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Vagueness of statute
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial Fiscal,
dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated
in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse and fail to
pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS
(P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended,
inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) CFI - accused is guilty
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the ordinance is null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
(2) Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional for being ex post facto
(3) Whether the ordinance covers only owners or overseer of fishponds of private ownership and not to lessees of public
lands
RULING:
(1) No, the ordinance is clear.
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." The petitioner contends that being
a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise
maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction.
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specifies a standard
though defectively phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very
provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "
manager." While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the
profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
(2) The ordinance is not ex post facto.
The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the
payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior
thereto."
Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.
(3) Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by
the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair
notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
1.
2.
3.
the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers.
he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article
13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.
In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person
named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to
testify.
1. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon
the degree of civilization and culture.
2. GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW
The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors
of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among
the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that
the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
3. NOT LIMITED TO CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT
It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant
asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures
of protection and security.
4. ACT APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not
an argument against the equality of its application.
(2) The law complies with the requirements of due process. To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are
not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials
in applying a law to particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:
(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government;