1

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of
the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents
further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the
JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the
petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non
are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants
to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus
of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional
is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress
non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization
of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II.

THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2.
Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,

privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the
prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
[T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also
to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder
shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.
For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of
the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the
WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy
of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into
a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and

limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy

does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It
does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade
without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx

xxx

xxx

10

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the

State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials
and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while
serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes
of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave
its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land
is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and
gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its
members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority.
As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and
the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

HENRY JUN DUEAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(HRET) and ANGELITO JET REYES

GR No. 185401

11

July 21, 2009

En banc

Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the guardians
themselves?)

Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, particularly of the allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual
liberties and the assurance of the peoples sovereignty. The Court has the
distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining constitutional meaning,
divining constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes. Nonetheless, its
judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal with the other
branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least dangerous branch).
Instead, judicial supremacy is the conscious and cautious awareness and
acceptance of its proper place in the overall scheme of government with the
objective of asserting and promoting the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus,
whenever the Court exercises its function of checking the excesses of any branch of
government, it is also duty-bound to check itself. Otherwise, who will guard the
guardian?

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes
were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district
of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After
the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered
28,564 votes as opposed to private respondents 27,107 votes. Not conceding
defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount,
alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious
and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the
systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioners
votes.

In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the
revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts

12

pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counterprotested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating
its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment
his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the
revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss
the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by
reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was
with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the
HRETs position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised
precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same.
Moreover, it ruled that its task of determining the true will of the electorate was not
confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could
motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counterprotest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a
motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced
that it could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative
district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested
precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to
continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested
precincts.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Resolution, to continue the revision and
appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

(2) Whether or not HRETs assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued
revision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds
nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

HELD:

13

The petition has no merit.

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . the power granted to
the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided
by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs
exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.

(1) HRETs Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw / Abandon Counter-protest

First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where
respondent protested the election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counterprotested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730 precincts were the subject of the
revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were already revised,
only 25% or 140 of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were
actually done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET only been allowed to
continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents were only speculating
that a sufficient number of fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that these fake/spurious ballots
would overturn the result of the election.

Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent
constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that
body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any
accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court finds no
evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.

Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By
employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and

14

exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full, complete and
unimpaired.

Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its constitutional mandate, the Tribunal
adopted Rule 7 of the HRET Rules: The Tribunal shall have exclusive control,
direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation.

In this connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for
itself the discretion to continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of Rule 88
is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue the revision proceedings ex propio
motu, that is, of its own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioners view
that he ought to have been allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there
was nothing to prevent the HRET from continuing the revision of its own accord by
authority of Rule 88.

The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88
was its own determination that the evidence thus far presented could affect the
officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of contested ballots and
election documents, the determination of whether the evidence could influence the
officially proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function best left
to the specialized expertise of the HRET.

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the
sole judge of election contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute
its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the
evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed
results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a
determination of the true will of the electorate. TheCourt should merely test
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. If the
Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest
proceedings, the Tribunal will no longer have exclusive control, direction and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation. It will
constitute an intrusion into the HRETs domain and a curtailment of the HRETs
power to act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and
effect of the result of the initial revision.

15

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v.
HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the
remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or
deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is
granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction already acquired.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all
questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case
of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No.
84297, December 8, 1988, thus:

The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the
Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as `intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140].
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the
House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Courts socalled extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunals
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse. (emphasis supplied)

16

(2) HRETs Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision Proceedings

When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or tribunal, that court or

tribunal, unless otherwise provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to
employ all writs, processes and other means to make its power effective. Where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Since the
HRET possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also
had the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own
funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. We
hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive
control, direction and supervision of its functions. The HRETs order was but one
aspect of its power.

Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and
exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such
other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes
and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law.
(emphasis supplied)

Certainly, the HRETs order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots
from the 75% counter-protested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or
incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole judge of election
protest cases involving its members.

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the
continuation of the revision of the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then
he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to prevent the HRET from
using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such
power on the part of the HRET becomes useless and meaningless.

Second, Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted
budget for the Adjudication of Electoral Contests Involving Members of the House
of Representatives. The provision is general and encompassing enough to
authorize the use of the HRETs funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a

17

protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the use of HRET funds for the
revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less
violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. To reiterate, the law (particularly
RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests in the
HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper
appropriation for that purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the disbursement
and allocation of such funds.

Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds
for any lawful purpose it deemed best. This is specially significant in election
contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in
determining the true will of the electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the
HRET from ordering any of the parties to make the additional required deposit(s) to
cover costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the HRET. Such disbursement
could not be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to a
party since the benefit would actually redound to the electorate whose true will
must be determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court
declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that [o]ver and above the desire of the
candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the
people. Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be
incidental.

All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is grave
abuse of discretion? It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion
when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Using the foregoing as yardstick, the Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.
No. 171101, November 22, 2011

18

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule
meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked
to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or
placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.

II.

THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

19

(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of

respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI,
which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.]

1.

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited
only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior
to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed

20

to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they
want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July
5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then
the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the
agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other
agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI
but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and
other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers,
and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR
leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of
actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of

21

agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and
have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and
of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs
SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is

November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time
that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,
that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority
(Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of
the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI
is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify
this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears
stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means,
final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action
with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

22

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have
not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share
of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).
The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested
and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were
arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political
and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..."
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he

23

assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial
law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to
declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of
martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial
inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry
by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit
in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective
of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to
safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this
case.
Javellana vs. executive secretary 50 scra 33
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipinoand a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec
Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing thesaid constitution. Javellana
averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the
president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify
such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC
justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made
by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives.

24

Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation
during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973
Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455

FACTS:
A number of petitions assailing the validity of B.P Blg. 883 calling for a special
election for a President and Vice-president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a
conditional resignation where he shall vacate the position only when a winner has
been proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath 10 days after the proclamation.
Petitioners question the validity of Marcos resignation as it did not create the
vacancy needed for a special election to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in
relation to B.P. Blg. 883

ISSUE:
Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?

HELD:
The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883. Unconstitutional. Whereas
the original issue on B.P Blg. 883s constitutionality, the issue has now transformed
into a political question where only the sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean
and honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and denied their
prayers of prohibition.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo,
JJ.------------------------------------------

25

DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
145 SCRA 160 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of

Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as
follows:

26

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then
asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent president.

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted

provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides
for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section
provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise
sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme Court
which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.
In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
Wednesday, April 30, 2014

27

Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry
of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court
and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the
new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of
appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking
changes from number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to
"inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction
of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and
Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts
where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E.O.
No. 33.

Held:

28

The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987
Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of
the people power in 1986.

Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in

any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden.
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602

Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen
of barangay dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo
antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8,
1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and
similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So,
February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986.

29

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was
no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its
transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were
suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in

effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for
barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with
constitution.

Lambino & Aumentado vs COMELEC

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at
least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least
represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified
by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution
seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the president
bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution
this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended
that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within
that case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2
ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.
The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay
those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The

30

proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The
proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments
were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely
handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full
text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided
upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long
as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the

Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735
is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

25
APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,
petitioners,

31

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN

PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
(1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2)
Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on
the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375
failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:

32

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the
Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
declared void.

RATIO:

Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of

33

Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy,
and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no
leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the
TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of
their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive
of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional
mandate on people initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

34

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his
view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the

people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may
be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other
rulings.

Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

35

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled::

I. General Provisions

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as The Initiative and Referendum Act.

Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of

initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

(a) Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the

Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

36

(b) Indirect initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition

sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation

through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or

law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) Proposition is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is

approved or rejected by the people.

(f) Petition is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required
number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to
the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) Local government units refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays.

(h) Local legislative bodies refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) Local executives refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors
and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

37

Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at

least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same
with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

38

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the

legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly
initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1)
legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in
a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be

deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum
(10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed

validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in said barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special

registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or
referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the

signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

II. National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall

call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

39

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall,
upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the
date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45)
days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition

of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be
submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered
voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of

the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment
shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as
certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the
repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected
or amended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the

votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an

initiative or referendum petition:

40

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety
(90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited peoples organization, as

defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary
of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be
enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except
that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative
measures on the committee.

Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative
body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of
any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days
from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered

41

representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary
of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous
regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in
subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may
be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether
or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then
set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within
ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after
which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections.

42

Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a

majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by
the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those
against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein
provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or

ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may
be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the
expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4

hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of
autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval
or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

43

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body
to enact the said measure.

IV. Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall
apply to all initiatives and referenda.

Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to

promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

44

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National
Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of
the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with
UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2

in which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North
Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are
in compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory,
shortening one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group
of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to
the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and
aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national
security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of
Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

45

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is
the citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the
remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory
tool to demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS
III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a
result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime
zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous
zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines
measured in accordance to the treatythe role played by RA 9522. The contention
of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is
devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points,
increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

46

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

consistent with the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as
part of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically
stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what
the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had
been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the
other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance
from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in
accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible observance of
its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation
of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the
internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized
that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of
the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath,
regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be
either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is
deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters
inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines
to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict
observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

47

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was
necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the
Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and
it will weaken the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding
its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas
Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of
Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center,
petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre,
Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople,
Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of
the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces

48

Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and
Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph
E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger
of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21,
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision,
is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion
and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and
nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government
may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

BAYAN MUNA vs. Romulo Digest

49

G.R. NO. 159618: Feruary 1, 2011

BAYAN MUNA, Represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep.
LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner

v.

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary , and BLAS F. OPLE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and

ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at
least declared as without force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of
the Rome Statute.

Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at
least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.

50

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute

First issue

The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]. the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling
or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a StateParty and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome
Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the
Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
Statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence

Second issue

51

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by our courts.

Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As

the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of
the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed
by long practice.

Petition is DISMISSED.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review

52

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the
power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

53

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines
in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726

Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of

Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition
against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules
and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion
of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

54

ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. 78742; 14 JUL 1989]

Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:

e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA
6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by
four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers
under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the
legislatures power.

f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental

against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.

h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police

power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

55

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of
the lawful subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be
determined is the method employed to achieve it.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities
may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

56

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the

agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land
than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
I.

Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.

II.
Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the
commerce of man.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To
repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention
of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly.
That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged
areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found
to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and
null and void.

57

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow
against the regalian doctrine.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

58

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director,
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary;
and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception
to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively
to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by nonFilipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.

In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company
- sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but
Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the
Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial

59

assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment
of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973

Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

60

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an

exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of

the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,

considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are

61

unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,

must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise

unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently,
the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)

FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to
a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in
Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However,
published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a
high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16

62

billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and
more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of
the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and
possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred
Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a
total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred
Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One
Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?

RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the States
inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion,
absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with
respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being
contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case,
the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to
this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the
750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area
are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the
Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their
actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and
issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This
Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed
lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion
of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the
PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."

G.R. No. 135385 Case Digest

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa

63

vs National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

Facts:
Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and
its implementing rules will amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources, in violation of the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Notes:

64

Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of
our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to
our indigenous people."

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or

indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is
the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or

homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since
time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and
other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier

proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the
principle of parens patriae.

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas

generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed

65

by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually

since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare.

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed

and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not
limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, widen farms and
tree lots."

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or
(2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with
respect to ancestral lands only.

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest.

Article 12

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such

66

activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing

agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.

67

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,

and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific
limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and
may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for
such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and watershed areas.

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain.

Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall
contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right
to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the
State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so
demands.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be

transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

68

TAWANG VS. LA TRINIDAD DIGEST

G.R. No. 166741:March 22, 2011.

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner, v. LA TRINIDAD WATER

DISTRICT, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system
inBarangayTawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local water utility, opposed
TMPCs application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, its franchise is exclusive.

The NWRB approved TMPCs application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision,
the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises
are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to
operate and maintain a waterworks system. The RTC set aside the NWRBs decision
and cancelled TMPCs CPC, stating that "the Constitution does not necessarily
prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be
allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others.
Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate
authority of the State."

ISSUE: Whether or not an exclusive franchise is allowed

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW: Nature of franchise grants.

69

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the
operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions (the latter in Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly
prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.When the law is
clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. InRepublic of the
Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., and other cases,the Court held
that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall
not be exclusive."

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot
legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the
Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing
the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President

Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the
BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character. Section 47 of PD No. 198 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to
any other person or agency xxxunless and except to the extent that the board of
directors consents theretoxxxsubject to review by the Administration." Section 47
creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it
is patently unconstitutional.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must
conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void
all laws that do not conform to it.

Petition is GRANTED.

Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. April 5,
2011]

70

03
SEP
FACTS:

Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic
Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Government took petitioners lands on December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the
properties atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that
amount. Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76,
respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the expropriated
properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits, placing the total amount
paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of
nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate
complaints for just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where
it was dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case
with the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in
favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners properties at P103.33/sq.m
with 12% interest plus attorneys fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division
of the Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees
and entry of judgment was issued. The just compensation of which was only settled
on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration with respect to
denial of award of legal interest and attorneys fees and a motion to refer the
second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly, restoring in toto
the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as
well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

71

(1) Whether or not the transcendental importance does not apply to the present
case.

(2) Whether or not the standard of transcendental importance cannot justify the
negation of the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a
vested right in favor of the Government that respondent LBP represents.

(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission showing that just compensation for expropriated
agricultural property must be viewed in the context of social justice.

Civil Law:

Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration of respondent deleting

interest and attorneys fees amount to unjust enrichment in its favor.

Remedial Law

(1) Whether or not the rules on second motion for reconsideration by the Supreme
Court should be strictly complied with by a vote of two-thirds of its actual
membership.

(2) Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still serve its purpose.

72

(3) Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for
Reconsideration in-Intervention from the Office of the Solicitor General may still be
granted.

RULINGS:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a
matter of public interest the proper application of a basic constitutionallyguaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive just compensation
when the government exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform
program.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on
eminent domain Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. While confirming the States inherent power and right to take
private property for public use, this provision at the same time lays down the
limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property pursuant to its
inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the
owner just compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered
just, it must not only be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must
also be paid to the landowner without delay.

(2) No. The doctrine transcendental importance, contrary to the assertion it is

applicable only to legal standing questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. It will be a very myopic reading of the ruling as the
context clearly shows that the phrase transcendental importance was used only
to emphasize the overriding public interest involved in this case. The Supreme Court
said in their resolution:

73

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to
discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less
than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation
in an eminent domain case be just when the payment for the compensation for
property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed
Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an
expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that
under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government
who carries the burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to
simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted
view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.

xxxx

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of

transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved
agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government has unceasingly sought
to achieve in the past half century.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of justice
are duly served.

(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to give a lower market price per square meter for larger
tracts of land, the Commission never intended to give agricultural landowners less
than just compensation in the expropriation of property for agrarian reform
purposes.

[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the
right of landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State
of their properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to own large
tracts of land should not be taken against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz
eloquently put it:

[S]ocial justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be
a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of

74

reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is
it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich
alike, according to the mandate of the law.

Civil Law

Yes. In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took the petitioners
lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full payment of the just
compensation due on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by itself, already confirms
the unconscionable delay in the payment of just compensation.

An added dimension is the impact of the delay. One impact as pointed out above
is the loss of income the landowners suffered. Another impact that the LBP now
glosses over is the income that the LBP earned from the sizeable sum it withheld for
twelve long years. From this perspective, the unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust
enrichment in its favor and an inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was
what the Court essentially addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12% interest.

Remedial Law

(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners motion for reconsideration by a
vote of 12 Members (8 for the grant of the motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on
the merits of the petitioners motion. This ruling complied in all respects with the
Constitution requirement for the votes that should support a ruling of the Court.
Admittedly, the Court did not make any express prior ruling accepting or disallowing
the petitioners motion as required by Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. The
Court, however, did not thereby contravene its own rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; since 12 Members of the Court opted to entertain the motion by

75

voting for and against it, the Court simply did not register an express vote, but
instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through the participation by no
less than 12 of its 15 Members. Viewed in this light, the Court cannot even be
claimed to have suspended the effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a form other than by express
and separate voting.

(2) No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the case, have
already provided this Court with enough arguments and particulars to rule on the
issues involved. Oral arguments at this point would be superfluous and would serve
no useful purpose.

(3) No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has been amply
protected through the direct action of petitioner LBP the government
instrumentality created by law to provide timely and adequate financial support in
all phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian reform. The OSG had every
opportunity to intervene through the long years that this case had been pending but
it chose to show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence can only
serve to delay the final disposition of this case. The arguments the OSG presents,
furthermore, are issues that this Court has considered in the course of resolving this
case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the intervention prayed for.

MCIAA v. Inocian, G.R. No. 168812

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of MCIAA sought
to acquire several lots in Lahug, Cebu for the proposed expansion of the Lahug
Airport. Some of the owners of these lots refused to sell their properties because the
proposed price was unacceptably way below the market value of the lands at that
time.

As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining the then existing
Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the right to
repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the event
that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some
landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their

76

properties became defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of

the Philippines before the CFI of Cebu docketed as Civil Case R-1881 entitled RP vs.
Damian Ouano.

The trial court declared the expropriated lots along with the other adjoining lands,
condemned for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject lands
were transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently
turned over to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990.

Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its functions and
operations were transferred to the Mactan Airport at the end of 1991, some of the
heirs of the original owners wrote to the President and the MCIAA General Manager,
requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot. Written and verbal
demands were ignored by the MCIAA.

Hence, the heirs of original owners filed complaint for reconveyance and damages
with the RTC of Cebu City against MCIAA.

The Ouanos here are the heirs of the original owner of Lot 763-A, while the Inocians'
claimed rights to Lots 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, and the Suicos' claim
pertained to 942, and 947, all of which were expropriated under CC R-1881.

Main Issue: Whether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right to repurchase or secure reconveyance
of their respective properties.

Specific issues:

I. Whether abandonment of the pubic purpose for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos and Inocians to reacquire them;

77

II. Whether the Ouanos and Inocians are entitled to reconveyance of the subject
properties simply on the basis of an alleged verbal promise of NAC officials that the
properties will be returned if the airport project would be abandoned.

RULING:

Yes. The former owners of the expropriated lots have the right to repurchase their
properties.

The Supreme Court emphasized the undisputed facts upon which the decision was
premised:

First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots
subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose
they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and
development of Lahug Airport.

Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant
portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development
as a commercial complex.

Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC,

through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners
that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are
no longer used for airport purposes.

The Supreme Court adhered to the precedents set in the previous cases of Heirs of
Moreno vs. MCIAA and MCIAA vs. Tudtud whose disputed lots are also part of Civil
Case R-1881, because in all respects, the present petition revolved around the same
milieu as that of the aforecited case.

The Supreme Court maintained that the title of the MCIAA over the expropriated lots
is not absolute as it is subject to the condition of using the lot for public purpose.

78

Thus, "the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as
may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties."

"While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the
survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but
instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these meaningful statements in the
body of the Decision contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport
expansion project were abandoned."

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there
should foremost be an express condition in the dispositive portion of the decision
before the condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the
purpose for its taking has been abandoned or ended.

The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by
the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be
recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In
fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed
to their previous owners. This belated news further bolsters the fact that the
purpose for which the properties were condemned has been abandoned.

As to the contention that the Ouano and the Inocians cannot lay claim on the verbal
promise as barred by the Statute of Frauds, the Supreme Court held that the Statue
of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially
consummated contracts. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not
either object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow
the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the
occurrence of certain events. Notably, objection on the admissibility of evidence on
the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised.

It was reiterated that the old Fery doctrine was revisited in the fairly recent case of
Lozada in that "the fee simple concept underpinning it is no longer compelling,
considering the ensuing inequity such application entails."

79

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for
public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of
the land if the condemning party would continues to use the property for public
purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a
public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee simple. The government's
taking of private property, and then transferring it to private persons under the
guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense power of
eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and unconstitutional state's power to oblige a
landowner to renounce his productive and invaluable possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for his own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

Thus, the MCIAA was ordered to reconvey the subject properties with a right to
retain the fruits thereof, and the Inocians, Ouano, Suicos are ordered to reimburse
MCIAA of the amount of just compensation with a right to retain the interest
therefrom.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended
by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

80

2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over
those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a

codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does
not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP
is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to
forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046
and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

81

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE PHARMA WEALTH, INC., G.R. No.

182358, February 20, 2013
Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly or impliedly. The
rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine
only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; its clear import then
is that the State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. x x x Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly
or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law,
either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent
when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. However, it
must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically
mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. Statutory

82

provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.

G.R. No. 155504

June 26, 2009

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3,
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that
antedates this Constitution.27 It is as well a universally recognized principle of
international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another
state.28 The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.29 It also rests on reasons of public policy
that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign
authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and,
consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.30

What are the various forms of state immunity from suit?

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms,
namely:
a suit against the Republic by name;
a suit against an unincorporated government agency;
a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the
agencys performance of governmental functions;
and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate
liability will fall on the government.

83

In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government
agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its
function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing,
and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core
reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by
suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the
performance of governmental functions. In Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.
Republic of the Philippines,31 we said:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss
of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its
immunity when it entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose.
According to PROVI, since the purpose of its contract with TESDA is to provide
identification PVC cards with security seal which TESDA will thereafter sell to TESDA
trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial transactions not incidental to its
governmental functions.
TESDAs response to this position is to point out that it is not engaged in business,
and there is nothing in the records to show that its purchase of the PVC cards from
PROVI is for a business purpose. While TESDA admits that it will charge the trainees
with a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only to recover their costs and
is not intended for profit.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

155650 July 20, 2006
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

Facts:

84

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency
was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings
should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The
petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on,
levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly

withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and-controlled
corporations upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also
argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one
person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus,
respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The
government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the
tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of
Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.

85

Held:

1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of

the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares.
MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock

corporation must have members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform

efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the

instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police
authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all
the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

86

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of
the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property
of public dominion as one intended for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges
to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the
bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such
fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees
are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually
use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use
the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the
commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy
on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will

87

happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the
Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n
MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is
clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on
behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of
conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation
to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of
Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the
beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by
the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to
the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are
exempted from payment of the real property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private
entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

88

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it
won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base
that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific
preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a
function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.

89

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered
under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of
Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two
parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters
from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See
should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do
it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied
the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by
entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was

90

also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally
accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall
form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission
in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the
Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the
immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit
but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is
non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of
the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental
(non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather
because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were
dismissed accordingly.

91

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS:

Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the

US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American
serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as
the activity exchange manager.
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford
managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her &
told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made
on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on
her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing
irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day
& she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees
are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrongdoing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a
wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos
for theft and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store
manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her
undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not
motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c

92

is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and
exemplary damages of P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of
filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from
suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the
performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of
1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power &
authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation &
defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective
command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at
base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant
to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that
Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties
w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that:
(1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and
since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3)
Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to
present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC
ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless,
oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded
P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual
expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining
RTC from enforcing decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not
performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental
acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside
the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee
are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is
under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of
the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right
to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She

93

further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine
WON Bradford is immune.

ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave
of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present
case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its
motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily
appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction.

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to

dismiss. - NO

Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec.
1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is
necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC
should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is
immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the
SC.

3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO

Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the
state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay
damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be
formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where

94

the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
& injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action
against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit
against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will
not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
& personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public
official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official
is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred
with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely
because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts
done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the
exception to the doctrine of state immunity.

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of
the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their
official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001

Lesson: Criminal acts not immune

Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention

FACTS:

95

2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey
Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB

MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal
processes

RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the
Philippines annulled and set aside the order of MTC

SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to
officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute and is limited on the official capacity
and immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty

A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official

capacity

issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is

still for the trial court to determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is

immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private
or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any
offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the
fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity

96

If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the DFA

CALLADO VS. IRRI

G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an
official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other
evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that
the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived
the same.

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its
immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from
an employer-employee relationship.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no merit in
petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential
Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

97

Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its
position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically
informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine
of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at
bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to
which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air
Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to
cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area
not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after
investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him
guilty and recommended his dismissal.

98

3.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust

operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of
the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial,
petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it
was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.

4.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US
military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants
beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny
this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus
incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of
our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge
of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be

99

regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with
its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA
a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither
may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of
their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii)
that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions

granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants
as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the
alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available.
Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in
its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground
that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove,
as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter

100

testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the
United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer

study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded
their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made
by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL
AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED
ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs
Guinto)

Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions.

No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

G.R. No.s 171947-48 Case Digest

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Concerned Citizens
vs MMDA
Ponente: Velasco

Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up,
rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the
water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law
(esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

101

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the
beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the
DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay.
Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the
study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the
cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that
the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions.

Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of
petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and
how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decisionmaking process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

102

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth
not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given
by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has

deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to

contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case
of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate,
to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Note:

103

- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial
duty is one that requires neither official discretion nor judgment.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,

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settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is

gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to

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conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

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opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents

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The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those
of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether

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occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through

the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

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WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents
to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his
own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right
to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore

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inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the
same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined
that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine

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elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v.

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014

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In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of
the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Acts.
The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for
non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus,
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled
that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents
the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he
is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The Court likewise
cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to explain that [s]tanding is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the petitioners
has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each

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of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief
Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these
cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners
included. As such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its
broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation
Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.
The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from the various
departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased
appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the savings and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support other priority
PAPs.
Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs,
Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the
savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation
in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested
in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.

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It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for
only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to portions
or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance
which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets.
The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of savings in order to
have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
appropriations under the GAAs.
The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert to the
General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal
year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a
condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed
resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project,
be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this
Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the savings
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in
the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive
was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the
GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of
the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to
undo the principle of separation of powers.

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Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment
any item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds
cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of
Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5).
No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a
finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law
should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such
parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain
why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law
or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is
resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the implementation
of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative
fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

Dacudao vs. DOJ

[Civil Law: Effectivity of laws; general rule: no retroactive effect; exception: when
law is procedural in nature]

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Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of

Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles
and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it
was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy
Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the
Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according
to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and
right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the
Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed
issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those
already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of
the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in
nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or
modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but
operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing
rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural law.

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MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's
license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on
August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter
to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license,
and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for
preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion
to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of
the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

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Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of
1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as
a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of
"metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations,
whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding,"
and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."

Alfeo Vivas, on his behalf and on behalf of the Shareholders of the Eurocredit
Community Bank, Petitioner, vs. The Monetary Board of the BSP and the PDIC,
Respondents.
GR No. 191424; August 7, 2013

Facts: The Monetary Board placed the Eurocredit Community Bank under Prompt
Corrective Action framework on account of the findings of serious findings and

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supervisory concerns. Vivas moved for the reconsideration of such action. ECBI also
unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from inspecting its books and records.
The MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership, because of its
inability to pay its liabilities, insufficient realizable assets and violation of cease and
desist order of the MB for acts constituting unsound banking practices. Vivas argued
that the MB committed grave abuse of discretion for placing ECBI under
receivership without prior notice and hearing, pursuant to RA 7353, Sec. 11.

Issue: Whether or not the MB committed grave abuse of discretion in placing ECBI
under receivership without notice and hearing.

Ruling:
No, the MB did not gravely abuse its discretion. The ECBI was given every
chance to be heard and improve its financial standing. Moreover, the MB has the
power to forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without
prior notice and hearing, when the circumstances warrant it. Under RA 7653, the MB
was given with more power of closure and placement of a bank in receivership for
insolvency or if the continuance in the business would result in the loss of
depositors or creditors. The close now, hear later doctrine was justified on
practical and legal considerations to preclude unwarranted dissipation of the banks
assets and as valid exercise of police power to protect creditors, depositors,
stockholders and the general public.

UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND; Hornbook doctrine is that
neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act beyond
the Constitutions mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power
beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As
elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION; LEGISLATIVE OR

EXECUTIVE ACTS ARE VOID. Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found
by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a
law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x x

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN HARMONY OF THE

CONSTITUTION. Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the Constitution. In a long line of cases, the cardinal
principle of construction established is that a statute should be interpreted to assure
its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command
or prescription. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative,
if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two
or more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it may be necessary, for this
purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.

POLITICAL LAW; MEANING OF QUALIFIED VOTERS THEREIN.Pursuant to established

jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be
construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the
plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a
city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under
Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly affected" shall
participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the
supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified
voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city
proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW; POLITICAL UNITS DIRECTLY AFFECTED; DEFINED.In identifying the

LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate
will be "directly affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC
and Padilla v. COMELEC are worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of
the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be
altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it

imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the

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plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or

merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable
to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected.

Giron vs. COMELEC Digest

G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent, ALMARIO

E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-inIntervention.

SERENO, CJ:

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the

constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act.

Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires:
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. He avers that these provisions are unrelated to the
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12
refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto
resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective

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certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently
holding in a permanent capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one
title rule?

HELD: The petition must fail.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid,
sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the
invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the
Fair Election Act.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters

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which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public.

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

Facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the
absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,
following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April
23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001,
October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were
issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the
use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President;
hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits
according to the State Auditor.
DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings
for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient
portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the
following manner: x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation
had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years
savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years
savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use

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of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward
to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits,
being part of the administrations 10-point action program to quote I will order
immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology
Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting
authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439,
please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging
the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY
1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April
12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in
the GAA of 1998.
Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5)
which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Held:

NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings
from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control
and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use
savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such
power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the
doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official
acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the
President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the

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year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted
on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A.
9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the
Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in
Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional
for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as
required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In
relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on
the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the
Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on
the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

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The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case,
the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on

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October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political

crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix

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William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No.

190529. April 29, 2010]

03
OCT
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of

registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for

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reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu

proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the
law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

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(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically
opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated
for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
[COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is]
obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not
to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:

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ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a

country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and
declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province
of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President
Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and
apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall
be composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as
well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the

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Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum

population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical
effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null
and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section
5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative,
with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum
population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of
1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present
of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of
the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the
deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

Neri vs. Senate

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours
relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the
President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

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Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri,

requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with
Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with China. Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a
result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive

Privilege. xxx we are convinced that the communications elicited by the questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the Right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Is the senate correct?

ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,

it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its
power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The right of
Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot

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be equated with the peoples right to public information. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right
of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not
have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
E.O. 464. Is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of
E.O. 464?

ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept
of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or

through the Executive Secretary by order of the President. Did Executive
Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the
President?

ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he
expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more
than enough compliance.

May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
particularity?

ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which

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the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and coequal department. (Senate v. Ermita)

Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?

ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of
the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent
Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that
the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the
contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent
Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and
ordering his immediate arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)

ROMERO V. ESTRADA (2009)

G.R. No. 174105
Promulgated:

April 2, 2009

Petitioners:
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ,
REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME
R. CANLAS
Respondent:
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
Ponente:

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders,
Inc., were invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The

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said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of

Republic Act 8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?
HELD
YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of
the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC
is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting
as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

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Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties
in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution
of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the
Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent

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threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat
to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of
major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by
the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of

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Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct
congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our
traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list
elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to
campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which
participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven
parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted,
yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58%
each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would
have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast,
only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155
parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the
time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the
party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In
ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and
powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who
have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow
major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we
will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the
graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

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However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible
2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the
House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party list system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats
the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in
the enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the
raison detre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans
Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to partylist representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be
realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically
impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system can never exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a

threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was
explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate
concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a
minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a
fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their
seats within the system;

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5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the

elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the
party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative
districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote
requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable
changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution,
because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides
a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law,
R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the
constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike
down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not
simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the
duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all
times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment
that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

RESOLUTION

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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against
respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999,
which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent
Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held
the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the
office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable
organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which
are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD
1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since

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Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the
Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they
create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with
regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II.

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

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NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature;
it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very
lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider
the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit

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in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention
and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.
The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized
with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate
the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like
any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the

government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto
imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving
the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was
never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to

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almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely
and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects
on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO.
209287, July 1, 2014
In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts
and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and
the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations
Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.

The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in
the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).

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Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.

Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the
Supreme Court ruled that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action
rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although
such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The
Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to
explain that [s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.

Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the

petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as
to confer locus standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues
center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate
public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that
are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its
broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the

Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget
process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget
Execution; and (4) Accountability.

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The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments
and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and
(3) applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program,
activity or project] or to support other priority PAPs.

Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of
the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive
as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional
mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need
to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.

Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not
contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to
faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He
could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and
identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart
from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI
of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law].

Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the
Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need

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for such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized.
This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse.

Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs
refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from
any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or
final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.

The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of
savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal
year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations under the
GAAs.

The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to
revert to the General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at
the end of the fiscal year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by
declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to
the end of the fiscal year.

Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and
2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to
be augmented must be deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence
in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon
implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by
augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in
this Act.

The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held
that the savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not

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covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the
Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in
line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such
authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful
to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs
was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public
wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending
power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of
separation of powers.

Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the

President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their offices, such
that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds,

the plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed.
Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under
Section 25(5).

No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated

against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others
could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few
legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds
under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators
could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The
requirement was not met here.

Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of
the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an

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operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored
or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional
law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or
executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies
only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application.

The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the
real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical
and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and
the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario
would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such
burden.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed
a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said
funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

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Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming

that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary
Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for
the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides

that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).

Issues:

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I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers
to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because
whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or

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realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no crossborder transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of

funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification
from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded
the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous
projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may
cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The

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beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so
that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact
may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it
is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they
have not acted in good faith.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

1.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the
formation of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact
date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted
to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September
2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on
the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the
synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said
enactment.

Issue/s:

1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore
should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the
constitution.

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2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the
power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled
during the May 2013 elections.

Held:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local
Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government
and the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not
as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more
powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the
category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections.

2.
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that
there is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local
governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President,
within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it

that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control

over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power
includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners

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foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The

provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officersin-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the
duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints
that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from

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making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

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ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly

160

done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

Facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the

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absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,

following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April
23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001,
October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were
issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the
use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President;
hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits
according to the State Auditor.
DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings
for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient
portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the
following manner: x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation
had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years
savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years
savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use
of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward
to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits,
being part of the administrations 10-point action program to quote I will order
immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology
Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting
authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439,
please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging
the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY
1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April
12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in
the GAA of 1998.
Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5)
which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to

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augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Held:

NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings
from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control
and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use
savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such
power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the
doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official
acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the
President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the
year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted
on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

Case Digest: GR No. 183591

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela
and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec.
Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National
Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in
intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

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Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject
matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be
open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void
said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD
and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null
and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined
from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting
and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between

the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in
1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace
negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation
regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace
talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in
2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman

164

Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was
born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the
birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law,
international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and
order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all

indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have
exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-SuluPalawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those
which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two
categories, A which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the
signing and B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management
over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial
waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental

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cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate
in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to
explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the
GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive
Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall
also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the
exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed
the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

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On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for
the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the
court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere
academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue
ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their
duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts
made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O.
No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a
prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact
that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not
negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province
of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and
Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to
delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing.
Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a nongovernment organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

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On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD
has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP,
the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a
general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a
voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does
not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff
is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the
GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than
ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the
same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in
another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of
the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have
already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects
the lives of the public at large.

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As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty
of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in
a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It
is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to
hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with
reasonable safeguards the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a
statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the
State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the
twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct
of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law
states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary
to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent
Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive
privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Courts order to
the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to
such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels
on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD
is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the

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free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially
noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince
they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question
that they cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The

parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted
from the international law. In international law, association happens when two
states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while
maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that
are consistent with the international definition of association which fairly would
deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at
any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because
the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond
what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have
such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated
entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The
court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM.
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the

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MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE
includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the
ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not
participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the
ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its
territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the
powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20,
art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to
vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC
ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new
legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making
power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the countrys sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states,
the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be
amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize
national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the
BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory
in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption
of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically
distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is

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contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of
Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the
ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law
which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part
of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long
been recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the
internal and external self-determinationinternal, meaning the self-pursuit of man
and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to
the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded
in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the
right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only
to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national
territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous

peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or
secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination;
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the
indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the
State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With
regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States
to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

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On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be

had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum
of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance to the territorial integrity of the countrysuch was negated by the
provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the
suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on
the query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3
to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a
power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather
implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and
as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally

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implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the
assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The Presidents power is limited
only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same
but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a
term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the
GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework which changes would include
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it
being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found
in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral

declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that
renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can
bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the
fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR

G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

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FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court
order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's SmallScale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control
over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and
cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the
local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the
small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision
and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the
DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the SmallScale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural
resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is
made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local
Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make
local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not
fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial

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government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of

the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization of the country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is
the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption
is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional
where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in
accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the
resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and
Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR
Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid
and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued
by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the
DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties
are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary
exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be
equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing SmallScale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it
is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

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While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such
appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in
accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the
undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO
292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the
civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim
appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided
the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year
after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess,
GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the president was in
good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary.
She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds
a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.

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The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the
Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under
the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their
liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?

Ruling:

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The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace.
The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate
more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as
apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty
of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

360 SCRA 718 Law on Public Officers Security of Tenure in a Public Office No
Vested Right to a Public Office Power to Create and Destroy Public Office

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the
employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be
essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning

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the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that
the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other
offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them
pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the
Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to reorganize the Office
of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and
PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations
has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it
needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just
P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e.,
search and seizure and arrest.

Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no
bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices
is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to
exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing
as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary.

Canonizado v. Aguirre
323 SCRA 312
FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police
Commission when Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and

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Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851
provided that the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners were deemed
expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure.

HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not
expressly abolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National
Police Commission was under the Department of Interior and Local Government,
while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an agency attached to the
Department of Interior and Local Government. The organizational structure and the
composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except
for the addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. The powers and duties of
the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona fide
reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA
8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation
from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees from office without
legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June
7, 2011.

The claim of petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation and
administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the
allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take
over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the
region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not
take over control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to
the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary
did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
versus

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SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of

Representatives, Respondents

xx
G.R. No. 187910
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.

Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution
No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene
for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon
a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress, convening the Congress into
a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions
seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that
the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution
regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the
members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted
and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e.,
of the members of Congress without distinction as to which institution of Congress
they belong to).

Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House
Resolution No. 1109.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may
interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful

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perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of
justiciability set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving
constitutional disputes.

The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-orcontroversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In

the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves
uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road
to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been
accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review
is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any
adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene
at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure
have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and
hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.

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As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still

unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only
after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In
the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would
endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and
sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving
difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case
is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they
are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers
suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no
allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does
not infuse petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates
courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of
locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the
broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It
is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove
nothing but their cerebral deficit.

184

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court
denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the
death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No.
8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF
CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection
against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations
under international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the
death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power

185

to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of

Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course
to the petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do
not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being
discriminatory.

Issue:
1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:
No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2)
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel.

186

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack
in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons
discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly
left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification
of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the
date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is
that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of
the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of
execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1
of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not
earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all
times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor
wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained
and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
This is unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the
drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations
in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in
prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which
requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained

187

prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting
cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is
cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain
or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved
in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most
serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy,
mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to
ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all

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personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to

the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would
be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of
what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite
and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the
execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate
the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit
of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such
apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional
for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to
legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment
of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person
over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as
well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the
death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is

189

pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules
omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer
found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the threeyear reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the
omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and
implement.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and
other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

190

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over
the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006
on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which
was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M.
on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials
for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited
as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II.

THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

191

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]

justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses

192

he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that
the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.

193

However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the
power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines
in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449

194

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas

Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of
Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center,
petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre,
Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople,
Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of
the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and
Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph
E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

195

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger
of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a
taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21,
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision,
is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion
and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and
nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government
may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

Gonzales v. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for
information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple
positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles
previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the
President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer
his letter.

HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner.
The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and
utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the
inspection and copying of appointment papers.

ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

196

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized
Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system
and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a

modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for
the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing
System; and Phase III Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order

No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10,
2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility
and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president,
Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC
"due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical
and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the
Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.

197

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and
VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to
Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract
executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is
further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement
entered into with regard to this project.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste,

without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal
requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even
if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the
bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the
mandatory eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite
the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed
Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding
process, there were violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as
those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the automated election
system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the
failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of
Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the
bidding for the automated counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral
Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major
areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A.

Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder

198

B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical
tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the
award, and their effect on the present controversy

In view of the bidding process

Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and
by what standards or criteria the condition, performance and/or readiness of the
machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the passing
mark.

The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the
manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the development of three (3) types of
software, which are intended for use in the following:
1.

Evaluation of Technical Bids

2.

Testing and Acceptance Procedures

3.

Election Day Use."

In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to
award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the basis of the operation of
the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore nothing but a
sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be used
on election day.

What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was
the subject of the Contract was still to be created and could conceivably undergo
innumerable changes before being considered as being in final form?

In view of awarding of contract

The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for
Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election) mandated the use of a twoenvelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was
meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform

199

the contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid
Envelope itself.

The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of

incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT
certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary evidence to
establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities
to perform the contract; and financial documents, including audited financial
statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial capacity.

However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement,

consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed
among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows that,
during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the
alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the
arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure
delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest.

In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners suing in their capacities as taxpayers,
registered voters and concerned citizens respond that the issues central to this
case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified
entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process.
Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the
people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government.
Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves
disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest
requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a
claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being
"deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law."

200

In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28
serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against
the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was signed by/for,
inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol.
Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure
outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1)
(2)

when there is a violation of due process,

when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction,
(4)

when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5)

when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8)

when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9)

when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

(10)

when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention."

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

201

(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs
decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the
respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art
VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:

202

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a

Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in
crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme
Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives, Respondents

xx
G.R. No. 187910
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.

203

Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution
No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene
for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon
a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress, convening the Congress into
a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions
seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that
the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution
regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the
members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted
and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e.,
of the members of Congress without distinction as to which institution of Congress
they belong to).

Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House
Resolution No. 1109.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may
interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful
perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of
justiciability set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving
constitutional disputes.

The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-orcontroversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action

204

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In

the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves
uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road
to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been
accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review
is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any
adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene
at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure
have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and
hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.

As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still

unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only
after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In
the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would
endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and

205

sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving
difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case
is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they
are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers
suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no
allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.

The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does
not infuse petitioners with locus standi

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates
courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of
locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the
broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It
is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove
nothing but their cerebral deficit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman

and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR
ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO
ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGAMENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III,
MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA,

206

SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM

SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and
the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the
Members of the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who

have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic
or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent
and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower
individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the
authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact,
a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF

must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel.

207

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial
review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by
the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:

I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested
the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the
sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have
been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional
spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the
assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

208

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose
sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify
the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court
cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly
legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend

projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by
the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that

individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So
long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and
the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________

NOTES:

209

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

(1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2)
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3)
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4)

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

GUTIERREZ VS. HR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE DIGEST

G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner

v.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES,
JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER
MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS,
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE
OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES
LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents, FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

FACTS:

210

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as the
Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by
Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.

The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker

Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.

Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante
order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.

They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it
was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.

ISSUES:

211

Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication.

Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule.

HELD: The petition lacks mert.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Impeachment

First issue:

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment

complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot
thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated
against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

Second issue:

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment

proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. However, the term initiate means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which
must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of
said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petition is DISMISSED.

212

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates
the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring wouldbe spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

213

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is
valid

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

* HELD:

A.

1. NO.

2. NO.

3.

a.) NO.

b.) YES.

214

c.) NO.

4. YES.

5. NO.

6. NO.

7. NO.

8. NO.

B. NO.

C. NO.

* RATIO:

1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.

215

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The
Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

216

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a
duly-licensed physician.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective.

3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner
to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to

217

another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based

on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and

hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers
to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so
(Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and
perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While
penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionallyprotected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24
of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible
distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this
freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the
life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted
provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means
to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other
secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA
6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of
Women).

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or

218

reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.

4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only
the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3,
Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also antifamily and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures.

5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

219

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The
right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section
23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

220

7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs
of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b
of this digest.)

B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not
a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA
not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover

221

health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA
Act of 2009).

C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments.
Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these

services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. CASE 2014-0041: CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, PETITIONER,- versus MARICELLE M. CORTES, Respondent. (G.R. No.
200103, 23 APRIL 2014, ABAD J.) SUBJECT/S: NEPOTISM (BRIEF TITLE: CIVIL SERVICE
VS CORTES)

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 11, 2011
and Resolution dated January 10, 2012 of the Comi of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 115380
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated
March 2, 2010 affirming the CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30, 2008
invalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being nepotistic
is hereby REINSTATED.

222

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS NEPOTISM?

NEPOTISM IS DEFINED IN SECTION 59 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AS AN

APPOINTMENT ISSUED IN FAVOR OF A RELATIVE WITHIN THE THIRD CIVIL DEGREE
OF CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY OF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:

(1) APPOINTING AUTHORITY;

(2) RECOMMENDING AUTHORITY;

(3) CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OR OFFICE; AND

(4) PERSON EXERCISING IMMEDIATE SUPERVISION OVER THE APPOINTEE.

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS?

YES, AS FOLLOWS:

(1) PERSONS EMPLOYED IN A CONFIDENTIAL CAPACITY;

(2) TEACHERS;

(3) PHYSICIANS; AND

223

(4) MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES.

CORTEZ WAS APPOINTED AT CHR AS INFORMATION OFFICER. IS HER APPOINTMENT

COVERED BY THE PROHIBITION ON NEPOTISM?

YES. SHE IS THE DAUGHTER OF CHR COMMISSIONER MALLARI. AND SHE IS NOT
COVERED BY THE EXCEPTIONS.

RESPONDENT CORTES ARGUES THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY REFERRED TO IN

SECTION 59 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IS THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND NOT
THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS WHO COMPOSE IT.
IS HER ARGUMENT
CORRECT?

NO. TO RULE THAT THE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO THE COMMISSION, AND NOT
TO THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS WHO COMPOSE IT, WILL RENDER THE PROHIBITION
MEANINGLESS. APPARENTLY, THE COMMISSION EN BANC, WHICH IS A BODY
CREATED BY FICTION OF LAW, CAN NEVER HAVE RELATIVES TO SPEAK OF.

FURTHER, IF ACTS THAT CANNOT BE LEGALLY DONE DIRECTLY CAN BE DONE

INDIRECTLY, THEN ALL LAWS WOULD BE ILLUSORY.

BUT COMMISSIONER MALLARI ABSTAINED FROM VOTING ON HER APPOINTMENT. DID

HIS ABSENTION NOT CURE THE NEPOTISTIC CHARACTER OF THE APPOINTMENT?

NO BECAUSE THE EVIL SOUGHT TO BE AVOIDED BY THE PROHIBITION STILL EXISTS.

HIS MERE PRESENCE DURING THE DELIBERATION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF IO V
CREATED AN IMPRESSION OF INFLUENCE AND CAST DOUBT ON THE IMPARTIALITY
AND NEUTRALITY OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC.

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

224

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates
the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners

b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling
medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious objections

c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring wouldbe spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

225

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
determine WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is
valid

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

* HELD:

A.

1. NO.

2. NO.

3.

a.) NO.

b.) YES.

c.) NO.

4. YES.

226

5. NO.

6. NO.

7. NO.

8. NO.

B. NO.

C. NO.

* RATIO:

1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is
that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

227

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn
child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The
Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a
duly-licensed physician.

228

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the
contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated
and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe,
legal, non-abortificient and effective.

3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion,
and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner
to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based
on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.

229

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and

hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers
to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so
(Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and
perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While
penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionallyprotected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24
of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible
distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this
freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the
life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted
provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means
to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other
secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA
6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of
Women).

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or
reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.

4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only
the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional

230

safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3,
Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also antifamily and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures.

5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education.

231

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The
right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other

interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section
23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs

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of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education

program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b
of this digest.)

B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not
a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA
not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover
health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA
Act of 2009).

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C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments.
Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it
has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these

services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These
provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

92 SCRA 358 Political Law Constitutional Law Constitutional Commissions The

Commission on Elections COMELECs Constitutional Independence

In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a

fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he
has to vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then
President Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in
an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging
that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come
from the President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the
constitutional independence of the COMELEC.

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HELD: Yes. Yoracs designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme

Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their
functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was
merely grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the functions
of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on
statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose whom to sit
temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by
choosing the most senior member).

But even though the presidents appointment of Yorac as acting president is void,
the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman
the point here is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman
pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

AKBAYAN YOUTH VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066, March 26 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters
ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register
on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189.

A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17

and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that
the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.

HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of
new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus
missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the
President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the
conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in
Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. Read full text

Cagas vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012)

Facts: Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of

Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast
transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing
of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the
winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. Alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010. The Comelec issues
orders stating that the protestant paid the cash deposit for filing of the case, and his
petition set out specific acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider, which
was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari directly with the SC.

Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition for insufficiency of
form.

Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly assail
the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to
seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the
Division in due course. The court may have the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a

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Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion
or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to
an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856 March 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno Lim both filed certificates of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd district of Albay in the May
10, 2010 election. Lim was the incumbent Congressman while Gonzales was the
former Governor of Albay. On March 30, 2010 a petiton for disqualification and
cancellation of certificate of candidacy was filed by Stephen Bichara on the ground
that Gonzales is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a spanish father
and a filipino mother, and that failed to elect Philippines citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act no. 625.
And that his certificate of candidacy contains misleading information. The Comelec
second division division disqualified Gonzales in the forthcoming National and Local
elections. Gonzales thru counsel, received a copy of the aforesaid resolution on May
11, 2010. Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of Canvassers to consider the votes
cast for Gonzales as stray or not counted and/or suspend his proclamation, citing
the second divisions May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzales as a candidate.
PBOC dismissed the petition stating that the period for filing the of a motion for
reconsideration of the comelec resolution has not yet elapsed, and hence, the same
is not yet final and executory. Based on the results of the counting, Gonzales
emerged as the winner having garnered a total vote of 96000 while Lim ranked
second with a vote of 68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC officially proclaimed
Gonzales as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd district of Albay.

Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a Representative which was officially
proclaimed as a winner.

Held: We have constantly held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the house of rep. the comelecs

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jurisdiction over election, returns, and qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. We declared that the court does not have jurisdiction to pass
upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was already a member of the
house at the time of the filing of the petition for cerctiorari.

G.R. NO. 191771,

MAY 06, 2010

LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND

SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA,PETITIONERVS.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B.
VILLAR AND NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as
dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NPNPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority
party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM)
case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an
accreditation case

On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as
dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NPNPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority
party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM)
case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an
accreditation case.

ISSUES:

I.

Preliminary Issues:

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A. Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical

infirmities?
B.
Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the
unsettled NP-NPC issue?
C. Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for
registration, time-barred?
D. Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and
recognize without need of registration?

II.
Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the
petition?

III.
On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it
gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the NP-NPC?
A.

Was due process observed in granting the registration?

B. Did the coalition take place as required by law:

i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?

ii.in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the
coalition?

RULING:

The court see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests
involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise now fast
approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant
parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide - particularly, the on-line real
time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate

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access to official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers
of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and
distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings - constitute distinct
advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information
enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The value of these
advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose
effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To
the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are
evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and
translate in no small measure to transparency and to the election's credibility, bypassing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not anyway affect the
integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and
concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the
parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive
roles and tasks in the coming elections.

The respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their
objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of
these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule
the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we
considered above.

When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctable through the original civil action of certiorari."

The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for
registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While
the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in
fact decreed the NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation
aspect of the petition.

The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are
two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is

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the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our
election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of
discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move;
otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view
of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to
forestall an event - the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall
soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the
registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a past and
accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based
on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless.

In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of
registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of
deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the registration of political
organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural
orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to introduce late and
confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on
election systems and procedures. This, the en banc very well knows, and their lack
of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how unusual the majority's
reading has been.

We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of electionrelated activities that peaks in the voting on May 10, 2010. This list takes into
account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in
implementing the automated election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely
related activity is the holding of political conventions to select and nominate official
party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, and
November 20, 2009 was the deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy
for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the candidates'
manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a host of election
activities in which officially registered parties have to participate, principally: the
examination and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of
source codes for review; the nomination of official watchers; and the printing,
storage and distribution of official ballots wherein accredited political parties may
assign watchers. Of course, registered political parties have very significant
participation on election day, during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs

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to receive advance information and make arrangements on which ones are the
registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.

All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory;
the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least suffer disruptions, if the deadlines
are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected
applications for registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the
application of the political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where the
COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time,among
other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only
political party whose application for registration was denied at the COMELEC level
for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late
filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.

Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change the
en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC
as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to
register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline.
Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been
satisfied and was not.
Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and
procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded
by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly
registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal
registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their
and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official
recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their
coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions,
including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There
are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms.

The court solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a
coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises
critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with
the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at

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its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures
the Constitution and our laws impose.
the court grants the petition and nullify and set aside the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of
the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition as a political coalition, docketed
as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting
accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for
lack of the requisite registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared
immediately executory.

[ G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009 ]

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R. BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F.
LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO,
FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, AND ALVIN A. PETERS,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. CHAIRMAN
JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE, REPRESENTED BY
ITS CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION AND SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

MOVANT-INTERVENOR.

VELASCO JR., J.:

Facts

On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the first automated

election law, RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which
amendment took effect on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:

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Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different

provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as
it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises:
Provided, that for the regular national and local election, which shall be held
immediately after effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be
chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding regular national or local elections,
the AES shall be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC did not use any automated election system in the 14 May 2007
elections, the national and local elections held after RA 9369 took effect.

On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM and Smartmatic
(Provider), on the other, signed the Contract for the automated tallying and
recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For
P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections
82,200 optical scanners (and related equipment) and hired ancillary services of the
Provider.

On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed this petition[4] to enjoin
the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the
terms of the Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its
subcontractors.[5] Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance
with the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial
use of an automated election system before deploying it nationwide. To further
support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1) the
optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems
capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to
submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community
of interest" among its constituent corporations as required in Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech).

Issue

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Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it entered to

contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to an automated election.

Ruling

Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA
8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which
petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have
complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the
corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of
discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And
surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company
as partner.

The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer
of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct
of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be
justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be
afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means and
initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was
created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should
be for, too often, COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult conditions to
address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from
interfering with the COMELECs exercise of its power which, by law and by the
nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from
utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that
body.

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience
are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In
the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x
x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative
which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the
independent character of the Commission x x x requires that the power of this court

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to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly,
but firmly in appropriate cases.

.This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary

powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The
road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be
rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would
accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all
men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the
Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

IBRAHIM VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192289, JANUARY 8, 2013

KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROLAN G.

BUAGAS, Respondents.

REYES, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as

municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then
Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law
Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered
voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name. cjuris

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009

disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted
Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through

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a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the
Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was
issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita
B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where
he seeks to be elected. cjuris

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had
not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the ViceMayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition. cjuris

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed resolutions. cjuris

HELD: The petition is meritorious. cjuris

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Comelec

The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for

the position of Vice-Mayor. cjuris

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions,
ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed
against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against
Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his
municipality disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of
Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition
had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and
jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions. cjuris

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REMEDIAL LAW: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64

Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the
COMELEC en banc. cjuris

Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed
by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of
the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant
Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation
controversy.

Petition is GRANTED.

APO Fruits Corp. et al vs Court of Appeals, Land Bank of the Philippines

647 SCRA 207 Political Law Doctrine of Transcendental Importance Eminent

Domain

Still not satisfied, Land Bank filed a second motion for reconsideration with request
for oral arguments. The Solicitor General also sought to intervene (rightly so
because of the amount involved). Land Bank assails the applicability of the Doctrine
of Transcendental Importance as applied by the SC in awarding interest in favor of
AFC and HPI. Land Bank argues that the said doctrine cannot be applied because
neither life nor liberty is involved in this case. Land Bank insisted that the real issue
in this case is the mere payment of money, a private claim, which in no way affects
public interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not Land Bank is correct.

HELD: No. This case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter
of public interest the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed

248

right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the
government exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.
A proper computation of just compensation will encourage more people to
participate in the land reform program of the government.

Note: Motion for oral arguments was denied. Sol-Gens motion to intervene was
likewise denied because SC said the government was already well represented by
Land Bank. Finally, SC ruled no further pleading on this case shall be entertained
and parties may be subjected to disciplinary actions if further pleadings are filed.

Case Digest: LBP vs Enrique Livioco

GR No 170685

September 22, 2010

Facts:
Livioco was the owner of a 30.6329 hectares sugarland. Sometime in 1987 to 1988
he offered his sugarland to the DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P 30.00 per
square meter, for a total of P 9,189,870.00. The voluntary offer-to-sell form he
submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential
subdivision and to an international paper mill.

LBP valuated the 26 hectares of such land for P 827,943.48 at P 3.21 per square
meter. Livioco was promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of
the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending his submission of the
requirements. LBP did not act upon the notice given to him by both government
agencies. Thereafter the LBP issued a certification to the ROD that it has earmarked
the just compensation for Livioco's 26 hectares.

After 2 years, Livioco then requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the
ground that its value had already increased from the time it was first offered for
sale. The DAR denied the request for the sale was already perfected. DAR
proceeded to take possession of the property and awarded CLOA's to 26 qualified
beneficiaries. Livioco then filed a complaint to cancel the CLOA's and to recover his
property and a petition for reconveyance which all led to futility.

249

Finally, Livioco filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation

contending that between 1900 and 2000, his property has become predominantly
residential, hence he should be paid his property's value as such. LBP in its answer
averred that they are justified in the P 3.21 per square meter valuation of the
property on the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA 6657 and
DAR AO 3, LBP objected that his property should be valued as a residential land for
the same was acquired for agricultural purposes, and not for its potential conversion
to other use.

In the RTC, the decision rendered was that Livioco was able to prove the higher
valuation of his property, hence, the valuation should be P 700.00 per square meter
for the 24.2088 hectares of land and LBP cannot substantiate support its P 3.21
valuation by documentary evidences. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
What is the just compensation of Livioco's property?

Ruling:
The court ruled that, for purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking. As to the character of the property it refers to its actual use at the time of
the taking and not its potential uses. Therefore the property's character is
agricultural; As to the price of the land Sec. 17 of RA 6657 should be considered.
The evidence presented by Livioco was irrelevent to the factors under Sec. 17 of Ra
6657.

Hence, both parties failed to adduce evidence of the property's value and an
agricultural land at the time of the taking and is remanded to RTC for determination
of just compensation.

MCIAA v. Inocian, G.R. No. 168812

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

250

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of MCIAA sought
to acquire several lots in Lahug, Cebu for the proposed expansion of the Lahug
Airport. Some of the owners of these lots refused to sell their properties because the
proposed price was unacceptably way below the market value of the lands at that
time.

As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining the then existing
Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the right to
repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the event
that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some
landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their
properties became defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of
the Philippines before the CFI of Cebu docketed as Civil Case R-1881 entitled RP vs.
Damian Ouano.

The trial court declared the expropriated lots along with the other adjoining lands,
condemned for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject lands
were transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently
turned over to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990.

Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its functions and
operations were transferred to the Mactan Airport at the end of 1991, some of the
heirs of the original owners wrote to the President and the MCIAA General Manager,
requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot. Written and verbal
demands were ignored by the MCIAA.

Hence, the heirs of original owners filed complaint for reconveyance and damages
with the RTC of Cebu City against MCIAA.

The Ouanos here are the heirs of the original owner of Lot 763-A, while the Inocians'
claimed rights to Lots 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, and the Suicos' claim
pertained to 942, and 947, all of which were expropriated under CC R-1881.

Main Issue: Whether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right to repurchase or secure reconveyance
of their respective properties.

251

Specific issues:

I. Whether abandonment of the pubic purpose for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos and Inocians to reacquire them;

II. Whether the Ouanos and Inocians are entitled to reconveyance of the subject
properties simply on the basis of an alleged verbal promise of NAC officials that the
properties will be returned if the airport project would be abandoned.

RULING:

Yes. The former owners of the expropriated lots have the right to repurchase their
properties.

The Supreme Court emphasized the undisputed facts upon which the decision was
premised:

First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots
subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose
they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and
development of Lahug Airport.

Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant
portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development
as a commercial complex.

Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC,

through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners
that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are
no longer used for airport purposes.

252

The Supreme Court adhered to the precedents set in the previous cases of Heirs of
Moreno vs. MCIAA and MCIAA vs. Tudtud whose disputed lots are also part of Civil
Case R-1881, because in all respects, the present petition revolved around the same
milieu as that of the aforecited case.

The Supreme Court maintained that the title of the MCIAA over the expropriated lots
is not absolute as it is subject to the condition of using the lot for public purpose.
Thus, "the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as
may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties."

"While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the
survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but
instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these meaningful statements in the
body of the Decision contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport
expansion project were abandoned."

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there
should foremost be an express condition in the dispositive portion of the decision
before the condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the
purpose for its taking has been abandoned or ended.

The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by
the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be
recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In
fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed
to their previous owners. This belated news further bolsters the fact that the
purpose for which the properties were condemned has been abandoned.

As to the contention that the Ouano and the Inocians cannot lay claim on the verbal
promise as barred by the Statute of Frauds, the Supreme Court held that the Statue
of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially
consummated contracts. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not
either object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow

253

the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the

occurrence of certain events. Notably, objection on the admissibility of evidence on
the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised.

It was reiterated that the old Fery doctrine was revisited in the fairly recent case of
Lozada in that "the fee simple concept underpinning it is no longer compelling,
considering the ensuing inequity such application entails."

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for
public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of
the land if the condemning party would continues to use the property for public
purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a
public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee simple. The government's
taking of private property, and then transferring it to private persons under the
guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense power of
eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and unconstitutional state's power to oblige a
landowner to renounce his productive and invaluable possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for his own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

Thus, the MCIAA was ordered to reconvey the subject properties with a right to
retain the fruits thereof, and the Inocians, Ouano, Suicos are ordered to reimburse
MCIAA of the amount of just compensation with a right to retain the interest
therefrom.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. JUST COMPENSATION.
G.R. No. 164195,
April 5, 2011

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

254

APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5
parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October
1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered
P86.9 million for AFCs land and P164.40 million for HPIs land (total of about P251.3
million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for
Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on
14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the
land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank of
the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs account as
down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers
under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for
determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a
decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered
from assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by
DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC
and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation.

FACTS:
No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an
agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just
compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and
HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based
its ruling on evidence. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the
purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such
evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them emptyhanded while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer
the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.

255

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court
that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and in the
abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it
does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on
AFCs and HPIs lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weatherroad network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others,
wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them
up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the
residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore.
The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less

256

consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties,

its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is
entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with
12% interest per annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just
compensation or P138 million.August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended
by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of
islands.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence
undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over
those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

257

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a

codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does
not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP
is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to
forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046
and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself
commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the
rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

258

Case Digest: LBP vs Enrique Livioco

GR No 170685

September 22, 2010

Facts:
Livioco was the owner of a 30.6329 hectares sugarland. Sometime in 1987 to 1988
he offered his sugarland to the DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P 30.00 per
square meter, for a total of P 9,189,870.00. The voluntary offer-to-sell form he
submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential
subdivision and to an international paper mill.

LBP valuated the 26 hectares of such land for P 827,943.48 at P 3.21 per square
meter. Livioco was promptly informed of the valuation and that the cash portion of
the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending his submission of the
requirements. LBP did not act upon the notice given to him by both government
agencies. Thereafter the LBP issued a certification to the ROD that it has earmarked
the just compensation for Livioco's 26 hectares.

After 2 years, Livioco then requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the
ground that its value had already increased from the time it was first offered for
sale. The DAR denied the request for the sale was already perfected. DAR
proceeded to take possession of the property and awarded CLOA's to 26 qualified
beneficiaries. Livioco then filed a complaint to cancel the CLOA's and to recover his
property and a petition for reconveyance which all led to futility.

Finally, Livioco filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation

contending that between 1900 and 2000, his property has become predominantly
residential, hence he should be paid his property's value as such. LBP in its answer
averred that they are justified in the P 3.21 per square meter valuation of the
property on the ground that it was made pursuant to the guidelines in RA 6657 and
DAR AO 3, LBP objected that his property should be valued as a residential land for
the same was acquired for agricultural purposes, and not for its potential conversion
to other use.

In the RTC, the decision rendered was that Livioco was able to prove the higher
valuation of his property, hence, the valuation should be P 700.00 per square meter

259

for the 24.2088 hectares of land and LBP cannot substantiate support its P 3.21
valuation by documentary evidences. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
What is the just compensation of Livioco's property?

Ruling:
The court ruled that, for purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking. As to the character of the property it refers to its actual use at the time of
the taking and not its potential uses. Therefore the property's character is
agricultural; As to the price of the land Sec. 17 of RA 6657 should be considered.
The evidence presented by Livioco was irrelevent to the factors under Sec. 17 of Ra
6657.

Hence, both parties failed to adduce evidence of the property's value and an
agricultural land at the time of the taking and is remanded to RTC for determination
of just compensation.
MCIAA v. Inocian, G.R. No. 168812
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of MCIAA sought
to acquire several lots in Lahug, Cebu for the proposed expansion of the Lahug
Airport. Some of the owners of these lots refused to sell their properties because the
proposed price was unacceptably way below the market value of the lands at that
time.

As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining the then existing
Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the right to
repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the event
that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some
landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their
properties became defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of

260

the Philippines before the CFI of Cebu docketed as Civil Case R-1881 entitled RP vs.
Damian Ouano.

The trial court declared the expropriated lots along with the other adjoining lands,
condemned for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject lands
were transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently
turned over to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990.

Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport was abandoned and all its functions and
operations were transferred to the Mactan Airport at the end of 1991, some of the
heirs of the original owners wrote to the President and the MCIAA General Manager,
requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot. Written and verbal
demands were ignored by the MCIAA.

Hence, the heirs of original owners filed complaint for reconveyance and damages
with the RTC of Cebu City against MCIAA.

The Ouanos here are the heirs of the original owner of Lot 763-A, while the Inocians'
claimed rights to Lots 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, and the Suicos' claim
pertained to 942, and 947, all of which were expropriated under CC R-1881.

Main Issue: Whether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right to repurchase or secure reconveyance
of their respective properties.

Specific issues:

I. Whether abandonment of the pubic purpose for which the subject properties were
expropriated entitles petitioners Ouanos and Inocians to reacquire them;

II. Whether the Ouanos and Inocians are entitled to reconveyance of the subject
properties simply on the basis of an alleged verbal promise of NAC officials that the
properties will be returned if the airport project would be abandoned.

261

RULING:

Yes. The former owners of the expropriated lots have the right to repurchase their
properties.

The Supreme Court emphasized the undisputed facts upon which the decision was
premised:

First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots
subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose
they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and
development of Lahug Airport.

Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant
portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development
as a commercial complex.

Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC,

through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners
that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are
no longer used for airport purposes.

The Supreme Court adhered to the precedents set in the previous cases of Heirs of
Moreno vs. MCIAA and MCIAA vs. Tudtud whose disputed lots are also part of Civil
Case R-1881, because in all respects, the present petition revolved around the same
milieu as that of the aforecited case.

The Supreme Court maintained that the title of the MCIAA over the expropriated lots
is not absolute as it is subject to the condition of using the lot for public purpose.
Thus, "the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as
may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties."

262

"While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the
presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the
survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but
instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that Lahug
Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these meaningful statements in the
body of the Decision contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport
expansion project were abandoned."

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there
should foremost be an express condition in the dispositive portion of the decision
before the condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the
purpose for its taking has been abandoned or ended.

The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by
the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be
recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In
fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed
to their previous owners. This belated news further bolsters the fact that the
purpose for which the properties were condemned has been abandoned.

As to the contention that the Ouano and the Inocians cannot lay claim on the verbal
promise as barred by the Statute of Frauds, the Supreme Court held that the Statue
of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially
consummated contracts. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not
either object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow
the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the
occurrence of certain events. Notably, objection on the admissibility of evidence on
the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised.

It was reiterated that the old Fery doctrine was revisited in the fairly recent case of
Lozada in that "the fee simple concept underpinning it is no longer compelling,
considering the ensuing inequity such application entails."

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for
public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of
the land if the condemning party would continues to use the property for public
purpose; however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a

263

public purpose, property reverts to the owner in fee simple. The government's
taking of private property, and then transferring it to private persons under the
guise of public use or purpose is the despotism found in the immense power of
eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and unconstitutional state's power to oblige a
landowner to renounce his productive and invaluable possession to another citizen,
who will use it predominantly for his own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

Thus, the MCIAA was ordered to reconvey the subject properties with a right to
retain the fruits thereof, and the Inocians, Ouano, Suicos are ordered to reimburse
MCIAA of the amount of just compensation with a right to retain the interest
therefrom.
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007
J. Carpio Morales

Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the
MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to
interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if
the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial
court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed
down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included
the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common
terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution;
and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without
due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The
trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed
its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police
power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does
not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus

264

terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service
Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of
the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce
any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that
the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.

Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?

Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory
relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must
be ripe for judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents.
The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of
income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents
claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of
law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in
the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
[the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who

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will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and
private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation
and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the
DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized
to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority
through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing
and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks
of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No.
179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to
set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate
the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management,
specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not
have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated
differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the
means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a
public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare
underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at
the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated
to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by

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the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police
power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that
needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at
all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to
"impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in
approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any
public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable
extension of its existing facilities.

DIGEST: National Power Corporation v.s. Ibrahim 526 SCRA 149 (2007)

FACTS:

Lucman G. Ibrahim instituted an action against the National Power Corporation

(NPC) for recovery of possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Sur on November 23, 1994. The complaint stated that in 1978
NPC used stealth and without permission took possession of the sub-terrain area of
the questioned lands and therein constructed underground tunnels. However, it was
only discovered in 1992, when Omar G. Maruhoms request to install a motorized
deep well was rejected by the Marawi City Water District. However, NPC refused to
vacate and / or pay damages considering that the area was prone to volcanic and
tectonic activities. Instead, NPC filed an answer stating that the respondents were

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never in possession the sub-terrain portion because they failed to present proof of
ownership and the tunnels were government projects for the benefit of all.

On August 7, 1996, The RTC denied the petition to vacate but ordered the NPC to
pay the fair market value plus damages. On June 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the original decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ibrahim owns the sub-terrain properties?

HELD:
YES. The Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion
of the property similarly belongs to Ibrahim. This conclusion is drawn from Article
437 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and
excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and
subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of the land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil
under it.
Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000)

FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills
Subdivision, San Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be
used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025.

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Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as
commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from
Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of
the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay
raised the issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its
effectivity.

HELD:

Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect
over any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO:

A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities
or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested
rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State
of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety,
and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police
power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a
legitimate police power measure.

PRC vs. De Guzman

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Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine,
Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination
conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board
observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima
College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam,
Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten
got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored
99% in OB-Gyne.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees
in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima
examinees gained early access to the test questions.
Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in
the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required
to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers

MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's
license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on
August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter
to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license,
and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for
preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion

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to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of

the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of
1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as
a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of
"metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

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* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations,
whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding,"
and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito
L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled

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AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES

PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise,
unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified
therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

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(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police
power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is

unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It
must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.

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Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process
clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that
the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police
powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable
and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys
social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment
of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community;
it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive
to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a
naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of
the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it
may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.

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Modality employed is
unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as
a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking
occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government

regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property
in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments
three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses
to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up
business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts
his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent
that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the
Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.

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Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A

zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a
wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not
noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as
we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular
taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in
its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than
the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly,
the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments

without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns,
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals
and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns
but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly

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treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does

not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of
the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of
motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to
banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an
equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension

houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City
Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general
welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit
altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.
That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,
health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance
per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel
is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.

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Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the
provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already
converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree
allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments
except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule
is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with
or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And
not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.

Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)

DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006

FACTS:

This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural

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Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on 20 June 1994
by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a
corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single

company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.

on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land
area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino.
Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration
Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same.
It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by
surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting
minerals therein.

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and

indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of
areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID
BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

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NO.

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the
foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the
specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas
on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the
latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for
at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be
acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely
facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from
violating the Anti-Dummy Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules
and regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private
properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION.

NO.

there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and
regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just
compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.

Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide
cases where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders
entry, thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the

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determination of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines

Adjudication Board is final and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing wrong with the grant of
primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to
determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected
landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to
decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite the preliminary
determination made by the administrative agency.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC
FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.

RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations.
The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial
rights over mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.

The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a
passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary,
the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the
corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY

FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING
ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

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the use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other
forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or
compatible with financial or technical assistance.

Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and
deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent
not to use the expression agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
assistance in an exclusionary and limiting manner.

WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS

NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution
was not carried over to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement
banning service contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.

the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to

in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one
hand; and on the other, the government as principal or owner of the works. In the
new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of
large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies
(DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.

OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on

the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved

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by a court of law through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial
review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power; - involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as
Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs
have been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been operating in various
provinces of the country.

(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the standing" personal or substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,
alleging more than a generalized grievance.

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.

! taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:

(1)

the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2)

the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

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(3)

the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities
to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to
public use upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police power is
the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property.

Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general
welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter
being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police
power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an
ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity
(which would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld
valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.

where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof
would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its
continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable

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taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some

public purpose, there is compensable taking.

! On different roles and responsibilities:

* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned

corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary,
the President may execute with the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279,
1987)

! in re: easements and taking

In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a
private property through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just
compensation is required. The Court declared:

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be

the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is
one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by
expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished
unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly
indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed
in such cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be
resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction
imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is
invested.

! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be
inconsistent.The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter
act.
G.R. NO. 188920, February 16, 2010
Jose Atienza, Jr., etc., petitioners

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vs COMELEC
Ponente: Abad

Facts:
July 5, 2005, Drilon, the president of LP announced his party's withdrawal of support
for the administration of PGMA but Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party
members denounced Drilon's move claiming that he made the announcement
without consulting the party.

March 2, 2006, Atienza hosted a party conference to discuss local autonomy and
party matters, when convened, the party proceeded to declare all positions in the
party vacant and elected new officers, making Atienza as the new president of LP.
Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections. Drilon
is claiming that the election was illegal because the party was not properly
convened. Drilon also claims that the officers of LP were elected to a fixed 3 year
term that was yet to end on November 2007.

Atienza claimed that the majority of LP attended the assembly and that the
amendments of LP's constitution were not properly ratified thus the term of Drilon
and other officers already ended on July 2006.

COMELEC ruled in favor of Drilon, Hence, this petition,

Issues: (1) Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an
indispensable party; (2) Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP
members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election. (3) Whether
or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO
membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president; (4) Whether or not the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the
validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the
expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; (5) Whether or not respondents Roxas, et
al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the
latters expulsion from the party.

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Held:
(1) Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for
failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party.
Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated
with finality without making the LP a party to the case.

(2) Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal
standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no
longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined
other political parties. As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the
action.

(3) . In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et

al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have
been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as
holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC
and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts decision in the earlier
cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus,
Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as party
chairman and changed the NECOs composition.

(4) Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its
jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into
the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh
heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of
the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
intra-party leadership disputes.

(5) Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a
simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their
constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO
and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily

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expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore,
covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations.

G.R. No. 187049

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs LITO MACAPANAS y ECIJA

Rape

FACTS: At around 7:30 a.m. on December 7, 1999, AAA, a student of Eastern Samar
State Agricultural College, was walking on the feeder road of Barangay XXX,
Salcedo, Eastern Samar going to the waiting shed where she was to take a ride to
school. She was 50 to 60 meters away from the waiting shed when the appellant,
wearing a makeshift ski mask and armed with a bladed weapon locally known as
sundang, grabbed her hair. Appellant poked the sundang on her side and pulled her
towards a grassy area. She tried to free herself and pleaded for mercy, but to no
avail.

When they reached a nearby stream, appellant shoved AAA towards an uninhabited
house with the knife. Inside, appellant told her to undress, but AAA did not obey.
She asked appellant to remove his mask so she could identify him. Appellant
acceded and removed his mask. Then, he ordered her anew to remove her dress.
When she refused, appellant grabbed her skirt and forcibly removed the buttons to
open her skirt. Appellant then pushed her to the floor where he removed her panty.
He mounted her and succeeded in having intercourse with her. After satisfying his
lust, appellant allowed AAA to put on her dress with a warning that he would kill her
if she tells anyone about what happened.

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When AAA saw plenty of people on the road, she shouted for help. Appellant then
stabbed her at the back and fled. AAA was brought to the Southern Samar General
Hospital where she was confined for nine (9) days.

On the third day of AAAs confinement, they suspected that something more had
happened to AAA, but she merely cried and did not answer their questions. On her
sixth day of confinement, AAA, accompanied by her mother, admitted she was also
raped.

ISSUE: Whether appellants guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING: Yes. The fact that AAA did not immediately reveal that she was raped by
appellant does not necessarily impair AAAs credibility. How the victim comported
herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Not all rape victims can be expected to act
conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees
of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an
aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given
situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.

In this case, the delay in reporting the sexual assault was reasonable and explained.
AAA adequately explained that she did not immediately inform anyone of her ordeal
because she was ashamed and afraid because appellant had threatened to kill her.
Thus, her reluctance that caused the delay should not be taken against her. Neither
can it be used to diminish her credibility nor undermine the charge of rape.

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While appellant was not placed in a police line-up for identification by AAA, the
absence of such police line-up does not make AAAs identification of appellant as
the one (1) who raped her, unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring
a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if there was no police
line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such
identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. What is
crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged
was the malefactor.

For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information and duly proved during
the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp-pointed bolo locally known as
sundang in consummating the salacious act. This circumstance was alleged in the
Information and duly proved during trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying
circumstance, use of a deadly weapon increases the penalties by degrees, and
cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only
the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the
use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. As such,
the presence of generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances will determine
whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed. When, as in this case,
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime, the minimum penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be the penalty
imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, both trial and
appellate courts properly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Exemplary damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil
Code since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon
attended the commission of the rape.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc., v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al
G.R. No. 160756. March 9, 2010

Facts: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA), an
association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines, questioned the

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validity of Section 27(E) of the Tax Code which imposes the minimum corporate
income tax (MCIT) on corporations.

Under the Tax Code, a corporation can become subject to the MCIT at the rate of 2%
of gross income, beginning on the 4th taxable year immediately following the year
in which it commenced its business operations, when such MCIT is greater than the
normal corporate income tax. If the regular income tax is higher than the MCIT, the
corporation does not pay the MCIT.

CREBA argued, among others, that the use of gross income as MCIT base amounts
to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized
gain.

CREBA also sought to invalidate the provisions of RR No. 2-98, as amended,

otherwise known as the Consolidated Withholding Tax Regulations, which prescribe
the rules and procedures for the collection of CWT on sales of real properties
classified as ordinary assets, on the grounds that these regulations:

Use gross selling price (GSP) or fair market value (FMV) as basis for determining
the income tax on the sale of real estate classified as ordinary assets, instead of the
entitys net taxable income as provided for under the Tax Code;
Mandate the collection of income tax on a per transaction basis, contrary to the
Tax Code provision which imposes income tax on net income at the end of the
taxable period;
Go against the due process clause because the government collects income tax
even when the net income has not yet been determined; gain is never assured by
mere receipt of the selling price; and
Contravene the equal protection clause because the CWT is being charged upon
real estate enterprises, but not on other business enterprises, more particularly,
those in the manufacturing sector, which do business similar to that of a real estate
enterprise.

Issues: (1) Is the imposition of MCIT constitutional? (2) Is the imposition of CWT on
income from sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets constitutional?

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Held: (1) Yes. The imposition of the MCIT is constitutional. An income tax is
arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital, because it is income, and not capital,
which is subject to income tax. However, MCIT is imposed on gross income which is
computed by deducting from gross sales the capital spent by a corporation in the
sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross sales.
Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.

Various safeguards were incorporated into the law imposing MCIT.

Firstly, recognizing the birth pangs of businesses and the reality of the need to
recoup initial major capital expenditures, the MCIT is imposed only on the 4th
taxable year immediately following the year in which the corporation commenced
its operations.

Secondly, the law allows the carry-forward of any excess of the MCIT paid over the
normal income tax which shall be credited against the normal income tax for the
three immediately succeeding years.

Thirdly, since certain businesses may be incurring genuine repeated losses, the law
authorizes the Secretary of Finance to suspend the imposition of MCIT if a
corporation suffers losses due to prolonged labor dispute, force majeure and
legitimate business reverses.

(2) Yes. Despite the imposition of CWT on GSP or FMV, the income tax base for sales
of real property classified as ordinary assets remains as the entitys net taxable
income as provided in the Tax Code, i.e., gross income less allowable costs and
deductions. The seller shall file its income tax return and credit the taxes withheld
by the withholding agent-buyer against its tax due. If the tax due is greater than the
tax withheld, then the taxpayer shall pay the difference. If, on the other hand, the
tax due is less than the tax withheld, the taxpayer will be entitled to a refund or tax
credit.

The use of the GSP or FMV as basis to determine the CWT is for purposes of
practicality and convenience. The knowledge of the withholding agent-buyer is

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limited to the particular transaction in which he is a party. Hence, his basis can only
be the GSP or FMV which figures are reasonably known to him.

Also, the collection of income tax via the CWT on a per transaction basis, i.e., upon
consummation of the sale, is not contrary to the Tax Code which calls for the
payment of the net income at the end of the taxable period. The taxes withheld are
in the nature of advance tax payments by a taxpayer in order to cancel its possible
future tax obligation. They are installments on the annual tax which may be due at
the end of the taxable year. The withholding agent-buyers act of collecting the tax
at the time of the transaction, by withholding the tax due from the income payable,
is the very essence of the withholding tax method of tax collection.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities
which result from singling out a particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe
no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be
validly treated differently from other business enterprises.

What distinguishes the real estate business from other manufacturing enterprises,
for purposes of the imposition of the CWT, is not their production processes but the
prices of their goods sold and the number of transactions involved. The income from
the sale of a real property is bigger and its frequency of transaction limited, making
it less cumbersome for the parties to comply with the withholding tax scheme. On
the other hand, each manufacturing enterprise may have tens of thousands of
transactions with several thousand customers every month involving both minimal
and substantial amounts.

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

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Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

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(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;

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3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

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Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those
of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can

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advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the

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commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial

differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

G.R. No. 189698

February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5
of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public

appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.

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b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective
office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who
hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed
COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized
or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not
ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from
their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other
civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who
hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory

governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

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(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are
created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned
than a four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification.
Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the

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purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the
same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a
Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the
example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the
entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the

functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling.
The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently

from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should
be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of
the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter
moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the

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Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled

corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional

Held: No

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions

satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers

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the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain."

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from
the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of
the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by
their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for
the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar
as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore

germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve
the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this
with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the
intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

==============

Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city,
provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service,

305

including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be

considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a
barangay office.

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule,

under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction
on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated
in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one.
For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.

Stephen Tibagong vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 182178
August 15, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA
9165.

Facts state that arresting officers, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received
information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two
proceeded to the reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic
allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and seized the
said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioners possession.

Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he wasnt doing anything

illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized
should be inadmissible since it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Issue:

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Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible,
it being the fruit of the poisonous tree.

HELD:

The court held that the petitioners failure to raise the issue on the validity of his
arrest before arraignment and his active participation in the proceedings in the
lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to
have waived his right.

The admissibility of the articles as evidence relied on whether the search made was
lawful.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only
occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)
When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The following occasions also permits a warrantless search: 1. Warrantless search

incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

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The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the warrantless arrest of
petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto.

The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet

containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that
the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached
petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After
laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic
sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.

The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention,
the items veracity was well established.

The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

Romer Sy Tan vs Sy Tiong Gue

Romer Sy Tan vs Sy Tiong Gue, et al.

G.R. No. 174570

December 15, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal case against respondents (Tiong Gue, et
al.). The Respondents moved for the withdrawal of the information which was
subsequently granted by the RTC on the ground that the information for robbery did
not contain the essential elements of robbery as decided upon by the Court of
Appeals on an prior complaint. Hence the case was dismissed. Now the petitioner,
seeking shelter from the Supreme Court contended that he filed information for
qualified theft based on the same subject matter of the dismissed robbery and
would like to use the item seized in the previously conducted search for the new
information of qualified theft.

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Issue:
Whether or not the items seized in the previously conducted search warrant issued
by the court for robbery be included and used for the filing of for an information for
qualified theft.

Ruling:
No, petitioner cannot iclude the seized items as part of the evidence in the new
information. Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.

Thus, as search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection
with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicant's personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Therefore, petitioner
cannot utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant issued in
connection with the case of robbery in a separate case of qualified theft, even if
both cases emanated form the same incident. Also, the withdrawal of the
information was justifiable, since there was no probable cause as to indict
respondents of the crime of robbery since unlawful taking which is an essential
element for Robbery and likewise for Qualified Theft is not present.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REVILLEZA

G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009

Violation of Sec 16, Art 3 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 9165

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Facts:

Raul R. Nuez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep.
Act No. 6425, as amended. The operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police
Detectives in coordination with the Los Baos Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile
Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuez based on reports of drug
possession.

Before proceeding to appellants residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group

summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to
assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellants house,
Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer
Pagkalinawan showed Nuez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then
surveyed appellants room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two
barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31)
packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with
shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser. The
group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in
exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property
Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed.

In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant.

Issue: Is appellant is guilty of possession of dangerous drugs?

Ruling:

310

YES. To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused
is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or
by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said
drug is a regulated drug. All these were found present in the instant case.

While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with
disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in
drug cases. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is
given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when
they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellants bed,
appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of
shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he
readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly
Search. Neither did appellants daughter identify the police officer who allegedly
planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely
testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions

the non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search.
The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even
for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State
should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would
present as witness. It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials
become part of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence,
even the accused could have presented them to testify thereon.

ROMAN CATHOLIC OF MALOLOS V. IAC

191 SCRA 411

FACTS:

311

Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land. It then entered into a contract
of lease agreement with Robes-Fransisco Realty for the parcel of land. The
agreement was that there would be downpayment plus installments with
interest. Robes-Fransisco was then in default. Knowing that it was in its
payment of the installments, it requested for the restructuring of the
installment payments but was denied. It then asked for grace period to pay
the same and tendered a check thereafter. Such was refused and the contract was
cancelled.

HELD:
A check whether a managers check or ordinary check is not legal tender and an
offer of a check in payment of a debt is not valid tender of payment and may be
refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. As this is the case, the subsequent
consignation of the check didn't operate to discharge Robes-Fransisco from its
obligation to petitioner.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and
other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby

312

command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over
the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006
on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which
was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M.
on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials
for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited
as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II.

THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

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[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]

justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

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[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that
the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were
violated by the CIDG operatives.

G.R. No. 169431 Case Digest

G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007
People of the Philippines, appellee
vs Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, appellant
Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirming the
consolidated judgment of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was found guilty of
2 counts of murder sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
plus indemnity for the heirs of the 2 victims.

In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged with the
murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.

Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan the
accused conspired, confiderating together and mutually helped each other, with
evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously
attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims.

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Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA
for review but RTC was affirmed.

Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a
killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the officer in charge sent to the
victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later
identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of
death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab
wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon information
supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found
fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed
his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was
brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available
lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from
rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial
investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan
of cULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge).

Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a
complaint for multiple murder was files against Regino who was likewise arrested.
MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only
against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however
reversed the finding of the TC by including Regino in the information, but then the
latter had left Culion already.

Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing
to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with
Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house.Several days
after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and
Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a
banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall. Regino too
was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was Regino
who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a
certain document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his
thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the
house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the

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MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain
where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot.

On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found him guilty.

Issues: (1) Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and (2) whether
the qualifying circumstance of evident premediation was likewise proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
(1) There is no direct evidence of appellants guilt except for the alleged confession
and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the
testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and
must perforce be discarded.

Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be

admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be
voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; 3) the confession must
be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.

We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited"
by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 oclock in the
morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his
extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have
been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect,
contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines
only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on
23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellants
arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in
the killing.

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In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be

meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as
opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since
comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of
the person undergoing investigation.
In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was
illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher
degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly
communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to
buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to
him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not
sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is
uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged
confession.

For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have
been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog
to Waray for appellant to understand what was going on. This significant
circumstance lends credence to appellants claim that he had never met Abad.

The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant

is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in
the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under
investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant.
The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were
translated in a language understood by accused-appellant.

(2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the
rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.

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Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as
to his competence and independence as appellants counsel for purposes of the
custodial investigation.

(3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved
and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found
that appellants bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several
factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that
conduce to its admissibility.
First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied
by the investigators themselves.Second, the prosecution failed to establish the
actual date of the killings. The actual date of the commission of the crimes is
material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the
admissibility of the alleged confession.

(4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently
disputed unless they are corroborated. There must be such corroboration so that
when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness
who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was
made or by any other evidence.
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering
doubt as to the credibility of appellants statement could have been laid to rest by
the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the
custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court.

Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which

must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as
evidence. Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers
against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their
respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find
the same insufficient bases to hold appellants extrajudicial confession admissible
against him.

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Lenido Lumanog v. People of the Philippines (and other consolidated cases), G.R. No.
182555, September 7, 2010

DECISION
(En Banc)

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.

The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard
employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the
ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw
during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.

All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.

The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly
recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the
fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed
the crime.

II.

THE ISSUES

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1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based?
2. Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the
custodial investigation valid?
3.

Was the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?

4. Was the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused
credible?
5. Was the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the
eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?
6. Were the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests conclusive of the
innocence of the accused-appellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the accused prevail over their positive identification
in this case?

III. THE RULING

1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm,

as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did
not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it
cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its
ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments
raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court actually referred to the
main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution
evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of
ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and
modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially
assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the

321

arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal.
On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor Generals position, as well
as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of
failure of intermediate review by the CA.

2. NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the
custodial investigation was NOT valid.

Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be
used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be
waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office,
Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station
before he was brought to said counsel.

Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of
his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must
be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to
constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in
evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under
custodial investigation.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether
he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified
that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of
the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain
questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified
from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if
said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.

3.

No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was NOT violated.

322

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the
periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the
constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What
the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which
render rights nugatory.

It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy

disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the
delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this
Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.

In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from enduring the
rigors and expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not
entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the
delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.

4. YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused was
credible.

In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the trial
judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his
elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view frontally all the
perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their faces (when the
two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth in front of his guard
post pointed their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later when the four [4]
armed men standing around the victims car momentarily looked at him as he was
approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his positive
identification in the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw
acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The clear view

323

that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza
(now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the ocular inspection conducted in
the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court personnel, and witnesses
Alejo and Maj. Villena.

The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how the
assailants shot Abadilla[,] who was inside his car, the relative positions of the
gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo
immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the
incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement
and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he
was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already
been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier
statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing
around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually
poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of
witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do
not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries
more weight than an affidavit.

5. YES, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the

eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we reiterate that Alejos out-courtidentification [of the accused] is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near
the place where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to
mention that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their guns at
them; second, no competing event took place to draw his attention from the event;
third, Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least two (2) of the perpetrators,
while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see them again, and
the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence that the
police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the suspects,
except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the basis of a
photograph shown to him by the police officers, insisting that he would like to see
said suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively
identified appellant Joel de Jesus independently of the previous identification made
at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive, straightforward and
categorical.

324

6. NO, the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were NOT conclusive of the
innocence of the accused-appellants.

[T]he negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no

showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the
same ones used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination
revealed that the empty shells and slug were fired from another firearm does not
disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different firearms were used by
them in shooting Abadilla. Neither will the finding that the empty shells and slug
matched those in another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that
they could have been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group,
exonerate the appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in
another case. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the firearms
confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal
possession of firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla.
A ballistic examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if another weapon
was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog
cannot escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.

The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner

Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no
prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were
taken from the car of Abadilla.

7. NO, the defense of alibi of the accused CANNOT prevail over their positive
identification in this case.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the
locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit
of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the
crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.

325

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the
accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. However, none of the appellants presented clear and convincing excuses
showing the physical impossibility of their being at the crime scene between 8:00
oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the trial court and
CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well
as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore,
it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers
rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the
State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language.

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[ G.R. NO. 172777, OCTOBER 19, 2011 ]

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two
children. Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his
concubine whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name,
"Benjamin Z. Sojayco." Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally. Furthermore,
Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a
certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan recommend the filing of an information for
bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite
knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go.
In its December 3, 2003 Order, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against
Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated
the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA further stated that Benjamin,
Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his
marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already
married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to
be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may
inquire into the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without
violating the constitutional right of herein petitioner against double jeopardy.

HELD:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express

327

consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is
considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits
and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the
accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no Double jeopardy (1)
where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and
(2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial
and adjudication.
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid
information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the
institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded
not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed
after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the
trial court's order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed
them in double jeopardy

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

G.R. No. 153675

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

FACTS:

328

Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to
defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was
issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.

On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.

On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for his extradition.

Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it

was denied by the same judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing
in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.

HELD:

The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty.

329

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail,
aright to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback
in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation

banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and
unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of
motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not
designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will
compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is

unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as
an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its
exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is
evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but
outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

330

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of
the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P.
No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support
of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions,
withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those
raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies
of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people
of the right to peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a
right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights
represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the
other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

331

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It
may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing
in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist
and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in
the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with
section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar
as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and
VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in
all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED

332

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from
their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units.
After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their
abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also
learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected
leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other
desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students
Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist
insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty,
torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a
petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by
existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of ones person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is freedom from fear, a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the
Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of
police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of
amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights.
Amparo, literally meaning to protect, is borne out of the long history of Latin
American and Philippine human rights abusesoften perpetrated by the armed
forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands.
The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced
disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to
ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has
been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.

333

(This digest is not meant for Constitutional law. Rather, this is written in fulfillment
of an assignment in Legal Philosophy.)

G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo
February 18, 2010

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the
Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During
her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and
Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there
were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo
be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with
the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on
the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense
that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence

334

of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his
or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents
for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that
body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment
that followed.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended
the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
an unwanted product of an invalid law.

335

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that
if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be

336

treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano

v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject
for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial

power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Mayor Jose Atienza

337

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a
rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their
rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated
thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom
park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the
scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit
because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Atienza.

Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the
Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case
against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for
staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in the rally permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did
was within his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of
the criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against
Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).

2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the rally permit
without consulting with the IBP.

HELD:

338

1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage
and in this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a
ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition
to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of
the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the
criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time
and place different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the
applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time
to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can
seek judicial remedies) Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant
must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP.
Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason
therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of
expression.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended

339

the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being
an unwanted product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional

because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

340

Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that
if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the
case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject
for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial

power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary

341

investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.

The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of
candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of
a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

342

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on

respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the

latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an

American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

343

Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on
the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of
citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and
he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a
representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET
decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,

344

naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by

Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply

consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA 630]

345

Facts: Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were

candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition

for disqualification. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution, dated
May 7, 1998, granting the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of
private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Private

respondent opposed contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of
the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively,
petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is
disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati.

Issue: WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective office
of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.

Held: Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate
for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who cannot be proclaimed as the ViceMayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by
final and executory judgment.

346

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.
The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race
at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in
several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for an elective local position under par 40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160.

G.R. No. 137000

August 9, 2000

CIRILO R. VALLES, Petitioner

Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, Respondents
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a disqualification case against private respondent in 1998 elections
for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez (private respondent) was
born on May 16, 1934 in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under
oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her
Philippine citizenship, therefore it operated to disqualify her to run for elective
office. He also argued that Comelecs finding of renouncing her Australian
citizenship and had her Australian passport cancelled did not automatically restore
the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is an Australian citizen

347

RULING:
No. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent was born
a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served
as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country and these were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Her father was born on 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Sur. Therefore by virtue of the said laws, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. Also, the
principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to
a Filipino father. Secondly, as ruled in Aznar vs Comelec and Mercado vs Manzano
and Comelec, the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express.
Petition is DISMISSED. COMELEC resolutions AFFIRMED.
Jacot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship
requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a
naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC against
petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national
elections were held petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the

348

petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack
of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required
by law for persons seeking public office.
Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It
specifically provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the
Constitutional requirements and existing laws. At the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have
one citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual
citizens and received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not
dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship
qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. The application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and
petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.

CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who

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Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth

Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual
allegiance.

RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not selfexecuting provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.

[ G.R. NO. 182701, JULY 23, 2008 ]

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

The Facts

Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez herein petitioner was a candidate for the Barangay
Election held last October 29, 2007. Petitioner won but was nonetheless disqualified
by COMELEC. Allegedly, he is a Filipino-American.

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Petitioner avers that he is indeed a dual citizen pursuant to his compliance with the
Citizenship Retention & Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and that he returned to the
Philippines and possesses all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman, hence
this petition.

Issue

Whether herein petitioner, as a Filipino-American or with dual citizenship, is eligible

to run for the office of Barangay Chairman.

Decision

The petition was dismissed and the order of the COMELEC disqualifying petitioner
was upheld.

The court stated that the petitioner cannot rely on Valles vs. COMELEC because his
case does not sit four squares with the facts of the same and that the doctrine in
Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003 which
expressly provides the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship
may run for public office to wit:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

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TABASA VS CA

FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when
his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the
Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and
detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a
request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a
standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the BID.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The
only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who
lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino,
including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be
applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in
1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at
the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.