Facts:

general rule

Petitioner Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun, the lead defense counsel of Ampatuan, Jr. in
the prominent"Maguindanao Massacre Case," filed this present petition for contempt
against Atty. Prima JesusaQuinsayas, et.al., including media men and broadcasting
companies.Quinsayas, et.al. filed a disbarment case against Fortun for dishonest and
deceitful conductviolative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. They alleged
that Fortun is "engaging in activitiesmisleading the prosecution and the trial court."
Pending the disbarment case, Quinsayas was invited to ashow

, disbarment proceedingsare confidential in nature until their final resolution and the
final decision of this Court. In this case,however, the filing of a disbarment
complaint against petitioner is itself

"ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre,"

where he discussed thedisbarment case against Fortun, including its principal points.
This tempted Fortun to file this present petition against him and various media men
and companies.Fortun alleged that Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details
of the disbarment complaintagainst him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court on the
confidential nature of disbarmentproceedings.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities conspired
withQuinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective
media platforms. He said thatthe public circulation of the disbarment complaint
against him exposed this Court and its investigators tooutside influence and public
interference.In their comments, respondents, among others, contended that the filing
of the disbarmentcomplaint against petitioner was already the subject of widespread
news and already of public knowledge,and that petitioner is a public figure and the
public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, andcharacter.

a matter of public concern

considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation
as defense counsel in the case.Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint
relate to petitioners supposed actions involving theMaguindanao Massacre case.
Since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure becausehe is
representing a matter of public concern, and because the event itself that led to the
filing of thedisbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the
media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news.
It would have been different if the disbarment caseagainst petitioner was about a
private matter as the media would then be bound to respect theconfidentiality
provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press. If there is alegitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a
fair, true, and accurate news report of a
6

Issue:

Jurisprudence on Legal and Judicial EthicsFebruary2013

Whether or not respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment

proceedings, warrantinga finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment

complaint, membersof the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings during its pendency.As to Quinsayas, he is bound by Section 18, Rule
139-B both as a complainant in the disbarmentcase against petitioner and as a
lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Quinsayas is familiar withthe
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
confidentiality, hedisseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner
to members of the media which actconstitutes contempt of court.

Held:
Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule, but the media men and companies are not
liable thereto.The Court recognizes that publications which are privileged for reasons
of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
As a

The premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment

proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule
.The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations
free from anyextraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal

and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients andlitigants. It is also to deter the
press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto withoutauthority.In
view thereof, the court found Quinsayas liable for indirect contempt of court, with a
fine of P20,000.

Republic of the Philippines

CARPIO, J.:

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The Case

SECOND DIVISION

Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun
(petitioner) against Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma
Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael
Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De
Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas
(Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents,
who are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty. Quinsayas, et al.
Petitioner also named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network) through
its news editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABSCBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa
(Ressa), Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI)
represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres),
Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu
Punay (Punay). Respondents Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups
and personalities are collectively referred to in this case as respondents.

G.R. No. 194578

February 13, 2013

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON,
NENITA OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA
QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU
MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK INC., through its new editors
Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN
CORPORATION, through the Head of its News Group, Maria Ressa, CECILIA
VICTORIA OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented
by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE
STAR represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY,
Respondents.

DECISION

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then

Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and
journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak
to file Mangudadatus Certificate of Candidacy1 when they were accosted by a group
of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some

four to ten kilometers from their destination.2 The group was taken hostage and
brought to a hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman,
Ampatuan, Maguindanao.3 The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later
discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by
shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles
were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe.4 These
gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57
victims were killed, 30 of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder
were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and
docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652,
and Q-10- 163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.
(Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against

petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment
case is still pending.

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct,

impede and degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action,
all in the hope of burying the principal issue of his clients participation or guilt in
the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of November 23, 2009," the petitioners
said.6

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article,

written by Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under
the rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject
matter of the cases, read the complaint.

***** ***** *****

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website
posted an article, written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment
of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others

filed a 33 page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of
"engaging in every conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the
proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."5

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by
Torres, which according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as
follows:

"Respondent Attorney Fortuns act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read
the complaint.

"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession,
rendering him unfit to be called a member of the Bar."7

Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national

television a program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao
Massacre." Drilon, the programs host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas
to discuss the disbarment case against petitioner, including its principal points.
Petitioner was allegedly singled out and identified in the program as the lead counsel
of the Ampatuan family.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent media groups and personalities conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by
publishing the confidential materials on their respective media platforms. Petitioner
pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a
television program viewed nationwide

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him
exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference.
Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote about and commented on the disbarment
complaint which opened his professional and personal reputation to attack. He
alleged that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was
to malign his personal and professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the
bases of the charges were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took
place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the
Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr. and his
counsel and violated the accuseds right to presumption of innocence and due
process; (3) it was published following articles written about petitioners advocacy
for the rights of an accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public;
and (4) respondents knew that the charges were baseless as petitioner always opted
for speedy trial and protection of the accuseds rights at trial. Petitioner further
alleged that in announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case,
respondents were only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public against him
and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication
where it could have printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the
disbarment complaint on its television station. GMA Network alleged that the
publication had already been done and completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed
copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who reported
the news and the media groups that published it on their website, including GMA
Network, did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network further alleged that
Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice
when she forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith
in posting the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with the

other respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the
disbarment complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only
after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who furnished copies of the
disbarment complaint to the media reporters. GMA Network alleged that it had no
intention to malign petitioners personal and professional reputation in posting the
news about the disbarment complaint on its website.

In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network
and not a writer of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Department of Justice. Dedace alleged that on
22 November 2010, she received an advice from fellow field reporter Mark
Merueas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu would be filing a disbarment case against
petitioner. She waited at the Supreme Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas
arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to news reporters and Dedace
received one. Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network where it
went to the editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality
of disbarment proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good faith and
without malice in forwarding her news story to the news desk and that she had no
intention to, and could not, influence or interfere in the proceedings of the
disbarment case. She further alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner was newsworthy and should be reported as
news.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website
through a syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are
not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and
Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations, with separate legal
personalities, and one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.

Torres8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told
her and several other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against
petitioner. The disbarment case was actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres
received a copy of the complaint. Since the lead of the story came from a lawyer,

Torres did not consider that writing a story about the filing of the disbarment
complaint might amount to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the
story was an independent act and she did not conspire with any of the other
respondents. Torres maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news report
because the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the
allegations in the disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioners handling
of the case. Torres further asserted that petitioner is a public figure and the public has
a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBNs News
and Current Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she
was on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her
contract on 3 January 2011. Ressa alleged that she had no participation in the
production and showing of the broadcast on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the
answer of her co-respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to
her case.

ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN
News Channel, commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok
Network News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program
"ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of
ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have
interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation and
hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate
the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the program
was a commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report solely on
the disbarment complaint against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the
one-hour program. They alleged that the program was not a publication intended to
embarrass petitioner who was not even identified as the respondent in the disbarment
complaint. Drilon even cautioned against the revelation of petitioners name in the
program. ABS-CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the
program on 23 November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner was already the subject of widespread news and already of public
knowledge. They denied petitioners allegation that they conspired with the other
respondents in violating the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. Finally,
they alleged that the contempt charge violates their right to equal protection because

there were other reports and publications of the disbarment complaint but the
publishers were not included in the charge. They also assailed the penalty of
imprisonment prayed for by petitioner as too harsh.

In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma

alleged that petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating
details of the disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while they were
the ones who filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that
they were also the ones who caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged
that petitioner did not provide the name of any particular person, dates, days or
places to show the alleged confederation in the dissemination of the disbarment
complaint.

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members

of the Board of Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ)
and Atty. Quinsayas, former counsel for FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming
that the alleged posting and publication of the articles were not established as a fact.
Respondents alleged that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles
and he only offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised
program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by Drilon. Respondents
alleged that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to support his
allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.

In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were
not able to file it on that day.9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment
complaint the following day, or on 23 November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged
that their news article, which was about the plan to file a disbarment complaint
against petitioner, was published on 23 November 2010. It came out before the
disbarment complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article on the
disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the
article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article
was straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author.
They alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the

disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he

perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news
article is not a privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the
freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution. They also
alleged that the case is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit
contempt of court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further
alleged that they did not commit any contemptible act. They maintained that the
news article did not impede, interfere with, or embarrass the administration of
justice. They further claimed that it is improbable, if not impossible, for the article to
influence the outcome of the case or sway this Court in making its decision. The
article also did not violate petitioners right to privacy because petitioner is a public
figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.

Pavia died during the pendency of this case10 and was no longer included in the
Comment filed for the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees
and was no longer represented by the FFFJ counsel in filing its comment.11 Gozo
did not file a separate comment.

The Issue

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of
the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand,
civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a
civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is
an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense
against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and
the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to
punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the
right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a
misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and
that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it
clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that
since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in
committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the courts order is not a defense in civil contempt.13

The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt.
In People v. Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil
contempt. The Court declared:

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner had been published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by
respondent media groups and personalities.

We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.

GMA Network, Inc.

GMA Networks defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the
article could be printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its
television station; and that the publication was already completed when Atty.
Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on
its website. It merely said that it has no publication where the article could be printed
and that the news was not televised. Online posting, however, is already publication
considering that it was done on GMA Networks online news website.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication.
PDI attached a photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication
agreements between PDI and Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not
appear in Inquirer.net."14

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Philippines most widely circulated broadsheet, and a
member of the Inquirer Group of Companies."15 PDI was not able to fully establish
that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.

ABS-CBN Corporation

ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking
directors, SNN has its own juridical personality separate from its parent company.
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the line-up of shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an
independent and separate juridical personality distinct from that of its parent
company and that any suit against the the latter does not bind the former and viceversa.16 A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be connected.17
Hence, SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.

Maria Ressa

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about
the Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its
production. Ressas defense was supported by a certification from the Human
Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on terminal leave
beginning 30 October 2010.18 This was not disputed by petitioner.

Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon,

and Edu Punay

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the
disbarment complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and
without malice; that petitioner is a public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a
matter of public interest; and that there was no conspiracy on their part in publishing
the disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news reports were part of
privileged communication.

In Drilons case, she further alleged that the television program was a
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the
disbarment case against petitioner. Even as the disbarment complaint was briefly
discussed in her program, petitioners name was not mentioned at all in the program.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and Personalities

may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to
one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore,
this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of
appellant.21

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and

confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like
its decisions in other cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its
investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect
the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to
deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim
reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors
and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a
contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the
discretion of the Court. x x x19

In People v. Castelo,20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the
principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding.
The Court ruled:

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public
policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech."22 As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final
resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation
as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the
disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
Maguindanao Massacre case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the

massacre, 30 were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the
Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public interest and that the
personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public figure. The
Court explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For
he could; for instance, if and when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter
is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did
not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or notoriety.23
(Boldface in the original)

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of
libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of
expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a
right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that
respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they
received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by

itself, is not sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the
confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a
public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because the
event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter
of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case
as legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case against
petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the
confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of
the press.1wphi1 If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from
making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the
absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the
media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its
pendency. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and
confidential until their final determination.24 Only the final order of this Court shall
be published like its decisions in other cases.25

Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and
personalities acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their
postings and publications of the filing of a disbarment complaint against him.
Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was a news item.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media groups and personalities acted with
malicious intent. Respondent media groups and personalities made a fair and true
news report and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and posting the
details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the commemoration

of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was briefly discussed
but petitioner was not named. There was also no proof that respondent media groups
and personalities posted and published the news to influence this Court on its action
on the disbarment case or to deliberately destroy petitioners reputation. It should
also be remembered that the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered
the public domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will discuss later,
the members of the media were given copies of the disbarment complaint by one of
the complainants.

Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo

Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the
disbarment complaint against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they
were the ones who disseminated the disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed
to substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the
ones who caused the publication of the disbarment complaint against him. There was
nothing in the records that would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and
Gemma distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner.

Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas,

and Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that
petitioner was not able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about
the disbarment complaint, and that assuming the posting and publication had been
established, petitioner failed to support his allegation that they actively disseminated
the details of the disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not cause
the publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy
and confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other
respondents, namely De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did
not file his separate comment, had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the
disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. In its
Comment, GMA Network stated that the publication "had already been done and
completed when copies of the complaint for disbarment were distributed by one of
the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas x x x."26 Dedace also stated in
her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint against
Atty. Fortun and she received one."27

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer
and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty.
Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to
members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De
Leon,28 the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and
pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule.29 In
that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused the
Paras
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy,Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased),
Cindy Rose(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on
May 27, 1993,Rosafiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Dumaguete City, a complaint forannulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article
36 of the Family Code, docketed as CivilCase No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to exercise theessential obligations of marriage as
shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipatedher business assets and
forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with aconcubine and
sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d)he
has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in
1961in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He
courtedher, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced

publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency of the

disbarment proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher

rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding
six months or both.30 Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting aside the
confidentiality rule which every lawyer and member of the legal profession should
know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000).

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect

contempt for distributing copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we order her to pay a FINE of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

SO ORDERED.
that he lovedher, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the
"most celebrated"marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose
was afflicted with leukemia.It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in
1984, their son Raoul was electrocutedwhile Justo was in their rest house with his
"barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice tobring Raoul in the rest house as the
latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with thedeath of the children, the
entire family went to the United States. However, after three months,Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she
wasshocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed
without herconsent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to takegasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act
of maintaining a mistress and siring anillegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found thatafter leaving their conjugal
house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitationresulted in the birth
of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and
Justos

10

deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.He also denied forging her signature in one
mortgage transaction. He maintained thathe did not dispose of a conjugal property
and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal ofa sugar crop loan before the
banks
authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in theUnited States. For his
part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor ofBindoy, thus,
he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his
childrens
education.At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law
practice and besides,their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their
needs. He admitted though thatthere were times he failed to give them financial
support because of his lack of income. Whatcaused the inevitable family break-out
was

incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. And lastly,
it ruled thatthere appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the
declaration of nullity of theirmarriage.On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its
Decision finding him guilty of falsifying
Rosas
signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He
wassuspended from the practice of law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the
practice of lawfor SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his
wifes
signature in bank documents andother related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the chargesof immorality and abandonment of his
own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Letnotice of this Decision be
spread in

Rosas

respondents

act of embarrassing him during his birthdaycelebration in 1987. She did not prepare
food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted thatshe has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This wasfurther aggravated
when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in
amountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that
JocelynChing is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by herboyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching
Leccioness is not his daughter.After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered
a Decision upholding the validity ofthe marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not
abandon the conjugal home as he was forced toleave after Rosa posted guards at the
gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets weresufficient to support the family
needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limitedsalary; and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed thatthe relationship
between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological

record as an attorney, and notice of the sameserved on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator forcirculation to all the
courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed theRTC
Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls
short ofthe standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that
Justos
allegeddefects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa
contends that this
Courts
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the presentcase.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings.
Also, sheargues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the
presentcase;2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the rootcause of

11

Justos
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and3) Whether the totality of evidence
in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part ofJusto
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of

such that while his acts violated the covenants ofmarriage, they do not necessarily
show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless stateof psychological incapacity
which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations ofmarriage in the
future.2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified,(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts,
and (d) clearly explained inthe decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological --not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must

Appeals
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved.In fact, the appellate court
even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that theyare insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo'salleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family
home aretrue, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal
husband and father.However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare
the marriage void due toan incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we
must emphasize, do not manifest thathe was truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that he must assume and discharge as amarried person. While they may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,they do not necessarily
show
incurability,

convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to
such anextent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them,could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and itsincapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatristsand clinical psychologist \3)
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration,
waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage shalllikewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c)incurability

FIRST DIVISION

ROSA YAP PARAS,

Petitioner,

12

- versus -

Present:

Puno, C.J., Chairperson,

Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JUSTO J. PARAS,
CORONA,
Respondent.
azcuna, and

garcia, JJ.

Promulgated:

G. R. No. 147824

August 2, 2007

13

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision[3] dated December 8, 2000 and (b)
Resolution[4] dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
49915, entitled Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, DefendantAppellee.

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+),
Dahlia, and Reuel.
DECISION

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case
No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines
set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina[1] do not
require that a physician should examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition.[2]

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage
transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

14

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.[12] His usual routine was to spend time with his
barkadas until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when
she sent for him during lunchtime.[13] He also failed to provide for their childrens
well-being.[14] Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with
leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son
Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his barkadas. He did
not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit
of climbing the rooftop.[15]
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San
Carlos University, Cebu City.[5] He courted her, frequently spending time at her
Botica.[6] Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him.
Their wedding was considered one of the most celebrated marriages in Bindoy.[7]

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon.
[8] Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents house. It was their
residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their own.[9] For
the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children
because he shouldered his sisters schooling.[10] Consequently, she was the one who
spent for all their family needs, using the income from her Botica and store.[11]

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States.
Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three
months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her Botica and other businesses heavy in debt.
She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her
consent a conjugal piece of land.[16] At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.

She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and
siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present
case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
[17]

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

15

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.
[18] He frequently spent time in her store.[19] Believing he loved her, he courted her
and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage
took place in 1964 upon his mothers signing a deed of conveyance involving 28
hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa.[20]

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of
sugar and not to his alleged profligacy.[21] Due to his business ventures, he and
Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish their
gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her
signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a
conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop
loan before the banks authorized employee.[22]

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her
return from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly
focused on the familys businesses.[23] He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast
in her new attitudinal outlook. Before other people, he merely pretended that their
relationship was blissful.[24]

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had
tourist visas. When they were there, their childrens tourist visas were converted into
study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three
(3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the
Philippines.[25]

He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he
was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than
enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed
to give them financial support because of his lack of income.[26]

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him
during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests.
When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern.[27] This was further aggravated when she
denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and
NPA-infested area.[28]

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress,
but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain
Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

16

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the
validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home
as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;[29] (b)
the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no
need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;[30] and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated.[31] The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties
started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the
time of the celebration of their marriage.[32] And lastly, it ruled that there appeared
to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.[33]

Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo,
docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its
Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents,
immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of
law, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in
respondents record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated

On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the
Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the
present case, holding that the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the
standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage. It ruled that Justos alleged
defects or idiosyncracies were sufficiently explained by the evidence, thus:

Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which
supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not
singularly from Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his
children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal
property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid
for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth,
although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justos alleged infidelity
came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.

17

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a
psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this
Court in Molina.[34] Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.[35]

In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a new matter
completely foreign and removed from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of
this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted
in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.

The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari.
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on
the present case;

Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are
conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina
relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an
expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had she been
required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on
the bases of the Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the
alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in
the interest of due process.

second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony
on the root cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on
the part of Justo.

18

The petition is bereft of merit.

Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume
Justos alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of
their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become
an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient
to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the gravity of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do
not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless
state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.[36]

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for
reconsideration, thus:

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of
Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the
appellate court even assumed that her charges are true, but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the
disbarment case appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellees falsification
of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not
conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the

19

existence of such seeming depravities in appellees character in our earlier judgment.

However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such eventualities is
not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern
and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36.[37]

Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered
conclusive on the present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already went
as far as to presume the existence of Justos depravities, however, even doing so
could not bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for relief suggests,
what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in
A.C. No. 5333.[38] Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C.
No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice
of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will
not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.[39] The Courts exposition in In re
Almacen[40] is instructive, thus:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Her premise is of course non-sequitur.

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of

their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether

Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness
as a husband or vice versa.[41] The yardsticks for such roles are simply different.
This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos
unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, the real

20

question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity,
the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable,
and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless
marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not
sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really
fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

II
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,[43] the Court clarified that the above
Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the partys psychological condition.
Whether a remand of this case to the

RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin
in Molina.[42] One of the Guidelines set forth therein states:

Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court
backtracked a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag[44] that, the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one
party.

Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[45] promulgated by this Court on March 15,
2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2,
paragraph (d) states:

21

(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,[46] this Court categorically explained that under

the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said
incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.[47]
Thus:

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege

expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.

Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.[48] Pesca stemmed
from a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a
battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated
November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[49] and Molina.[50] When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife
argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the
Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that
the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to
the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand
Pesca[51] on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines constitute a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted, thus:

The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis
vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and

22

have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non replicit.

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both
in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.

as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence
is sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as
to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.

At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on
marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates that:
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant
case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that
there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

III
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.

Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo

23

This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of
the Family Code which states that:

ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

In Molina,[53] the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36, thus:

Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has
held fast to the position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be
resolved in favor of its validity.[52] Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is
psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under
Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of

24

ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological

illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71

of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

25

The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court
in Santos,[54] to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence,

shows that Rosas main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her
signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and
abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated
and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the
evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, and abandonment of family, thus:

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on

the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras
vis--vis the questioned signature Rosa Y. Paras appearing in the questioned bank loan
documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following
results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written
by one and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not
written by one and the same person. (Annex B, Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE

26

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures
of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other
conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y.
Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the
sample signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)

executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan
from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the
presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain
loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank
loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-infact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his

children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the
acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has
strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where
respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex J, Rollo, p. 108); his naming
the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing
Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the

allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother
of his illegitimate child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as
sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support
of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they
were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of
the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting
in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were
blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his
mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and
acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even
Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were young.
Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their
relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of
irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two (2) children
and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to
sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well
as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his
self-esteem.

27

There is no evidence that Justos defects were present at the inception of the marriage.
His defects surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two
children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law
practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances
explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos defects are incurable or
grave.

The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between
Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals[55] which involved a promiscuous wife who left her
family to live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of
sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent
a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus:

x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or
sexual promiscuity.

In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,[56] the wifes inability to conceive led her

husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own
flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological
incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,[57] this Court
declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,[58] a
Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she
flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing
and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave
psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage;
and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity,
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36.

28

What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage
because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated lifes
setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that
he is psychologically incapacitated.

abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.[61]

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosas plight, however, it has no choice
but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[59]
As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.[60]

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and
Maria Victoria Ventura vs Atty. Danilo Samson
A.C. No. 9608 (November 27, 2012)
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Danilo Samson filed
by Maria Victoria Ventura.
Facts:
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent for grossly
immoral conduct. She alleged that respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.
when she was still a minor, the first being committed in the maids room and the
other committed in the respondents poultry farm.
Respondent did not deny the deed, but alleged that the sexual act was done with
mutual consent, the complainant even accepting the fees he had given after the
intercourse. Respondent also alleged that the complainant was of loose morals and
that complaint was only concocted so that the complainant can extort money from
him.
Issue:

29

Whether or not the respondents act warrant disbarment

Ruling:
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant,
then a 13-year-old minor who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the
sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the
latters consent is of no moment.
BASCOS VS. RAMIREZ
A.M. No. P-08-2418,, January 31, 2008

Facts : Petitioner charges respondent attorney with neglect of duty, arrogance and
willful and deliberate violation of circulars of this Court in relation to P.D. 1079, and
for several attempts at extortion. The latter failed to raffle judicial and extra-judicial
notices and other court processes requiring publication on more than 20 instances,
oftentimes showing his partiality to only one publication. The OCA recommended
that respondent be fine for P2,000 with a warning.

Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly

reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Adjudication:
Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

hand, Resolution No. A.M. 01-01-07-SC dated October 16, 2001 provides for
uniform and comprehensive guidelines in the accreditation of newspapers and other
periodicals seeking to publish the notices mentioned in P.D. No. 1079 and Circular 598 dated January 12, 1998. The distribution of notices for publication by raffle is
mandatory and cannot be dispensed with. By failing to include more than twenty
foreclosure cases in the raffle, respondent showed a blatant disregard for the
procedure enjoined by P.D. No. 1079 and by this Court.
Respondents failure to heed the mandate of the law and Supreme Court directives
constitutes unjustified and neglectful conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
judicial system and the public, and signifies inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties. As a member of the bar, respondent is, moreover,
charged with the duty to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes. He deserves a penalty higher than that recommended by the OCA.

Issue/s: W/N the OCAs recommendation is sufficient.

Held/Ratio: NO. Executive judges are required under the P.D. to distribute those
notices by raffle for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals. On the other

Respondent is GUILTY of dereliction of duty, gross neglect, insubordination and for

violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of
P20,000 with a WARNING

30

HIRD DIVISION

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR.

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG A.C. No. 6313

ATTY. DIOSDADO M.

Complainant,

RONGCAL,

Respondent. Promulgated:

Present:

September 7, 2006

QUISUMBING, J.,

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

- versus - Chairperson,

CARPIO,

DECISION

31

less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.

Tinga, J.:

The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not
tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[1]

Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by

Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal
(respondent). A classic case of he said, she said, the parties conflicting versions of
the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.

Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when
she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the
biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was
then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with
complainant, respondent sent a demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he
asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no

At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and respondent started
having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after
respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her
behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he
had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security
for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances,
assured by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own
marriage had already been annulled.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an

Affidavit of Disclaimer[3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even as Aquino was
denoted as the father in the birth certificate[4] of her daughter, he was, in truth, not
the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims.
Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it
was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the
Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him at this point,
she signed the document without even taking a glance at it.[5]

32

On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave

him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the
medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent
handed her his personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May
2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he
used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.

Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and
referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).

Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise
agreement.[7] It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.

Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to
her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved,
aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the
trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak
emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to
appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues
that respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as
well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.[8] Hence, she filed the instant
complaint[9] dated 2 February 2004.

Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant

needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support.
Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also
his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter
to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.[10] Subsequently, he and
Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos
infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things
the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would
execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.

Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she
requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than
P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the

33

amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four

postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed.
Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total
of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.

Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit
that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies
forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not
know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is
a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands English.
He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement proceeds.
When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the
sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did
not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.

As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,
[11] complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into
believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes
considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married
when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high
school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where
she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his
residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing

to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association
of Barangay Council (ABC) and as such was an ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial
Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for
complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no more
than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.

Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being
worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor
had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the
promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the
money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to
pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for
Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her
to look for the right man[12] and to stop depending on him for financial assistance.
He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one
who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty.
Tolentino.

In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still
he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months.
Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an
emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the
assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States would have
arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for

34

the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.

Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent.

She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting
up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According to this friend,
complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he
was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she
filed the instant complaint.

On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[13] After the parties submitted their
respective position papers and supporting documents, the Investigating
Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation[14] dated 2 September
2005. After presenting the parties conflicting factual versions, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that respondent
clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:

of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously
described as MORAL CHARACTER.

Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice

complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent
kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid
while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took
advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.

xxxx

Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x[15]

Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in
good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the
BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to
him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense

35

It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of
P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005,
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondents obviously taking advantage of the
lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,[17] respondent was meted out the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will
merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.

While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the
IBP has recommended.

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree[20] in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a
Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006
with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more
detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant.
Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she
wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainants bare
allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the
case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who
between them is telling the truth.

In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground
that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed
to the Supreme Court.

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.[21] As officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.[22] The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.[23] A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[24] It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.[25]

36

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior,[26] it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity.[27] Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[28]

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of

Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether
this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was
then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires.
While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.

Complainants allegations that she succumbed to respondents sexual advances due to

his promises of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in
filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant
deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like
herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties,
would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental
or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part.
[29] Respondents numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily
prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite

being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is rooted.
Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief
that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not
badgering, him for financial support.

Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital
status inspire belief. We find credence in respondents assertion that it was impossible
for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they
were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone
number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is an active
barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001. Curiously, she
never refuted respondents allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his
campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his
marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who was
also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual
relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short time without
verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred to change [her] life for the
better,[30] as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned
allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in
disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and
wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any
misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and
moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit

37

without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While
acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.

We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial

support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment.
We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she had met
for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing
without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she
intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single
page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.

Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that
respondent even urged her to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
money for Alexandras medical and educational support if she will not sign the said
Affidavit of Disclaimer.[32] If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she
was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim
for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that
she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny
being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is
written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The
inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any
coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.

The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit,
a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
negative.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement
with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the
amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might
otherwise be filed in court.[33] Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure
that Aquino is the father of complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven.
As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she
cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquinos counsel
in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainants bare allegations that
cannot be considered evidence.[34] Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough.
In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.[35]

Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given

by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly
issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

38

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion
is in order.

We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a

finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere
conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties, apparently
finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and
answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more

in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the

We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that
she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting to
P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees
that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and
complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorneys fees.

We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed
two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other
hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented
no evidence of an agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can
keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by
respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for
Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that
he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested
for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of
money.

substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the
IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.

We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to be made liable for
the cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds
exclusively earmarked for the purpose.

Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages and attorneys fees.
Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that
is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.[36] It is an investigation by the Court into
the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges
as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the
misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those

39

who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men
and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[37] As such, it
involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.[38] The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyers alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[39]

Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where

the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross
immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned
his family to cohabit with his paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42]
lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer.[44]
The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.

We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In
Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another
woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court
pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a
product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude,
the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47]
where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no
conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his
conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the
case.

We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years
ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of such severe depravity and
thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.[48] Considering
further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would
suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this case
involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY

of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this Decision.

40

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an
attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

Amparo Bueno Vs. Atty. Ramon A. Raneses

A.C. No. 8383 December 11, 2012
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Ramon Raneses filed
on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Facts:
Complainant hired the services of the respondent to represent her in a civil case.
Respondent allegedly convinced her to give P10,000 and another P5,000 in order to
bribe the judge and win the case. Despite the complainants giving of the required
money, however, she was shocked to find out that the case turned out against her
despite her counsels assurance of winning the case. Worse, the respondent allegedly
concealed all the development of the case from her, including his failure to comment
on the adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the
case.
The respondent has also failed to attend the hearings set by the IBP.
Issue:

Associate Justice

Whether or not the acts of the respondent warrant disbarment from the practice of
law
Ruling:
Yes. In this case, Atty. Raeses committed a grave offense. As explained below, he
committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and
the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during
the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to
one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the
case.
From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the
take, the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let
this be a signal to one and all to all lawyers, their clients and the general public
that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend
the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and
to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of
the Bar.
Adjudication:

41

Respondent Atty. Ramon A. Raeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of

law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

- versus -

FIRST DIVISION

FE D. VALDEZ,

Complainant,

JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES,

42

MeTC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City,

BERSAMIN,

Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

PERLAS-BERNABE,** JJ.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2279-MTJ)

Promulgated:

Present:

June 13, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

DECISION

Acting Chairperson,

43

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fe D. Valdez against

respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.

Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorneys fees instituted on
October 25, 2005 by complainant against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc.
(PGAI) and Charlie Tan (Tan), which was raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch
60, presided over by respondent.[1] Complainant alleged that she bought
comprehensive insurance policy for her motor vehicle from PGAI, through broker
Tan; that she had fully paid her premium; that during the validity of her insurance,
the insured motor vehicle was damaged; that the repair of the motor vehicle cost
P167,278.56; and that PGAI and Tan refused to pay her claim despite several
demands. Complainant prayed for judgment awarding in her favor P167,278.56 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P50,000.00 attorneys fees, plus P2,000.00 appearance fees.

Respondent proceeded to hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. After the parties had filed their respective position
papers, respondent submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for decision on July 19, 2006.[2]

Almost a year had passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved, prompting
complainant to file a motion for immediate resolution of Civil Case No. 20191 on
June 27, 2007.[3] Complainant followed-up with a second motion for immediate
resolution filed on October 19, 2007,[4] third motion for immediate resolution filed
on December 11, 2007,[5] fourth motion for immediate resolution filed on April 15,
2008,[6] fifth motion for immediate resolution filed on June 11, 2008,[7] sixth
motion for immediate resolution filed on July 7, 2008,[8] seventh motion to resolve
filed on April 21, 2009,[9] and eighth motion to resolve filed on January 17, 2010.
[10]

Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution of Civil Case No. 20191, complainant
filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010 against respondent,
alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in the disposition of said case to the damage
and prejudice of the former.

Through a 1st Indorsement dated June 10, 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) informed respondent of the administrative complaint against
her and required her to submit her comment thereon within 10 days from receipt of
said indorsement.[11] The Registry Return Receipt showed that respondent received
the 1st Indorsement on July 5, 2010 but she failed to file her comment within the
period prescribed.

44

The OCA sent a 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010 reiterating the order for
respondent to submit her comment to the administrative complaint against her within
10 days from receipt of said tracer, otherwise, the complaint shall be submitted for
resolution without her comment.[12] The Registry Return Receipt established that
respondent received the 1st Tracer on October 22, 2010, yet she still did not comply
with the same.

In the meantime, complainant filed a letter before the OCA on September 8, 2010,
requesting action on her administrative complaint given that respondent has still not
decided Civil Case No. 20191.

1.
The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter against respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City;

2.
Respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres be found GUILTY of
INSUBORDINATION, GROSS INEFFICIENCY, and GRAVE and SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT;

On November 23, 2010, this Court promulgated its Decision in three other
consolidated administrative cases against respondent, Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres,
[13] already dismissing her from service.
3.
In view of her previous dismissal from the service, a FINE OF
P20,000.00 instead be imposed upon her, to be deducted from her accrued leave
credits;

In its report[14] dated August 25, 2011, the OCA made the following
recommendations:

4.
To effect the same, the Employees Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services-OCA be DIRECTED to compute respondent Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torres earned leave credits; and
RECOMMENDATION: Premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended
for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

45

manifest whether they were willing to submit the present administrative matter for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.
5.
The Leave Division, thereafter, be DIRECTED to forward respondent
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres total accrued leave credits to the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA, for the latter to compute the monetary value of the said
leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of the fine herein imposed, without
prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may impose on other remaining and/or
pending administrative cases, if any.[15]

The Court then issued a Resolution[16] dated October 3, 2011 re-docketing the
administrative complaint against respondent as a regular administrative matter and
requiring the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to
submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Following the failure of
both parties to submit their respective manifestations despite notice, the Court
deemed the instant case submitted for decision.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to
address the complaint against her. The OCA had sent and respondent received the 1st
Indorsement dated June 10, 2010 and 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010, both of
which explicitly required her to file her comment on the complaint. However, up
until the resolution of the present case, respondent has not complied with the OCA
directives. Moreover, respondent had also failed to comply, despite due notice, with
the Resolution dated October 3, 2011 of the Court itself requiring the parties to

It is true that respondents failure to submit her comment and manifestation as

required by the OCA and this Court, respectively, may be tantamount to
insubordination,[17] gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty.[18] It is respondents
duty, not only to obey the lawful orders of her superiors, but also to defend herself
against complainants charges and prove her fitness to remain on the Bench.[19] As a
result of her non-compliance with the directives of the OCA and the resolution of
this Court, respondent had completely lost the opportunity to defend herself against
complainants charges.

As for the merits of the instant administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence
on record satisfactorily establish respondents guilt for the undue delay in resolving
Civil Case No. 20191.

Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed
with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date
they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the
Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following
the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same, within which to render judgment.

46

7. PUNCTUALITY
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[20]
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the
time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is
unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending
before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs
judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort
judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and
matters pending before their courts, to wit:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that

justice delayed is often justice denied.

Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all
magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters
pending before their courts.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and

dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges

47

should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
their obligation to promptly administer justice.[21]

Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and

responsibility that her position requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for
resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed the
present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per
complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after
being submitted for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was still awaiting decision by
respondent.

Respondent irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the 30-day
period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her inaction in Civil
Case No. 20191 is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the
speedy disposition of cases.[22] Indeed, respondent even failed to decide Civil Case
No. 20191 within the three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for
lower courts to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made
any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve Civil Case
No. 20191.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the
penalty is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to
three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00.

The Court is well-aware of the previous administrative cases against respondent for
failure to act with dispatch on cases and incidents pending before her. In Del Mundo
v. Gutierrez-Torres,[23] respondent was found guilty of gross inefficiency for undue
delay in resolving the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 18756, for which she was
fined P20,000.00. In Gonzalez v. Torres,[24] respondent was sanctioned for
unreasonable delay in resolving the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No.
71984 and meted the penalty of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00. In Plata v.
Torres,[25] respondent was fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in resolving the
Motion to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 6679, and another P10,000.00
for her repeated failure to comply with Court directives to file her comment on the
administrative complaint against her. In Winternitz v. Gutierrez-Torres,[26] the Court
held respondent guilty of undue delay in acting upon the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 84382, 84383, and 84384, and suspended her
from office without salary and other benefits for one month. In Soluren v. Torres,[27]
respondent was once again adjudged guilty of undue delay in acting upon repeated
motions to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 100833 for which she
was fined P20,000.00. In Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres,[28] promulgated on
November 23, 2010, the Court already dismissed respondent from the service for
gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, and violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, in relation to Civil Case Nos. 19887, 19063, 17765, and
18425; as well as for insubordination because she defied Court orders by failing to
file her comment on the charges against her. Finally, in Pancubila v. Torres,[29] the
Court imposed another fine of P20,000.00 upon respondent for undue delay in
rendering a decision and violation of a directive in connection with Civil Case No.
20700. In all the foregoing administrative cases, respondent was sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

48

Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable herein. Instead, the Court imposes upon
respondent, for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, a fine in the
maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.

WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found GUILTY of the less

serious charge of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, for which she is
FINED the amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits,
since she had already been dismissed from the service. To effect the penalty imposed,

the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is

DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torress total earned leave
credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is
DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of respondent Lizabeth GutierrezTorress total accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of fine herein
imposed without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may impose on other
remaining and/or pending administrative cases, if any.

SO ORDERED.

ADM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008

has pursued the inconsistentposition that Raleigh owned the same property in
common with Lydio, with complainants, whoinherited the property, committing acts
which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO

FALAME and JERRYFALAME,

ISSUEWhether or not Atty. Baguio is guilty of representing conflicting interests

between his clients.RULING:Yes, Atty. Baguio is guilty.

petitioners,vs.

A lawyer may not act as counsel for a person whose interest conflictswith that of his
present or former client as provided in

ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,

respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Baguio jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the
first civilcase. As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the
stance that Lydiosolely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil
case involving the sameproperty, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse,

Rule 15.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

. The rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or thelawyer
has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.Furthermore, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer torepresent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The client'sconfidence once reposed should not be divested by
mere expiration of professional employmentor even death.

SECOND DIVISION
FALAME, namely: MELBA
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876

49

FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present:

JERRY FALAME,

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Complainants, CARPIO, J.,

Acting Chairperson,
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,*
Tinga, J.:
- versus - TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of
Lydio Jerry Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent),
docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.

March 7, 2008

50

respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydios death on 8
September 1996.[5]

In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991,

their father, the late Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent
to represent him in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694
(the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia
Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and
Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]

Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the
answer to the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the
first civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent used
and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July
1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter
to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988,
executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property
subject of the first civil case.[4]

However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi

Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the
property subject of the first civil case, entitled Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F.
Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty
Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons
acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case)
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the
declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of
the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it
prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages
with preliminary injunction and restraining order.[6]

Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in
the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent
violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the
spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.[7]
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had
ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of

51

Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of

fact in the complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing,
respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20[8] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
[9] complainants asserted further.

case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired
knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case
as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place.
Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or
untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did
he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.
[13]

Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated
suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants uncle against the heirs of
respondents deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case
for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the

possession of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners.
Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 20[10] of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[11]

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[12] respondent controverted complainants

allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged
his legal services for him and on Lydios behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who
paid him the attorneys fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleighs
affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the best
of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not
betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latters counsel in the first civil

Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any
case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the
termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil case,
respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh
but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on
the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further
averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh
and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame,
and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case
which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after
Lydios death.[14]

Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the
trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added
that complainants filed this administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify
in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.[15]

52

In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous

charges against respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule
15.03[17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause
of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.[18]

In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in
paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants position paper stating: With all due
respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot be countenanced. The reason being that it is an
elementary principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only
those charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not
specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167
adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report
and recommendation for the dismissal of this administrative case, thus:[19]

x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated
by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in
mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence,
but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in
confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by
respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or
suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint
the alleged secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of
such specification, the complaint must fail.

x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.

xxx

Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years
since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is a suit against

53

the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their

respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA
104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights,
obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of the
improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such
land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental
complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.

The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d),
Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath when he allegedly
betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the
fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the
Court that at one time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally
recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba
Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.

While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of
secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit
any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.

xxx

It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for
his and Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.

It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the
complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable
Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the
subject of an administrative complaint against the respondent.

xxx

xxx

54

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this

complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four
(4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.

presumption of innocence.[27] Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of

violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their
position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.[28]

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]

There is merit in the petition.

At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by
prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.
[21] They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative
complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three
(3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case was filed
on 23 October 2000.[22] In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be
Consolidated Reply),[23] complainants invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v. BautistaLozada[24] to support their contention that administrative complaints against
members of the bar do not prescribe.[25]

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings,

nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a
crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect
the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)[30]

In his Comment,[26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to

him have never been proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is
the quantum of proof required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that
complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the

55

This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. BautistaLozada[31] where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure
of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no
legal effect for being ultra vires.[32]

Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs
with the Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by
complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated.

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not
raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants position paper
filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent
proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise
in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer
with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of
attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of
conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.

The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately
apprised of and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice
and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial
proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process
is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit evidence in support of their arguments.[33]

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

56

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.[34] The
test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest for that which
his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop.[35] The rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used.[36] In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.[37]

The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client
if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.
In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the
fiduciary obligation of loyalty.[38] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. [39]

The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to

represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The
clients confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should
not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which
he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients
confidences acquired in the previous relation.[40]

In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to himself.[41] The protection given to the client
is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected
by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.[42]

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh
as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between
Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who
paid him. The case of Hilado v. David[43] tells us that it is immaterial whether such
employment was paid, promised or charged for.[44]

As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio
solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the
same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the
inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio,
with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase
respondents rights as a co-owner.

57

The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or
through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is
not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.[45]
Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney may
not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while
acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.[46] And while
complainants have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the
property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil
case.

For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleighs
supposed co-ownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and
Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the

potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.[47]

Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from the
point of view that there are possible conflicts; and further, to think in terms of
impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair
loyalty to a client.[48] Considering, however, that this is respondents first offense,
the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.[49]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing

conflicting interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession
and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

SUPREME COURT
Manila

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

vs.

FIRST DIVISION

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of
the Phils.), respondents.

58

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11,
1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order
dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the
notice of garnishment. 5

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually
allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the
case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in
connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development

Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust
and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse
during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her
reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to
date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by
public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the
executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to
the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the
judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 Pursuant thereto, the said

In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was timebarred, having been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of
Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been
reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her
right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and
other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be

executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715,
viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or
Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any
interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from
the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer
to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...

59

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception
snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been
previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial
difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution
more than five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar,
Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is
authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time
when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to
have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The
statute of limitation has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do
so, for causes beyond their central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the
execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record
shows it was she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt
thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no

evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her
demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement
with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP
the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to
the date of the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually
reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period
beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her
reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments
that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor
and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her
right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured
employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked
from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that
business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher
than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the
CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator
with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33
monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the
rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the
waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now
Philippine National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the

60

petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three
years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November
1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed
another Quitclaim and Release reading as follows:

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum
she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in
part:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87

Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS:
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00)
Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me under
the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs.
PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction
of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I
had voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and
in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my present position as XEROX
MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision
dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from
money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay,
company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection
with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or right
of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said
corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have
helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of
granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying

the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly
salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company
increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly
salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this
petition.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold,
as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she
rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the
ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full

61

settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after
accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same
judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the
earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They
were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and
cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new
management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is
denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the second
quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law
will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement
of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration
of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the
decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was
still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in
hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The
amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the
exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight
years.
Republic of the Philippines

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases
that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during
which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed
without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should
be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that
would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was actually employed
during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the
failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the
Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an
appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision,
as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against
making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that
have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General,
the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely
hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however
unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the
pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so

ordered.

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Manila

SUPREME COURT

62

EN BANC

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J

September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel
scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy
spawned massive protest actions all over the country. In the course of the
investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain
government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers"
who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs.
Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistleblowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events,
among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein
respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with
the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him
of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles'
anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she
reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify
against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into
certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio
pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
Judiciary.1

Factual Antecedents

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and
other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or
join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and
family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene
Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut,
DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen,

63

Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice
Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that
case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear
pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na
siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim
Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that
we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko
kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the
NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim
Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo
si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera."3
(Emphasis supplied.)

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries
Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a
photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public
figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent.
The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles
and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently
hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly
admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different
context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and
further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in

connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of
the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting
Presiding Justice.4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay "5

wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement,
alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may

petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong
bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special
occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan
ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno.
Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo
sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po

ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office

sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam
JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.

x x x x6

64

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013,
Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes
sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which
raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the
decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet
cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator
Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or
earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would
have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator
Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles,
respondent asserted:

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party
or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case
with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time
afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the
Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have
been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted
that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a
co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these
cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body

65

and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself
to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to submit
an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and
protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing
the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat
the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles,
Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed'
(inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan",
to wit:

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MS. SULA. Opo.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan

Xxxx8

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

MS. SULA. Opo.

Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation
motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members
of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who
were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial
books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental
organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam).9

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at
sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si
Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required
respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with
certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received
respondent's Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the

66

Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified
by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal
knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told
her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that
Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the
context of massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time.
With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the
Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs.
Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in their business operation that she would
not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so
they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if
Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her
"connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees
that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting
Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room,
respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial
photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during
which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of
Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend
of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the
Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene
devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special
permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief
moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to
the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of
his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of
courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed
that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit
when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room
of their office in Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have
personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she
no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other
division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation
of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the
same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible

transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent.
Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter
RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to
retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report
and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre
Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013,
transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty.
Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to transmit to this Court the postsentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the
accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

67

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her

report with the following findings and conclusions:

years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and
each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both
cases.

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal
Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769
for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of
Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles
(Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo
Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.

The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in
question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later
deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x
x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same
- the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in
the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the
payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers
are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the
U.S.A.

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins.
After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was
employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal
assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those
of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation
and kept records of its daily business activities.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in
an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser
crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to

him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect"
in that court who would help her.

68

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the
Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote,
"Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your
memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas
po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question:
"Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming
koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na
iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being
asked from you?

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases,
kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap
niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator
Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other
(nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:

xxxx

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Yes po.

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon
Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this
connect you were talking about, if you remember?

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

Witness Luy

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms.
Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong.

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

69

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na naguusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong
lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator
Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the
Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar
case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger
of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100
million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that
what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she
gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which
lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she
also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew
she would be acquitted.

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos

ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles,
parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So
nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million
na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ...
kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya
po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice
Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.

xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago,
"Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before
us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by
that "inayos"?

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

70

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms.
Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar
case.

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya
kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.

xxx

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice
to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig
City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other
employees.

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos
niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang P3.8
lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos
mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was
it spent?

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so
much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles
called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his
BDO check of P25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she
would just deposit respondent's P25.5 million in her personal account with Metro
bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each
amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent
to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash.
So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang
staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong
ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms.
Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office
namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera

71

siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay

nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari
po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng
interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q
Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?

A Opo.

12, lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam kasi naground

off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11)
checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation
check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee,
inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si
Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po
sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa
kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na
eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga
ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang
opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang
ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa
akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko
naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at
the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank
will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is
that the arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal
account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO
check na inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13%
interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na
lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the
meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest.
So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in

conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his
(respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he

did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the
Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the amount stated in
each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction
of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to
respondent.

72

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN
Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the
forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and
others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles
twice sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during
the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Ms. Sula
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte
sa Sandiganbayan?

Opo.

xxx

The Chairman

Ms. Sula

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by
the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam
against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other
employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan respondent Justice Ong, thus:

The Chairman

73

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Q Is that in your affidavit?

Witness Sula

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya
nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si
Justice Ong.

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so

hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag
na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa

PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na,
Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon
sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala.
Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she
would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as
follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na
si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix
(aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her
acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi
masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

74

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him
the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because
he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the
members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he
was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical
standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not
be seen or be going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was
in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise
the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get
his side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it
to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during
one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know
that the woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the
hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of
those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the

Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,

respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose
R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independentminded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by
their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from

Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent
deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles
considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012,

after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what
prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles
approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation
and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should
thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence
against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like
supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring
Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until
she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

75

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black
Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with
him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it.
Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his
ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate
members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until
respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in
Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now
to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy,
he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating
four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he
kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is
"walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and
had coffee.

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar
case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual
basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be
pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a
collegial body and that he never interceded on her behalf.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest

consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he
issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he
claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI.
In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue
any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11)
checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the
internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00
every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3 million with an
interest of 15% or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility.
While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach
respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers
claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar
case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially
testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at
the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The
witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to
difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and
knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect
whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this

76

challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle
blowers would testify false! y against respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur
testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million
incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case
which extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an
undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay,
inadmissible in evidence:
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with
their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During crossexamination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle
blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction,
reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and
Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar
case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and
according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their
statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by
Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx

Justice Gutierrez
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation.
Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides,
respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded
Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur
and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles.

Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.

77

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to
respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true.
It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a
detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave
respondent P3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for
making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it
is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have
transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced
interest of P3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a
favor?

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's
suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and
Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise
hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to
support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the
Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan,

resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her,
constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his
judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy
of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code

providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and
must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

xxxx

78

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in
her office considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in

violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making
it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting
her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone.
Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is
an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers
who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the
Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being
aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal
behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the
court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct
and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has
to pay for holding an exalted position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote
public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground
for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of
the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was
not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she
must have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court
could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for
arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has
been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty
of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for
nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao
City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then
Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

79

The Court's Ruling

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of
Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the
Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable
purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the
transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How
could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates
clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that
she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to
P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only one
bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has
a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the
truth.

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the

Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated
the charges against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while
it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration

of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY
of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

xxxx

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the

promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of
her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him
eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as
advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada
and Napoles.11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or

bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his
dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally,
respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno

80

that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied
having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.

eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given
the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper
or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree
with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during
the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct
evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they
have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely
told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony
indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help
Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to
Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their
conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too
high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in
connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant
who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has
condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial

evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence
is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible
for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant.13

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles'
trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business
and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding
the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the
Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and
some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that
she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity
was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told
him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no
reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her
expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles'
information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The

complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation.
Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave
misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.16
Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed
respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in
the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent,
we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of
the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association
strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's
perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to
respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the

81

suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the
decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of
partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a
photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy,
made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the
present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the
public revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and
how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of
their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions
with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly
observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the
Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these
whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this
case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid,
straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as
"instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more
important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate;
they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given
great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the
deportment of the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect,
and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil
and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we
concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and
Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies
about his association with Napoles.

that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was
referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get
to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her
office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to
Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts
from Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected
outcome of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the
problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na

binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa
kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang
tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ...
sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat,
dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso
pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung
asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will
answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that
right?

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever

Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew

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A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga
officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang
probation period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na
si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence in the
Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the
mere appearance of impropriety.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification
of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted
secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer
delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on
respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions
was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept
himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself
from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price
one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he
may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to
avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his
activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner
that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)

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On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid

association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court.
Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did not find
fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that
case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when
they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in
Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines
Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to
lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints
regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his
transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty.
Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency
long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and
Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this
point was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public
functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his
house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including
Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so
that [the] staff could see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not
proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former
colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes
requests which are not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court.
Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse,
and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of
members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation
before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because
Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before
the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her
from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat
for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as
may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he
emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level
while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even
quoted Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with
respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already
been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only
pending and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:

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SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel
appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or
partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that
they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the
bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in
keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or
prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful
to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or
sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would
assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence,
integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public
scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may
cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case,
respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive
officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We
cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and
its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the
Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be
possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help
you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near
the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the
proper request. Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

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Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you
are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest
there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo
that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a
former respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you
learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr.
Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already
knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated
yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that
conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that
there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Ong

Justice Gutierrez

Your honor, talking about ....

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should
have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in
public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could
have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true
feelings that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you
could not have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply
called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of
Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful
not to be seen by the public with her considering that she was a former accused in
that case.

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo
parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent
and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of
respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and
truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .

86

5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money
to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying
that, as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their
office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam"
controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed

advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to
respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.1wphi1 Such
finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO
million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe
that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee.
Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly
merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent
had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit.
The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an
accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public
opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt
the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of
our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of
administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the
Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events
hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her
office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not
disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before
the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that
respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single
occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before
the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of
Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack

of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being
a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a
serious charge may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of

87

the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal.

prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the

government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice

Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

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