Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
5.
AUTHORIZED
DEPLOYMENT-The
deployment of domestic helpers and workers of
similar skills defined herein to the following [sic]
are authorized under these guidelines and are
exempted from the suspension.
1.
Bilateral
agreements
or
understanding with the Philippines,
and/or,
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 41206-85, promulgated on December 11, 1986, 1 containing the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration,
the Decision appealed from is set aside and another
one entered, declaring the suspension of complainants
to be illegal and consequently, respondent PAL is
directed
to
pay
complainants
their
salaries
corresponding to the respective period(s) of their
suspension, and to delete the disciplinary action from
complainants' service records. 2
Evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this
Court in labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or its
determination, but is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion. 4 It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to
perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the
exercise of a right to which it is entitled.
The instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 2, Article IV of
the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement, (hereinafter, CBA), to
wit:
It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring
classes, not only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but
because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. 9 The
constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as explicit as it is
demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane
with management with all its power and influence in negotiating for
the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights. 10 Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 11
It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during
his absence. 12 Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head
shall act on the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation
thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved in favor of the
aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division
head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their grievance
which was received by Abad's secretary. 13 This knowledge, however,
should not prevent the application of the CBA.
On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:
. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division
head Reynaldo Abad had to act on the grievance of
complainants within five days from 21 November 1984.
Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad, failed to act within the
reglementary period, complainants, believing in good
faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in,
cannot be blamed if they did not conduct ramp
Then in the case of National Labor Union vs. Standard Vacuum Oil
Company, 73 Phil., 279, the City Fiscal refused to prosecute two
employees charged with theft for lack of evidence and yet this Tribunal
upheld their dismissal from the employer company on the ground that
their employer had ample reason to distrust them.
The relation of employer and employee, specially where the employee
has access to the employer's property in the form of articles and
merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and confidence. If said
merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said
employee, and he is charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of the
form of articles and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust
and confidence. If said merchandise are lost and said loss is
reasonably attributed to said employee, and he is charged with theft,
even if he is acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt, when the
employer has lost its confidence in him, it would be highly unfair to
require said employer to continue employing him or to reinstate him, for
in that case the former might find it necessary for its protection to
employ another person to watch and keep an eye on him. In the
present case, Carpio was refused reinstatement not because of any
union affiliation or activity or because the company has been guilty of
any unfair labor practice. As already stated, Carpio was convicted in
the Municipal Court and although he was acquitted on reasonable
doubt in the Court of First Instance, the company had ample reason to
distrust him. Under the circumstances, we cannot in conscience require
the company to reemploy or reinstate him.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders of the Industrial Court of
February 7, 1958 and March 22, 1958 are hereby reversed. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
NARVASA, J.:p
From July 30, 1973, Zenaida Alonzo was employed as a ring frame
operator in the Pacific Mills, Inc. until September 30, 1982 when she
was discharged by Management.
The record shows that in the early afternoon of September 22, 1982,
Zenaida challenged Company Inspector Ernesto Tamondong to a fight,
saying: "Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, tarantado, kalalaki mong tao,
duwag ka . . Ipagugulpi kita sa labas at kaya kitang ipakaladkad dito sa
loob ng compound palabas ng gate sa mga kamag-anak ko." And
suiting action to the word, she thereupon boxed Tamondong in the
stomach. The motive for the assault was Zenaida's resentment at
having been reprimanded, together with other employees, two days
earlier by Tamondong for wasting time by engaging in Idle
chatter. 1 Tamondong forthwith reported the incident to the firm's
Administrative Manager 2 as well as the Chairman of Barangay Balombato,
Quezon City. 3
On September 30, 1982, Zenaida Alonzo was given a Memorandum by
the company's Executive Vice President & General Manager
terminating her employment as of October 1, 1982 on various grounds:
poor work, habitual absences and tardiness, wasting time,
insubordination and gross disrespect. The service of that memorandum
of dismissal on her was not preceded by any complaint, hearing or
For their part, the Chief Legal Officer of the NLRC, 8 and the private
respondent, 9 insist that since the dismissal of Zenaida Alonzo was not
preceded by any notice of the charges and a hearing thereon, the
judgment of the NLRC must be sustained.
Decisive of this controversy is the judgment of the Court en
banc in Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, promulgated on February 8,
1989, 10 in which the following policy pronouncements were made:
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the
reinstatement to the service of an employee without
loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual
reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without
qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not
afforded due process, although his dismissal was found
to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate
proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the
interests of the employer to impose on him the services
of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the
charges that warranted his dismissal from employment.
Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service.
Thus in the present case, where the private respondent,
who appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble
during office hours and even defied his superiors as
they tried to pacify him, should not be rewarded with
reemployment and back wages. It may encourage him
to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules
of discipline that employees are required to observe.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private
respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has
no right to return to his former employer.
However, the petitioner (employer) must nevertheless
be held to account for failure to extend to private
respondent his right to an investigation before causing
his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed.
The dismissal of an employee must be for just or
authorized cause and after due process (Section 1,
Rule XIV, Implementing Regulations of the Labor
Code). Petitioner committed an infraction of the second
NARVASA, J.:p
This case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), who
was dismissed from his work on August 23, 1967 on the basis of the
findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel, submitted on
August 11, 1967 after an investigation commenced in July, 1967 in
coordination with a well known accounting firm. 1 The Fact Finding Panel
recommended the criminal prosecution of the employee, Oscar Irineo,
together with four others, namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco,
Jacinto Macatol and Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular
refunds of international plane tickets. 2
On the basis of the panel's report, and the testimony of witnesses taken
in the course of the investigation, criminal proceedings were also
initiated against four of the PAL employees above named, namely:
Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, and Jacinto Macatol.
They were prosecuted for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, under an information
filed by the Provincial Fiscal on September 25, 1968. 3 The case resulted
in the conviction after due trial of all the accused on March 1, 1976; this,
despite the fiscal's having earlier moved for the dismissal of the charges as
against Irineo and Macatol. 4
All four (4) defendants filed motions for reconsideration and/or new
trial. All the motions were denied except Macatol's. After due hearing on
said motions, the Trial Court rendered an amended decision
dated September 23, 1977 absolving Macatol of any liability for the
offense charged, "for lack of sufficient evidence." The other three
appealed. 5
On July 6, 1978 about twelve (12) years after his dismissal from
employment Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
PAL in the Department of Labor. His complaint was however dismissed
by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that his right of action had
prescribed. That dismissal was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission in a decision promulgated on May 30, 1980. The
Commission ruled that "the running of the prescriptive period ...
commenced on the date ... (Macatol's) cause of action accrued;" that
such cause of action did not accrue "upon the termination of the
criminal case," but upon "his dismissal, the legality or illegality of which
could be determined soon after it was effected ... (and a) suit to contest
its legality could proceed independently of any criminal proceedings;"
that "if no criminal case was instituted, following the logic of the
complainant's argument, the cause of action would not and could not
have accrued at all; ... (and) the institution of the criminal action did not
bar the complainant from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal." 6
On the other hand, the appeal taken by Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian,
Antonio Rabasco, resulted in a decision promulgated on September
23, 1983 by the Intermediate Appellate Court, 7 affirming the judgment of
conviction only as regards Rogelio Damian, but acquitting Irineo and
Rabasco "on grounds of reasonable doubt." 8
On May 10, 1984, seventeen (17) years after the termination of his
employment on August 23, 1967, Irineo filed a complaint against PAL
for reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that termination
was illegal. It is the action thus instituted that has given rise to the
proceedings now before this Court.
Irineo's action eventuated in a decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
November 12, 1985, 9 decreeing his reinstatement to his position in 1967
without loss of seniority rights and the payment to him of back wages "from
August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement," as well as moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00.
The Arbiter overruled the defense of prescription asserted by PAL,
among others. The Arbiter held that since there was a PAL circular
dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any
crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under
preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and there
was, too, a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that
time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court
authority, the termination by PAL of Irineo's employment on August 23,
1967 merely "amounted to a suspension per (said) PAL IRD Circular
No. 66-11." According to the Arbiter, said IRD Circular No. 66-11 was
not raised in issue in the earlier case instituted by Macatol, supra, 10 and
this serves to distinguish Macatol's case from Irineo's, precluding reaching
a conclusion in the latter similar to that in the former (i.e., that the claim
was barred by prescription). The Arbiter held, in fine, that in view of said
Circular No. 66-11, PAL's termination of Irineo's employment should be
deemed only as an act by which "Irineo was placed under preventive
suspension until his (criminal) case was finally adjudicated, for after all, the
arbitration branch of the Commission should put meaning to the law
between the parties and unless such law between the parties are (sic)
implemented the same would become useless." The Arbiter concluded with
the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing
PAL to terminate the suspension of Irineo which it
imposed on August 23, 1967 and to reinstate him to his
position without loss of seniority rights and with
backwages from August 13, 1967 up to his actual
reinstatement.
Lastly, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is
(sic) awarded to complainant.
PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's
judgment. In a Resolution promulgated on February 28, 1989, the Third
Division of the NLRC upheld all the Arbiter's conclusions. 11 The NLRC
agreed with the Arbiter that "applying the mandate of IRD Circular No. 6611 which respondent PAL itself solely promulgated," Irineo was never
dismissed from employment but "was merely under preventive
suspension;" and that PAL's termination of Irineo's work was violative of
the "Injunction Order dated September 3, 1963 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA"
(forbidding, during the pendency of said case, the dismissal of any
employee by PAL without court authority), even though that order "lost its
efficacy when the parties concerned entered into a valid Certified
Bargaining Agreement" (on December 7, 1965, according to petitioner
PAL 12 ). It also affirmed the award of moral damages.
PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari to nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution of February
28, 1989 as constituting "a plain case of patent abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same an exemplary
example of power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of
law." The Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 26, 1989
prohibiting enforcement or implementation of the challenged
resolution. 13
Required to comment in public respondent's behalf, the Office of the
Solicitor General begged to be excused, declaring that "(a)fter an
exhaustive and judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, as well as
the applicable law and jurisprudence on the issues involved, ... (it could
not), without violating the law, espouse the position taken by the
respondent ... (NLRC) ..." Comments were filed by private
respondent 14 and the Senior Research Attorney of the NLRC in the latter's
behalf, 15 which the Court resolved to treat as their answers to PAL's
petition.
In light of the material facts above set out, it is not indeed possible, as
the Solicitor General holds, to defend the decision of the respondent
Commission or that of the Labor Arbiter.
That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and
vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid; but that
care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or
eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules
in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is
perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration.
The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr.
dated August 23, 1967, based evidently on the investigation and report
of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was
being ended; the language is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently
as follows: 16
To: Oscar Ireneo
Comptroller's Department
For being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in
the international service to the damage and prejudice of
can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not
share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the
theory. His claim must thus be rejected as time-barred, as being
unpardonably tardy.
Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the respondent
Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account be
struck down.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of
certiorari prayed for, NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE the
respondent Commission's Resolutions promulgated on February 28,
1989 and on March 20, 1989, MAKING PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1989, and
DISMISSING private respondent's complaint. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure
of respondent company to give the petitioner the desired promotion
which appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut
Provider continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of charterers. 17
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation,
not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed.
This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes
always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat
the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of
judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result
(of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 18
There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract
without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of
law.
Specifically, the law provides:
Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads:
Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any
individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
xxxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved
and verified by the Department of Labor from the time
of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the period of expiration of the same without
the approval of the Department of Labor.
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations
as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but
only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be
considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar
circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition,
exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But
such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable,
sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments
set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and
conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable
and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin
Law. 19
The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the
protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment
served to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by
the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go beyond the
bounds of reason and justice.
As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be
concern, sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the
working class, is meet and proper. That in controversies between a
laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or
in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in
the former's favor, is not an unreasonable or unfair rule. 20 But to
disregard the employer's own rights and interests solely on the basis of
that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust and unacceptable.
Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the National Labor Relations Commission which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. 21
In fact since Madrigal v. Rafferty 22 great weight has been accorded to the
interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called
upon to implement the same. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
The evidence is clear that even before the final approval of Act
No. 4242 amending Act No. 4123, the Eight Hour Labor Law, by
extending the provisions of the latter to other class of laborers
including drivers of public service vehicles, a petition was
addressed by 44 drivers of the company to the GovernorGeneral asking him to veto the bill amending the law extending
it to drivers for the reason stated in their petition (Exhibit 5 and
5-a). About the 6th day of September, 1935, a petition was
again addressed by 97 drivers of the company to the
Commissioner of Labor requesting adjustment of working hours
to permit them to retain their present status with the company
as nearly as possible under the law (Exhibits 4, 4-a, 4-b, 4-c, 4d and 4-e). This petition was prepared after a meeting of the
employees was held and was drawn with the help of the
manager of the respondent about the last days of August, 1935.
In September, 1937, about 347 employees of the different
departments of the company again addresses a petition to the
Director of Labor expressing their satisfaction with the hours
they work and the pay they receive for their labor including the
special bonuses and overtime pay they receive for extra work,
and asking, in view thereof, that the law be not applied to them
(Exhibits 6, 6-a to 6-g).
After the enactment of Act No. 4242 several transportation
companies operating motor buses filed with Commissioner of
Labor petitions for a readjustment of the hours of labor
specified in section 1 of the Act on the basis of maintaining
the status quo as to the hours the drivers were required to be
actually on duty in order to enable them to make the prescribed
hours daily that the exigencies of the service required. The
petitions were based on the impracticability of applying the
provisions of the law to drivers of public service vehicles without
disrupting the public service and causing pecuniary loss to both
employers and employees alike, and the resulting difficulties on
the part of the drivers. The testimony of Atty. Carlos Alvear on
this point in uncontradicted. He testified that in 1935, he was
president of the Philippine Motor Association composed of bus
operators operating in the Philippines, of which the respondent
is a member. Major Olson, who was at the time the executive
secretary of the association, and himself took up the matter with
the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Labor after the
to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30
p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field work.
We concur with the following disquisition by the respondent arbitrator:
The requirement for the salesmen and other similarly
situated employees to report for work at the office at
8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within
the realm of work in the field as defined in the Code but
an exercise of purely management prerogative of
providing administrative control over such personnel.
This does not in any manner provide a reasonable level
of determination on the actual field work of the
employees which can be reasonably ascertained. The
theoretical analysis that salesmen and other similarlysituated workers regularly report for work at 8:00 a.m.
and return to their home station at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.,
creating the assumption that their field work is
supervised, is surface projection. Actual field work
begins after 8:00 a.m., when the sales personnel follow
their field itinerary, and ends immediately before 4:00 or
4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The
period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or
scope and result of which are subject to their individual
capacity and industry and which "cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty." This is the reason why
effective supervision over field work of salesmen and
medical representatives, truck drivers and
merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility.
Consequently, they are excluded from the ten holidays
with pay award. (Rollo, pp. 36-37)
Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction
with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all
employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding
sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance;
(3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good
merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck
maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190).
The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given
incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their
actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result
of their work and not by the actual hours of field work which are hardly
susceptible to determination.
In San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Democratic Labor Organization (8 SCRA
613 [1963]), the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the job of
a salesman. Citing the case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, C.C.A.
Okla., 118 F. 2d 202, the Court stated:
The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are
fairly apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent,
works individually. There are no restrictions respecting
the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as
little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition
dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives
commissions as extra compensation. He works away
from his employer's place of business, is not subject to
the personal supervision of his employer, and his
employer has no way of knowing the number of hours
he works per day.
While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled
to overtime pay, the same rationale for their exclusion as field
personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.
The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator's ruling that,
concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be
changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10 holidays and
the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due
to the use of 251 days' divisor.
Arbitrator Vivar's rationale for his decision is as follows:
251 days
Following the criterion laid down in the Chartered Bank case, the use of
251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not
yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should have
been 261.
It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no
intervening salary increases, is a constant figure for the purpose of
computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick
and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be
the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261
days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the
prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the
Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to
261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employee's annual
salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday
pay. To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee's
annual salary is P25,100, then dividing such figure by 251 days, his
daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days' holiday pay, his
annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100
(P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days, the daily rate is still
P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of
overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and
vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on the
daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the grant
of holiday pay.
Respondent Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti, or payment by
mistake, due to its use of 251 days as divisor must fail in light of the
Labor Code mandate that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Moreover,
prior to September 1, 1980, when the company was on a 6-day working
schedule, the divisor used by the company was 303, indicating that the
10 holidays were likewise not paid. When Filipro shifted to a 5-day
working schebule on September 1, 1980, it had the chance to rectify its
error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now too late to allege
payment by mistake.
Nestle also questions the voluntary arbitrator's ruling that holiday pay
should be computed from November 1, 1974. This ruling was not
questioned by the petitioner union as obviously said decision was
favorable to it. Technically, therefore, respondent Nestle should have
filed a separate petition raising the issue of effectivity of the holiday pay
award. This Court has ruled that an appellee who is not an appellant
may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the
judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal
of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.
(Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989], citing
La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394 [1986]). Nevertheless, in order to fully
settle the issues so that the execution of the Court's decision in this
case may not be needlessly delayed by another petition, the Court
resolved to take up the matter of effectivity of the holiday pay award
raised by Nestle.
Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the holiday
pay award is 1985 when the Chartered Bank decision, promulgated on
August 28, 1985, became final and executory, and not from the date of
effectivity of the Labor Code. Although the Court does not entirely
agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious.
In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU)
v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 [1984], hereinafter referred to as the IBAA
case, the Court declared that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued by the then
Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976,
respectively, and which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday
pay benefits, are null and void. The Court therein reasoned that, in the
guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, the
aforementioned implementing rule and policy instruction amended
them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Chartered
Bank case reiterated the above ruling and added the "divisor" test.
However, prior to their being declared null and void, the implementing
rule and policy instruction enjoyed the presumption of validity and
hence, Nestle's non-payment of the holiday benefit up to the
promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23, 1984 was in compliance
with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
court with temporary restraining order to reverse and set aside the
Order dated September 21, 1994 of the Labor Arbiter in the NLRC RAB
X Cases Nos. 10-04-00232 (-00233)-94.
Petitioner FEM's elegance Lodging House is a business enterprise
engaged in providing lodging accommodations. It is owned by
petitioner Fenitha Saavedra and managed by petitioner Iries Anthony
Saavedra. Private respondents are former employees of petitioners
whose services were terminated between March and April, 1994.
Sometime after their dismissal from the employment of petitioners,
private respondents separately filed two cases against petitioners
Hence, the present petition where petitioners charged the Labor Arbiter
with grave abuse of discretion for issuing the order in contravention of
Section 3, Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, Said
section provides:
Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. . . .
Unless otherwise requested in writing by both parties,
the Labor Arbiter shall direct both parties to
submit simultaneously their position
papers/memorandum with the supporting documents
and affidavits within fifteen (15) calendar days from the
date of the last conference, with proof of having
furnished each other with copies thereof (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process and that the
Labor Arbiter should have cited private respondents in contempt for
their failure to comply with their agreement in the pre-arbitration
conference.
We dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust their
remedies, particularly in seeking redress from the NLRC prior to the
filing of the instant petition. Article 223 of the Labor code of the
Philippines provides that decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are appealable to the NLRC. Thus, petitioners should have first
appealed the questioned order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, and
not to this court. their omission is fatal to their cause.
However, even if the petition was given due course, we see no merit in
petitioners' arguments. The delay of private respondents in the
submission of their position paper is a procedural flaw, and the
admission thereof is within the discretion of the Labor Arbiter.
Well-settled is the rule that technical rules of procedure are not binding
in labor cases, for procedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest
of substantial justice, particularly where labor matters are concerned
(Ranara v. National Labor Relations commission, 212 SCRA 631
[1992]).
The failure to submit a position paper on time is not on of the grounds
for the dismissal of a complaint in labor cases (The New Rules of
procedure of the NLRC, Rule V, Section 15). It cannot therefore be
invoked by petitioners to declare private respondents as non-suited.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
The petition in this case should be dismissed because petitioners did
not exhaust their remedies in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) before coming to this Court.
It is clear from Article 223 of the Labor Code that decisions, awards
or orders of the labor arbiter are appealable to the National Labor
Relations Commission. The proper remedy which petitioners should
have taken was to appeal to the NLRC the labor arbiter's order denying
their motion to dismiss and motion to expunge private respondents'
position paper. The present petition is therefore clearly premature, a
procedural flaw and should on this score be dismissed.
If this Court were to entertain appeals from orders of labor arbiters,
even in the form of a petition for certiorari for alleged grave abuse of
discretion under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we will be opening the
flood gates to petitions for certiorari against orders (including
interlocutory ones) of labor arbiters when the clear intent of the law is to
subject the decisions, awards and orders of labor arbiters to review by
the NLRC before they are brought to this Court.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0692, entitled "Domna N.
Villavert, appellant versus Government Service Insurance System
(Philippine Constabulary), respondents," affirming the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death
benefits. 1
The petitioner, Domna N. Villavert, is the mother of the late, Marcelino
N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on December
12, 1975 employed as a Code Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary.
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D.
No. 626 as amended with the Government Service Insurance System
on March 18, 1976. The said claim was denied by the Government
Service Insurance System on the ground that acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the petitioner had
failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal
ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission
which affirmed on May 31, 1978 the decision of the respondent,
Government Service Insurance System, denying the claim.
Separate Opinions
SECTION 1.
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SECTION 1.
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(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease annotated under Annex "A" of
these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (emphasis supplied).
The cause of death of petitioner's son was acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis. This disease is not one of those listed, even under the
additional listing, as an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. Neither did petitioner
present evidence to prove that the risk of contracting hemorrhagic
pancreatitis was increased by the working conditions surrounding her
son's employment as code verifier, computer operator and typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. For which reasons, the Government Service
Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission
denied the claim for compensation.
That physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the
development of the disease, as stated by the Medico Legal Officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation is not scientifically confirmed
"research data." Medical science still associates the disease with
alcoholism, binary tract disease, the use of drugs, or trauma, among
others. In fact, the exact cause is still unknown. Medical reports
indicate that approximately 20% of the patients suffering from that
disease have no apparent underlying or predisposing cause.
The illness of petitioner's son not having been caused nor aggravated
by the nature of his duties as an employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, petitioner's claim is not compensable under explicit
provisions of existing laws.
Separate Opinions
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated August
20, 1981 (Annex "A", Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC Case
No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denying
petitioners claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended.
The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who joined
the government service in June, 1969 as a constable in the
Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.)
After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the
rank of constable second class. On December 16, 1974, he
was again promoted to the rank of sergeant (p. 26, rec.)
Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan. While on their
way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was seated on the left side of the bus,
fell down from the bus because of the sudden stop of the
vehicle. As a result, he was confined at the Cagayan
Provincial Hospital for about one (1) week, and thereafter,
released (comment of respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He
was again confined for further treatment from November 7,
1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center in Quezon
City.
While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, he was assigned as security to one Dr. Emilio
"x
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2084078-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres, ComplainantsAppellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC
Case No. RN- IV-20855-78-T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, ComplainantAppellant, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee," which
dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to pay
petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month salary
(exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred to as
Zuellig) filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) an
On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing
provides:
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of
employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving-devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses, and other similar causes, shall entitle
the employee affected thereby to separation pay. In
case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
SO ORDERED.
The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission
was dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of Voluntary
Abandonment and Withdrawal of Petition dated April 7, 1980 filed by
petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the ground that he wants "to abide
by the decision appealed from" since he had "received, to his full and
complete satisfaction, his separation pay," resolved to dismiss the
petition as to him.
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances
should be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose
of computation of their separation pay.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal amount
of separation pay due them, whether under the Labor Code or the
CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances
should be added together. They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code
which includes commission as part on one's salary, to wit;
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable
of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis,
or other method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written
or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to
be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered,
and includes the fair and reasonable value, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging,
or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer
to the employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not
include any profit to the employer or to any person
affiliated with the employer.
Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code as
well as its implementing rules to include commission in the computation
This is the decision modified by the NLRC 2 which is now faulted by the
petitioners for grave abuse of discretion. The contention is that the public
respondent acted arbitrarily and erroneously in ruling that: a) the motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; b) the strike was illegal; and c) the
separation of the project employees was justified.
CRUZ, J.:
Having considered the issues and the arguments of the parties in their
respective pleadings, including the petitioners' ex parte motion for early
resolution of this case, the Court makes the findings that follow.
On the first issue, we note that the rule on motions for reconsideration
of the decision of the NLRC is now found in Rule X of the Revised
Rules of the NLRC, providing thus:
Section 9. Motions for reconsideration Motions for
reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of
the Commission shall not be entertained except when
based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the
motion is under oath and filed within ten (I 0) calendar
days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision,
with proof of service that a copy of the same has been
furnished, within the aforesaid reglementary period, the
adverse party and provided further, that only one such
motion shall be entertained.
Subject to the provisions of Section 3, Rule IX of these
Rules, motions for reconsideration of an order,
It is obvious that the real reason for the termination of their serviceswhich, to repeat, were still needed-was the complaint the project
workers had filed and their participation in the strike against the private
respondent. These were the acts that rendered them persona non
grata to the management. Their services were discontinued by the
MDC not because of the expiration of their contracts, which had not
prevented their retention or rehiring before as long as the project they
were working on had not yet been completed. The real purpose of the
MDC was to retaliate against the workers, to punish them for their
defiance by replacing them with more tractable employees.
Applying this rule, we hold that the project workers in the case at bar,
who were separated even before the completion of the project at the
New Alabang Village and not really for the reason that their contracts
had expired, are entitled to separation pay. We make this disposition
instead of ordering their reinstatement as it may be assumed that the
said project has been completed by this time. Considering the workers
to have been separated without valid cause, we shall compute their
separation pay at the rate of one month for every year of service of
each dismissed employee, up to the time of the completion of the
project. 8 We feel this is the most equitable way to treat their claim in light
of their cavalier dismissal by the private respondent despite their long
period of satisfactory service with it.
It is the policy of the Constitution to afford protection to labor in
recognition of its role in the improvement of our welfare and the
strengthening of our democracy. An exploited working class is a
discontented working class. It is a treadmill to progress and a threat to
freedom. Knowing this, we must exert all effort to dignify the lot of the
employee, elevating him to the same plane as his employer, that they
may better work together as equal partners in the quest for a better life.
Footnotes
* On April 14, 1983, a compromise agreement
subsequently approved by the NLRC en banc provided
for the reinstatement of the workers and payment to
them of one year backwage and separation pay by the
MDC.
1 Rollo, pp. 53-61.
2 Rollo, pp. 45-52.
3 Daily Express, dated November 13 and 14, 1986.
4 Rollo, p. 115.
5 G.R. No. 82973, September 15, 1989.
6 Rollo, p. 60.
7 Dated February 15, 1977.
8 Art. 283, Labor Code.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of
P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the
petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he
was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow
sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel,
argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and
after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits
and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department
of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of
the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect
the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient
standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity"
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare"
in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency"
in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the
United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security"
in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the
scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be
counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must
accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given
the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate
on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active
and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is
hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
On September 15, 1955, the petitioner reiterated its petition for the
reconsideration of the computation mentioned above and urged that
the same be made merely on the basis of the eye injury sustained by
Mr. Geronca, alleging that the latter's insanity upon which the disputed
computation was based cannot be taken into consideration without
giving the herein petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard. This
petition for reconsideration was turned down by the Commissioner on
January 27, 1956, hence the present appeal by way of certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the Commissioner committed an error in
adjudicating Geronca's claim on the basis of insanity without holding a
hearing thereon as demanded by it in its letter of April 28, 1955.
Petitioner claims: "that the casuality of the injury in relation to the
insanity upon which the compensation was computed can be arrived at
only after a hearing. Short of any showing by evidence that there is
such causality, many other factors may be surmised to have
intervened, not necessarily connected with the eye injury, which could
have induced the psychosis. As a matter of fact, the authorities hold the
view that insanity which comes about after an injury cannot necessarily
be presumed to be causally linked. The legal causation must still be
established and proved. In support of our stand, we quote from
Schneider on Workmen's Compensation Laws, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, section
629 to 632, as follows:
"In October a workman suffered an injury to his thumb, which,
due to infection, was slow in healing. He could not work. After
Christmas he became very depressed, and began to suffer
from neurasthenia and in a few days threw himself under a train
and was killed. The court, in denying compensation, said: "I
think if we were to assent to the very able and interesting
arguments which we have heard, we should be driven to say
that, wherever we find an accident which involves, as so many
accidents do, depression of spirits, particularly in the case of a
man who had been leading an active life as a laboring man or
artisan, depression at being kept from his work and idling about
at home, then it neurasthenia and suicide result, they can all be
traced directly to the accident. If we were to say that, we should
be opening a very wide door; and I think we ought not to do so.
I think as the Scottish court said, there must be some direct
evidence of the insanity being a result of the accident
something more than the insanity being subsequent in turn to
the accident. The legal causation must be established and
proved."
xxx
xxx
xxx
We do not lose sight of the fact that under our laws and the policies of
our government, the labor laws should be construed liberally in favor of
the laborer; but, on the other hand, the fundamental principle of due
process of law should be sternly applied alike on both the poor and the
rich in order to attain proper justice. Hence, in the present case, we
believe that a hearing should be had on the disputed facts about
causality of the injury on the eye of Jorge Geronca and his alleged
insanity arising therefrom.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions of the respondent Commissioner,
dated March 21 and July 21, 1955 and January 27, 1956, are hereby
set aside and a formal hearing is hereby ordered on the issue of legal
causation between the eye injury and insanity of Jorge Geronca in
order to determine the true compensation that should be awarded to
him.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix, JJ.,concur.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the
Honorable Francisco Santamaria, judge, found the defendant guilty of
the crime charged, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of
two months and to pay a fine of P100, in case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law,
and to pay the costs. The defendant was further sentenced to be
disqualified from holding any public office or from giving testimony in
any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the sentence
against him is reversed. From that sentence the defendant appealed to
this court and made the following assignments of error:
for the purpose of avoiding identity. The defendant said that "Francisco"
was the same as "Frank" and that he had adopted the name of "Frank"
instead of "Francisco." The answers to the questions in said application
were made in English.
With reference to the first assignment of error, that the lower court
committed an error in applying section 3 of Act No. 1697 to the facts in
the present case, it may be said that said article provides that:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any
written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
true, is guilty or perjury, and shall be punished, etc.
Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which is an Act to provide for
the reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of
the municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act
No. 83, provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the
municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No.
83.
Said Act further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare
general regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection
of the municipal police, "compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for
all members of the organization."
Said Act further provides for an examining board for the municipal
police. It further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an
examination manual, prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for
the conduct of the examination.
Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time and place for holding
said examinations.
Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a
candidate shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no
criminal record."
captains of ships for the coastwise trade, providing at the same time
that the Collector of Customs shall establish rules and regulations for
such examinations. Such regulations, once established and found to be
in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding
upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the
original law itself. (United States vs. Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506;
Williamson vs. United States, 207 U. S., 425; United States vs. United
Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S., 207.)
1awphil.net
In the case of United States vs. Dumlao (R. G., No. 8721, not reported)
this court held the defendant guilty of the crime of perjury, under facts
exactly analogous to those in this case, under the provisions of section
3 of Act No. 1697. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument
of the appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our
conclusions in that case (No. 8721).
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant alleged
that the lower court committed an error in finding that he had committed
the crime of perjury voluntarily and corruptly. There is nothing in the
record which shows that he did not present to the proper authorities
Exhibit A voluntarily. It is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that
the defendant had theretofore been convicted of two different offenses
and in one of them by two courts, how he could, within a few months
thereafter, make a sworn statement that he "did not have a criminal
record," unless he answered said question No. 5 in the manner
indicated in said application for the express purpose of deceiving the
authority to which said application was presented.
With reference to the third assignment of error, it may be said that the
language of question No. 5 seems to be perfectly clear. The defendant
admitted that he could read and understand Spanish. It is to be noted
that at the very beginning of said application there are three
paragraphs devoted to instructions to the applicant, which he should
have read and no doubt did. Said instructions were sufficient to indicate
to the defendant that if there were any questions which he did not fully
understand, he should have acquired a full understanding of the same
before answering them. If there was any fault in understanding said
question No. 5, it was wholly due to his own negligence.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, the appellant contends
that the lower court committed an error in holding that the phrase
"which he does not believe to be true," found in section 3 of Act No.
1697, is equivalent to the word "knowingly," used in other laws. The
lower court cited the case of U. S. vs. Tin Masa (17 Phil. Rep., 463) in
support of his conclusion. Said section 3, in effect, provides that any
person who takes an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or
person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes
an oath, that he will testify, etc., or that any written testimony,
declaration, etc., by him subscribed is true, and thereafter willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter, "which
he does not believe to be true," is guilty of perjury. Under said section,
three things are necessary, in order to constitute the crime of perjury:
1. The person must have taken an oath, in a case where the law
authorizes an oath, before a competent person, or a person authorized
to administer an oath;
2. That the person who has taken the oath will testify, declare, dispose,
or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or
certificate by him subscribed is true;
3. That he willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter, "which he does not believe to be true."
It is difficult to understand how a person can state, under oath, that a
fact is true or subscribe a document, asserting that the same is true,
which he does not believe to be true. If, under his oath, he declares
that said facts are true, we must conclude that he believed that they
were true. If, as a matter of fact, they were not true, and he had full
knowledge of the fact that they were not true, then his declaration that
they were true would certainly be a sworn statement that a certain fact
was true which he did not believe to be true and, therefore, he must
have made a false statement knowingly. Without attempting to show or
assert that the phrase "which he does not believe to be true" is
equivalent to the word "knowingly," as the lower court held, we are of
the opinion that whoever makes a statement or subscribes a document,
under the circumstances mentioned in said section 3, which is false
and which he, at the time he makes the same does not believe to be
true, is guilty of the crime of perjury. In other words, under the
circumstances mentioned in said section, if one swears positively that a
fact is true, which he does not believe to be true, and it turns out that it
is false, he is guilty of the crime of perjury. No one should swear
positively that a fact is true or subscribe a document asserting that the
facts stated therein are true, unless he at least believes that they are
true at the time he takes such oath or subscribes such document. It can
scarcely be believed that the defendant in the present case believed
that the answer to said question No. 5 was true. He must have signed
or answered said question not only believing that it was not true, but,
as a matter of fact, signed the same knowing that the answer was
false.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, we are of the opinion
that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly shows
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and therefore the
sentence of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed with
costs.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by
the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to
prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and
implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and
POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the
DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and
deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and
recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to
engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino
landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA,
which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take
over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board,
the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of
the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the
defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power
and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a
registration and/or licensing system to
regulate private sector participation in
the recruitment and placement of
workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art.
15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p.
13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment
Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for
overseas employment of Filipino
contract workers on a government to
government arrangement and in such
other sectors as policy may dictate . . .
(Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took
over:
2. To regulate and supervise the
activities of agents or representatives of
shipping companies in the hiring of
seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of
employment for contract seamen
workers and secure compliance
therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the
modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79).
More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the
regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular
field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner
from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased
workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged
administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79
SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36
of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or
stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the
power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard
for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and
of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs.
Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative
Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of
petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom
recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for
Hong Kong till after the establishment of the
"mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In
fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may
still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for
Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of
Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not
to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel
fees and other charges committed by private
employment agencies recruiting and deploying
domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable,
valid and justified under the general welfare clause of
Manuel were the employees of Jose Negre, Maxima filed two separate
claims for death compensation against Jose Negre before the
Workmen's Compensation Unit in Bacolod City. The claims based on
the death of Miguel Solivio were docketed as WC Case No. 923.
In her claim, Maxima alleged that Miguel was employed as master
fisherman locally known as "maestro" of the fishing boat (basnigan)
while Manuel was just a member of the crew; that Miguel received a
monthly salary of P250.00 plus his percentage in the catch which,
could not be less than P400.00 monthly, and that Manuel received a
monthly Wary of P150.00 plus a percentage in the catch which netted
him the minimum amount of P200.00. She added that after the accident
she asked for the payment of compensation for the death of Miguel and
Manuel but Jose Negre made promises without paying her until after
several months when he gave her the amount of P700.00.
In his controversion, Jose Negre while admitting that Miguel Solivio
was a "maestro" of his fishing boat "Sonny" denied any employeremployee relationship between them. He described the operation of his
fishing business in the following manner:
In the operation of his "basnigan", he requested the
master fisherman or "maestro" to recruit fishermen with
license and the "maestro" whom he requested was
Miguel Solivio and the arrangement were that after the
catch, the expenses for the trip like rice, crude oil,
gasoline and other expenses needed for the trip were
deducted and the remainder was divided, one half goes
to him and the other half to the members of the crew.
The shares for the crew members are further divided in
proportion to the nature of their respective jobs. He
furnished the boat and all the expenses while the crew
members merely contributed their labor.
In effect, Jose Negre claimed that Miguel was his business partner with
him providing the capital and Miguel contributing his labor.
As regards Manuel Solivio, Jose Negre denied that he was his
employee because he was then a minor and if he was on board the
boat when the accident happened, the fault could be attributed to his
father. He also denied that Miguel Solivio received a monthly salary
from him.
We note that this case was decided after the process of phasing out the
Workmen's Compensation Commission had commenced.
Under Letter of Instruction No. 190, dated June 3, 1974, the Secretary
of Labor was instructed to effect the orderly abolition of the workmen's
compensation system by taking "such remedial steps as may be
necessary to expedite the determination and/or settlement under such
terms as he may consider fair and just, of the backlog of the
compensation cases pending before the workmen's compensation units
in the regional offices of the Department of Labor as well as in the
Workmen's Compensation Commission to the end that said backlog
may be liquidated by the end of the transaction period.
Pursuant to this mandate the Secretary of Labor on July 17, 1974,
issued Department Order No. 3, Series of 1974 providing, among
others, the following:
Section 5. Decision by the Commission en banc, when
final. Within ten (10) days from receipt of an
appealed case, the Commission en banc shall review
and decide said case. Two affirmative votes shall
decide the case.
Any decision or Order on the merits of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory
if no appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within ten
(10) days from notice in accordance with the law.
Since the questioned decision bears the concurrence of the chairman
and an associate commissioner, it is apparent that the commission
followed this directive and immediately reviewed the case en
banc. Hence, the commission was merely implementing the rules for a
speedy and orderly transaction to the new compensation system when
it did not act on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. At any rate,
we have gone; into the merits of the case and considered all issues
raised b3' the petitioner in the records. The declaration of finality has
not resulted in a denial of due process,
The petitioner objects to the death compensation benefits awarded to
the private respondent insisting that Manuel Solivio and Miguel Solivio
were not his employees.
The petitioner admittedly owns four fishing boats which he uses in his
fishing business. For this purpose, he engages a considerable number
of fishermen, with one master fisherman locally known as "maestro" in
charge of recruiting the others to complete the crew members. At the
time of death, Manuel Solivio acted as "maestro" while Miguel Solivio
was among those present in the petitioner's boat named "Sonny" when
it Capsized and was wrecked due to typhoon "Klaring".
We have defined an employee to be ... any person in the service of
another under a contract for hire, express, or implied, oral or written."
(Uy v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 97 SCRA 255, Natividad
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., L-42021, November
21, 1979: Villones v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al., L46200, July 30, 1979; Mesina v. Republic, L-43517, May 31, 1979, 90
SCRA 489; Dulay v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 89
SCRA 659; Marasigan v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.,
89 SCRA 259; Vega v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 89
SCRA 141; and Capinpin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
103 SCRA 270).
There is no doubt that under the facts of the case, Manuel Solivio falls
under this decision. The pretense of the petitioner that Manuel was his
business partner is not supported by the evidence. The fact that
Manuel is paid on a commission basis does not support the petitioner's
partnership theory.
In Abong v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (54 SCRA 379), we
held that fishermen crew-members hired and working under the same
circumstances as Manuel and Miguel are employees and not industrial
partners.
Miguel Solivio was an employee of the petitioner. His presence in the
fishing boat "Sonny" at the time of the fatal accident points to no other
conclusion but that he was among those who were recruited by Manuel
Solivio to be a crew member for his employer, the petitioner. In the
absence of convincing evidence on record, Miguel's being a minor at
the time does not support the petitioner's allegations that he was not
his employee. We ruled in Uy v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission (97 SCRA 255):
... it is true that the existence of employer-employee
relationship is often difficult of determination because it
was purposely made so by employers bent on evading
NOCON, J.:
A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights and the filing of claims
for benefits under the Labor Code and other presidential issuances or
labor legislations is the status and nature of one's employment.
Whether an employer-employee relationship exist and whether such
employment is managerial in character or that of a rank and file
employee are primordial considerations before extending labor
benefits. Thus, petitioners in this case seek a definitive ruling on the
status and nature of their employment with Broad Street Tailoring and
pray for the nullification of the resolution dated May 12, 1986 of the
National Labor Relations Commissions in NLRC Case No. RB-IV21558-78-T affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa
dated May 28, 1979, which held eleven of them as independent
contractors and the remaining one as employee but of managerial rank.
The facts of the case shows that petitioner Elias Villuga was employed
as cutter in the tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo
Zapanta and known as Broad Street Tailoring located at Shaw
Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a fixed
monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of
P40.00. In addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the
chore of distributing work to the shop's tailors or sewers when both the
shop's manager and assistant manager would be absent. He saw to it
that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not,
he had them redone, repaired or resewn.
The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They
were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn,
regardless of the time consumed in accomplishing the task. Petitioners
did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed
hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home
especially when the volume of work, which depended on the number of
job orders, could no longer be coped up with.
From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for
work allegedly due to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he
was considered to have abandoned his work.
In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of
the Department of Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused
admittance when he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due
to his active participation in the union organized by private respondent's
tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday
pay, premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.
Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and
David Oro also claimed that they were dismissed from their
employment because they joined the Philippine Social Security Labor
Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo
Aguilan, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and
Domingo Saguit claimed that they stopped working because private
respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their
membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the
different labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly
violated.
petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and
without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the
imposition of a sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of
the fact that this is petitioner's first offense. In lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can
no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the
realities of the situation. 10 But petitioner should not be granted backwages
in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the
circumstances considering that he was not entirely free from blame. 11
FELICIANO, J.:p
Petitioners seek to set aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") dated 11 November 1981, which
affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 28 February 1980.
Private respondent National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM")
PSSLU-TUCP is a labor organization that counts among its members a
majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring
Services, Inc. ("PIER 8 A&S") consisting, among others, of stevedores,
dockworkers, sweepers and forklift operators (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the stevedores"). On 31 July 1978, NOWM PSSLUTUCP and about 300 stevedores filed with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment ("MOLE") a complaint 1 for unfair labor practice ULP
and illegal dismissal against PIER 8 A&S.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The instant Petition for certiorari imputes grave abuse of discretion to
the NLRC in upholding the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the
stevedores are employees not only of PIER 8 A&S but also of Escao.
Petitioners also assail that portion of the Decision which directed them
to reinstate the dismissed stevedores with the obligation to pay
backwages from 10 August 1978 to 27 March 1979.
In his Decision, the Labor Arbiter took the view that PIER 8 A&S was a
labor only contractor and held that Escao was the principal employer
of the stevedores. For that reason, the Labor Arbiter adjudged the
petitioners solidarily liable for payment of backwages to the stevedores
as well as for reinstatement.
While petitioner PIER 8 A&S does not dispute that the stevedores were
its employees, petitioner Escao denies the existence of an employeremployee relationship between it and the stevedores. Escao therefore
contends that liability, if any, should attach only to PIER 8 A&S.
PIER 8 A&S is a corporation providing Arrastre and stevedoring
services to vessels docked at Pier 8 of the Manila North Harbor. Prior
to the incorporation of PIER 8 A&S two (2) stevedoring companies had
been servicing vessels docking at Pier 8. One of these was the Manila
Integrated Services, Inc. MISI which was servicing Escao vessels,
then berthing at Pier 8. The other was the San Nicolas Stevedoring and
Arrastre Services, Inc. (SNSASI) which was servicing Compania
Maritima vessels. Aside, of course, from MISI and SNSASI there were
individual contractors known as the "cabos" who were operating in Pier
8.
On 11 July 1974, the Philippine Port Authority ("PPA") was created
pursuant to the policy of the State to implement an integrated program
of port development for the entire country. 4 Towards this end, the PPA
issued Administrative Order No. 1377 specifically adopting the policy of
"one pier, one Arrastre and/or stevedoring company." MISI and SNSASI
merged to form the Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.
Sometime in June 1978, Escao had transferred berth to Pier 16 with
the approval of the PPA. PIER 8 A&S then started to encounter
Stevedoring Services, Inc. 6 apparently to show that they are paid for their
services by either or both of petitioners, they did not submit direct
evidence, e.g., copies of payrolls and remittances to the SSS and
Medicare, establishing this fact. Further, the stevedores failed to
substantiate their allegation that the supervisors of Escao had control
over them while discharging their (stevedores') duties. On the contrary,
their Position Paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter disclosed that the
supervisors of Escao "merely supervised" them.
The record includes letters written by the National President of NOWM
PSSLU-TUC to which the stevedores belong-relating to collective
bargaining and other operating matters, were all addressed to the
management of PIER 8 A&S indicating that they recognized PIER 8
A&S as their employer. Specifically, in the letter dated 21 May 1977, the
stevedores proposed that PIER 8 A&S recognize their union as the sole
and exclusive representative of the stevedores for the purpose of
collective bargaining. They also sought to submit for collective
bargaining with PIER 8 A&S such other labor standard issues as wage
increases, 13th month pay and vacation and sick leave pay. 7
The stevedores, however, now contend that PIER 8 A&S is not an
independent contract but a labor only contractor. In their Amended
Complaint and Position Paper, the stevedores alleged that:
(1) They perform their duties or work assignments
under the close supervision of supervisors of
respondent Hijos de F. Escao Inc.;
(2) The machineries, equipment, tools and other
facilities complainants used, while in the performance of
their jobs, are owned by respondent Hijos de F. Escao,
Inc.;
(3) The jobs they were performing from the time they
were first employed, until their dismissals, are principal
phases of respondent's operations; and
(4) The so-called Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring
Services, Inc. is a mere middleman; its vital role is
purely one of supplying workers to respondent Hijos de
F. Escao, Inc. in short, a mere recruiting agent. Plainly,
said contractor can be categorized as an agent of
respondent Hijos de F. Escao, Inc. as it performs
SARMIENTO , J.:
The petitioners invoke the provisions on human relations of the Civil
Code in this appeal by certiorari. The facts are beyond dispute:
xxx xxx xxx
On the strength of a contract (Exhibit A for the appellant
Exhibit 2 for the appellees) entered into on Oct. 19,
1960 by and between Mrs. Segundina Noguera, party
of the first part; the Tourist World Service, Inc.,
represented by Mr. Eliseo Canilao as party of the
second part, and hereinafter referred to as appellants,
the Tourist World Service, Inc. leased the premises
belonging to the party of the first part at Mabini St.,
Manila for the former-s use as a branch office. In the
said contract the party of the third part held herself
solidarily liable with the party of the part for the prompt
payment of the monthly rental agreed on. When the
branch office was opened, the same was run by the
herein appellant Una 0. Sevilla payable to Tourist World
Service Inc. by any airline for any fare brought in on the
efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla, 4% was to go to Lina Sevilla
The trial court 2 held for the private respondent on the premise that the
private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., being the true lessee, it
was within its prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock the
premises. 3 It likewise found the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to be a mere
employee of said Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such, she was bound
by the acts of her employer. 4 The respondent Court of Appeal 5 rendered
an affirmance.
The petitioners now claim that the respondent Court, in sustaining the
lower court, erred. Specifically, they state:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THE
PADLOCKING OF THE PREMISES BY TOURIST WORLD SERVICE
INC. WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE
APPELLANT LINA SEVILLA ... WITHOUT NOTIFYING MRS. LINA O.
SEVILLA OR ANY OF HER EMPLOYEES AND WITHOUT
INFORMING COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT (SEVILIA), WHO
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE PADLOCKING INCIDENT, WAS IN
CONFERENCE WITH THE CORPORATE SECRETARY OF TOURIST
WORLD SERVICE (ADMITTEDLY THE PERSON WHO PADLOCKED
THE SAID OFFICE), IN THEIR ATTEMP AMICABLY SETTLE THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE APPELLANT (SEVILLA) AND THE
TOURIST WORLD SERVICE ... (DID NOT) ENTITLE THE LATTER TO
THE RELIEF OF DAMAGES" (ANNEX "A" PP. 7,8 AND ANNEX "B" P.
2) DECISION AGAINST DUE PROCESS WHICH ADHERES TO THE
RULE OF LAW.
II
The Court finds the resolution of the issue material, for if, as the private
respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., maintains, that the relation
between the parties was in the character of employer and employee,
the courts would have been without jurisdiction to try the case, labor
disputes being the exclusive domain of the Court of Industrial
Relations, later, the Bureau Of Labor Relations, pursuant to statutes
then in force. 9
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING-IN FACT NOT
PASSING AND RESOLVING-APPELLANT SEVILLAS CAUSE OF
ACTION FOUNDED ON ARTICLES 19, 20 AND 21 OF THE CIVIL
CODE ON RELATIONS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPEAL
APPELLANT SEVILLA RELIEF YET NOT RESOLVING HER CLAIM
THAT SHE WAS IN JOINT VENTURE WITH TOURIST WORLD
SERVICE INC. OR AT LEAST ITS AGENT COUPLED WITH AN
INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE TERMINATED OR REVOKED
UNILATERALLY BY TOURIST WORLD SERVICE INC. 6
As a preliminary inquiry, the Court is asked to declare the true nature of
the relation between Lina Sevilla and Tourist World Service, Inc. The
respondent Court of see fit to rule on the question, the crucial issue, in
its opinion being "whether or not the padlocking of the premises by the
Tourist World Service, Inc. without the knowledge and consent of the
appellant Lina Sevilla entitled the latter to the relief of damages prayed
for and whether or not the evidence for the said appellant supports the
contention that the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. unilaterally and
without the consent of the appellant disconnected the telephone lines
of the Ermita branch office of the appellee Tourist World Service,
Inc. 7 Tourist World Service, Inc., insists, on the other hand, that Lina
SEVILLA was a mere employee, being "branch manager" of its Ermita
"branch" office and that inferentially, she had no say on the lease executed
with the private respondent, Segundina Noguera. The petitioners contend,
however, that relation between the between parties was one of joint
venture, but concede that "whatever might have been the true relationship
between Sevilla and Tourist World Service," the Rule of Law enjoined
Tourist World Service and Canilao from taking the law into their own
hands, 8 in reference to the padlocking now questioned.
entrusted to her. Moreover, she had assumed a personal obligation for the
operation thereof, holding herself solidarily liable for the payment of
rentals. She continued the business, using her own name, after Tourist
World had stopped further operations. Her interest, obviously, is not to the
commissions she earned as a result of her business transactions, but one
that extends to the very subject matter of the power of management
delegated to her. It is an agency that, as we said, cannot be revoked at the
pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation complained of should
entitle the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to damages.
It was only on June 4, 1962, and after office hours significantly, that the
Ermita office was padlocked, personally by the respondent Canilao, on
the pretext that it was necessary to Protect the interests of the Tourist
World Service. " 22 It is strange indeed that Tourist World Service, Inc. did
not find such a need when it cancelled the lease five months earlier. While
Tourist World Service, Inc. would not pretend that it sought to locate Sevilla
to inform her of the closure, but surely, it was aware that after office hours, she could
not have been anywhere near the premises. Capping these series of "offensives," it cut the office's
telephone lines, paralyzing completely its business operations, and in the process, depriving Sevilla
articipation therein.
This conduct on the part of Tourist World Service, Inc. betrays a sinister
effort to punish Sevillsa it had perceived to be disloyalty on her part. It
is offensive, in any event, to elementary norms of justice and fair play.
We rule therefore, that for its unwarranted revocation of the contract of
agency, the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., should be
sentenced to pay damages. Under the Civil Code, moral damages may
be awarded for "breaches of contract where the defendant acted ... in
bad faith. 23
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
That Santiago Fabrigar had been employed from 1947 to March 12,
1956, as a janitor-messenger of the respondent Iloilo Chinese
Commercial School, his work consisting of sweeping and scrubbing the
floors, cleaning the classrooms and the school premises, and other
janitorial chores; on March 11, 1956, preparatory to graduation day, he
carried desks and chairs from the classrooms to the auditorium, set the
curtains and worked harder and faster than usual; that although he felt
shortness of breath and did not feel very well that day, he continued
working at the request of the overseer of respondent, that on the
following day he reported for work, but on March 13, he spat blood and
stopped working; that from April 29, 1956 to May 15, 1956, he was
under treatment by Dr. Quirico Villareal "for far advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis and for heart disease"; and that previous to said treatment,
he was attended by Dr. Jaranilla for pulmonary tuberculosis. The
Commission concluded that the short period of intervention between
his last day of work (March 13, 1956) when he spat blood and his death
on June 28, 1956, due to pulmonary tuberculosis, indicated that he had
been suffering from such disease even during the time he was
employed by the respondent and considering the strenuous work he
performed, his employment as janitor aggravated his pre-existing
illness; that although here is a discrepancy between the cause of death
"beriberi adult," as appearing in the death Certificate and the testimony
of Dr. Villareal, the latter deserves more credence, because the
information (cause of death) was given by the sanitary inspector who
did not, in any way, examine the deceased before or after his death.
The Commission, therefore, ordered the respondent Chinese
Commercial School, Inc., in said case
1. To pay to the claimant, for and in behalf of her minor children
by the deceased, namely, Carlito, Gloria, Rosita and Ernesto,
all surnamed Fabrigar, the amount of TWO THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY SIX and 00/00 Pesos (P2,496.00) as
Death benefits; and
2. To pay to the Commission the amount of P25.00 as fees
pursuant to Section 55 of Act 3428, as amended.
The above decision is now before Us for Review on a Writ of Certiorari,
after the motion for reconsideration had been denied, petitioner alleging
that the Commission erred:
1. In disregarding completely the evidentiary value of the death
certificate of the attending physician which was presented as
fact that immediately preceding his last day of work with the
respondent, he had an unusually hard day lifting desks and
other furnitures and assisting in the preparations for the
graduation exercises of the school. Considering also his
complaints during that day (March 11), among which was
"shortness of breath", we may also say that his work affected
an already existing heart ailment.
We find no plausible reason for altering or disturbing the above factual
findings of the Commission, in the present appeal by certiorari.
lawphil.net
not found in the record before us. And the resolution to the motion for
reconsideration does not touch this question.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appeal interposed by the petitioner is
dismissed, and the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against the herein petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
REGALADO, J.:p
This petition for certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated May
27, 1994, as well as its resolution, dated August 8, 1994, denying
petitioners's motion for reconsideration, 1 which assailed decision
affirmed with modifications the adverse decision of the labor arbiter against
herein petitioners.
On June 29, 1990, herein private respondent Pedro and Fredelito
Juanatas, father and son, filed a claim for unpaid wages/commissions,
separation pay and damages against JJ's Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo
Jimenez. Said respondents, as complainants therein, alleged that in
December, 1987, they were hired by herein petitioner Bernardo
Jimenez as driver/mechanic and helper, respectively, in his trucking
firm, JJ Trucking. They were assigned to a ten-wheeler truck to haul
soft drinks of Coca-Cola Bottling Company and paid on commission
basis, initially fixed at 17% but later increased to 20% in 1988.
Private respondents further alleged that for the years 1988 and 1989
they received only a partial commission of P84,000.00 from petitioners'
total gross income of almost P1,000,000.00 for the said two years.
vs. Drilon, 193 SCRA 270, 275; Deferia vs. NLRC, 194
SCRA 531, 525; Ecal vs. NLRC, 224, 228, Hijos De F.
Escano, Inc vs. NLRC, 224 SCRA 781, 785). The
aforequoted pertinent findings of the Labor Arbiter
indicate (that) the foregoing requirements do not exist
between petitioner and private respondent Fredelito
Juanatas. Thus, the labor arbiter stated that respondent
Fredelito Juanatas was never hired by petitioners.
Instead the former's services were availed of by
respondent Pedro Juanatas his father, who, at the same
time, supervised and controlled his work and paid his
commissions. Respondent NLRC's ruling did not
traverse these findings of the labor arbiter. 19
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
paragraph 1 thereof, declaring Fredelito Juanatas an employee of
petitioners and entitled to share in the award for commission and
separation pay, is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
VITUG, J.:
A prime focus in the instant petition is the question of when to hold a
director or officer of a corporation solidarily obligated with the latter for
a corporate liability.
The case originated from a complaint filed with the Labor Arbiter by
private respondent Celso B. Balbastro against herein petitioners, MAM
Realty Development Corporation ("MAM") and its Vice President
Manuel P. Centeno, for wage differentials, "ECOLA," overtime pay,
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay (for the years 1988 and 1989),
holiday pay and rest day pay. Balbastro alleged that he was employed
by MAM as a pump operator in 1982 and had since performed such
work at its Rancho Estate, Marikina, Metro Manila. He earned a basic
monthly salary of P1,590.00 for seven days of work a week that started
from 6:00 a.m. to up until 6:00 p.m. daily.
MAM countered that Balbastro had previously been employed by
Francisco Cacho and Co., Inc., the developer of Rancho Estates.
Sometime in May 1982, his services were contracted by MAM for the
operation of the Rancho Estates' water pump. He was engaged,
however, not as an employee, but as a service contractor, at an agreed
decision of the Labor Arbiter and held instead that the complaint was
properly filed as an employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and private respondent.
Petitioner reprises the stand it assumed below that it never had any
employer-employee relationship with private respondent, this being an
express agreement between them in the agency contracts, particularly
reinforced by the stipulation therein that De los Reyes was allowed
discretion to devise ways and means to fulfill his obligations as agent
and would be paid commission fees based on his actual output. It
further insists that the nature of this work status as described in the
contracts had already been squarely resolved by the Court in the
earlier case ofInsular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC and
Basiao where the complainant therein, Melecio Basiao, was similarly
situated as respondent De los Reyes in that he was appointed first as
an agent and then promoted as agency manager, and the contracts
under which he was appointed contained terms and conditions identical
to those of Delos Reyes. Petitioner concludes that since Basiao was
declared by the Court to be an independent contractor and not an
employee of petitioner, there should be no reason why the status of De
los Reyes hereinvis-a-vis petitioner should not be similarly determined.
3
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 17 June 1994 respondent Labor Arbiter dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 03-0309-94 filed by private
respondent Pantaleon de los Reyes against petitioner Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. (INSULAR LIFE), for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of salaries and back wages after finding no employeremployee relationship between De los Reyes and petitioner INSULAR
LIFE. On appeal by private respondent, the order of dismissal was
reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
ruled that respondent De los Reyes was an employee of
petitioner. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for hearing on the
merits.
1
Seeking relief through this special civil action for certiorari with prayer
for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner now
comes to us praying for annulment of the decision of respondent NLRC
dated 3 March 1995 and its Order dated 6 April 1995 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the decision. It faults NLRC for acting
without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when, contrary
to established facts and pertinent law and jurisprudence, it reversed the
whenever he was not in the field; (c) paying private respondent during
the period of twelve (12) months of his appointment as Acting Unit
Manager the amount of P1,500.00 as Unit Development Financing of
which 20% formed his salary and the rest, i.e., 80%, as advance of his
expected commissions; and, (d) promising that upon completion of
certain requirements, he would be promoted to Unit Manager with the
right of petitioner to revert him to agent status when warranted.
Parenthetically, both petitioner and respondent NLRC treated the
agency contract and the management contract entered into between
petitioner and De los Reyes as contracts of agency. We however hold
otherwise. Unquestionably there exist major distinctions between the
two agreements. While the first has the earmarks of an agency
contract, the second is far removed from the concept of agency in that
provided therein are conditionalities that indicate an employeremployee relationship. The NLRC therefore was correct in finding that
private respondent was an employee of petitioner, but this holds true
only insofar as the management contract is concerned. In view thereof,
the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case..
It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee relationship
cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management
contract and providing therein that the "employee" is an independent
contractor when the terms of the agreement clearly show otherwise.
For, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by
law and not by what the parties say it should be. In determining the
status of the management contract, the "four-fold test" on employment
earlier mentioned has to be applied.
7
xxx
xxx
But we are not convinced that the cited case is on all fours with the
case at bar. In Basiao, the agent was appointed Agency Manager
under an Agency Manager Contract. To implement his end of the
agreement, Melecio Basiao organized an agency office to which he
gave the name M. Basiao and Associates. The Agency Manager
Contract practically contained the same terms and conditions as the
Agency Contract earlier entered into, and the Court observed that,
"drawn from the terms of the contract they had entered into, (which)
either expressly or by necessary implication, Basiao (was) made the
master of his own time and selling methods, left to his own judgment
the time, place and means of soliciting insurance, set no
accomplishment quotas and compensated him on the bases of results
obtained. He was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours
or report to any regular station; he could seek and work on his
prospects anywhere and at anytime he chose to and was free to adopt
the selling methods he deemed most effective." Upon these premises,
Basiao was considered as agent an independent contractor of
petitioner INSULAR LIFE.
Unlike Basiao, herein respondent De los Reyes was appointed Acting
Unit Manager, not agency manager. There is no evidence that to
implement his obligations under the management contract, De los
Reyes had organized an office. Petitioner in fact has admitted that it
provided De los Reyes a place and a table at its office where he
reported for and worked whenever he was not out in the field. Placed
under petitioner's Cebu District Service Office, the unit was given a
name by petitioner De los Reyes and Associates and assigned
Code No. 11753 and Recruitment No. 109398. Under the managership
contract, De los Reyes was obliged to work exclusively for petitioner in
life insurance solicitation and was imposed premium production quotas.
Of course, the acting unit manager could not underwrite other lines of
insurance because his Permanent Certificate of Authority was for life
insurance only and for no other. He was proscribed from accepting a
managerial or supervisory position in any other office including the
government without the written consent of petitioner. De los Reyes
could only be promoted to permanent unit manager if he met certain
law and the evidence, but the same was denied by the industrial
court en banc.
1awphl.nt
In compliance with the order of the court, the Examining Division of the
Court of Industrial Relations submitted a report in which it stated that
the amount due the employees as additional compensation for
overtime and night services rendered from January to December 31,
1958 was P32,950.69. The management filed its objection to the report
on the ground that it included 22 names of employees who were not
employees of the Pines Hotel at the time the petition was filed so that
insofar as said employees are concerned the petition merely involves a
money claim which comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The trial judge, however, overruled this objection holding that, while the
22 employees were actually not in the service at the time of the filing of
the petition, they were however subsequently employed even during
the pendency of the incident, and so their claim comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Hence, the present
petition for review.
There is no merit in this appeal it appearing that while it is true that the
22 employees whose claim is objected to were not actually in the
service at the time the instant petition was filed, they were however,
subsequently reemployed even while the present incident was pending
consideration by the trial court. Moreover, it appears that the
questioned employees were never separated from the service. Their
status is that of regular seasonal employees who are called to work
from time to time, mostly during summer season. The nature of their
relationship with the hotel is such that during off season they are
temporarily laid off but during summer season they are re-employed, or
when their services may be needed. They are not strictly speaking
separated from the service but are merely considered as on leave of
absence without pay until they are re-employed. Their employment
relationship is never severed but only suspended. As such, these
employees can be considered as in the regular employment of the
hotel.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.
INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL-AGRICULTURAL WORKERS'
ORGANIZATION (ICAWO), petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE
PILAR and/or ANTONIO BELZARENA as Manager, CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DE PILAR ALLIED WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(CAPAWA), respondents-appellees.
A. Velez for the petitioner.
Tirol and Tirol for the respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No.
44-ULP-Iloilo) dismissing charges for unfair labor practice.
On 9 February 1956, the petitioner, Industrial-Commercial-Agricultural
Workers' Organization (hereinafter referred to as the "ICAWO"),
declared a strike against the respondent Central Azucarera de Pilar.
The strike was amicably settled the following day, and among the
provisions of the "Amicable Settlement" (Exhibit "C") reads:
That the company shall not discriminate against any worker and
the same treatment shall be accorded to workers (ICAWO
affiliates) who declared a strike or not. A petition for Certification
Election will be filed by the ICAWO in view of the other labor
union, CAPAWA, with whom the company has an existing
collective bargaining contract, a union which is considered by
the ICAWO as a company union.
because there was no work for these seasonal workers during the offseason, from March to October. Moreover, the seat of the prosecutor's
office was in Cebu, not in Panay, and a certification election had
intervened to absorb the attention of the complainants.
For the foregoing reasons, the resolution under review is hereby set
aside, and the court of origin is directed to order the reinstatement of
the 101 seasonal workers to their former positions in the respondent
sugar milling company.
With regard to the petitioners' claim for backpay, this matter should be
threshed out in the court below where the parties must be given
opportunity to submit evidence to prove or disprove the employer's
good faith as well as the amounts that petitioners have earned or
should have earned during their wrongful lay off, such amounts being
deductible from the backpay due to petitioners (National Labor Union
vs. Zip Venetian Blind Co., L-15827, 31 May 1961; Aboitiz & Co. vs.
C.I.R., L-8418, 29 Nov. 1962).
Let the records be returned to the Court of Industrial Relations for
further proceedings, in consonance with this opinion. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., is on leave.
RESOLUTION
August 23, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Respondents Central Azucarera de Pilar and its manager have asked
this Court to reconsider and reverse its decision of March 31, 1966.
They insist that the seasonal character of the milling activities of the
respondent Central each year necessarily implies that the employment
of petitioners ceases after each milling season.
We do not find this position tenable. The cessation of the Central's
milling activities at the end of the season is certainly not permanent or
definitive; it is a foreseeable suspension of work, and both Central and
laborers have reason to expect that such activities will be resumed, as
they are in fact resumed, when sugar cane ripe for milling is again
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of
the decision of the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations dismissing
their complaint of unfair labor practices against respondents San Diego
Fishery Enterprises, Inc., Bartolome A. San Diego and Anatolio Llido.
Petitioners Francisco Visayas and Ambrocio Bergado, who were
dismissed by respondent corporation likewise pray that they be granted
backwages from the date of their dismissal on May 9, 1958.
Respondent San Diego Fishery Enterprises, Inc. is a domestic
corporation engaged in deep-sea fishing and respondents Bartolome A.
San Diego and Anatolio Llido are the manager and an employee
thereof while petitioners Philippine Fishing Boat Officers and Engineers
Union and Samahan ng Mangdaragat sa Filipinas are duly registered
labor unions. Petitioners Francisco Visayas and Ambrocio Bergado
were the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the first named
union. The Philippine Fishing Boat Officers and Engineers Union is
composed of officers and engineers, while Samahan ng Mangdaragat
sa Filipinas is composed of crew members, in the employ of
respondent corporation.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC
performs governmental functions and not proprietary ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its
amended articles of incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is
organized is to assist and carry out the coordinated
massive housing program of the government, principally
but not limited to low-cost housing with the integration
cooperation and assistance of all governmental
agencies concerned, through the carrying on of any or
all the following activities:
l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands
for the purpose of construction and building therein
preferably low-cost housing so as to provide decent and
durable dwelling for the greatest number of inhabitants
in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social
and economic community growth through the
establishment of general physical plans for urban,
suburban and metropolitan areas to be characterized by
efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects
of the government for the establishment of nationwide
and massive low cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and
technical studies of the development and promotion of
construction of houses and buildings of sound
standards of design liability, durability, safety, comfort
and size for improvement of the architectural and
engineering designs and utility of houses and buildings
with the utilization of new and/or native materials
economics in material and construction, distribution,
assembly and construction and of applying advanced
housing and building technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of lowcost housing privately or cooperatively owned water
general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the
Constitutional Convention discussed only corporations created by
special law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner
NHC from civil service coverage. As stated in the cited speech
delivered during the convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all
government corporations then in existence were organized under
special laws or charters. The convention delegates could not possibly
discuss government-owned or controlled corporations which were still
non-existent or about whose existence they were unaware.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify
the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all
possible and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case
refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled
entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the
government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment
on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to
this Court.
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a
circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the
Constitution It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to
create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code
funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could
create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations
would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would
be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by
the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on
Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints
of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service
employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled
corporations could be created, no longer by special charters, but
through incorporation under the general law. The constitutional
amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil
service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation
cannot be allowed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case
before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L.
PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988
EUGENIA C. CREDO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL
SERVICES CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, respondents.
The Chief Legal Counsel for respondents NASECO and Arturo L.
Perez.
Melchor R. Flores for petitioner Eugenia C. Credo.
PADILLA, J.:
Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the
decision * of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. 11-4944-83
dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions for
reconsideration of said decision.
July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then
Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records, on
10 March 1980. 1
Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively
charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project
and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her noncompliance with Lloren's memorandum, dated 11 October 1983,
regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of
Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not comply
with Lloren's instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks
in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo] was called
by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo]
showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting
and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her coemployees." 2
On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then
Acting General Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez
and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the
administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the
same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days,
effective 8 November 1983. 3
Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983,
Credo filed a complaint, docketed as Case No. 114944-83, with the
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and
Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forced leave,
without due process. 4
Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983,
NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated
a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her. 5 As
a result of this deliberation, said committee resolved:
1. That, respondent [Credo] committed the following
offenses in the Code of Discipline, viz:
OFFENSE vs. Company Interest & Policies
No. 3 Any discourteous act to customer, officer and
employee of client company or officer of the
Corporation.
separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of
service. 11
Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendered a
decision: 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former
position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months'
backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's
fees, moral and exemplary damages. As a consequence, both parties
filed their respective motions for reconsideration, 12 which the NLRC
denied in a resolution of 16 January 1985. 13
Hence, the present recourse by both parties. In G.R. No. 68970,
petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive
portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's
reinstatement with backwages. 14 Petitioners contend that in arriving at
said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
finding that: 1) petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on
termination, 2) petitioners failed in the burden of proving that the
termination of Credo was for a valid or authorized cause, 3) the alleged
infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could
be considered to have been condoned by petitioners, and 4) the
termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. 15
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as
grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November
1984 decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages and limited her right to backwages to only six (6)
months. 16
As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss
employees for just causes, the law provides that:
Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting
the grounds for his dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may
answer the allegations stated against him in the notice
In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in
effecting Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the
chance to explain her side" of the charges filed against her, this chance
was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credo's right to
security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance
with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to
afford her a chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a
day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements
aforementioned.
The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or
the decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made
effective 1 December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on
terminating her services when she was informed on 1 December 1983
of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO
thought of affording her after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro
forma or an exercise in futility.
terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are not
disputed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The applicability to private respondent Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66
of the Election Code is what is chiefly involved in the case at bar. Said
section reads as follows:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or
position. Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the
Philippine National Oil Co., from September 17, 1981, when he was
hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his employment was
Petitioner PNOC-EDC argues that at the time that Pineda filed his
certificate of candidacy for municipal councilor in November, 1987, the
case law "applicable as far as coverage of government-owned or
controlled corporations are concerned . . . ( was to the following
effect): 18
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
issue of jurisdiction had been resolved in a string of
cases starting with the National Housing Authority
vs. Juco (134 SCRA 172) followed byMetropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez (143
SCRA 602) and the comparatively recent case
of Quimpo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72553, Dec. 2,
1986) in whichthis Court squarely ruled that PNOC
subsidiaries, whether or not originally created as
government-owned or controlled corporations are
governed by the Civil Service Law.
This doctrine, petitioner further argues, was not "automatically
reversed" by the 1987 Constitution because not "amended or repealed
by the Supreme Court or the Congress;" 19 and this Court's decision in
November, 1988, inNational Service Corporation vs. NLRC, supra 20
abandoning the Juco ruling "cannot be given retroactive effect . . . (in
view of ) the time-honored principle . . . that laws (judicial decisions
included) shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided
(Articles 4 and 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines)."
Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a governmentowned or controlled corporation does not lose its character as such
because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the
general law. If a corporation's capital stock is owned by the
Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged with
the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been
organized, it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even if
organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute;
and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by
the Labor Code, are nonetheless "employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations," and come within the letter of Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned from . . .
office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter,
and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the
Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for
termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor
Code, as amended.
The conclusions here reached make unnecessary discussion and
resolution of the other issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated April 24, 1991
and its Resolution dated June 21, 1991 are NULLIFIED AND SET
ASIDE; and the complaint of Manuel S. Pineda is DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Through this Petition for Certiorari, Philippine National Oil CompanyEnergy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) seeks to declare null
and void, for lack of jurisdiction, the Order of public respondent, the
Deputy Minister of Labor, sustaining his jurisdiction over the instant
controversy.
Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC). On 20 January 1978, it filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City (MOLE), a
clearance application to dismiss/ terminate the services of private
respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.
The application for clearance was premised on Ellelina's alleged
commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a Christmas
party on 19 December 1977 at petitioner's camp in Uling, Cebu, when,
because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize
corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite
rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning shots
fired by the latter.
Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but was
subsequently revoked and petitioner was ordered to reinstate Ellelina
Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in determining
whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the
Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions
while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not
within its coverage.
In NASECO vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 69870, November 29,1988), we had
occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not
the employees of NASECO (a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is in turn a
subsidiary wholly-owned by the PNB, a government-owned
corporation) are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code
notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973
Constitution was still in effect. We held that the NLRC has jurisdiction
over the employees of NASECO "on the premise that it is the 1987
Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the
time of decision;" and that being a corporation without an original
charter, the employees of NASECO are subject to the provisions of the
Labor Code.
We see no reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.
However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show
cause why its Certificate of Registration should not be suspended for:
(a) failure to submit the General Information Sheet from 1981 to 1987;
(b) failure to submit its Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c)
failure to register its Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a
continuous period of at least five (5) years since September 27, 1967.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated January 30, 1989, the
NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department) of Tourism and
provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on
Audit.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88- 44048
praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private
respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the
petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.
The key issue in this case is whether the petitioner, National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private
corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to
strike.
This issue came about because although the NPDC was originally
created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive
Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and
other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks
Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September
21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The
National Parks Development Committee, Inc."