PETER FIBJGER BANG

IMPERIAL BAZAAR:
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF MARKETS
TNTHEROMAN EMPIRE

Accor<lin, to thl! Jl(ltural ('()ur$1' of thing:(. th('r<fof(!,

the greatr part of tht COtlital t){tt'ery growing society
is first. dircted to Clgriculture, afterwards to
manufacrurrs. and last ofall tofo"ign commerct... IJUJ
though this n(lllllra ordr oftltings tnust hule toke11

plilCe in some de1.rt ut ewry such SIX:iny. it lfiJS. in till

th modern srotes of 1tro Hen. in man.\ respts.

nn'rely imrtd.. . Th mannt'rs and customs 'M:/rich the
naruu o f their original RO\'ernmenr inrrodurtd...
ntcessnrily jorctd them into this unn(Jturaf mu/
retrograde order"

Adarn Smith

There it is. the e ssential argument of An Inquiry into the Nawre and
Causes ofthe IVea/tlt ofNations. the found ing charter of modern economic
theory (1776) 1 Within these few sentences. Adam Smith condensed his
views on tbe ideal economic order of society and the contrary course taken
by economic history. This paper is about the fundamental ideas which
shape our conception of markets. Perhaps it will come as no small surprise
that the a postl e of free trade>> saw his call for laissez jCire, not as a
method for boosting the merchant classes, but as a means to restoring
agriculture, in the British society of his own day. to its natural and
historical position of p rimacy . It is cert ainly not what his latterday
disciples in the business schools ha,e in mind when they advocate giving
the market a free rein.

1 A. Smith. An Inquiry into 1h Nantr and Causes ofthr U'ctllrlr ofNarions. R. H. Campbcll.
A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (eds.}, Glasgow &liu'on of tJrt HrJ:s tmd Correspo11drnrt! t{
At/am Smith, l-IT. Oxford 1976. I. 380.

52

PETER FrBTCl!R UANG

The doctrine of the Scottisb economist an d pr o fes sor of m oral phi losophy,

however, was offered in re futatio n of metca nti lism . Mercamilism is the

converuent modem shon-hand for the numerous active strategies pursued by
Lhe early modern European nation-states in <Jrder deliberately to promote trade
and manufacturing , To achieve this goal, govemment:s d e veloped an arsenal of
s comprise d such diverse measures as the granting of priv il e ges
tools. The e

and m onopolies, protectionist regulations of importS, export substitution and

even m i litary action. As Smith sa"' it, these economic instruments perverted
th e allocation of eco nom ic resources and diverted th em from their most
efficient use. The special interestS of merchants had been unduly favoured to
the detriment of society. By abo l i shing <<the mercantile system, Srruth
counselled, the government would enable the free play of market forces to
restore the economy 10 its natural and hence optimum balance. The resuil
would be greater wealth and faster and more stabl e growth than any active
manipulation of the e.conomy by the state could ever hope to achieve.
The excerpt from The Wealth of Nations marks a defining moment, not

only in economic theory, but also in historical scholarhip. With his analysi s
s

Smith i nadvertently raised one of the g reat que stions of pre-modem econorruc
his tory: the relationship between land and commerce /)efore the age of
industry. The qu es ti on has continued to b e devil scholars ever since. This
paper attempts to lay bare the. foundations of this problem and offers a
thorough re-examination in relation to trade in the Roman Empire. It opens by
discussing the terms which Smith set for tbe ongoing debate and po ints to
institutional ecooorrucs as an alternative set of concepts which allows the

historian t o transcend th e dichotomy between mercantilism and markets,

between institution al power and the undisturbed play of economic forces, at
the heart of Smith's an alysis . The result is an approach that enables the
historian to account for market im p erfections in Lhe Roman world. The three
following sections, the secon d part of the paper, describe tbe important
s pe of
influence of imperfection s and i.rrcg u l arities on Lhe functioning and ha

markets in th e empire. The final concludi ng section suggests tbe bazaar, rather
than the cap ital i st market, as a com parative model for the marke t regime
produced by tbe Roman Empire .

J, Analysing markets in an agrarian set.ting

The relati onship between land and commerce in the prc-i nduStrial wo.rld
was central to both Marx and Weber. To th em it posed a pro blem of the
transition from feudalism to cp italism , from the agrdfian , a istocratic world
r

IMPERIALBAZAAR

53

to modern commercial society:. Intense discussions have followed.

Primilivisrs versus modemisrs in classics, Dolbb versus Sweezy and rhe
Brenner-debare wirbin rhc broad current of Marxist historical scholarship,
these controversies are but some prominent examples that now occupy a
central posirion within 20"' century hisroriograph.y ' 111ese debates revolved
nround the problem of the origins and dcvelopmem of capitalism in Europe.
As third world hisroriographics have e,olved. the analytical scope has
widened and moved closer to Weber's original comparative concerns.
Extensive markets can be found in several. complex. prc-induslrial societies.
Graeco-Roman Anriquiry. the world of Islam. India and the Indian Ocean
wol'ld as well as imperial China. frequently thought of as epitomes of agrarian
stagnation , all have considerable commercial developments 10 show.
The basic questi on has 1herefore received a slight change of emphasis. It is
now les s a maner of rhe growth. i n one part of rhe world. of commercial
society per se. The burning issue is rather bow 10 account for commercial
processes in differem complex agmrian societies. Are they necessarily ro be
tal.en as signs of incipient capiralism" Is unrivalled agricullural dominance in
society really compariblc with the g.rowth and development of an ever
deepening commercially inregrated marker sysrem of the kind we fi n d in 17"
and 18'' century Europe on the brink of the indusrrial revoluti on ? Even on

' M. Weber. e.g.. Agmnrrhli/tn;,\'Se im Alterrum. G.smnmeltt AII[Silt:e zur So:.ial- und
\VirtschaftsRschichre. Tilbingen 1924. 1188; Wimchtift und Ge.,dl.<rilaft. Tiibingcn 1972.

6lS-S3. Mar.c in his own lifc1imc. focu....OO on capitalism \Vbcrca' hi' vie"s on pore-capitalist
<OCietie> were ooly sketchily presenrcd. The p<>srhumoos publicouon in 1939140 and 1953.
thc:reforc. of lbc unridged m3nu.script to Gmndriss dt'r Kritik dr PoliJscht'n Okonnmi<
whete prc..capitalist MK:ieti raxh'Cd fuller U'Caonent. sparked tcne\\ed activity. Among lhc
n:-..-.u lt.s '-'ete E. Hobsbawm (eel.). Karl Man: Prapitalisr cmu11ic Fornwions. Loodon 1964
and P. Anders<lCl. Lina..s of''" Absol,.rist Stat<, London 197. A. Sehiovone. The 1W1ofth
P<lSt. PriJKCion 2QOO for a recent example of the cros..-fertili.ation or Marx.ist nod Weberian
lhougha in Roman economic hi10ry. N. Morley. PoJirica{ colf.()my mu/ Classical Antiq11iry,
Jlll. 59.1 (t998), 95114 for a trclltment of classical p<>litic:tl cconQmy. Maaism. Weber and
the study of nciem economic hbaory.
J M. 1. Finlcy, The /Jiit;htrMCJ"tr Conrrcweny. New York 1979 (oollc.."CCs the papers which
initi;ucd the battle belwccn primitivisls nnd modernists). P. F'. 13t\ng. Antiquity betwet>n
'prtmitiisnr and modrrnism www.hum.aau.dkldklcl-ufturf!DOCS/PUB/pfb/antiquily .him..
A:trhus 1997 for an analysis of the ill l:tSting influence of this ck:b.11e on the field of ruxicnl
cconomk hiSIOI)'. R. Hihon (cd.). n. Transiti()nfrom Fudnlism lf1 Capitalism. London 1976
>nd T. H. Aston >nd C. 11. E. Ptulpin (C<b.). Tk Brnnr Dbtll<. Cambndgc 1985 oollec< !he

M:ux1 controversies.
1. Rodinson. Islam n Capitalism. P:l:ris 1966: 1. Ehin. 17te Pauun ofth Chines Past.

Stanford 1973: K. :-1. Chaudhuti. Mlt Bqor< /;11roJ)<. Cambridge 1990: J. Goody, Th< East in
th Wsl. Cambddge 1996: R. Bin Wong. Chine Transfi,rnJPd,ilhaca 1997: K. Poroeranz. Tht>
Grat Divagence. Princeton 2000 nnd H. Plckct. Wirtschafl. in F. Vittjnghoff (red.),
Europtlischc WirrschCI/ts- unci So:.ialge$chichft> ilf der ROmischen Kai.rtr:J!il. Sluttgan 1990, 25160.

54

PETER FlBJGER BANG

Smith's own tem1s the answer was never straightforward. The prob lem was
thm the e mer genc e and spec tacular growth of the capitalist world-system, as
Smith observed, bad been closely linked with the unnaturally, today we would
say unusually, favoured pos ition of commercial interests in European states.

There was more

to

economic history than tbe doctrine of laissez-faire. The

development of European markets had occurred i.n a context which was

frequently averse to its basic tenets. The Wealth of Nations, therefore,
contained a Sti'Ong unresolved tension. Historical interpretation ran counrer to

market theory.
As a result the market h as remained a very ho t potato in the study of pre
modcrn societies. Ooe group of scholars has ibeen most im pr e ssed by Smith's
historical observations. They have emphasised the prepon der anc e of a
l nded
interest before the early modem period in Eur opean hist ory an d co nseq uentl y
tended to r eleg at e t.he market to the margins of the analysis. Here we find
substantivism and Pola ny i in an thro p ology , primitivism a n d Finley io
i mes referred to as formalists or modernists. have on
classics 5. Others, o
s met
the contrary paid less attention to the historical primacy of agriculture and
been most struck b y Smith's belief in the market as rhe central organising
princ iple of t he economy. They have focused on identify ing market trade and
from there proceeded to stress its ab il it y to produce economic conditions very
c losely resembling the capitalist integration of the early modem European
. is of the CCOnomy of the Roman Empire is
world. Harry Pleket's 1990-synt!Jes
th e best argued attempt, so far, by a classicist 'tO take this position.
More recent examples of this trend include the economist Peter Temin's
discussion of the market in the Roman empire 1 Against Fioley, he asse11s that
the Roman economy should, indeed, primarily be regarded as a market
economy. Temin's case, however, rests on little more than th e w ide s pr ead
existence of prices and markets within t h e empire. This. in his eyes,
con stitutes sufficient evidence that the imperial e conomy was organised as an
interconnected market system resembling Europe and the Americas in the 18"
ce nt ury But t his is to jump to conclusions$. Fioley happened to be among the
.

s K. Polanyi K.

Arensberg, T 1. Pearoo (cd.). 1iodt and Morkts i11 rh &1rly Empire,s, New

Yorl: 1957: M. I. Finlcy. The Ancient &onomy. 2"' ed.. l.ondon 1985.
H. l'leket, \Vimchaft cit .. 25-tGO.

7 P. Temin, A Marker Economy in th Early Roman E.mpire.JRS, 91 (2001), 169-81.

'Temjo's style of argurnern may be surmised from two exm

a
ples. \VhlJe admining that
probably more than hairof production was C()llmned within peasant households. he still iJ:..sists
that t h e marKet was the main mcch;mism for all ocatjng ccunornic resoutce..o.;. For pcasan1household production and own consumption merely mea.n that moSt of each farm's o.\Ctivitics:
were devoted to maintaining its work force (p. l80). Tbc corollary of tbis observation.
however. OJU$1 be thou pcasarH farms cannot be seen priJnariJy as firms. Such peasant

55

JMPERIAL BAZAAR

first to criticise Polanyi's more orthodox brand of primitivism for grossly

underestimating the extent of market formation in classical antiquity . His
point, however, was that this process did not come with any strong
modernising drive t o re-organise the economy into a conglomeration of
interdependent markets. Antiquity, dominated a s it was by aristocratic values
and politics rather than bourgeois commercialism, remained a r.raditional,
agrarian society which was eventually transformed into the medieval world 10

Traditional, in this context however, should oot be confused with simple or

primitive. The argument is about complex peasant societies characterised by
urbanisation. clites aod state-formation. The division of labour undeq:>ins me
structure of such societies; specialisation of functions and ma.rket5 are an

integral pa.rt of their institutional set-up 11 But this form of society is as old as
civilisation, whicb began to emerge in rbe late fourth, early third millermu
i m
BC in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Capitalism and economic modernisation, on
the other tland. arc much more recent historical phenomena, gaining
momemum as

traosformative forces only in tbc: 17"' or perhaps 16th century.

Tbey are not identical with the developmem of social complexity as such, let
alone marketsu. The challenge.rherefore. i s to develop an analysis of markets

households did not depend on the market for their Ji,rcJ i hoods . Ac mos t they derived a
..,Opplementary income from m:,rket acttvitie.s. r1le market. in other words. was subject to a
number of other. probab ly more important allocation mechanisms. ApaJ1 from the pca:.mt
household. the po l i tical ex ploi tation of empire must bve !\if:.rliticarltly circumscribed the
influence of the market {on this . P. F. Bang. Ronwns and /1-fughals. &:onomk Jnu:gralion in a
TribuUJry Empire. io 1,.. de Blois aod 1. Rich (eds.), The Tra11s.(ormation ofEconomk Uft under
the Roman Empire, Ams te rda m 2002. 1-27). But ag:.i o,. Temin plays down this aspect of

cconollliC allocation i n the Roman world. Extortionate r.-llCS o r interest rer)()rled by Cicero in
c.:OOI)ecion wilh Rornan tnxmion in the pr ovi nc es arc cit:cd as evidt."nCt- that "''he va riati on
shows th:H these loans were rlOt reciprocal exchange at :J fixed rate; they were market
exchmgcs. (p. 174). Quite 1hc reverse, these interest tates were the result of monopolistic
abuse of political power. not market prices. In or).; of Temirfs cases. Brurus: famously had
/\tticus apply pressure on Ciccro. then serving as governor. to supply ;;oldietS to force Salami s
tO p3y UJ> in one of BrurlLo; il1 ici1 deals. against Cice.co's publkly stltcd poUcics (Cic. Att. 5. 21,

10-13: 6. I. 3-8: 6, 2. 7-9).

0 t-.1. L Finlcy.Arisrotle ami Economic An(l/ysis, P&P. 47

r<;

(1970).3-25.

M. 1. Finley.Ailcic>m Economy cit chapters 1 and 6.

11 R.
Din Wong. China Transformed cit . . 17-22 has coined the 1cm1 S.milhian dynamics to
describe the coo1mon economic processes of civilised peas.ant socictit'S. This is an iEne-re.sting
idc:t. btt i t seems to me to produce too narrow a conception of the character of spccialisatiOEl in
these sociotl form;tt ions . as is dear from K. Pomeranz,. Grat DNrgeml! cit .. ::tttcmpt to
develop the idea. PreindustriaJ specialisa6on did not only re)\t on ma(ket forces. Political.
religious and military fonns of powu weE'(;. even more imponanl . h was the lauer kinds of
soci:..t for e
c s which t>rovjdcd the b asis of aristocracies and r eligious institutions - the two
dominant kinds of speca
i lisat ion in the <grarian world. ror some fundamentaJ observations P.
Crone. Pre-Jndustri<ll Socieri-Rs. Anatomy of th<' Pn:ft1odern ltorld. Oxford 2003. introduction
compJemented b y chaps. 13.
l:: J. G()()(fy. East in The Usr cit. ten ds to make this assumption. as does Ple.ket. Winschaft
.

56

PETER FlBfGER BANG

which will rid them of the modernising expectations comained in Smitb's

paradigmatic analysis. In effect the <juestion wbicb Smith left us to consider
was what a market regime would look like which was domrnated, not by the
,

-r

capitalist entrepreneur and middle-man so familiar from early modern

European history, but by landed interests.
Classics has seen one recent radical ancmpt

to

solve this problem: The

Corrupting Sea by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell " The title is
polemical. Ancient moralists frequent!y frowned on the corrupting influence
of the sea. merchants and money on the stable, aristocratic order of sociery;
the power of money undermined respect for <<oarural>> social hierarchies. Such
tirades have been taken as testimony of the marginal importance of exchange
to life in the classical world. They should rather be ascribed ro wishful
think.ing, according to Horden & PurceJL Extreme geographic variation and
erratic rainfall combined in the Mediterranean to make self-sufficiency in
agricultural products virtually impossible. Harvest returns fluctuated too much
to make autarky a viable strategy of survival. Instead peasants had to counter
the risks of agriculture by diversifying production and engaging in exchange
processes with wider networks. That way, one year's shortfall could be
exchanged for the next year's surplus. Sustainable agriculture, in other words,
relied heavily on markets to complement production of individual households
and localities. Tbc Mediterranean was crucial to this system. 1l1e (corrupting)
sea provided cheap and easy transport which invested the region with a
fundamental connectivity that enabled an ecological equilibriwn to emerge
between the numerous, small communities of the Mediterranean world. They
were united in an organic state of complementary ecological interdependence.
in the vision of Hordeo and PurceU ".
Tb.is is an ingenious solution to

an

old problem. But it faiIs to persuade.

Exchange and specialisation cannot be put down to ecological necessity alone.
not even primarily. They are no less a reflection of social and cultural
demands. Production of peasant households, as the authors are well aware, has
generally been subject to extensive extraneous claims from aristocracies.
religious institutions and states. Admittedly, such claims were not sustainable
without some attention to the ecological balance of the peasant household.

c:i1. C. A. Bayly, The Birth (f the Modem

1\i>rld, London 2003, 1483 fOt a balanced discussion

of the differences betweenagrariancomplexity and C<lpiraJism.

P 'P. Hordenand N. Pllrce11, The Corrupting Se(t. A srmly ofMediurrancwr History Oxford
20(X). B. Shaw, Challenging Braudel: a new vision cfthl! Mediterrane-an. JRA. 14 (200 1). 1-25
for some inhi:)l reflections. \V. V. Harrls (ed.). Rerhillkin. the Metliterranean. Oxford 2005

cona
t ins a scl of papers dodicated to the book.
1" P. Hordcnand N. PuroeU. Corrupting Sea cil., chaps. 4-6 and 9.

to.iPERJALB AZAAR

57

Othe rwise . its reproduction would have been jeopardised, as indeed it was in

o
s me instanc.es. But while social elites could not, in the long run. afford to be

completely indifferent to the well-being of agricul tural producers. they had no

interest in the lllOSt desirable ecological equilibrimm from the peasant poim of
view. Such an eq uilibrium ran counter to their ne ed for siphoning off a
substantial portion of production over and above the bare minimulll peasam
i cal
subsistence. Peasant production was shaped by politic al as well as ecolog
pressures, the former influencing in panicular the range. kind and amount of
products which left the househo.ld. This makes it very difficult to share in the
vision of Horden and Purcell of a traditional Mediterranean unity as arisi ng
out of an ecological equilibri um . One cannot a priori expect surpl us resources
of individual communities to find their way and complement each other in
response to ecological need. Demand was, to a considerable extent, sbaped or
distorted by po litical power. Economic inter dep endence was not simply a
reflection of organic, Durkheimiao co-operation. Exploitation and conflicting
interests were also a prominent part of the process 15.
11 is noticeable that economists in recent years have become increasingl y '
aware of this problem. The fom1erly unshakeable Smitbian belief in the ability
of the economy to reach its equilibrium state, inciden tall y common to
economics and ecology alike, has been considerably modified . lnstiMions,
some economists now argue, significan tly shape economic conditions and
determine bow m;trkets behave i.n practice 17 In 200 I, three economists were
awarded the Nobel Prize for demonstrating that in many circumstances
markets will behave contrary to the expectati o ns of traditional economic
tbeory according to which the free and undistur bed p lay of market forces i s
supposed t o be able to match supply and demand across individual locations
in a single unified market with iodiyjduaJ prices te nding to converge around
the same general price. This expectation, bowever, is based on the assump tion '11

IS P.
F. Bang. Tile Medit<'rranecur: A Corrupting Sta? A Review E.'ssay on Ec:Qfogy ami
History. An.thropology and Symhcsis. Ancient nsr & l:'ast.. 3.2 (2004). 385-399. for a more
e:<fended discussion md <.1 nal
v si s of Harden and PurceJJ's great work.. In De La (fivision du
trove if social. P ar is I 893. mile Durkheim famously chartcrc:rilied socicdcs b::.scd on
speciaJis<ltion, lhe divisio' of labour and the economiC integrati on of market exchang e as
organic . Produce-tS existed in a system of organi c. mutual interdependence.

I(>
Belief in equilibrium is common to both tmditional economics and ecologjcal t hinking.
The classical economists derived theit faith from ooru: other tban Aristotle (secK. G. Pcrsson.
Grain Markets in f;urope. J5{)()-J90Q. Cambridge 1999, 106).1t is the same Aristotel.ian notion
{cf. Politics I, 3. 1-18) of exchange as origoating
in natural. c ompl ementary Jleed.s which
i
underpin); llorden and Purccll's notion of inevitable redistribution where. tO cite 1he Greek

philoophcr, -the inhabitants of one c ouncry became more d.;:pendent on those of another. and
they impon cd whn they needed, and expol'ted what tbcy had too much of.
17 D. Nonh. Jnstimrions.lnstiturionLII Change and Econom-ic Perfomumce. QlJnbridge 1990.
.,

58

PETER r1UIGER BANG

t hat movement of goods and commercial activities between individual

markets is relatively frictionless. In practice. however, such movement oflcn
encounters considerable difficulties and obstacles and may only take place at
a high cost. if at all.
T h e three e c o n o mists h ave p a nicu.lar ly focused o n the effec1s o f

' information deficiencies. The classical market model requires economic actors
to have near perfect infonna1ion about conditions in other market places in
order to dclermine where best to bring their goods for sale. Often. however,

market wiJJ be far less transparent to the individual agents. Some will have
much bener infonna1ion than others. Such infonnmion asymmerries can. for
example. be used to explain why interest rates in Indian towns differ
significan tly from the usurious rates charged to peasants by the village
money-lender. Contrary to the banks. the money-lender is familiar with the
individual borrowers and can. therefore. much better assess the risk of
advancing a loan. 1he argum ent goes. lf a middleman should try 10 bring the
two credit markets together, due to his lack of local knowledge. be risks
auractin g all the bad payers and w o u l d quickly g o out of busi ness.
Consequently. the money-lender rests secure in his local monopoly and the
markeiS stay separate 1.
In many circumstances. 1he free play o f marke1 forces does not lead the
economy towards an equilibrium-state where resources are alloca1ed
effectively according to sup ply and demand. Imperfections. irregularities and
usymmerries in trading conditions enhance fr iction a n d hence 1ransac1ion
costs, I he costs of conducting business. When these arc high. it will often be
e ither very difficult. even outright impossible. or at least prohibitively
expensive to s y nch ronise developments in markets more closely. In I he
example. the focus was on asynnmetries in information. Other equally
imponant aspect to examine would include lhe effects of logistical prob lems

and ecological uncenainty. No less central. as we saw in the discussion of I he

Corrupti11g sa. are inequalities in social and political power. They .e_revent
economic actors from meeting on equal renns and may, for instance, be used
to force competi10rs to stay out of t h e market.
All three areas are of obvious inlcrest to the history of markets in pre
industrial societies like the Roman Empire. The empire certainly knew plenty
of asymmetrics. imperfections and irregularities across the spectrum from
logist ics to social power. These would have made the empire anything bul the

1 G. Akerlof. Tlr m(Oket for 'lemon,.,'. QJE. 8-1 (l970), 488-500. Conlr"d.sl Ternin's
confidence th:u in pitc of impcrfecrions the m:ut.c:c conditions under which prices tended lO t
c.'Ommon "alue were fulfilled in tbc c:ui) R001an Empire:. (Martn Economy cit.. 179).

59

fMPERIAI."8A7.A.AR

level and even playing field imagined, each in their own way, by scholars
such as Temin, Horden and PurceJJ. By suspending the automatic belief in the
achie.vemcm of economic or ecological equilibrium, institutional economics
provides the conceptual tools which enable the historian to transcend the
contradiction in Adarn Smith's original understanding of markets. Transaction
cost analysis makes it possible to explore how a set of institutions, constrained

by pre-industrial technology and dominated by agrarian ar stocratic interests,

i
affected the workings of markets in the Roman world and shapc.d the
ch<tntcter of economic integrati on in particular ways.

2, Market Imperfections in the Roman Empire

There is n o better place to start than with the possible effects of
irregularities and asymmetries i n transpmt and informatjoo. Irresp ec tive of
how one judges the finer details in our image of Roman tnmsport, it cannot be
doubted that the physical movement of goods and information remained a
serjous challenge, The numerous wrecks from Roman antiquity found by
diver s along the coasts of 1he Mediternmean ought to be a sufficient reminder

of this 1. Travel times, over longer distances, were both relatively slow and
irregular20 This could hardly have been any different since t raospon
technology was hig hl y sensitive towards changing weather conditions
especia lly at sea whe,c traffic slowed down considerably during the

dangerous winter months in the Medit erranean Trade across longer dis!ances,
.

therefore, tended to follow the pat.tcrn of seasonal changes. In the autumn it

almost came to a bah When the mariners>>. as Philo informs us, return from
their trading ports everywhere to their own harbours and roadsteads,
particularly those who take care not to winter in a forei gn couorry "

Seasonality of business exacerbated what Braudel described as rhe obstacle of

distance. Slow, irregular and periodica.lly discontinuous 1ranspor1 and
communication made it very difficult to match demand and supply across the
1" G. Parke r, A 11re
i n1 Sftipwrt:<:ks (if the Medi.tcrranean and the Roman Prodnus. Oxford
t992. F. Brnudel, The Medit<>rrane<m <ur.d the J\1/editerranean World in the Age <if Philip 11,
Lo ndon 1972. vol. J, pan I remains unswpassed a s a descipLion of the environ.mcnt. trnnsporl,
communication and tradi ng conditions i1l the pro-industrial Mediterranean. Some recent studies
from cJassics include J. Monoo. The R<Jle of the Physical Environmellt in Ancient Creek
.
200 I and M. M cC ormick. 'f}t(> Origin.t of the European tanomy.
Seaf(lring, Leide11
Cambridge 2001. cl>ps. 3-4 and 13-17.
R.l)uncan--Jones. Smtaun <md SC'aM in the Roman E<:onomy, Cambridge 1990. c.bap. J.
is the bcs1 Ulolysis of such irregularities in the Roman \\orld.
21 Philo . Leg. od Caium. l5. crans. F. H. Colson in Loe!J..

60

l'ET'ER FIOICr.R BANC

individual market places around the empire in an even, ste;ody and predictable
way. h was simply hard for merchants to respond with sufficient speed and
Oexibility to developments in other more distant markets. The trading season
might. for instance. have been over before an extra shipment of goods could
arrive in response to favourable

pric e s. As

a result. goods would normally

have met demand in uneven. not easily predictable. clusters. The problem is
aptly illustralcd from Apulcius' Golden Ass by the story !old by one of its
characters, a small trdcr. Having had news of the availability of some g ood
quality cheese at a very auractivc price i n a neighbouring area. he rushes t o
the place only to find that everything had sold out. His efforts had all com e to
noughtll.

The evidence of Apuleius \hould not be dismissed as anecdotal. lt reOccts

the expectations of anciem peoples to market performance based on their own
experience. Acting on wrong or out-of-date information which did not
correspon d to the actual situation in the market place on tbe rime of arrival
was an ever looming risk, not only for Roman. but for all pre-industrial
merchant. It was not just that the goods might have cleared on their arrival. A
large number of variations of the basic problem arc possible. Too many
competitors might on picldng up the same news Dock to the market and cause
the low price to increase violently so as to endanger the profitability of
maldng the trip in the firs! place. The opposite situations. with high prices
attracting too many sellers ruining it for each other or too few buyers turning
up causing a shortage of demand and tbe market to plummet well below
normal levels. were equally possible. These problems of unpredictability have

been documented

in

great detail by historians of other pre-modem societies

with access to a more abundantly nowing documentary record'"' Scattered

across the centuries from the republic to Iale antiquity, however. enough
material exists from the Roman world to place it within this basic scenario''
Egyptian business lenco-s confirm the problems of market uncertainty

experienced by merchants. One 4th ceorury letter contains the report of

" Apol. Mn

I. 5.

n ;ddition lO the work of 8r::aude1 a.lrcoldy ci1cd, one could .ncnrion S. D. Goitdn. A
Medizcrrc11ean So<:iery. Berl<clcy 1967. vol. I. port Ill. D-E & IV; K. N. Chaudhuri. Tratlctmd
CM/isorion in tM lndkm Oaan. Combridgc t985. chaps. 6 and 9 aJ1d A. Das ()upta. llldion
Merdtont.< and the Declineo[Surar, r.t71XJ-J750, W""oodcn 1979.
l'

2..1

Below l huvc ued evidence preserved mostly in (bu::.incs) letters from the l111 10 6111

century AD. As Lteb:' persuasively argues in this volume, in lcrm.(O ofcoromercia.lisation there
is oo big divide between enrly to hogh empire aJ1d )are >nljquity. For .omc rqoubli'"'n ex=plcs.
drawn mninly rrom historians and public or:uions. 1 refer to P. Erd.kamp, The Grah1 Marktt in
tJu: Romcm mpi. Cambridge 200 5. especially his treatment on pages 153 and 177 of Uv. 30.

38. 5

>nd Cic. Pro Rabirio 40.

61

Besodoro the commercial agent of a monastery: <<l will now tell you Doilos,
my lord father, about the goods which you have given me to sell. Great
stagnancy prevails here. One may make a contrary bid by only offering 4000
talents for any kind of commodity and I couldn't dispose of the goods witllout
consulting you. As for the sleeveless tunic, it has been damaged and I was
wholly unable to show it>>. On arrival in the market, trading was at a virtual
standstill and it proved impossible for Besodoro to obtain the prices expected
by his master. He had already suffered the loss of a damaged tunic and now he
sends for advice about the remaining goods >.s. A considerable delay would
follow before new instructions could arrive and his business, perhaps. be
concluded; and in the meaorime condition in rhe market might have changed,
making his new orders obs
olete even before they arrived. One option during
such a standstill is described in a letter preserved from the 5'' century. By the
grace of God J completed the disposal of Lhe sacks, by the love of our

Mart)'TS, the writer announces triumphantly. But then be proceed with tl1e
cau tionary observation: ..There is still a great shortage of business in
Alexandria. Several traders known to him had been less fortunate and had
now been sent on to Caesarea by their merchant rnasrers in hope, but not
cerrainty, of a better market "' Supply and demand were not easily paired.
Commerce could only react slowly to sudden market developments. Another

,
.,.._

illustration of this problem can be found in one of the administrative leners of

Cassiodorus. The state needed to make some requiitions from an area with
plentiful stocks. But it was out of season and tnere were few merchants in the
area. Therefore demand was at a low and people were forced to accept a very
unattractive price for rheir goods"
Connectivl!Y seems a distinctly misleading term to apply to this world. The
very fragmentation, appealed to by Horden and Purcell as necessitating
economic unity, would have been a serious, if not the biggest obsacle
t
to the
emergence of an economic equilibrium. Closely connected to the information
problems were logistical difficulties. A merchant might act on correct
information and still see his plans fall through. Hi shipment of goods might
be seriously delayed en route. It would, occasionally, be difficult to find a ship
15 P. land. I 00,

ll. 7-14 (the tenn used t o denote the suwdstjll of busines. is ix11jl<X'(ict).
reponed by P. Oslo ll, 63. 1. Hidcrato. Th Tramfer of Money ;n Roman
Egyp1. A Swtly o[bn91)lC'I\, Kodai, H) (1999/2000), 99. based on the letter of Besodoros
Similar problerns

arc

(thotgh with slight errors of translation) and P. Oxy . 3864, seems to overestimate the
repercussjons of a great ::.'tngn:mcy ln other markets. He imagines a general credit crisis to
have spread among merchants throughout the Egyptian economy. This e4"<.:lgge.nues the level of
oc<momic: integratjon aod underestimates the relative isolation of individull markets.

" P. Oxy. 3864.

n

Cassiodoru!'i. Variae, Xfl. 222.

Plrl'P.R FfBTGER BAN(i

62

which could bring orders to an agent in another harbour at the required time.

Equally it could be a problem to find cargo-space for hire on a boat heading

rowards the right market when you needed it. Surplus of shipping in an area
with nolhing to export and shortage in a neighbouring region with stocks
ready for export was not unheard of. In other words. the premodero
merchant had to act in a highly uncertain market situation where i t "as

diffiClllt to predict or estimate the amounts of goods brought to the individual

market place and the number and buying capacity of his competitors.
Such marketS would normally be quite prone to violent fluctuations in the
short tenn. The price of bullion is now 326 dr.. for as you know, the prices at

Coptos change from day to day, it was reported from one of the centres of

the import-trade

in eastern luxuries in the early second century 29 Price

changes, as we can see from a few Egypri:an papyri.

of say 10, 20

or 30%

within a few months. weeks or sometimes even between days were the order
of the day. making it a very risky business environment"' The relative
fragility of links between locations made the individual markets highly
vulnerable to sudden changes and su.ceptible to be brought off balance.
Under the prevailing regime of communication and transport, neighbouring or
more

distant markets would normally be unable. in the short tenn. to step in

and stabilise the situation by reacting to the fluctuating prices. One could not

trust the hidden lumd to ensure that such fllLCtuations would find a strong and

"" ready response in other markets which could absorb the individual shocks by

ironing out the differences in supply and demand between market locations

except in a very imperfect. one might almost say bapha7

.ard. manner. In the
short run, there would normally only be a very weak link between price

developments in particular demand markets on the one hand and the quantities

iusoffer some lrikmg iUusann()f}). Kr.

:t C.assiodorus. \bria<". XII. 24. 'The letter'S of Sync
129 mentions lcttcn. wh1ch bavc gone mtrny and have been delayed many months. Nr, 134 and

148 describe problems about finding cargo sp:we .and :ships headmg towards the required
descinalion. J. Rouge!. Rtlwrclles sru /'orga1!isarifm du c:ommercl' Jtlllritim en Mldit(1fft1nlfe
smM /'empire romain. Paris 1966 resn:tins valuable: for its c"ploitation of tale antique
col1ccttans. ofltetef' to llustt::u.c the condition.' of Roman trade.
" P. Giss. 47 >v:ulablc as IV. Chr. 326 .,.- "" no. 277 i
n A. C. Joiln>IOn. Romon F.,_1p1. Air
J:.toll()mi, Survt')' of Anci
'm Rome. U. Baltimore 1936 (from ,,h.ich dle tr3fi'Siation i' t;akco),
Incidentally the lcncr ulso reports how it had bee n impsiblc to obmin the bronzejug with the
donkey figurc for the 24 dr. 1he COI'I'HlliS.Sioner wished to pay.The Ctlrrcnt asking price wus 40
dr.

"P. Mi
dt. 21127. coL t (a scrnp from lhc """""'
" book oflhe Teblunb Graphdon COnlains
lierit> of6 prices from Sep<emberOct. AD 45/-16 whi
ch Ructu>l<> violently). R. OullCln-Jones.
Titt price ofwlu!at m Rom1m Egypr untlr eh' Princ1pat. Chiron. 6 (1976), 241-62 :md H . J.
Orexhagc. Scimus quam vori(J sinr prtti(l rerum pt.>Y smgulns civira.t ngionesqur... Zu den
Prcl.wttri
ari
.onen im rlimisdren i\gyfJU:n. MBAH. 7.2

( 1988). ll l .

IMPERJA.LBAZAAR

63

of a given commodity sent from the various individual supply markets on the
Other hand".
Against such a background. it is very difficult to sec how the empire could
have constituted a unified market-sphere in any meaningful sense. Nor should
this call for surprise: it is whm we should expect. Even at the beginning of the

18'" century, in spite of considerable commercia

l developments. merchants
had still not managed to embrace all of Europe within a single system.
International markets were emerging against a background of considerable
and persistent regional and local fragmentation across the continent.1!. Instead

of a uni fied market-sphere. we must imagine the Roman empire to have

constituted a much looser system of parallel networks based on concrete and
fragile links of very varying intensity. As a consequence, markets in the
Roman world were chantctcised by significant local and regional differences

in the price of goods. A remark by the Rom;m jurist Gaius offers confirmation:
We know how varied the prices of things are between individual cities and

regions.u. In totaL this amounted to a Erading world characterised by chronic

bottlenecks. imbalances and asynunetries. :\one of thi;, was helped by the fact
that many trades ultimately depended on harvest results which fluctuated
considcr.lbly from year tO year and region to region according to weather
conditions. A humorous lcller of Pliny sums up the situation: A storm of hail.
I am infom1ed, has destroyed all tl1c produce of my estate in Tuscany; while
that which I have on the other side of the Po, though it has proved extremely
fruitful this season, yet from the excessive cheapness of everything, turns to
'mall account. Only my Laurcntinc seat yields me any return. I have nothing
there...still, however. my sole profit comes thence. For there l cultivate not
my land {since I have none). but my mind .. _,.,.._ deanh in one region and glut
with collapsing prices not too far away.

'' N . S1eensgard.
a
Carrods. CllfOl'm's and Companies. T/u stntcturai crisis ;n the
1973.58 . Jn general pages 22
..
..59 for an
inci:-ivc nnalysis of markets cllar.ltlcricd by weak il'llegr.:.uion liJld :.hon-tenn tlucruations.

f:umprtmAsian trade in 1ht early 17"' century. Odense

11 Sec now also P. f.nllc:lnp. Gtain Mnrkrt <:ir., J 9596. 0

2 5 for n scr or bwadly shuihtr
rcl'lcctions. But he does pcrhnp cend In underestimate the churo.c;:rcr of rhe emerging new
European grai1\ market. The c.'Ommercil order. pioneered by 1\rn:-.h,:rdam aod its Korcnbocun.,
does in inirutioo.;.l terms rcpre...\Cnl a lloignificant new deporture. K. G. Pcrsson. Grain Marku
in Europ ciL chaps. 4-5 for the slow emergence of Europc:inwidc inlegrarion of g
rain

m:ui<cos.
" DiR. t3. 4. 3. Sec also Phn. NH 33. 57 >nd Cic. If Vtrr. 3. 191-193 (tb< lancr with P.
EtdL:::mtp. Groin Mortcit.. 197).

" Ptin, Ep. . 6. 12: Tu.-,ci gr.mdint cxcussi. in regionc: Tr:ln\p3dana summ3 abundamia.
vilitas nuJttiarur: .!>
Oiutn mihi Laurentinum meum in rcdi ru. Nihil q:uidem ibi
a bco
possidco. . .solum r..amc1t mihi in rc<illu. lbi enim plurimum scnbo. nee :1grurn quem ooo h
M::d ipsum me srudii ex(.vlo. tre:ued by A. Tchcmia. Le tiJt de l'lw/ie romaine. Paris 1986.
172 93. P. Erdkamp. Gmbr Murkct cir .. 15567 for an excellent diu:;sion of uncertainty
!'>Cd p:n

PL'TER Fl8KlR BA..N"G

64
3. Nilotic explorations

So far the view presented here of the trading world in the Roman empire
has been based mainly on impressionistic evidence. Economic hiStorians of
later periods are used to bener. They normally prefer to base their analyses on
systematic scrutiny of long cominuous price-series. This option is almost
closed to the historian of mtde in antiquity who suflcrs from a deanh of price
data and especilly of continuous time series. But there are a few notable
exceptions to this general rule. For the Hellenistic age, survi\ing temple
accounts from Rhodes and astrological tables from Babylon record a
sufficient quamity of prices to allow historians at least a gl..i.Olpse of the
development of prices in a few markets in some periods. These markets s..-em
to correspond well 10ith the image presented above 1$. During the Roman era,
the major exception to the general paucity of recorded prices is, not
surprisingly, the province of Egypt. By painstakingly sifting through surviving
scraps of papyri from estate accounts. letters and other records, list of prices
have been establi shed for a consider.tble number of goods during the fis!
r 3
centuries AD. particularly by H. J. Drexhage and then Dominic Rathbone"'
On the basis of this work. Rathbone concluded that Egypt seemed to
constitule an integrated market in agricultural goods such as wheat or wine.
From the perspective of pro-industrial trade, the Nile Valley does, indeed,
seem to have been particularly w ell endowed by nature to facilitate
-

integration. The river provided cheap transport and easy communi cation
within the narrow strip of inhabited land which made up the country. AI the
same ti me it imposed on all movement a very clearly directed panem (up or
,

down the river). If anywhere. it should have been Egypl that broke the panem
i contradicted
of Jimiled market integration in antiquity. Yet, this hypothesi s s
by the business letters cited above which rather seemed to rcnect the familiar
pre-industrial experie
nce. n1c price cvidco1ce, however. cannot really be used
to show what Rathbone claims. A score or so of individual wheat prices
scattered across the I" and 2nd

centuries AD, for

instance, may. perhaps,

suffice to give us a very broad impression of the prevailing level of prices.

caused by fluctuujng harvest rcsuh and 1ow carry-over of Slacks from year to year. His
discu!)sion of Pliny's letter. pages 167-70, however, unncccssnrily complicates the issue.
G. Reger. A.rpccrs oftire Role ofMtrchallls in the J.>oiitictll Life Qjthe HellelliJ'ti
r World. in
C. l.acC'dlmini {ed.). Mercami e politka net mmulc aniico. Roma 2003. 172-79 (on nuc1unting
m.3rkeu i n the Hellenistic world).
_,.. H. J. Drex.h"JZ:C. Prci4e. M;
t'rniPMhtt!n Kosrm u.nd UJhn im riimischt'n Agypr,. S1.
Katlminen 1991: D. Rathbone. l'ri<'s IJnd Price Fqrmarion in R0'11Dn Egypt. in J. Aoc!=u. P.
Briano and R. Descao (eds.). fronomt< AnttqiU': pri< nformari<>n tks prix. SaintBenrandde
Commingcs 1997. 183-244.

L\tPOUAL BAZAAR

65

Arkadia

*A
p
hrodito
po
is
l
Arsinoe *

\)

Theotlosi9
East Mediterranean:

Ox
yrhynchus

Arkadia >
l,

a dia.
Map Qf Lhe proviJJCc ofArk

66

PCrER FIBIGE:R BANG

But they simply do not allow us to monitor market developments at

sufficiently close quarters to pronounce on market integration; and even if. in

theory, they did, the fact that most prices stem from only a c oupl e of
locations, makes them impossible to use as evidence of integration across
markets in Egypt".
Incidentally, however, Egypt has also produced what is easily the best
available, though far from unproblemalic, evidence on market integration io
the ancient world. ft dates fTom the 4" and 5"' centuries AD. At this date,
Egypt remained an agriculturally prosperous province with a well oiled
commercial life. Conditions were not fundamenally
t
different from previous

centuries. The evidence consists of lists of prices collected by the late

Roman administrdtion for taxa
t ion purposes. Market prices were reported by
urban guilds to enable the imperial administration to calculate rates for the
commutation of taxes in kind into monetary payment or vice-versa or for
determinjng remuneration rates in connection with forced purchases. One
dossier of documents is particularly i'1teresting. lt was drawn up by the
adnistration in the early 5"' century and collects the prices of 11 goods,
given in 4-monthly intervals, during an entire year for 6 out of the 9 nome
capitals in Middle EJ,rypt, which at that moment constituted the province of

Arcadia (see

map on p.

65). to

theory, lhen. it should be poss ible to follow

market developments during a year across a 100 mile stretch of tbe Nile
Valley. But, alas, the state of preervat
s
ion has left considerable holes in the
dossie So we have far fewer ptices than might ideally have been the case.
r.

Nonetheless. it is still possible to compare the situation in a considerable

number of markets 19
Obviously, one can always question the quality of the dara collected or
produced by the administration. What does it mean when they stare a price for
present an average or the
a particular month or interval of months? Does it re
price on a panicular day? We cannot know. But this is in no way damning.
The internal consistency of the data leave little doubt that. taken as a whole,

n 1'"he prices ()f whear ate completely dominated by the noolCs of Arsinoc (15 + perhaps 3
ut1cerlain) aod Hcrmopolis (7) in the firs1 and second centuries . rhe wlncscrics is
ovcrv.helmingly dcpc.ndcnt on records from the A('Sinoite n<)tne already befoce lhe matedaJ
from lbc 3oc1 century Hcroninos Archjvc appc-..trs. Sec also P. Erdkamp, Grc1in Mtlrkt.t cit., 204
for scepficism about the e\idendal base provided byRathbonc to support his claim
.

:S
R. $. Bagnall, Egypt n
i Late Antiquity. Prii)C'eton 1993 and J. Banaji, A.raricm Change in
Late Antiquity. Gold. labour and aristo<raric domintmc:e, Oxfotd 200 I on the continuous

prosperity and vigour of the monell.ry economy i1t late mlique Egypt
\<!" P. Oxy. 362S..33. J. R. Rc.a's editorial introductjon provides ' bas
ic ana lysis of these =>het:IS
of papyrus. Apparently the dossier was never finished. Some blanks were len to ioserl
infom1arion on the remaining cities of the ptovii)C<:!.

fMPERIAL BAZAAR

67

the prices did bear a fairly close relationship to the situation in tbe markets.
close enough at least to juslify lhe heading: .Schedule ofpurchasable goods
on sale

in rile market for each dry"'. Thus, the prices generally do move;

they are not simply permanent, administratively set rates. The documents even
register m.inor variations in the pr
ice of gold expressed .in myriads of denarii
per solidus. The wine prices declared follow the harvest cycle very closely,

starting at a low after harvest and rsing steadily tllrough the year up until the
next harvest. Salt, on the other hand. governed by a state-imposed monopoly.
is egistered
r
with the same price in all the nomes tllroughout the year. This is
all as we would expect it and invites trust in the reliability of the price-series.
They may serve as tl1c basis for testing, at least in a rudimentary fash.ion, the
impression of weak market integration appearing from olhe
r sources in the
Roman world or its alternative suggested by Rathbone.
When markets are weakly integrated, short-term price developments are
mostly determined by conditions prevailing locally at the time. Individual
markets are only moderately affected by conditions in neighbouring markets.
This makes for considerable price volatility. However, the s century records,
only registering prices, probably as averages, within 4-month.ly intervals. do
not enable us to follow short-term fluctuations_ But the e.xpected result of such
fluctuations should be consideable
r
v<uiation -of prices across markets. That,

on the other hand, is precisely what the ma.terial allows us to monitor n

unusual detail. For reasons of space, the gran prices have been selected for
treatment here . Prices fall within a very wide span. For wheat, the
simultaneously recorded prices vary up to approximately LOO% from lowest to
b.ighest. For barley the same figure is 78%. The differences between recorded
low and high within each 4-month interval have been summarised as
percenag
t es in able
t
I.
Table 1

Sept.-Dec.

Jan.-Apr.

May-Aug.

Wheat

88%

67%

108%

Barley

30%

78%

33%

"" P. O.ry. 3628, I (edjtor's translation). The dos.sicr. as we bnve h. w:ls mosr probably based
indi\'idu.;;J, poss
ibly monthly, declarations ubmilted by urb;tn guilds to the authorities. Such
reports arc extant in the documcnwry record. e.g. P. Oxy. 3624-26. E. Lo Cascio,
Considera:ioni su Cir('()/azione Monetaria. Pret.::J e Fiscaiitt.f ne/ /V Secolo, in Atti
t.feii'Ar.:nulemia Romanistha Cosu111th1iana. XII Conv.egno lntenwzionflle. Pcrug.
ia-Spcllo
1998. 121-36. with discussion of previous schol;;rship, places tbc dossier of market prices
firmly in the <...'<mtext of late aruiqoe fiscal pracciccs.
41 I n.fcr to my thesis (uoder preparation for publication). The Roman Bat,lwr - a
comparaJive study uf trtule cmd markets in a rribuwr
y Rmpire. Ciimbridge 0
2 03 for a fuller
l)J'l

analysis ot the. price materi:ll, including lhc data for wine prices.

68

PC'I'<R 11UIGF.R BANG

The considerable range of

1 80
160
140

Cl>
.<l

)(
"'
..,

...

80

market fragmentation is
through time in individual

40

markets are compared.

20
0

trade. The impression of

reinforced if developmentS

60

.E

markets

was fairly low in the grain

100

c:

across

suggesrs that integration

120

E
"'

prices

Ideally comparison would

have been possible as

-+-Cynopolle

100

97

1 06

unfortunate gaps in the

-lilcertain

146

162

162

records have reduced the

4-monthly intervals
GrainPrices in 1hc province of Arkadia inthe
Sill cenlut
y. l)eveiOpiDcnt o f wheal price.

Grapb 1 .

150
"'

J:l

100

"'

'
..

)(
"'

'C

numbe
r of cities w
ith a full
set of prices, covering all
three periods, to two for
wheat and three for barley.

and barley respectively

across the year in the cities
where this is possible. For
wheat it is noticeable that

50

.E

cities. But

indexed prices for wheat

-+

c:

Graph I and 2 plot the

between

the development in each of

the two markets follows

separate courses. From

Sept.-Dec. to Jan.-Apr. the

Cynopolile

100

98

105

__,._ Lhcertain

94

140

94

continues at this level into

--Arsinoe

79

79

79

the 3 period. By contrast

4-monthly intervals
Grain Prices in the province of Arkadia in the
5111 century. Developmenl of barley prices.

Graph 2.

price rises i n the city of

uncertain identity and then

the price in Cynopolis

hovers around the same
level through the year with
a modest increase only at
the

end. The

lack of

synchronisation also emerges from the barley prices. Cynopolis follows the
pattern already familiar from wheat. Arsinoe follows an almost similar course.

i ty deviates with a significant rise in the second

But then the unidentifiable c

lMPERlAL BAZAAR

69

pe riod only to fall back ro it s previous level i n the third per iod 'l. This
behaviour is exactly what we would expect of a set of markets wher e
integration was li mited .
In a fully unified marker. prices shouId ideally he the same everywhere.
But ideal cond
itions only obtain in a frictionless universe. Merchants incur
costs to move goods from ooe market to another. This wiiJ only begin to
happen when the pri ce differential becomes ltuge e n ough to enable the
merchant to add tr:msponation and otl:ter transact ion costs to his origi nal price
and still be able to earn a profit by bringing his goods to the l:tigher priced
market. In a closely integrated market, the price differential between markets
will converge around the transportation costs. lt is not possible to make an
exact calculation of the costs of bringing grain from one end of the province
of Arcadia to the other. But freight charges preserved in other papyri suggest
that these would have been less than 5% J. Technological barriers, io other
words, are insufficient to explain the observed differences bet ween the
indi vidual markets.
Another factor to consider is man- m ade barriers. customs dues in
particular. Historically. these have created serious ob stacles 10 the integration
of markers. Our evidenc
e for customs collection in Roman Egy pt mainly dates
from the high e m pire "' . But the situation is un like l y to have been
fundamentally different in late antiquity. In the period from which we do have
information, there seems to have been a charge of approximately 3% on
leaving a nome and another 3% on entry. Whether goods moving through a
nome in transit would also have had to defray customs duties is unclear.
Suffice it here to note that customs are likely to have hampered market
Ill ][
i llOiiCe-able. that the harvesl cycle t1ils tO manifest itselfclearly in the grain pricc..>S. ll iS,
however. i.m.J)Onant 10 remember that :l p::ntem of gradually rising price!\ between harvests is
only what we would expect on avcr1ge. Devi:;tions could easily OCCl.lr- <I year with a bad crop
might prcveo1 prices from falling significanrly after the harvest or e
ven cause lhcm LO rise;;.
Another cxpla.nalion may be- lhe intetvaJs chosetl for calcularing o.verage prices. Ifharvest cmnc
l:ne in lhe year under observ:uion. May-eal'ly June rather 1.ha.n April, then the high prc-harvcst
prices would have lasted into the third interval in our rcc.:orded price series. The resuJt might
well have been m mask the effect ofthe harvest in our rocords.
t

<l- P
. Oxy. 522 gives a rate of 21 dr. per LOO art. for a distance of 450 km. Setting tbe price or
"'heat at 8 drlatr., ttansporralion cost would have amounted to some 2.5 %. H. J. Drexhage.

Preistt cit.. 335, followed by C. P. Adams, Who bore the burden? Tire Orgtmization of sume
transport in Roman Egypt. in D. MattingJy and J. SaJmo.n (ds.).
c
Eccnomhs Beyond
Agriculttire in the Classical Wor/J. London and New York. l85. cxtntpolatcs from such tare an
average of 4.75 drnchmas per 1 00 a11abas per 100 km l'ivcNran.spon or some 0.5 % . 1 SuSp(.'CI
this is too low. To !.his r.lte should probably also be added some handling fees and so on. But be
that ts it m1y, tr:;mspOrt does 1ppe:.tr 10 h:l\e been r:ektli vely che.aJ) in Eg
ypt.

.uP. J. Sijpcstcin, Customs Dw;es in Gr(JfCORoman Egypt. Stut/i(l Amsterdamen:ia t1d

Epigruphicam. Jus Amiquum et Papyrologic(Uil pertincmia... XVI1. Zutphcn l987. I 925 on
customs rates in Roman Egypt.

PETER ABIGER DANC

70

integration as much or probably even more than transport costs. At a

minimum they would have raised tbe barrier t<> the integration of markets with
an extra 6% of the value of the grain :md possibly even more depending on
how far the grain load had to travel. The combined effect of transport and
customs would have created a far from negligible span between markets, ay
s

in the order of 10-15% of the grain va

l ue. Tnis would in itself have created a
fair range within wl:llch markets could tluctu.ate independently of each other.
But individual markets behaved with even greater independence. This is
further confirmation of the impression that m.arket integration was limited and
fragmented.

4. State-formation and markets

The Egyptian price material substantiates the impression conveyed by
other sources that the Roman tmding world was characterised by huge
variations between individual markets. The empire did not constitute a
generalised market-sphere. Transaction costs were too high to enable an
empire-wide imegrarion of markets, <L the comparative experience of other
prc-industrial societies also teaches us to expect.. Similarities in transport and
communication technology made merchants subject to recognisable
constmints and weaknesses across the ages. Nonetheless, market integration is
not only a problem of technology; it is also a question of social power. In the
atlempt to explain the weak and fragile level of imegration between individual
m;u-kets in 5"' centu.ry Middle Egypt. the question of customs exaction a
r ose
as a dark horse. Tolls or customs duties may have been of e.qual or even
greater importance in keeping markets apart than transport costs. which afr.er
all were manageable within the province of Arcadia. The economic
imbalances of the Roman trading world should not just be reduced to a
question of technological or Jogistical problems. Social institutions influenced
the shape of markets significamly.
lt is the great American historian of pre-industrial trade F. C. Lane,
followed by the Dane Niels Steensgaard, who most instructively has treated
this issue's. Transport problems were common to all pre-industrial merchants.
But they are not the be-all and end-all of pre-industrial trade. Huge contrasts
existed in the performance ofdifferent merchant groups <md their ability to tie

F. C. Ltmc, Venire cuul Hismry. Th( CollecTed Papers off. C. Lane, Baltimore. 1966. N .
Steensgard.
a
Consuls and Nmiorts ifl Ihe Lt,\amfr(lm 1570 w !650. SEHR, 15 ( 1967) 13w55
N . Stccnsga
ard, Carracks. Cltrawm.t and Companits ciL

IMPERIALBAZAAR

71

market together under agrarian conditions. These differences were caused by

great variations in the social costs of transacting and the socio-political
overheads of trading such as the defraying of customs. One of Finley's
favourite examples of the fragile nature of e.conomic integration in the Roman
world may erve
s
to illuminate this point: the famous famine in 4" century
Antioch during the stay of the emperor Julian. Only with his intervention was
the crisis surmounted and grain brought into the city from nearby imperial
estates and EgypL. Market networks had been unable to olve
s
the problem by
responding to the growing demand and bringing in supplies from surplus
areas46.
Finley explained this as a consequence of the h.igb costs of land transport.
The various accounts of the food crisis add an extra dimension to our
understanding of the problem. The food-shortage was not only a matter of
lo1,>istics7 A seriOu$ conflict developed betwee<> Julian and the aristocracy of
Antioch when the emperor first decided to intervene by imposing a maximum
limit on prices against the protests of the city council. Far from solving the
food shortage, Julians measure aggravated the crisis. Administrative price
fixing was met by the passive resistance of stockholders, the landowning
aristocracy in other words, who responded by withdrawing their supplies from
the market s. Julian, of course, was furious and eventually published the

Misopogon, an ironic invective. satire directed against the elite of Antiocb.

There he accused his aristocratic opponents of speculation and hoarding in
order to profit on the misery of the common population'9. Things looked very
different from the perspective of the landboldcrs. They denied the allegations
of the emperor5&. They saw Julian's initiative to regulate the market as an

4() M. I. Finlcy. Ancient l!.conomy Cil., l27. lCK' f

ul'ther dis.cussion or the emperor Julian s
relic.f ofAntioch during the f(lmioc in 362-3. S(:e P. G<imsey :md C. Humfress. The Evolmicn of
tht Lltu: Antique U'rlrld. Cambridge 2001 . 120... 12l ; P. Garosey. Famine tmd Fotld-Supply in the
GraecoRom(m Wc)r/d, Cambridge l9\{8, 21-23. 230, 242. 247-48, 259-60 and K. Hopkins.
Economic Growlh (llld Towns in Classical Antiquity, i.n P. Abrams and E. A . Wrigley (eds.).
Tt)wu:; in Socetis. Essays in Economic History cmd Histori<ai Sociology. Cambridge. 1978. 46-47. llle discussion in P. Erdkamp. Grain Murk(!t cit... 291-94 focu.ses on regulation rather than
on tbe functioning of markets.
tl The eviderH!e for the food..erisis is UJlusually rich for ancient history: Julia.Q. Mlsopogl>n
350 and 368e-370b. Liban.ius, Or. 15. I(> (also I , 126 and 18. 195). E
p . 82
4 and Amm. Marc.
22. 14, J..2. It consists of comcmpor.uy texl S \\IT"illcn 3S interveotiOilS during the crisis by the
emperor Juliao and Libanius, both deeply lovolvcd ln its rcM>Iutjon. and the interpretation of
tbe episode wriueo some years :10er by Ammianus l\1aroellinus who was himselfpresem during
the cvc.nrs.
'

411 A
s Ubanius. though attempting to
<acicly confim>S (Or. 15. 2t and 16. 25).
4"' Julian. Mis()pog(M, 3-68cJ70b.
'" l.ibanius, Or. J5. 21 rutd 16. 2123.

presem chc ari1ocrotic

course in a favourable light,

72

PETER ABlGER 8,.\NG-

(unnecessary) attempt to curry favour with the broad masses while le aving
them, the elite, to foot the bill. The emperor should have more important
things to do than restricting the property rights of bis aristocracy. That grain
supplies had been withdrawn in response to the rash and vainglorious actions
of lhe emperor, could have been anticipateds_ The Antiochene elite, in short

did not react kindly to lhe prospect of havin g their <<just prof'it curtailed and
missing out on an opportunity to benefit from itS control of the agricultural
surplus in the region. The landed aristocracy preferred the marker to be
autonomous>>. as Libanius later was to express it in a letter to a Roman
official sz.

Leaving aside the weather, if anyone were to blame for the situaiion i n the
market. according to some of the city-councillors, then the emperor had better
look to t h e small shopke epers and market-sellers" Given these
circumstances, one can easily understand why more modest merchants had
hesitated ro step in and alleviate the crisis in Antioch. They had to challenge
the temporary local monopoly position enjoyed by a group of very powerful
landowners determined to oppose even the emperor. Jul ian pl aus ibly
complained that rb.is resistance bad carried on beyond the arrival of subsidised
gr&in from imperial grana i es. Wealthy speculators. he alleged, had brought up
r

cheap imperi al grain and sold it at elevated price. in the countrysides.<. Such
market-power was not to be taken lightly ; nor could it be expected 10 be
deterred by the arrival of m erch ants from the outside.
Outsiders in the market, without local allies of consequence, had to
consider lhe possibility of encouotering tough opposition, both passive and
active.

Phys ical obstruction and chi canery were risks that forei gn mct'Chams

had to take into account. Local aristocracies disposed of considerable

resources in manpower which could be employed to safegumd their interests

)t Amm. Marc.

21, 14. 1-2 states 1hc ariSI<>Cr::cic case mosc clearly.

p. 1379. 2: 'titv a,opa,. aVt6\10f..lOV. Cf. the brief commcnr on Lhc letter in P.
Gamscy md C. Humfrcss. Evo/mion of the Lare Anrique World cit.. 121. Aristocratic land
owners expected to derive large profits from high prices in years of scarcity and babiruaUy
hoarded grain EO take- advantage ofrising prices at Lhe end of the agricullurnl yeat. cf. Ono, Agr.
3. 2. On 1he specuJar.ive stnlcgics of lao.downcrs. sec C. >iicolcl. Rendre 0 Cis<1r, Paris 1988.
)"l Liban
ius.

166 and P. Erdkamp. Grain Market cit.. 15155. thou.gh the latter. perhaps. underestimates 1hc
market power of landowners, cf. p. 154.
" Libanius. Or. 15.21 and 16, 24.

Juli.an. Misopogon. 369c370a. hl his funeral on:.1ion over 1he dece.1sed emperor libanius
18. 195) acc::epr.s Juliaos versioo of the story.. lhus conu-Jdicti.ng some of h.is ea
r lier
speeches. The text is encomiastic. though. and may not count for too much. On the other h
a nd.
here Libanius was free not to pander to ruistocrdt'ic opinion to the extent that he did in speech
15 :tnd 16.
.!oJ

(Or.

73
if the need occurred-". They were also n
i control of local political institutions.

A visiting merchant could not ignore the possibility that the council might
declare a maximum pl"ice on food grains. demoostrming public spirit while
leaving him to shoulder some of the cost 56. As a group. local power wielders
could be suspected of possessing sufficient stocks to undermine the business
of imponing merchant. There was a very real risk that imponers might have
to face sudden releases of locally stored grain with subsequently falling

prices. That. in turn. would threaten the profitability of having brought in

supplies from afar at great expense and difficulty. During a shonage in
Oxyrhynchus in AD 246. when pressed by a Roman official. one noble lady,
Calpumia Heraclia. came out declaring grain stocks of more tban 5000

m1nbas. This amount of grain was sufficient to feed several thousand people
for two or three months and could have exercised an enormous influence in a
small market like Oxyrhynchus " A much bigger market like Antioch is a
different story. of course. But it also had maoy ruore of Calpumia's kind and
on average richer.

In this analytical context. aristocratic euergetism may be treated as a

panicular fonn of flooding the marke1. Merchants also had to calculate the
risk that one or more leading people might decide to conven some of their
stored surplus to symbolic capital by donating free or cheap grain to the city. I

doubt, though, if local landowners generally had to go to the length of

depressing the mmket one way or another, ro reassert their local monopoly ;,.
.

and predominance. Eucrgetism was an CJ<pcnsivc strategy and landowners

were not normally eager to forego revenue. After aU. it wn. the basis of tbeir
position of prominence ll. The more likely response 10 foreign importers
would be passive resistance or continuous hoarding. conveniently leaving the

newcomers to face the blame and anger of the urban crowd when they failed
10 bring down prices. Ordinary trading people were easy scapegoats - those
sordid elf-serving,
s
profilecring speculators. to paraphrase ancient prejudice.

'1 R . MacMullen. Romcm S<x:irtl Rchuions. 50 B.C. to AJ). 284. New f.laveo and London
197d, 8-12 for some vivid obscrvnlion on the mighc of local bigwigs.

As pointed OUl by J.Y. Grcnie.r. conomie du surplus. (ronomie du d

rcuit. in J. Andrcau.
P. Bria:nt and R. Descac (eds.). &cnomi Antique. Us chcm,c:s clans l'a.ntiquiti: J r6/.t tk
rtuu. S,int-Beruand-<lc Comminges 1997.385-40:1.

" P. O:ry. 3068 (sec al5o ll>e di><.-uion ofGomsey. Fomi11 tmd Food SJqJply cit.. 258-59).
Setting o.nnual coosumption orllt"i 81 170 1:. per - .00 one 3rt o(gr.Un 31 30. 2 kg. sooo
un. nuy suppon more th:n 10.000 P"rsoos for a month. or more th:m 3000 for three months.
Catpum1a Hel'aCJia s1a1 lha1 tbc people on her eswcs n:cth't. monthly living aiiO\
\'ance ou1
of the!Oe g
rain-stocks. Thh rcdu the etfec.tive amount of grain which could be m::u-J.:C:.Ic..-d Bu1

the n.:muindcr wouJd undoubtudly till have been significant.

P. Gam.s
cy, fluuin and F'o()(J Supp/y cit.. 257-61 for me caUiionary observations on
..

cuergctism.

74

The prolilS of middlemen were resented by the aristocracy and disliked by a

suspicious urban population,._ An importing merchant was confronted by
many risks and considerable uncertainty 60 The range of obstructions to the
close integration of markets in the empire was wide.
There is a significant lesson to be drawn from this. which is rarely
commented upon: in the pre-industrial world closer integration of economic
resources and tighter co-ordination of markelS. in panicular. depended on a
hand anything but hidden. It took very tangible and overt forms of
organisational power to tic supply and demand across locations into a more
stable relationship where markets would be more closely integrated and
behave more uniformly 61 It is in this context that the many mercantilist
privileges and anempt to promote commercial interests. often backed by

armed force. in early modem Europe take on a crucial importance. They

enabled merchants to a much higher degree than hitherto to overcome local
resistance and connect separate markets in more stable and permanent ways.
These policies were pan of the centralising state's strategy of breaking down
local particularisms and mobilising an ever expanding share of social
resources to meet ilS own quickly growing requirements"'.

The principle of /aisu: faire. as advocated by Smith and many others.

does not represent a sharp break from this process. Quite the reverse: it was. if

anything, an intensification of the old pattern. Laissez .faire did not merely
mean non-interference. Tt was adopted and promoted by the growing states

and bureaucracies across Europe to assert and promote the interests of the

lfl The price-edict of Dioclcli:m frowns on 1hc merchants who bn.luoht in supplies to profit
from CICV(ItCd prjCCS C'.:lUSed by lhc J)reSe-JlCC nrlhC :,mny. cr. lhc. prt:fncc in general md Chi\J). 1 7
in p:micuhu (cd. S. Lauffcr, Diokletiau$ Prdst:dikt. Berlin 1971). $(..-e also the tJ)iLic of
Hadrian. pu1 up in the Piracu!.. :mempting 10 curb the activities of middlemen in the. fishtnde
al Eis (J. H. Oliver. Grt't'k CfNfStinaions ofn1rly Roman ('mptrorsfrom insrri
piibM and
pupJri. Phi13Cktphia t989. no. 77). E. P. TI!ompson. Cuszoms in Common. l.oodon 1991. 208-9
norcs how landowners till in 1 g. <:X:nnuy England n::,cnred the prof'ih or middlemen and on
occasion found it a convenient way of di...cning rhe public gaze from themselves to lay the
blame on rdati..,ely s:maJI traders.
oo In thi coMection, one n1iglu bring up th
e pi.)Cch Againsr Dkmysodoms, co1H:1incd in the
Demtlsrhcnic corpus (56, 7 9). h ha> recently been Lteated a:> n
a
c.xnmple of the information
problems facmg ancient merchants by P. 6rdL:.amp. Grai
n Markr cit.. JSJ ...S.S. This is one
aspecc. Another is tbc auernpt to sme--.tr rhe moral standing of rhc ace b
y playing to
Athenian prejudices again the E
gyptian st:uesm.an Cleomcoes. The speaker cla
ims th:n the
ac:cused h3d acted in co1lus1on with Cleomenes to the detriment of Athens. In times or conflk1..
mcrch:lnls nlwtys risked hcing !ltigmatised as suspicious and unfriendly foreigners by close

knit locnl communities.

61 N. Stccnsgaard. Carrnt'ks. Carmans ond Comptmiescir.

" C. Tilly. Crrion. Capital. und European Srat<!s. AD 990-1991. rev. e<L O
xford t992.
t18-120.also for lhe fottowinj:.

I\1PR.IALBAZAAR

75

despised middlemen in the face of local opposition 63. That required active
intervention, as Adam Smith recognised. No trade deserves more the full
protection or the law. and no trade requires it so much: becmtse no trade is so
expos
ed to popular odium, he remarked in a treatment of the grain trade.
Such odium. however, was uodeerved. on a par with the popular terrors and
suspicion of witchcraft, in the opinion of the Scottish rationalist: After the
business of the farmer. that of the corn merchant is in reality the trade which.
if properly

proteCied and encouraged. would contribute most to the raising of

corn ... The protection and encouragement Smi

t h had in mind found a ready
champion in the state. New government policies included regulations to
dismantle control of the agricultural surplus by local political institutions,
cancellation of internal tolls. and ensuring the free movement of grain outside
its area of origin by providing armed escorts of police and militias to
merchants in the face of local opposition. The aim was to open up the inlwui

trade and thus create a unified national market.

the Volkswirrschaft of Kart

Biicher. the German economist familiar 10 ancient historians as the founder of

primitil'i
sm.

The new political economy of the modern state was gradually dissolving
the barriers of the old moral economy of local, aristocratic-led. societies 65
The result was a steadily growing integration of markets during the 17'' to
the 19 ccntury 00. This is where the early modern European and the Roman

"-' K.G. Pcrs.son. Grain Markets m E;'uropr Cif., ch:tpcer 4 and 6 for excellent analyses of this
process. In most of Europe the policy or lai.sse:.faiu was J)tOitlOlc:d by authoritarian
mon.archies. The tcr integration of 411frtt inland mark w\b bli'\hcd, lirerall). with
recouN: to the fom:s oforder... (146)

.. ("'iation> from A. Sm
ith. An lnqrury buo Jhr Natur,. andCaust>s oflht" U?alth ofNations.
on of rh lll>rkr and
R . 11. C.mpbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B . Todd (tds.). Glasgow F.diri
Corr.S/}()n.tffl('
" ofAdam Smith. 11. Oxford 1976. vol. 1,527. 534 ;nd 531.
The contrast is that of E. P. Tllompson. set up in Tlu: Moral conOmJ of Jh(' English
Crou'tl in th Eigluumh Cemury. reprinted in Custt>m...o; in Commo11 cit. Thompson s
i mW.nly
<.,."QrlCCl'ned with lower da n:ist.mce to the free movement of grain I>Ctwoen localities. Food
rioters rcsi)Ondod to the new CXJ>andin order of free markets by :aucmpting to prevent
metropolitan merchants from e.xp011ing grnin from rural frequently proto--industrial. regions to
the bit citic in years of scarcity. Food riots by themsdvs. however. were ft()( 4bc result of the
nt\\ market regime. Tbey m<.ly ha\'C incr in inlen,ity. but they wen: :kn integral pan of the
order or ranrin ri
gime. Tbc other side or that order. which has played a bia:gc:r rolto in the
a.Jiumcnt udv-.tt"K.""ed here.was aristocr.uic domin:ancc ofJocaJ communiti. inc
luding romrol of
lhc major part oflhc agricullllr.ll surplu< P. En:lkamp. A Starving Mob has 110 R.<f"t:r. Urban
Mamts tmd F001 Riors in thr Roman 11'01'/d. /00 B.C. - AD. 4()(). in L. de Bto;< and J. Rich
(oh.). T1tr TruiL)fonnniion ofErorwmir l..ifr IIJI(/" Romtut Empin. AmMerdam 2002. 93115 for a recent discussion of food ri'OC}. in Roman antiquir
y.
,

(Ill P. Bmudcl and F. SJX)Oncr. Pricrf ht Eltropt'from 1450 to 1750, Cambridgr f<o,wmic
Histor
yo
fr:urop. IV. Cambridge 1967. 3744116 for a classic survey. A. E. ChriStcnscn. Dutch
Trruh to t!tl' Bttltic llbout /600. Studirs ;, tile Sound Toll Re,ister antfiJ,Jdt SMppin,!!, Rtcords.
Copcnhacn l941 and K. Glrmann./)utclt A"t'iruir Trodc 1620./750. The llague L958 for two

76

PETER H.DlGe;R 8A:NG

trader really pan company. MoOtesquieu. for instance. observed in the t8

century that the attitude of his contemporaries in relation to colonies and
imperialism differed markedly from anything he found in antiquity 6'.
Subsequent research has by and large confirmed the impression of the great
French sociologist. Roman imperiali>m was not fuelled by the strong and
aggressive commercial drive of ater
l
Europeans aimi ng to expand and
capn1re markets''" The Roman process of stare- or empire-formation was not
closely wedded to commercial mobilismion and intcgrtuion. This does not
i mply that trade was unimponant in Roman society. Nor. for that maner.
was it insignificant to the imperial state. But it was seen in a different
perspective. Imperial discourse, for in;tance did recognise the advantages
of commercial exchanges across the empire. Philo described the art of good
goverr.ment as that Which causes the good deep soil in lowlands and
highlands to be tilled. and all the seas to be safely navigated by merchant
ships laden with cargoes to effect the exchange of goods which the countries
in desire for fellowship render to each oLher. receiving those which they Jack
and sending in return those of which they carry a surplus
But these
notions were not accompanied by any articulate ideological creed
prescribing the integration of free,. markeLS. nor by any great sympathy for
the middleman. His profits remained under suspicion, as we have seen. They
were justifiable pri mari ly in term& of the ability of merchants to
complement the needs of local societies by making available goods which
were otherwise lacking10.
Roman imperial society saw rrade in tenns of provisioning policies. The
mai n concern was nor the uninhibited operation of markets, but whether
,

>.

fundorncnl:ll studi<"< ofthe marcl n

i ce!T.llion pioneered by Ducch copitilism. J. de Vrie.< and A.
''311 der Woudc. Th First Modern F.conom) S11et:ss. FaihAn!. cuul PuY\'utJnC' oflM Dwda
Econom>' ISIJ0/815. C>mbridc 1997 foro modem mndard worl:.
''C. de Monccsquieu. De L'&pr;t tlr$ Lois (Gcncvo 1748). L. Vc,.ini (od.), Pari> t995, book
2 1 , chap. 21. B. llcck.schcr, MercomiUsm. 2ld cd., London 195.5 is the cl<ssic survey of
mcntilism. Mcrcnntilism, howl!ver. is not ro be understood as a unified doctrine. more :lS a
cluster of ide.
1011 M. I. Finlc:y. Ancient Eronom,- c
it.. c:pcc:r 6: J. Aod1u. LA ril
L romam dans sn

roJ>ptms cl /'khttng n au moJtd d l'khong. '" J . Andr<:Ou. P. Bri:llll nnd R. Dc=c (eds.).
t.conomi Antiqu. Lt!s icharg.'j don.s l'amiquill: le r6fe d I"Erat. Sainc-Bercraod-dc
Comminges 1994, 83..98. W. V. Jlarris, Rom(ln Gv,emmenrs ami Commerce. 300 IJ.C. - A.D.
300. in C. Zac<::cgnini (ed.). Mercmu; < Poli
tic" 11cl Mondo Ant;((), Roma 2003. 275-305 adds

noching new to this pi<:tu.n:.

"Pbilo ug. Gai. 47. Other ex>mptes Plin. NH. 3. 39-41. . t23 nnd 14. I. 2: Htrodian..
tO. 4 nnd the l>!c ntiquc V:Uenunian Ill. No.. S. 480.
"'Sec, for inscancc.lhe epitlph of a Syrian lradcr found in Lyon, published by C. P. Jones. A
S
yrian in Lyon. AJPh. 99 (1989). SS. conveniently included il) F. Mcijcr ruld 0. van Nijf. Trade.
1'rtw.tp<Jrt and Sol'iety in the An<:ient \Vorld. London 1992, 85-86.

lt.tl"t:RIALBAZAAR

Sllpplic were made available to consumers, mostly urban. while the right of
local aristocracies to control the agricultural surplus still bad to be maintained.
The Lex lmirana, the municipal statutes of a small Spanish community. i s a
good example of the balancing act this required. h f(lrbids hoarding and
forestalling of goods. in order to ensure affordable provisions for the broad
population. minimise social discontent and prevent popular riots. all with the
purpose of preserving social peace". The effect. of collfse. was to curb the
free movement of grain outside its area of origin. On the ot.hcr hand. the
municipal chaner left political control and implementation of policies in the
hands of the local land-owning elite. As farmers. the members of this group
depended for tl1cir income on receiving as high a price for their agricultural
products as possible. The political elite. in other words. had constantly to
weigh its own pecuniary interests against its continued ability to act as leaders
of the community. High prices of free markets and public welfare were
locked in competition against each other. lt was the balance of power within
local societies which determined how the balance was struck between these
opposing interests. The numemu< small communities of the Roman world
genemlly remined authority over their market. The imperial order did not n
i
any way systematically seek to wrest markets from their command by
pmmoting the middleman and his unobstructed movement of grain bctwee.o
locationsr..

5. Tbe Imperial Bazaar

The Roman Empire lacked the constellation of social forces that drove
markets towards greater integration in Europe during the early modem
period. As a result, the pressure and the ability to integrate markets were
less significam; the Roman trading world remained more locally and
regionally fragmented. The absence of the deliberate policies to force

" I.e.: lmirmw. chap. 75. Chap. 86 n:.slrict.s jury members to tho:o,c in the community who
hold poscssiQns of at least 5.000 :stcrccs. a far from negllgiblc urn thm will have ensured a
urt hold on r:he law court to the propcnied ses.rnent ofthe city of lrni.
1:' R. Bin Wong. China TransfomtLd eh.. cbapeer 9 for a similar compari500 of late: imperial
Chtna and early modem-Europe. The imperial slate's focus on pro'i>ioning policies rather than
the promotion of cfr anar\eu prevented Chinese authoritic: from choosing belween
favouring Ill< regional movement of n and preserving !o<;;,l cootrol of Ill< <urplus. 11 W2S
commincd 10 both. Therefore it dtd not refrain from intervCJling n
i markeLS eilher. During the
18111 ocn10ry a public grooary sySJcm w eMablishcd tbat soughl to ubidi local grain in
year$ of hortngc. Tax-grain was also shipped on the Grand Canal to Dcijin,_:. The similarities to
the Roman situ:ltion are obviouo and I explore. these in a forlhcomtng contribution to a
collection of papets edited by Wailer Scheidcl 1hrn auernpts lo compare Ronc and I la,. China.

78

Pl ABIGER BANG

market-integration pursued by European states was not unique to tbe Roman

Empire: this was equally true of other tribuary
t
empires such as the MughaJ,
Ottoman and Ming!Cn'ing empires" Jt should be emphasised that markers
in these tributary empires were not imperfect versions of the emerging
capitalist order in Europe. Rather, the local obstacles to integration made the
greater fragmentation of markets economically viable. The predom.inam
pattern, as the economists would say, represented a stable state of the
economy. not failure. Close irnegration would frequently have been too
costly. Instead, a different form of market-regime with its own
characteristics prevailed.
Historians of trade in the Middle East and India have most fully ex.plorcd
and debated the dyoamics aod characrcrisics of this sort of agrarian market
regime. Pioneers in the field focused on the small scale of most operations
and introduced the concept of peddlers and peddling trade to describe the
predominant form of business " But this term is unfortunate; it conveys too
simple and primitive an impression of the agrarian trading world. Myriads
of small traders and peddlers were certainly an important part of ancient
commercial life. But there were also bigger merchants and bankers, long
distance as well as local movement of goods wholes<tle trade and auctions
.

as well as retail. In short, the agrarian market regime was a complex affair;
it was nor primitive" After all, the demarnds of (frequently imperial) high

cultures had ro be catered for. States, courts. aristocracies and religious

institutions spawned the rise of sophisticated cultures of consumption. 1l1ey
prized expensive rarities, exotic spices and precious stones from afar. They
also valued large numbers of retainers and hangers on. These thronged the
cities which commonly provided the back-drop for leading <<civilis
ed styles
of life. Concentration of consumption in urban centres, o
s metimes reaching
saggering
t
proportions, created a demand for supplies of staple foods 7. The
7 M. N. Pe;:m;on, Merdwnrs <wd St<ttes. in J. Tracy (ed.), Tile Poliaca/ E<otwmy of
Mercham Empires. Stare Power mul W
o rld Tmde 1350-1750. Ca.mbridge 199 i, 41 1 i6.
1 The concept of the pcddlcrmarkcl goes back to J. C. van Lcor. whose \\'eberinspircd
wotks: from lhe 1920s and 30s. were published posthumously s lndoneshm Tmde and Socit:T)'.
The; Hague 1955 . N. Steensg
allrd. Carracks, Ct1rtwans aJUt Companies cit.. cbup. I developed
these idcs further. P. J. Marsh
aJI. RcfrQspelt on f. C. vwt Lettr's Essay on the Eighteemlt
Cemury as a Cmegory in Asian History. hineario,
r
17.1 (1993), 45-58 for a balanced

re-appraisal .
" A s it has repea
t edly been pointed out. e.g. by K. N. Chaudhuri. Markets & Traders in
ft
uf
i
u during 1/u: SeHwteenth aud Eigluecm!J Ctmruries. in K. N. Ch::wdhuri and C. Dewc.y
(eds.). Econ(>m.v <uuf Sodety. Delhi I 979. !43-62. M. N. Pc.arson and A. Das Gupm (eds.), Jndin
and the lndilm Ocean. Oxford 1987 for ao cxccJienl collection of works bringing out lhe
complexity of tr:.tdc in the grc;.l tcr Indi::m world durlng 1he early .nodenl 1>eiocL
MW. Sombart. Luxus und KapiralismuJ, MOnchen ::md Leipzig 191 3 is the classic analysis of
the effect of lu.:.;ury demand on trade.

lMff.R.I.'\1. BAZAAR

79

trading world of civilised agrarian societies had to supply a considerable

range of products whose aggregate was far from trifling. The commercial
universe had 10 be sructurally differentiated: it was a complete social
system.
Middle Eastern and Indian history has a better term available than
peddler to describe the markets of complex agrarian societies. baaar n. It
combi nes the presence of peddlers and small retailers with larger wholesale
merchants and long-distance tr'ddC while at the same time recognising that
these categories were more fluent and their functions not as clearly distinct

as we would expect them to be today. A number of sllJidies have allemptcd to

understand the greater and smaller bazaars of pre-indutrial North Indian
and Middle Eastern ociety as a particular socio-economic system rather
than simply as markets in the abstract. In a modern perspective, the world of
the bazaar was notorious as a place of high risk <nd uncerainty where
t

bottlenecks, asymrnetries and imbalances were endemic. Even after

telegraph communication and rail transport were introduced at the turn of
the 19" century, the Indian bataar remai ned a very risky and uncertain
business environment. The contrast to Elll'opcan companies in India was

pronounced. Many chose to opemte outside the bazaar as they required a far

more stable market regime in which to function'" The bazaar, in other

words. seems an attractive concept to apply to the markets of preindustrial
'>OCieties before the twin pr<JCesse$ of capital ism and State-formation began
to

homogenise and integrate markets with greater intensity. Bazaar can be

used to denote a srable and complex business environment characterised by

uncertainty, unpredictability and local segmentation of markets.
This situation was rctlectcd in institutional heterogeneity. Often bazaars
operated with everal
s
legal system co-existing and intermingling" In great

"' E.xamples iocludc /\, A. Yang. Ba:.aar India. MwJ.tl\', Society, and tlrc Colonitlf State in
Bihar. Berkc:lcy 1998: C. Gecrtz. Pddlers and PriflCIJ'. Chicago J963 a.nd C. Gccrt7.. Suq: The

&onomy in s,jiTJU. in C. . H. Geenz and L. Roan (eel.<.). M.aning ond Ordu in

llcroccmr S<>ciI).Cambridgt l979. 123313.
:s R. K. Rny. 17r.e Bo4wr: Changi
ng Stnwtural Clwracrnistics o
frite l11dignwus .crion of
th(' Indian B
tonomy before (md after the Gnor Depressi011, ISEHR. 25 ( 1988). 263-3 18. On rhe
uncertainty nnd onprcdicmbilily of the Indian baza:trs before the cofoni:al period. see P. J.
\l.ushalr discussion of 1he problems. experienced by English merchants engaged in the so-
':ll led cO\Intry-u:.tde. British Much(J.IItS ;,
..
ighte('"nth Ct>nlurJ B.:ngal. in Bengal PMI and
"r<>mJ. 95.1 (1976). 151-63. Funbcr. K. K. Cbaucrjce. M<rchants. Politics ond Sitt) in
&r\' Modt'm India. le1de11 1996: O. J>rnknsh. Preciou.t Metal FIO'W.'. C()inage and Prices n
i
l'ldia in 1Jw 1711 tmd Ear('' 18"' Cmury, in E. van Cauwcnbcrgbe {ed.). Essays in the Monewry
'i1H0ry of A.sit' and Europt. Zcu\'en 1991. 55-73. l.. Subrahmartiam. India's lnTtrtwtiollal

!C<>t:omy. Jj()().J/I()(). IHR. 25.2 ( 1999).38-57 and A. Dos Coupc. llld1an Mnrhams ell.
"'C. Gccm. Suq cit .. t92-197 brwgbt thi, QUt"" a fcotu"' of the Morocc:lft or.

')

80
agrarian empires. the law of lbe elites had to be accommodated to a number
of local and diverse cultural practices. fn the Mughal empire. imperial
regulations. Mu$lim law and local Hindu custom co-existed in the bazaars
and were often brought together'"'. In the Roman world. the administration
of imperial law co-existed. mixed and clashed with

considerable number

of local practices and customs across the empire. In a ruling from AD 204,
the emperors (Septimius) Scvcrus and Antoninus

(Caracalla) ordered

group of Jewish traders to hand over to the original owner a load of stolen
goods they had bought. apparently in good faith. The emperors were acting

<:> in accordance with solid Roman precedents. But the traders had asked tO be
allowed tO retain the goods until the rightful owner had compenated
s
them

for their economic loss. This was in acc<lrdance with established Jewish
legal traditions sa .

But. and this is the important thing. the bazaar was not simply a passive
victim of instability and fragmentation. It had developed ways of handling
these problems. The bazaar had contrived to institutionalise irregularity. The
result was a set of characteristic commercial str:ttegies that helped merchants
to cope with risks while reproducing the general asymmetries and

r rities of the bazaar trading environment

1

S'. iFour

irregula-

can be discussed here. These

are 11.arcelling of capital. low standardis.ation of products, opportunistic

speculation and the formation of segmemed social networks.
First. capital tended to be parcelled. Most traders in the bazaar were
relatively small. Much of their capital was extended by a restricted group of

larger merchants or occasionally even aristocrats. These financiers forwarded

small ponions of their own capital to junior partners or dependams who
would then trade with it on their own. This was a wise procedure in the
risky bazaar environment. By dividing up eapital bigger merchants achieved

w f. Has:m, Sum tutd Uxat;,y in Mughal lndhJ, Cambridge 2004. chaps. 4-5 nd mMe
gcner.11ly A. Hintzc. Th Mug/m/ E
mpire cmd its Decllnl', ''ldcrshot 1997 . 175-180.
Code.r lusti11itmus 6. 2. 2 with D. Daube. ltwish U1w in tht He/fenistic WOrld, in B. S.
Jackson (ed.). Jewish J..aw in U!Ral History and the Modun IVorl<l. Leiden 1980.56-57.
c C. Gcertz.. Suq eic 216 for this crucial point. As he note>. in his tirsr study of the b37.a.a.r.
Pt!ddlus and Princs cil.. he had fO<:used on the lack of orgaoi::uional
s
capacity in 1he
.

frOJgt:ntnted bazaar universe. Now. be had become more aware of the positi\'e strategies
available to the merchanas to handle the irregularity and unJlf<idictabitity of the bazaar. FOT
some observations on the 1mpon.ancc. of household otgnilion and possesion
s
of derailed
local Jmowlcdge>o for the oper.tion of prc-<:<>lonial lndtan mc:rchants. see T. Raychoudhuri.
The Commercial Enrrprne.ur in PrtColoniallndio: As11irt1fions and cUitions. A Nor. in
.
R. Plak and D. Rothcrmund (cds.). Fmporia. Comm()l/itin <md Enuepr<nurs in Asian
Maritime Twde. c. 1400-1750. Stuttgart 1991, 339351 and 0. Prakash. Asian Tradr cmtl
F.uroJxr<m Impact: A Study ofthe Trade of Bengal. !6JIJ.J720. in B. Kling and M. N. Pean;on

(cds.), The Age of Ponnrrs!Jip. llonolulu 1979, 43-7().

81

IMPf:RlAL BAZAAR

enhanced llexibility in responding to the prevailing local variations and

spread their risks by not puning all their eggs in one basket". This pattern
corresponds well with how we think of the Roman trading world. Even
smallish ships of. say. 50 tonnes capacity would regularly have

carried

shipments for several merchants at a time. as is clear from inscriptions

found on objects recovered from Roman wrecks. The ostraka from a first ,
cenrury customs house in Berenike on the Egyptian Red Sea coast tell a
similar story. They reveal a world of small agents and cargoes being
a'embled from a slow trickle of goods arriving in many individual
instalments" This impression is reiofored by rhc image of business
organisation provided by Roman law. The actions on middlemen in the

, insriroria. quod jussu and de peculio. as well as that on

Digest. exerciwria

societas. convey an impression of many small primary agents. depending on

the delegation of parcels of working capital from a more select group of

financiers, including some aristocrats, and merchant patricians'. The latter

occasionally surface in the epigraphic record. Palmyra,

a city

which played

a central role in the trade in eastern luxuries and precious objecrs. has
delivered several examples such as: This statue of Marcus Ulpius Yarhai.
son of Hairn. son of Abgaros. was erected in his honour by the caravan
which was led from Spasinou Charax by his son Abgaros because he
assisted it in every possible way ""

..

&.I S. D. Goitcin. Mrtliu"antan SodN)' cit.. l48 208 and J. C. van Leur. ln.dons,.art Trc1<k
tmd Sorie<> cit.. 19t245 for detailed descriptions. The tucr incidentally commented upon the

close simitaritie> to practices known

from the Henenisli<: "orld (chap. 2). 0 Rthbone. n.

F;tUlJJCing ofMorifiml' Ct.11111tlVr in Jltt' Rqman Empire. 111 AI), in E. to Casc10 CrediJO r

Montt(l ne/ Mondo Romuno. Bari 2003. 210-227. while admitting the continui1y of fonns.
int'ish. on a marked brek between llellcnistic and Roman times: Roman oor'nmercial finance
was. in 1\J)iril. rnuch cJoscr to rhe aff:lir,; of the .nucb l:ucr East India companies. This
misinterprets the evidence. Gr.md financiel'$ and merchant princes were an imrin:.ic pan: of lhe

ba:r.zatar and did noc SlruCtur..lly transform h the: way the large: ch3rtered <:ompanies 13rer were tO
do.cf.A. O.S Gupt:o. /ndian Mm:Nmr.<cit. I 1-13.

" E.g. 8. Liou and R.Almeida,uslnKriptioruduAmplwr<s du Pio Gamlolfo. MEFRA.

112.1 (2000). 725 ond R. S. Bagoall. C. Helms and A. Vemoog
t, DocumMtsfrom Bcr.nikc. l.
Grk O.str(lka from thr 1996-1998 uosons. Papyrologac: Bruxelleusia 31. Bruxelles 2000.
110>.

80-88.

" Dig. 14. I, 36 ond all of book 15 for tbc middleman in<titutioos. J. E. Sydsgo:ord. Th
Disinugration of th Roman Labour Market and the Cllmtol.tl Theory. Studia Romana n
i.
honorem Petri Krorup Septuagenorii. Odense 1976. 44-48. is central ror chc p31'Ce1Hng of
capital. For an mrroduc1ory analysis or Rotn3n law insutultorb. D. Jobnston. RomtJn /...aw in

Context. C:unbride 1998. 99-108 (tbo<lgh too modernising in !oOmc respects). On banking. sc:c
funher J. Andreau, Banking and Business in 1hc Roman IVorld. Cambridgt 1997 and G.
Camodeca, 11 credlto tt>gli ard1bi tlml/)fl!li: if caso di Putcoli I' di Hercul<mcum i1\ E. Lo

Cllscio (ed.). Crc.dito e Mcmcm nel Moudo Ro umo, Bari

2003. 69'-98.

" Ins. Palm. w. 107 (author'.\ tranl:uion orlhe Greek Md Pulmyrcne bilinguul inscripLion).
G. Young. Rom's E.asr.em Trot/;:. /JJternar;ona/
On the organisation or P-".t1myro's trade, OC
b

82

Second, he
t
standardisation of products was often relatively low and
quality was difficult to control. Most products originated in agricultural
processes. This caused their characteristics and qualities to vary
considerably from region to region and from year to year according to
weather conditions. Not even something as seemingly homogeneous to
modem perceptions as grain constirutes an -exception here. As Pliny explains
in his Nawral History, the properties of, say. Egyptian wheat differed
significantly from Sicilian, Gaulish or Thracian in terms of weight, baking
capacity, colour and fineness. Adulteration of goods WOttld often have been
rife. Wheat might get mixed with small quantities of stale or cheaper sorts
of grain such as barley or even eatth. Expensive s pices would commonly

be

mixed up with cheaper imitations. Detailed local knowledge of products and

production processes was crucial to avoid being cheated and ensure
commercial success t>. If merchants generally achieved little in the way of
standardisation they atlempted to profit on variability instead. Modern
global trade is based on the consumption of generalised goods and brands; a
pair of Nike trainers or a Big Mac is supposed to be the same everywhere.
The long-distance trade of the bazaar wa fuelled by the demand for exotic
ra6t.ies. marvels and goods with special aod unique properties. Such
expensive and singular producs were often believed to possess medicinal,
magic or religious qualities and exercised a charismatic influence. Elite
consumption of rare luxuries was intended to inspire awe io l.be common
folk and impress on them the sublime qualities of the rich and powerful who
so demonstratively had the world at their fingertips ss. <<Receive this which
is too grand for private houses... consume the turbot reserved for your reigo
only. Juvenal mockingly described the presentation of a marvellous fish to
the emperor Domitianso.
Third. opportunistic speculation. If the bazaar trader rarely possessed
sufficient social power to begin to change the general uncertainty of his
world, that did not leave him entirely at the mercy of commercial nuctuations.
Instead. be seems to have developed a set of strategies that anempted. not s
o
much to transform the uncertainties and asymmetries, as to turn the risks and

Commt:n.c aml lmperi

rd Poli(r. 31 BC- l\0 305, London 2001. chapter 4 and R. Drc.Ulage.
Untersudumge.n zum ri.Jmisdzen Ostlwndel, Bono 1988 (including a complete cataJoguc of the

inscriptions rclj,ti_ng to the caravan trade).

.., Pliny, NH, books 12 and 18 describe in great dct::UI the pcculilr properties of food grains,
pice <lnd other plant substances (18. 12. 63-70 on lhe tcgionally varying properties of wheat)
and their adulteratiOIL See also P. Oxy. 708 and 2125.
"" C . A. Bayly. 'Archaic' and ',Hodm Globali:.ation, in A. G. Hopk.ins (ed.). Globalizcu;on
in World Hisrory. London 2002. 4773.

,. Juv. 4, 6569.

IMPERIAL 131\.ZAAR

83

imbaances
l
to his advantage. The result was an approach to the market which
would often have b e e n opportunistic, a s merchants attempted to p u t
themselves into a local monopoly position. Monopoly is here t o be taken in
the broad s e n s e used by economists of economic agents who enjoy a
r.emporary advantage due to a market imbalance. The North lndiao Bazaar
offer many examples of this 90_ In the Roman wo:rld, that stock character of
classical moralising, the grain speculating merchant, always on the look out to
make a profit from irregular and excessively high local prices, i s the
embodiment of this approach to trade. lt is significant that he is commonly
portrayed as acting in collusion with local people".
This brings us, finally, to the fourth aspect, the formation of social
networks. Rather than a generalised market environment. tbc bazaar trader
nom1ally depended o n various concrete, social connections. As a comment of
Cic-ero implies, the merchant visiting a foreign harbour generally needed
(local) contacts to vouch for his credibility"' Personal tlientage, therefore.
would have been impo11ant to him. So would membership of communal
networks that provided him with tbe shelter of a broader social environment.
Such merchant commun.ities and <<nations>> would often have been organised
around religious and cultic activities. In antiquity as in India. we thus find
merchants in various contexts financing, wholly or in part, the erection of
temples, the performance of cult and the celebration of festivals and feasts.
The point about personal and communal relations. however, i s that they
benefit people on the inside of the networks. Outsiders, on the other hand,

suffer from higher barriers to entry into the markct3

Together the set of strategies outlined here provided a complex and
resistant foundation for trade. But the result was to consolidate tendencies
towards market segmentation where economic flows seem to run in separate.

"> R. Dana. Sociesy. Economy aud 1he Market. CommercilJ/isarion ;, Rural Bent;al, 1760
/8(}(). New Delhi 2000. 208-16. is suong on this aspect of traditional Indi
an markets.
91 Philoswuus. Vit. Apol.. 4. 32. J. Rouge. Commc:ne maritime cit.. 417-19 and 454.

mistakenly took such examples as indic;uive of a form of markec whidl depended on a more
elabora
t e and regular form of organisation. Quite he reverse. he oppornmistic merchant is
precisely the cmbodimc1lt of the speculative behaviour produced by baz31I stntcgi'(.$. F.
Kudliell, Die Rolle dt-r Konlwrn'n:::. im untiken Ct'sclliiftsieJ)I!Il, MBAH, 13.1 (1994). 1-39,

makes some interesriog observariors on lhe :1goniSlic approach of ancient merchants.

42Cic. 1/ Verr, 5. 161.
n A. Grcif. Comracs EnjOrc{labiJity and Economic

lnstinaions in larly Trtuic: The MagJIJ';b;

Traders' Coolirion. AER. 83.3 (1993). 525-548. C. A. Bayly. Rulers. Townsmen a,uJ Bauuus,

Oxford l983. chaps. 10-11, exattU.nes 1he !'el.igious and cuirural practjces of Indian merchants.
FQr j,n(iquity these phenomena hwe been Lre:lfed most f\tlly by N. Rauh. 111e Sacred /Jonds of
Commerfe. R{ligion. &:onomy, cmd Trade Society ar HelhwistU
: Ronum Ddos, 166-87 B.C..
Ant$tcrdam 1993 and 0. van Nijf. 771e Civic'- Ubrld ofProfessional Assudations in the Roman
as:. Leiden 1997.

84

PE1'F.R FlBIGER BA'<(;

compruunentalised channels and networks. The bazaar represented a panicular

comme.rcial regime which produced its own patterns of behaviour. The bazaar.
to conclude, is the model of agrarian markets we have been looking for"'.

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