Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.

202242, July 17, 2012

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of
the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents
further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the
JBCs current composition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the
petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case; and

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non
are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants
to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus
of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional
is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in
voting.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress
non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization
of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II.

THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2.
Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the
sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing

provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of
Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,

privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx

xxx

xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the
prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
[T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible
for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also
to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder
shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.
For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of
the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the
WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy
of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into
a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and

limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage
the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it
does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy

does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It
does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic
industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade
without discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law
encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the

State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials
and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while
serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes
of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles
relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the
exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave
its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land
is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and
gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its
members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial
power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority.
As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and
the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

HENRY JUN DUEAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(HRET) and ANGELITO JET REYES

GR No. 185401

July 21, 2009

En banc

Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the guardians
themselves?)

Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, particularly of the allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual
liberties and the assurance of the peoples sovereignty. The Court has the
distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining constitutional meaning,
divining constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes. Nonetheless, its
judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal with the other
branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least dangerous branch).
Instead, judicial supremacy is the conscious and cautious awareness and
acceptance of its proper place in the overall scheme of government with the
objective of asserting and promoting the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus,
whenever the Court exercises its function of checking the excesses of any branch of
government, it is also duty-bound to check itself. Otherwise, who will guard the
guardian?

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes
were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district
of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After
the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered
28,564 votes as opposed to private respondents 27,107 votes. Not conceding
defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount,
alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious
and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the
systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioners
votes.

In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the
revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts

pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counterprotested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating
its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment
his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the
revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss
the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by
reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was
with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the
HRETs position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised
precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same.
Moreover, it ruled that its task of determining the true will of the electorate was not
confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could
motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counterprotest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a
motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced
that it could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative
district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested
precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to
continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested
precincts.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Resolution, to continue the revision and
appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

(2) Whether or not HRETs assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued
revision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds
nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . the power granted to
the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided
by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs
exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.

(1) HRETs Power to Deny the Motion to Withdraw / Abandon Counter-protest

First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where
respondent protested the election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counterprotested 560 precincts. All in all, therefore, 730 precincts were the subject of the
revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were already revised,
only 25% or 140 of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were
actually done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET only been allowed to
continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents were only speculating
that a sufficient number of fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that these fake/spurious ballots
would overturn the result of the election.

Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent
constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that
body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any
accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established
by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. But the Court finds no
evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.

Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By
employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and

exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full, complete and
unimpaired.

Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its constitutional mandate, the Tribunal
adopted Rule 7 of the HRET Rules: The Tribunal shall have exclusive control,
direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation.

In this connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for
itself the discretion to continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of Rule 88
is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue the revision proceedings ex propio
motu, that is, of its own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioners view
that he ought to have been allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there
was nothing to prevent the HRET from continuing the revision of its own accord by
authority of Rule 88.

The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88
was its own determination that the evidence thus far presented could affect the
officially proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of contested ballots and
election documents, the determination of whether the evidence could influence the
officially proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function best left
to the specialized expertise of the HRET.

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the
sole judge of election contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute
its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the
evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed
results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a
determination of the true will of the electorate. TheCourt should merely test
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a different view. If the
Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest
proceedings, the Tribunal will no longer have exclusive control, direction and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation. It will
constitute an intrusion into the HRETs domain and a curtailment of the HRETs
power to act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and
effect of the result of the initial revision.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v.
HRET, the Court ruled: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the
remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or
deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is
granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction already acquired.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all
questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case
of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No.
84297, December 8, 1988, thus:

The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the
Power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as `intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140].
The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the
House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Courts socalled extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunals
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse. (emphasis supplied)

(2) HRETs Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision Proceedings

When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or tribunal, that court or

tribunal, unless otherwise provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to
employ all writs, processes and other means to make its power effective. Where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Since the
HRET possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also
had the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own
funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. We
hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive
control, direction and supervision of its functions. The HRETs order was but one
aspect of its power.

Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and
exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such
other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes
and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law.
(emphasis supplied)

Certainly, the HRETs order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots
from the 75% counter-protested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or
incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole judge of election
protest cases involving its members.

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the
continuation of the revision of the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then
he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to prevent the HRET from
using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such
power on the part of the HRET becomes useless and meaningless.

Second, Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted
budget for the Adjudication of Electoral Contests Involving Members of the House
of Representatives. The provision is general and encompassing enough to
authorize the use of the HRETs funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a

protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the use of HRET funds for the
revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less
violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. To reiterate, the law (particularly
RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests in the
HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper
appropriation for that purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the disbursement
and allocation of such funds.

Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds
for any lawful purpose it deemed best. This is specially significant in election
contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in
determining the true will of the electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the
HRET from ordering any of the parties to make the additional required deposit(s) to
cover costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the HRET. Such disbursement
could not be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to a
party since the benefit would actually redound to the electorate whose true will
must be determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court
declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that [o]ver and above the desire of the
candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the
people. Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be
incidental.

All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is grave
abuse of discretion? It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion
when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Using the foregoing as yardstick, the Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.
No. 171101, November 22, 2011

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I.

THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule
meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked
to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or
placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.

II.

THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of

respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI,
which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.]

1.

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited
only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior
to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed

to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they
want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July
5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then
the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the
agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other
agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI
but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and
other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers,
and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR
leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of
actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of

agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and
have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and
of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs
SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is

November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time
that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,
that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority
(Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of
the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI
is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify
this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears
stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means,
final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action
with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The
court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have
not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share
of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).
The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested
and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were
arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being
participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political
and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..."
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he

assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial
law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to
declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of
martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial
inquiry, while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry
by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit
in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective
of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to
safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this
case.
Javellana vs. executive secretary 50 scra 33
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipinoand a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec
Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing thesaid constitution. Javellana
averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the
president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify
such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC
justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made
by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives.

Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation
during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or
accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973
Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455

FACTS:
A number of petitions assailing the validity of B.P Blg. 883 calling for a special
election for a President and Vice-president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a
conditional resignation where he shall vacate the position only when a winner has
been proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath 10 days after the proclamation.
Petitioners question the validity of Marcos resignation as it did not create the
vacancy needed for a special election to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in
relation to B.P. Blg. 883

ISSUE:
Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?

HELD:
The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883. Unconstitutional. Whereas
the original issue on B.P Blg. 883s constitutionality, the issue has now transformed
into a political question where only the sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean
and honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and denied their
prayers of prohibition.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo,
JJ.------------------------------------------

DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
145 SCRA 160 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of

Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as
follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then
asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent president.

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted

provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides
for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section
provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise
sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme Court
which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.
In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
Wednesday, April 30, 2014

Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry
of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court
and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the
new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of
appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking
changes from number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to
"inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction
of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and
Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts
where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the promulgation of E.O.
No. 33.

Held:

The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987
Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of
the people power in 1986.

Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in

any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as sudden.
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."

De Leon vs Esguerra 153 scra 602

Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen
of barangay dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo
antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8,
1987, designating
Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government and
similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So,
February 8, 1987 and not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was
no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its
transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states that all previous constitution were
suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in

effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for
barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with
constitution.

Lambino & Aumentado vs COMELEC

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative
petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at
least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least
represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified
by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution
seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the president
bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution
this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended
that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within
that case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2
ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.
The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay
those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The

proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The
proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments
were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely
handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full
text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided
upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long
as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the

Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735
is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

25
APR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,
petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN

PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
(1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2)
Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on
the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375
failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No.
6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the
Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
declared void.

RATIO:

Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy,
and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I
cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are
legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no
leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the
TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of
their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive
of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional
mandate on people initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his
view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the

people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may
be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other
rulings.

Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled::

I. General Provisions

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as The Initiative and Referendum Act.

Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of

initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

(a) Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the

Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) Indirect initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition

sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation

through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or

law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) Proposition is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is

approved or rejected by the people.

(f) Petition is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required
number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to
the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) Local government units refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays.

(h) Local legislative bodies refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) Local executives refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors
and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be
exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at

least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which
every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same
with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the

legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly
initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1)
legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in
a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be

deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum
(10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed

validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in said barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special

registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or
referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the

signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and voters
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

II. National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall

call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall,
upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and
English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the
date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45)
days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission
of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition

of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be
submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered
voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of

the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment
shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as
certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the
repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected
or amended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the

votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an

initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety
(90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited peoples organization, as

defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary
of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be
enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except
that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative
measures on the committee.

Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative
body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of
any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days
from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered

representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary
of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous
regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in
subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may
be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether
or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the
required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then
set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within
ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after
which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections.

Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a

majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by
the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those
against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein
provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or

ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may
be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3)
years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the
expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4

hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of
autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval
or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body
to enact the said measure.

IV. Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall
apply to all initiatives and referenda.

Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to

promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE PHARMA WEALTH, INC., G.R. No.

182358, February 20, 2013
Political Law; The State may be sued if it consents, either expressly or impliedly. The
rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine
only conveys, the state may not be sued without its consent; its clear import then
is that the State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given either
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. x x x Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to
the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts
entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly
or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law,
either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent
when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. However, it
must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically
mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. Statutory
provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.

G.R. No. 155504

June 26, 2009

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Section 3,
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that
antedates this Constitution.27 It is as well a universally recognized principle of
international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another
state.28 The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.29 It also rests on reasons of public policy
that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign
authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and,
consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.30

What are the various forms of state immunity from suit?

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms,
namely:
a suit against the Republic by name;
a suit against an unincorporated government agency;
a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the
agencys performance of governmental functions;
and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate
liability will fall on the government.

In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government
agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its
function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing,
and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core
reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by
suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the
performance of governmental functions. In Providence Washington Insurance Co. v.
Republic of the Philippines,31 we said:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious

functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss
of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its
immunity when it entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose.
According to PROVI, since the purpose of its contract with TESDA is to provide
identification PVC cards with security seal which TESDA will thereafter sell to TESDA
trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial transactions not incidental to its
governmental functions.
TESDAs response to this position is to point out that it is not engaged in business,
and there is nothing in the records to show that its purchase of the PVC cards from
PROVI is for a business purpose. While TESDA admits that it will charge the trainees
with a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is only to recover their costs and
is not intended for profit.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

155650 July 20, 2006
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency
was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings
should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The
petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on,
levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly

withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and-controlled
corporations upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also
argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one
person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus,
respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The
government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the
tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of
Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.

Held:

1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of

the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares.
MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock

corporation must have members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform

efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the

instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police
authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all
the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of
the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property
of public dominion as one intended for public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges
to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the
bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such
fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees
are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually
use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use
the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the
commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy
on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will
happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the
Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n
MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is
clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on

behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of
conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation
to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of
Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the
beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by
the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to
the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are
exempted from payment of the real property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private
entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it
won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base
that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific
preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer,
the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a
function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered
under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of
Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises
sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two
parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters
from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See
should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do
it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties
and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied
the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by
entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its
non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally
accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall
form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission
in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the
Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the
immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit
but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is
non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of
the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental
(non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather
because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were
dismissed accordingly.

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS:

 Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the

US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American
serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as
the activity exchange manager.
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford
managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her &
told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made
on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on
her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing
irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day
& she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees
are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrongdoing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a
wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos
for theft and/or shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store
manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her
undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not
motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c
is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and
exemplary damages of P100k.
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of
filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from
suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the
performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of
1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power &
authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation &
defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective
command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at
base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant
to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.

 July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that
Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties
w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that:
(1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and
since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3)
Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to
present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC
ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless,
oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded
P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual
expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining
RTC from enforcing decision.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not
performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental
acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside
the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee
are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is
under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of
the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right
to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She
further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine
WON Bradford is immune.

ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave
of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present
case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its

motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily

appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction.

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to

dismiss. - NO

Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec.
1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is
necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC
should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is
immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the
SC.

3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO

Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the
state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay
damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be
formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where
the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
& injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action
against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit
against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will
not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
& personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public
official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official
is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred
with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely
because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official
functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts
done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the
exception to the doctrine of state immunity.

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of
the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their
official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001

Lesson: Criminal acts not immune

Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention

FACTS:

2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey
Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB

MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal
processes

RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the
Philippines annulled and set aside the order of MTC

SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to
officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute and is limited on the official capacity
and immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty

A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official

capacity

issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is

still for the trial court to determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is

immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private
or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any
offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the
fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity

If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the DFA

CALLADO VS. IRRI

G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an
official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other
evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that
the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived
the same.

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its
immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in
resolving the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from
an employer-employee relationship.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition. Theres no merit in
petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential
Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its
Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its
position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically
informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine
of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at
bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to
which it has not consented.

FACTS:

1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air
Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber
services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to
cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area
not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after
investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him
guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust

operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of
the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial,
petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it
was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.

4.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US
military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants
beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny

this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus
incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of
our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge
of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with
its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA
a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither
may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of
their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract

involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii)

that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions

granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants
as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the
alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available.
Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in
its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity
because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground
that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove,
as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genoves employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter
testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the
United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer

study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded
their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made
by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

NOTE:

1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL

AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED
ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs
Guinto)

Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions.

No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

G.R. No.s 171947-48 Case Digest

G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Concerned Citizens
vs MMDA
Ponente: Velasco

Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up,
rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the
water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law
(esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the
beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the
DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay.
Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the
study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the
cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that
the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions.

Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of
petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and
how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decisionmaking process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth
not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given
by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has

deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to

contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case
of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This
section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate,
to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Note:

- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial
duty is one that requires neither official discretion nor judgment.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In

private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to

know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those
of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in

view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid

classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to

the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents

to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified
by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his
own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right
to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the
same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined
that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v.

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014
In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of
the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of

the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Acts.
The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a
certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for
non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).
Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Thus,
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the Supreme Court ruled
that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents
the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he
is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The Court likewise
cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to explain that [s]tanding is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the petitioners
has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each
of them. In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief
Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these
cases pose issues that are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners
included. As such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its
broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the Disbursement Allocation
Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability.
The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from the various
departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased
appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the savings and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program, activity or project] or to support other priority
PAPs.
Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs,
Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys
economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the
savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation
in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested
in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for
only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs refer to portions
or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance

which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of
absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets.
The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of savings in order to
have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
appropriations under the GAAs.
The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to revert to the
General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal
year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a
condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be
deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or
project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed
resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project,
be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this
Act.
The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held that the savings
pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in
the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive
was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the
GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of
the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in the
Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to
undo the principle of separation of powers.
Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment
any item in the GAA for their respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds
cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of
Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under Section 25(5).
No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a
finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law
should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such
parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of
funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain
why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here.
Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law
or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is
resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application.
The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the implementation
of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative
fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

Dacudao vs. DOJ

[Civil Law: Effectivity of laws; general rule: no retroactive effect; exception: when
law is procedural in nature]

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of

Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles
and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it
was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy
Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the
Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according
to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and
right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the
Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed
issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those
already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of
the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in
nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or
modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but
operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing
rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural law.

MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's

license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on
August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter
to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license,
and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for
preliminary injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion
to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of
the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.
Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of
1991. 15 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as
a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of

"metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the
petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations,
whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding,"
and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."

Alfeo Vivas, on his behalf and on behalf of the Shareholders of the Eurocredit
Community Bank, Petitioner, vs. The Monetary Board of the BSP and the PDIC,
Respondents.
GR No. 191424; August 7, 2013

Facts: The Monetary Board placed the Eurocredit Community Bank under Prompt
Corrective Action framework on account of the findings of serious findings and
supervisory concerns. Vivas moved for the reconsideration of such action. ECBI also
unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from inspecting its books and records.
The MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership, because of its
inability to pay its liabilities, insufficient realizable assets and violation of cease and
desist order of the MB for acts constituting unsound banking practices. Vivas argued
that the MB committed grave abuse of discretion for placing ECBI under
receivership without prior notice and hearing, pursuant to RA 7353, Sec. 11.

Issue: Whether or not the MB committed grave abuse of discretion in placing ECBI
under receivership without notice and hearing.

Ruling:
No, the MB did not gravely abuse its discretion. The ECBI was given every
chance to be heard and improve its financial standing. Moreover, the MB has the
power to forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without
prior notice and hearing, when the circumstances warrant it. Under RA 7653, the MB
was given with more power of closure and placement of a bank in receivership for
insolvency or if the continuance in the business would result in the loss of
depositors or creditors. The close now, hear later doctrine was justified on
practical and legal considerations to preclude unwarranted dissipation of the banks
assets and as valid exercise of police power to protect creditors, depositors,
stockholders and the general public.

UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND; Hornbook doctrine is that
neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act beyond
the Constitutions mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power
beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As
elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION; LEGISLATIVE OR

EXECUTIVE ACTS ARE VOID. Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found
by the judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a
law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x x

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN HARMONY OF THE

CONSTITUTION. Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the Constitution. In a long line of cases, the cardinal
principle of construction established is that a statute should be interpreted to assure
its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command
or prescription. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative,
if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two

or more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of

unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it may be necessary, for this
purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.

POLITICAL LAW; MEANING OF QUALIFIED VOTERS THEREIN.Pursuant to established

jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be
construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the
plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a
city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under
Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly affected" shall
participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the
supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified
voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city
proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW; POLITICAL UNITS DIRECTLY AFFECTED; DEFINED.In identifying the

LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate
will be "directly affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC
and Padilla v. COMELEC are worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of
the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be
altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite. As held:

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it

imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable
to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected.

Giron vs. COMELEC Digest

G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent, ALMARIO

E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-inIntervention.

SERENO, CJ:

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the

constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act.

Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires:
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. He avers that these provisions are unrelated to the
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12
refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67
(Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto
resignation of elective officials immediately after they file their respective
certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently
holding in a permanent capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the one subject-one
title rule?

HELD: The petition must fail.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid,
sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the
invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that
would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the
Fair Election Act.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public.

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

Facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the
absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,
following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April
23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001,
October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were
issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the
use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President;
hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits
according to the State Auditor.
DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings
for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient
portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the
following manner: x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation
had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years
savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years
savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use
of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward
to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits,
being part of the administrations 10-point action program to quote I will order
immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology
Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting
authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439,
please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.

On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging
the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY
1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April
12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in
the GAA of 1998.
Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5)
which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Held:

NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings
from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control
and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use
savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such
power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the
doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official
acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the
President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the
year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted
on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A.
9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the
Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in
Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional
for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as
required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In
relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on
the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the
Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on
the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case,
the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one
year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political

crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a
duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the

other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No.

190529. April 29, 2010]

03
OCT
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of

registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu

proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the
law in question.

ISSUES:

Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:

Political Law

(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,

regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically
opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited
congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated
for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
[COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is]
obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not
to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a

country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and
declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province
of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President
Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and
apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall
be composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as
well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the
Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical
effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null
and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section
5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative,
with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum
population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of
1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present
of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of
the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the
deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

Neri vs. Senate

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours
relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the
President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri,

requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense with
Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with China. Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a
result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive

Privilege. xxx we are convinced that the communications elicited by the questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the Right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Is the senate correct?

ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,

it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its
power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The right of
Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot
be equated with the peoples right to public information. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right
of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not
have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
E.O. 464. Is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of
E.O. 464?

ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept
of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or

through the Executive Secretary by order of the President. Did Executive
Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the
President?

ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he
expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more
than enough compliance.

May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
particularity?

ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and coequal department. (Senate v. Ermita)

Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?

ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of
the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent
Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that
the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the

need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and
the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find merit in the
argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the
contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent
Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and
ordering his immediate arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)

ROMERO V. ESTRADA (2009)

G.R. No. 174105
Promulgated:

April 2, 2009

Petitioners:
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ,
REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME
R. CANLAS
Respondent:
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
Ponente:

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders,
Inc., were invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The
said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of
Republic Act 8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?
HELD
YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the

legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

Facts: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of
the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC
is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting
as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties
in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?

Held: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution
of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the
Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a

partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat
to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of
major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by
the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of
Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major
political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct
congruence with theirs, hence

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our
traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list
elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to
campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which
participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven
parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted,

yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those
whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58%
each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would
have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast,
only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155
parties garnered more than 2%.

In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the
time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the
party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In
ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and
powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who
have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow
major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we
will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the
graveyard of the party-list system.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political
parties into the party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible
2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the
House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the
party list system presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats
the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in
the enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the
raison detre for the adoption of the party-list system.

Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans
Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to partylist representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be
realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically
impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system can never exceed 100%.

Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a

threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was
explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate
concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a
minimum vote requirement is needed --

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a
fallback position;

2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their
seats within the system;

5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the

elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree
their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.9

However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the
party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative
districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote
requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable
changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution,
because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides
a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law,
R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the
constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling
completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike
down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not
simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the
duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all
times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment
that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against

respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999,
which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent
Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held
the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the
office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable
organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which
are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD
1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since
Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the
Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the

1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they
create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with
regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II.

THE ISSUE

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III.

THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature;
it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very
lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider
the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit
in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention
and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.
The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of

the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized
with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate
the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like
any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the

government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto
imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving
the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was
never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to
almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely
and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects
on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO.
209287, July 1, 2014

In a Decision dated July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court partially granted the
consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition and declared the following acts
and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget
Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances unconstitutional for violating
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and
the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations
Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.

The Court further declared void the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in
the relevant General Appropriations Acts (GAAs).

Remedial law; Certiorari and prohibition. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.

Remedial law; Locus standi. Citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, the
Supreme Court ruled that the assertion of a public right as a predicate for
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action
rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although
such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The
Court likewise cited Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., to
explain that [s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.

Transcendental importance as a ground to waive locus standi. Each of the

petitioners has established sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as
to confer locus standi on each of them. In addition, considering that the issues
center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate
public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that
are of transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its
broad and wise discretion to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

Administrative law; Budget process; Implementation and funding of the

Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP). Four phases comprise the Philippine budget
process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget
Execution; and (4) Accountability.

The DAP was to be implemented and funded (1) by declaring savings coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments
and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and
(3) applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing [program,
activity or project] or to support other priority PAPs.

Administrative law; Nature of the DAP. The DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of
the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive
as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional

mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need
to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.

Constitutional law; The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not
contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to
faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He
could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and
identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart
from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI
of the Constitution [that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law].

Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the
Constitution], must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need
for such funds had ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized.
This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse.

Savings, defined. The definition of savings under the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs
refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from
any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or
final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of

absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets.

The Court agreed with petitioners that respondents were forcing the generation of
savings in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending.
Respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal
year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations under the
GAAs.

The mandate of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code is to
revert to the General Fund balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at
the end of the fiscal year. The Executive could not circumvent this provision by
declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to
the end of the fiscal year.

Augmentation is valid only when funding is deficient. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and
2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to
be augmented must be deficient, to wit: x x x Augmentation implies the existence
in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon
implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by
augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in
this Act.

The President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress. The Court held
that the savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not
covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs. Although the [Office of the
Solicitor General] rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in
line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such
authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to
substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful
to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs
was but a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public
wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the spending
power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of
separation of powers.

Cross-border transfers or augmentations are prohibited. By providing that the

President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices, Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their offices, such
that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another
office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.

Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds,

the plain text of Section 25(5) disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed.
Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited under
Section 25(5).

No violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated

against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others
could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few
legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds
under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators
could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The
requirement was not met here.

Operative fact doctrine. The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of
the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored
or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional
law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and
circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or
executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies
only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application.

The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the DAP. To declare the
implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the
real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical
and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and
the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario
would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such
burden.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed
a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said
funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming

that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary
Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for
the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides

that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).

Issues:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a
program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers
to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at bar because
whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no crossborder transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of

funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification
from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded
the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous
projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may
cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so
that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact
may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it
is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they
have not acted in good faith.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

1.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the
formation of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact
date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted
to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September
2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on
the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the
synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said
enactment.

Issue/s:

1.
WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore
should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the
constitution.

2.
WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the
power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled
during the May 2013 elections.

Held:
1.
No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the
synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the
enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local
Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local
governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government
and the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not
as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more
powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the
category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections.

2.
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that
there is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local
governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President,
within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it

that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is
distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control

over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power
includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners
foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The

provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officersin-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the
duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints
that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;

and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

DIGEST: Nazareth v.s. Villar G.R. 188635 (2013)

Facts:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the
State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST). Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of
the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the
absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently,
following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April
23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001,
October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001, several NDs (Notice of Disallowance) were
issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The provision for the
use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the President;
hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits
according to the State Auditor.
DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP)
through his Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings
for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.6 The salient
portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. explained the request in the
following manner: x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation

had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years
savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years
savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use
of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits from its 2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward
to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits,
being part of the administrations 10-point action program to quote I will order
immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and Technology
Personnel in Government) as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the request of Secretary
Uriarte, Jr., With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting
authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439,
please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in
Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging
the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY
1998 to CY 2001 amounting to P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April
12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in
the GAA of 1998.
Issue: Is the act of the Executive Secretary falls under Article VI, Section 25 (5)
which provides (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Held:

NO. Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings
from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control
and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special
Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the department heads to use
savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such
power could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the
doctrine of qualified political agency enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official

acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless

disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority
granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the
President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the
year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted
on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.

Case Digest: GR No. 183591

Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela
and Municipality of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec.
Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National
Mapping & Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in
intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject
matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be
open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void
said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.

GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD
and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null
and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined
from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting
and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and
nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between

the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the
Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in
1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in
Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace
negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation
regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace
talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in
2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman
Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was
born.

MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the
birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law,
international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the
principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and
order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all

indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the
right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have

exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The
MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-SuluPalawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those
which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two
categories, A which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the
signing and B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have
jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal
waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE
and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management
over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial
waters; but no provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental
cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external
defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the
ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate
in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to
explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the
GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive
Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall

also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the
exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed
the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for
the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the
court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere
academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue
ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their
duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts
made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O.
No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a
prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact
that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not
negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province
of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and
Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to
delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing.
Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and
Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and
prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a nongovernment organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD
has already been suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP,
the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a
general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a
voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does
not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff
is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the
GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to
further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than
ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the
same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in
another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of
the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have
already complied thereat.

On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects
the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty
of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in
a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It
is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to
hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with
reasonable safeguards the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a
statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the

State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the
twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct
of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law
states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary
to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent
Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive
privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Courts order to
the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to
such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels
on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD
is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the
free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially
noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince
they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question
that they cannot be all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:

On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The

parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted
from the international law. In international law, association happens when two
states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while
maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle ground
between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that
are consistent with the international definition of association which fairly would
deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at
any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because
the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond
what the Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have
such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated
entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The
court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM.
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the
MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE
includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the
ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not
participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the
ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its
territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the
powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20,
art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to
vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC
ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new
legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making
power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only the
President has the sole organ and is the countrys sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states,
the former provision must be amended consequently. Section 22 must also be
amendedthe provision of the law that promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize
national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the
BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory
in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption
of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically
distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is
contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of
Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the
ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law
which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part
of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long
been recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the

internal and external self-determinationinternal, meaning the self-pursuit of man

and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral
secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to
the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded
in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the
right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only
to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national
territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous

peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or
secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination;
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the
indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it shall be the
State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With
regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States
to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be

had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the
necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum
of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance to the territorial integrity of the countrysuch was negated by the
provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the
suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP
Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even

constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on

the query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3
to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a
power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather
implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and
as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress
rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace
negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally
implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally
implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the
assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The Presidents power is limited
only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same
but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a
term because it is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal
framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the
GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework which changes would include
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with
the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it
being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found
in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral

declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that
renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can
bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the
fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR

G.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court
order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's SmallScale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control
over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and
cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the
local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the
small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision
and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the
DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the SmallScale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural
resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is
made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local
Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make
local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not
fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of
the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization of the country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is
the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption
is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional
where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in
accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the
resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and
Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR
Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid
and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued
by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the
DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties
are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary
exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be
equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing SmallScale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it
is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such
appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in
accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the
undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO

292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the
civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim
appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided
the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year
after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess,
GMA issued the ad interim appointments this also proves that the president was in
good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary.
She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds
a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the
Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under
the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their
liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by
law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace.
The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate
more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as
apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty
of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

360 SCRA 718 Law on Public Officers Security of Tenure in a Public Office No
Vested Right to a Public Office Power to Create and Destroy Public Office

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the
employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be
essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning
the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that
the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other
offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them
pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the
Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to reorganize the Office
of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and
PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the

continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the

power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations
has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it
needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just
P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e.,
search and seizure and arrest.

Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no
bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices
is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to
exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing
as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary.

Canonizado v. Aguirre
323 SCRA 312
FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police
Commission when Republic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851
provided that the terms of office of the incumbent commissioners were deemed
expired. Petitioners claimed that this violated their security of tenure.

HELD: Petitioners are members of the civil service. Republic Act No. 8551 did not
expressly abolish the positions of petitioners. Under RA No. 6975, the National
Police Commission was under the Department of Interior and Local Government,
while under Republic Act. No. 8551 it is made an agency attached to the
Department of Interior and Local Government. The organizational structure and the
composition of the National Police Commission remain essentially the same except
for the addition of the Chief of PNP as ex-officio member. The powers and duties of
the National Police Commission remain basically unchanged. No bona fide
reorganization of the NPC having been mandated by Congress and insofar as RA
8851 declares the office of the petitioner as expired resulting in their separation

from office, it is tantamount to removing civil service employees from office without
legal cause therefore, it must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June
7, 2011.

The claim of petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation and
administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the
allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take
over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the
region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not
take over control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to
the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary
did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.