Daza v Singson G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989.

Facts: On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was

reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives.
Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and
joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
their former party to only 17 members.
On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting
of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal
from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by
the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot
be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is
political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains
that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the
House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional;
Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is
unconstitutional;
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been
validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to
assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio: If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or
of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their
affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority
to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on
Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political

party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in
conformity with the Constitution.

In view of the Allied Majority of 1961

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by
the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent.
Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments
was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal
Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent
over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed
what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the
chamber.
It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined
the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party.
The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was
not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of
Representatives as required by the Constitution.
The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on
the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it
that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take
appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.

In view of Congress authority

Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of
Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do
not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.

In view of the Courts intervention

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be
settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the
bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more
importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no
alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are
not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for
theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No.

179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised
in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it
may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject
for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
RULING: The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty

(LAMP) vs The Secretary of Budget and
Management, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who
have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic
or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent
and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower
individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the
authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact,
a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF
must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial
review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by
the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested
the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the
sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have
been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose
sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify
the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and

unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the

sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court
cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly
legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend
projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by
the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that
individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So
long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and
the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as spam

is entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission
of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is
constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new
crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already
punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes similar means for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes
only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes aiding or abetting
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the
petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and
their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications,
and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

FACTS:

Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette
Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek
to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for violating the fundamental rights protected
under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively,
from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the
petitioners constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due
process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the
Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of
legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure;
o

Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the

liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in
violation of the petitioners right against Double Jeopardy;

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the
PNP with due cause to engage in real time collection of traffic data
without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the
Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy
of communications;

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent

Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon
a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue
delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of
the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected
right to due process and freedom of expression; and

Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section

6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2
months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the
right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the
press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ

can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the

said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA
10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also
restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the
ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from
access, work together as a chilling effect upon protected speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this
Petition is therefore cognizable by the SCs judicial power under Article VIII,
Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o

imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based

libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized
separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;

online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of
the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a
chilling effect upon the freedom of speech;

with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto IIIs
earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users
who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in
his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of
criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such
as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus creating a
chilling effect upon the freedom of expression;

gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block

access to content whether authored by private citizens or the
organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a
mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes
online libel;

respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare

under strict scrutiny

2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:

Persons who commit crimes using information and communication

technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than
double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by
the passage of the Cybercrime Act;

the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are
absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws
which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for
the same offense in violation of the Constitution;

Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes by,

through or with the use of ICTs in violation of the equal
protection clause

3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
o

No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data;

the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National
Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any
reasonable standard except due cause which presumably, the PNP
and NBI will determine for itself;

While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human

Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals
before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all
citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the
Cybercrime Act;

Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into
the right to privacy;

No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully
collect traffic data at all times without interruption;

No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into

the privacy of citizens

4. The Respondent DOJ Secretarys Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the
Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of
Legislative Authority
o

The DOJ Secretarys overwhelming powers to order the restriction or

blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding
without any need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of
petitioners Constitutionally protected right to due process;

The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary

will be judge, jury and executioner of all cybercrime-related
complaints;

To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes
under Section 6, it follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be
acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to
websites and content upon a mere prima facie showing of an
infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to
Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade
Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from
offering voice services without securing a license from the
National Telecommunications Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP
Code.

The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court
in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine
the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Acts declaration of policy does it lay
down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking of
content. No limits upon the takedown power of the respondent
DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary
from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the supreme
authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.

PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12
and 19 of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19
of RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4),
6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and

4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.

5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most
provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel
subject to one condition.
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state
the power to take down online content without a court warrant.
7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government
control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175
a little over a year afteroral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013.
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's
provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC
cybercime ruling')
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online
libel to be constitutional but with an exception that is, in cases where it
covers persons other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who
react to a potentially defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel.

Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:

Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications

Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data

Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data

The SC decided that Section 19 granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence
was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is
found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC
that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final
restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to
collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or

offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions such
as prior affirmative consent from the recipient are met. This was ruled
unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest
of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held
invalid.

Nuances in other provisions

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not
apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel,
which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and
to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the
following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or
spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the
law.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto
explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the
prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."
Aiding a
nd abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly
cover certain players in the online industry.
Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was
declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child
pornography.
The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than
once for the same offense a guarantee outlined in the Constitution in deciding on
Section 7.
Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child
pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under
the coverage of a single law.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APRIL

22, 2014

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES with finality the various motions for reconsideration
that both the petitioners and the respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

TAADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL.

FACTS:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected
respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon
the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats, originally for
minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional
mandate under Sec. 2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator
Taada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the
respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the
nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate,
violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET are reserved for minority
senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore, as
respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar
is a violation not only of Taada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent
Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise
duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed.
Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of
ET members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the
petition is without cause of action since Taada exhausted his right to nominate 2
more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the
proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

ISSUES:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on
Rules for the Senate
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction.

RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate compelling them to allow
petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither House,
even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to
elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised
(constitutionality). The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said
discretionary powers.
2. No.
RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate
members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit
& philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The
respondents' practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation)
cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed
mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Taada waived his rights or is
in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the
power to waive is inexistent. Taada never led Primicias to believe that his
nominations on behalf of the CP are valid.
WHEREFORE:
The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor
can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS
has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado
void ab initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of
personnel - a matter under the discretion of the Chairman.

PARAS DISSENTING:
The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that
the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held
fixed, since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the
minority party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the
Senate, and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan
concerns.

LABRADOR DISSENTING:
The petition itself is unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:
1. 9-member ET mandate violated
2. right to elect of Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to
nominate

3. process of nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate

power)
4. SC arrogation of power in determining Con Cons proviso of <9 ET members
under certain circumstances
The refusal of Taada to nominate must be considered a waiver of privilege based
on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec.
2.

Daza V. Singson
Facts:
Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments andwas listed as
representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganizedand 24 members from the
Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Becauseof this, the House of Representatives
revised its representation bywithdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the
newly-formedLDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance
toproportional representation.
Issues:
1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable politicalparty
2.Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to beentitled to proportional
representation in the CA
Held and Ratio
Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case,
25 Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied
Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their
seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanans ad interim
appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place.
Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied
Majority was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the
Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on
proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not
affect the organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy of the
House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party
and has not yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence
for a year. They command the biggest following. They not only survived but
prevailed. Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its

registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of

the petitioner that registration is required.