TodayisThursday,July16,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC

G.R.Nos.11177177November9,1993
ANTONIOL.SANCHEZ,petitioner,
vs.
TheHonorableHARRIETO.DEMETRIOU(inhercapacityasPresidingJudgeofRegionalTrialCourt,
NCR,Branch70,Pasig),TheHonorableFRANKLINDRILON(inhiscapacityasSecretaryofJustice),
JOVENCITOR.ZUO,LEONARDOC.GUIYAB,CARLOSL.DELEON,RAMONCITOC.MISON,REYNALDO
J.LUGTU,andRODRIGOP.LORENZO,thelastsixrespondentsintheirofficialcapacitiesasmembersof
theStateProsecutor'sOffice),respondents.
MarioE.OngkikoandMarcianoP.Brion,Jr.forpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforrespondents.

CRUZ,J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan,
Laguna,whostandsaccusedofanunspeakablecrime.Onhim,theverdicthasalreadybeenrenderedbymany
outragedpersonswhowouldimmediatelyimposeonhimanangrysentence.Yet,foralltheprejudgmentsagainst
him,heisunderourConstitutionpresumedinnocentaslongasthecontraryhasnotbeenproved.Likeanyother
personaccusedofanoffense,heisentitledtothefullandvigilantprotectionoftheBillofRights.
Sanchezhasbroughtthispetitiontochallengetheorderoftherespondentjudgedenyinghismotiontoquashthe
informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any
othersuitfiledbyanylitiganthopingtoobtainajustandimpartialjudgmentfromthisCourt.
Thepertinentfactsareasfollows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential AntiCrime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against
severalpersons,includingthepetitioner,inconnectionwiththerapeslayofMaryEileenSarmentaandthekilling
ofAllanGomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
MarcianoBrion,Jr.
OnAugust12,1993,PNPCommanderRexPiadissuedan"invitation"tothepetitionerrequestinghimtoappear
forinvestigationatCampVicenteLiminCanlubang,Laguna.ItwasservedonSanchezinthemorningofAugust
13,1993,andhewasimmediatelytakentothesaidcamp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio
Malabanan,whobothexecutedconfessionsimplicatinghimasaprincipalintherapeslayofSarmentaandthe
killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in
Manila.
Therespondentprosecutorsimmediatelyconductedaninquestuponhisarrival,withAtty.SalvadorPaneloashis
counsel.
Afterthehearing,awarrantofarrestwasservedonSanchez.ThiswarrantwasissuedonAugust13,1993,by
JudgeEnricoA.LanzanasoftheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch7,inconnectionwithCriminalCasesNos.

93124634 to 93124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was
forthwithtakentotheCISDetentionCenter,CampCrame,whereheremainsconfined.
OnAugust16,1993,therespondentprosecutorsfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofCalamba,Laguna,seven
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr.,
GeorgeMedialdeaandZoiloAmawiththerapeandkillingofMaryEileenSarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused,includingthepetitioner,inconnectionwiththesaidcrime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases
mightresultinamiscarriageofjusticebecauseofthetenseandpartisanatmosphereinLagunainfavorofthe
petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon
ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondentJudgeHarrietDemetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravatingcircumstance.
Onthatsamedate,thepetitionerfiledamotiontoquashtheinformationssubstantiallyonthegroundsnowraised
inthispetition.OnSeptember13,1993,afteroralarguments,therespondentjudgedeniedthemotion.Sanchez
thenfiledwiththisCourttheinstantpetitionforcertiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/writofinjunction.
Thepetitionerarguesthattheseveninformationsfiledagainsthimshouldbequashedbecause:1)hewasdenied
the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to
conducttheinvestigation3)hiswarrantlessarrestisillegalandthecourthasthereforenotacquiredjurisdiction
over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia and 6) as a
publicofficer,hecanbetriedfortheoffenseonlybytheSandiganbayan.
TherespondentssubmittedaCommentonthepetition,towhichwerequiredaReplyfromthepetitionerwithina
nonextendibleperiodoffivedays.1TheReplywasfiledfivedayslate.2TheCourtmayconsiderhisnoncompliancean
implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its
dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the
argumentsbeforeus.

ThePreliminaryInvestigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not
accordedtherighttopresentcounteraffidavits.
DuringthepreliminaryinvestigationonAugust9,1993,thepetitioner'scounsel,Atty.MarcianoBrion,manifested
thathisclientwaswaivingthepresentationofacounteraffidavit,thus:
Atty.Brion,Jr.:
[W]emanifestthatafterreviewingthemthereisnothingtorebutorcountermandallthesestatements
asfarasMayorSanchezisconcerned,Wearenotgoingtosubmitanycounteraffidavit.
ACSPZuotoAtty.Brion:
xxxxxxxxx
Q.Sofar,therearenootherstatements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counteraffidavit because we believe
thereisnothingtorebutorcountermandwithallthesestatements.
Q.So,youarewaivingyoursubmissionofcounteraffidavit?
A.Yes,yourhonor,unlessthereareotherwitnesseswhowillcomeupsoon.3
Nonetheless,theheadofthePanelofProsecutors,respondentJovencitoZuo,toldAtty.Brionthathecouldstill
fileacounteraffidavituptoAugust27,1993.Nosuchcounteraffidavitwasfiled.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty.
SalvadorPanelo,withcopiesoftheswornstatementsofCentenoandMalabanan,andtoldhimhecouldsubmit

counteraffidavitsonorbeforeAugust27,1993.Thefollowingexchangeensued:
ACSPZuo:
Fortherecord,wearefurnishingtoyoutheswornstatementofwitnessAurelioCenteno
yRoxasandtheswornstatementofSPO3VivencioMalabananyAngeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of counter
affidavit?
Atty.Panelo:
Yes.
ACSPZuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this case is
submittedforresolution.4
Ontheotherhand,thereisnosupportforthepetitioner'ssubsequentmanifestationthathiscounsel,Atty.Brion,
wasnotnotifiedoftheinquestheldonAugust13,1993,andthathewasnotfurnishedwiththeaffidavitsswornto
onthatdatebyVivencioMalabananandAurelioCenteno,orwiththeirsupplementalaffidavitsdatedAugust15,
1993.Moreover,theabovequotedexcerptshowsthatthepetitioner'scounselatthehearingheldonAugust13,
1993,wasnotAtty.BrionbutAtty.Panelo.
ThepetitionerwaspresentatthathearingandheneverdisownedAtty.Paneloashiscounsel.Duringtheentire
proceedings,heremainedquietandletthiscounselspeakandargueonhisbehalf.ItwasonlyinhistardyReply
thathehassuddenlybestirredhimselfandwouldnowquestionhisrepresentationbythislawyerasunauthorized
andinofficious.
Section3,Paragraph(d),Rule112oftheRulesofCourt,providesthatiftherespondentcannotbesubpoenaed
or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counteraffidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the
evidencepresentedbythecomplainant.
Justastheaccusedmayrenouncetherighttobepresentatthepreliminaryinvestigation5, so may he waive the
righttopresentcounteraffidavitsoranyotherevidenceinhisdefense.

At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
informationorotherwiserenderthesamedefectiveandneitherdoesitaffectthejurisdictionofthecourtoverthe
caseorconstituteagroundforquashingtheinformation.6
Ifnopreliminaryinvestigationhasbeenheld,orifitisflawed,thetrialcourtmay,onmotionoftheaccused,order
aninvestigationorreinvestigationandholdtheproceedingsinthecriminalcaseinabeyance. 7Inthecaseatbar,
however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions,
weshalldefertoherjudgment.

JurisdictionoftheOmbudsman
InvokingthecaseofDelosov.Domingo,8the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department of
Justicearenullandvoidbecauseithadnojurisdictionoverthecase.HisclaimisthatitistheOfficeoftheOmbudsman
that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal
mayorofCalauan,Laguna.

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and
prosecute,anyillegalactoromissionofanypublicofficial.However,asweheldonlytwoyearsagointhecaseof
Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in.
respectoftheoffensecharged."

Petitionersfinallyassertthattheinformationandamendedinformationfiledinthiscaseneededthe
approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here
didnothavetheapprovaloftheOmbudsman.However,wedonotbelievethatsuchapprovalwas
necessaryatall.InDelosov.Domingo,191SCRA.545(1990),theCourtheldthattheOmbudsman
hasauthoritytoinvestigatechargesofillegaloromissionsonthepartofanypublicofficial,i.e.,any
crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the
Ombudsmantoinvestigate"any[illegal]actoromissionofanypublicofficial"(191SCRAat550)is
notanexclusiveauthoritybutratherasharedorconcurrentauthorityinrespectoftheoffensehere
charged,i.e.,thecrimeofsedition.Thus,thenoninvolvementoftheofficeoftheOmbudsmaninthe

present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutorstofileandprosecutetheinformationoramendedinformation.
Infact,otherinvestigatoryagencies,ofthegovernmentsuchastheDepartmentofJustice,inconnectionwiththe
chargeofsedition, 10andthePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,inillgottenwealthcases,11 may conduct
theinvestigation,

TheArrest
WaspetitionerSanchezarrestedonAugust13,1993?
"Arrest"isdefinedunderSection1,Rule113oftheRulesofCourtasthetakingofapersonintocustodyinorder
thathemaybeboundtoanswerforthecommissionofanoffense.UnderSection2ofthesameRule,anarrestis
effectedbyanactualrestraintofthepersontobearrestedorbyhisvoluntarysubmissiontothecustodyofthe
personmakingthearrest.
Applicationofactualforce,manualtouchingofthebody,physicalrestraintoraformaldeclarationofarrestisnot,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
onthepartoftheothertosubmit,underthebeliefandimpressionthatsubmissionisnecessary.12
ThepetitionerwastakentoCampVicenteLim,Canlubang,Laguna,byvirtueofaletterinvitationissuedbyPNP
CommanderRexPiadrequestinghimtoappearatthesaidcampforinvestigation.
InBabstv.NationalIntelligenceBoard13thisCourtdeclared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily
assumeadifferentappearance.Thus,wheretheinvitationcomesfromapowerfulgroupcomposed
predominantlyofrankingmilitaryofficers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from
martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus has not entirely
been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can be easily taken,
not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which
onecanonlydefyathisperil....(Emphasissupplied)
Inthecaseatbar,theinvitationcamefromahighrankingmilitaryofficialandtheinvestigationofSanchezwasto
bemadeatamilitarycamp.Althoughintheguiseofarequest,itwasobviouslyacommandoranorderofarrest
thatthepetitionercouldhardlyheexpectedtodefy.Infact,apparentlycowedbythe"invitation,"hewentwithout
protest(andininformalclothesandslippersonly)withtheofficerswhohadcometofetchhim.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicableeventoapersonnotformallyarrestedbutmerely"invited"forquestioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo
himselfacknowledgedduringtheAugust13,1993hearingthat,onthebasisoftheswornstatementsofthetwo
statewitnesses,petitionerhadbeen"arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
providingasfollows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant,arrestaperson:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicatingthatthepersontobearrestedhascommitteditand
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
Itisnotdeniedthatthearrestingofficerswerenotpresentwhenthepetitionerallegedlyparticipatedinthekilling
ofAllanGomezandtherapeslayofMaryEileenSarmenta.Neitherdidtheyhaveanypersonalknowledgethat
thepetitionerwasresponsiblethereforbecausethebasisofthearrestwastheswornstatementsofCentenoand

Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28June 29, 1993, or
fortysix days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed"
whenthepetitionerwasarrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfullyacquiredjurisdictionoverthepersonofthepetitionerbyvirtueofthewarrantofarrestitissuedonAugust
26,1993againsthimandtheotheraccusedinconnectionwiththerapeslaycases.Itwasbelated,tobesure,but
itwasnonethelesslegal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdictionoverthepersonofthepetitioner.Theruleisthatiftheaccusedobjectstothejurisdictionofthecourt
overhisperson,hemaymovetoquashtheinformation,butonlyonthatground.If,asinthiscase,theaccused
raisesothergroundsinthemotiontoquash,heisdeemedtohavewaivedthatobjectionandtohavesubmitted
hispersontothejurisdictionofthatcourt.14
TheCourtnotesthatonAugust13,1993,afterthepetitionerwasunlawfullyarrested,JudgeLanzanasissueda
warrantofarrestagainstAntonioL.SanchezinconnectionwithCriminalCasesNos.93124634to93124637for
violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rapeslay cases, this first warrant
servedastheinitialjustificationforhisdetention.

The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding
warrantofarrest,againstapersoninvalidlydetainedwillcurethedefectofthatdetentionoratleastdenyhimthe
righttobereleasedbecauseofsuchdefect.*ApplicablebyanalogytothecaseatbarisRule102Section4oftheRulesofCourtthat:
Sec,4.Whenwritisnotallowedordischargeauthorized.Ifitappearsthatthepersonallegedto
berestrainedofhislibertyisinthecustodyofanofficerunderprocessissuedbyacourtorjudgeor
byvirtueofajudgmentororderofacourtofrecord,andthatthecourtorjudgehadjurisdictionto
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorizethedischargeofapersonchargedwithorconvictedofanoffenseinthePhilippinesorofa
personsufferingimprisonmentunderlawfuljudgment.
Inonecase, 16the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe
warrant.Intheirreturn,therespondentsdeclaredthatanewwarrantspecificallynamingherhadbeenissued,thusvalidating
herdetention.Whilefrowningatthetacticsoftherespondents,theCourtsaid:

The,casehas,indeed,becomemootandacademicinasmuchasthenewwarrantofarrestcomplies
withtherequirementsoftheConstitutionandtheRulesofCourtregardingtheparticulardescription
of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was unquestionably void, being a general
warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her
immediaterearrestpursuanttothenewandvalidwarrant,returninghertothesameprisonshewill
justhaveleft.ThisCourtwillnotparticipateinsuchameaninglesscharade.
ThesamedoctrinehasbeenconsistentlyfollowedbytheCourt,17morerecentlyintheUmilcase.18
TheInformations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the
twovictimsinthesecasescouldnothavediedseventimes.
ThisargumentwascorrectlyrefutedbytheSolicitorGeneralinthiswise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasionorbyreasonofeachrape,mustbedeemedasaconstituentofthespecialcomplexcrime
of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are
rapescommitted.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the
highestdegree.Thus,homicidecommittedontheoccasionorbyreasonofrape,losesitscharacter
as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying
circumstance.However,byfictionoflaw,itmergedwithrapetoconstituteanconstituentelementofa
specialcomplexcrimeofrapewithhomicidewithaspecificpenaltywhichisinthehighestdegree,i.e.
death(reducedtoreclusionperpetuawiththesuspensionoftheapplicationofthedeathpenaltyby
theConstitution).
ItisclearlyprovidedinRule110oftheRulesofCourtthat:

Sec.13.Duplicityofoffense.Acomplaintorinformationmustchargebutoneoffense,exceptonlyin
thosecasesinwhichexistinglawsprescribeasimplepunishmentforvariousoffenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal
Code.
Thepetitionerandhissixcoaccusedarenotchargedwithonlyonerapecommittedbyhiminconspiracywiththe
other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helpingSanchezincommittingonlyonerape.Inotherwords,theallegationoftheprosecutionisthatthegirlwas
rapedseventimes,witheachofthesevenaccusedtakingturnsinabusingherwiththeassistanceoftheother
six.Afterwards,theirlustsatisfied,allsevenofthemdecidedtokillandthussilenceSarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her
insteadofmerelyassistingthepetitionerinrapingandthenslayingher.Theseparateinformationsfiledagainst
each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committedinsuccessionbythesevenaccused,culminatingintheslayingofSarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the
informationsdonotmakesuchasuggestion.Itisthepetitionerwhodoessoandisthushoistbyhisownpetard.
TheAllegedDiscrimination
ThechargeofdiscriminationagainstthepetitionerbecauseofthenoninclusionofTeofiloAlquezaandEdgardo
Lavadiaintheinformationsmustalsobedismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he
neverthelesscannotbecompelledtoincludeintheinformationapersonagainstwhomhebelievesnosufficient
evidenceofguiltexists. 19Theappreciationoftheevidenceinvolvestheuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheprosecutor,
andwedonotfindinthecaseatbaraclearshowingbythepetitionerofagraveabuseofsuchdiscretion.20

ThedecisionoftheprosecutormaybereversedormodifiedbytheSecretaryofJusticeorinspecialcasesbythe
PresidentofthePhilippines.21ButeventhisCourtcannotordertheprosecutionofapersonagainstwhomtheprosecutor
doesnotfindsufficientevidencetosupportatleastaprimafaciecase.Thecourtstryandabsolveorconvicttheaccused
butasarulehavenopartintheinitialdecisiontoprosecutehim.

Thepossibleexceptioniswherethereisanunmistakableshowingofagraveabuseofdiscretionthatwilljustify
judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such
exceptionisapetitionformandamus,notcertiorariorprohibition.22Moreover,beforeresortingtothisrelief,theparty
seekingtheinclusionofanotherpersonasacoaccusedinthesamecasemustfirstavailitselfofotheradequateremedies
suchasthefilingofamotionforsuchinclusion.23

At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza and
Lavadia,thechargesagainstthepetitionerandhiscoaccusedshouldalsobedropped.
JurisdictionoftheSandiganbayan
Thepetitionerarguedearlierthatsincemostoftheaccusedwereincumbentpublicofficialsoremployeesatthe
timeoftheallegedcommissionofthecrimes,thecasesagainstthemshouldcomeunderthejurisdictionofthe
Sandiganbayanandnotoftheregularcourts.ThiscontentionwaswithdrawninhisReplybutweshalldiscussit
justthesamefortheguidanceofallthoseconcerned.
Section4,paragraph(a)ofP.D.No,1606,asamendedbyP.D.No.1861,provides:
Sec.4.Jurisdiction.TheSandiganbayanshallexercise:
a)Exclusiveoriginaljurisdictioninallcasesinvolving:
(1)ViolationsofRepublicActNo.3019,asamended,otherwiseknownastheAntiGraft
andCorruptPracticesAct,RepublicActNo.1379,andChapterII,Section2,TitleVIIof
theRevisedPenalCode:
(2)Otheroffensesorfeloniescommittedbypublicofficersandemployeesinrelationto
theiroffice, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations,
whethersimpleorcomplexedwithothercrimes,wherethepenaltyprescribedbylawis
higherthanprisioncorreccionalorimprisonmentforsix(6)years,orafineofP6,000.00.
...(Emphasissupplied)

Thecrimeofrapewithhomicidewithwhichthepetitionerstandschargedobviouslydoesnotfallunderparagraph
(1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an
offensecommittedinrelationtotheofficeofthepetitioner.
InMontillav,Hilario,24thisCourtdescribedthe"offensecommittedinrelationtotheoffice"asfollows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion,
directandnotaccidental.TofallintotheintentoftheConstitution,therelationhastobesuchthat,in
the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituentelementofthecrimeasdefinedinthestatute,suchas,forinstance,thecrimesdefined
andpunishedinChapterTwotoSix,TitleSeven,oftheRevisedPenalCode.
Publicofficeisnotoftheessenceofmurder.Thetakingofhumanlifeiseithermurderorhomicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator.beingapublicfunctionarytookadvantageofhisoffice,asallegedinthiscase,inwhich
eventthepenaltyisincreased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element and even as an
aggravatingcircumstance,itsmaterialityarisesnotfromtheallegationsbutontheproof,notfromthe
factthatthecriminalsarepublicofficialsbutfromthemannerofthecommissionofthecrime
Thereisnodirectrelationbetweenthecommissionofthecrimeofrapewithhomicideandthepetitioner'soffice
asmunicipalmayorbecausepublicofficeisnotanessentialelementofthecrimecharged.Theoffensecanstand
independentlyoftheoffice.Moreover,itisnotevenallegedintheinformationthatthecommissionofthecrime
chargedwasintimatelyconnectedwiththeperformanceofthepetitioner'sofficialfunctionstomakeitfallunder
theexceptionlaiddowninPeoplev.Montejo.25
Inthatcase,acitymayorandseveraldetectiveswerechargedwithmurderforthedeathofasuspectasaresult
of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was
questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing them
becausetheywereaccusedofanoffensecommittedinrelationtotheiroffice.TheCourtagreed.Itheldthateven
if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
betweentheofficeandtheoffense,asallegedintheinformation,thatbroughtitwithinthedefinitionofanoffense
"committedinrelationtothepublicoffice."
AsChiefJusticeConcepcionsaid:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of
murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended
information,theoffensethereinchargedisintimatelyconnectedwiththeirrespectiveofficesandwas
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The codefendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
(Emphasissupplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
homicideimputedtothepetitionerwasconnectedwiththedischargeofhisfunctionsasmunicipalmayororthat
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an
ordinaryoffense,istriablebytheregularcourtsandnottheSandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
whohasstartedthetrialofthecriminalcasesagainstthepetitionerandhiscoaccused,mayproceedtherewith
withoutfurtherhindrance.
Itremainstostressthatthedecisionwemaketodayisnotadecisiononthemeritsofthecriminalcasesbeing
triedbelow.Thesewillhavetobedecidedbytherespondentjudgeinaccordancewiththeevidencethatisstill
beingreceived.Atthistime,thereisyetnobasisforjudgment,onlyuninformedconjecture.TheCourtwillcaution
against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not officious
ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with
deliberatedispatch.

SOORDERED.
Feliciano,Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,Davide,Jr.,Romero,Nocon,Melo,Quiason,PunoandVitug,JJ.,concur.
Narvasa,C.J.,tooknopart.
Bellosillo,J.,isonleave.

#Footnotes
1ResolutiondatedOctober5,1993.
2ThepetitionerclaimsinhisReplytohavereceivedtheresolutiononOctober15,1993.Thereply
wasfiledonlyonOctober25,1993.
3TSN,August9,1993,pp.1011.
4TSN,August13,1993,pp.710.
5Guzmanv.People,119SCRA337Cruzv.Salva,105Phil.1151.
6Gov.CourtofAppeals,206SCRA138Rodisv.Sandiganbayan,166SCRA618Sanciangco,Jr.
v.People,149SCRA1Peoplev.Gomez,117SCRA72Peoplev.Yutila,102SCRA264Solisv.
People,84SCRA377Peoplev.Figueroa,27SCRA1239Peoplev.Casiano,111Phil73.
7Gov.CourtofAppeals,supraVelaquezv.Tuquero,182SCRA388Crespov.Mogul,151SCRA
462Peoplev.LaCaste,37SCRA767.
8191SCRA545.
9G.R.No.98452,September26,1991.
10Aguinaldov.Domagas,supra.
11Panliliov.Sandiganbayan,210SCRA421Viratav.Sandiganbayan,202SCRA680Cojuangco
v.PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,190SCRA226.
125AmJur2d,p.696
13132SCRA318.
14Regalado,RemedialLawCompendiumBook2,1989Ed.,p.318citing22C.J.S.1961Ed.,p.
418.
15Annex1,Comment.
*Thewriterofthisopinionhasobjectedtothisrulingbutwithoutsuccess.Whilemaintaininghis
dissentinthiscase,heneverthelessmustacknowledgethebindingcharacterofthedoctrine.
16Dugay,etalv.Ramos,G.R.No.75221,January15,1987.
17Harveyv.DefensorSantiago,162SCRA840Domingov.MinisterofNationalDefense,etal.,124
SCRA529Beltranv.Garcia,89SCRA717DelaPlatav.Escarcha,78SCRA208Cruzv.Montoya,
62SCRA543.
18187SCRA312and202SCRA215.
19Albertov.delaCruz,98SCRA406Peoplev.Santos,30SCRA100Peoplev.Agasang,60Phil
182Peoplev.Ong,53Phil.544.
20Maddelav.Aquino,104Phil.433Peoplev.Morton,23SCRA1024Guiaov.Figueroa,94Phil.
1018.
21Section1,par.(d)P.D.No.911Section4,Rule112,1985RulesonCriminalProcedure
DepartmentCircularNo.7,January25,1990MemorandumCircularNo.1266Vda.deJacobv.
Puno,131SCRA144Crespov.Mogul,supra.

22Section3,Rule65,RulesofCourtBaylosisv.Chavez,202SCRA405DeCastro,etal.,v.
Castaeda,etal.,1SCRA1131Guiaov.Figueroa,94Phil.1018.
23Aquinov.Mariano,129SCRA532.
2490Phil.49.
25108Phil.613.
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