# 5 CASE TITLE: Heinz Heck vs City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr.

A.C. 5329 March 18, 2014

Bersamin J.

Petitioners Claim:
Petitioner filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano
Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City for faulty, highly improper, suspicious, anomalous, and
unlawful practice by the respondent. Respondent also obstructed justice by delaying
cases and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty
Azada, respondents business partner and friends.

Respondents Claim:
Respondent claims that he has no knowledge of the suspension of Atty Adaza because
such information had not been disseminated to the public offices. He also claimed that
there were no irregularities in the filing and resolution of the motion for reconsideration
of Atty Adaza, in a different case. Respondent also asserts that he did not display any
act of violence, particularly the kicking of the chair and slamming of the door.

Issue: Whether or not respondent breached any canon on professional conduct or legal
ethics.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to prove the
charges filed. The evidence adduced by the complainant insufficient to warrant the
disbarment of the respondent. The power to disbar, being the most severe form of
disciplinary action, must be exercised with caution. It must be exercised only for the
most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

#8 CASE TITLE : Judge Adoracion Angeles vs. Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248, September 29, 2010
Facts:
Judge Angeles filed a complaint for disbarment and dismissal against Judge
Sempio-Diy, alleging that the latter violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution,

New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional

Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. This
complaint stemmed from the consolidated cases of People vs. Pacay and People vs.
Ganias, which was presided by Judge Sempio-Diy.
It appears that in that case, the Decision, of which all accused were acquitted
except one, was promulgated after 6 months from the time it was submitted for
resolution. Moreover, when the accused filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
against which the prosecution filed an Opposition, it was not until more than 6 months
later that Judge Sempio-Diy denied that Motion for lack of merit.
For her part, Judge Sempio-Diy replied that the promulgation of the Decision was
repeatedly postponed due to a medical check-up, and that she had recently arrived from
a trip in the US to attend a symposium. Also, she stated that she had requested for
several extensions from the Supreme Court pertaining to the repeated postponement of
the promulgation.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Sempio-Diy was guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering
the Decision.

Held:
No. Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions of the
period to decide the consolidated criminal cases, and those requests were favorably
considered by this Court.
However, there was indeed delay in resolving accuseds Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. When the prosecution filed an Opposition to that Motion, the defense
failed to file its reply thereto. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual
inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were discovered.
Considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, admonition would
suffice.

# 10 CASE TITLE : Makar vs. Honorable Indar

Petitioners Claim:
Complainants charged respondents Judge Indar and Amilil with serious misconduct,
grave abuse of discretion, oppression, evident bad faith, manifest

partiality and gross ignorance of the law in connection with the issuance entitled In the
Matter of Insolvencia Voluntaria de Olarte Hermanos y Cia, Heirs of the Late Alberto P.
Olarte, etc., Petitioners. Complainants allege that respondents Judge Indar and Amilil
are "guilty of violating the permanent writ of injunction which the Intermediate Appellate
Court issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 02613 and affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 73457, (which voided the December 7, 1983 order of Judge Singayao), by
resurrecting the same in an order issued ex parte on February 14, 2005, and directed
the implementation thereof, despite knowledge of its nullity.

Respondents Claim:
Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil deny the allegations in the complaint. Respondent
Judge Indar claims that since the filing of the petition to revive the case was made on
May 3, 2004, neither party made any reference to the fact that the Order dated
December 7, 1983 of Judge Singayao had been nullified and set aside by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. He also asserts that he issued the Order dated
February 14, 2005 on the ground that he found the party's motion for execution
meritorious. It was only when complainants filed a motion for reconsideration to set
aside the said order did he come to know of the said Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court decisions. Respondent Judge Indar intimated that he even had to go through six
volumes of rollo in the bodega and verify with the Court of Appeals the authenticity of its
decision dated November 21, 1986 since what he found attached to the records was an
unreadable and uncertified copy of the said decision. Respondents Judge Indar and
Amilil contend that the administrative case filed against them is designed to harass and
malign them. They allege that two other complaints have been filed against them by the
complainants for indirect contempt and for graft and corruption. Thus, respondents
Judge Indar and Amilil also seek the disbarment of complainants' counsels for allegedly
being dishonest and in bad faith when they filed the instant administrative case.

Issue: W/N respondents should be admistratively liable.

Ruling:

Yes. The facts established from the records of the case and the pleadings filed
before the Investigating Justice are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of
the law on the part of the respondent Judge. To be held liable therefore, "the judge must
be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious." Respondent Judge may have erred in the issuance of the February 14, 2005
Order, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. He cannot, however, be
completely absolved of administrative liability.

Respondent Judge Indar failed to conform with the high standards of competence
and diligence required of judges under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly the following Rules:

Rule 3.01.A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Rule 3.02.In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear or criticism.

Rule 3.08.A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

Rule 3.09.A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.

In the instant case, respondent Judge Indar failed to exert due diligence required
of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order. Had he
taken time and effort to read and examine the pleadings and the records of the case, he
could have known that the Order dated December 7, 1983 was already nullified and set
aside by the Court of Appeals.
With regard to respondent Amilil, this Court agrees with the Investigating Justice
that the records and pleadings filed have established his administrative liability
Indeed, the clerk of court is an essential officer of our judicial system. As a
ranking officer of the court, he performs delicate administrative functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice. As custodian of judicial records, it is
incumbent upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and efficient court management
system in the court, and to supervise the personnel under his office to function
effectively. A clerk of court plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot
be permitted to slacken his job under one pretext or another. In fact, it has been held
that branch clerks of court are chiefly responsible for the shortcomings of subordinates
to whom administrative functions normally pertaining to the branch clerk of court were
delegated. Hence, clerks of court must be assiduous in performing official duty and in
supervising and managing court dockets and records.
Clearly, it is respondent Amilil's duty as OIC Clerk of Court to safely keep all files,

pleadings and files committed to his charge. As custodian of these records, it is

incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent with dispatch to the parties
concerned. Respondent Amilil should ensure an orderly
and efficient record management system to assist all personnel, including respondent
Judge Indar, in the performance of their respective duties. Unfortunately, respondent
Amilil failed to live up to these standards.
Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are reminded that as public officers, they are
recipients of public trust, and are thus under obligation to perform the duties of their
offices honestly, faithfully, andto the best of their ability.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility
which court officials and employees are mandated to observe, inview of their exalted
position as keepers of the public faith. They are constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence the performance of official functions
must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the
part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violatet the norm of
public accountability and diminish the people's faith in the judiciary.

# 13 Case Title: Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Cader P. Indar
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232)

Petitioners Claims:
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon
City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming
number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly
issued by Judge Indar.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of
marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive
requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when
the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.
Respondents Claims:
Judge Indar explained, in a Letter, that this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and
can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations.
Issue:

Whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Ruling:
Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other
public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at
all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the
law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the
questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding
marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential
conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties
honestly.
Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a
breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
act.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and
established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for disbarment.
# 15 CASE TITLE: Reynaria Barcenas vs. Atty. Anorlito Alvero
A.C. No. 8159 April 23, 2010

Facts: On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio,
entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000, which the latter was supposed to give
to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a
ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money
was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt,
Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta
refused to accept the same.
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To
check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow
P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or
as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala
nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na? Subsequently, Barcenas
discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted
and used the same for his personal needs. Despite repeated demands to return the
money, Atty. Alvero refused. Hence, Barcenas filed a case with the IBP. Atty. Alvero
stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He,
however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still
subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he
had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness
to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio
subsisted.
Issue: hether or not Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02
and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Alvero breached 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03
of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. There is a clear breach of
lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. These,
Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of
the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall
deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the
instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite
complainant's repeated demands.

#16 Case title: Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo,

A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011.

Petitioners claim:
Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on behalf of parties who were
already deceased. To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for,
as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas: A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He
swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.
He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion.
Respondents claim:
the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a
deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of
the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already
deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the
justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the
criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the
Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior
referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based
on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its
merits.
Issue: whether or not the respondent is guilty of falsehood.
Ruling:
We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in
his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous
complaint. A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose
officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the
unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any
patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith
from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from
intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can
then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.
The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the
respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with
Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject

matter of the pending action, or to

accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent
from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later.

#17 Case Title: Denis Habawel and Alexis Medina vs. The Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. 174759, September 7, 2011
Petitioners Claim: it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held
that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable
Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the
understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis
Respondents Claim: the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in
sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which
brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts
alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. the Court finds no sincerity and
humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In
fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of
discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor
and integrity.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt.
Ruling: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist
on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of
propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An
imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the
absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, [30] and constitutes direct contempt of
court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in
pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to
a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt

the administration of justice.[31] This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements are not read in open court

# 18 Case Title: In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 In G.R. Nos.
145817 And 145822
Petitioners Claim: No petitioner, this was initiated by SC.
Respondents Claim:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea alleges that the ponente in G.R. 145145817 And
145822, Justice Carpio, was bribed by the opposing counsel in those cases, Atty.
Singson, which caused him to lose those cases. He hinged his theory on a phone call
he made to Singson to confirm the outcome of the cases where he told Singson jokingly
kaya pala may bagong Mercedez si Carpio eh, and that Singson remained silent and
did not deny his statement.
He then filed a motion to make Justice Carpio inhibit from the case, asserting this
theory.
Issue/s: Whether respondent Pea made malicious and groundless imputation of
bribery and wrong doings against members of the Court.
Ruling per Issue:
Respondent Pea is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery
and wrongdoing against a member of the Court. In moving for the inhibition of a
Member of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Pea, as a lawyer,
contravened the ethical standards of the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge
motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. A lawyers language should be forceful but

dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Pea insinuated that the then ponente of
the case had been bribed by Atty. Singson.
However, the Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First
Division, had indeed adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice
Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban
Bank. It is completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that the action had been
issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with
partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the
imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court,
absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery
involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave
accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be jokingly alleged by parties, much less
by counsel in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or insinuations strike not only at
the stature or reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its
decisions as well.

# 19 Case Title: ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.

BUSMENTE
Petitioners claim:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over a specific property was
annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case (Civil Case No. 9284) before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, where Busmente appeared as counsel.
Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Also,
she
alleged
that
one
Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa
would
accompany Ulaso in
court,
projecting
herself
as Busmentes collaborating
counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284
nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Furthermore, NoeLacsamana alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. She contended that upon verification with this
Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not
a lawyer.
Respondents claim:
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant
for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in

2000 but DelaRosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the
help of Regine Macasieb, Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did
not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
Issue:
Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
Ruling: YES.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
The Court agrees with the findings of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmentes
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. It was noted that while Busmente claimed
that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her
separation from employment. It was further found that notices from the MTC San Juan,
as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office
address. Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services.The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law

makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law

# 21 Case title: A.C. No 7297

September 29, 2009

Imelda Bides-Ulaso v. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana

Bersamin, J.

Petitioners claim:
Irene Bides filed a complaint against petitioner to which respondent Atty. Noe-Lacsama
was her counsel. Irene Bides amended the complaint to demand declaration of nullity of
the deed of sale pertaining to a parcel of land in San Juan of which Irene Bides was the
registered owner. The amended complaint contained so-called amended verification
and affidavit of non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature
preceded by the word for above the printed name IRENE BIDES. The signature bore
a positive resemblance to respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss citing the defect as a ground. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even
declared petitioners in default. The RTC ultimately decide the action in favor of Irene
Bides, granting reliefs like the nullification of the deed of sale between Irene Bides, as
seller, and petitioner as buyer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs
judgment. Irene and respondent brought other proceedings against petitioner.
Respondent herself commenced disbarment proceedings in the IBP against Atty.
Yolando Busmente, petitioners counsel. To counteract the aforestated moves of Irene
and respondent, petitioner initiated this proceeding against the respondent on March 2,
2005, praying for the latters disbarment due to her act of signing the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the amended complaint of
Bides and notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides and despite the nonappearance of Bides before her.

Respondents claim:
Respondent claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature
appearing above the printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the
defective amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been
only a "sample-draft" intended to instruct Mallari, Irenes new secretary, on where Irene,
as affiant, should sign; that the signature had not been intended to replace Irenes
signature; that the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping to
be appended to the amended complaint had been executed only on June 23, 2003 due
to Irenes delayed arrival from the province of Abra; and that Mallari had failed to

replace the defective document with the correct amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping.

Issue/s: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional

Responsibility and Notarial Law.

Ruling: The Court held in the affirmative. Respondent in notarizing the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in the absence of Irene Bides as the
affiant constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable. The
jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is
sworn to before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act, the faithful observance and
utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct. Thus,
respondent, by signing as notary even before Irene Bides herself could appear before
her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity. It was emphatically her
primary duty as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for
the law and legal processes. She was expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver
responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer. Hence,
respondent is reprimanded with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

# 23 CASE TITLE : Rolando Saa v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines

G.R. No. 132826 (September 3, 2009)

Petitioners Claim:
Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Freddie A.
Venida. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases against
him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.
Respondents Claim:
Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions.
He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Atty. Venida still did not file his
complete comment within 10 days, as required.

The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997,
Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit. It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were
acts of oppression or unethical practice. The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt and approve the investigating commissioners report and dismissed the complaint
ISSUE: whether or not respondent was guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Ruling:
There was a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the
part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a
desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.
Nonetheless, the Court declared that it strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas
blatant refusal to comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the
responsibility to follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very
important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26,
1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution.
Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years
after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a
clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed.
However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

#24 CASE TITLE: ANTERO J. POBRE vs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

Petitioners Claim: Antero J. Pobre invites the Court's attention to the following
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's speech delivered on the Senate floor:
. . . I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots . . . .
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the

Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
Respondents Claim: Senator Santiago does not deny making the aforequoted
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered
in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of
her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to
expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]", which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of
Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least
given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not
be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
Issue: Whether or not the Senator violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling: No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady
senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks,
and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member
of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago
should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.
\\#25 Case Title: Sesbreno vs CA and City of Cebu
Petitioners Claim:
He should be paid higher Attorneys Fees as the City of Cebu paid the whole amount of
backwages and allowances.
Respondents Claim:

The Compromise Agreement between the City of Cebu and private respondents, as well
as the agreement between private respondents and petitioner, as distinct and separate
from each other. At any rate, the relationship between private respondents and
petitioner had already been terminated as the case was already final and executed.
Issue: W/N petitioner should be paid an additional Attorneys Fees
Ruling:
No; the claim is baseless as he had already been actually paid and the case executed.

# 27 Case Title: WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G.

RELLOSA, respondent
Petitioners Claims:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu
and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay where the parties reside. Respondent, as punong
barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that
respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
Respondents Claims
: In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard
the complaint. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity,
without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able
to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was
then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled
her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent has committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer?
Ruling:
Yes. As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of
his Department, as required by civil service regulations (Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules) This he failed to do. Such failure to comply constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil
service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

# 28 CASE TITLE: MANUEL L. LEE vs ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of
the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. Complainant
averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and
Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution. The will was purportedly
executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificate 1 of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of
the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation.
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise
been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondent stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the
criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not
1

prosper. Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will
was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the
contested will could be found there because none was filed. Lastly, respondent pointed
out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did
not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the
inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
Yes. Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire
will invalid. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity
of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. The first
and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. While the duty to
uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a
lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship.
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary
duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public
with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with
the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted
very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less
severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law.

# 30 Case title: Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 03, 2007
Petitioners claim: Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as
they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the
Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing
Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for
some legal advice and that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to
be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage
contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the
respondent that she would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so
complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had
already heard her secrets. Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information
she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice. According to
complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
Counter complaint with the Ombudsman charging her with violation of Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And

also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary
case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Respondents claim:Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and
dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between
them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and
sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Madianda is guilty of violating the provisions of the CPR?
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer-client relationship was established
from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the
former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employments is established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the non-payment of the former's fees. Respondent indeed breached his duty of
preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in
the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.

# 31 CASE TITLE: NAPOLEON CAGAS VS JUDGE ROSARIO B. TORRECAMPO

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1979
March 14, 2007

PETITIONERS CLAIM:
Complainant alleges: He is the brother of accused Genuival Cagas (Genuival). In 1992,
criminal charges for murder were filed against Genuival, Wilson Butin (Wilson), and
Julio Astillero, and they were arrested and detained without bail. Respondent failed to
resolve the cases submitted for decision for over four years, prompting Genuival to file
motions to resolve the cases. From June 2000 to January 2005, 55 months had elapsed
before respondent wrote her decision. Each time respondent makes a certification that
she has no pending cases for resolution, respondent must be criminally charged for
falsification.

RESPONDENTS CLAIM
Respondent contends: The records of Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201
were remanded to the lower court sometime in the middle part of 1997. She had just
assumed her duties as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur. Due to
postponements at the instance of the accused, they were finally arraigned on January 5,
1998. On November 14, 2001, she requested time to finalize the decision in several
cases including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201, due to illness hounding her
family. On January 15, 2002, she requested for another extension of 30 days to decide
some cases including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to lower back pains
which prevents her from sitting down for a long period of time. On June 10, 2003, she
requested for another extension to decide Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to
health problems, resulting to her hospitalization on February 17 to 19, 2003 for
hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. She took a two-month leave of absence
on doctor's advice and returned to duty in May 2003. On August 13, 2003, the Court
granted her request for extension of 30 days to decide cases including Criminal Case
Nos. P-2196 to P-2201. During the early part of 2004 to date, she has been on
treatment for enlarged thyroid gland. The foregoing circumstances which were beyond
her control adversely affected and hampered her capacity to perform and not neglect of
duty on her part.

ISSUE:
Conduct.

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial

RULING:
Yes. Records reveal that the criminal cases subject of herein complaint were
submitted for decision on December 8, 2000. The Court granted respondent's requests
for several extensions of 30 days, i.e., November 14, 2001, January 15, 2002, and June
10, 2003, within which to decide said cases, due to recurring health problems, such as
hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. However, despite all the extensions
granted by the Court, respondent still failed to seasonably render decision on the
subject cases. Record further reveals that the decision on the criminal cases subject of
herein complaint was rendered only on January 10, 2005, or more than four years after
the same were submitted for decision on December 8, 2000. This, to our mind, is a
clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Constitution requiring the early
disposition of cases so as not to erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.

#32 CASE TITLE: ADVINCULA VS. MACABATA

PETITIONER'S CLAIM:
Sometime on December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of
the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and
Tours. On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon
City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and
Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner,
respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very
tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at
Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint
to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually
did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt
so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt
Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City
when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her
face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even
in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately
manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM:
Respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice.
ISSUE: Whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
RULING:
No. Immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply
be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
We perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on
the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same
was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the

complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a

cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people
in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours.
If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to
a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

# 34 Case Title: Clarita Samala v. Atty. Luciano Valencia

Petitioners claim:
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75
for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's
ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name
of Alba on February 2, 1995. They further claim that respondent leads an immoral life
since he sired illegitimate children. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that
Civil Case No. 2000- 657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT
No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, before RTC, Branch 273,
Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of
Alba's title only in
2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before
Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the
same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Respondents claim:
Respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time
that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the
court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further
avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when
the case for rescission was filed in 2002. On the second issue, he avers that he does
not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the
latter as his second family. He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay
because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.

Issue: Whether or not, the respondent is guilty for violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify
the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. In this case, respondent admitted that he sired
three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife
was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest
of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died, he married Lagmay. These
admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the
charge of immorality. The Court also found that the respondent failed to comply
with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was
already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof
of the latter's ownership