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G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919


ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably,
during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros,
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao.
The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo.
The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent.
The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and
Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the
women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged order was valid
RULING:
But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila
or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a
sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine
penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression?
The remedies of the citizen are three:
(1) Civil action;
(2) criminal action, and
(3) habeas corpus.
DEFENSES:
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this
instance. The fiscal has argued
(l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners,
(2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and
(3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the
jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they
could not bring the women from Davao.
General rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the
Philippine Islands.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought

before the court; or


(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain
a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed
a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station
on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza
by a creek.
The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or
beauty of the public plaza
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property.
On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI Camarines - convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the
municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
ISSUE:
Whether the said ordinance is valid
RULING:
No.
The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose
to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a
case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid
The city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others.
Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to
a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may
prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein
appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Vagueness of statute
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal,
dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated
in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to
pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended,
inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI - accused is guilty
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the ordinance is null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
(2) Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional for being ex post facto
(3) Whether the ordinance covers only owners or overseer of fishponds of private ownership and not to lessees of public
lands
RULING:
(1) No, the ordinance is clear.
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." The petitioner contends that being
a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise
maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction.
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a standard
though defectively phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very
provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "
manager." While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the
profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
(2) The ordinance is not ex post facto.
The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the
payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior
thereto."
Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.
(3) Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by
the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair
notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

G.R. No. 121777 January 24, 2001


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well,
the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment
conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters,
immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta.
Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at
around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on
the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman,
identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that
the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC Zamboanga: guilty of Illegal Recruitment
ISSUES:
(1) Whether recruitment and placement is void for vagueness
(2) Whether the Labor Code violates the due process clause
RULING:
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon
her.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
The proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to
create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever
he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made
in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or
employment referral"
("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law
overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or
employment referral"
("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law
overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to
punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute.
A discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."33 Appellant
has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of
the prosecuting officials. The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment
whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.
The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the
expense of society
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur.

1.
2.
3.

the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers.
he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article
13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.

In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person
named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to
testify.

Equal protection clause


G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in
his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International
School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the
School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same
decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and
regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local
hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure, namely:
(a) the "dislocation factor" and
(b) limited tenure.
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities
other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
RULING:
employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a
principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal
work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement
to the prejudice of local-hires.
The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances.

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle
of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but
pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings.
APPLICABLE LAW:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as
provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or
any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the
possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
ISSUES:
Whether the law
(1) is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and
(3) is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:


(1) Peace Court of Baguio - sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
RULING:
(1) The law is not discriminatory.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

1. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon
the degree of civilization and culture.
2. GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW
The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors
of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among
the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that
the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
3. NOT LIMITED TO CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT
It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant
asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures
of protection and security.
4. ACT APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not
an argument against the equality of its application.
(2) The law complies with the requirements of due process. To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are
not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials
in applying a law to particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:
(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government;

(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;


(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class
(3) It is a proper exercise of police power
Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the
industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a
legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of
an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all
obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of
their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines.
When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons,
the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which
some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of
the nation

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