Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who
were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

SECOND DIVISION

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

Senior Civil Registry Officer

PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor,
Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June
24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from
the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of
the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when
he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the
solemnization of the subject marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

February 20, 1987

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
voidab initio. 5

=================================================================================================

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994236 SCRA 257

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or
by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians
of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof,
he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record
to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is
null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.
They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was
pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother
with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration
for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue
a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony without the knowledge of the formers
parents. All the documents required for the celebration of the marriage which includes procurement of marriage
license, was attended by Cardenas. It was stated in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued. The cohabitation of Castro and Cardenas lasted only for four (4) months after which they parted ways. Castro
sought the advice of a lawyer for a possible annulment of her marriage with Cardenas before leaving for the States to
follow her daughter who was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The Civil Registrar of Pasig issued
a certification stating that Castro and Cardenas were allegedly married in the Pasay Court on June 21, 1970 under an
alleged marriage license no.3196182 which was allegedly issued on June 20, 1970 but such cannot be located since it
does not appear in their records. It was then that she found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of her marriage with Cardenas. Castro filed a petition seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. The Regional Trial Court denied her petition. It ruled that inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court contending that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license. The respondent appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court
declaring that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
cancel the marriage contract. However, the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner herein, brought a petition for

review on certiorari which alleged that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of Castro are not sufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of marriage.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not
issue marriage license no.3196182 to the contracting parties. The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her
testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not aground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The finding of the appellate court
that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the
fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. It was held that under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license. Therefore, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros
parents. The marriage contract states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple decided to live together.
Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castros
brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he chose to ignore it, thus,
he was properly declared in default. The trial court denied her petition on the ground that the certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the
contracting parties. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
now assailed the decision of the appellate court and posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage or
private respondent to Edwin Cardenas?

Held: The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a secret marriage, ordinarily used to refer to a civil
marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the
marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which

provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being
one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the rules of court, a
certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate
court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount
that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The petition is Denied
there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a
City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.Defendant
Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The
cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her
daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled
that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE: Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without
a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally nonexistent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the former.

not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to
have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker,
a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On
15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by
Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given
birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then
immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He
also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite
his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him
such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet
Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-inlaw Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique.
Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her
son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her
expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information
as to the missing person's present whereabouts.

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the
Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative,
that the marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares
as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the
following allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief
on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence
as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case
of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5

United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case,

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief
that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
supplied).

defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife
had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife,
noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails
to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived
in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt
to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or wellfounded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41
of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there
be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead andbelieved to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead.

Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to look for
her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place in England,
the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London
and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope
of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to
him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their
friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if
admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9)
months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be
finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the
help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's
departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them
leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The
Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the
marital bonds through existing legal means.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an
ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:

CASE DIGEST: Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet
started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco
expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982.
Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his
mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went
home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another
seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but
it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that
he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured anher contract. More
so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M.
Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of
their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force
his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. 5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained
to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, 6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. 7 A
certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains
at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 8 Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990. 9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda
and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but
they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda
and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that
Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children. 10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until
January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating
that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No.
34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90
declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. 2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was
no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5,
1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to
be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage
this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."

On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground
that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial
court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows: 13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December
27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere
alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment.
These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological
incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983.
The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support
his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the
Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted.
1wphi1.nt

Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only
after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and
appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to
dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG
NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER,
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing
thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any
of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the
plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)." 16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts
of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity
as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the
basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of

children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code 21 in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he
was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals
of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein
that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court
is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV,
Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001 Republic of the Philippines Vs. Erlinda Matias
Dagdag
Facts:
Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag on October 20, 1988.They begot two children
namely Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21,
1982. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During
the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would
return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he
would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the
last they heard from him. The family is left to tend for themselves. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. A
certification dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino
remains at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would
present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the
case would be deemed submitted for decision. In compliance with the Order, the investigating
prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the
parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. On
December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated
December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code On January 29, 1991, the investigating
prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely
rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Solicitor General appealed to the
Supreme Court and on April 22, 1993 CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic,
and a fugitive from justice.
Ruling:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a prior assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. Taking into consideration the guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina,
it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The
present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993,
in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been
proven to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the
marriage null and void.
Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in
which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return
home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted,
would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda was
constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda
filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage
void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.