CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)

Concept of Marriage
In re: Bucana (ACTUAL CASE NO DIGEST KASI)

FACTS: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar,

Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, dated
February 26, 1976, respondent Notary Public Rufillo D.
Bucana was required by this Court in its Resolution of March
23, 1976, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice,
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having
notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an
Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and
Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses
agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both
parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal
actions against them" and that the afore-mentioned
Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement
to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without
objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law
because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation,
admitting that he notarized the afore-mentioned document
and that the Agreement is "immoral and against public
policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in
question was Prepared by his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero
without his previous knowledge; that when said document
was presented to him for signature after it was signed by the
parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the
parties that the document was immoral; that he placed the
said document on his table among his files and more than a
week later, he asked his clerk where the document was for
the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he found that
the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the
office; that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the
parties, but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in
their respective residences; that he must have inadvertently
notarized the same in view of the numerous documents on
his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as his
father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing
contentions of respondent were corroborated substantially by
the separate sworn statements of his clerk, Lucia D.
Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20,
1976. 1
There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is
contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an
inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of
the family and of society without which there could be neither
civilization nor progress. 2

commission of a crime. A notary public, by virtue of the

nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due
care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v.
Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts
to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal
enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has
been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the
commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held
responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the
bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful
or immoral character may be held to account by the court
even to the extent of disbarment."
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency,
claiming that the notarization of the questioned document
was due to his negligence. We find, however, that the
aforementioned document could not have been notarized if
the respondent had only exercised the requisite care
required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public.
WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is
guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the office
of not try public for a period of six (6) months, with the
admonition that a repetition of the same or a similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

Legal Capacity Sex

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007.
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Rommel Silverio filed a
petition to change his first name (to Mely) and sex (to
female) in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. He alleges to be a male transsexual and that he has
always identified more with girls since childhood. After
undergoing breast augmentation, hormone treatment and
psychological examination, on January 27, 2001, he finally
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok.
The petition was granted by the trial court, but was reversed
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, and Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court allow petitioner to change
his name and sex in his birth certificate. NO.
RATIO: A persons first name cannot be changed because of
sex reassignment. The State has an interest in the names
carried by individuals and entities for the purpose of
identification. Change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are thus controlled by statute.

The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an

agreement between the husband and the wife to take unto
himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous
relations with another man, without opposition from either
one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit
bigamy. 3 This is not only immoral but in effect abets the

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Art. 376 of the Civil Code1 was amended by R.A. 9048.2
Section 1 of the said law provides:
Section 1. Authority to
Correct
Clerical
or
Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in
a civil register shall be
changed or corrected
without a judicial order,
except for clerical or
typographical errors and
change of first name or
nickname which can be
corrected or changed by
the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar
or consul general in
accordance with the
provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules
and regulations.
Thus, the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar, assuming it
could be legally done, instead of the trial
court.
Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and
official name worked no prejudice towards him.
R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a
change of first name may be allowed:
1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
2. First name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by petitioner and has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
3. Change will avoid confusion.3
Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true name. His basis in
praying for the change of his first name was the sex
reassignment to make his name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into. A change of name does
not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. The law does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, granting the
petition may only create complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries correctable under
Rule 108 and Art. 412 of the Civil Code are found in Articles
407 and 408 of the same Code.4 No reasonable
interpretation of the provisions can justify a conclusion that
they cover correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

1 No person can change his name or surname without judicial

authority

2 Clerical Error Law

To correct means to make or set aright; to remove the faults

or error. To change means to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute. The birth certificate of Silverio
contained no error. No correction is necessary.

22. Republic v. Cagandahan

Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of
Gender not a mere typographical or clerical error, hence
subject to judicial order.
Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. Petitioner further
alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus,
she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that
her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both male
and female organs!) Court granted petition, to which the
OSG countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does
not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does
not make her a male, and that the local civil registrar should
be impleaded as an indispensable party .
Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction
of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her
sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins.
Ratio: Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by R.A. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical
errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No.
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the

4 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.Art. 408. The
following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery
of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

3 Section 4, Republic Act 9048.

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civil register. In short, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has
this unique condition which makes her feel and appear like a
man. In other words, the Court respects her congenital
condition and her mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with her unordinary state and
thus help make her life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. As for her change of name under
Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we
find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in her birth
certificate from female to male.
Prior existing marriage

Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy

Issue: Sempio-Dy guilty of GADALEJ?

Held: No. Petition dismissed.
There is no need for LILIA to prove that her 1 st marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties, because
even assuming this to be so, marriage WILL NOT BE VOID
but merely voidable, and therefore VALID until annulled.
Since there was no annulment yet, it is clear that when she
married Karl Wiegel, she was still validly married to Maxion.
Thus, her marriage to Karl is VOID.
There is likewise no need to introduce evidence about the
existing prior marriage of Maxion at the time he and LILIA
were married, because even if their marriage was void, a
judicial declaration of such fact is necessary. Without the
judicial declaration, LILIA (for all legal intents and purposes)
was still regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with Karl Wiegel. Thus, marriage to
Karl would still be regarded as VOID under the law.

143 SCRA 499 (1986)

Facts:

24. TY v. CA

Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration

of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner
LILIA) on the ground of LILIAs previous existing
marriage to Eduardo Maxion.

LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to

Maxion but claimed that their marriage was null and
void because she and Maxion were allegedly forced
to enter said marital union.

During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and

Karl Wiegel was the status of the first marriage
(void or voidable?).

LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and

asked the court for an opportunity to present
evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2)
Maxion, at the time of their marriage, was already
married to someone else.

Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f

evidence because the existence of force exerted on
LILIA and Maxion had already been agreed upon.

LILIA assailed Sempio-Dys Orders (compelling to

submit the case for resolution based on agreed
facts and denying motion to present evidence in
her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging
GADALEJ.

FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina

Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila.
Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null
and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The
church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to
Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the
judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also
had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and
void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when
they got married. He also averred that at the time he
married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He
stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to
petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted
without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on
April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question
this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner
also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which
declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria
Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his
church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977.

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These documents were submitted as evidence during trial
and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient
proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of
private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979,
before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and
void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony
on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996,
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into
validly
HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before a subsequent
marriage can be contracted is not applicable in the present
case. In the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this
case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not
quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding
that despite private respondents deceit and perfidy in
contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from
her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil
effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three
years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now
has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as
untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed
petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find
there was a marriage license, though it was the same license
issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the
church rites.
Obviously, the church ceremony was
confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends,
the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the
validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a
technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter
as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such
failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her
defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the
interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage,
as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality.
In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied
with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used
legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not
detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church
wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that

the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the
first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing
aside this possible defense of the defendant below which
undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which
was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But
we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity,
if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the
CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee
on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first
met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiance
Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who
was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three
children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as
messages some which read I love you, I miss you, or
Meet you at Megamall. He also noticed that Irene habitually
went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work.
When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept
at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy
with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and
Respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001
complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at
which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings. Complainant later found a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his
wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondents car
and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street,
New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be
the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the
Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make
use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime
involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was
accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised
Penal Code, Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium

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period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that Marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state. Respondents grossly
immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws,
that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court
declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Beso v. Daguman
FACTS: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman,
Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction and of
negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Judge Daguman is a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar. He solemnized the marriage of Beso in his residence
in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daguman is liable for solemnizing
marriage outside his area of jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita
Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize
marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his
area of jurisdiction.
There are only 3 instances, as provided by Article 8 of the
FC, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge
outside of his chambers or at a place other than his sala, to
wit:
1.when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point
of death;
2.when the residence of either party is located in a remote
place;
3.where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either Beso or his
fianc Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to the Judge that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his
sala. What, in fact appears on record is that respondent
Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage because Beso was an overseas worker.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisites laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official
to administrative liability.

27 Aranes v Occiano
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law in a letter complaint because said judge

solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with Dominador

Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the
requisite marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the
marriage lived together as husband and wife for many years
but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him
because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise
deprived of receiving Orobias pension from the navy.
In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a
Juan Arroyo asked him to solemnize the marriage between
the parties on the assurance that all the necessary
documents were complete.He agreed to conduct the
wedding at Nabua because Orobia suffered from a stroke
and couldnt travel to Balatan. On the day of the wedding,
he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he
informed the parties that their marriage will be a nullity and
had wanted to move the date of the wedding but out of
human compassion decided to continue because the visitors
were already coming in, the delivery of provisions for the
reception, the possibility of further aggravating Orobias
condition (nastroke) and the parties assured him that they
will give him the license the afternoon of the same day. No
license was ever delivered.
Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault
BUT the Office of the Court Administrator still found the judge
guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction and was fined 5K.
ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct?
HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as
defined by the Supreme Court. Judge Occiano only had
jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in Balatan and not Nabua
and he should be held administratively liable for violating the
law on marriage. He should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license because
thats considered a gross ignorance of the law.
The fact of desistance of Aranes doesnt exculpate him from
liability. Disciplinary actions like this arent private matters,
the Court has the power to discipline judges.

28. NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY

Facts:
Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative
case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy
for gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of
the law. First, he solemnized a wedding despite knowing
that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, he performed another marriage ceremony outside
his courts jurisdiction. His jurisdiction was Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the wedding at
his residence in Dapa.
Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the wedding of a married man because he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge
confirming the fact that the husband has not seen his first
wife for almost 7 years. Regarding the second charge, he
did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the FC (marriage may be
solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the courts jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The marriage
shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or
in open court, in the churchand not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in

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remote placesor where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement

The issue on psychological incapacity is mooted by the

conclusion that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized.

Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a
married man on the basis of an affidavit of presumptive
death? NO

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent.

Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other

wedding outside his courts jurisdiction? NO
Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death
Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in the FC for the declaration of the death of the
absentee. Absent this judicial declaration, the husband
remains married to his first wife. Such neglect or ignorance
of the law has resulted in a bigamous marriage under Article
35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not falling under Art.
41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided under Art.
7. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite, which while not affecting the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.
Marriage License
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973.
They were blessed with 2 children. Filipina filed a petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition,
which was later on affirmed by the CA. MR was denied as
well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner, for the first
time, is raising the issue that there is an absence of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The date of
issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate is
September 14, 1974, while the date of the celebration of the
marriage is on November 15, 1973.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the
time of the ceremony
Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year
after the ceremony took place. Therefore, the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of
the Civil Code is applicable in this case. There being no
claim of an exceptional character, he purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Article 72-79 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is VOID from the
beginning.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in

1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint,
respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that
the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming
that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract
to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief
and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own
child.
ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked. However, other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

Page 6 of 10

CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)

When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause is the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Marriages exempt from marriage license
Ninal v. Badayog
Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license
doctrine. Case is also discussed under declaration of nullity.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE,
INGRID, ARCHIE &
PEPITO NIAL, JR.) . Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
Pepitos death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect their
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code
was silent, obscure and inefficient in resolving: a) petitioners
cause of action, b) WON Pepitos second marriage was null
and void and c) WON the plaintiffs are stopped from
assailing the validity of the 2nd marriage considering it was
dissolved by Pepitos death. He ruled that the action should
have been filed before Pepitos death.
Issue: WON they Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog were
exempt from a marriage license.
Held: No. Not having met the marriagle license requirement,
their marriage is null and void.

Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 58. The requirement and issuance of marriage license
is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
as a basic "autonomous social institution."
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.
There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma
Badayog was celebrated without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that
we now desire to marry each other." The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation
is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant
the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the
future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it
be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous
period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed
on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.

Page 7 of 10

CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO)

In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayogs marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their fiveyear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only

by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a

subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".

Page 8 of 10

BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ

Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22,
1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During
that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married
however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived
together as husband and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of
the law against Sanchez.

ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid?

RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of marital cohabitation) to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1.

The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2.

The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3.

The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4.

The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and

5.

The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed
on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. Respondent Judge
knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage
null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged
him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting
previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The
fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA
likewise affirmed. But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage void ab initio???
RULING: YES.

The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be
valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her
by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited
Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.