Creed - Family Values and Domestic Economies

"Family Values" and Domestic Economies
Author(s): Gerald W. Creed

Source: Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 29 (2000), pp. 329-355
Published by: Annual Reviews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223424
Accessed: 20-07-2015 21:38 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of Anthropology.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 72.167.47.101 on Mon, 20 Jul 2015 21:38:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2000. 29:329-55

Copyright? 2000 by AnnualReviews. All rights reserved
"FAMILYVALUES"AND DOMESTICECONOMIES
GeraldW. Creed
Departmentof Anthropology,Hunter College and the GraduateSchool of the City
Universityof New York,New York,New York10021;
e-mail: gcreed@shiva.huntercuny.edu
Key Words capitalism,familyhistory,households,kinship,strategies

* Abstract Thisreviewinvertsthe idiom"familyvalues"to showthe valueof the
family. It groundsthis valuein familyeconomicactivitybut advocatesan interactive
approachin which culturalcommitmentsto the family influenceeconomicand political outcomes. Historicaland ethnographicresearchon the family is musteredto
illustratetheinteractionandthencombinedwiththeoriesof capitalismandnationalism
to accountfor the resonanceof the familyvalues discourse. A final sectionreviews
the potentialdangersof family-focusedresearch.
That tradesmanwho does not delight in his family will never long delight
in his business.
D. Defoe
INTRODUCTION
The discourse on "familyvalues"in the United States reflects a radicalinsistence
on connections anthropologistshave spent 40 years disaggregating.We long ago
distinguishedfamilies (definedby blood andmarriage)fromhouseholds(basedon
propinquity),which might or might not be the loci of various domestic functions
(Bender 1967, Sanjek 1982). We subsequentlyaccumulateda compendiumof
ethnographicexamples to verify the culturalflexibility of domestic arrangements.
Eventually,the concept of family came underscrutinywith challenges to the biological/affinalmonopoly over its constitution(Carsten1995, Peletz 1995, Ragone
1996, Weismantel1995). Those concernedwith the decline of family valuesrefuse
these insights and insist that living arrangementsare essential to concepts of the
family, and that proper families are constituted with particulartypes of blood
and conjugal relations. Those whose lives do not fit these models often defend
themselves with the same family breastplate.Gays and lesbians claim that their
domestic relationshipsconstitute"chosen"families (Weston 1991), and many advocate marriage(Stiers 1999) and parenthood(Lewin 1993). For the defenders
of family values, such actions provide more evidence of how far the family has
degenerated;the attemptto broadendefinitionsof the family only amplifiestheir
0084-6570/00/1015-0329$14.00
329
330
CREED
distress. The escalatingargumentsthen enhancethe social centralityof the family.

This positive feedbackhas driventhe debateto a feveredpitch.
The extremepositions thathave evolved fail to containthe issues that inspired
them. Many of those espousing narrowideas about the family rallied to resist
the returnof Elian Gonzalez to his biological fatherin Cubafor political reasons.
Conversely, some of the lesbians who challenged biological family dogma by
forming "chosen families" pursued numerous strategies to replicate biological
bonds (Hayden 1995) and appealedto blood connectionsto gain custody of their
children when their relationshipsran aground(Galst 1998). Such ironies verify
thatthe argumentover family values is not simply about(re)producingparticular
domesticarrangements.It is also an attemptto tapthe culturalcapitalconcentrated
in the idea of "family"for personal,social, political, and economic objectives. As
an analyticalstrategy,then, it is useful to invertthe idea of family values andbegin
with the value of the family.
Domestic arrangementsaremeaningfulin all places studiedby anthropologists.
There may be no universalunderstandingof the family, but everyone has ideas
about how relationshipsof blood, marriage,sex, and residence should relate and
articulatewith processes of social reproduction(Ilcan 1996). These meanings
are constituted in the experiences of everyday life, especially those related to
makinga living. Diverseeconomicexperiencesin differentculturalcontextsleadto
divergentfamily forms,differentfamilyrelations,andvariedfamily commitments,
both between societies and withinthem, as well as over time. These commitments
can influence human actions in ways that impact broad political and economic
developments. In other words, the value of the family begins with its everyday
economic significance, but it does not end there. This view, of course, suggests
that those concerned about family values are right-the constitutionof families
has social consequences. Although the formulas they offer are simplistic, their
critics errwhen they deny the impactof social organizationon society.
This article reviews some of the literaturethat illuminatesthe interactionbetween domesticarrangements,the materialaspectsof makinga living, andthe culturalvalue attachedto the family. It examineswork publishedsince Yanagisako's
(1979) magisterialtrek over similarterrain,with an emphasison the past decade.
Much of the currentanthropologicalliteratureis still comprehendiblein the categories Yanagisakodeciphered, but it has also taken her admonitionsto heart.
As she advised, most researchershave given up the search for a uniformdefinition of family or household in favor of contingent characterizationsin different
culturalcontexts. I follow their lead and resist defining these terms. Instead, I
begin by contrastingan interactiveview of family-economy relations to earlier
approachesand illustratethe requisite interactionwith recent work from family
history, historical anthropology,and long-term field projects. I then review examples of ethnographicresearch in a variety of contexts where the family and
capitalist economic forces are closely interwoven, from the family farm to the
family business. The subsequentsection reconnectsthese economic relationswith
family history and theoriesof capitalismand nationalismto betterunderstandthe
FAMILY
VALUES
331
latest fascinationwith family values. I conclude with a cautionarysection on the

possible pitfalls of family economy research.
FROM EVOLUTION TO INTERACTION

The interactivemodel suggested here is a fusion of two opposing views of the
relationshipbetween family and economy: economic versus culturaldeterminism. In the latter, the value of the family is associated with a particularfamily
form thoughtto be conducive to capitalistdevelopment. This idea emergedfrom
Hajnal's (1965) distinction of family formationin eastern and western Europe,
which othersadoptedto explainthe origins of capitalismin the West andits spread
to those partsof Asia with similarfamily patterns(Wolf & Hanley 1985). The lack
of developmentelsewhere could then be blamed on strong family commitments
incompatiblewith capitalism. This logic is common in whatbecame knownas the
modernizationparadigm.
The alternativesees the value of the family in its complete adaptabilityto
economic opportunitiesand exigencies. It is perhapsexpressedmost explicitly by
Laslett (1972), who insists that the size and characterof the family is not a value
or norm,but rather"a circumstanceincidentalto the practiceof agriculture,to the
customs of land distributionand redistribution,to the laws and traditionof land
inheritance,and of succession in the patriline"(1972:xii). Many family historians
and historical anthropologistsin the 1970s and 1980s accepted this economic
reasoning(for a review see Casey 1989). Because most of the ethnographerswho
took up the study of households came from materialistperspectives, economic
interpretationswere reproducedthere as well; most of these studies documented
domestic adaptationsto economic conditionsand changes (e.g. Maclachlan1987,
Smith et al 1984).
Takentogether,then, the literatureon family andhouseholdin the 1980s seems
to imply thatculturalcommitmentsto the family were eithernonexistentor completely determinant.Both views have heavy evolutionarybaggage, and both assume an association between particularfamily forms and particulareconomic
arrangements,which Goody (1996:15) criticizes as a "too deterministicview of
the relationshipbetween macroeconomicand family variables."More important,
both deny any processual interplaybetween family ideas and economic forces.
When family commitmentsarerecognizedas importantthey arepersistentanddeterminant.When families adapt,culturalcommitmentsarenonexistentor ignored.
The family as both a culturaland economic formationis conceptuallyforeclosed.
There were dissenters. Many of the numerous collections on the household
economy from the 1980s included contributionssuggesting that domestic ideas
were a culturalforce in theirown right(Kunstadter1984, Olsen 1989, Rutz 1989).
Cheal (1989) grapples directly with the opposition in the well-worn terms of
moral versus political economies. He concludes that neither is sufficient alone,
but he leaves us with the image of two "parallelsystems" selectively drawnupon
332
CREED
(1989:19, see also Cheal 1991). This reinforcesevolutionaryviews in historyand

anthropologythat see a shift from culturalto practicalor individualmotivations
with the rise of capitalismand still fails to capturethe way that multiple factors
intertwine.The collection editedby Medick& Sabean(1984) was an explicit effort
to overcome this analyticalopposition, but most of the contributionsfocused on
the emotionalcosts of materialadjustments.I accept thatthe family is largely the
dependentvariablein relation to capitalism and the state (Harrell 1997:27), but
culturalcommitmentscan influencefamily "adaptations"
in nuancedways thatare
evident
is
when
focus
on
the
rather
than
the
outcome.
only
process
An importantbreakthroughin this effort came with the history of the English
middle class by Davidoff & Hall (1987). Following Ryan's (1981) insights about
the middle class in New York,they provide overwhelmingevidence that familybasedmotivesdrovemost of the capitalistexpansionandinvestmentthateventually
constituted the middle class in England. The purpose of business was not the
pursuitof profitbutthe provisionof a "modestcompetency"for the family. Family
andhome providedboththe rationaleandsettingfor businessenterprises,andthese
enterprisesthenproducedvast materialresourcesand social confidenceat a period
when the nation was poised to reap the benefits of an overseas empire. Many of
these goods and services were consumed by the middle class itself in the pursuit
of a good family life (Davidoff & Hall 1987:195-196). In this model, then, much
of the supply and demanddriving capitalistexpansion was generatedby family
objectives.
Creighton(1996) addresseshow and why this middle-class,male-breadwinner
model spreadthroughoutthe working classes of Europe and America from the
middle of the nineteenthcentury. He calls for an integrativeapproachthat examines "the ways in which the actions of households, male and female workers,
employers,statesand social movementsall relatedto and conditionedeach other"
(1996:333). He creditsSeccombe (1993) with gettingclosest to this ideal, although
still falling short, and then attemptsto achieve it with materialfrom Britain. He
maintainsthat men and women of the working class in the first half of the nineteenth century believed economic changes and ruling class policies threatened
the reproductionof their family life. This was already evident in the enclosure
movement,which foreclosed an importantcontributionto the budget of laboring
families (Humphries1990), and was verifiedby the Poor Law AmendmentAct of
1834, which threatenedto separatehusbands,wives, and childrenin workhouses.
These actions occurredin a context of Malthusiandiscussions among the upper
and middle classes aboutthe threatsof working-classfecundity. "Circumstances
such as these meantthatthe strugglesof this periodto defend working-classinterests were saturatedwith concernfor the maintenanceof the working-classfamily"
(Creighton1996:332). In working-classconsciousness, a main cause of declining
wages was excessive laborsupply,so the withdrawalof women fromthe workforce
was a logical response.
These two cases are only a sample of the growing researchin family history
thatgrantsfamily commitmentsa centralrole. Sabean'shistoryof a southGerman
FAMILY
VALUES
333
village documents"theways in which propertyand production...shapedand were

shapedby the family"(1990:12). Propertydisputescould severfamilyconnections
between individuals, but family commitmentsreestablishedthem with the next
generation(Sabean 1990:419-20). Pedersen's(1995) study of the origins of the
welfare statein Britainand Francedenies thatit can be explainedadequatelywith
class- or gender-basedargumentsand suggests that the perceivedcrisis of family
relationsand its impact on childrenwas equally consequential. McMurry(1995)
suggests thatthe transformationof dairyingin nineteenth-centuryruralNew York
from a feminized home enterpriseto a male factoryoccupationwas drivenin part
by conflicts within the family relatedto the increasingdemandsof cheese making.
Women'srole as the skilledcheese makersgave themthe powerto effect its transfer
to the factory. In the antebellumSoutheast,it was men's need to establishfamily
independencethat drove frontierexpansion to Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi
(Cashin 1991).
In all these studies,familyrelationsandexpectationsinfluencedpeople's choices
or actions within changingeconomic contexts. Thatthese insights come fromhistorical studies is not coincidental; even adaptablefamilies are not necessarily
quick-responseunits. The life cycle cannotbe easily compressed,and many family decisions are not reversibleor adjustable.Ideas aboutthe family may be more
malleablebut they do not change overnightor at the same time for all sectors of a
society. Thus, withinanthropology,manyof the recentfamily studiestranscending
the material/culturaloppositionalso have longerhistoricalpurviews. The studyof
demographictransitionin westernSicily by Schneider& Schneider(1996) begins
in the nineteenthcenturyto show how three differentclasses made the transition
to limited fertilityat differenttimes. When the depressionarrivedat the end of the
century,the gentrychose to limit their families ratherthandispersethem through
migration.Artisansbegan restrictingbirthsin the interwarperiodwhen providing
apprenticeshipsfor sons became a problem. Proletarianmen restrictedfertility
after WorldWarII in partto meet family ideals that had previouslyeluded them,
such as keeping women at home. In each case, class-specific economic conditions
interactedwith culturalcommitmentsto the family to shape fertility decisions.
The Schneidersrepresenta growing anthropologicalinterestin demographythat
connectsdemographictrendsto family life (e.g. Duben & Behar 1991, Greenhalgh
1995, Kertzer& Hogan 1989, Kertzer& Fricke 1997). The correctionsthese anthropologistshave made to demographictheorydemonstratethe value of a family
focus.
Collier's (1997) long-termstudy of families in an Andalusianvillage also provides new insight into old theories. She documents a shift in ideas about the
family between 1963 and 1983. In the 1960s, villagers attributedtheir family
behavior to social obligation and conventions. In the 1980s, they said they did
what they wantedto do: Love replacedstatusconcerns in the choice of a spouse,
and the resulting marriagewas based on partnershipratherthan patriarchy. In
many respects, however, these "new" families were much like the old onesnuclearfamily householdswith partibleinheritance.She attributesthe differences
334
CREED
to the developmentof a moder subjectivity. This argumentseems to replicate
Shorter's(1975) evolutionarymodel of the moder family (see also Frykman&
Lofgren 1987), but Collier's attemptto grapple with the change in subjectivity
using Foucauldiannotions of power suggests more aboutthe culturalsignificance
of family relationsthan the earlierevolutionaryparadigm.The changes were not
a reflection of an objective modernization,which had occurredlong before the
1960s, but rathera sign of the degree to which controlhad been internalizedin the
disciplines of daily life.
Collier traces this change to shifting ideas about the natureof inequality,notably the declining importanceof land inheritanceand its replacementby occupational achievement. People conceptualizedkin relations in the ways they
conceptualizedeconomic relations. Ratherthan being completely transformed,
however, continuingfamily commitmentswere repackagedto fit with new economic reality. Moreover, the fact that the family became the central arena for
demonstratingmodernityverifies its significance. Faier (1997) found the same
focus among Palestinian social activists who defined their image of a "Palestinian modern"on the foundationof a critique of orientaliststereotypes of the
"Arabfamily."Similarly,in Cashin's(1991) analysis of southernplanterfamilies,
young men's desires to be modern providedpart of the motivationto establish
independenceon the frontierin an agriculturalvariantof the male-breadwinner
model emerging elsewhere. Following Collier, we cannot assume these modern ideas reflect a retrenchmentin family values. They may instead reflect the
need to makecontinuingfamily commitmentsconsistentwith othersocio-cultural
changes.
A few historianshave startedto grapple directly with the social translation
of economic changes into a family-values discourse. Gillis (1996) attemptsto
"reconstructthe history of the western family imaginaryfrom its beginnings in
the late middle ages to the present" (p. xviii). The inevitable loss of cultural
specificity in such a project is worsened by his apparentrefusal to acknowledge
it: "Today... regardlessof class, ethnicity, or region, there is striking similarity
in the way family cultures are practiced"(Gillis 1996:xix). Nonetheless, parts
of the argumentare intriguing,especially his analysis of the late eighteenthand
early nineteenthcenturies. Early industrializationstrainedresources of the nuclear family, leading to more expansions (Ruggles 1987). New kin were incorporated while spiritualfamilies and associations such as the Masons acquired
parity with blood ties. "On such bonds was built the class consciousness that
encouragedthe bourgeoisieto challenge the aristocraticmonopoly of wealth and
power" (Gillis 1996:65). Thus, although Gillis sees clear economic causes to
family experiments,the resulting family arrangementsprovided the consciousness crucial to subsequenteconomic transformation. The era of experimentation came to an end in the mid-nineteenthcentury, when industrialproduction
moved from the household to the factory. This opened up vast new possibilities
and obligationsfor individualsto constructfamily worlds accordingto their own
specifications(Gillis 1996:71). The resultingobsession with family was evident
FAMILY
VALUES
335
in the celebrationof children'sbirthdays,the venerationof family portraitsand

heirlooms, new patternsof gift exchange, Christmascelebrations(Kuper 1993),
the new interestin family trees, and the significance of family reunions (Neville
1987).
Whereas Gillis is interested in the culturalhistory of family myths, Coontz
(1992) is determinedto showjust how mythic these ideas arein the United States.
First, the traditionalfamily is not even "traditional"because the Victorianmodel
was significantlyreworkedin the 1950s. Women in the nineteenthcentury left
houseworkto servants,but theircounterpartsin the 1950s had to do everythingfor
themselves. Men, who had focused on enterpriseand occupationin the Victorian
era, were increasinglyencouragedto root their self-image in familial roles. This
"historicalfluke"was based on a post-wareconomic boom that allowed middleclass and many working-classAmericansto adoptfamily models dependentupon
cheap energy, low-interesthome loans, educationaland occupationalopportunities, and secureemployment,to wit: early marriage,early childbearing,consumer
debt, and big houses in the suburbs.
Coontzthenrevealsa morecomplicatedrealityfor the 1950s, with povertyrates
at a quarterof the populationexacerbatedby extreme racial and ethnic discrimination. Many white people who could aspire to the family model embodied by
television icons such as the Cleaversand the Nelsons felt restrictedand pressured
by it in a context where any deviations (e.g. disinterestin houseworkor refusal
to marry)were pathologized,while real family pathologies (e.g. sexual abuse and
domestic violence) were denied. Even for families that thrived,the basis of their
enchantmentwas short-lived.The economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s underminedthe possibilityor even desirabilityof the 1950s familyideal. "Familyvalues,
forms, and strategiesthat once coordinatedpersonal life with older relations of
productionanddistributionarenow out of sync with economic andpoliticaltrends"
(Coontz 1992:257). This generic family crisis soon evolved into a collection of
very distinct problems. As Coontz (1997) points out in her sequel on contemporaryfamilies, "kids who've had too much luxury and indulgence [sometimes]
act like kids who've had too little, but both the reasons and the treatments... are
quite distinct"(p. 8). The fact that both are "family"problems, however, leads
some to perceive a uniform family crisis. More specific analyses of family life
and economy are crucialto deconstructingthese conceptions.
DOMESTIC ECONOMIES
Studies of contemporarydomestic economies illustratethe value of the family in
a variety of places and economic circumstances. Most of these studies can be
grouped into four categories: (a) the family farm; (b) households and development; (c) the family business; and (d) working-classfamilies. In the following
two sections, I discuss a few works in each category to illustrate their distinct
contributionsto an appreciationof the economic and culturalvalue of the family.
336
CREED
FamilyFarmsand Development
The concept of the family farm,with the emotions it evokes and the policies it has
provoked,constitutesdefinitiveproof of the relationshipbetween family culture
and economy. Why does the family farm merit protectionwhen so many other
small enterprisesof all stripes have been gobbled up or put out of business by
capitalistbehemoths?The small farmgains contemporaryresonancefrom its culturalassociationwith the family and the assumptionthat agricultureis somehow
the appropriatecustodianof such traditions. One of the most detailed recent efforts to documentthe economics of the phenomenonis Barlett's(1993) study of
Dodge County,Georgia. Hermajorcontributionis to disaggregatethe categoryand
show significantvariationon the basis of threefactors: (a) the scale of operation,
(b) when operatorsbeganfarming,and(c) "managementstyle"(see Bennett 1982).
Barlettconcludesthatthe interactionof these variables,with an emphasison management style, accountsfor the ability of family farmsto surviverecurrentcrises
(especially the one that began in the 1970s). Cautiousmanagers,who generally
faredbetterthanambitiousones, valuedphysical work and preferredfamily labor
to hiredworkers. Thus, the more family orientedthe enterprise,the betterit fared,
albeit at the cost of significantself-exploitation.O'Hara(1998) makes it clear that
this exploitationweighs heavily on Irishwomen whose importantcontributionsto
family farmingare largely overlooked. The idealogical and culturalsignificance
of the family farm in Irelandestablishes a preserve for male dominance. Sick
(1999) uses the concept of the family farmto characterizecoffee growersin two
Costa Rican communities. Acknowledging that their experience has been more
positive thanthatof coffee farmerselsewhere, she sets out to documentthe factors
thatunderliethis achievement.Sick shows how income diversification,migration,
and education,which are often seen as the death knell of the family farm model,
can actually sustaina family enterprisein periods of difficulty.
It is revealing that Sick sees the farmersin her study as relatively successful,
because the concept of the family farm is usually reserved for more developed
societies, primarilythe United States, Canada,and parts of Europe. In less developed partsof the world, the relationshipbetween family and economy is more
often discussed in terms of "households,""development,"and "ecology." This
reflects differencesin scale and the differentialrole of subsistence,as well as the
fact that the families involved often do not conform to the discrete nuclearindependentunits of family farm fame (Blackwood 1997:282). The populist version
of this approachis articulatedby Netting (1993). He maintainsthat in situations
wherepeople areplentifulandlandis scarce,small-holdingintensiveagricultureis
more effective thanindustrialfarmingand thatthe householdis the most efficient
unit for small-holding production.The household not only reproducesits own
workers,it also trainsthem in the special skills and ecological knowledgeneeded
for carefulhusbandry.Householdlaboris superiorto hiredworkersfor the skilled,
unsupervisedwork of intensive cultivation,and children can contributeas well.
Householdsalso enjoy lower transactioncosts andprovidegreaterincentivesthan
alternativeproductionunits such as the collective or firm.
FAMILY
VALUES
337
Wilk apparentlylearnedthis lesson and has become a strongand prolific proponent of a householdfocus in economic research. In his work among the Kekchi
Maya of Belize (Wilk 1991), he uses insights of ecological and economic anthropology, specifically a focus on choice, strategy,and decision making, to redress
the limitationsof evolutionarythinking. He wants to show thatdomestic arrangements are always finely tuned to local factors. This local "niche"includes spatial
andtemporalpatternsof access to markets,populationpressureon landresources,
ecological variation,and the social organizationof productivelaborin agriculture
(Wilk 1991:9). Througha contrastof three villages, he shows that expandedproductionfor consumptionandthe marketleads to the emergenceof the householdas
the maincooperativeworkgroupanda greaterrole for householdclusters(formed
when marriedchildrensettle neartheirparentsand continueto cooperate). These
discoveries would provide strongersupportfor his emphasis on local factors if
he had incorporatedvillagers' expresseddislike of three-generationfamilies more
centrally.This minorslight reachesmajorproportionsin the innovativeanalysisof
the domestic economy and its relationshipto economic developmentin Colombia
by Gudeman& Rivera (1990). They claim "the house is the principalgrouping
for carryingout the practices of livelihood" (1990:1), but in the "conversations"
they relate, the issue of family or kinshipis hardlybroached.
Hakansson(1994) suggests that much of the literatureon African gender and
developmenthas madea similarmistake. Despite anextensiveliteratureon African
households (Mackintosh1989, Haswell & Hunt 1991, Guyer 1981, Moock 1986,
Vaughan1985), he believes political-economic factors have eclipsed the role of
kinship and marriage systems. Across Africa, elopement and informal unions
have replacedtraditionalmarriages,leading to an increase in households headed
by women with diminishedaccess to subsistenceandincome (Kilbride& Kilbride
1990, Vaughan1983:277). The causes include land scarcity,marketdependency,
andlabormigrations,but Hakansson(1994) suggests these forces aremediatedby
culturally specific kinship and marriageideas to produce differentfamily forms
with differentconsequencesfor women. To makethis point, he contraststhe Gusii
of western Kenya with the Luyia. Luyia women have secure rights as daughters,
so women endangeredby the dissolution of informalunions can call on parents
and brotherswho incorporatethem or theirchildreninto extendedfamilies. Gusii
women are"detachable,"with theirconnectionto natalfamilies based on theirrole
as wives, so if their marriagesdissolve they lose claims on their natal family and
have to supportthemselves.
Blackwood (1997) shows how kinship relations can also shape the outcome
of economic development. The green revolutiontransformedthe Minangkabau
villagers she studied from subsistence farmersto marketproducersand opened
up the possibility for wage labor. Most families, however, preferredthe kin relations of sharecroppingto the capitalist relations of wage labor. Sharecropping
contractswere usually establishedbetween kin, and unrelatedpartiesactuallybecame kin through the arrangement. Kinship obligations prevented elites from
freely dismissing clients whereas the ability to tap clients for other labor made
the arrangementattractiveto owners as well. In short, the role of kinship kept
338
CREED
sharecroppingcentral (cf Emigh 1998, Kertzer1984, Shaffer 1982). The result
was not a lack of developmentbut rathera culturallyspecific variantthat mitigated capitalistindividualismandproletarianization(Blackwood 1997:291). This
replicatesHarmsworth's(1991) view of kinshiprelationsin tobaccoproductionin
Uganda,but both requiremore attentionto the inequalitybetween kin.
The issue of inequalitybrings us directly into the resilient differentiationdebate. This debate was central to the original anthropologicalinterest in peasant
householdsand has been with householdand family studiesever since. It is especially robustin the literatureon Africa (Guyer 1981:109-14). We need not engage
it here because both sides of the debate accept that the family may be crucial to
economic outcomes. Those who follow Chyanovemphasizethe cyclical natureof
economic fortunesas a result of changinghouseholdcomposition,whereasthose
who see differentiationsometimes attributeit to particularfamily or household
constellationsthatallow membersto consolidateresourcesin particulareconomic
circumstances.Toulmin(1992:277), for example,points out thatBambarahouseholds with sufficient labor during the groundnutboom of the 1950s and 1960s,
were able to accumulateenough wealth to give them a permanenteconomic advantage. Of course, the questionof differentiationneed not have the same answer
in all cases of capitalistdevelopment.
FamilyBusinessesand WorkingFamilies
Moving fromagrarianto industrialcontextsshifts the family focus butthe inequality remains. At the most advantagedend we find researchon elite families that
are multifacetedconcentrationsof financial, human, social, and culturalcapital
(McDonogh 1986, Marcus 1992, Lomnitz & Perez-Lizaur1987, Douglass 1992,
Hamabata1990). Douglass's (1992) analysisis uniquein thatit covers all the powerful families of Jamaica-21 families that live in the hills aroundKingston and
own the major manufacturing,financial, import/export,and tourism enterprises
(1992:1). She insists that it was the intense commitmentto family among these
groupsthatfacilitatedtheir economic supremacy(Douglass 1992:266-67). Lomnitz & Perez-Lizaur(1987) reacha similarconclusion aboutthe Gomez family in
Mexico, which is basically a business conglomeratewith hundredsof members
across a variety of class positions. The authors'original objective was to show
how membersof this "grandfamily"tappedfamily connectionsfor economic gain,
but they discoveredinsteadthatthese entrepreneurswastedvaluableresourcesand
made bad decisions to satisfy cravingsfor family sentiment. Hamabata's(1990)
account of several wealthy business families in Japancomes closer to showing
strategic manipulationof family connections, but not within the patrilinealenterprisefamily. Instead,relationshipsbetween owners' wives throughtheir natal
families establishedessential networksbetween industries.These studiesdemonstratethe economic value of family commitments,but they often give too little
attentionto how economic success over time can reinforceand even createfamily
sentiments.
FAMILY
VALUES
339
Kondo (1990) explores this relationshipin smallerJapanesefamily businesses.

She distinguishesie, the family as weight of history and obligation,from uchi, the
family as a centerof emotionalattachment.Togetherthey "createa symbolicwhole
with tremendouspower"(Kondo1990:153). Ratherthana kinshipgroup,however,
the ie is best understood as a corporate group holding property in perpetuity.
Although recruitmentto the ie is based on sets of priorities that privilege kin,
continuityof the ie takesprecedenceover kin, anda blood relativecould be passed
over for an unrelatedperson with more competenceat the family trade,assuming
the enterprisewas promisingenough to attractsuch a person. Her accountof one
young man's dilemmain decidingbetween his desiredcareeras an artteacherand
takingover the falteringfamily shoe business, which would likely defaultwithout
him, illustratedhow the family enterprisewas interwoven with the ie and how
perpetuityof both was a strongforce in his sense of self.
Kondo offers an explanationof the currentarrangementgroundedin the early
history of Japanesecapitalism,but studies of small family enterpriseselsewhere
tracetheirsignificanceto morerecentglobal transformationsof capitalism(andsocialism). This model suggests that small, family-basedenterprises(sometimes in
combinationwith othereconomic activities)are a productof global economic difficulties afterthe 1960s, reflectedin oil shocks, recurrentrecessions, andgenerally
slow growth. Capitalistsrespondedby seeking cheaper labor aroundthe world,
shuckingoff many of the expenses they had acquiredin post-warexpansionsand
Fordistcompromises with workers,and institutingproductivearrangementsthat
could respond quickly to changing marketconditions. The new strategy,often
referredto as flexible accumulation(Harvey 1989), dependedon fragmentedproductionunits, dispersedto the cheapestlocation, utilizing existing social arrangements thatcould be easily abandonedwith little cost. Families fit the bill perfectly
andhad the addedbenefit of a preexistinghierarchicalorganizationby genderand
generationbuttressedby emotionalculturalattachments,all of which insuredinternal efficiency and self-exploitation. In a sense, this representsa returnto elements
of the proto-industrialfamily economy (Medick 1981) revivedby deindustrialization. It also requireda shift in capitalist strategiestowardmore accommodation
of local culturalpractices (Rothstein& Blim 1992), which in turnproducednew
variantsof capitalism(Blim 1997). Thus, capitalistdiversityis partiallya product
of the culturallydistinctivefamily contexts that late capitalismembraced.
Blim (1990) detailsthe efficiencyof such smallfamily enterprisesin centraland
northeastItaly. These small businesses were centralto Italianeconomic development and succeeded throughself-exploitation,minute specialization,sharedrisk,
and flexibility. They were limited, however,by the same family commitmentsthat
accountedfor their success. They avoided aggrandizementbecause the risks endangeredthe household's well-being, and they redistributedprofitsfirstto family
needs insteadof expansion. Greenhalgh(1994:751) assertsthatTaiwan'searlyeconomic miracle "bothfostered and was fostered by Taiwanesefamily enterprises."
Family memberswere importantnot only for direct laborand administration,but
also for deployment in various networks importantfor recruitinglabor, capital,
340
CREED
and information. Among furniture-producinghouseholds in Cuanajo, Mexico,

Acheson (1996) found that"thehouseholdandbusiness are so closely intertwined
thatit is difficultto distinguishbetween the two" (1996:334). Living and working
quartersoverlap, and family members switch regularlybetween house and shop
tasks. He tracesdifferentialsuccess amongenterprisesto householdvariablessuch
as composition,degree of consensus, and budgetingpractices.
Ironically,the capitalistvalue of domestic productionis clearestin the case of
socialist China, where the model has been a centerpieceof the reforms credited
with unprecedentedeconomic growth. According to Bruun (1993), the explosion of family businessesdevelopedfrom two opposite motivations:Some people
were forced into such activity by unemployment,whereas others were attracted
to it by the possibility of profit. Farquhar(1994) discusses how these reforms
transformedthe ruraltown where she workedas storefrontfamily shops sprangup
to provideeverythingfrom noodles and tobacco to funeralgoods and medical services (1994:240). She notes thatthe Chinesewordfor suchentrepreneurialactivity
literally translatesas "one-body-household."She is primarilyinterestedin how
entrepreneurialdoctors attractpatientsthroughefforts to embody their medicine
in ways that are antitheticalto state institutionalapproaches,and she maintains
thattheirabilityto do so lies partiallyin "thefact thatthey workwith theirfamilies
and for family welfare"(Farquhar1994:242). Whyte (1996) has questionedthe
role of entrepreneurialfamilism as the "engine"of Chinese development,but he
still acknowledgesthatit has played a partin economic improvements.
A final example complementsthe pictureof Chinese family businesses by following their significanceoutside China. Workingwith immigrantHakkaChinese
tannersin Calcutta,Oxfeld (1993) shows how their statusas a politically insecure
minorityandtheircommitmentto a seemingly nonnegotiablefamily development
cycle shaped their entrepreneurialstrategies. She develops the idea of "family
process"to includeboth the unfoldingof family structureandthe manipulationof
its possibilities. She is wrestlingwith the dilemmaof structureand agency that is
centralto the culture-economydialectic. How can we simultaneouslyrecognize
that people manipulatefamily relations and arrangementswithout denying the
apparentculturalpower of family ideas and commitments? The cases reviewed
here may suggest part of an answer. What if family commitmentsare based on
the recognitionof alternatives?Given the diversityof family arrangementswithin
societies, the possibility of naturalizationseems limited (cf Harris1981). Perhaps
ideal familyarrangements,althoughoverlappingwith ideasof sexualityandgender
thatare thoroughlynaturalized,acquireculturalmeaningprecisely as preferential
practicesamongalternatives.These preferencescertainlyacquiremeaningin connectionto group/classidentityandmorality,butthe fact thatthey are"preferential"
rendersmanipulationculturallyacceptable,at least untilvariationreachesthe point
of threateningtheir statusas preferences.
This brings us back to the United States and to Stacey's (1991) analysis of
working-class families in the Silicon Valley. In a path-breakingbook that became a lightningrod in the family values debate, she focuses on two families to
FAMILY
VALUES
341
show just how diverse family arrangementsare becoming. According to her, the
modem family includedthe seeds of its own destruction:the dependenceon love
and affection. That idea logically requiredthe outlet of divorce when affection
waned, and divorce proved to be the Achilles' heel of the modem family when
the women's movement and economic changes reorientedmaritalrelations and
expectations(Stacey 1991:9). Subsequentremarriage,however,turnedout to be
the creativemechanismof the post-moder family, generatingall sorts of innovative family relationships(Stacey 1991:254). Contraryto its image as a bastion of
family conservatism,the workingclass pioneeredthese changes.
Stacey focuses on a wide arrayof social relations from romance to religion.
Other economic studies of working-class families focus more attention on the
workplace (Lamphere 1987, Lamphereet al 1993, Wolf 1992, Zavella 1987).
Here we find the recurrentinterestin how women manage the multiple demands
of family andwork,andhow theirincreasinginvolvementin wage laborandgreater
contributionto the family's cash economy influencegenderideology and practice
within the family. Some suggest that work allows women to challenge family
patriarchy,otherssee it as only a temporaryrespitefrom such oppression,and still
othersemphasizethe patriarchyof the workplaceitself (cf Salaff 1981, Kim 1997).
Takentogether,they verify a complex interactionbetween family and work, often
with ambiguousresults.
Lamphere(1987) has noted women's use of the family to humanizethe workplace by holdingbaby showersandshowingfamilyphotographs.In othercontexts,
however,owners and managersare the ones who bring the family to the work site
to increase exploitation. By modeling factory relations on a family idiom and
equating the workplace with the family, owners tap into such family values as
cooperationand industriousnessto increase productionand minimize resistance.
Still, the metaphorcannotbe sustainedwithoutsome supportfromfactoryowners.
Kondo (1990) recounts the efforts of Japaneseowners to imparta family feeling
to their enterprisesthrougha varietyof practices,including companyoutings and
involvement in importantpersonal events of employees, such as weddings and
birthdays. These efforts are driven by profit motives, but for the owners these
economic ties "arefar more than merely contractual,entailing... strongbonds of
loyalty,gratitude,andcommitment"(Kondo1990:198). She thenshowshow workers turnthe family idiom to theirown advantage,using it to build group solidarity
within enterprisesand to criticize owners for failing to fulfill familial obligations.
Cairoli (1998) has a differentassessment of the "factoryas family" model in
the garmentindustryin Morocco. She sees little gain in termsof laborconditions
and acknowledgesthatthe model renderedwomen more amenableto exploitation.
But she still sees the model as a workers'productwith otherbenefits. Contraryto
the rationalizationsoffered by exploitativefactory owners, these women's wages
are essential to their family economies. However,theirjobs violate gender codes
thatvalue women primarilyfor theirfamily/domesticroles. In an effortto simulate
this culturalideal, they remakethe factoryinto a privatespace like home andrecast
staff as family. There is certainlyno liberationhere, but the resultingpatriarchal
342
CREED
family factorymakesit possible for lower-classwomen to adhereto culturalideals

thatotherwisethreatento furtherdemeanthem. Ruralimmigrantwomen in Istanbul resortto home and informalworkfor the same reason-it allows them to deny
thatthey actuallywork(White 1994). Home workalso allows economically secure
Dominicanwomen in New Yorkto leave the workforceto symbolize theirhouseholds' socio-economic mobility while still contributingto it economically (Pessar
1994). In these cases, the family becomes a site of industrialproductionbut not a
family enterprise. The invisibility of these arrangementsoften facilitates greater
exploitation,includingchild labor(Beneria& Roldan1987). At the otherextreme,
working at home (as opposed to home working) allows careerwomen (and even
men) to fulfill family commitmentssuch as child rearingwithoutbeing definedas
a housewife (or househusband)in places where such a categoryis devalued.
THE NEW VALUEOF OLD VALUES

From the diverse examples of domestic economies reviewedhere, one fact seems
clear: Contemporaryeconomic developments are not eroding the value of the
family; rather,in many places, the family seems to be of increasing economic
significance (Wheelock & Mariussen 1997). I have suggested that the rise of
small family businesses has to do with the advent of a flexible global economy,
and home work is probablyeven more attractivefor the same reasons (Boris &
Priigl 1996). In many places these small family enterprisesare part of a diverse
economic strategy. Multinationalcorporationsare often attractedto such places
expresslybecause subsistenceproductionand othereconomic activitieslower the
level of wages requiredto reproducethe laborforce. Workersmust then combine
formalwage laborwith cash-cropping,subsistenceproduction,and variousinformal activities. Sick (1999) finds the same situationamong commercial farmers
vulnerableto the worldmarket:"Formanyfarminghouseholds,a diversifiedstrategy involving a combinationof farming,wage-labor,craft production,migration
and formalsector employment(when possible) has become the norm"(1999:17).
Such arrangementscan be found throughoutLatin America and the Caribbean
(Buechler & Buechler 1992, Deere 1990, Rothstein 1999, Safa 1995, Tice 1995,
Weismantel1995) as well as in Asia (Blackwood 1997, Bruun 1993, Wolf 1992),
the Middle East (Singerman 1995, White 1994), Africa (Ellis 1998, Haswell &
Hunt 1991, Moock 1986), and North America (Barlett 1993). In other words,
the same capitalist economic forces that generate multiple income possibilities
make it necessary to tap them, not only to supplementlow wages but also as a
hedge againstthe uncertaintythataccompaniesflexibility (Nash 1994). This also
applies to the so-called transitioneconomies. In easternEurope,the importance
of householdproductionundersocialism was reproducedby transitiondifficulties
(Creed 1998), provoking some to see postcommunistdomestic economies as a
distinctive arena in a new variantof capitalism (Smith 2000). In China during
the crucial early years of the reform, Bruun (1993) believes families pursueda
FAMILY
VALUES
343
"dual flow" strategyin which some members continued to tap the prestige and
securityof the state sector while otherspursuedthe materialwealth of privateenterprise.The point here is thatdiverseglobal economic forces in the 1990s-from
capitalist flexibility to socialist transition-make the family as a space of interaction more importantthan ever. The new informationage may have challenged
patriarchalismwithin the family as Castells (1997) insists, but related capitalist
dynamicshave made the family,reformedor not, more economically essential for
many people. They need multiple incomes, from multiple sources, with multiple
fallbackpositions; the family providesthis synthesis.
The new value of the family is clearly reflected in family research. A prior
fascinationwith the household division of labor has given way to a focus on the
articulationof income streams.This has been accompaniedby a decline in attention to inheritance. Earlieranthropologicaland historicalresearchon the family
focused on inheritanceas the centralfactorshapinghouseholdforms andrelations.
To the degree that family farms or enterprisesare among the multiple sources of
income families rely on, inheritancewill still be important,but the diversityof income sourcesdiminishesits centrality.Even in family enterprises,new economic
considerationshave made managementskills and business acumenperhapsmore
valuable. Thus, Greenhalgh(1994:750) notes an increasedimportanceof acquired
over inheritedpropertyfor the family/firmheads in Taiwan. In more marginalregions, one might querythe very benefitof inheritinga family enterprisewhen part
of its value to a flexible global economy is its expendability.
The declining importanceof inheritancein family studies has been balanced
by increasing attentionto migration. Migrationhas long been a centralconcern
in both the anthropologyand history of the family, but its role has shifted in
the context of globalization. Historiansoften see migrationas the unhappydestination of family members who could not be supportedwith family resources.
Anthropologiststraditionallyfocus on how migrantfamilies adapt to their new
environment,or how the departureof individuals,usually men, shapes the structure of the families left behind (Brettell 1988, Gailey 1992). Increasingly,however, migration of family members is seen as a way to maintain a family or
family enterprise. Pessar (1982) argues that Dominicans migrate to the United
States precisely to sustain their island family economies with remittances.Remittances are not new, but her research suggests that those who send money
and those who receive it are involved in a more collective family endeavorthan
in the past, enhanced by richer and more frequent interaction.Thus, Harrison
(1997) suggests that structuraladjustmentpolicies in Jamaicahave reduced the
extended family by encouragingmigration,but that relations with migrantsare
now centralto these families, creatingfamilies that are in some ways more complex than their predecessors. Ho (1993) capturesthis complexity with the concept of "internationalfamilies"among Afro-Trinidadianimmigrantsin the United
States. They maintainintense relations, including child-minding,with relatives
back home throughregulartraveland telephoning.It is probablynot coincidental
thatthese revelationscome from a migrationstreamthat is predominantlyfemale
344
CREED
(Ho 1993:33),reinforcingand/orreflectingthefeminizationof kinship(di Leonardo

1987, Gillis 1996:80, Stacey 1991:267). But it is not only women creatingthis
phenomenon. Oxfeld (1993) concludes her study of Chinese tannersin Calcutta
with analysis of their migrationto Torontoas an effort to diversify the family
economy.
The complex combinationsnow needed for economic securityaccountfor the
increasingdifficultymany families aroundthe world have in sustainingthese arrangementsandtheproblemsthatresult. This is especiallyevidentin the increasing
global phenomenonof female-headedhouseholds (Mencher& Okongwu 1993,
Fitchen 1995, Mullings 1997, Br0gger & Gilmore 1997, Susser 1993, Kilbride
& Kilbride 1990). These arrangementshave become a focal point for the family
values discourseeven thoughmost of the people in these families sharethe domestic ideas of the largersociety and may even be more committedto them (Coontz
1992:232-54). The escalatingrhetoricreflectsnot a crisis of values but ratherthe
new value of particularfamily arrangementsin an economic context where multiple incomes are needed to supportchildrenand/oraging parents,and where the
state is less willing to help. Single-parentfamilies constitutea "crisis"precisely
because the family has become more importantas a space of economic interaction
and integration,not to mention marketdemand. Still, the diversity of economic
niches under flexible capitalism assures that no single family arrangementcan
answer the call for socio-economic coordinationacross a society, guaranteeing
varietyand perhapsanxiety (Stacey 1991).
There are also historical explanationsfor why the currentdiversity is interpretedas a crisis of values in the West. An extremediversityof family forms and
arrangementsis certainto limit the developmentof a rigid family notion common
to a whole society or group. Given that the family, despite being flexible, is not
a quick-responseunit, culturaluniformityis unlikely to develop from short-term
adjustments.In Anderson's(1985) work on Britain,however,we see a long-term
trendtowardincreasinguniformitythatmay be applicablemorebroadly.Overthe
past century,there was a significantincrease in the uniformityof the life cycle.
This uniformitycombined with economic developmentsto producesimilar family units, relations, and experiences. I believe this broad similaritytransformed
everydaypracticeinto culture,which then became a standardto criticize nonconformists, as well as subsequentchanges. As several of the cases reviewed here
suggest, this process usually occursvia class emulation.Economic improvements
allow lower-class families to aspire to the cultural and material advantagesof
upper/middle-classforms. This achievementincreases the similarityof family
arrangementsand strengthensthe power of these models as culturalicons in the
society. This iconic statusthen providesthe basis for blaminglower classes when
economic shifts force them to abandonvalorizedfamily forms for new arrangements, even if they do so in defense of their families. Their mobility forges the
culturalweapon that is laterused againstthem.
If we turnto Borneman's(1992) work on nationalidentity in the two Germanies, we see anotherdimensionof significance. He suggeststhatthe state-through
FAMILY
VALUES
345
policies and laws pertainingto marriage,taxation,and other state prerogativesproduces a single master narrativeof the life course. The extent to which one's
life experiencecorrespondsto thatscenarioaffects one's sense of belonging to the
state, which provides the basis of national identity. Combined with Anderson's
insight, we can see how this might have contributedto the growthof nationalism
since the nineteenthcentury. The increasing uniformityof the life cycle within
societies made it possible for state policies to resonate more closely with large
portions of populations, engenderinga sense of belonging across otherwise diverse populations. The increasinginvestmentof states in the nationalidea then
increasedthe political andculturalsignificanceof the uniformfamily arrangements
that underlaynationalistidentifications. Deviations from these models could be
interpretedas threatsto nationalprojectsand their associatedvalues.
Many of these factors came together in the 1950s in the United States. Althoughneverpredominant,the male-breadwinnerfamily model did become more
common (Coontz 1992, Stacey 1996). The increaseduniformityof family form
across the society combined with an increasedsense of nationalpride associated
with victory in World War II. All of this was cemented by the growing role of
television and the representationof ideal family forms among the Cleavers and
the Nelsons. It was duringthis period that family form enteredthe culture. The
subsequentdiversificationof families seemed to threatenthis aspect of American
culture. This interpretationis heightenedby the fact that the economic changes
reshapingfamilies are also furtherseparatingthe populationby class, race, and
ethnicity so that the diversificationof families is occurringat a time when national identityis threatenedon otherfronts. These divisions have not been muted
by the economic recovery of the 1990s, which has, in some ways, widened the
gulf between a growing numberof beneficiariesand those who are still left out.
Simultaneously,the increasingrole of culturalmediationhas transformedearlier
images of the Nelsons and Cleavers,along with such multi-culturalsuccessors as
the Huxtables,into hyperreality.In other words, in our sharedconcept of family,
these fictionalizedideals andcomposites have become more real thanrealityitself
(Lemert 1997:30-31), exacerbatingthe sense of dysfunction. The collective anxiety createdby these developmentsmakes the family a focus of popularconcern
ripe for political posturing.
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FAMILY

The objectiveof this review was not to synthesizethe expansiveliteratureon family
economies butratherto illustratethe value of the family in variouseconomic activities and to suggest thatthis economic value both benefits from and contributesto
political and culturalvalue as well. This combinationalso generatesanthropological value for the family as a site for researchon varioustopics. Having advocated
such a focus, I conclude with some importantcautions. A common fatal flaw of
family studies noted by both practitionersand critics (Hart 1992, Wilk 1989b) is
346
CREED
the tendency to reify the unit, to treatit as an entity or "blackbox" ratherthan a

collection of people andrelationships.In this view, the householdbecomes an actor itself; the social relationsthatactuallyconstituteit disappearand conflicts and
divisions withinthe family areeclipsed. This is especially problematicin termsof
genderbecauseinequalitiesbetweenmen andwomen areusuallyelementalto family cultures(Dwyer & Bruce 1988, althoughsee Hamilton 1988 for an important
exception). The same charge can be made on the basis of generationaldifferences. Neither is inevitable, however, and many of the family studies reviewed
here actually focus on conflict. Much of Sabean's (1990) account of families
in Neckarhausen,for example, concerns the conflicts, disputes, and negotiations
between generationsand spouses.
These differences often overlap with economic inequalitybetween members.
Deere (1990) points out that the common multiple-livelihoodstrategydescribed
above actually introducedmultiple class positions into the household, with attendant conflict. White (1994:4) says we must see power relations within the
commodity-producingfamily as simultaneouslykin relationsof solidarityandcapitalist relationsof exploitation(see also Brass 1986). This interactionis clear in
Schrauwers'(1999) examinationof adoptionpracticesin centralSulawesi. There,
fragmentationof landholdingsand increasing marketinvolvementincreased inequality among small-holdingrice farmers. In a culturalcontext where relationships arebasedas muchon nurturanceas on filiation,poorerparentshave difficulty
binding childrento them. Adoption is easy and usually reflects the movementof
childrenfrompoorerhouseholdsto wealthierones in need of cheap labor(see also
Weismantel 1995). Because kinship relations are culturallydefined as distinct
from any calculationof costs andbenefits,the adopteesarevulnerableto exploitation. This outcome is verified by some children'suse of the category "slave"to
characterizetheirposition in their adoptedhomes.
In China, 15%-20%of the family enterprisesBruun(1993:52, 59) interviewed
hadincorporateddistantrelativesor strangersas full family members. Blim (1990)
suggests thatthis strategyaccountsfor the success of Italianhouseholdindustries,
which pickedup vulnerablelaborersfromamongin-lawsto supplementthe elderly
and young who provided much of the enterprises'"flexibility."Stephen (1991)
claims thatthe Zapotecideology of equalityamong kin maskedincreasingdifferentiationamong women who used kinshipties to mobilize resourcesin a context
of increasingcommercialization.These relationsare hardlynovel: The historyof
capitalismis repletewith examplesof family exploitation.Rebel's (1983) description of the manorialsystemin sixteenth-centuryAustriashows how rationalization
efforts divided the peasanthouse into two classes: an advantagedone consisting
of the head, his parents, and his heir, and a disadvantagedone made up of the
noninheritingchildren,servants,and lodgers.
Greenhalgh(1994) has criticized the concept of "family firm"for obscuring
these relationsin Taiwan.She suggests it reproducesan orientalistdiscoursebased
on Confuciancollectivism, which hides the fact thatfamily firmsarebased instead
on gender and other inequalities. As previously noted, O'Hara (1998) lodges a
similar complaint against the concept of the family farm in Ireland.Many more
FAMILY
VALUES
347
critics have associatedthis violation with the concept of "family/householdstrategy" (see especially Wolf 1992). Feminists have suggested that so-called household strategiesareoftenjust the interestsof the dominantmale imposed on the rest
of the household members (Folbre 1988:248). To see the outcome as a strategy
not only misrepresentsthe result, it also ignores the struggleinvolved in the process (Schmink 1984). These problemsare compoundedby the rationaleconomic
motives often assumedto drive "strategic"behavior.
I accept these criticisms but do not think they are terminal. First, the fact that
there is debate and conflict within a family does not precludeseeing the outcome
as a strategy,unless one has an unduly romanticview of the term. "Decisions
emergefromhouseholdsthroughnegotiation,disagreement,conflict, andbargaining" (Netting et al 1984b:xxii). If the outcomes were not in some ways mutual
products,then there would not be so much conflict. This is nicely illustratedby
Brettell's (1991) historicaldiscussion of propertytransmissionin Portugal,where
the differentialinterestsof family membersprovidedoccasions for renegotiating
social relations. Of course, we must attendto inequitiesin the negotiationprocess.
Even when the outcome is not a completely collective product, however, family membersmake individualdecisions on the basis of the collective resourcesor
possibilitieswithinthe family. In otherwords,the degreeto which familyconsiderationsaffect individualdecisions aboutactivitiesandlivelihood makesthe concept
of strategymore appropriatethancritics suggest, albeit a strategyby default.
Obviously, these particularjustifications do not always apply, so the idea of
strategymust be viewed as a socio-culturalvariable. Lamphere(1986) noted that
Portugueseimmigrantworkersin New Englandhad a more corporatistnotion of
family than their Colombian counterparts. Sick (1999) found that women who
broughtland into Costa Rican family farmshad more say in householddecisions.
Such differencesaffect the applicabilityof the strategyidea. It is no coincidence,
then, thatthe termis encounteredmost often in studiesof poorfamilies, sometimes
qualifiedby "survival"(Selby et al 1990). As Singerman(1995:50) notes, "Cooperation,trust,and mutualdependencemake sense in a context where financial
scarcity, political exclusion and incomplete informationare everyday realities."
Hart (1986:164) discovered that landless households in rural Java exhibited a
greaterdegree of coordinationand interdependenceamong family membersthan
households with more control over the means of production. The role of economic difficultyalso implies thatstrategiesmay be more likely at some times than
at othersbecause economic fortunesshift. Toulmin(1992) believes the groundnut
boom of the 1950s and 1960s in Mali led to more individualisticlabor activities,
whereas the periods before and after were characterizedby pooling of labor and
collective activity within households. In addition, strategicbehaviormight vary
over the family developmentalcycle because the interestsof differentgenerations
and genders may be more simpaticoat some points than at others.
Certainly,technological and economic changes associated with globalization
have affectedthe possibilities for family strategies.The increasingease with which
people and money move aroundthe world, combined with the increasingease of
communication,havemademigrationmoreof a family strategy.Intenseinteraction
348
CREED
facilitatesreal-timenegotiationbetween members,reproducestheir mutualinterests, andsustainstheircollective identity(Baschet al 1994, Ho 1993, Pessar 1982).

This may be even more likely if migrantsare discriminatedagainst in new locations, andindeed,it seems thatthe conceptof strategyis generallymore applicable
when families are undera perceivedthreatfrom the outside. Accordingto Bruun
(1993:55), the constantthreatof state bureaucraticinterferencein privatefamily
businesses in China made it easier to manage family conflicts. This would apply
as well to East Europeansocialism (Kideckel 1993, Rev 1987). In Africa, Heald
(1991) found thatKuriacattleherdersplaced greateremphasison mutualinterests
and cooperationwithin the family than the Teso partly because of the threatof
cattle raiding. Threatsmay also account for the utility that Oxfeld finds in the
term strategybecause it is clear that the CalcuttaChinese feel threatenedin their
position as a "pariahethnic group"(1993:27-28). Similarly,Pessar (1994:138)
says Dominican immigrantwomen in the United States put household interests
ahead of individual ones in an attemptto challenge the negative stereotypes of
Dominicans held by the majorityculture. Of course, marginalitycan also diversify family interestsand createconflict, as Kibria(1993) finds among Vietnamese
Americans. Family unity is not the inevitableresultof externalpressures,but it is
one possibility,as Oxfeld (1993) and Pessar (1994) demonstrate.
Pessar'sanalysis suggests thatthe refusalof the conceptof strategyto highlight
women's agency may have the opposite effect because women may opt for a collective domestic strategy. The Dominican women she interviewedrecognized a
choice betweenhouseholdversusindividualinterests,andtheirselection of the former "wasnot a resignedor passive one foisted upon themby traditionalhusbands.
Rather,these women saw themselves as strugglingon anotherfront... confronting
the distortedand denigratingculturalstereotypesof the majorityculture"(Pessar
1994:138). In some cases a household strategy may representwomen's initiative. Brusco (1995) arguesthat Colombianwomen convertedto Protestantismin
a strategiceffort to converttheirhusbandsto its ascetic regime, which prohibited
drinking, gambling, and womanizing. The money that was saved benefited the
household as a whole. To see these efforts as women's resistanceratherthan as a
household strategyis to diminishwomen's influencein the family a priori.
A final caveat can only be acknowledgedby way of conclusion: We cannot
fully understanddomestic economies without situatingthem within larger contexts of communities and states. Critics of the family values discourse in the
United States suggest that it is largely a response to a crisis in community and
collective responsibilities(Coontz 1992, Stacey 1996). Families have taken on
all the emotionaland materialresponsibilitiespreviouslysharedbetweenfamilies,
so it is little wonderthatthey are beleaguered,especially in economic hardtimes
when communityrelationsaremost needed. In manyplaces over the pastdecades,
the family has become the sole real community,supplementedonly by imagined
and virtualones. Imaginedcommunitiesof nationand ethnic groupmay actually
enhancethe centralityof the family in thatthey rest upon essentializednotions of
relatednessthroughblood thatreinforcerigid notions of the family (Connor1993)
FAMILY
VALUES
349
andhighlightits role as the productionsite of new nationals(Huseby-Darvas1996,

Lampland1994, Verdery1994).
The imaginednationis often manifestin a real state. In nearlyall the examples
of family researchdiscussed in this review, the options availableto families and
households were shaped as much by state actions as by economic factors, albeit
often in service to capitalistforces. In many of the cases, the economic changes
that influence families are themselves state productions, such as development
projects(Blackwood 1997) or reformprograms(Davis & Harrell1993), although
sometimesforcedon the stateby internationalforces (Bolles 1996, Harrison1997).
Some family economies, from the family farm (Barlett 1993, Sick 1999) to the
single-parentfamily (Mullings 1997, Fitchen 1995), are actually sustained, if
barely, by state support. In other cases, the state attemptsto shape the family
directly in ways that are more conducive to economic development(Salaff 1988,
Ong 1990) or to administrationand taxation (Rebel 1983, Sabean 1990). The
applicability of the strategy concept is also mediated by the state because the
bargainingpowerof individualswithinthe family (especially women andchildren)
is shapedby the formallegal rightsthey can assertand the state's likely response
(Sabean1990). In sum, the state'spervasiveengagementwith the familyis perhaps
the definitive evidence of its value. Culturalcommitmentsto particularfamily
ideas can provide a basis for resistance to state and economic forces, but they
also renderactivity championedby politicians and advertisersin the name of the
family beyond reproach. This power is why politicians and corporationscannot
get enough of "the family" and why anthropologistsneed to pay attentionto it,
even if we cannotdefine it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am gratefulto ErinMartineaufor extensivebibliographicassistanceandeditorial
advice.
Visit the Annual Reviewshome page at www.AnnualReviews.org
LITERATURE
CITED
AchesonJ. 1996.Householdorganization
and
in a Purepecha
budgetstructures
pueblo.Am.
Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and

DeterritorializedNation-States.Langhome,
Ethnol. 23:331-51
PA:Gordon& Breach
AndersonM. 1985.Theemergenceof themod- BenderDR. 1967.A refinement
of theconcept
em life cyclein Britain.Soc.Hist. 10:69-87
of household:families,co-residence,and
BarlettPF. 1993. AmericanDreams, RuralRedomesticfunctions.Am.Anthropol.
69:493alities: FamilyFarms in Crisis. ChapelHill:
504
Univ.N. CarolinaPress
BeneriaL, RoldanM. 1987. The Crossroads
Basch LG, Glick-SchillerN, SzantonBlanc
of Class and Gender: IndustrialHomework,
C. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational
Subcontracting and Household Dynamics
350
CREED
in Mexico City. Chicago: Univ. Chicago

Press
BennettJW. 1982. Of Timeand the Enterprise:
North American Family Farm Management
in a Contextof Resource Marginality.Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press
Blackwood E. 1997. Women, land, and labor:
negotiating clientage and kinship in a Minangkabau peasant community. Ethnology
36:277-93
Blim ML. 1990. Made in Italy: Small-ScaleIndustrializationand its Consequences.New
York:Praeger
Blim ML. 1997. Can NOT-capitalismlie at the
end of history,oris capitalism'shistorydrawing to an end? Crit.Anthropol.17:351-64
Bolles AL. 1996. Sister Jamaica: A Study of
Women,Work,and Households in Kingston.
Lanham,MD: Univ. Press Am.
Boris E, Priigl E, eds. 1996. Homeworkersin
Global Perspective:InvisibleNo More.New
York:Routledge
Boreman J. 1992. Belonging in the Two
Berlins: Kin,State,Nation.New York:Cambridge Univ. Press
BrassT. 1986. The elementarystructuresof kinship: unfree relationsand the productionof
commodities.Soc. Anal. 20:56-68
Brettell CB. 1988. Emigrationand household
structurein a Portugueseparish, 1850-1920.
J. Fam. Hist. 13:33-57
BrettellCB. 1991. Kinshipand contract:property transmission and family relations in
northwest Portugal. Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.
33:443-65
Br0gger J, Gilmore DD. 1997. The matrifocal
family in Iberia: Spain and Portugal compared.Ethnology36:13-30
BruscoE. 1995. TheReformationof Machismo:
Evangelical Conversion and Gender in
Colombia.Austin: Univ. Texas Press
Bruun 0. 1993. Business and Bureaucracyin
a Chinese City: An Ethnography of Private Business Households in Contemporary
China. Berkeley,CA: Inst. East Asian Stud.
Buechler HC, Buechler J-M. 1992. Manufacturing Against the Odds: Small-Scale Pro-
ducers in an Andean City. Boulder, CO:

Westview
CairoliML. 1998. Factoryas home and family:
female workersin the Moroccangarmentindustry.Hum. Org. 57:181-89
CarstenJ. 1995. The substanceof kinship and
the heart of the hearth: feeding, personhood andrelatednessamongMalaysin Pulau
Langkawi.Am. Ethnol. 22:223-41
Casey J. 1989. TheHistoryof the Family.New
York:Blackwell
Cashin JE. 1991. A Family Venture:Men and
Womenon the SouthernFrontier.New York:
OxfordUniv. Press
Castells M. 1997. The Power of Identity.
Malden,MA: Blackwell
Cheal D. 1989. Strategiesof resourcemanagement in household economies: moral economy or political economy? See Wilk 1989a,
pp. 11-22
Cheal D. 1991. Familyand the State of Theory.
Toronto:Univ. TorontoPress
CollierJF. 1997. FromDuty to Desire: Remaking Families in a Spanish Village.Princeton,
NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press
ConnorW. 1993. Beyond reason: the natureof
the ethnonationalbond. Ethn. Racial Stud.
16:373-89
Coontz S. 1992. The Way We Never Were:
American Families and the Nostalgia Trap.
New York:Basic Books
Coontz S. 1997. The WayWeReallyAre: Coming to TermswithAmerica's ChangingFamilies. New York:Basic Books
Creed G. 1998. Domesticating Revolution:
FromSocialist Reformto AmbivalentTransition in a Bulgarian Village.UniversityPark:
Penn. State Univ. Press
CreightonC. 1996. The rise of the male breadwinner family: a reappraisal.Comp. Stud.
Soc. Hist. 38:310-37
Davidoff L, Hall C. 1987. Family Fortunes:
Menand Womenof theEnglishMiddleClass,
1780-1850. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
Davis D, HarrellS, eds. 1993. ChineseFamilies
in the Post-MaoEra. Berkeley: Univ. Calif.
Press
FAMILYVALUES
Deere CD. 1990. Household and Class Relations: Peasants and Landlordsin Northern
Peru. Berkeley,CA: Univ. Calif. Press
di LeonardoM. 1987. The female worldof cards
andholidays: women, families, andthe work
of kinship. Signs 12:440-53
Douglass L. 1992. The Power of Sentiment:
Love, Hierarchy and the Jamaican Family
Elite. Boulder,CO: Westview
DubenA, BeharC. 1991. IstanbulHouseholds:
Marriage, Family and Fertility,1880-1940.
New York:CambridgeUniv. Press
Dwyer DH, Bruce J, eds. 1988. A Home Divided: Women and Income in the Third
World.Stanford,CA: StanfordUniv. Press
Ellis F. 1998. Household strategies and rural
livelihood diversification.J. Dev. Stud.35:138
Emigh R. 1998. Land use and landlord control: sharecroppers'household structurein
15th centuryTuscany.J. Hist. Sociol. 11:3773
Faier E. 1997. Looking in/acting out: gender, modernity and the reproductionof the
Palestinianfamily.Polit.Leg.Anthropol.Rev.
20(2):1-15
FarquharJ. 1994. Marketmagic: getting rich
and getting personalin medicine after Mao.
Am. Ethnol. 23:239-57
Fitchen JM. 1995. The single-parent family,
child povertyand welfarereform.Hum. Org.
54:355-62
Folbre N. 1988. The black four of hearts: toward a new paradigm of household economics. See Dwyer & Bruce 1988, pp. 24862
FrykmanJ, Lofgren0. 1987. CultureBuilders:
A Historical Anthropologyof Middle-Class
Life. Transl.A Crozier.New Brunswick,NJ:
RutgersUniv. Press (From Swedish)
Galley CW. 1992. A good man is hardto find:
overseas migrationand the decenteredfamily in the Tongan Islands. Crit. Anthropol.
12:47-74
Galst L. 1998. Blood breaks a family. Village
Voice.June 2, pp. 43-44, 47
Gillis JR. 1996. A Worldof Their Own Mak-
351
ing: Myth, Ritual and the Questfor Family

Values.New York:Basic Books
Goody J. 1996. Comparingfamily systems in
Europeand Asia: Are there differentsets of
rules? Popul. Dev. Rev.22:1-20
GreenhalghS. 1994. Deorientalizingthe Chinese family firm.Am. Ethnol. 21:746-75
GreenhalghS, ed. 1995. SituatingFertility:Anthropologyand DemographicInquiry.New
York: CambridgeUniv. Press
GudemanS, RiveraA. 1990. Conversationsin
Colombia: The Domestic Economy in Life
and Text.New York:CambridgeUniv. Press
Guyer JI. 1981. Household and communityin
African studies. Afr. Stud. Rev. 24(2/3):87137
HajnalJ. 1965. Europeanmarriagepatternsin
perspective.InPopulationin History: Essays
in Historical Demography, ed. DV Glass,
DEC Eversley,pp. 101-43. Chicago: Aldine
Hakansson NT. 1994. The detachability of
women: gender and kinship in processes of
socioeconomic change among the Gusii of
Kenya.Am. Ethnol. 21:516-38
HamabataMM. 1990. CrestedKimono: Power
and Love in the Japanese Business Family.
Ithaca,NY: Corell Univ. Press
Hamilton S. 1998. The Two-HeadedHousehold: Gender and Rural Development in
the EcuadorianAndes. Pittsburgh,PA:Univ.
PittsburghPress
HarmsworthJ. 1991. The impactof the tobacco
industryon rural developmentand farming
systems in Arua, Uganda. See Haswell &
Hunt 1991, pp.173-202
HarrellS. 1997. HumanFamilies.Boulder,CO:
Westview
Harris0. 1981. Householdsas naturalunits. In
Of Marriageand the Market: Women'sSubordination in InternationalPerspective, ed.
K Young, C Wolkowitz, R McCullagh, pp.
49-68. London: CSE Books
HarrisonFV. 1997. The genderedpolitics and
violence of structuraladjustment.In Situated
Lives: Genderand Culturein EverydayLife,
ed. L Lamphere,H Ragone, P Zavella, pp.
451-68. New York:Routledge
352
CREED
Hart G. 1986. Power, Labor, and Livelihood:

Processes of Change in Rural Java. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
HartG. 1992. Imaginedunities: constructionof
"the household"in economic theory.In UnderstandingEconomicProcess, ed. S Ortiz,S
Lees, pp. 111-21. Lanham,MD: Univ. Press
Am.
Harvey D. 1989. The Conditionof Postmodernity: An Enquiryinto the Originsof Cultural
Change. Cambridge,MA: Blackwell
Haswell MR, HuntD, eds. 1991. RuralHouseholds in EmergingSocieties: Technologyand
Change in Sub-SaharanAfrica. New York:
Berg
Hayden C. 1995. Gender,genetics and generation: reformulatingbiology in lesbian kinship. Cult.Anthropol.10:41-63
Heald S. 1991. Tobacco, time and the household economy in two Kenyan societies: the
Teso and the Kuria. Comp.Stud. Soc. Hist.
33:130-57
Ho CGT. 1993. The internationalizationof kinship and the feminization of Caribbeanmigration: the case of Afro-Trinidadianimmigrantsin Los Angeles. Hum. Org. 52:32-40
Humphries J. 1990. Enclosures, common
rights, and women: the proletarianizationof
families in the late eighteenthandearly nineteenth centuries. J. Econ. Hist. 50:17-42
Huseby-DarvasEV. 1996. "Feminism,the murderer of mothers": the rise and fall of neonationalistreconstructionof gender in Hungary. In WomenOut of Place: The Gender
of Agency and the Race of Nationality, ed.
B Williams, pp. 161-85. New York: Routledge
Ilcan SM. 1996. Fragmentaryencountersin a
moralworld: householdpower relationsand
genderpolitics. Ethnology35:33-49
KertzerDI. 1984. Family Life in CentralItaly,
1880-1910: Sharecropping, Wage Labor
and Coresidence.New Brunswick,NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press
KertzerDI, FrickeTE, eds. 1997. Anthropological Demography: Towarda New Synthesis.
Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
KertzerDI, Hogan DP. 1989. Family,Political

Economy, and Demographic Change: The
Transformationof Life in Casalecchio, Italy,
1861-1921. Madison: Univ. Wisc. Press
Kibria N. 1993. Family Tightrope: Changing
Lives of VietnameseAmericans. Princeton,
NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press
Kideckel DA. 1993. The Solitude of Collectivism: RomanianVillagersto theRevolution
and Beyond.Ithaca,NY: CornellUniv. Press
KilbridePL, KilbrideJC. 1990. ChangingFamily Life in East Africa: Womenand Children
at Risk. University Park: Penn. State Univ.
Press
Kim S-K. 1997. ClassStruggleorFamilyStruggle? TheLives of WomenFactoryWorkersin
South Korea. New York: CambridgeUniv.
Press
Kondo D. 1990. CraftingSelves: Power, Gender,and Discourses of Identityin a Japanese
Workplace.Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
KunstadterP. 1984. Culturalideals, socioeconomic change, and household composition:
Karen,Lua', Hmong and Thai in northwestern Thailand. See Netting et al 1984a, pp.
299-329
KuperA. 1993. The English Christmasand the
family: time out and alternativerealities. In
Unwrapping Christmas, ed. D Miller, pp.
157-75. Oxford,UK: Clarendon
LamphereL. 1986. Workingmothersand family strategies: Portuguese and Colombian
women in a New Englandcommunity.In InternationalMigration: The Female Experience, ed. RJ Simon, C Brettell, pp. 266-83.
Totowa,NJ: Rowman& Allanheld
LamphereL. 1987. From WorkingDaughters
to WorkingMothers: ImmigrantWomenin a
New EnglandIndustrialCommunity.Ithaca,
NY: CornellUniv. Press
LamphereL, Zavella P, Gonzales F, Evans PB.
1993. Sunbelt WorkingMothers: Reconciling Familyand Factory.Ithaca,NY: Cornell
Univ. Press
LamplandM. 1994. Familyportraits:gendered
images of the nation in nineteenth century
Hungary.East Eur Polit. Soc. 8:287-316
FAMILYVALUES
Laslett P. 1972. Preface. In Household and
Family in Past Time, ed. P Laslett, R Wall,
pp. ix-xii. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniv.
Press
Lemert C. 1997. PostmodernismIs Not What
YouThink.Maiden,MA: Blackwell
Lewin E. 1993. Lesbian Mothers: Accounts
of Gender in American Culture.Ithaca,NY:
Cornell Univ. Press
LomnitzLA de, P6rez-LizaurM. 1987. A Mexican Elite Family,1820-1980: Kinship,Class
and Culture.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniv.
Press
MackintoshM. 1989. Gender,Class, and Rural
Transition:Agribusinessand the Food Crisis in Senegal. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed
Books
Maclachlan MD, ed. 1987. Household
Economies and Their Transformations.
Lanham,MD: Univ. Press Am.
Marcus GE, Hall PE. 1992. Lives in Trust:
The Fortunes of Dynastic Families in Late
Twentieth-CenturyAmerica. Boulder, CO:
Westview
McDonogh GW. 1986. Good Families of
Barcelona: A Social History of Power in
the IndustrialEra. Princeton,NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press
McMurrySA. 1995. TransformingRural Life:
Dairying Familiesand AgriculturalChange,
1820-1885. Baltimore,MD: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press
Medick H. 1981. The proto-industrialfamily economy. In IndustrializationBefore Industrialization,ed. P Kriedte, H Medick, J
Schlumbohn, pp. 38-73. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Medick H, SabeanDW, eds. 1984. Interestand
Emotion: Essays on the Studyof Familyand
Kinship.New York: CambridgeUniv. Press
MencherJ, OkongwuA, eds. 1993. WhereDid
All theMen Go? Female-HeadedHouseholds
Cross-Culturally.Boulder,CO: Westview
Moock JL, ed. 1986. UnderstandingAfrica's
Rural Households and Farming Systems.
Boulder,CO: Westview
Mullings L. 1997. On Our Own Terms: Race,
353
Class, and Gender in the Lives of African

AmericanWomen.New York:Routledge
Nash J. 1994. Global integration and subsistence insecurity. Am. Anthropol. 96:730
Netting RMc. 1993. Smallholders,Householders: FarmFamiliesand the Ecology of Intensive, SustainableAgriculture.Tucson: Univ.
Ariz. Press
NettingRMc, WilkRR, AmouldEJ,eds. 1984a.
Households: Comparativeand Historical
Studies of the Domestic Group. Berkeley:
Univ. Calif. Press
Netting RMc, Wilk RR, Arould EJ. 1984b.Introduction.See Netting et al 1984a, pp. xiiixxxviii
Neville G. 1987. Kinshipand Pilgrimage: Rituals of Reunionin AmericanProtestantCulture.New York: OxfordUniv. Press
O'Hara P. 1998. Partners in Production?
Women,Farm, and Family in Ireland. Oxford: BerghahnBooks
Olsen MKG. 1989. Authority and conflict in
Slavonianhouseholds:the effect of social environmenton intra-householdprocesses. See
Wilk 1989a, pp. 149-69
Ong A. 1990. State versus Islam: Malay families, women's bodies and the body politic in
Malaysia.Am. Ethnol. 17:258-76
Oxfeld E. 1993. Blood, Sweat and Mahjong:
Family and Enterprise in an Overseas Chinese Community.Ithaca,NY: Cornell Univ.
Press
PedersenS. 1995. Family,Dependenceand the
Origins of the WelfareState: Britain and
France 1914-1945. New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press
Peletz MG. 1995. Kinship studies in late 20th
centuryanthropology.Annu.Rev.Anthropol.
24:343-72
PessarPR. 1982. The role of households in internationalmigration and the case of U.S.boundmigrationfromthe DominicanRepublic. Int. MigrationRev. 16:342-64
Pessar PR. 1994. Sweatshop workers and domestic ideologies. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res.
18:127-42
354
CREED
Ragone H. 1996. Chasingthe blood tie: surrogate mothers, adoptivemothersand fathers.

Am. Ethnol. 23:352-65
Rebel H. 1983. Peasant Classes: The Bureaucratizationof Propertyand FamilyRelations
under Early Habsburg Absolutism, 15111636. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press
Rev I. 1987. The advantagesof being atomized:
how Hungarian peasants coped with collectivization.Dissent 34:335-50
Rothstein F. 1999. Declining odds: kinship,
women's employment, and political economy in rural Mexico. Am. Anthropol.
101:579-93
Rothstein F, Blim ML, eds. 1992. Anthropology and the Global Factory: Studies of the
New Industrializationin the Late Twentieth
Century.New York:Bergin & Garvey
Ruggles S. 1987. Prolonged Connections: The
Rise of the ExtendedFamily in NineteenthCentury England and America. Madison:
Univ. Wisc. Press
Rutz HJ. 1989. Fijian household practicesand
the reproductionof class. See Wilk 1989a,
pp. 119-48
RyanM. 1981. Cradleof theMiddleClass: The
Family in Oneida County,New York17901865. New York:CambridgeUniv. Press
Sabean D. 1990. Property, Production and
Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870. New
York:CambridgeUniv. Press
Safa HI. 1995. The Myth of the Male Breadwinner: Womenand Industrializationin the
Caribbean.Boulder,CO: Westview
Salaff JW. 1981. WorkingDaughters of Hong
Kong: Filial Piety or Power in the Family?
New York: ColumbiaUniv. Press
SalaffJW.1988. StateandFamilyin Singapore:
Restructuringa Developing Society. Ithaca,
NY: Corell Univ. Press
SanjekR. 1982. The organizationof households
in Adabraka: toward a wider perspective.
Comp.Stud.Soc. Hist. 24:57-103
SchminkM. 1984. Householdeconomic strategies: review and researchagenda. Lat. Am.
Res. Rev. 19(3):87-101
SchneiderJC, SchneiderPT. 1996. Festival of
the Poor: FertilityDecline and the Ideology

of Class in Sicily, 1860-1980. Tucson: Univ.
Ariz. Press
Schrauwers A. 1999. Negotiating parentage:
the political economy of kinship in central
Sulawesi, Indonesia.Am. Ethnol. 26:310-23
Seccombe W. 1993. Weatheringthe Storm:
Working-ClassFamiliesfrom the Industrial
Revolutionto the FertilityDecline. London:
Verso
Selby HA, MurphyAD, LorenzenSA, Cabrera
I, CastenedaA, Ruiz Love I. 1990. TheMexican UrbanHousehold: Organizingfor Self
Defense. Austin: Univ. Tex. Press
Shaffer JW. 1982. Family and Farm: Agrarian Change and Household Organizationin
the Loire Valley,1500-1900. Albany: State
Univ. New YorkPress
Shorter E. 1975. The Making of the Modern
Family.New York:Basic Books
Sick D. 1999. Farmers of the Golden Bean:
Costa Rican Households and Global Coffee
Economy.Dekalb: NorthIllinois Univ. Press
SingermanD. 1995. Avenuesof Participation:
Family, Politics and Networks in Urban
Quartersof Cairo. Princeton,NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press
Smith A. 2000. Employment restructuring
and household survivalin "post-communist
transition": rethinking economic practices
in Eastern Europe. Environ. Plan. A. In
press
SmithJ, WallersteinIM, Evers H-D, eds. 1984.
Householdsand the WorldEconomy.Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage
Stacey J. 1991. Brave New Families: Stories
of Domestic Upheaval in Late 20th Century
America.New York:Basic Books
Stacey J. 1996. In the Name of the Family:
RethinkingFamily Valuesin the Postmodern
Age. Boston, MA: Beacon
Stephen L. 1991. Zapotec Women. Austin:
Univ. Texas Press
Stiers GA. 1999. From This Day Forward:
Commitment,Marriage and Family in Lesbian and Gay Relationships.New York: St.
Martin's
FAMILYVALUES
Susser I. 1993. Creatingfamily forms: the exclusion of men and teenage boys from families in the New York City shelter system,
1987-91. Crit.Anthropol.13:267-83
Tice KE. 1995. Kuna Crafts, Gender,and the
Global Economy.Austin: Univ. Texas Press
Toulmin C. 1992. Cattle, Womenand Wells:
Managing Household Survival in the
Sahel. Clarendon,UK: OxfordUniv. Press
VaughanM. 1983. Which family? The problems in the reconstructionof the history of
the family as an economic and culturalunit.
J. Afr.Hist. 24:275-83
VaughanM. 1985. Householdunits and historical process in Southern Malawi. Rev. Afr
Polit. Econ. 34:35-45
VerderyK. 1994. From parent-stateto family
patriarchs:gender and nation in contemporary Eastern Europe. East Eur Polit. Soc.
8:225-55
WeismantelM. 1995. Makingkin: kinshiptheory and Zumbaguaadoptions. Am. Ethnol.
22:685-709
Weston K. 1991. Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays and Kinship. New York:
ColumbiaUniv. Press
Wheelock J, MariussenA, eds. 1997. Households, Work and Economic Change: A
ComparativeInstitutional Perspective. Recent Econ. ThoughtSer. 57. Norwell, MA:
KluwerAcad.
355
White JB. 1994. Money Makes Us Relatives:

Women'sLabor in Urban Turkey.Austin:
Univ. Texas Press
Whyte MK. 1996. The Chinese family and
economic development:obstacle or engine?
Econ. Dev. Cult. Change45:1-30
Wilk RR, ed. 1989a. TheHouseholdEconomy:
Reconsidering the Domestic Mode of Production. Boulder,CO: Westview
Wilk RR. 1989b.Decision makingandresource
flows withinthe household:beyondtheblack
box. See Wilk 1989a, pp. 23-52
Wilk RR. 1991. Household Ecology: Economic Changeand Domestic Life among the
KekchiMaya in Belize. Tucson: Univ. Ariz.
Press
Wolf AP, Hanley SB, eds. 1985. Family and
Populationin East Asian History. Stanford,
CA: StanfordUniv. Press
Wolf DL. 1992. Factory Daughters: Gender,
Household Dynamics, and Rural Industrialization in Java. Berkeley: Univ. Calif.
Press
Yanagisako S. 1979. Family and household:
a review of the anthropological literature
on domestic groups. Annu. Rev. Anthropol.
8:161-205
Zavella P. 1987. Women'sWorkand Chicano
Families: Cannery Workersof the Santa
Clara Valley. Ithaca, NY: Corell Univ.
Press

Creed - Family Values and Domestic Economies

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Creed - Family Values and Domestic Economies

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

"Family Values" and Domestic Economies

Author(s): Gerald W. Creed

Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2000. 29:329-55

Key Words capitalism,familyhistory,households,kinship,strategies

distress. The escalatingargumentsthen enhancethe social centralityof the family.

latest fascinationwith family values. I conclude with a cautionarysection on the

FROM EVOLUTION TO INTERACTION

(1989:19, see also Cheal 1991). This reinforcesevolutionaryviews in historyand

village documents"theways in which propertyand production...shapedand were

in the celebrationof children'sbirthdays,the venerationof family portraitsand

Kondo (1990) explores this relationshipin smallerJapanesefamily businesses.

and information. Among furniture-producinghouseholds in Cuanajo, Mexico,

family factorymakesit possible for lower-classwomen to adhereto culturalideals

THE NEW VALUEOF OLD VALUES

(Ho 1993:33),reinforcingand/orreflectingthefeminizationof kinship(di Leonardo

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FAMILY

the tendency to reify the unit, to treatit as an entity or "blackbox" ratherthan a

facilitatesreal-timenegotiationbetween members,reproducestheir mutualinterests, andsustainstheircollective identity(Baschet al 1994, Ho 1993, Pessar 1982).

andhighlightits role as the productionsite of new nationals(Huseby-Darvas1996,

Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and

Subcontracting and Household Dynamics

in Mexico City. Chicago: Univ. Chicago

ducers in an Andean City. Boulder, CO:

ing: Myth, Ritual and the Questfor Family

Hart G. 1986. Power, Labor, and Livelihood:

KertzerDI, Hogan DP. 1989. Family,Political

Class, and Gender in the Lives of African

Ragone H. 1996. Chasingthe blood tie: surrogate mothers, adoptivemothersand fathers.

the Poor: FertilityDecline and the Ideology

White JB. 1994. Money Makes Us Relatives:

Potrebbero piacerti anche