NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP., petitioners, vs.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, respondents.
G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993
225 SCRA 279
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal. The NATALIA properties are
situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation on 18 April 1979 under Presidential Proclamation No. 163. Since private landowners
were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors
Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision after the necessary
permits for Phase I, II and III were issued on 1982, 1983 and 1986 respectively.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect.
Conformably therewith, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued Notice
of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.
They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the
townsite reservation.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the
DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members. 8 The Regional Adjudicator
temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was
denied. Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, the DARAB merely remanded the case to the
Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings. 9
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they
did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, and no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from
agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands."
RULLING:
As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This
can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development.
The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these
lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion 19 that lands covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as
human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of
R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

FROILAN DE GUZMAN, ANGEL MARCELO and NICASIO MAGBITANG, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and the MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG, BULACAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 156965

October 12, 2006

Petitioners Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo and Nicasio Magbitang were among the tenants of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Pagala,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Sometime in 1979, respondent Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan sought the expropriation of the land before the now defunct Court
of Agrarian Relations.
The municipality eventually acquired ownership of the land through expropriation but allowed petitioners to continue cultivating their lots pending the
construction of the Baliuag Wholesale Complex Market. The petitioners who continually occupied and cultivated the land because, the construction
of the market did not push through , filed petition with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Baliuag, praying that the land be placed under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) in accordance with Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. 4
Following the filing of their petition for CARP coverage before the MARO, petitioners filed a complaint with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) against the municipality. The Provincial Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The Regional Director of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition and declaring the land as covered by OLT. 6 After the denial of its
motion for reconsideration, the municipality elevated the matter to the DAR Secretary who reversed the said order. Petitioners filed an appeal with
the Office of the President. However, it was dismissed and the order of the DAR Secretary was affirmed.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Upholding the non-agricultural classification of the land, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the land could no longer be subject of the comprehensive agrarian reform law (CARL). The Court of Appeals also denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 2003.
Petitioners contend that despite the conversion of the land for a commercial purpose, they have remained tenants of the land devoting it for
agricultural production.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land can be reclassified to agricultural after the purpose of its conversion to a non-agricultural land had not materialized.
RULLING:
Under Section 3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), an agricultural land
refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined therein and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."10
The records reveal that the municipality had passed a zoning ordinance which identified the subject land as the site of the wholesale market
complex. The minutes of meetings and resolutions passed by the municipality's Sanggunian clearly show that petitioners' use and possession of the
land was by mere tolerance of the municipality and subject to the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the land when the need would
arise
The land had ceased to be classified as agricultural when the municipality extended petitioners' occupation of the land. Any transaction entered into
by the municipality involving the land was governed by the applicable civil law in relation to laws on local government. At this point, agrarian laws no
longer governed the relationship between petitioners and the municipality.
Certainly, petitioners' occupation of the land, made possible as it was by the tolerance of the municipality, was subject to its peremptory right to
terminate. As absolute owner of the land, the municipality is entitled to devote the land for purposes it deems appropriate. The mere fact of cultivating
an agricultural land does not ipso jure vest ownership right in favor of the tiller. Since petitioners had not applied for CARP coverage prior to the
reclassification of the land to commercial, their occupation by mere tolerance cannot ripen into absolute ownership. Thus, discretion is vested on the
appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes.
The reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land took place before the effectivity of the CARL, the
Court held that Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 cannot be applied retroactively. 19 Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies
only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed under agrarian reform law after the lapse of five
years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657. 21
Thus, the zoning ordinance passed by the municipality sometime in 1980 reclassifying the subject land as commercial and future site of a market
complex operated to take away the "agricultural" status of the subject property. Subsequent events cited by petitioners such as their continuous
tillage of the land and the non-commencement of the construction of the market complex did not strip the land of its classification as commercial.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

[G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000]

EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES,
APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI, respondents. Korte
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) to private respondents as beneficiaries.
However, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers [10]. Armed with
such document, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the
cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. In their Affidavit, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over the said
agricultural lands.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is
covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares. [12] Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to
DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order. But Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order
upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents affidavit for having
been executed under duress.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order
of Secretary Leong . Eudosia pursued her petition before the SC but it was denied it in a minute resolution as well as her motion for reconsideration.
Meantime, DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. DAR
Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8)
children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law.
[14]
Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR. But DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo and the case is
remanded to the Regional Office for immediate implementation of the Order as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which
ruled in her favor.
Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of the Office of the President. The CA reversed the
Decision of the Office of the President. The Resolution and Order of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao are REINSTATED.
Hence, this petition.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE CITED (EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE DUE TO NON-TENANCY) AND THE PRESENT
CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION.

First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under
the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy
obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered
under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is
untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or
corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twentyfour (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more
than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the
exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies,
finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application
filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a
decision that became final and executory.
Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. [21] It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner [22].
For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowners choice
of the area to be retained, must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, [27] which supplies the details for the exercise of a
landowners retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to
avoid dislocation of farmers.
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmerbeneficiaries.[28] What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the
landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. [29]
Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform program are subject to the exercise by a landowner, who is so qualified, of
his right of retention.
Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) after
compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their presentation to the Register of Deeds, result in the issuance of the corresponding
transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor of the beneficiaries mentioned therein [30].
Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified [31]. Only Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after
compliance with all prerequisites. Thereafter, upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated
beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative
Order No. 2, series of 1994[32], an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowners retained area. Scmis
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the status of the fee held by the owner of a parcel of land. [33] As
such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot confer title where no title has been acquired by
any of the means provided by law[34].
In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of
choice as to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat
the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain the said riceland.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

G.R. No. 93045 June 29, 1992

THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR.
JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL SISON, respondents.
Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27, certificates of land transfer were issued by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering
that certificates of land transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado
Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."
Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation report dated November 17, 1980, revealed that the landholdings of the late
Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966.
Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had
been issued to the petitioners-tenants.
However, a Reinvestigation Report recommended that the landholdings be included in the Operation Land Transfer. This was affirmed in a second
Reinvestigation Report. Still another (third) Reinvestigation Report affirmed the previous recommendation that the landholdings of the Heirs be
covered by the Operation Land Transfer.
Then Minister Heherson Alvarez dismissed the petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their
landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order was denied.
The heirs reiterated their request for reconsideration when Secretary Philip Ella Juico succeeded Secretary Alvarez. They stressed the fact that their
individual landholdings were too small, not exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer. After ordering a
reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was issued by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled
that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison,
Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners
of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands
from the Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.
The tenants filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration which the Heirs of Dr. Sison opposed. An order was issued by Secretary Juico
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on March 29, 1990, dismissing their petition for certiorari. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison having failed to file any application for retention within the period required by laware
estopped and totally barred from claiming such retentions or exemptions.
Whether or not personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is a mandatory precondition for them to be entitled to their retention right.
RULLING:

The orders for the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become final and executory because the certificates had been
marked "under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella. The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of
their agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission was cured by their timely
protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the petitioners.
There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate
for failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo), The Secretary
interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as
agricultural lessees therein. Which means, that while ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain to the concerned Heirs of
Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not
have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation
and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs" Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to
be entitled to their retention right.
The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretary's adminiHaving found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were
entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered
the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.
The SC found no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court hereby AFFIRMS it in toto.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171972, June 08 : 2011]
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. TERESITA V. SALVADOR, RESPONDENT.
Respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and
daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. [6] Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel
of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 [7] issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of
Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador;[8] that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessorsin-interest;[9] and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. [10]
In their Answer,[11] petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered
the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement
that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. [12] Since there is a
tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.
The MTC promulgated a Decision[15] finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the consent to tenurial arrangement between the parties is inferred from the fact that the plaintiff
and her successors-in-interest had received their share of the harvests of the property in dispute from the defendants.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu. The RTC affirmed the decision of Municipal Trial Court.
Respondent sought reconsideration[22] but it was denied by the RTC. Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review [24] with the CA. The CA rendered
judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent
or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship.
Petitioners contend that under Section 5[32] of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, tenancy may be
constituted by agreement of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. [33] In this case, there was an implied consent to constitute a
tenancy relationship as respondent and her predecessors-in-interest allowed petitioners to cultivate the land and share the harvest with the
landowners for more than 40 years.[34]
Petitioners further argue that the CA erred in disregarding the affidavits executed by their witnesses as these are sufficient to prove the existence of
a tenancy relationship.[35] Petitioners claim that their witnesses had personal knowledge of the cultivation and the sharing of harvest. Respondent, on
the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not agricultural tenants because mere cultivation of an agricultural land does not make the tiller an
agricultural tenant.[37] Respondent insists that her predecessors-in-interest merely tolerated petitioners' occupation of the subject land. [38]
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.
RULLING:
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship

is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. [39]
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy. Self-serving
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary. Aside from consent, petitioners also
failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners' neighbors are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other
evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest [45] and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. [46]
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant.[47] It is incumbent
upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. [48]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead
patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
Private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as
Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of
Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued
land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition. The then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV,
Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to
enjoin the defendants was denied. Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition. The Regional Trial
Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal to the respondent
Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
RULLING:
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a
modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens
to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of
comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction
of this vital right.
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by
the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that the State shall apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains
a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. ...

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.