Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Court of Appeals
Manila
SPS.
ROLAND0
and
FLORDELIZA VERZOSA,
Members:
Applicants-Appellees,
*
versus
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
**
PUNZALAN-CASTILLO, and
ROSARIO, JJ.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
Public Oppositor-Appellant,
March 31, 2009
WILFREDO SISON,
Private Oppositor-Appellant.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
ROSARIO, J.:
**
For their part, the spouses Verzosa deny that the subject
property is foreshore land, as defined by jurisprudence, because it is
6
7
Rollo, p. 96.
Id., at pp. 41-42.
far from the seashore and is not alternately wet and dry , depending
on the flow of the tides. Moreover, the spouses Verzosa rely on the
strength of a Certification8 dated 17 May 2001 of the previous CENR
officer of Dagupan City, to the effect that:
This area is located along the beach of Lingayen but far
from the foreshore area and it is not within timberland or
public forest per L.C. Map No. 698 certified on November 21,
1927, it appears that there is no timberland or forestland within the
Municipality of Lingayen.
xxx
xxx
8
9
Exhibit B-1.
Rollo, pp. 200-201.
Director of Lands10 as
"that part of the land immediately in front of the shore; the
part which is between high and low water marks, and alternately
covered with water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It
is indicated by a middle line between the highest and lowest tides."
From the definition given by the Supreme Court over the years,
it is clear that foreshore land is only that portion of the shore that is
covered and uncovered by the action of the tides. On the other hand,
land accreted by sea action could encompass a bigger area,
6724-R, 49 O.G. No. 5, p. 1863 [1953].
L-21870, 3 February 1965.
12
L-22669, 3 February 1965.
13
131 SCRA 532, 539 [1984].
10
11
preferential right.
In this case, since the spouses Verzosa are not littoral owners,
17
18
10
they may not benefit from the preference to lease foreshore land from
the government, under paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, given to owners of land adjacent to foreshore land.
In contrast, Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters19 allows a
littoral owner the right to acquire accretions from the sea but only
upon declaration by the government that the same is no longer
necessary for public use. Thus
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners
of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
11
the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action
of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for
the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard
services.20
In any event, even if the executive or legislative department
were to declare the disputed land as qualified to become private
property, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, only
the littoral owner may benefit from such a declaration. Since the
spouses Verzosa are not littoral owners
or owners of property
Heirs of Navarro vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, 12 February 1997.
12
SO ORDERED.
RICARDO R. ROSARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARIFLOR PUNZALAN-CASTILLO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Special Seventh Division
RRR/acn(em)