Ronald Reagan deserves the most credit for ending the Cold War.

Assess this view.

Cold war is defined as superpower rivalry that is borne out of an
ideological conflict which could be manifested in the form of an arms
race or the division in Europe. Even though Reagans confrontational
approach escalated the Cold War on all fronts, challenged USSR to its
limit and brought forth the end of Cold War, Cold War ended largely
because internal problems within USSR and Gobachevs attempt to
resolve them, not because of Ronald Reagans actions. Hence, this
essay seeks to argue that Ronald Reagan does not deserve the most
credit for ending the Cold War because his actions, while intended to
bring about victory for the US in the superpower rivalry, was
insufficient in bring about a conclusive ending on most occasions and
for most of the aspects of the Cold War, if not all, they ended largely
because in one way or another, Gobachev wanted them to be so.
Reagans military buildup intensified the arms race and brought about
the de facto surrender of USSR in terms of arms race, an aspect of the
Cold War. With an iron determination to drastically increase American
military power, in 1981, Ronald Reagan launched the 5year $1.5trillion
defense program for 1982-1986 which included 2 strategic weapons
systems, MX ICBM and Trident II SLBM. Reagan also funded the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the Kremlin dreaded because
it would give the US the ability to strike unilaterally at USSR, thereby
greatly endangering their security. As a result, Gobachev was
pressurized to put an end to the zero sum game of an arms race his
country could not win. On the 8 December 1987, Gobachev and
Reagan cosigned the INF Treaty, which was a breakthrough in
international arms control and the first step to disarmament.
Considering that Reagan had to sustain the military build up for several
years under immense political and social pressure within his own
country, he deserves much credit for ending the nuclear arms race.
Still, Reagans inability to end the arms race in the period before
Gobachev came into power limits the credence of the argument that
he was the one that ended the arms race. Reagans military build up
started in 1982, yet not only did the nuclear situation not improve until
1987, Reagans military build up exacerbated the situation and
intensified the international climate, contrary to the claim that it would
bring about a conclusion. The fact that the arms race did not end even
during the time of Andropov, the reformist who wanted to end the arms
race, highlights its inadequacy in compelling a conclusion. Moreover,
Reagan was merely continuing with something his predecessor started,
and the very reason why Reykjavik Summit failed in October 1986 was
because Reagan obstinately refused to scrap the SDI missile program,

thus showing how he was instead an obstacle that delayed the end of
arms race. Furthermore, Gobachev had to embrace diplomacy as the
way of ensuring security because of Soviet economic decline, not
Reagans military build up.
The fact that a compromise which was necessary for a breakthrough in
international arms control, would only come from the Soviets,
particularly Gobachev, speaks volume of his significance over Reagan
in the ending of the arms race. Under the INF Treaty, USSR had to
swallow a drastically asymmetrical reduction of thermal nuclear
weapons, terms no other Soviet leaders would have complied. Whereas
the US only had to destroy 293 launchers, USSR had to destroy 851
launchers. On top of that, he had to accept a remarkably intrusive
monitoring system that included short notice, on-site inspections by
the other signatory to ensure compliance. Furthermore, progress on
arms reduction after this is a product of Gobachevs unilateral venture
to sustain the momentum of arms control. Therefore, by and large, the
arms race still ended because Gobachev wanted to end it.
Reagans foreign policy which embraced a confrontational approach of
rollback aggravated the strain on Soviet economy in continuing its
support for its client states, and hence laid grounds for its capitulation
to the ideological aspect of Cold War and superpower rivalry. By
supporting rebel movements in parts of the world that has sovietsupported government such as Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola and
Cambodia, through the provision of large amount of weapons and
military trainings, and more covertly, through the suspension of
economic aid, Reagan was able to raise the cost of Soviet military and
economic aid to its client states. Besides trying to instate democracy in
these Third World countries, Reagan was determined to further drain
the resources of the Soviets, especially when its commitment to the
Eastern European countries was already tiring its finance, so that their
ability to keep up to the superpower rivalry would be undermined.
Evidently, the resistance forces, particularly in Afghanistan, bled the
Soviets both militarily and economically so much so that by late 1988,
USSR had had to withdraw from the Third World. As such, in December
1988, Gobachev made a speech at the UN which symbolized the
acknowledgement of defeat on the side of USSR, thus ending the Cold
War as defined by an ideological conflict and superpower rivalry.
However, even though Reagans foreign policy, together with his
superhawk image and his hostile rhetoric, might have gathered
impetus for Gobachev to deliver his 1988 UN speech, the primary
driving force was still with Gobachevs New Political Thinking. After
the signing of the INF Treaty, the US insistence on its ballistic missile
plan had persistently served as a stumbling block to the adoption of

START agreement. Without ending the conventional arms race,

Gobachev could not rebuild the Soviet economy. As such, in bid to
revitalize the arms control negotiation, Gobachev delivered the speech.
Even without Ronald Reagan, Gobachev would still likely have put an
end to the ideological conflict and the superpower rivalry because his
clear goal when he came into power in 1985 was to rebuild the soviet
economy, and that is not possible if USSR continued with the
superpower rivalry and the ideological conflict. Hence, Reagans
contribution, while significant, was not the decisive factor that ended
superpower rivalry and the ideological conflict.
Reagans support for the anti-communist movements within USSR itself
undermined the Soviet system and laid grounds for liberation of
satellite states, yet another hallmark fro the end of Cold War. In
response to the imposition of martial law in Poland, the US cancelled
plans to negotiate Polands debt and announced that they would not
extend its credits. The US also imposed trade sanctions on Poland and
blocked International Monetary Fund loans to Poland. Although USSR
had already refrained from direct intervention, the US nevertheless
imposed a number of economic sanctions on USSR, including
suspension of sales of oil, gas technology and licenses for various hightechnology exports. The sanctions were not only to pressurize USSR to
loosen control on its satellite states, but also to damage the capacity of
Soviet military power and their ability to meet the need of their people.
As such, the martial law was suspended in 1982 and the US-funded
anti-communist party, Solidarity was able to build up its support base
until February 1989, when under immense political pressure, free
elections were forced to be held. The first ever accession to power by
the non-communist government in the communist world sparked off a
series of revolution in Eastern Europe, and thus ended the Cold War as
defined by a division in Europe.
Nevertheless, the liberation of Eastern Europe came about primarily as
a product of Gobachevs New Political Thinking and his desire to
rebuild the countrys economy, not Reagans subversive efforts. Under
his New Thinking, Gobachev advocated that consent, not coercion,
should be the basis of power for the Soviets. This explains why when
the unintended effect of Gobachevs 1988 UN speech sparked off a
widespread revolution in Eastern Europe, not only did he not clam
down on them, he even prevented the old-line communist officials from
interfering with the movement as this would pave the way for the
committal withdrawn of USSR from its satellite states, which would be
helpful to Gobachevs reconstruction of the economy. Considering that
the liberation of Eastern Europe was formed fundamentally on the
premise that Gobachev permitted it to be so, political tolerance by the

central authority was hence

insurrectionary undertakings.

more

significant

than

Reagans

In conclusion, Ronald Reagan does not deserve the most credit for the
end of Cold War because the determining factor which ended the Cold
War did not come from his actions but rather they came from
Gobachevs intention to end it for the sake of USSR. Even though
Reagans military build up pressurized Gobachev to end the arms race,
the arms race would not have ended if Gobachev had not want it to be
so and if he had not been willing to make the compromises, when
Reagan had not been willing to do so. Likewise, Gobachevs UN speech
was fundamentally a result of his own intention to end the ideological
conflict and the superpower rivalry. Although Reagans support for the
anti-communist movements within USSR gave rise to the 1989
insurrections, decision to led the liberation of Europe actualize came
fundamentally from Gobachevs consideration of USSR and not
pressure from the US. Hence, for the most part, Cold War ended
because of Gobachevs intention for them to be so and Reagan does
not deserve the most credit for it.