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Journal of Adult Development, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 2003 (
A Cost of Pretending
Murad S. Hussain1 and Ellen Langer1,2
Two experiments were conducted to assess the effect of pretending on the pretenders selfesteem. People use social pretenses to avoid criticism and receive praise to maintain and
augment this self-esteem. Nevertheless, there is a hidden opportunity cost of pretending.
Participants were led (or not) to pretend that they possessed knowledge they did not have
(i.e., made-up words), and did or did not receive praise for being knowledgeable. Pretending
blunts the effects of praise. Praise raised control participants self-esteem more than it did that
of pretenders.
KEY WORDS: self-presentation; pretending; social pretense; self-esteem; mindfulness.
Goffmans dramaturgical metaphor for impression management (Goffman, 1959) emphasizes this
role of pretense in social behavior. By actively manipulating others impressions of ourselves, we can
reduce the negative feedback we receive and protect our self-concepts from being associated with negative characteristics (Roth, Snyder, & Pace, 1986).
Self-presentation allows those with low self-esteem to
demonstrate to themselves and others that they possess favorable qualities (Baumgardner, Kaufman, &
Levy, 1989), and even in the absence of positive feedback, strategic self-enhancement alone can enhance
self-esteem (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton,
1981).
The less genuine the impression managements,
the greater the threat posed to the quest for praise. As
the gulf widens between the pretended and the genuine selves, the pretense becomes more vulnerable to
disconfirmation, particularly upon future encounters
with the deceived audience. In fact, if the audience
suspects the presented behavior to be false, the praise
2 To
3 THE
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that the pretender seeks may give way to disapproving
feedback (Tesser & Moore, 1986).
Nevertheless, suppose that a pretense goes undetected, evokes no negative feedback, and elicits
glowing praise instead. How can positive feedback affect pretenders self-esteem if they do not possess the
attributes being complimented? Pretenders not only
sidestep the risk of displaying their genuine selves for
negative evaluation, but also simultaneously sidestep
the opportunity for benefiting from positive evaluation, because praise directed at their pretended qualities cannot be directed at what they areonly what
they are not. We hypothesize that this is a hidden opportunity cost of social pretending, rendering ineffective any praise won under pretense.
What Is Pretending
When pretense is used as exploration by children it may be beneficial (Heatherton & Engel, 1998).
Pretense intended to deceive as impression management, however, is quite another matter. A job applicant who falsely implies to his interviewer that he is
a skilled computer programmer uses pretense to distort or conceal the truth. It is this genre of pretending
that is the focus of the present research. Buss and
Briggs (1984) refine Goffmans approach (Goffman,
1959) and elaborate upon a dimension of pretense.
At one extreme lies behavior that is completely genuine and spontaneous. Slightly higher in pretense is
putting ones best foot forward, where actors select
only genuine positive facets of themselves for presentation but omit negative aspects, and thus lie by
omission (Buss & Briggs, 1984, p. 1312). Still higher
in pretense is unrehearsed exaggeration of the truth;
higher yet is rehearsed exaggeration using premeditated strategy. Finally, the other extreme of the pretense dimension is marked by utter impersonation
the absence of truthful features, where actors (such as
con men) use only falsehoods to present themselves.
Deception = Lying = Pretending
We define pretending as intentional, implicit deception (Miller & Stiff, 1993; Russow, 1986).4
4 Although
lying is often viewed as more severe than pretending (perjury, e.g., only covers knowingly false statements), the
two should not be distinguished on the basis that lying is more
heinous. For example, You pretended to be my friend! connotes
a cardinal interpersonal sin.
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A Cost of Pretending
effects of praise. The studies focused on the use of
pretense as a tool for hiding a lack of knowledge.
While answering open-ended questions about a reading passage, half the participants came upon meaningless words. Half the participants were later praised on
their vocabulary ability (in a situation in which they
were unlikely to admit not knowing the word), and
their change in self-esteem was measured by administering Heatherton and Polivys 20-item State SelfEsteem Scale (SSES; Heathern & Polivy, 1990) before
and after the experimental manipulations.
STUDY 1
Prior studies investigating strategic selfpresentation have tended either to induce the selfenhancement of genuine aspects of the self (e.g.,
Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989; Jones et al., 1981),
or to instruct participants to intentionally deceive
an audience (e.g., Jones et al., 1990; Riordan, Gross,
& Maloney, 1994). Here we are interested in spontaneous pretense.
In Pazy and Goussinskys phenomenological survey of technical professionals (Pazy and Goussinsky,
1995), four fifths of the respondents recalled only
negative feelings in situations where they discovered
that they lacked work-related knowledge. Forty percent wished they could escape the situation without
exposing or further confronting this deficiency. The
majority of those who experienced lack of knowledge during an interpersonal context either remained
silent during the interaction or actively attempted to
hide their deficiency instead of openly admitting it. In
other words, they hoped to pretend that they knew
something they did not. Further, the primary motive
was to preempt a loss of self-esteem. The present
study examined how such a desire to preempt negative feedback might, in turn, unintentionally preempt
the effect of any positive feedback received by the
pretender. In a questionnaire study, we found that 32
out of 59 people felt that if they did not know the
meaning of a word, they would ask. The word given
in that scenario was bresionary (a made-up word).
The following studies examine participants who actually pretend about their knowledge of this word,
and how they react when their vocabulary ability is
praised.
Participants were recruited for a study in teaching styles to prime them for a context valuing academic competence. Some were confronted with a
made-up word, knowledge of which was essential for
263
answering a question. Participants were defined as
pretending if they answered this question without
indicating that they did not know the meaning of the
manufactured word, because they could not have answered it on their own with any certainty as to what
they were being asked to do. They also received written feedback complimenting their vocabulary comprehension of the manufactured word.
Predictions
SSE levels. Pretending is hypothesized to insulate pretenders self-images from the feedback they
receive. It was thus predicted that praised pretenders
SSE changes would not differ from those of unpraised
pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), and that
praised control participants would exhibit SSE increases larger than any other group.
GRE completion time. Praised controls would
complete challenging vocabulary questions faster
than would praised pretenders.
Volunteer tutoring. Praised controls would volunteer more hours towards teaching vocabulary to high
school students than would praised pretenders.
Method
Overview
Participants provided demographic information
and completed the SSES and Self-Monitoring Scale
(SMS: Snyder, 1974). They then read a historical
oration and answered qualitative questions inquiring about the passage. Half the participants answered
questions containing two words fabricated for this
study, knowledge of which was required in order to
respond fully (Pretending condition).
All participants then filled out a survey unrelated
to this study. Half the participants then received written comments complimenting their responses to the
passages (Praise condition). After receipt of the feedback, participants completed a second SSE scale and
solved GRE vocabulary questions.
Participants
Twenty students at Harvard University (19 undergraduates, 1 postbaccalaureate) volunteered for
a thesis study on teaching styles in exchange for
financial compensation. They were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions.
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Materials
Question 2
Question 3
Question 4
Question 5
Procedure
Participants were seated alone in a seminar room
and given a packet of materials. The experimenter left
after instructing them that he would be available in a
nearby room to answer questions, and that he would
return in approximately 20 min to collect the packet
and give them the next section.
Participants completed a cover sheet requesting information about college year, gender, ethnicity/race, country of birth, languages spoken, SAT verbal score, number of English or literature courses
taken at college, and previous teaching or tutoring experience. They then read a sheet explaining that the
experiment was an examination of teaching styles
and attributes, and were provided with the following
cover story:
In this study, your responses will be compared to
those of high school students who tutor their peers in
math, science, English and history. Through this and
other studies, we hope to get a clearer understanding of the cognitive styles and personality attributes
possessed by effective teachers.
6 Only
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265
Table II. Mean SSE Changes Scores for Study 1
SSE subscales
Condition
Control/No praise
M
SD
Control/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD
Total SSE
Performance
Social
Appearance
2.0
1.6
0.2
0.5
0.8
1.5
1.0
0.7
10.5
9.3
3.5
2.1
4.5
4.4
2.5
3.9
1.4
5.5
0.2
3.3
0.6
1.8
1.0
1.7
0.0
2.9
0.0
1.8
1.0
1.8
1.0
0.8
+3
1
1
the subjects response to that question. This feedback explained that tutors at the campus writing
center provided a coding key by which participants
responses were evaluated. The other half of the
participants received no praise.
After giving all participants the final packet of
materials, the experimenter left the room. Participants completed a second SSES, followed by five
antonym and five analogy questions from past GRE
exams. Unknown to the participants, the experimenter sat in an adjacent room, observed them
through a one-way mirror, and measured the time
taken to complete the GRE questions. Participants
then completed the final section, which asked how
many hours they would be willing to tutor local high
school students in SAT vocabulary skills, and what
levels (basic through advanced SAT vocabulary) they
were interested in tutoring. After completing the
packet, participants were debriefed and paid.
dition yielded the mean SSE change for each condition (Table II). Contrast analysis used the weights
displayed in Table II, and yielded the data displayed in
Table III.
Total SSE Change. A 2 2 (Pretending x Praise)
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for Pretending, F(1, 14) = 4.6, p = .05, but not for Praise
( p > .15). Contrast analysis was significant, p = .023,
r = .50.
Performance SSE Change. ANOVA yielded
a near significant main effect for Pretending,
F(1, 14) = 3.55, p = .08, but not for Praise ( p > .10).
Contrast analysis was significant, p = .017, r = .53.
Social SSE Change. ANOVA yielded nonsignificant effects for Pretending and Praise ( ps > .10). Contrast analysis was significant, p = .023, r = .47.
Appearance SSE Change. ANOVA yielded
nonsignificant effects for Pretending and Praise
( ps > .09). Contrast analysis was nonsignificant,
p = .29, r = .15.
Results
Discussion
State Self-Esteem
Participants premanipulation SSE scores were
subtracted from their postmanipulation SSE scores
to obtain the dependent variable of SSE change.
Averaging participants SSE changes for each con-
10
The ralerting for Appearance SSE was small, but because Appearance items pertain mostly to physical appearance, it is not
surprising that feelings of academic competence may not involve
a self-evaluation of ones body image.
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28.1
10.5
11.9
6.5
29.73
4.76
6.50
4.36
3.03
2.83
2.56
1.83
.005
.007
.01
.04
.54
.52
.48
.37
.98
.99
.99
.75
support the hypothesis that pretending blunts the effect of praise. Manipulations had little or no effect
upon secondary dependent measures (GRE completion time, hours volunteered to tutor).
Nonetheless, the small sample size prevents anything but tentative conclusions. There is also a possible alternate explanation for the differential SSE
increases. It may have been that the lack of SSE increase in praised pretenders, relative to praised controls, was due not to social pretending but to their
exposure to unfamiliar words. It is possible that exposure to a word they had never seen before could
have humbled them enough to offset any increase
in SSE due to praise. If so, this would undermine the
hypothesis that pretending itself blunts praise. With
this in mind, adjustments were made to the replication study.
from those of unpraised pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), and that praised control and No
Pretending participants would exhibit SSE increases
larger than any other group.
GRE completion time. As in Study 1, praised controls would complete challenging vocabulary questions faster than would praised pretenders.
STUDY 2
Procedure
Predictions
SSE levels. As in Study 1, it was predicted that
praised pretenders SSE changes would not differ
Method
Participants
Sixty-six undergraduates volunteered for a study
on teaching styles and attributes in exchange for either partial academic credit or financial compensation. They were randomly assigned among conditions.
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267
factured words and genuineness of the feedback. The
remaining 60 participants were spread evenly across
conditions.
State Self-Esteem
Results
Classification of Participants
Omission of Data. The data for six participants
were excluded. Three of the participants (two females, one male) in the Pretending condition explicitly stated in speech or writing that they did not know
the meaning of bresionary and thus did not pretend
to have knowledge of the word. (Interestingly, two of
these participants had perfect SAT scores.) Three (all
males) participants expressed suspicion of the manu-
Control/No praise
M
SD
Control/praise
M
SD
No Pretending/No praise
M
SD
No Pretending/praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/praise
M
SD
Total SSE
Performance
Social
Appearance
2.3
6.8
0.4
2.1
1.0
3.2
0.9
2.0
6.9
6.3
3.3
4.3
2.6
4.1
1.0
1.2
0.8
4.0
0.7
2.3
0.4
2.0
0.3
1.7
6.0
4.1
2.5
1.0
2.6
2.8
0.9
1.3
1.8
3.9
1.0
2.0
0.8
2.0
0.0
1.2
1.2
3.6
0.7
1.6
0.4
2.2
0.9
1.9
+2
1
+2
1
1
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19.70
8.80
8.60
2.30
24.70
5.99
7.95
2.53
3.62
3.28
2.78
1.32
.0003
.0009
.004
.10
.44
.41
.38
.11
.97
.96
.92
.53
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In a study given to 59 Harvard students, they were
presented with a hypothetical opportunity to pretend
about their knowledge of bresionary. Thirty two out
of 59 participants (54%) responded that they would
not pretend and would ask what the words meant.
When knowledge of this same words was required in
order to correctly answer a question, only 3 out of
32 people (9%) exposed to the word (but without being given a definition) actually stated that they did not
know what it meant. There is a significant discrepancy
between the number of people who intended to pretend to know the word and who actually pretended to
know it, 2 (1, N = 91) = 17.64, p < .001.
In both experiments, praise was ineffective in
raising pretenders SSE, particularly when compared
If there is a cost of pretending, why are people not dissuaded from pretending? One explanation
might be that the cost is not absolute, but relative. Although praised pretenders may not feel worse than
they did earlier, they have swept aside an opportunity to feel better about themselves by engaging in
praise-blunting pretenses. That is, when a pretense
is used to eliminate the possibility of a decrease in
self-esteem, the possibility for a raise in self-esteem
is also eliminated. Thus it is a hidden opportunity
cost, whereby praised pretenders are left no better
off than unpraised pretendersand may indeed be
11
Although praise only raised or had no effect on the SSE of Control and No Pretending participants, two praised pretenders experienced a decrease (|r|s < .50, ps > .15).
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A Cost of Pretending
no better off than if they had not pretended in the
first place. The precise costs of knowing that one
was inauthentic are not clear. Still it is hard, at least
for us, to imagine that they do not exist. At this
point we can say that, although pretending may be
reinforced by a mild affect increase from blunted
praise, pretenders preclude the possibility of being
reinforced even more strongly when behaving more
genuinely.
Another possibility is that if praise does indeed
interact with pretending to decrease self-esteem, pretenders may reattribute their lowered affect to something else; for example, they may conclude that the
pretense was unsuccessful, or that the praise was
not genuine but disparaging. Because these attributions do not personalize the cost incurred, pretenders
would not necessarily be deterred from again seeking
praise with pretenses.
It may also be that when people execute intricate deceptions, with heavy risks of failure and psychological damage (e.g., loss of trust, loss of face in
the eyes of esteemed others), they are aware of the
costs precisely because they are so severe, but when
the pretense is for something as insignificant as
knowing a word, the preparation and risks are assumed to be negligible. The propensity to engage
in a deception may increase as the perceived risk
and cost decrease. Thus, the big lie, ironically, may
end up being less costly than the small one, because
the deceiver has accounted for the consequences of
the former while assuming that the latter, involving such minimal effort, will have no detrimental
effect.
In other research (Kawakami, White, & Langer,
2000), we have found that people are aware of when
we are inauthentic and clearly prefer us to be genuine.
People who engage in small pretenses (e.g., pretending to know an unfamiliar word) may conclude
that because the pretense is so narrowly defined and
seemingly trivial, it cannot possibly be analogous to,
nor nearly as costly as, pretending in a broader interpersonal setting. Yet, the results of the present studies clearly indicate that despite the pretenses narrow
boundaries, pretenders did not benefit as greatly from
praise as others did. Pretending is typically mindless,
that is, scripted. As such, if extensive, it should result
in all of the negative consequences outlined elsewhere
(see Langer, 1989, 1997).
As shown here, even the small pretense is disadvantageous for the actor. This strengthens the conclusion that the cost of pretending is far more pervasive
than might normally be assumed.
269
Breaking the Cycle?
While people in an academic context may place
a particular value on appearing academically competent, competence in general is greatly valued by
our culture, and people will go to great and varied
lengths to manipulate others assessments of their
own skill levels (Jones, 1989). The benefits of competence are instilled in us early in childhood and fostered through years of grades and accolades for being the smartest, fastest, strongest, and most talented
among our peers. As we grow older, we are expected
to increase our knowledge and capabilities, which no
doubt increases our opportunities and motives for
pretendingas well as the costs for doing so.
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