Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

2012, Vol. 32, No. 1, 19

2011 American Psychological Association

1068-8471/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0025819

Placing Virtue and the Human Good in Psychology

Blaine J. Fowers

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University of Miami
This article contextualizes and critiques the recent increase in interest in virtue ethics
and the good life (eudaimonia) in psychology. Theoretically, psychologists interests in
virtue and eudaimonia have followed the philosophical revival of these topics, but this
work has been subject to persistent, disguised commitments to the ideologies of
individualism and instrumentalism. Moreover, psychologists tendency to separate the
topics of virtue and eudaimonia is described and critiqued as theoretically misguided,
particularly because Aristotle, the originator of these concepts, saw them as mutually
entailing one another. Historically, psychology turned away from the topic of virtue in
tandem with the popular cultural interest in favor of personality rather than character.
The article concludes with a brief overview of Aristotles account of eudaimonia as the
overarching human good consisting of participation in characteristically human goods
(e.g., knowledge, belonging) through virtuous activity.
Keywords: eudaimonia, virtue, goods, ideology, Aristotle

The first decade of the 21st century saw a

tremendous upsurge in interest in virtue and the
good life among psychologists. Part of this interest
is directly connected to the positive psychology
movement, but it is important to remember that
there are many theorists and researchers who are
interested in these topics who have limited or no
ties to that movement. At this point, the psychological literatures on the topics of virtue and the
good life are extremely fragmented, lacking cohesion in either domain and exhibiting precious few
connections between these two growing and
deeply interconnected areas of interest. This fragmentation is partly due to the novelty of psychologists interest, and it would take some time for
these literatures to cohere even in the absence of
enormous conceptual confusions. Unfortunately,
there is deep and widespread conceptual confusion, and these literatures will remain disordered
until theoretical clarity can be established (Fowers, 2010a).
This special issue was designed to contribute
to the theoretical systematization of these literatures. The authors of the articles in this issue

address two of the most vexing confusions.

First, some notable psychologists remain surprisingly ambivalent about acknowledging that
virtue and the good life are inherently moral
concepts that cannot be investigated solely from
a detached, value-neutral perspective if they are
to be studied scientifically (e.g., Peterson &
Seligman, 2004). This oxymoronic approach to
inextricably moral concepts has required extreme lexical and conceptual gymnastics,
thereby obfuscating more than it has revealed.
Richardson (this issue) and I (Fowers, this issue) address the singular inappropriateness of
the attempt to maintain the fact-value dichotomy in inquiries about virtue and the good life
(cf. Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999;
Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985).
Second, psychologists who theorize about
and investigate virtue seldom tie their work to
an explicit theory of the good life. Similarly,
those who theorize about and study the good life
generally neglect the virtues. This disconnect is
remarkable because Aristotles (1999) philosophy forms the basis for most of this work in
psychology, whether that is explicitly acknowledged or not. From an Aristotelian perspective,
virtues are simply the excellences that make it
possible to live the good life, meaning that these
two concepts mutually entail one another. All of
the contributions to this special issue address
the connections between virtue and the good.

This article was published Online First October 10, 2011.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Blaine J. Fowers, PhD, Department of Educational and Psychological Studies, University of Miami, P.O.
Box 248065, Coral Gables, FL 33124. E-mail:
bfowers@miami.edu
1

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(see Fowers, 2005, 2008, 2010a for additional

commentary).
In setting the stage for the special issue, I
briefly recount arguments by prominent theorists that psychologys efforts to account for
human action have been hamstrung by the implausible attempt to sharply separate facts and
values (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Gadamer, 1975; Habermas, 1970; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon,
1999; Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985).
The articles in this issue build on this extensive
literature critiquing the attempt to avoid questions of what is valuable, choiceworthy, and
good in psychology. I highlight ontological
hermeneutics as one of the key sources of this
critique, but note its shortcomings as a source of
an alternative framework for a positive theory
of the human good. Interestingly, the authors of
this special issue suggest that a systematic understanding of virtue and the good life can point
the way to overcoming the fact-value antinomy.
Among the many possible perspectives from
which such a positive framework can be developed, the articles in this issue will focus on
Aristotles ethical philosophy. Following this, I
provide a brief history of the waxing and waning of virtue theory in psychology and conclude
with a description of contemporary virtue theory and eudaimonism.
The Critiques of Individualism and
Instrumentalism
A sustained and detailed series of critiques
has illuminated the prominent ideologies of
individualism and instrumentalism in psychological theory, research, and practice (Bellah,
Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985;
Cushman, 1995; Danziger, 1990; Fowers, 1998;
Fowers, 2010b; Richardson et al., 1999). Individualism takes the individual to be the ultimate
social reality and views the autonomous pursuit
and satisfaction of individually defined ends as
the ultimate goods in life (Bellah et al., 1985).
This perspective is termed individualism because all human phenomena tend to be interpreted in terms of the individual. The predominant understanding is that individuals pursue
their chosen goods instrumentally, which means
that they have subjectively predetermined ends,
and they select the best strategies, techniques,
and skills to attain those ends. The means are
separate from the ends and can be taken up or

discarded based on effectiveness. This viewpoint is termed instrumentalism because all human behavior tends to be portrayed as instrumental. Indeed, rationality is often defined in
terms of the ability to recognize and utilize
means that will help in achieving ones aims.
These theorists have shown the profound influence of individualism and instrumentalism in
the conceptualization of persons, research methods, and practice approaches. A few illustrations can indicate the pervasive influence of
these ideologies. Interested readers can find
many examples and clear demonstrations of
these ideologies in the literature cited above.
One prominent example of the ideology of individualism is evident in self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which posits three
universal individual needs: autonomy, competence, and social relatedness. Individual autonomy and personal ownership of goals and
behaviors are the core of this theory, with
competence and social relatedness seen as demonstrations of and supports for autonomy. Individualism is also apparent in that this theory
suggests that the business of life is satisfying
these three individual needs, and a good life is
one in which this satisfaction is consistently
obtained. The ideology of instrumentalism is
apparent in the widespread use of concepts such
as technique, strategy, skill, manipulation,
mechanism, and effect, all of which imply unilateral action and a separation of means and
ends. The most prominent theories of interpersonal relationships, social exchange theory
(Cook & Rice, 2003) and interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), are built on an
economic exchange model construing the essential reality of relationships as an economic
model of exchange. These theories portray individuals as traders and relationships as quid
pro quo interactions to be continued as long as
the individuals believe they are getting a reasonably good relationship deal.
The mainstream portrayal of the individual as
a strategic actor in pursuit of need and desire
satisfaction through instrumental activity is pervasive in psychology, and it is seldom questioned in mainstream circles. Although critical
perspectives are available from many sources,
including critical theory (Habermas, 1970),
postmodern perspectives (e.g., Foucault, 1980),
and feminism (e.g., Fox-Genovese, 1991), the
most sustained critique of these ideologies

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VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY

within psychology has originated in ontological

hermeneutics (e.g., Richardson et al., 1999;
Taylor, 1985). In spite of psychologys labored attempts to maintain a detached objectivity about human behavior, the discipline
has adopted an individualistic view of human
life in which individuals perpetually pursue
need and desire satisfaction through strategic
means. Ironically, neutrality about individual
ends was adopted in the service of maintaining objectivity. This supposed neutrality is
belied, however, because taking a neutral
stance on what is needed or desired by leaving it to the individual is at the core of individualism and viewing behaviors as mere
means to individual ends is the definition of
instrumentalism. Therefore, the idea that human life amounts to satisfying individual
needs and desires through instrumental action
does not free psychology from having a vision
of the human good. Rather, it means that
psychology has unwittingly built individualism and instrumentalism into its understanding of the good throughout its theory, research, and practice. As the articles in this
special issue will argue, not only does psychology fail to attain the desired detached
objectivity, it fails rather miserably by promoting a distinctly thin and grubby vision of
the human good.
The takeaway lesson from this array of theoretical critiques of disguised ideology is that
the strenuous efforts of a great many intelligent,
dedicated, and visionary psychologists have
been insufficient to separate psychological science from commitments to a vision of the good.
The hermeneutic recommendation is to acknowledge that the ideal of detached objectivity
has failed and recognize that commitment to
some set of goods and goals is inescapable in
any human endeavor, including science. Then
we can begin to reveal, discuss, and critique the
hidden commitments to particular goods in our
discipline. Instead of settling for a set of unacknowledged culturally guided goods, it seems
preferable to explicitly explore the systematic
frameworks that are available for understanding
human goods. The purpose of this special issue
is to explicate an understanding of Aristotles
framework of virtues and the good life as one
promising way to explicitly incorporate the
good in psychology.

From Hermeneutics to Aristotles Ethics

Before exploring Aristotles perspective on
human goods, I want to describe how this project got off the ground. The critiques of individualism and instrumentalism that laid the
groundwork for this special issue were formulated through the application of ontological
hermeneutics to psychology (e.g., Richardson et
al., 1999). Hermeneutic philosophy addresses
human goods by clarifying that people are always living out a vision of the human good
every day, both personally and professionally.
All people inherit a set of ethical commitments
from and are shaped by ongoing historical communities with their understandings of the good.
In this milieu, we perceive and move within a
moral space oriented to particular goods (Taylor, 1989). We are not trapped by our inherited
values because the human capacity for reflection on the valuable allows us to call these
traditions into question and reinterpret them.
These reinterpretations arise from many different perspectives within a given tradition. For
these reasons, all traditions are multivocal.
Moreover, our appreciation of what is valuable
can be deepened and broadened through dialogue with our historical forbearers and with
contemporaries who espouse differing viewpoints. Ontological hermeneutics argues powerfully that claims about the human good are
inescapable in psychological practices and in
ordinary life. Much can be said about the human
good with the hermeneutic framework, but the
full-bodied, substantive account of the human
good one would like has remained elusive. As a
result, hermeneutically oriented critiques of disguised ideologies in psychology begin strongly,
but frequently peter out to vague generalities in
conclusion, typically providing relatively abstract and contentless comments regarding the
human good. In other words, hermeneutics calls
for a substantive theory of the good, but does
not seem to have the resources to provide such
a theory. In this special issue, the contributors
take up the challenge of developing a substantive theory of the good by exploring the resources of Aristotles ethics.
Among the background sources of hermeneutics, Aristotle (1999) is the premier guide regarding a substantive perspective on the human
good. He begins by making the good the chief
priority of ethics in the opening paragraph of the

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Nicomachean Ethics. The orienting statement of

this central text is every action and choice
seem to aim at some good (1094a 2). Although
one can be mistaken or misguided about the
good, Aristotle located the good at the center of
human action because it orients all choice and
activity. Just so it is clear that he did not abandon this position in his characteristic back-andforth style of inquiry, he repeats this point several times. For example, in book 6 he states:
For the originating causes of the things that are
done consist in the end at which they are aimed
(1140 b 20 21).
There are four reasons that Aristotle provides
a good beginning for the exploration of human
goods. First, the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle,
1999) has been a primary source for Western
explorations of the good life, having stood the
test of time by remaining relevant over the
course of two millennia. Although Platos
works provide a similarly valuable set of
sources, they have not enjoyed the same degree
of interest that Aristotles more straightforward
and systematic approach has. Second, there is
widespread interest in appropriating Aristotles
ethics to contemporary concerns among philosophers and psychologists, with rapidly expanding literatures in both disciplines. Third, as the
articles in this issue show, Aristotle provides
excellent resources for transcending the individualism and instrumentalism in which psychology is currently mired. Finally, Aristotles ethics is directed toward living a good life, but he
does not commit himself to a narrow or prescriptive understanding of a single form of the
good life. This allows for the incorporation of a
diversity of goods, which is an essential feature
of an acceptable ethics in our time. Clearly,
Aristotles is not the only perspective on human
goods that is worth exploring, but this special
issue focuses on his thought in the service of
depth of presentation. Explorations of other perspectives and comparisons among them have
great value, but doing them justice will require
a similar depth of presentation.
The Waxing and Waning and Waxing of
Virtue Theory in Psychology
Character and virtue were very prominent
topics in the early decades of psychology, and
character training was seen as very important
(Leahey, 1994; Sussman, 1973). Sussman

(1973) recounts a significant shift in American

culture from character to personality beginning
in the late 19th century. Psychologists followed
as much as led this shift in emphasis away from
character and toward the more expressive,
adaptable, and morally unencumbered self that
seemed necessary for a more industrialized and
urbanized age (Nicholson, 1998, p. 52). By the
mid-20th century, personality research had entirely eclipsed interest in character.
Character and virtue fell into disfavor as the
discipline attempted to split scientific fact from
moral value in its drive to become an accepted
social science (Nicholson, 1998; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Two key moments in the waning of
character are particularly important. First, Allport (1937) engaged in a sustained critique of
character as a fitting subject for psychology. His
pointed couplet is emblematic for this move:
Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated (p. 52, emphasis in original). This devaluation of character has been an important part of psychologys
attempt to exclude evaluative and popular terms
from personality psychology. In the service of a
science of personality, Allport frequently asserted the necessity of rigidly separating personality traits as scientific from character and virtue
as normative elements of ethics (Allport, 1921;
Allport & Vernon, 1930). Nicholson (1998)
suggests that Allports goal was not to destroy
the traditional ethical foundations of America
but to revitalize them through scientific rigor.
His rationale for this approach was that he was
convinced that the solution to Americas ethical
dilemmas lay not in history, culture, or religion,
but in science, in particular, psychology (p.
64). Allport had difficulty fully effecting the
separation of character and personality partly
because he worried that psychologists would
not do justice to the richness and dignity of
human personality (Allport, 1937, p. vii, emphasis added). His commitment to a morally
informed understanding of living well is even
clearer in his description of the mature personality who is loyal, dignified, devoted, and who
eschews egoism, self-seeking, vanity, and selfjustification.
Allports theory of personality illustrates the
difficulty in separating description and prescription. This difficulty of separating moral ideals
from detached, objective descriptions of personality was not limited to Allports theorizing,

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VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY

however. Character remains embedded in the

most widely accepted and best documented
contemporary understanding of personality: the
Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1991).
McCrae and John (1992) comment that two of
the famed Five Factors are clearly related to
traditional virtue terms: Agreeableness (A) and
Conscientiousness (C). Like A, C is a highly
evaluated dimension: indeed, A and C are the
classic dimensions of character describing
good versus evil and strong-willed versus
weak-willed individuals. Perhaps it was these
moral overtones that often led scientific psychologists to ignore these factors, but in fact,
both represent objectively observable dimensions of individual differences (p. 197, emphasis added).
The second important moment in psychologys
move away from character was the publication of
Hartshorne and Mays celebrated studies of honesty among schoolchildren (Hartshorne & May,
1928; Hartshorne, May, & Maller, 1929; Hartshorne, May, & Shuttleworth, 1930). The standard interpretation of their results (Doris, 2002;
Emler, 1999; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) has been
that children are typically dishonest when given
the opportunity, even those students who were
rated as honest by peers and teachers. Because
many students exploited experimenter contrived
opportunities for dishonesty, these authors concluded that situational factors were more important for moral behavior than character. This
interpretation has been extremely influential.
Hartshorne and Mays results have been subsequently reinterpreted theoretically and empirically. Virtue theory does not suggest that the
majority of adult individuals will act virtuously
in all situations, much less the majority of children. The finding that some children acted honestly in spite of incentives not to, suggests the
presence of a character strength. Statistical reanalyses have also cast doubt on Hartshorne and
Mays conclusions (Burton, 1963; Epstein &
OBrien, 1985; Rushton, 1984).
Virtue ethics was also marginal in philosophy
until a dramatic upsurge in interest in recent
decades (Anscombe, 1958; Broadie, 1991; MacIntyre, 1984; Rorty, 1980). This renewal has
spurred theoretical and empirical work on virtue
and the good life in psychology as well (Fowers, 1998, 2005; Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996;
Tjeltveit, 2003). Contrary to earlier dismissals,
Baumeister and Exline (1999) have argued that

virtue concepts are entirely amenable to empirical research with available methods. The advent of positive psychology, with its interest in
virtue has also contributed to this literature (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). There is a growing
empirical literature on virtue in general (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000; Hawkins, Fowers, Carroll, & Yang, 2006; Walker & Pitts,
1998) and specific virtues such as gratitude
(Emmons & Crumpler, 2000; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002), courage (Pury & Kowalski, 2007), and practical wisdom (Kramer,
2000; Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997). In
addition, some investigators have studied perceptions of what makes a life good (King &
Napa, 1998; McGregor & Little, 1998).
This recent upsurge of theoretical and empirical interest in virtue and the good life demonstrates a waxing interest in these topics. Unfortunately, the vast majority of authors in this
emerging literature in psychology has only a
rudimentary and fragmented understanding of
the rich theory available on virtue and the good
life (Fowers, 2005, 2008, 2010a). One of the
primary purposes of this special issue is to address that lack of knowledge.
A Precis of Virtue and the Human Good
Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics (NE) (1999)
is the locus classicus on virtue and the good life.
In addition, Aristotle had much to say about
these topics in his other works, and there is a
voluminous secondary literature. I will provide
an extremely brief, but close interpretation of
what Aristotle said about these topics here, and
encourage the reader to study Aristotles works
and recent philosophical scholarship for greater
depth of understanding.
The central concept of the NE is eudaimonia,
which is Aristotles term for the highest form of
human life. It can be translated as happiness or
flourishing. Translating it as happiness can be
misleading, however, as happiness generally
connotes an affective state, particularly in psychology. Aristotle understood eudaimonia as living a complete human life that is fully realized
through virtuous activity. For these reasons, I prefer the term flourishing as a translation. I will rely
primarily on the term eudaimonia, but occasionally employ flourishing as a synonym.
Aristotle begins the NE with eudaimonia because, as MacIntyre (1984) noted, the concept

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of the good life is prior to the concept of a

virtue (p. 184, emphasis in original). The reason for this is that virtues are the character
excellences that make it possible to pursue the
good life. Aristotle defined eudaimonia as
the best, most complete form of human life and
he highlighted a number of features that comprise this kind of life. The first and most basic
point about eudaimonia is that it is an inextricably ethical concept because it is about living
the best kind of life. Aristotle understood the
best kind of life in terms of human nature,
defining eudaimonia as realizing ones full human potential given the particular kind of natural beings we are. This formulation, wherein a
beings good is a matter of the full expression of
its nature, is known as the function argument.
Throughout the NE, Aristotle emphasized that
eudaimonia is a form of activity.1 That is, eudaimonia is a way of living and cannot be
limited to a mental state or process. The everyday activities that constitute eudaimonia are devoted to the pursuit of characteristically human
goods such as friendship, knowledge, and the
best form of politics. He made the case that
eudaimonia is comprised of a broad set of such
choiceworthy ends. Aristotle argues that one
can pursue these ends and live a eudaimonic life
in so doing only through virtuous action. This
means that, for Aristotle, a good human life is
inextricably tied to being a good person. This is
one of the key reasons that eudaimonia cannot
be studied in a value-neutral way. Aristotle also
saw eudaimonia as inherently pleasant because
excellent activity is pleasant. He distinguished
noble pleasures (e.g., learning) from base pleasures (e.g., gluttony), but he clearly saw both
virtuous activity and a eudaimonic life as deeply
pleasurable.
Aristotle defined eudaimonia as the ultimate
and sufficient end for human life. This means
that it is chosen for itself and not for the sake of
some other end and that there is nothing that can
be added to a flourishing life to make it better.
Finally, eudaimonia is comprised by a complete
life, meaning that eudaimonia is a matter of how
ones life comes together as a whole rather than
being comprised of a series of transitory states
such as emotions, moods, or experiences.
Psychologists who theorize about and study
virtue generally do so by focusing on a single
virtue or a list of virtues. Although these approaches have some merits, they are deeply

problematic because these scholars seldom have

a clear, systematic conceptualization of what a
virtue is. The original Greek term for virtue was
arete, best translated as excellence. Virtues are,
simply, human excellences or character
strengths that make it possible for individuals to
pursue characteristically human goods (e.g., social connections, knowledge) that allow them to
flourish as human beings. Broadie (1991) put it
simply: an excellence or virtue . . . is nothing
but a characteristic which makes the difference
between functioning and functioning well
(p. 37, emphasis in original). The capacities to
act generously, loyally, courageously, and justly
allow individuals to fulfill their potential as the
rational social beings we are.
Virtues are multidimensional characteristics
that include a cognitive understanding of the
character strength and its relationship to the
good life, which creates a strong and spontaneous motivation to enact the virtue, a reliable
disposition or habit of enacting the virtue, and
the practical wisdom to know how to enact the
virtue. The ability to make wise decisions about
how best to pursue ones aims, which character
strengths to employ and in what way is also
essential to a virtue framework and is known as
practical wisdom. The cognitive, emotional,
dispositional, behavioral, and wisdom aspects
of character strengths comprise a seamless
whole. Individuals who have developed good
character want to act ethically out of an attachment to what is good.
A brief illustration of the necessary role of
virtue in pursuing human goods can clarify the
features of virtue and the relationship between
virtue and what is good. The sustained interest
in and peculiar kinds of knowledge that humans
pursue makes knowledge a characteristically
human good. There are many ways to pursue
knowledge, with science as one of the paradigmatic approaches. The pursuit of scientific
1
Through most of the NE, Aristotle describes rational,
social, and political activity as it takes place in everyday
life. In part of Book X of the NE, however, he discusses
contemplation as the highest human activity. There is a
good deal of controversy regarding how this concept is to be
integrated into the rest of Aristotles account of eudaimonia.
I have downplayed this concept and the controversy here
because it is beyond the scope of this special issue due to its
complexity. For more on this fascinating, but vexing question, see Broadie (1991), Nussbaum (1986), and Rorty
(1980).

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VIRTUE AND THE HUMAN GOOD IN PSYCHOLOGY

knowledge cannot proceed unless scientists exercise the virtue of honesty in reporting their
procedures and findings accurately, and science
is utterly dependent on this kind of honesty.
From time to time, spectacular cases of scientific fraud remind us that we cannot take this
honesty for granted. Moreover, there are enormously powerful incentives for fabricating results, misrepresenting findings, or massaging
data, including academic tenure and promotion,
grant funding, public notoriety, and political
influence. Although honesty could be a matter
of conventional rule following or the avoidance
of negative consequences, a more powerful and
appealing reason for honesty is an enduring
interest in truthfulness that grows out of a personal devotion to seeking knowledge. At their
best, scientists are engaged in a genuine search
for the best ways to understand the phenomena
of interest. Dishonesty about ones results is not
merely an error. Rather, it is a kind of bad faith.
Deception is inherently contradictory to science
because it is destructive to the very possibility
of pursuing the most accurate account of a phenomenon by distorting or fabricating ones findings. Scientists who willingly and consistently
report procedures and findings accurately are
enacting the virtue of honesty. Scientific honesty serves the good of expanding human
knowledge and is the only way to pursue this
good. The pursuit of knowledge and other characteristically human goods through virtuous action is what makes for a eudaimonic life. It is
essential that theorists and investigators recognize the central and ineliminable theoretical
connection between virtue, human goods, and
eudaimonia.
Deep friendship provides a more everyday
example as a key good in human life that can
only come into being through an extended history of loyalty and honesty. Such a friendship is
called into question and perhaps fatally undermined by acts of betrayal, manipulation, or
abandonment because those actions contradict
the constitutive elements of deep friendship.
Perhaps the unwillingness of psychologists to
address the virtue terms so elemental to deep
friendship helps to explain why psychological
accounts of friendship (e.g., social exchange
theory) so blithely include manipulation and
potential abandonment as defining features of
friendships and why such accounts seem so

thoroughly to misdescribe and distort the experience of cherished friendships.

This special issue makes the case for the
systematic theorizing of virtues in psychology.
Richardson (this issue) begins by laying bare
the pretensions of psychology to value-neutral
inquiry and suggests that attention to substantive moral issues is inescapable for the discipline. He argues that a virtue framework provides a promising approach to this challenge. I
follow this line of thought in arguing that eudaimonia is constituted by the consistent pursuit
of characteristically human goods, which are, in
turn, a matter of virtuous activity (Fowers, this
issue). Slife (this issue) provides an extended
and compelling account of the role that teaching
virtues plays in encouraging troubled girls toward a flourishing life in a residential school.
Aho (this issue) reflects on the contribution of
the articles in this issue and suggests critical
questions and future directions for psychological theory and research on virtue and the human
good.
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Received March 20, 2011
Revision received June 27, 2011
Accepted August 18, 2011