experience is a compelling reason to
allow him hybrid representation and his familiarity with the trial process ensured
that such a representation would not have been disruptive of the legal process. In
the interest of justice, Mr. Crozier should have been permitted to represent himself
as co-counsel to Attorney Hillis.
24
II.
The trial court erred by failing to grant Croziers Motion for

Judgment of Acquittal as to County I Conspiracy to Launder
Monetary Instruments, after the close of the Governments case,
because the Government failed to prove and the evidence was
insufficient to show that: 1) a conspiracy to launder monetary
instruments existed between Messrs. Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik,
Croziers alleged co-conspirator; 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite
specific intent to launder monetary proceeds; and 3) Mr. Crozier
knew that the proceeds were from drug transactions.
a. Standard of Review 1
Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed de novo. United
States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d. Cir. 2004). Although the burden on the
defendant is heavy, it is not an impossible burden. Id. The Appellate Court can
confirm only if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Id., quoting United States v. Samaria, 239
F.3d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 2010) quoting in part Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). Although the Appellate Court defers to a jurys assessment of credibility,
This de novo standard of review will apply to issues II and III.

25
conflicting testimony and competing inferences, specious inferences are not

indulged. Jones 393 F.3d at 111. To convict, a jury must reach a subjective state
of near certitude of the guilt of the accused . . . Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315.
Jackson recognized that a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even
when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . Id. at 317. It remains axiomatic that,[i]t would not satisfy
the [Constitution] to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty.
United States v. Rodriquez, 392 F.3d 539, 544 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993).
b. Argument Lack of Conspiracy and Specific Intent
Mr. Crozier was charged in Count I of the indictment with conspiracy to
Launder Monetary Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i): 18
U.S.C. 1956 in pertinent part:
(a) (1) Whenever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
Conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in
fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity --
(B)
Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part
26
(i)
to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity; or
To prove conspiracy, the government must show that the defendant agreed
with another to commit the offense; that he knowingly engaged in the conspiracy
with the specific intent to commit the offenses that were the object of the
conspiracy; and that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed.
United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 180, (2d Cir. 2008) citing United States v.
Monaco, 1964 F. 3d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1999).
The law of conspiracy partakes of the law of contract it requires a
meeting of the minds. See, e.g., United States v. Geibel, 369 F.2d 682, 692 (2d
Cir. 2004), citing United States v. Rosenblatt, 54 F.2d 36, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1977);
see also, United States v. Rulido, 699 F.3d 192, 209 (7th Cir. 1995)([a]n
agreement among two or more individuals to commit a criminal act, like a contract,
involves a meeting of the minds.)
Although the prosecution need not prove that the conspirators agreed on the
details of their criminal enterprise, it must prove the essential nature of the plan.
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); see also United States v.
LaSpina, 229 F.3d 165, 174 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Salamaeh, 152 F.3d
27
88, 147 (2d Cir 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1028 (1999). The essence of
conspiracy is agreement, and the prosecution must prove that an agreement was in
fact made. United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2004); Rosenblatt,
584 F.2d at 39.
Because Mr. Crozier was indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Monetary
Laundering, along with the essential nature of the plan amongst conspirators, the
government also had to prove that Mr. Crozier intended to launder money. In a
prosecution for money laundering, the government must prove that [the
defendant] had the specific intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of property he believed to be the proceeds of
unlawful activity. United States. v. Carter, 966 F.Supp 336, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1997),
citing U.S. v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, (7th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913,
113 S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 259 (1993) (emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Saunders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991), the defendant,
a narcotics dealer, successfully appealed her conviction on money laundering
charges predicated on her purchase of a vehicle she had titled it in her daughters
name. The Saunders Court held that the titling of an automobile in a family
members name was insufficient evidence of a design to conceal where other
actions of the purchaser served to identify the relationship between the true buyer,
the property and the cash. Saunders, 929 F.2d. at 1472-73.
28
In United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d 1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993), the
Appellate Court held that a, [c]onviction for attempt requires culpable intent and a
substantial step toward the commission of the crime strongly corroborative of that
intent. Id. citing United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.); cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 858, 113 S.Ct. 171, 121 L.Ed.2d 118 (1992.) The Court found
that McLambs actions in accepting multiple checks under $10,000 for the
purchase of a car, agreeing to title the vehicle in anothers name, and telling the
undercover agent about the clean way to conduct the transaction were enough to
support a conviction under 1956 (a)(3)(B). Id. at 1287. The Court also wrote
that McLambs negotiations with [the federal agent] and his conduct on the day
[the agent] arrived at the dealership ostensibly to pay for and pick up the car went
far beyond mere preparation and were certainly substantial steps toward
conducting a transaction, steps which strongly corroborate the necessary culpable
intent. Id.
Here the government has failed to show both that Mr. Yazdzik had an
agreement with Mr. Crozier to launder money and that Mr. Crozier had the specific
intent to launder the proceeds. The governments evidence adduced at trial was
solely centered on the testimony of Mr. Yazdzik, the purported drug dealer that
turned to Mr. Crozier for legal representation. Assuming, arguendo, that the
29
$30,000.00 Mr. Yazdzik gave to Mr. Crozier was drug proceeds, Mr. Yazdziks
testimony supports a judgment of acquittal for Mr. Crozier.
At no time during the direct examination did Mr. Yazdzik intimate that he
agreed with Mr. Crozier to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source,
ownership or control of purported drug proceeds. In fact, Mr. Yazdziks testimony
construed most favorable to the government (Glasser v United States, 315 U.S.
60,80,62 S.Ct. 457,86 L. Ed 680 (1942)) only suggests an attempt to avoid a
transaction reporting requirement in violation of 18 U.S. 1956 9a)(1)(B) (ii) for
which Mr. Crozier was not charged.
In United States v Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110,120-122 (2d Cir.1999), this
court held [a]bsent proof of intent to conceal, an ordinary purchase made with illgotten gains does not violate the money laundering statute. (Id. at 121).
The purchase in this matter was a note given to Mr. Yazdzik by Brightside
Solar, LLC for the investment by Mr. Yazdzik of $30,000.00. The transaction was
open and notorious. The note was in the name of Bruce Yazdzik. (A-34) Mr.
Yazdzik met with the principals of Brightside and was introduced as Bruce
Yazdzik, (A-47). In fact, Mr. Crozier even made the principals execute a personal
guarantee to Mr. Yazdzik in Mr. Yazdziks name. (A-38). As in Stephenson, Mr.
Yazdziks interaction with Brightside Solar, LLC was open and notorious (Id. at
30
121) as a result of Mr. Croziers representation. The only intent to conceal that was
possibly shown by the government was to avoid IRS scrutiny, a reporting crime
not charged by the government. (See 18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(1)(B)(ii)).
Mr. Yazdziks testimony on direct fails to establish a violation of intent to
conceal and forecloses any conspiracy, as there was no agreement with Mr.
Crozier, Mr. Yazdziks testimony on cross examination forecloses both conspiracy
and intent to conceal. Mr. Yazdzik explained the transaction as follows:
He explains to me that he was going to it was good, okay. This is
all here. Sign the contract. We did the whole deal. He told me he was
going to have to take the money down. He was going to have to put
9000 in his account. He was going to put the rest in a safety deposit
box. He couldnt pull out $30,000.00 to give to the company. He
couldnt deposit $30,000.00 into the account because the IRS would
start to notice the type of money coming in. He said he would put nine
grand. Take the $30,000 out of his account and put the rest of the
money into a safety deposit box and take the money out gradually and
put it into his account. (A-33)
31
There is nothing in Mr. Yazdziks testimony that evidences an agreement

that Mr. Yazdzik had with Mr. Crozier to launder proceeds of Mr. Yazdziks
narcotic trafficking.
On direct examination, Mr. Yazdzik testified:
A.
Yeah, we talked about the meeting and there was two ways for
the contract basically. I invested $30,000 and they had the option to
give me back $33,000 which would be a 10 percent on your 10 percent
that would come back or they have the option -- I have the option of
owning 10 percent of the company, keep
the revenue coming. I said
I wanted the revenue come in. I didnt want the $3,000 that wouldnt
do me no good. 30,000 and 3000 back wouldnt have did me any good.
I told them that. They said they can see what they can do. Either way it
was going to be good because even if they gave me back the $33,000. I
get that back in a check from the company so it will still be legitimate
money.
Q.
Who told you it was going to be legitimate money?
A.
Mr. Crozier.
Q.
What was your understanding when he said legit money?
32
A.
I was going to get a check from the company. I can put that in the
bank. I can do anything I want with it. It is legitimate money. I can

take that 33,000 and buy another company with that 33,000. It would
be legitimate. It would be clean money.
(A-27, 28)
Nothing in Mr. Yazdziks testimony proves that Mr. Yazdzik agreed with Mr.
Crozier to launder the money. Mr. Yazdzik wanted to make money on his money
and that is insufficient to show an agreement with Mr. Crozier to conceal the source
or identity of the money.
The government introduced a note with Mr. Yazdziks name on it (A-92).
Mr. Yazdzik testified that his name was on the note as a lender (A-30) and that his
signature was on the note (A-31).
On cross examination Mr. Yazdzik testified that governments exhibit 2 was
a promise to pay:
Q.
Thats just where someone is promising to pay you money,
right? And the note is given to you by the Brightside folks who owned
Brightside. You give them money. They give you a note, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And thats in your name, correct?
33
A.
Yes.
Q.
Its not in your mothers name?
A.
No.
Q.
Not in Gaudiosis name?
A.
No.
Q.
Not in anybodys name but yours, right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So you would agree with me, sir, that certainly isnt hiding your
name on a document, right?

A.
Yes.
(A-34)
In fact, Mr. Yazdzik testified that Mr. Crozier made the principals of
Brightside Solar give Mr. Yazdzik a personal guarantee on the note:
Q.
You understand that Ralph, Mr. Crozier, Attorney Crozier,
forced them to put their personal guarantee on this agreement. Do you

remember that?
A.
He said theres a personal guarantee on it.
Q.
That was again to protect you, correct?

34
A.
Yes.
Q.
Because you understand, sir, that if the company goes bust, and
they dont have a personal guarantee, you dont get paid, correct?
A.
Yes.
(A-38)
After a review of all of Mr. Yazdziks testimony it is clear that there was no
agreement to hide or conceal the source; nature; control or ownership of the subject
$30,000.00 (assuming for argument that it was unlawful proceeds) and, more
importantly, it was a commercial transaction which had Mr. Yazdziks name on it,
open and notorious.
Q.
Was there any time during that was there any time during that
interview of February 16, 2012 that you told the government that
Ralph Crozier was money laundering for you?
A.
I just told them he was my lawyer.
Q.
But you didnt say you would agree that you did not tell him
that he was money laundering?

A.
I dont know exactly what money laundering entails.
Q.
Right. So you never told him he was a money launderer?
A.
I cant make that decision where I dont know what it entails.

35
Q.
Let me rephrase my questions better for you. I apologize. You
never told them, yes or no, that Attorney Crozier was money
laundering for you, correct?
A.
I dont know what money laundering is, so no.
Q.
So the answer would be no, right?
A.
I told him my dealings.
Q.
You also didnt tell him that Ralph Crozier was helping you
hide money in Brightside, did you?

A.
No. There was a contract. There was no money hidden.

(A-39, 40)
Here, as in Stephenson, the evidence produced by the government was

inadequate to establish that Mr. Yazdziks loan to Brightside Solar, LLC was
designed to disguise or conceal drug proceeds. Mr. Crozier was only charged with
subsection (i) of 18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(i)(B), and not subsection (ii) which prohibits
transactions to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law.
Examination of government witness Mr. Yazdziks own testimony supports
the fact that the loan to Brightside Solar, LLC was a loan to make money on an
36
ordinary commercial transaction. Mr. Yazdzik testified that the contract was in his
name, with the appropriate commercial guarantee and that the transaction was just
the contract, no money was hidden. (A-40)
Joining a number of other circuits, we hold that
Subsection (i) of the money laundering statute does not
criminalize the mere spending of proceeds of specified
unlawful activity. See, e.g. United States v. Dobbs, 63 F
3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1995) (where the use of the money
was not disguised and the purchases were for family
expenses and business expenses there is insufficient
evidence to support the money laundering conviction);
United States v. Rockelman, 49 F 3d 418, 422 (8th Cir.
1995) (money laundering statute should not be interpreted
to criminalize ordinary spending of drug proceeds). By its
express terms, the statute requires proof that a financial
transaction involving drug proceeds was designed to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity . 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Thus,
absent proof of intent to conceal, an ordinary purchase
made with ill-gotten gains does not violate the money
laundering statute. (Stephenson at 120, 121).
The only reference to conceal was the inference that Mr. Crozier didnt want
the IRS involved. (A-33)
37
Mr. Crozier may have intentionally split up the $30,000.00 given to him by
Yazdzik in order to avoid triggering federal transaction reporting requirements.
However, here as in Stephenson, the Court held that we hold such purpose is not
sufficient to satisfy the intent to conceal requirement of Section 1956
(a)(1)(B)(i). Conceal implies conduct entailing deception that goes beyond
merely acting in a way that avoids compulsory disclosure. (Stephenson at 121).
Respectfully, this distinction wasnt made by the District Court. 18 U.S.C.
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) proscribes conduct distinct from 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
Arguably, from the governments evidence a violation of the money laundering
statute regarding reporting requirements to the IRS may have been shown. But this
evidence cannot be used to satisfy the intent to conceal element found in 18
U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
Moreover, Subsection (ii) expressly criminalizes
transactions designed to evade state or federal reporting
requirements. A statute should be construed so that all of
its parts are given effect, see Mobil Oil Corp v. Karbowski,
879 F 2d 1052, 1055 92d Cir. 1989), and a construction
ascribing to two separate statutory provisions the same
meaning and scope is [therefore] disfavored. United
States v. Yip, 930 F 2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991). In light of
these customary guides to statutory interpretation, the
governments view that an intent to avoid government
38
reporting *122 requirements by itself establishes intent to

conceal must be rejected. To give effect to both
subsections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (B)(ii), each must
proscribe conduct distinct from the other. See id. Evidence
of intent to evade a reporting requirement cannot,
therefore, in and of itself satisfy the intent to conceal
element of subsection (B)(i). The evidence proffered in the
instant case thus failed as a matter of law to satisfy the
scienter requirement of Subsection 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
(Stephenson at 121, 122).
c. Argument Lack of Knowledge concerning the source of the proceeds.
The trial court also erred in not granting Mr. Croziers Motion for Judgment
of Acquittal after the government rested because the evidence was insufficient to
establish that Mr. Crozier knew the $30,000.00 Mr. Yazdzik invested were
proceeds from Mr. Yazdziks narcotic trafficking. In Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of knowledge of the
source of the proceeds. Kaufmann, a car dealer, had been told that a marijuana
dealer wanted to purchase a vehicle. Kaufmann agreed to accept $40,000 in cash
for a Porsche and to title the vehicle in a name that was not the purchasers. Id. at
887. On appeal, Kaufmann claimed that there was insufficient evidence to show
the he in fact believed the cash was drug proceeds. Id. at 892.
39
The Kaufmann Court noted that although no express statements were made
to Kaufmann that the money was drug proceeds, there were, however, statements
of various facts from which a reasonable person would almost certainly infer that
drug proceeds were involved. Id. at 893. These statements included that
Kaufmann was told that the man interested in purchasing the $40,000 Porsche had
to pay cash, and that he wanted the car titled in a name other than his own. Id.
The CI also told Kaufmann that this man was a marijuana dealer and provided
Kaufmann with a letter purported to be from the interested buyer . . . stat[ing]
that the purchase in cash and the titling in anothers name were more important
considerations than price. Id. The Court concluded that the evidence, taken as
a whole, sufficiently demonstrates that [the CIs and agents] assertions gave
Kaufmann or any reasonable person in his position a firm basis to believe that the
money derived from drug sales. Id.
In applying Kaufmanns reasonable person test to the instant case, although
Mr. Crozier may have been somewhat aware of Mr. Yazdziks criminal history
there are very few other assertions that would give a reasonable person a firm basis
to believe that the money was derived from drug sales. Mr. Yazdzik testified that
he purposefully portrayed himself as a used car dealer to appear legitimate. Mr.
Yazdzik also testified that he created false pay stubs from the used car business to
show legitimate income to both Mr. Crozier and the Courts. Mr. Yazdzik testified
40
that he hid his identity from Mr. Crozier as a drug dealer. Mr. Yazdzik never told
Crozier that the $30,000.00 was drug proceeds. Mr. Yazdzik testified that Mr.
Crozier learned about his drug dealing when Mr. Yazdzik turned in Mike. (A40)
In the governments case in-chief, no evidence was adduced to prove that
Mr. Crozier knew Mr. Yazdziks investment into Brightside were proceeds from
narcotics trafficking as charged in the indictment. The government has not set
forth sufficient evidence to support Mr. Croziers conviction under 18 U.S.C.
1956 (a)(2)(B)(i). As such, the District Court should have granted Mr. Croziers
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after the government rested.
Q.
Can you answer my question?
A.
No.
Q.
Im not trying to be rude, Im just trying to get you to focus on
that question, please. And you never told them that he knew he was
hiding drug money, did you?
A.
He knew it was drug money.
Q.
You never told him that he knew that he was hiding drug
money for you? Just listen to my question. You never told him that,
correct?
41
A.
No.
Q.
You never told them that you came to Attorney Crozier and
said, hey, I have drug money to hide, would you hide it for me? You
never said that, correct?
A.
No.
(A-40)
Q.
turning your attention back to the proffer of 1-18-12 that we
talked about yesterday. You never told the agents that Attorney
Crozier was hiding drug money for you, did you?
A.
No.
(A-43)
Q.
As you sit here today, you dont recall whether you told the
government that Mr. Crozier knew that the money you gave him was
from the sale of drugs?
A.
I dont recall.
(A-44)
Q.
Do you recall whether you had told the government that Mr.
Crozier knew that you gave him drug money to help you invest in
Brightside Solar? Do you recall telling the government that?
A.
I dont recall.
Q.
You were debriefed by the government?

42
A.
Yes.
Q.
And do you recall telling the government that Mr. Crozier
helped you launder money at that time?

A.
I never said that.
Q.
Pardon?
A.
Q.
No, I didnt say that.

Okay, You didnt say that. And you didnt tell them that Mr.
Crozier in this 12-16 proffer session was trying to hide money for
you? You never told them that, correct?
A.
No.
Q.
How about on the 1-18 session, you never told them that
Attorney Crozier was trying to hide money for you, did you?
A.
No.
Q.
That was a 1-18 session. Im sorry.
A.
No.
Q.
Then on the February session, you never told them that
Attorney Crozier was trying to hide money for you, did you?
43
A.
No.
(A-45, 46)\
Q.
And the paperwork that you signed was paperwork that had
Bruce Yazdziks name on it, right?

A.
Paperwork, this paper?
Q.
Yes.
A.
Yes.
Q.
You also signed an agreement which had Bruce Yazdziks
name on it, the two documents you signed?

A.
Correct.
Q.
That had Bruce Yazdziks name on it as well?
A.
Yes.
(A-53)
However, during cross examination Mr. Croziers counsel pointed out that
Mr. Yazdzik also owned a car dealership and that he had shipments made to this
legitimate business. (A-86) Based on the limited evidence used in convicting
Mr. Crozier, it was not sufficient to show that Mr. Crozier was aware of the
circumstances from which a reasonable person would infer that the property was
drug proceeds
44
III.
Judgment of Acquittal as to Count II Attempt to Launder
Monetary Instruments, because the government failed to prove and
the evidence was insufficient to show that: 1) the transaction was
designed to disguise or conceal the nature, location, source,
ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity; and 2) Mr. Crozier had the requisite
specific intent to launder monetary proceeds.
The basis for Count Two of Mr. Croziers conviction was two meetings he
had with Mr. Yazdziks mother, Debra Rost. During these meetings, Ms. Rost, in
her role as a confidential informant, wore an electronic listening/recording device.
(Transcripts of the recordings from these meetings are at A-98 and A-106) At the
first meeting, Ms. Rost inquired about the Brightside, LLC investment and
informed Mr. Crozier that Mr. Yazdzik needs money in jail. (A-98)
RC: What they, what they, if he doesnt want the ten percent, which
I assume he doesnt he needs money, so basically I what Ill do is
Ill have them pay the interest thats due which should be three
thousand thirty six hundred already due, because its been well over a
year, um I will find out what I can get, send it off to him, open up a
channel with him. (A-105)
45
DR: you know the feds took everything I dont want the feds to
get it, I dont know (A-98)
DR: But like I said, I dont want people looking at me seeing I got
money from him (A-100)
DR: Okay.
RC: Which is what youre here for me to do I assume.
Analysis of the first recorded conversation established that Mr. Yazdzik
wanted his money from Brightside, LLC, Mr. Crozier was going to talk to the
principals at Brightside and that Ms. Rost wanted Mr. Crozier to send Mr. Yazdzik
money in prison.
No evidentiary inference can be drawn that Mr. Croziers intention was to
conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership and control of
property believed to be proceeds of a specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. 1956
(a)(3)(B). Mr. Crozier never agrees to hide Mr. Yazdziks Brightside, LLC
investment.
The second recorded conversation between Crozier and Rost took place on
April 11, 2013. (A-106)
46
RC: Yes I contacted people with regards to the Solar energy, Ive
gotten them to agree to meet with me no later than April the thirtiet
(sic) and to bring the account current at which time I will be funding
your sons account in the federal prison so that he has money.
DR: Okay, now I did talk to Bruce
RC: Um Huh
DR; Okay I told him that you know I did finally make it here and all
that
RC:
DR:
Good
and he said, well I told him you told me you know, about
hiding his money from shipments. So he said okay. And you know he
is paranoid.
RC: Hiding his, hiding his money from
DR: His shipments. You know when hes doing the thing.
RC: Right (A-107)
Ms. Rost then informs Mr. Crozier that she found Mr. Yazdziks money
hidden in the basement and she wants to give Mr. Crozier the $11,000.00 cash, so
47
that she will not get in trouble. Later on in the conversation Mr. Crozier and Ms.
Rost discuss putting the money into Mr. Yazdziks name.
RC: I will not only help him, Im gonna make out this receipt to him
DR: Okay
RC: Okay?
DR: Yup
RC: And Im going to put in eleven thousand, but Im going to put
down, to be counted, all right? Because I (stutters)
DR: Yeah no problem
RC: You understand what I am saying Im not going to sit and count
it (voices overlap)
RC: All right give it to me let me see what you got. And what Im
going to do Im going to give you a receipt maam um then I gotta
deposit it. Hello? Give me two seconds.
DR: Yeah, yeah, no problem
(A-108)
RC: To be counted, um okay, I dont want to put your name on

anything
48
DR: Okay
RC: Cause I dont want you involved with hiding things from the
feds.
DR: Okay. (A-110)
Mr. Crozier then gave Ms. Rost a receipt for the $11,000.00 in Bruce
Yazdziks name. . (A-112) In effect, putting the funds back into the alleged drug
dealers name. Moreover, Mr. Crozier informed Ms. Rost that he would have to
deposit the cash. Presumably, Mr. Crozier would have had to file a cash
transaction report on the $11,000.00 but the government arrested him prior to the
cash going to the bank.
The governments only plausible argument can be that Mr. Crozier took the
money from Mr. Rost to conceal the nature, source or ownership of the cash and
thus launder the proceeds of Mr. Yazdziks drug business. The only source or
ownership of the $11,000.00 that could be concealed, is that of Mr. Yazdzik.
Instead of concealing Mr. Yazdziks name from the funds, Mr. Crozier issued a
receipt of the funds with Yazdziks name on it.
In Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550,128 S Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed. 2d 942
(2008), the Supreme Court confirmed that a conviction for transaction money
laundering, like a conviction for transportation money laundering requires proof
49
that the purpose or intended aim of the transaction was to conceal or disguise a
specified attribute of the funds. Huezo, 546 F. 3d at 179, 565 F. 3d 73, 78 (2d Cir.
2009). Although Cuellar arose in the context of transportation money laundering,
we found it holding equally applicable in the context of transaction money
laundering, in light of the identical language in the two provisions. United States
v. Garcia, 587 F. 3d 509, 517 (2d Cir.2009) citing, Huezo, 546 F. 3d at 179).
The ruse concocted by the government was to send Ms. Rost to Mr.
Crozier, who informed Mr. Crozier that the $11,000.00 was drug money or at least
money from unlawful activity, derived from her son, Mr. Yazdzik. If Mr. Crozier
gave the receipt to Ms. Rost in Ms. Rosts name, after being so informed, there
may be an argument for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956 (a)(3)(B). Instead of
concealing the source or ownership of the dirty money, Mr. Crozier put it in the
source and owners name. Absolutely, no intent to conceal Mr. Yazdzik.
Ms. Rost was informed by Mr. Crozier that he had to deposit the cash. The
implication is that the deposit would have been in the name of Mr. Yazdzik as
well. Unfortunately, the government arrested Mr. Crozier soon after his
conversation with Ms. Rost and before the cash could be deposited. If Mr. Crozier
put the cash in his trustee account and filed a Cash Transaction Report in Mr.
Yazdziks name, there would have been no trial. Instead we are left to conjecture.
50
Mr. Croziers intent to protect Ms. Rost from being involved with hiding
things from the feds (Appendix 9) is not a crime. Putting the funds back into the
name of Mr. Yazdzik, the drug dealing owner and source of the funds, is an action
that protects Ms. Rost, not an action designed to conceal the nature, source or
ownership of the $11,000.00 in cash. Thus, Cuellar confirms that a conviction for
transaction money laundering, like a conviction for transportation money
laundering, requires proof that the intended aim of the transaction was to conceal
or disguise a specified attribute of the funds. (see Huezo at 179).
Mr. Croziers intent was to make sure Ms. Rost was not involved with
hiding things from the feds, thats why he put the cash into Mr. Yazdziks name.
Actions do, indeed, speak louder than words United States v. Cromitie, 2011
WL 1842219 at p. 7 (2d Cir. 2011).
Similarly, in Ness, the Second Circuit applied Cuellar in a case involving
the proceeds of drug sales that were being transported to people in Europe and
commingled with jewelry and other valuables that [defendant] Ness declared to be
part of his business of transporting such valuables internationally 565 F 3d at 77.
In Ness, the government introduced testimony by (1) the defendants business
partner that the defendant stated that he sells confidentiality and (2) testimony
from an ecstasy trafficker who had delivered drug money to defendants company
because he didnt want a paper trail saying anything about the money that [he]
51
dropped off Id. at 78. The Second Circuit found that although the evidence
showed how defendant moved the money, it failed to establish why he moved
it. Id. The testimonial evidence, in conjunction with evidence of defendants
avoidance of a paper trail, hiding of the proceeds in packages of jewelry, and use
of code words[.] show only that he concealed the proceeds in order to transport
them. Id. Accordingly, the governments evidence was not sufficient to support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants purpose in transporting the
narcotics proceeds was to conceal one or more of their attributes. Id. see also
United States v. Roberts, 650 F. Supp. 2d 219 221(E.D. New York 2009) citing,
United States v Ness, 565 F. 3d 73 (2d Cir. 2009).
In fact, by putting the proceeds into Mr. Yazdziks name with the intent to
deposit the cash into a bank, Mr. Crozier revealed the source and ownership of the
allegedly unlawful proceeds from criminal activity. This effectively would protect
Ms. Rost from any inference that she was hiding money from the feds. No one
would have known that Ms. Rost was in possession of her sons ill-gotten proceeds
until Mr. Crozier brought it into the light.
Mr. Crozier was not the source of the proceeds, Mr. Yazdzik was, at least
according to Ms. Rost in her CI role. As such, where Mr. Yazdzik was the source
of the proceeds, the relevant question is not Mr. Croziers purpose, but Mr.
Croziers knowledge of Mr. Yazdzik, the drug dealers purpose. United States v.
52
Campbell, 977 F. 2d 854, 857, 858, (4th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 938, 113
S. Ct 1331, 122 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1993). Where the defendant is someone other than
the source of the illegal proceeds the statute is concerned with his knowledge of
the sources intent in the transaction. United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F. 3d
1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2000).
53
CONCLUSION
Based on the violation of Mr. Croziers right to counsel, his conviction
should be overturned and, if this Court does not reverse Mr. Croziers convictions
on both Court 1 and Count 2, this Court should order a new trial on any remaining
count(s) and that Mr. Crozier be allowed to assist in his defense as co-counsel to
his private retained attorney.
Based on the insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction for
Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Proceeds and Attempt to Launder Monetary
Proceeds, Mr. Croziers conviction should be overturned, his conviction reversed
and he should be acquitted on all counts.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
DEFENDANT RALPH CROZIER
By:
54
/s/
Michael S. Hillis
___________________________
MICHAEL S. HILLIS
DOMBROSKI HILLIS LLC
129 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, Connecticut 06510
203.624.9096
203.624.1308 facsimile
mhillis@dkh-law.com
Federal Bar No.: ct 11867
Attorney for Ralph Crozier
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1.
This brief complies with the type volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because:
This brief contains 9592 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:
This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
WordPerfect in Times New Roman 14-point type for text and 12-point
type for footnotes.
Dated: July 16, 2015
By:
55
/s/ Michael S. Hillis

___________________________
MICHAEL S. HILLIS
DOMBROSKI HILLIS LLC
129 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, Connecticut 06510
203.624.9096
203.624.1308 facsimile
mhillis@dkh-law.com
Federal Bar No.: ct 11867
Attorney for Ralph Crozier
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the original and six copies of the foregoing Brief for
Defendant-Appellant were dispatched to RECORD PRESS, this 16TH day of June,
2015, for delivery to the clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit this day.
I hereby certify that on June 16, 2015 a copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing.
Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Courts
electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as
indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through
the Courts CM/ECF System.
/s/ Michael S. Hillis

___________________________
MICHAEL S. HILLIS
56

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Case 15-572, Document 25, 07/16/2015, 1555985, Page1 of 57

United States Court of Appeals

21$33($/ )5207+(81,7('67$7(6',675,&7 &2857

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Case 15-572, Document 25, 07/16/2015, 1555985, Page3 of 57

Crozier and Bruce Yazdzik, Croziers alleged co-conspirator; 2) Mr.

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United States v. Dobbs, 63 F 3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1995) ..37

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STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) Laundering of Monetary Instruments

18 U.S.C. 1956(h) Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments

18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B) Attempt to Launder Monetary Instruments

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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trafficking laws and incarcerated. Subsequent to Mr. Yazdziks incarceration, Mr.

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He explains to me that he was going to it was good, okay. This is

the revenue coming. I said

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forth sufficient evidence to support Mr. Croziers conviction under 18 U.S.C.

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

appearance as co-counsel to his privately retained counsel. Mr. Croziers extensive

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The government failed to prove that a conspiracy to conceal or hide

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The trial court erred in striking the pro-se appearance of Mr.

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The trial court erred by failing to grant Croziers Motion for

This de novo standard of review will apply to issues II and III.

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conflicting testimony and competing inferences, specious inferences are not

Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part

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to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

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There is nothing in Mr. Yazdziks testimony that evidences an agreement

the revenue coming. I said

Who told you it was going to be legitimate money?

What was your understanding when he said legit money?

Case 15-572, Document 25, 07/16/2015, 1555985, Page34 of 57

bank. I can do anything I want with it. It is legitimate money. I can

Thats just where someone is promising to pay you money,