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C 2003)
Journal of Adult Development, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 2003 (

A Cost of Pretending
Murad S. Hussain1 and Ellen Langer1,2

Two experiments were conducted to assess the effect of pretending on the pretenders selfesteem. People use social pretenses to avoid criticism and receive praise to maintain and
augment this self-esteem. Nevertheless, there is a hidden opportunity cost of pretending.
Participants were led (or not) to pretend that they possessed knowledge they did not have
(i.e., made-up words), and did or did not receive praise for being knowledgeable. Pretending
blunts the effects of praise. Praise raised control participants self-esteem more than it did that
of pretenders.
KEY WORDS: self-presentation; pretending; social pretense; self-esteem; mindfulness.

Jebediah Springfield: A noble spirit embiggens the smallest man.


Edna Krabappel: Embiggens? I never heard that word before I moved to Springfield.
Ms. Hoover: I dont know why. Its a perfectly cromulent word.
The Simpsons3
INTRODUCTION

Goffmans dramaturgical metaphor for impression management (Goffman, 1959) emphasizes this
role of pretense in social behavior. By actively manipulating others impressions of ourselves, we can
reduce the negative feedback we receive and protect our self-concepts from being associated with negative characteristics (Roth, Snyder, & Pace, 1986).
Self-presentation allows those with low self-esteem to
demonstrate to themselves and others that they possess favorable qualities (Baumgardner, Kaufman, &
Levy, 1989), and even in the absence of positive feedback, strategic self-enhancement alone can enhance
self-esteem (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton,
1981).
The less genuine the impression managements,
the greater the threat posed to the quest for praise. As
the gulf widens between the pretended and the genuine selves, the pretense becomes more vulnerable to
disconfirmation, particularly upon future encounters
with the deceived audience. In fact, if the audience
suspects the presented behavior to be false, the praise

Why do we care about how we are seen? Given


that our culture is preoccupied with appearances, it
seems prudent to entertain the question. Mead (1934)
theorized that we internalize feedback received during interactions with significant otherswhich include family, peer and ethnic groups, and social influences like television and other media (Hussain, 1997;
Newton & Buck, 1985)and come to construe ourselves as others see us. When others hold us in high
esteem, we appropriate their positive views about us,
which may reinforce us to elicit further positive feedback and do what we can to avoid negative feedback.
When we doubt that this can be done through genuine self-presentation, we may strategically employ
pretenses in order to increase the possibility of being
praised and decrease the likelihood of being criticized.
1 Harvard

University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.


whom correspondence should be addressed at Department
of Psychology, Harvard University, 1330 William James Hall,
33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; e-mail:
langer@wjh.harvard.edu.

2 To

c 2003, Twentieth Century Fox Film CorSIMPSONSTM


poration. All rights reserved.

3 THE

261

C 2003 Plenum Publishing Corporation


1068-0667/03/1000-0261/0

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that the pretender seeks may give way to disapproving
feedback (Tesser & Moore, 1986).
Nevertheless, suppose that a pretense goes undetected, evokes no negative feedback, and elicits
glowing praise instead. How can positive feedback affect pretenders self-esteem if they do not possess the
attributes being complimented? Pretenders not only
sidestep the risk of displaying their genuine selves for
negative evaluation, but also simultaneously sidestep
the opportunity for benefiting from positive evaluation, because praise directed at their pretended qualities cannot be directed at what they areonly what
they are not. We hypothesize that this is a hidden opportunity cost of social pretending, rendering ineffective any praise won under pretense.
What Is Pretending
When pretense is used as exploration by children it may be beneficial (Heatherton & Engel, 1998).
Pretense intended to deceive as impression management, however, is quite another matter. A job applicant who falsely implies to his interviewer that he is
a skilled computer programmer uses pretense to distort or conceal the truth. It is this genre of pretending
that is the focus of the present research. Buss and
Briggs (1984) refine Goffmans approach (Goffman,
1959) and elaborate upon a dimension of pretense.
At one extreme lies behavior that is completely genuine and spontaneous. Slightly higher in pretense is
putting ones best foot forward, where actors select
only genuine positive facets of themselves for presentation but omit negative aspects, and thus lie by
omission (Buss & Briggs, 1984, p. 1312). Still higher
in pretense is unrehearsed exaggeration of the truth;
higher yet is rehearsed exaggeration using premeditated strategy. Finally, the other extreme of the pretense dimension is marked by utter impersonation
the absence of truthful features, where actors (such as
con men) use only falsehoods to present themselves.
Deception = Lying = Pretending
We define pretending as intentional, implicit deception (Miller & Stiff, 1993; Russow, 1986).4
4 Although

lying is often viewed as more severe than pretending (perjury, e.g., only covers knowingly false statements), the
two should not be distinguished on the basis that lying is more
heinous. For example, You pretended to be my friend! connotes
a cardinal interpersonal sin.

Hussain and Langer


Pretending is the process by which an actor,
through word or action,
(a) implies a premise for an observer to conclude
as true, although the actor believes it to be
false, and
(b) intentionally causes the observer to believe
that the actor embraces this premise as true.
Who Deceives? Although individuals believe
that other people lie more frequently than they
themselves do (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, &
Epstein, 1996), and individual women tend to believe
that others find lying more acceptable than they
themselves do (Backbier, Hoogstraten, & Meerum
Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997), women and men do
not differ in their rate of telling lies and the rate
is seemingly high (DePaulo et al., 1996).5 Jones,
Brenner, and Knight (1990) found that high selfmonitors who had pretended to be a reprehensible
character exhibited increased self-esteem when they
heard personally disparaging feedback confirming
the success of the pretense. The reverse was true
for low self-monitors, whose self-esteem decreased
upon hearing the same pretense-confirming negative
feedback.
Interpersonal Costs of Deception
When people pretend for self-centered reasons,
they hope to avoid criticism and prevent loss in selfesteem (Roth et al., 1986), or to win praise and raise
their self-esteem (DePaulo et al., 1996)sometimes
simultaneously. We propose, however, that although
we may pretend in order to bolster our self-esteem,
pretending blunts and may even decrease the effects
of praise. If we pretend and we are successful in our
deception, praise will be ineffective.
Overview of the Studies
Two studies were conducted to investigate the
general hypothesis that pretense counteracts the

5 Participants were told toand did indeedconstrue a lie as any

time you intentionally try to mislead someone (DePaulo et al.,


1996, p. 981). Lies designated as subtle included literal truths
that are designed to mislead and behavioral or nonverbal lies
(e.g., He and I discussed sexual acts that I had performed, but he
assumed that they had been performed with a woman) (p. 982).
This encompasses the operational definition of pretending provided earlier.

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A Cost of Pretending
effects of praise. The studies focused on the use of
pretense as a tool for hiding a lack of knowledge.
While answering open-ended questions about a reading passage, half the participants came upon meaningless words. Half the participants were later praised on
their vocabulary ability (in a situation in which they
were unlikely to admit not knowing the word), and
their change in self-esteem was measured by administering Heatherton and Polivys 20-item State SelfEsteem Scale (SSES; Heathern & Polivy, 1990) before
and after the experimental manipulations.

STUDY 1
Prior studies investigating strategic selfpresentation have tended either to induce the selfenhancement of genuine aspects of the self (e.g.,
Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989; Jones et al., 1981),
or to instruct participants to intentionally deceive
an audience (e.g., Jones et al., 1990; Riordan, Gross,
& Maloney, 1994). Here we are interested in spontaneous pretense.
In Pazy and Goussinskys phenomenological survey of technical professionals (Pazy and Goussinsky,
1995), four fifths of the respondents recalled only
negative feelings in situations where they discovered
that they lacked work-related knowledge. Forty percent wished they could escape the situation without
exposing or further confronting this deficiency. The
majority of those who experienced lack of knowledge during an interpersonal context either remained
silent during the interaction or actively attempted to
hide their deficiency instead of openly admitting it. In
other words, they hoped to pretend that they knew
something they did not. Further, the primary motive
was to preempt a loss of self-esteem. The present
study examined how such a desire to preempt negative feedback might, in turn, unintentionally preempt
the effect of any positive feedback received by the
pretender. In a questionnaire study, we found that 32
out of 59 people felt that if they did not know the
meaning of a word, they would ask. The word given
in that scenario was bresionary (a made-up word).
The following studies examine participants who actually pretend about their knowledge of this word,
and how they react when their vocabulary ability is
praised.
Participants were recruited for a study in teaching styles to prime them for a context valuing academic competence. Some were confronted with a
made-up word, knowledge of which was essential for

263
answering a question. Participants were defined as
pretending if they answered this question without
indicating that they did not know the meaning of the
manufactured word, because they could not have answered it on their own with any certainty as to what
they were being asked to do. They also received written feedback complimenting their vocabulary comprehension of the manufactured word.
Predictions
SSE levels. Pretending is hypothesized to insulate pretenders self-images from the feedback they
receive. It was thus predicted that praised pretenders
SSE changes would not differ from those of unpraised
pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), and that
praised control participants would exhibit SSE increases larger than any other group.
GRE completion time. Praised controls would
complete challenging vocabulary questions faster
than would praised pretenders.
Volunteer tutoring. Praised controls would volunteer more hours towards teaching vocabulary to high
school students than would praised pretenders.
Method
Overview
Participants provided demographic information
and completed the SSES and Self-Monitoring Scale
(SMS: Snyder, 1974). They then read a historical
oration and answered qualitative questions inquiring about the passage. Half the participants answered
questions containing two words fabricated for this
study, knowledge of which was required in order to
respond fully (Pretending condition).
All participants then filled out a survey unrelated
to this study. Half the participants then received written comments complimenting their responses to the
passages (Praise condition). After receipt of the feedback, participants completed a second SSE scale and
solved GRE vocabulary questions.
Participants
Twenty students at Harvard University (19 undergraduates, 1 postbaccalaureate) volunteered for
a thesis study on teaching styles in exchange for
financial compensation. They were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions.

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Materials

Table I. Comments Provided in Praise Condition for Study 1


Question 1

Participants completed the SSES and the 25-item


SMS. The reading passage provided was an excerpt
from Patrick Henrys Revolutionary War oration best
known for its coda, Give me liberty or give me
death! Twenty-four items from the Kiersey Temperament Sorter (Kiersey, 1984), an Internet-accessible
personality inventory, were used here as filler material. Ten GRE vocabulary questions, taken from a
GRE review book (ETS [Educational Testing Services], 1992), were chosen for their extreme difficulty.6

Question 2
Question 3
Question 4
Question 5

3. From paragraph 6: Besides, sir, we have no


election. Define the meaning of election as
it is used in this context.
4. George Beard, a 19th century historian, called
this speech an example of how political debates can be influenced unduly by the ramblings of a patriot too eager for martyrdom.
Do you agree or disagree?7
5. Do you know the name of the orator who gave
this speech, or the specific timeframe in which
it occurred?

Procedure
Participants were seated alone in a seminar room
and given a packet of materials. The experimenter left
after instructing them that he would be available in a
nearby room to answer questions, and that he would
return in approximately 20 min to collect the packet
and give them the next section.
Participants completed a cover sheet requesting information about college year, gender, ethnicity/race, country of birth, languages spoken, SAT verbal score, number of English or literature courses
taken at college, and previous teaching or tutoring experience. They then read a sheet explaining that the
experiment was an examination of teaching styles
and attributes, and were provided with the following
cover story:
In this study, your responses will be compared to
those of high school students who tutor their peers in
math, science, English and history. Through this and
other studies, we hope to get a clearer understanding of the cognitive styles and personality attributes
possessed by effective teachers.

Participants completed the SSES and SMS, and


then read an excerpt of Patrick Henrys oration and
answered five open-ended questions related to the
passage. Half the participants received questions that
contained only legitimate vocabulary (Control condition):
1. In the space below, elaborate upon the purpose of the oration.
2. In three or four complete sentences, discuss
two of the speakers references to God.

6 Only

720% of GRE test-takers had successfully answered each


of these questions.

goodclear, yet concise, summary of material


understands key concepts
excellent comprehension of vocabulary
firm grasp of specific themes
good analysis of context
firm grasp of specific themes
good comprehension of vocabulary
[no comment given]

The other half (Pretending condition) received


nearly identical questions, except that the second and
fourth questions contained nonexistent words created
for this study:
2. In three or four complete sentences, discuss the
speakers two bresionary references to God.8
4. [. . .] how political debates can be influenced unduly by the visinane9 ramblings of a patriot too eager for martyrdom. Do you agree or disagree?
After 20 minutes had elapsed, the experimenter
returned to the room to collect the materials. All
participants were given the Kiersey sorter, after
which the experimenter then left the room for 6 min.
Upon his return, the Kiersey sorter was collected, and half the participants (Praise condition)
were presented with a copy of the five oration-related
questions. Beneath the first four questions were
standardized hand-written comments (Table I) about
7

This quotation was also manufactured, although there was an


American historian names Charles Beard.
8 The passage contained four direct references to God, so participants who answered this question but did not ask what bresionary meant could not have known, not even from the words
context, how to select the two references. Therefore, they were
defined to be pretending to know what the word meant.
9 Visinane was added to reinforce the fact that there existed some
words that were unfamiliar to the participants. However, because
several respondents interpreted to the word to be an archaic version of inane, only the word bresionary was considered as the
central manipulation.

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Table II. Mean SSE Changes Scores for Study 1
SSE subscales
Condition

Control/No praise
M
SD
Control/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD

Total SSE

Performance

Social

Appearance

2.0
1.6

0.2
0.5

0.8
1.5

1.0
0.7

10.5
9.3

3.5
2.1

4.5
4.4

2.5
3.9

1.4
5.5

0.2
3.3

0.6
1.8

1.0
1.7

0.0
2.9

0.0
1.8

1.0
1.8

1.0
0.8

+3
1
1

the subjects response to that question. This feedback explained that tutors at the campus writing
center provided a coding key by which participants
responses were evaluated. The other half of the
participants received no praise.
After giving all participants the final packet of
materials, the experimenter left the room. Participants completed a second SSES, followed by five
antonym and five analogy questions from past GRE
exams. Unknown to the participants, the experimenter sat in an adjacent room, observed them
through a one-way mirror, and measured the time
taken to complete the GRE questions. Participants
then completed the final section, which asked how
many hours they would be willing to tutor local high
school students in SAT vocabulary skills, and what
levels (basic through advanced SAT vocabulary) they
were interested in tutoring. After completing the
packet, participants were debriefed and paid.

dition yielded the mean SSE change for each condition (Table II). Contrast analysis used the weights
displayed in Table II, and yielded the data displayed in
Table III.
Total SSE Change. A 2 2 (Pretending x Praise)
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for Pretending, F(1, 14) = 4.6, p = .05, but not for Praise
( p > .15). Contrast analysis was significant, p = .023,
r = .50.
Performance SSE Change. ANOVA yielded
a near significant main effect for Pretending,
F(1, 14) = 3.55, p = .08, but not for Praise ( p > .10).
Contrast analysis was significant, p = .017, r = .53.
Social SSE Change. ANOVA yielded nonsignificant effects for Pretending and Praise ( ps > .10). Contrast analysis was significant, p = .023, r = .47.
Appearance SSE Change. ANOVA yielded
nonsignificant effects for Pretending and Praise
( ps > .09). Contrast analysis was nonsignificant,
p = .29, r = .15.

Results

Discussion

[The data for two participants (both females)


were excluded because they expressed suspicion
about the made-up words and feedback. One participants GRE completion time was inadvertently not
recorded, leaving 17 points in that data set.]

The primary dependent measure, SSE, revealed


support for the predicted results: praised pretenders
did not differ in SSE change from unpraised pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), whereas
praised controls exhibited larger increases on all SSE
measure than did any other group. The strong effect
sizes together with the strong correlations between
contrast weights and observed means (ralerting )10

State Self-Esteem
Participants premanipulation SSE scores were
subtracted from their postmanipulation SSE scores
to obtain the dependent variable of SSE change.
Averaging participants SSE changes for each con-

10

The ralerting for Appearance SSE was small, but because Appearance items pertain mostly to physical appearance, it is not
surprising that feelings of academic competence may not involve
a self-evaluation of ones body image.

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Table III. Contrast Analyses for Total SSE and Subscales for Study 1
P
Mi ia
MS-within t(d f = 14)
p
reffect
ralerting
Total SSE
Performance
Social
Appearance
a Sum

28.1
10.5
11.9
6.5

29.73
4.76
6.50
4.36

3.03
2.83
2.56
1.83

.005
.007
.01
.04

.54
.52
.48
.37

.98
.99
.99
.75

of condition means multiplied by condition contrast weights.

support the hypothesis that pretending blunts the effect of praise. Manipulations had little or no effect
upon secondary dependent measures (GRE completion time, hours volunteered to tutor).
Nonetheless, the small sample size prevents anything but tentative conclusions. There is also a possible alternate explanation for the differential SSE
increases. It may have been that the lack of SSE increase in praised pretenders, relative to praised controls, was due not to social pretending but to their
exposure to unfamiliar words. It is possible that exposure to a word they had never seen before could
have humbled them enough to offset any increase
in SSE due to praise. If so, this would undermine the
hypothesis that pretending itself blunts praise. With
this in mind, adjustments were made to the replication study.

from those of unpraised pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), and that praised control and No
Pretending participants would exhibit SSE increases
larger than any other group.
GRE completion time. As in Study 1, praised controls would complete challenging vocabulary questions faster than would praised pretenders.

STUDY 2

Procedure

The second experiment replicated the first with


an added control group. Some participants were presented with the same questions containing the madeup words, but were also provided with definitions after
being told a number of people had asked about the
meanings (No Pretending condition). Thus, when participants encountered bresionary and visinane
while answering the questions, they had no need
to pretend, nor should they have felt humbled
because many other people were also said not to
have known the words meanings. It was predicted
that praise would increase No Pretending participants SSE levels comparably to participants answering questions containing only real words (Control,
identical to Study 2), because neither group would
have had the opportunity to pretend that they knew
the made-up words meanings. The cover story and
praise comments were simplified, and the dependent
measures involving volunteer tutoring were omitted
in this study.

Participants were seated alone in a seminar


room and given a packet of materials. One third
of the participants received packets containing only
real vocabulary (Control condition). The remaining participants received packets using the two manufactured words. Of these, half were given no further instructions (Pretending condition), while the
other half were told, By the way, a lot of people have been having trouble with these words,
and then given definitions of the two words (No
Pretending condition). The experimenter then left after saying that he would be available in a nearby room
to answer questions, and that he would return in approximately 25 min to collect the packet and give them
the next section.
As in Study 1, participants provided demographic information and completed the SSES and
SMS, read Patrick Henrys oration, completed the
open-ended questions inquiring about the passage,
and then completed the Kiersey Temperament Sorter.
The experimenter then returned for the praise manipulation, giving half of all participants complimentary
feedback (Table IV) which detailed how an instructor
with the college expository writing program provided
a coding key by which participants responses were

Predictions
SSE levels. As in Study 1, it was predicted that
praised pretenders SSE changes would not differ

Method
Participants
Sixty-six undergraduates volunteered for a study
on teaching styles and attributes in exchange for either partial academic credit or financial compensation. They were randomly assigned among conditions.

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A Cost of Pretending

267
factured words and genuineness of the feedback. The
remaining 60 participants were spread evenly across
conditions.

Table IV. Comments Given in Praise Condition for Study 2


Question 1
Question 2
Question 3
Question 4
Question 5

clear summary of material


good vocabulary comprehension
good context analysis
good vocabulary comprehension
[no comment given]

State Self-Esteem

evaluated (Praise condition). The other half received


no praise.
As in Study 1, after receipt of praise, participants
completed a second SSES and solved 10 GRE vocabulary questions (during which they were secretly
timed). When participants had finished the materials,
the experimenter returned to give them a questionnaire being developed for another study, unrelated to
this experiment. After this had been completed, participants were debriefed and paid/credited.

Results
Classification of Participants
Omission of Data. The data for six participants
were excluded. Three of the participants (two females, one male) in the Pretending condition explicitly stated in speech or writing that they did not know
the meaning of bresionary and thus did not pretend
to have knowledge of the word. (Interestingly, two of
these participants had perfect SAT scores.) Three (all
males) participants expressed suspicion of the manu-

Averaging participants SSE changes for each


condition yielded the mean SSE change for each condition (Table V). Contrast analysis used the weights
displayed in Table V, and yielded the data displayed
in Table VI.
Total SSE Change. A 3 2 (Pretending Praise)
ANOVA yielded a significant effect for Praise,
F(1, 54) = 5.71, p = .02. The contrast analysis also
was significant, p = .0003, reffect = .44.
Performance SSE Change. The ANOVA also
yielded a significant effect for Praise, F(1, 54) = 5.39,
p = .02. The contrast analysis was also significant,
p = .0009, reffect = .41.
Social SSE Change. Contrast analysis, p = .004,
reffect = .38.
Appearance SSE Change. This ANOVA was not
significant.
GRE Vocabulary Completion Time
The mean GRE completion times did not fit
the hypothesized pattern. Contrast analysis was
nonsignificant, t(54) = 0.08, p = .47, r = .00,
ralerting = .48. Completion times only differed by

Table V. Mean Changes in SSE Scores for Study 2


SSE subscales
Condition

Control/No praise
M
SD
Control/praise
M
SD
No Pretending/No praise
M
SD
No Pretending/praise
M
SD
Pretending/No praise
M
SD
Pretending/praise
M
SD

Note. n = 10 for each cell.

Total SSE

Performance

Social

Appearance

2.3
6.8

0.4
2.1

1.0
3.2

0.9
2.0

6.9
6.3

3.3
4.3

2.6
4.1

1.0
1.2

0.8
4.0

0.7
2.3

0.4
2.0

0.3
1.7

6.0
4.1

2.5
1.0

2.6
2.8

0.9
1.3

1.8
3.9

1.0
2.0

0.8
2.0

0.0
1.2

1.2
3.6

0.7
1.6

0.4
2.2

0.9
1.9

+2
1
+2
1
1

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Table VI. Contrast Analyses for Total SSE and Subscales for Study 2
P
Mi ia
MS-within t(d f = 54)
p
reffect
ralerting
Total SSE
Performance
Social
Appearance
a Sum

19.70
8.80
8.60
2.30

24.70
5.99
7.95
2.53

3.62
3.28
2.78
1.32

.0003
.0009
.004
.10

.44
.41
.38
.11

.97
.96
.92
.53

of condition means multiplied by condition contrast weights.

gender, with males taking less time (M = 271 s,


SD = 16.7) than females (M = 333 s, SD = 15.9),
t(58) = 2.50, p = .008.
Discussion
As with Study 1, the primary dependent measure revealed support for the main hypothesis: praised
pretenders did not differ in SSE change from unpraised pretenders (nor from unpraised controls), and
praised controls and No Pretending participants had
significantly higher SSE increases than did any other
group. The strong ralerting values (except for Appearance, all are greater than .90) indicate a particularly
good fit between the obtained means and the contrast
hypothesis, which holds that pretending blunts the
effect of praise. Manipulations had no effect upon
the secondary dependent measure (GRE completion
time).
While two groups of participants were exposed to
the manufactured words, praise increased one groups
SSE more than the others. Therefore, the differential
effect of praise cannot be attributed solely to exposure
to unfamiliar words.

to how robustly praise raised the SSE of participants


in the Control and No Pretending conditions.
Why did this happen? One possibility is
these pretenders were aware that their personae
(bresionary-knowers) were not truly representative
of their genuine selves, and thus, they could not take
praise as an evaluation of their genuine selves performances. The pretenses may have acted as a barrier
between their genuine selves and the positive feedback, blunting the impact of praise upon their selfesteem. Another possibilitynot contradicting the
firstis that the praise complimenting pretenders vocabulary comprehension drew their attention to the
disparity between the praised qualities of the personae (bresionary-knowing-ness) and the absence
of those qualities in the genuine self. As a result, they
might have felt, The pretend-me has quality X, which
has been praised as a good thingbut the genuine-me
lacks this quality, and so I lack this good thing, and
thus, I am not as good as I could be. This implicit
social comparison could result in a decrease in selfesteem,11 which could cancel out the positive effects
of praise upon SSE.
CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In a study given to 59 Harvard students, they were
presented with a hypothetical opportunity to pretend
about their knowledge of bresionary. Thirty two out
of 59 participants (54%) responded that they would
not pretend and would ask what the words meant.
When knowledge of this same words was required in
order to correctly answer a question, only 3 out of
32 people (9%) exposed to the word (but without being given a definition) actually stated that they did not
know what it meant. There is a significant discrepancy
between the number of people who intended to pretend to know the word and who actually pretended to
know it, 2 (1, N = 91) = 17.64, p < .001.
In both experiments, praise was ineffective in
raising pretenders SSE, particularly when compared

If there is a cost of pretending, why are people not dissuaded from pretending? One explanation
might be that the cost is not absolute, but relative. Although praised pretenders may not feel worse than
they did earlier, they have swept aside an opportunity to feel better about themselves by engaging in
praise-blunting pretenses. That is, when a pretense
is used to eliminate the possibility of a decrease in
self-esteem, the possibility for a raise in self-esteem
is also eliminated. Thus it is a hidden opportunity
cost, whereby praised pretenders are left no better
off than unpraised pretendersand may indeed be

11

Although praise only raised or had no effect on the SSE of Control and No Pretending participants, two praised pretenders experienced a decrease (|r|s < .50, ps > .15).

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A Cost of Pretending
no better off than if they had not pretended in the
first place. The precise costs of knowing that one
was inauthentic are not clear. Still it is hard, at least
for us, to imagine that they do not exist. At this
point we can say that, although pretending may be
reinforced by a mild affect increase from blunted
praise, pretenders preclude the possibility of being
reinforced even more strongly when behaving more
genuinely.
Another possibility is that if praise does indeed
interact with pretending to decrease self-esteem, pretenders may reattribute their lowered affect to something else; for example, they may conclude that the
pretense was unsuccessful, or that the praise was
not genuine but disparaging. Because these attributions do not personalize the cost incurred, pretenders
would not necessarily be deterred from again seeking
praise with pretenses.
It may also be that when people execute intricate deceptions, with heavy risks of failure and psychological damage (e.g., loss of trust, loss of face in
the eyes of esteemed others), they are aware of the
costs precisely because they are so severe, but when
the pretense is for something as insignificant as
knowing a word, the preparation and risks are assumed to be negligible. The propensity to engage
in a deception may increase as the perceived risk
and cost decrease. Thus, the big lie, ironically, may
end up being less costly than the small one, because
the deceiver has accounted for the consequences of
the former while assuming that the latter, involving such minimal effort, will have no detrimental
effect.
In other research (Kawakami, White, & Langer,
2000), we have found that people are aware of when
we are inauthentic and clearly prefer us to be genuine.
People who engage in small pretenses (e.g., pretending to know an unfamiliar word) may conclude
that because the pretense is so narrowly defined and
seemingly trivial, it cannot possibly be analogous to,
nor nearly as costly as, pretending in a broader interpersonal setting. Yet, the results of the present studies clearly indicate that despite the pretenses narrow
boundaries, pretenders did not benefit as greatly from
praise as others did. Pretending is typically mindless,
that is, scripted. As such, if extensive, it should result
in all of the negative consequences outlined elsewhere
(see Langer, 1989, 1997).
As shown here, even the small pretense is disadvantageous for the actor. This strengthens the conclusion that the cost of pretending is far more pervasive
than might normally be assumed.

269
Breaking the Cycle?
While people in an academic context may place
a particular value on appearing academically competent, competence in general is greatly valued by
our culture, and people will go to great and varied
lengths to manipulate others assessments of their
own skill levels (Jones, 1989). The benefits of competence are instilled in us early in childhood and fostered through years of grades and accolades for being the smartest, fastest, strongest, and most talented
among our peers. As we grow older, we are expected
to increase our knowledge and capabilities, which no
doubt increases our opportunities and motives for
pretendingas well as the costs for doing so.
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