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The German oensive plan, called Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), envisioned an assault at
the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and
south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the
Soviet forces in the salient.[12][13] The two spearheads
were to meet near Kursk. From the south, the XLVIII
Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer
Corps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th Panzer
Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth,
would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army
Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoths right ank
from counterattack by the Soviet strategic reserves known
1 Background
to be located just east of the salient. The 4th Panzer
Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army
See also: Battle of Kursk
As the spring rasputitsa season came to an end in 1943, Group South, commanded by Manstein; and their air supby Colonel General Otto Deloch's
both the German and Soviet commands considered their port was provided
[14][15][16]
Luftotte
4.
plans for future operations. Stalin and some senior Soviet ocers wanted to seize the initiative and attack the Multiple delays by the Germans allowed the Soviets a
German forces inside the Soviet Union, but they were great deal of time to prepare their defences. Employconvinced by a number of key commanders, including ing defence in depth, they constructed a series of dethe Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, to as- fensive lines to wear down the attacking panzer forma1
tions. Six belts made up of extensive mineelds, antitank ditches, and anti-tank gun emplacements were created, although the last three belts were mostly unoccupied
and less fortied than the rst three.[17][18] The Soviet
forces in the salient were organised into two fronts. The
Voronezh Front, commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin,
was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient.
The Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Ivan
Konev, included Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov's 5th
Guards Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's
5th Guards Tank Army, and formed the strategic reserve
force to be held behind the front until it was needed for
the counteroensive.[19][20]
1.1
German advance
Prokhorovka
leading
up
to
BACKGROUND
Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July indicated that defensive works were being constructed by
German infantry all along the anks of 4th Panzer Army
Main article: Operation Citadel
and that German armoured formations could not be spotThe Germans launched their attack on the morning of 5
ted on the anks despite armoured counterattacks that
should have provoked their appearance.[38] The Voronezh
Front headquarters concluded that the Germans were
reaching their limit, and hence it decided on a major
counteroensive as the next course of action.[38]
2.2
Planning
2.1
Unbeknownst to Hausser, on the night of 11 July Rot- and reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 July
mistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an respectively.[62] On 11 July Vatutin ordered that the folassembly area just south of Prokhorovka in preparation lowing day the armies of the Voronezh Front were to go
over onto the oensive along the entire front of the southern salient.[63] This counterattack was planned to be in
concert with the Soviet Operation Kutuzov in the northern side of the Kursk Salient.[64] Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovka
with his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing the
Germans to withdraw southwards.[65] Rotmistrov ordered
his tanks to move forward at speed to engage the German
armour in order to nullify the advantages the Tiger tanks
had in the range and repower of their 88 mm guns. He
believed the more manoeuvrable T-34 would be able to
quickly close and obtain eective anking shots against
the German heavy tanks.[56][66] In fact, Soviet intelligence
had greatly overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands and
Tigers possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps.[lower-alpha 11]
In actuality there were no Ferdinands with the 4th Panzer
Army, as they were all deployed in the northern side of
the Kursk salient with the 9th Army.[67]
Late on the night of 12 July, the III Panzer Corps
crossed the Northern Donets at Rzhawes (also known as
Rzhavets). This jeopardised Rotmistrovs entire plan by
threatening the ank of the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68][60]
Early on 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send reinforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armies
facing the III Panzer Corps.[68][36][60] He organised a task
force under the command of his deputy, General Kuzma
Grigorevich Trufanov, which consisted of the 26th Tank
Brigade from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and
12th Guards Mechanized Brigades from the 5th Guards
Mechanized Corps, and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment
from the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68] Other units from
the reserve also were attached to the group on its way
south.[68] In doing so Rotmistrov had committed over half
of his reserves to an essential ad-hoc advance before the
Battle of Prokhorovka began.[60]
OPPOSING FORCES
Opposing forces
3.2 Soviet
5
T-34s, while the remainder were T-70 light tanks,[84]
with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well.[85][86]
Not all of the 5th Guards Tank Army was present in
the Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of the
formation had been sent south to check the advance
of the III Panzer Corps.[68] The Soviet armour of the
5th Guards Tank Army including the newly attached
2nd Guards[lower-alpha 3] and 2nd[lower-alpha 2] Tank Corps,
as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps[lower-alpha 4]
held in reserve facing the II SS Panzer Corps on 12 July
was about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns.[87][88] In addition, ve artillery regiments, one artillery brigade, and
one anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to the 5th
Guards Tank Army for the assault.[89]
The main attack of the the 5th Guards Tank Army was
conducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18th
Tank Corps that had been brought up from the Soviet
strategic reserve.[90][91] These two Soviet tank formations
together provided the greatest number of tanks in the
attack,[92] with the 18th Tank Corps elding 190 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps elding 212 tanks and self-propelled guns.[91][93] Infantry support to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided by
the 9th Guards Airborne Division.[91] A portion of the
18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern ank of
Totenkopf 's Regiment Eicke.[91] On the southeastern
wing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployed
the remaining forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps that
were not sent south, which numbered about 80 tanks.[92]
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnants
of the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich.[36][94]
Their infantry support was provided by the 183rd Rie
Division.[95] The northwestern ank of the 5th Guards
Tank Army, which faced Totenkpf, was defended by the
33rd Guards Rie Corps 42nd and 95th Guards Rie
Divisions,[96][97] supported by the remnants of the 31st
Tank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Rie Corps 52nd Guards Rie Division.[98][97] The forces
of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not sent
south were held as reserve north of Prokhorovka,[89][92]
and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelled
guns.[93]
Despite having suered signicant losses over the previous weeks ghting, on 12 July the 2nd Air Army still
had some 472 aircraft operational, while the 17th Air
Army had 300 remaining operational aircraft; however,
only a few of these were made available to support the
5th Guards Tank Army.[69]
Battle
6
hill. The Soviet tanks were ring on the move. Rotmistrovs tactic to close at speed disrupted the control
and co-ordination of the Soviet tank formations and also
greatly reduced their accuracy.[36]
7
northwest of Prokhorovka and return to a more defendable positions along the north bank of the Psel River.[127]
Soviet attempts to sever the salient were unsuccessful, and
the unit completed its withdrawal by nightfall.[127]
5.1
Aftermath
5.2
Operation Roland
6.1 German
The II SS Panzer Corps reported 842 men killed,
wounded, or missing for 12 July.[160] Since the Germans
controlled the Prokhorovka battleeld until 17 July, they
7 OUTCOME
6.2
for all of its ve corps, as well smaller units directly subordinated to the army headquarters.[170] The document
reported the following irrecoverable losses: 222 T-34s,
89 T-70s, 12 Churchill tanks, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and
240 support vehicles.[170] The document reported damaged vehicles still under repair as 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s,
7 Churchill tanks, 3 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and no gures
for support vehicles.[170] The document reported personnel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded in
action, and 1,157 missing in action.[170] This adds up to a
total of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelled
guns,[159] with another 212 tanks and self-propelled guns
under repair, and 7,607 casualties.
7 Outcome
Soviet
Exact Soviet losses for 12 July are not known, but have
been estimated by military historians. Personnel losses
at Prokhorovka were estimated by the historian Christer Bergstrm to have been as high as 5,500 men.[115]
For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz and
Jonathan House estimate that the 5th Guards Tank Army
lost at least 400 tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[167] George
Nipe puts the losses in armour as between 600 and 650
tanks.[168] 5th Guards Tank Army losses were estimated
by the Soviet historians Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris
Soloviev to have been about 300 tanks and self-propelled
guns.[115][169]
8.2
Citations
8
8.1
References
Notes
[1] The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the control of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11
July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327) All of its subordinate
corps as of 12 July are listed below;(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48) the divisions, regiments and battalions
directly subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not
listed below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327)
[2] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the
5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the control of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July,
and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July.(Glantz
& House 2004, p. 318)
[3] The 2nd Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th
Guards Tank Army, but was transferred from the control of the Southwestern Front to the 5th Guards Tank
Army on 11 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 321) Due to
earlier combat, by 12 July the 2nd Tank Corps had few
tanks left, many of which were locked in combat elsewhere outside the battleeld of Prokhorovka and out of
contact with their parent headquarters. Therefore it was
reinforced with the 10th Antitank Brigade and relegated
to a supportive role in Prokhorovka.(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106; Glantz & House 2004, p. 179,181)
[4] Two of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps four brigades
the 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized, and the
24th Guards Tank Brigades were sent south to block
the III Panzer Corps, leaving its 10th Guards Mechanized
and 24th Guards Tank Brigades near Prokhorovka on 12
July.(Clark 2012, p. 379; Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p.
101; Glantz & House 2004, p. 321)
[5] The 5th Guards Army was transferred from the control of
the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July.(Glantz
& House 2004, p. 323) Only one of its two corps
were present on the battleeld of Prokhorovka the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167) The
other corps the 32nd Guards Rie Corps was deployed further west, near Oboyan.(Clark 2012, p. 230)
The divisions, regiments and other smaller units directly
subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not listed
below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 323)
[6] The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of
5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July and
to the 1st Tank Army on 8 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p.
324) Only its 11th Motorized Rie Brigade was in the battleeld of Prokhorovka on 12 July.(Glantz & House 2004,
p. 166,195,417) It is not uncommon for this formation to
be portrayed as part of the 5th Guards Army during the
Battle of Prokhorovka, but that is a metachronistic error.
[7] The 6th Guards Army bore the brunt of the German oensive from the very opening hours of it; therefore, its subordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka were
already heavily depleted.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167)
[8] These are only for the II SS Panzer Corps.
[9] These are for the whole 5th Guards Tank Army.
[10] See also: Battle of Brody (1941), Battle of Raseiniai,
Operation Goodwood, Battle for Golan Heights (1973),
and others.
[11] A Soviet General Sta report estimated that the II SSPanzer Corps and III Panzer Corps had 100 Tigers and
Ferdinands on 12 July.(Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 222)
8.2 Citations
[1] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... a local, tactical
German victory..
[2] Clark 2012, p. 408, Excerpt reads: Even though II
SS-Panzer Corps could claim to have won a tactical victory in the monumental armoured clash at Prokhorovka ...
Haussers men did not do enough to change the course of
the operation..
[3] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: The Waen-SS
won a tactical victory on July 12..
[4] Nipe 2012, p. 86, Excerpt reads: The small expansion of
the Psel bridgehead by Totenkopf and the advances of Das
Reich around the southern edges of Prochorovka were tactical victories at best and not decisive by any denition..
[5] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: Operationally,
however, the palm rests with the Red Army..
[6] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 561, The counterattack
did not achieve its basic goal. The enemy [II SSPanzer Corps] was not routed, but the further advance of
the II SS-Panzer Corps beyond Prokhorovka was nally
halted..
[7] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... the clash was,
when set against the much wider strategic backdrop of the
oensive, no more than a local, tactical German victory.
It was of no consequence or signicance in helping to realise any of the wider oensive objectives of Operation
Zitadelle, which was in any case by this date already a
failure..
[8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108, If we take a look
at how the front lines changed during these ve days one
could interpret it as some sort of success for the Germans
... However, if we compare the outcome with the German
orders for the battle, which stated that Prokhorovka was
the target, it is clear that the Germans fell short of their
goals. The Red Army had hoped to push the II SS-Panzer
10
[30] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820
miles.
[31] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820
miles.
REFERENCES
8.2
Citations
11
[81] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 105106, 793 tanks [117] Nipe 2010, p. 335.
and 57 self-propelled guns.
[118] Showalter 2013, p. 216.
[82] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 151, 328, 793 tanks and 37
[119] Clark 2012, pp. 388389.
self-propelled guns.
[83] Nipe 2012, p. 39, 850 tanks.
[133] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208, Kutuzov and allied landings had an eect on the German High Command.
12
8.3
Bibliography
Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. London; New York: Zenith
Imprint. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4.
Bauman, Walter (1998). Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise Phase II (KOSAVE
II) (PDF). Maryland: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. A study of the southern sector of
the Battle of Kursk conducted by the US Army
Concepts Analysis Agency and directed by Walter J. Bauman, using data collected from military
archives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy Institute (TDI).
Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Kursk The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN
978-1-903223-88-8.
REFERENCES
Brand, Dieter (2003). Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)". sterreichische Militrische
Zeitschrift (in German) (Bundesministerium fr
Landesverteidigung und Sport) (6).
Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle:
Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing
Group. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5.
Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitlers Gamble, 1943.
Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-27595733-9.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schnherr,
Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungvry, Kristin; Wegner, Bernd (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44
Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
(in German). Mnchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt
Mnchen. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.
Glantz, David M. (September 1986). Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 (PDF). US
Army Command and General Sta College (Ft.
Belvoir). Soviet Army Studies Oce Combined
Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report
No. 11). OCLC 320412485.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathon (1995). When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 9780-7006-0899-7.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1999). The
Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas. ISBN 978-0-70060-978-9.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004)
[1999]. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1335-9.
Glantz, David (2013). Soviet Military Intelligence
in War. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis (Routledge).
ISBN 978-1-136-28934-7.
Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The
Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Sta
Study. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass).
ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. This report, commissioned by the Soviet General Sta in 1944, was designed to educate the Red Army on how to conduct war operations. It was classied secret until
its declassication in 1964, and was subsequently
translated to English and edited by Orenstein and
Glantz. Its original title was Collection of materials for the study of war experience, no. 11 (Russian:
11, Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny
11)
13
Healy, Mark (2008). Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
Healy, Mark (2010) [2008]. Zitadelle: The German
Oensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5716-1.
Molony, C.J.C.; Flynn, F.C.; Davies, H.L. &
Gleave, T.P. (2004) [1973]. Butler, Sir James, ed.
The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V: The
Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy
3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. History of
the Second World War, United Kingdom Military
Series. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 184574-069-6.
Licari, Michael J. (2004). The Battle of Kursk:
Myths and Reality. Cedar Falls: University of
Northern Iowa. Archived from the original on 11
September 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
Newton, Steven (2002). Kursk: The German View:
Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.
ISBN 0-306-81150-2.
Nipe, George (2010). Blood, Steel, and Myth: The
II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka.
Southbury; Newbury: RZM; Casemate (distributor). ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6.
Nipe, George (2012). Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
ISBN 978-0-8117-1162-3.
Overy, Richard (1997). Russias War: A History of
the Soviet Eort. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN
0-14-027169-4.
Showalter, Dennis E. (2013). Armor and Blood:
The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War
II. New York: Random House.
Zamulin, Valeriy; Britton, Stuart (2011). Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka,
Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative. Solihull: Helion & Company. ISBN 1-906033-89-7.
Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk
1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War. London: Taylor &
Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8.
VIII. Fliegerkorps. Retrieved 11 July 2015.
17th Air Army. Retrieved 11 July 2015.
9 Further reading
Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia
in the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 9780-330-48808-2.
Evans, Richard (2010). The Third Reich at War.
New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14311671-4.
Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational
Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland,
OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-71464077-8.
Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don to
the Dnepr: Soviet Oensive Operations, December
1942 August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis
(Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1996) [1937]. Achtung-Panzer:
The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential. London: Arms and
Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-282-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. New York:
Da Capo. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the
East. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
Kasdorf, Bruno (2000). The Battle of Kursk
An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles
(PDF). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. OCLC 44584575.
von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76032-0549.
von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles.
Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 156852-578-8.
Moorhouse, Roger (2011). Berlin at War: Life and
Death in Hitlers Capital, 193945. London: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-09-955189-8.
Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies
of Adolf Hitler. Jeerson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN
978-0-7864-2054-4.
Smith, J.R. (1966). Aircraft in Prole No.69 The
Henschel Hs 129. UK: Prole Publications. OCLC
42473519.
Willmott, Hedley Paul (1990). The Great Crusade:
A New Complete History of the Second World War.
New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-934715-7.
14
10
, (2006). [Prokhorovka
- the unknown battle of the Great War] (in Russian). : X. ISBN 5-17-0395485. Comprehensive description of Soviet and Germany troop movement based on Soviet and German
archives
10
External links
EXTERNAL LINKS
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