G.R. No.

78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON,respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order
issued by the public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon.
Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal
case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private
respondent as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60)
square meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo
and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba
Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of
about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder
of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by
Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus
consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor
of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said
landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes.
The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty
basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the
landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant

bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for
the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea
Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners,
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to
build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling
to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay
the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was
not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises,
saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The
parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in
Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the
landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter
simply refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit
stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property
worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against
Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all
the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been
done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in
open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the
case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the
1
Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification dated January
24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for
hearing on the bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land
owned by the complaining witness, which is devoted to
bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the
tenant from his farmholding, which act is prohibited by law;
and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian

relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the
respondent DAR. Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its
then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its
2
Order of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for
trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square
meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the
industrial zone of the town as evinced from the Certification issued by the
Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR,
through its new Minister, herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an
3
Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous Order dated
February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial,
finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that
the case was designed to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner,
Andrea Millenes, testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50%
share of the produce of the land under his cultivation. The grandson of
Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former,
stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further
testified that the present owners received in his presence a bunch of
bananas from the accused representing or 50% of the two bunches of
4
bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the property.
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of
Andrea Millenes, the former owner, who had testified that she shared the
5
produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of
RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold
relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the
term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer
of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR
ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy,
notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small,

consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a
6
total of sixty (60) square meters."
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse
of power and discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that
private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating
only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the
petitioner.
II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003
7
is not proper for trial and hearing by the court.
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by
RA 3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is
preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those
who live and work on the land as tillers, ownercultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence,
divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of
farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm
family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of
living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education
with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and
8
reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income."

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters)
of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas,
camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as
an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn
on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient
to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.
The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the
products of the land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry
9
jobs on the side. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary
to the declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land
with the former owner, Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public
respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the
petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents
continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner
new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of
the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
10
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of

the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This
is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way
of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not
automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area
tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area
and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession
for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this
case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who
was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the
premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather
than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the
former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since
Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief
filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the
petitioner, we hold that the remand of the case to the lower court for the
resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice.
Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends
of justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position
to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest,
and towards the expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on
11
the merits and dispose of the case with finality.
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the
private respondent for allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly
P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to
the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore,
the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance
his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were
to resume. Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in

the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of such litigations.
The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished
that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can
only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty,
deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the
misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of
justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from
heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the
Court finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of
further deferring its final termination.

possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said
crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the
land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by the previous
owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private
respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and
present owners. Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and
cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the
landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief,
which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent
because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the
petitioner's affidavit stating that after she reprimanded private respondent
Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property
worth about P50.00.

WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is

SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy
of this decision be sent to the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for
appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner,

who likewise executed an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private
12
respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana trees.
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within
the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious
13
mischief."
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the
property of another;
2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes
involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the
aforesaid criminal case against the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious
mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO
ALZONA, respondents.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.
Emil Capulong, Jr., for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims
to be a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of
tenancy laws. The private respondent objects, contending that the petitioner
is only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the subject land ended with the
termination of their contract of employment.
The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao,
Laguna, and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and
his parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written
contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the
1
land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. On September 4, 1973, after
Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the
land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services and to
demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working
on the land.
On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and
asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later
withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which
granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer
against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was
declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. Alzona was

rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of the Ministry
of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On
appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared
proper for trial and so de-archived and reinstated.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken
over the Court of Agrarian Relations under PB 129) rendered a decision
2
dated April 21, 1987, dismissing the complaint. It found Gelos to be a
tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The
plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs.
The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its
3
judgment promulgated on November 25, 1988, it held that Gelos was not a
tenant of the land in question and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona. He
was also held liable for the payment of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit.
The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially
factual and therefore not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Only questions of law may be raised in this kind of
proceeding. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. The petitioner has not shown that his case comes
under any of those rare exceptions on such findings may be validly reversed
by this Court.
4

It is true that in Talavera v. Court of Appeals, we held that a factual

conclusion made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is
supported by the minimum evidence demanded by law, is final and
conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals except for
compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find with the respondent
court that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination of the
record reveals that, indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it
ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent.
The circumstance that the findings of the respondent court do not concur
with those of the trial court does not, of course, call for automatic reversal of
the appellate court. Precisely, the function of the appellate court is to review

and, if warranted, reverse the findings of the trial court. Disagreement

between the two courts merely calls on us to make a specially careful study
of their respective decisions to determine which of them should be preferred
as more conformable to the facts at hand.
The Court has made this careful study and will sustain the decision of the
respondent court.
The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and
entitled "Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw," reads pertinently as follows:
1. Ang Unang Panig ay siyang may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng
isang lagay na lupa, sinasaka, na tumatayo sa Nayon ng
Baclaran, Cabuyao, Laguna, na siyang gagawa at sasaka
sa lupa, samantalang ang Ikalawang Panig ay magiging
upahan at katulong sa paggawa ng lupa.
2. Ang Unang Panig ay gustong ipagpatuloy ang
pagbubungkal at paggawa ng bukid na binabanggit sa
itaas at ang Ikalawang Panig ay may ibig na magpaupa sa
paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawat araw, walong oras
na trabaho gaya ng mga sumusunod: Patubigan ng linang;
pagpapahalabas ng mga pilapil; pagpapaaldabis sa unang
araw ng pag-aararo; pagpapalinis ng damo sa ibabaw ng
pilapil; pagpapakamot (unang pagpapasuyod),
pagpapahalang at pagpapabalasaw (ikalawa't ikatlong
pagpapasuyod); isang tao sa pagsasabog ng abono una
sa pagpapantay ng linang; bago magtanim; isang tao sa
pagaalaga ng dapog; upa sa isang tao ng magbobomba
ng gamot laban sa pagkapit ng mga kulisap (mayroon at
wala); sa nag-we-weeder; upa sa mga tao na
maggagamas at magpapatubig ng palay; magsasapaw ng
mga pilapil at iba pa.
3. Ang Unang Panig at ang Ikalawang Panig ay
nagkasundo na ang huli ay gagawa sa bukid ayon sa
nabanggit sa itaas bilang katulong at upahan lamang. Ang
Unang Panig bukod sa sila ang gagawa at magsasaka ay
maaaring umupa ng iba pang tao manggagawa sa

upahang umiiral sang-ayon sa batas katulad ng pagaararo, pagpapahulip, pagpapagamas, pagbobomba,

pagweweeder, pagsasabog ng abono, pagbobomba ng
gamot, pagpapatubig at iba pang mga gawain. Maaaring
alisin ang Ikalawang Panig sa pagpapatrabaho sa ano
mang oras ng Unang Panig.
4. Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi
kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa
bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.
It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning
Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't
araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his
services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that
"Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi
upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa
bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm
tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work on the said
farm.)
These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a
tenancy agreement but only a contract of employment. The agreement is a
lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite consistent
with the undisputed fact that three days before that agreement was
concluded, the former tenant of the land, Leocadio Punongbayan, had
executed an instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy
5
rights to the private respondent. It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary
to the petitioner's contention, Alzona intended to cultivate the land himself
instead of placing it again under tenancy.
The petitioner would now disavow the agreement, but his protestations are
less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his
6
own testimony to the contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that they
were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up against the
testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a
witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the
meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it himself before signing
7
it. Atty. Pampolina said the agreement was not notarized because his
commission as notary public was good only for Manila and did not cover

Laguna, where the document was executed. 8 At any rate, the lack of
notarization did not adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the
agreement, which, significantly, Gelos and his wife do not deny having
signed.
Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests
that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so.
The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may
also be done by a hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner,
as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the
intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them.
9

As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely

factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law,
are even more important."
10

Gelos presented receipts for fertilizer and pesticides he allegedly bought

and applied to the land of the private respondent, but the latter insists that it
was his brother who bought them, being an agriculturist and in charge of the
technical aspect of the farm. Moreover, the receipts do not indicate to which
particular landholding the fertilizers would be applied and, as pointed out by
the private respondent, could refer to the other parcels of land which Gelos
was tenanting.
The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National
Irrigation Administration on the said landholding is explained by the fact that
during the pendency of the CAR case, the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a
provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary finding that Gelos was the
tenant of the private respondent. As such, it was he who had to pay the
irrigation fees. Incidentally, Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that
the Secretary's determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary
and cannot be conclusive on the lower court.
It is noteworthy that, except for the self-serving testimony of the petitioner's
wife, the records of this case are bereft of evidence regarding the sharing of
harvest between Gelos and Alzona. No less importantly, as the Court of

Appeals observed, the petitioner has not shown that he paid rentals on the
subject property from 1970 to 1973, before their dispute arose.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person
who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. (Emphasis supplied)
For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is
consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the
absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
11
cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are:
1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages;
3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's
12
conduct although the latter is the most important element.
13

According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is

distinguished from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm
employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as
the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the
lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker
works for the farm employer and for his labor be receives a salary or wage
regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the
tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest."
The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in
the produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of
work on the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages
as laborer thereon. The petitioner's wife claims that Alzona made her
husband sign the invoices all at one time because he allegedly needed them
to reduce his income taxes. Even assuming this to be true, we do not think

that made the said payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner
never denied having received them.
The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is easily
resolved. There being no tenancy relationship, the contention that the private
respondent's complaint has prescribed under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must
also fail. That section is not applicable. It must be noted that at the very
outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's claim of agricultural tenancy and
immediately instituted his action for unlawful detainer in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. As it happened, the said case was
held not proper for trial by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. He then resorted
to other remedies just so he could recover possession of his land and,
finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The action,
which was commenced in 1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive
period provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code for actions based on a
written contract. *
The Court quotes with approval the following acute observations made by
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
It might not be amiss to state at this juncture that in
deciding this case in favor of defendant, the lower court
might have been greatly influenced by the fact that
defendant is a mere farmer who is almost illiterate while
plaintiff is an educated landlord, such that it had felt that it
was its duty to be vigilant for the protection of defendant's
interests. But the duty of the court to protect the weak and
the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an
extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth
and justice happen to be on his side. Besides, defendant's
economic position vis a visthe plaintiff does not
necessarily make him the underprivileged party in this
case, for as testified by plaintiff which defendant never
denied, the small land in question was the only
landholding of plaintiff when he and his father bought the
same, at which time he was just a lowly employee who did
not even have a house of his own and his father, a mere
farmer, while defendant was the agricultural tenant of
another piece of land and also owns his own house, a sari

sari store, and a caritela. Plaintiff also surmised that it was

only after defendant had been taken into its wings by the
Federation of Free Farmers that he started claiming to be
plaintiff's agricultural tenant, presumably upon the
Federation's instigation and advice. And we cannot
discount this possibility indeed, considering that during the
early stages of the proceedings this case, defendant even
counter-proposed to plaintiff that he would surrender the
land in question to the latter if plaintiff would convey to him
another piece of land adjacent to the land in question,
almost one ha. in area, that plaintiff had also acquired after
buying the land in question, showing that defendant was
not as ignorant as he would want the Court to believe and
had the advice of people knowledgeable on agrarian
matters.
This Court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice
for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his
mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt,
we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it
justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and
rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an
inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29,
1972, Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
gave notice to this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was
survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador
Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and
Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with
this Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and
was survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O.
Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel,
married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and
Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted
by her heirs herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the
prayer for substitution was granted.

In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the
Court of Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio
Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond
situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and
measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime
during the last war she entered into an oral contract of
lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis,
i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance
in the month of January; that desiring to develop and
cultivate the fishpond by herself, she notified the
defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was
terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that
upon request of the defendant, she extended the lease for
another year; that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote
the defendant that he should surrender possession of the
fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however
ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be
ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her
and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter
filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that
the land in question was originally leased to him, also
verbally, by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano Gabriel in
1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and the part which was already a fishpond be
improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the
lease for whatever cause; that when the plaintiff became
the owner of the property through inheritance, she told the

defendant that she would honor her father's contract with

the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could
continue leasing the property, whose original rental of
P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to
P1,200.00, for as long as he wanted since she was not in
a position to attend to it personally. As a special defense,
the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court to take cognizance of the case.
On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order
herein below quoted in full:
The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond
described in the complaint which is under lease to the said
defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he
has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that
the action should have been filed with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold
tenancy.
After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the
allegations of the complaint, the parties were ordered to
adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which
Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession
of the defendant, who originally leased it from the father of
the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond
was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T.
No. 1634 and is registered in her name. It contains an
area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a
yearly basis.
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work
personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond
since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter,
Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her
father in administering the leased property, conveying his

instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro

Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan
and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers
who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo
Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher.
He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting
Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the
other children of the defendant are all professions; a
lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila.
None of these persons has been seen working on the
fishpond.
The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which
we enter this order.
After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions
of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly
Sections 4 and 9, as amended. it seems clear that his
case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease
contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by the New
Civil Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16
hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant,
who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements, and the
further fact that the persons named above are not
members of the immediate farm household of the
defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship
exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined
by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this
Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
After this order has become final, the plaintiff may request
for the setting of the initial trial.
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts
therein made by the trial court.

After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the

merits, decision was rendered wherein the trial court
Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the period
of the low up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date
to surrender possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and
to pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part,
was required upon surrender of on to her, to pay the
defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the
expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon
failure by either party to pay the amount due the other, the
same would bear interest at the legal rate until full
payment is made.
A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied,
he appealed to this Court and assigned the following
errors:
1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of
appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease, in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and not
a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as
amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of
an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. NO.
1199 as amended.
3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of
the appellant particularly the basis for the expenditure for
the development of the fishpond in question.
4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of
the appellant in them easily amount of one thousand
pesos for reimbursement and for seven hundred pesos for
the cost of the floodgate.
Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased
the fishpond to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental

payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13,
1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in the fishpond
consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae
would not grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond,
changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and
planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that these were done by
defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until
1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan,
who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and
his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his
instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between
the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act
No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844,
and the present case is therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in
effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or
with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has
been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore
the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the
interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or
1
with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household.
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of
2
Appeals which, as a general rule, bind this Court.
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the
relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a
civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land;
that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention
and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not

personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding

in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
3
governed by special laws.

question of whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked

by the appellant's family or not has not been raised, and We see no need of
tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the
tenant himself personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the
land.

In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may
exist, the following requisites must concur.

Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement

of leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such
tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the
fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did
the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land in
question. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are
6
included in the term "immediate farm household" The record shows who
helped work the land in question, and We quote:

1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. That the land belongs to another; and
5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed
4
amount in money or in produce or in both.
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond
and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use
thereof. Thus Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for
the use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the
raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties".
This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish is produced is classified
5
as agricultural land." The mere fact, however, that a person works an
agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has
an area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work

personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond
since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated. His
daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she
helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The
names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been
mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of
the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant,
acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got
married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near
the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all
professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all
residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen
7
working on the fishpond.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work
the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines
a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to

the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the

leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of
landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the
person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available
from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act
requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy
exists when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or
legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or
in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons,
therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
8
tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of
the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and
ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199.
Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
9
Court of Agrarian Relations.
2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the
Court of First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar,
this being a case of civil law lease.
3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as
these are issues involving findings of facts which have been settled by the
lower court, and unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which we do not
find in the record of the case, We shall not venture to discuss the merits of
the factual findings of the court a quo.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance

of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with
costs against the appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
original parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the decision
of the lower court, the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the fishpond in question to the
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs
and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued
rentals. From January 1, 1960, at the rate of P1,200.00 a year, until the
actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein ordered, with
interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 132477 August 31, 2005

JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ, ROBERTO E.
ABOITIZ, ENRIQUE ABOITIZ, MATTHIAS G. MENDEZONA, CEBU
INDUSTRIAL PARK DEVELOPERS, INC. and FBM ABOITIZ MARINE,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, in
his capacity as DAR Secretary, and DIR. JOSE LLAMES, in his capacity
as Director of DAR-Regional 7, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in
Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by
the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as
1
industrial lands. On 03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved
Balambans land use plan and adopteden toto Balambans Municipal
Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and
2
Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for
the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners
secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government
3
certifications.
Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona
received a letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the
DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use
and directed him to cease and desist from further developments on the land
4
to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal liabilities.
Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Toledo City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
5
6
docketed as Civil Case No. T-590. In an order dated 12 August 1996, the
RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint
7
for lack of jurisdiction. It justified the dismissal in this wise:

A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code expressly provides

that the Municipalities through an Ordinance by the Sanggunian may
authorize the reclassification of the agricultural land within their area into
non-agricultural. Paragraph (e) of the aforesaid Section, provides further:
that nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in
any manner the provision of Republic Act 6657. In an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, quoted: With respect of (sic) conversion of agricultural
land to non-agricultural uses the authority of the DAR to approve the same
may be exercise (sic) only from the date of the effectivity of the Agrarian
Reform Law on June 15, 1988. It appears that the petitioners had applied for
conversion on June 13, 1995 and therefore the petitioner (sic) are estopped
from questioning the authority and jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The application having been filed after June 15, 1988, the
reclassification by the Municipal Council of Balamban was just a step in the
conversion of the aforestated lands according to its purpose. Executive
Order No. 129-A, Section 5, "The Department shall be responsible for
implementing Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and for such purpose it is
authorized to (J) approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural land into non-agricultural uses." Said Executive
Order amended Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3644 which clearly mandates
that the DAR Secretary (sic) approve or disapprove conversion are not
impliedly repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of Republic Act 6657 the above
laws and other laws not inconsistent of (sic) this act shall have suppletory
effect. Further, Section 68 of Republic Act 6657 provides: No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court
against the Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and Department of
Justice in their implementation of the program. With this provision, it is
therefore clear (sic) when there is conflict of laws determining whether the
Department of Agrarian Reform has been exclusively empowered by law to
approve land conversion after June 15, 1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls
only with the Supreme Court or Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for Restraining
Order is hereby ordered DENIED and the main case is DISMISSED, this
8
Court having no jurisdiction over the same.
In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the motion for
9
reconsideration filed by the petitioners. Petitioners filed before this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining
10
11
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In a resolution dated 11
November 1996, this Court referred the petition to the Court of

12

Appeals. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution but

13
the same was denied in a resolution dated 27 January 1997.
14

At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered to file their
Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public
respondents, one from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial
15
16
Office and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were
17
submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply.
18

On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming

19
the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. A motion for reconsideration
20
filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or which has been distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must be confirmed by the
DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for
the reclassification to become effective. If, however, the land sought to be
reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in
order for the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall
within the DARs conversion authority. Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the
CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and allencompassing power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or
conversions of all agricultural lands. Said section only grants the DAR
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands which have already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and
which have already been distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

Hence, this petition.

The following issues

21

The petition lacks merit.

are raised by the petitioners for resolution:

(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use
by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under
Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of
the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;

After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though
reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over
which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified
before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:

(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy
against the order of the DAR enjoining development works on the subject
lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to
issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to
reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set
2223
forth in Section 20
of the Local Government Code. According to them, if
the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one
which has already been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive

". . . True, the DARs express power over land use conversion is limited to
cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years,
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or
the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that
these are the only instances when the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner
may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it
should logically follow from the said departments express duty and function
to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be cleared
by the DAR."

The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of

conversion despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in
24
the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that
reclassification of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject
landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from
reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece
of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying
how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject
to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a
mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a
landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He
has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No.
101 of Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on
25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of
Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April
1995, long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act
No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
...
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 12 dated October 1994 which reads:

Administrative Order No. 12

Series of 1994
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING CONVERSION OF ARICULTURAL LANDS TO NONAGRICULTURAL USES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
The guiding principles on land use conversion is to preserve prime
agricultural lands. On the other hand, conversion of agricultural lands, when
coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to
promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum use of land as a
national resource for public welfare, shall be pursued in a speedy and
judicious manner.
To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
as amended, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946, Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 129-A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) has issued several policy guidelines to regulate land use
conversion. This Administrative Order consolidates and revises all existing
implementing guidelines issued by the DAR, taking into consideration, other
Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use conversion.
II. LEGAL MANDATE
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or
disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4(i) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
B. Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR,
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses.
C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize

under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural

lands.

Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v.
Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).

D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of

the President, provides that "action on applications for land use conversion
on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of the DAR,
which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by
the local government units concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A."

The Court of Appeals reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in
order. In the said opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz:

III. DEFINITION OF TERMS

A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land
(Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).
B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use.
C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. It also
includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.

Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to
conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to nonagricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be
exercised from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988. This
conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of
DARs mandate and extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural
before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any
conversion clearance:
I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ
Opinion No. 44, the following guidelines are being issued for the guidance of
the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis

...
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

V. COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. It shall also
include agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses,
after June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54, Series
of 1993 of the Office of the President and those proposed to be used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising as provided in DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1993.
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,

25

we held:

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may
be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands
that are already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15
June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.

The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands

covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced
by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly
26
provides that "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or
modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."

expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts

of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the
case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it. . . ."

It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR,
the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate
courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v.
27
Mag-isa Vda. De Villena, found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction

Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or
not an injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR
enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land, we rule in the negative.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a

controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This
law divested the regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:
"Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
"It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most

SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No

injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the
lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the
Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated
02 December 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183409

June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.

(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule
65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to
nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 051
2
07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, for having been issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid
administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella
organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single
proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and
housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials
production and supply, and services in the various related fields of
engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly
appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject
of this petition.

embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement

and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural
lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued
4
DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and
updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes
the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural
purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such
as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3)
those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
5
6
6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7
7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to
such uses.
On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another
Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97
and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith.
The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended
8
certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07,
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

The Antecedent Facts

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real

estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued
Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No.

3
07-97, entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of

housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,

unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not

only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his
discretion is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:

Hence, this petition.

Section 3. Applicability of Rules. These guidelines shall apply to all

applications for conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use, such as:

The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS
THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING
AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO
REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL
AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
IV.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
V.
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
9
POWER.

xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by
the LGU or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA
6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x. [Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No.
10
8435, the term agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and
not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in the definition of agricultural
lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988." In effect, lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes
of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no
authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural
lands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it
must conform to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No.
6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be
questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as
11
amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657
because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of

agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by

way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner,
there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other
provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require
that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion
authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
12

Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19, Article I of DAR AO No.

01-02, as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to
the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20
of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that
reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to
effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy
13
14
under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without
due process of law. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that
are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively
prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and
criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative
order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other
sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not
a valid exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and
that it is unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion
without any basis.
The Courts Ruling

This petition must be dismissed.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
15
16
court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v.
17
Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It
is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
18
further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
19
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the

extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its

20
primary jurisdiction.
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following
21
cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo, on citizens right to bear arms; (b)
22
Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan, on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano23
Padilla, on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
24
Hon. Sec. Zamora, on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon.
25
Fortich v. Hon. Corona, on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office
of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro26
industrial area.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth
special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why
this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby
failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
27
Melicor. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for
Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
28
jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis
supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only
questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy,
this Petition is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
29
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the
writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
30
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means
that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is
not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because
the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in
31
respect of it are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal
power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means
32
lack of power to exercise authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a

virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of

33
law.
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the abovementioned requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in
accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance
of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special
civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.1avvphi1
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it
has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other
hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
34
nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts,
it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate
35
the respective rights of the contending parties.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance
and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in
the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative
issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of
rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in
essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy for the
petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court
has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of
certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional
and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of the
existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to
declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise
36
of judicial discretion."
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed.
37

Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive
order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies,
rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation.
Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the

conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has
given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion
of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land
uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive
order clearly provides that "the authority and responsibility for the exercise of
the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall
be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x."
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so
doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his
authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A,
which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform
implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for
purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of
agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural
uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of
land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified
that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR
38
has been given the authority to approve land conversion. Concomitant to
such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of
agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial
or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include
"lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands
39
finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, this
Court has enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657,
agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However,
agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from

40

conversion. It bears stressing that the said date of effectivity of Republic

Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or
rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion
41
clearance or authority. It necessarily follows that any reclassification made
thereafter can be the subject of DARs conversion authority. Having
recognized the DARs conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15
June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
was wrongfully given the authority and power to include "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands. Such
inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural
lands; instead, it made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of
DARs conversion authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use
conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even
those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious. As
explained in Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it is true
that the DARs express power over land use conversion provided for under
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural
lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the
only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open
a loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to
evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should logically
follow, therefore, from the said departments express duty and function to
execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared
42
by the DAR.
43

This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals that reclassification of lands

does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is
the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as

embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures
for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use.
He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use
44
the agricultural land for other purposes.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the
process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they
are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion
authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
45
on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any
46
DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of
agricultural lands is already subject to DARs conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other
purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified
agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by
the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they
must still undergo conversion process. It bears stressing that the act of
reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not
automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other
purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994,
cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the
47
Department of Agrarian Reform, reclassification of lands denotes their
allocation into some specific use and providing for the manner of their
utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall
be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified agricultural
lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended there
is still a need to change the current use thereof through the process of
conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is mandated
to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus,

notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural

uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other
purposes.
Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential
Proclamations to non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs
conversion clearance from the DAR. We reiterate that reclassification is
different from conversion. Reclassification alone will not suffice and does not
automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must still undergo
conversion process before the landowner can use such agricultural lands for
48
such purpose. Reclassification of agricultural lands is one thing, conversion
is another. Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural uses do
not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose.
Stated differently, despite having reclassified into school sites, the landowner
of such reclassified agricultural lands must apply for conversion before the
DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or
by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must
undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone
reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public
agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or
purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no
49
longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo, only a positive act of the
President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public
domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands
for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without
undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly
and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been
reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and
transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the
50
CARP. More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or
purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
51
public domain suitable for agriculture. Hence, they are outside the
coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the
conversion authority of the DAR.

Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 0102, as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction for conversion lands which
had already been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for
other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification
of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land
use conversion procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may,
through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following
cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited
to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No.
6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,"
shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such
lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
xxxx

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or

modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to
reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to
approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657
to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in this
section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process
clause, as well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In
providing administrative and criminal penalties in the said administrative
order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of
Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are prohibited:
xxxx
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any nonagricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his
landholdings and to disposes his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
xxxx
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or
any other usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a
beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the
provisions of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month to not more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and not more than fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.

If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor

shall be criminally liable.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:

in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice
cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. x x

x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is

DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized

with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one
hundred percent (100%) of the government's investment cost, or both, at the
discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and
any improvement thereon.

SO ORDERED.

In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining,
in an administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been
committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use
conversion; and
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent
conversion applications that they may file with the DAR.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties
provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the
illegal or premature conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction, i.e., "lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1998."
The petitioners argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional,
as it suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow
ground.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of
prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made

G.R. No. 131457

August 19, 1999

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and
intervenors' separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
CourtEn banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of which
the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said
motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been
referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of
the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution
dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted without action the intervenors'
"Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc" filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations,
to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress
before the Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this case
was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion
for reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the
motion to the Court En Banc, was also denied in the November 17,
1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of
December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for

reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52 in

relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
The impropriety of movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all
the more glaring considering that all the respondents in this case
did not anymore join them (movants) ill seeking a reconsideration of
1
the November 17, 1998 Resolution.
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
their "Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17,
1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With
Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)" on December 3, 1998,
2
accompanied by a "Manifestation and Motion" and a copy of the Registered
3
Mail Bill evidencing filing of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court
by registered mail.1wphi1.nt
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and
intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They
contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the
required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently,
the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying
on the following constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of
such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
4
sitting en banc.
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one
hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided"
whilematters, which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word
"decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to
"matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only

in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of
5
the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this
case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The abovequoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other
hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party
files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of
this case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate
motions are of first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio
M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on
November 17, 1998, the following was expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the
Court En Banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power
of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided
by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et
al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government
units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or
reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The
dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the

questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondent's property (b) orders the trial court to
suspended the exportation proceedings; and (c) requires
the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to nonagricultural use.
xxx

xxx

x x x(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by

a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of
this Court, Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion
that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not
deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the
participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants' motions
6
for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not
dispose of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April
24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration
necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration
which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section
4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second
motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily
persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for
7
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first obtained. In
this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more
importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional
reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the
Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but
rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained

therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in
the said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President
had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion
for reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win"
Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of
protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties
for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that
notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was
disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as
what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration,
the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive
rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
8
the finality of the resolution of his/her case."
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly
vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on
the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case,
9
therefore, is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit.
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule
once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their
present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership
award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the
plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of
the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they
have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of
our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the

subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their
10
right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the
"Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to
be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian
11
Reform. Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest
in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the
issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing
in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc," dated December 3, 1998; respondents' "Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer
For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)," dated December 2, 1998; and
intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En
Banc To Annul The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999
And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration
Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with
FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this
case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., please see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result. I maintain my original position that the case should go
to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.

Separate Opinions
MELO, J., separate opinion;

On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case
should be referred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions for

clarification.

Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which

under the rules is generally proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to
limit its resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.

MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the
Court En Banc's Resolution No. 99-109-SC dated January 2, 1999, which
settled the issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to vote
with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the above-captioned
case. Nevertheless, I wish to express my views on this issue and put them or
record, so, in the event that the Court decides to open and re-discuss this
issue at some future time, these consideration may be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding majority's position regarding
an even (2-2) vote in a division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required
majority of at least 3 votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and
decided by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall e decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendereden banc or in division may be modified or reversed by the
court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the
case is not decided in a division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En
Banc and not to a longer division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to
theBanc shall be automatic. Thus,

MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of

divisions: one would be a division composed of 3 justices in which
case there will be 5 divisions; another division is composed of 5
justices each, in which case there will be 3 divisions; and the other
is composed of 7 members each, in which case, there will be 2
divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is
less than 3 votes. Should it immediately go to the court en banc of
15 justices or should it first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of
3, the vote is 2-1, automatically it goes to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not
obtained. So, this last phrase would operate automatically
"WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE
CASE SHALL BE DECIDEDEN BANC."
xxx

xxx

xxx

(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)

Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in
any case or matter heard by a division. Failing thus, or, when the required

number of 3 votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be decided
by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member
having inhibited himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has
retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be any
valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances
when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view
that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if
the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should
automatically got to the Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between "cases" and "matters" referred to in
the above-quoted constitutional provision. "Cases" being decided, and
"matters" being resolved. Only "cases" are referred to the Court En Banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained Matters" are
not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that "cases" would only refer to deliberations at first
instance on the merits of a case filed with the Court, and other deliberations,
such as motions, including motions of reconsideration, are "matters" to be
resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the
voting on motions for reconsideration, the decision which already been
passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed
to appealed cases, filed with the Court. However, because of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to only original cases which are taken cognizable of by
this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably,
these cases are all required by the Constitution to be heard by the Court En
Banc. so, there will be no instance when a division will be ever taking
cognizance of an original actions filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizable of by the divisions are either
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of
petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be

a tie in the voting on deliberation of a "case" by the division, although

apparently no action is passed, a decision may still be rendered the
petition is thereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This
is definitely in consonance with the majority's line of reasoning in the 2-2
vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the
deliberation of the "case" at the first instance should still be referred to the
Court En Banc? The reason is simple. Because the express provision of the
Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid
and binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to
motions for reconsideration? Even on this score alone, it is my view that, in
all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a case at first instance or
on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass
action.1wphi1.nt
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for
reconsideration because the provision contemplates "cases" or "matters"
(which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced
from the decision in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if
the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion
for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as mandated by
the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the
division on 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be sustained by
a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is
not a "case" but only a "matter" which does not concern a case, so that,
even through the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not
required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded
hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on
a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be sustained only in cases where there is
no recourse to a higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2,
with 1 abstaining) would result in the motion not being carried, but only
because there is and there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En
Bancwhich, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even
vote results in the failure of the proposition, only because there is no higher
body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if there voting is evenly
split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or

disqualifying himself, the motion shall, of course, not be carried because that
is the end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there
being recourse to the Court En Banc, and more so, this being expressly
directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.