A Cuckoo Strategy on China

Atul Bhardwaj

n a vintage warship, the crows nest is

the topmost spot on the ships mast
from where a lookout scans the
seas for incoming danger. In a modern
warship this vantage point has been
replaced by the radar. However, for
students of strategy, the story of the
cuckoo surreptitiously laying eggs in the
crows nest continues to be relevant. The
wise crow is lured out of his nest into a
chase when provoked by the continuously jarring sounds produced by the
male cuckoo. While the crow is busy in
hot pursuit, the female cuckoo quietly
moves into the crows nest, throws out
some of the crows eggs, thereby making
place to lay her eggs. Unknowingly, the
crow warms all the eggs and nurtures
the babies when the eggs hatch.
The crow is a perfect example of a
strategic sucker. In the secular world
too, there are nations who are suckered
to provide their military manpower to
fight someone elses war. The first question to ask vis--vis China is whether the
1962 conflict was Indias own war? The
lack of dispassionate analysis of the
period has led Indian strategic thought
to shy away from identifying and naming the cuckoo that clandestinely came
and laid its egg in the Indian nest.
Foreign Strategy of India
According to K M Panikkar, America
and Apa Pant were the twin factors
responsible for a sudden deterioration in
Sino-Indian relations in the mid-1950s
(Gupta 1982: 14). A powerful American
lobby having deep links with all political
parties in India, barring the Communist
Party of India, pushed the Indian establishment on an escalatory path vis--vis
China that eventually resulted in a border
war. Apa Pant, Indias political officer in
Sikkim (1955-61), was instrumental in
building a Tibet lobby within India. He
convinced many senior Indian political
leaders like Jai Prakash Narain, G B Pant

Economic & Political Weekly

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SEPTEMBER 20, 2014

review article
Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian
Ocean and International Security edited by
John Garofano and Andrew J Dew (Washington DC:
Georgetown University Press), 2013; pp xvii + 331, $32.95.
Asymmetrical Threat Perception in IndiaChina Relations by Tien-sze Fang (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press), 2014; pp xv + 247, Rs 795.
Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in
the Indo-Pacific by C Raja Mohan (Washington DC:
Carnegie Foundation), 2012; pp xii + 360, $19.95.
Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior:
Growing Power and Alarm by George J Gilboy and
Eric Heginbotham (New York: Cambridge University Press),
2012; pp xxx + 376, 22.99.

and the ex-president Rajendra Prasad

to take up the Tibetan cause as their
own (Gupta 1982: 15). Purshottam Das
Trikamdas, an old associate of Apa Pant,
inspired the international commission of
jurists to publish two reports on Tibet in
1959 and 1960 with an aim to establish
that Tibet enjoyed de facto sovereignty
between 1912 and 1951.
In 1959, India entered the game of
brinkmanship vis--vis China and kept
climbing up the escalation ladder. India
was gullible enough to follow western
instructions both on Tibet and its boundary with China and ended up fighting a
frivolous war. By allowing asylum to
Dalai Lama, India acted like a foolish crow
that hatched American strategic eggs.
The United States (US) actions in Tibet
provoked the Sino-Indian war that fulfilled the American goal of preventing
any possibility of Soviet Union, China
and India forming a progressive joint
front against western imperialism. The
1962 war was used to widen the wedge
in the communist bloc and inch closer
towards making Mao Zedong, a Chinese Tito, who could speak openly
against the Soviets (Xiang 1992: 319).
The conflict shook Jawaharlal Nehrus
belief in non-alignment, teaching him an
unforgettable lesson on the relevance of
empires in the postcolonial world.
vol xlix no 38

Some argue that recent scientific studies have revealed that not all varieties of
cuckoos are cunning. In some cases, the
pungent juices secreted by the newlyhatched baby cuckoos protect the nest
from being attacked by predators, thereby ensuring that the left-behind baby
crows are also nurtured in a protected
environment. According to this logic,
America was not a cunning cuckoo since
the war proved beneficial for some in
India too. The US, by instigating India
to take on China, helped the capitalistdriven Indian state to stem the growth
of the left movement in India. The
venom spewed against the communists
during and in the wake of the 1962 war
was enough to cause a three-way divide
in the Communist Party of India and
push the leftist forces on the defensive
for times to come. An editorial in The
Indian Express of 6 November 1962 suggested that people should
keep our country consolidated by weeding
out the indigenous communist vermin from
such organisations and bodies into which,
behind the facade of fellow travellers, they
have infiltrated. There can be no place for
these faceless traitors in any war committee
or council. Despite their belated protestations of patriotism they cannot be trusted
and must be put effectively beyond the pale.

Masked in realpolitik, the national

chauvinist evangelism surged in the wake
of the 1962 war. It has continued to
serve the Indian elites ideological
interests that perceive the Chinese
threat to the American empire as their
national concern.
Twin American Contributions
In the initial years after Independence,
the twin American contributions that
laid the intellectual groundwork for an
Indian foreign policy aimed at acquiring
regional primacy were the Monroe
doctrine and Alfred Thayer Mahans
concepts of sea power and overseas
naval bases. In March 1953, at the end of
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his first stint as the US ambassador to

India, Chester Bowles apprised Nehru of
the Monroe doctrine and its applicability
in the Indian context. He advised Nehru
that in order to preempt potential Communist advancements, he should take
charge of Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim, Burma
and Tibet and drive out all external
influences (primarily China) from its
vicinity. This, according to Bowles, was
the best way for India to maintain its
neutrality (Iscoe 2010: 8).
A scenario where Japan, China, India
and Russia may combine to end centurieslong western dominance of the IndoPacific maritime space is never allowed
to be considered as a viable strategic
option. History is, however, replete
with examples of efforts to forge a pan
Asian solidarity. In 1913, Katsura Taro,
Japans acting Prime Minister, a soldierpolitician, proposed to Sun Yat-Sen, the
Chinese nationalist leader, the launch of
a joint Sino-Japanese effort to liberate
India. Taro felt that booting out the British
from India would relieve Japan of the
necessity to worry about land for colonisation and commerce and liberate it from
pursuing the crude policy of conquest
(Altman and Schiffrin 1972: 387-88).
The general paranoia related to the
rise of China and unflinching faith in
the myth of unipolar peacefulness is
perplexing.
The first two decades of the unipolar era
have been anything but peacefulIn all
the US has been at war for 13 of the 22 years
since the end of the Cold War The first two
decades of unipolarity, which make up less
than 10% of US history, account for more
than 25% of the nations total time at war
(Monteiro 2012: 11).

Out of the 30 days that the IndiaChina war lasted, for 18 days the Indian
Parliament and press were engaged in
driving out Krishna Menon from the
Ministry of Defence (Ghose 1993: 292).
The remaining 12 days were spent in
preparing a shopping list of arms to be
presented to the Americans.
One of the biggest fallout of the 1962
war was the growth of arms lobbies in
India. On 26 November 1962, one
week after the Sino-Indian war ended,
T T Krishnamachari (popularly known
as TTK), a minister without portfolio in
Nehrus cabinet, wrote a personal and
32

confidential letter to the cabinet secretary, S S Khera, lobbying for the immediate procurement of M-14 guns from
Harrington and Richardson Arms Company of Massachusetts. Intriguingly, along
with TTK, Partap Singh Kairon, the then
Chief Minister of Punjab, was also involved in meeting the arms agents.1
This North-South bonhomie in the
arms business offers a perfect example
of the ad hocism and political interference that has plagued Indian defence
purchases since Independence. However,
this crucial cultural malaise is rarely
considered as a factor in analysing Indias
national strategy. Paradoxically, those
who profess greater indigenisation are
also the biggest advocates for hastening
the process of importing arms and
ammunition from abroad.
The modernisation of the forces with
indigenised equipment is a long-drawn
out process that requires protracted
peace. However, the Indian defence and
foreign affairs establishment, married to
theories of security dilemma, international anarchy and balance of power,
can hardly appreciate the need for deliberately lowering the threat levels to
achieve national objectives. Should India
impose a moratorium on its desire to
appear masculine? Why should India not
explore the possibility of an isolationist
foreign policy? It is sacrilegious to pose
such questions, because it is tantamount
to disrespecting Kautilya and the western realpolitik scholars ranging from
Machiavelli to Mearsheimer.
Take for example, the recent raising of
a mountain strike corps in the eastern
sector, consisting of 40,000 troops and
costing Rs 60,000 crore. This mobilisation of men and money is justified by
digging out the ghost of the 1962 war
and echoing the weather-beaten American theories of Chinese threat and irredentism. The predominance of security
matters in the India-China matrix has
needlessly rocked the boat and made the
two neighbours sit on a powder keg. The
net result is that the precious Rs 60,000
crore that should have gone to beef up
indigenisation plans has been spent on
creating a military asset that will continue to draw its feed from the foreign
military industry.
SEPTEMBER 20, 2014

It is hard to discount the fact that

much of the anti-China rhetoric in India
emanates from the international arms
and currency bazaars, especially when
New Delhi is the largest importer of
arms in the world and Chinas growing
economic might is seen as a direct threat
to the supremacy of the dollar.
Familiar Chant of Bazaars
The four recent books discussed here
echo the familiar chant of bazaars that
well-nigh pray for strained Sino-Indian
ties. Some authors simply reiterate the
India-China disagreements over Tibet
and unsettled borders, others who find
the two contentious issues inadequate to
keep the Asian giants apart for long insist
on extending the rivalry into oceans and
the nuclear realm. The common thread
running through these analyses is the
underlying assumption that the US is a
benign balancer in the region and India
should not contest American hegemony.
The authors believe that America has a
central role in mitigating the ChinaIndia conundrum. A trilateral dialogue between India, China and America is prescribed to calm the maritime commons.
In Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, Gilboy
and Heginbotham talk of India and Chinas
strategic culture and how those historical
and social moorings could be best utilised by America. Raja Mohans Samudra
Manthan sees the surging economies of
the Asian giants and their expansionist
urges as a cause of Mahanian resurgence
in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). He
almost treats India and China as the East
India Company and Dutch East India
Company respectively who will entangle
themselves in a war for resources and
profits. Such western and much of the
Indian analyses imagine the Indian and
Chinese armada competing on the high
seas to establish their naval bases in
Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in
the IOR. It is also imagined that the
Indian navy in order to maintain its perceived hold over the Indian Ocean would
interdict the China-bound oil tankers
and choke their growth. Tien-sze Fang
in Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in
India-China Relations uses constructivist
studies to understand the perception of
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a threat in India-China dynamics,

but arrives at the realists conclusion
that sees security dilemma as the
raison dtre that prevents India-China
ties from resting on an even keel. Tien-sze
Fangs nuanced theoretical understanding of Indias misperceptions with
regard to Chinese intentions is helpful
in drawing a correct picture of the problems in current Sino-Indian relations.
Samudra Manthan that talks about
churning of the Indian Ocean misses the
point that the mythological magic potion
of immortality is no longer concentrated
in the oceans, it has proliferated to
the global financial markets, where
daily trade amounts to trillions of dollars. The ratio of global financial assets
to global gross domestic product (GDP) is
now above 450 in developed countries
(Sassen 2008: 187).
The financial deepening of advanced as
well as emerging economies is one of the
major reasons for the western worlds
bold alteration of course away from the
seas. Holmes and Yoshiharas chapter,
In Red lines for Sino Indian Rivalry, in
Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian
Ocean and International Security, highlights the opposing approaches to sea
power in Europe and Asia. On the one
hand, the West seems to have
transcended Mahan, entering a post modern,
post-Mahanian age in which high seas
combat appears almost unthinkable
Asians by contrast inhabit a modern, neoMahanian in which naval war becomes a
reality (pp 187-88).

Just as in the 20th century, America

used maritime strategy as a subset of a
grand strategy to deal with the balance
of power, it is once again trying to do the
same by poking its nose in the South and
East China Sea disputes between sovereign nations. One sees a great deal of
commonality between the current SinoUS maritime competition (in which
India is being used as a pawn) and the
Anglo-American maritime rivalry during
the interwar years. It was a period when
the naval problem ranked with reparation as the most serious international
problem. Much of the maritime problems in the 1920s resulted from AngloFrench fears related to emerging competition to their colonial holdings. The
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1922 Naval Treaty arrived at the Washington conference was successful only
for a couple of years, mainly because it
did not account for the fast declining
combat capacities of the warships in the
era of naval aviation and submarine
warfare. This resulted in the need for
further review of international navies
and restricting their tonnage or type.
The Three-Power Naval Conference in
1927 between the US, Great Britain and
Japan failed to arrive at a common denominator to measure the navies. The
US did not approve of the greater expansion in the cruiser strength of the United
Kingdoms naval power and any limitations on the type of vessels that America
wanted to invest in (Dulles 1929).
The naval negotiations of the interwar
years, between the rising and the declining international powers, were primarily
focused on putting restrictions on the
naval vessels and their armament.
Another element in the American strategy
was to apply moral pressure on the AngloFrench to retain their colonial status.
Throughout the 1930s, Anglo-American
tussle continued on the maritime high
table. It is only in the ABC Conference of
29 January-29 March 1941 that the
Americans finally convinced the British
to accept their Atlantic First strategy
which, according to General George
Marshall, meant, If we lose in the
Atlantic we lose every-where (Offner
1978: 832).
Ongoing Power Game
With Asia now emerging on the global
economic stage, America is focused on
an Asia First strategy. The strategy is
to deepen the schism within the Asian
community and project the rise of China
as morally repugnant and militarily
threatening. America (primarily due to
money constraints) is seeking help from
India, Japan and the Philippines to make
China divert its resources to spending
more money and energy in managing
the maritime issues in South and East
China Sea.
It is under these circumstances that
one sees the Chinese proposal of a Maritime Silk Road, as a counter-strategy, a
conciliatory strategic gesture, or probably a Chinese version of the Monroe
vol xlix no 38

doctrine. As Robert Kaplan says in his

latest book, Asias Cauldron: The South
China Sea and the End to a Stable Pacific,
China is seeking an Asian version of the
Monroe doctrine, an approach that
helped America take over from European
nations as the supreme power in the
western hemisphere. Kaplan is of the
opinion that the US must encourage a
rising Chinese navy to assume its rightful position, as the representative of the
regions largest indigenous power.
What Kaplan is saying is that China,
the sleeping partner of the US in the cold
war, must now play an active role on
behalf of Washington in the ensuing
US-Russian rivalry. America wanted
Chiange-Kai-shek to be the US policeman
in Asia-Pacific region and subsequently
expected Mao to perform that role.
The 21st century power game is not
ideological nor is it between players
with huge asymmetries in terms of wealth
and technology. In the 1950s, China only
had nationalism and a bit of ideology to
defend itself. Now, in addition, it is also
rich. However, the role of China in shaping the contours of future regional and
global politics remains as important now
as it was in the past in shaping the final
outcome of the cold war.
In this ongoing power game, should
India be in the playing 11 or decide to be
the 12th man? Should India remain
indifferent to Chinas geopolitical rise or
help America maintain the status quo
and retain its supremacy? Working in
aid of the US entails India to partake in
US military adventures. Gilboy and Heginbotham attempt to extrapolate from
ancient Chinese and Indian texts their
respective propensity to use force and
willingness to sacrifice their military
manpower to achieve US goals. The
Indian and Chinese texts (Kautilyas
Arthashastra and Sun Tzus Art of War)
on strategy are more or less similar in
terms of how to fight wars through deception, deceit and treachery. The major
difference between the two is that Kautilya openly suggests that continuous conquest is indicative of good leadership
while Sun Tzus use of force is cloaked
under the rubric of self-defence.
One tends to disagree with Gilboy and
Heginbotham that strategic culture can
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be used to distinguish a nations military

behaviour from another. The entire human
civilisation is entrapped in a vicious
cycle of fear and violence that has made
their military behaviour almost similar.
There is a universal culture of violence
that transcends all boundaries. However,
one cannot ignore the modern history of
a nation to understand its propensity to
use force under different circumstances.
For example, modern history can provide an answer to the question of whether
China or India is culturally more inclined to use force to fight other peoples
wars. The Indian military tradition does
not consider it repugnant to send armies
on expeditionary missions launched by
imperial powers. Indian armed forces
celebrate their regimental achievements
in the first and second world wars that
fought under the Union Jack. The Chinese
military tradition, on the other hand, is
more intertwined with their nationalism.
Historically, the Chinese have never left
their country to fight others wars. During the second world war, the Chinese
soldiers did come to India to be trained by
American and British forces, but that was
only to fight the Japanese within China.
Furthermore, most of the wars that China
has fought after 1950 have been related
to their territory. India, on the other hand,
has fought wars in Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka for reasons other than territory.
Looking further back into history one
finds an excellent example of how the
British imperial navy used an Indian
prince to attack Tibet at a time when the
British were launching their first opium
war against China in 1840. Those who
argue that it was the British naval might
that forced China to sign the unequal
treaty in 1842 must also give due credit
to Gulab Singh who unknowingly fell
into the British trap to hatch their eggs
in Ladakh and Tibet.
Ladakh, Tibet and Nanking Treaty
In the second half of the 19th century,
in order to prevent English ships and
sailors from being regularly checked and
regulated by the Chinese authorities in
Canton (Lamb 1958: 35), the British identified Tibet as the soft spot that could be
exploited to pressurise and provoke the
Chinese. Massive economic and financial
34

stakes in mainland China prevented

London from direct military action against Peking. The British preferred covert
means to draw the Chinese military into
a noose.
Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, was used
to attack Tibet. He was ensnared by the
lucrative pashmina shawl wool trade to
invade Ladakh in 1834. Ladakh was the
transit point for the wool coming from
western Tibet for its onward journey to
Kashmir. However, the moment Ladakh
was invaded by Gulab Singh, the Tibetans diverted their export consignments
along the Sutlej route to RampurBushahr, a British territory. Gulab Singh
got Ladakh but not the profits. His first
war ended up filling British coffers since
the selling price of shawl wool in Rampur
skyrocketed by 200% (Lamb 1958: 40).
Then in 1841, the prospect of earning
huge profits bewitched Gulab Singh to
conquer western Tibet, the source of
pashmina wool. He attacked, but only to
face the combined wrath of the ChineseTibetan military might. He lost Leh to
the Chinese and was forced to toe
their line.
Analogy of Crows Nest
The story of gullible Gulab Singh brings
us back to the analogy of the crows nest.
Singhs first invasion in 1834 led him to
invest in the administration of Ladakh,
while the British made all the gains from
shawl imports. Gulab Singhs second war
in 1841 against western Tibet brought
him only defeat and humiliation, but
again huge strategic and commercial
gains for the British. In 1841, the British
were launching the first opium war
against China and forcing them to grant
trade and territorial rights within China.
Gulab Singh unknowingly helped the
British navy secure victory against the
Chinese and forced them to sign the
treaty of Nanking. Incidentally, the British involvement in instigating Gulab
Singh to go on expeditionary missions is
borne out by the fact that the British raj
influenced and instigated Gulab Singh
through their ally, the Sikh kingdom of
Lahore to indulge in the futile use of force.
Tibet, for the British imperialists of
the 19th century, was not worth a
candle. They were least interested in
SEPTEMBER 20, 2014

wasting their resources on a land that

did not promise to fetch adequate profits
for their businessmen. The British could
not match the Chinese might in terms of
land warfare. All they could do was to
divert Chinese military manpower
towards distant Tibet and tie them up in
a noose that could be pulled and tightened at will.
It is important to understand the
noose strategy because this is exactly
what Mao used when he bombed Jinmen
and Mazu in 1958. He did not launch an
amphibious attack to land on Jinmen.
He made sure that the shells from mainland China avoided hitting the American
naval ships and inhabited areas. Mao did
not escalate the crisis; his intention was
to control the American movements by
drawing them into an area where they
were unwilling to commit their forces.
China wanted America to maintain the
sanctity of its territorial waters by
remaining outside the 12-mile limit. Besides bombing, Mao was also having
ambassadorial-level talks with America
in Warsaw (Xiaobing et al 2009).
It can be safely concluded that the
propensity to use force is not a function
of cultural moorings. Use of military is a
matter of time and space. The best results ensue when passion is combined
with politics. Gulab Singh, a Sikh, belonging to a martial race, failed because
he played a pure military game. He let
the British accumulate the political gains
that accrued from his military actions.
Mao, on the other hand, played a political game with military tools. At one
stage during the bombing campaign, in
order to avoid pushing the envelope too
far, Mao ordered the shelling to be conducted only on odd numbered days. This
unprecedented military joke displayed
Maos judicious understanding of the
limits of limited war and the futility of
pushing it beyond a certain limit.
Conclusions
Military power is generally considered
to be the ultima ratio of power because
it is perceived as a decisive arbiter of
disputes when it is used and shapes
outcomes among states even when it is
not (Beckley 2012: 57). However, more
than the military, it is the strength of the
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treasury that determines majority of the

international outcomes. Viewing strategy
purely as a military option or use of force
is a skewed approach. Strategy must
extend beyond the narrow confines of
use of force to include options that suggest ways and means to avoid getting
sucked into wars. Middle powers that
get suckered into wars designed to sustain empires and anarchy in the international order only increase their debt
and dependency.
Indias aspirations to be a global power
are justified and legitimate. However,
what is questionable is the timing and its
level of preparedness to jump into the
great power game. Has India accumulated the requisite capital to be a meaningful actor in the global game? America,
despite being a pre-eminent economic
power from 1900 to the 1940s, did not
display its true intentions to be a global
hegemon. It began appearing militarily
on the global stage only after the AngloFrench Asian empire had been bankrupted and delegitimised by the second
world war.
The Chinese too are patiently waiting
for their time to come. It is only in 1987
that China started considering an aircraft carrier for the PLA Navy that was
eventually commissioned in 2012, when
their foreign reserves stood at $3 trillion. India, on the other hand, bought an
old aircraft carrier in 1957 and 1980. On
both occasions, India was suffering from
acute foreign exchange crisis and going
to the World Bank with a begging bowl.
Today China holds about a third of the
worlds international reserve assets excluding gold and has foreign exchange
reserves of $4 trillion. It can afford to be
more assertive in the South China Sea
by placing 80 ships to protect its newly
established deep-sea oil rig in Paracel
Island. But how can India think of playing big maritime games in the Pacific,
when its foreign reserves stand at a
meagre $300 billion plus? Despite such
glaring asymmetries between the two,
Raja Mohan still sees India in competition with China. He sees China having
diplomatic ties with Bangladesh also as
a problem and a potential flashpoint.
Tien-sze Fang is more objective in his
assessment that China is not moving
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ahead to thwart the Indian advance. In

fact, New Delhi does not figure in the
Beijings immediate adversary list.
The anti-China, pro-Tibet advocacy
groups in India who were active during
the 1962 war are once again reviving old
rivalries with state-capitalist China. The
only novelty is that the stage for enacting the Machiavellian drama, with
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Monroe as the
lead actors, is being shifted from the
Himalayas to the high seas. The drama,
scripted in American think tanks has
gained popularity among Indian realists. The resulting nautical neurosis is
making India draw imaginary redlines
in the Indian Ocean, challenging China
to cross them at their own peril. Mahan
the fin de sicle American sea captain, is being invoked to kindle the
Indian elites colonial instincts, urging
them to take on China.
Perhaps, it is the Chinese Jin-class submarines, with JL-2 ballistic missiles, that
the Indian strategists find menacing.
However, the fact is that currently China
has no proper command and control
mechanism in place to operationalise a
sea-based deterrent. Moreover, China has
no experience of operating SSBNs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) at sea
with nuclear warheads mated to missiles
(Lewis 2013: 12). Furthermore, China has
enough land-based missiles that cover
the entire Indian subcontinent. There is
no reason for China to come and meet
India from the Indian Ocean.
Why should India be perturbed by
Chinas rise? If India can manage to live
with America, a global hegemon of monstrous proportions, with around 700
military bases around the world, then
dealing with a powerful China, in a
multipolar world should hardly be a
cause for concern. If Japan, despite being nuked, positively engages with the
US, there is no reason to imagine that
India cannot jettison the historical baggage of a low-level Sino-Indian war of
five decades vintage. The China-India
territorial dispute is not insurmountable
nor is it difficult to have a dialogue with
China on the Tibet issue.
India suffered immensely during the
1940s, losing her men to famine and imperial wars. India must revisit 1962 and its
vol xlix no 38

relations with China as a catharsis rather

than repeating the process of churning
at the behest of another empire.
Atul Bhardwaj (atul.beret@gmail.com) is an
ICSSR senior fellow at the Institute of Chinese
Studies, New Delhi.

Note
1

National Archive of India, Ministry of Home

Affairs, File No 110/62/E,CS/1962.

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