CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner, vs. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO

ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN
ROQUE, respondents.

Facts: Concepcion Roque filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance of a
parcel of land which she claims to be the co-owner of. Defendants denied the claim of
Concepcion as a co-owner. The RTC of malolos decided in favor of Concepcion. However,
upon appeal CA dismissed the case and the appeal stating that:
"While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendants, after denying
plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership, asserted that they are the exclusive and sole owners
of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case has become one of
ownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as such from the moment an
alleged co-owner asserts an adverse title. The action that may be brought by an aggrieved
co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession (Jardin vs.
Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532, 536, 537; Paner vs. Gaspar, 3 CA Rep. 155, 158)." (Emphasis
supplied).
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the Intermediate Appellate Court's
decision appears to imply that from the moment respondents (defendants below) alleged
absolute and exclusive ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1549 in their Answer, the trial
court should have immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for partition and
petitioner (plaintiff below), if she so desired, should have refiled the case but this time as
an accion reinvindicatoria. Taking this analysis a step further should the reivindicatory
action prosper i.e., a co-ownership relation is found to have existed between the parties
a second action for partition would still have to be instituted in order to effect division of
the property among the co-owners.

ISSUE: WON a complaint for partition with Specific performance merits dismissal once the
other party claims to have an adverse title over the property subject for partition.
HELD: NEGATIVE
The Supreme Court held that:
An action for partition which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner
of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to
be co-owners may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is
the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned. Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is
the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and
defendant(s) i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

DELIMA V. CA- Repudiation of Co-ownership

Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation
of the trust or co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.

FACTS:

This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their
parent who had acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died,
Respondent Galileo allegedly paid the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the
estate tax. Later on, he executed an affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired
TCT over it. 10 years after the TCT was issued, the other heirs instituted this action for
reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by
prescription.

RULING:
The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove
the 4 requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to
the other owners (3) adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.
What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be
sufficient compliance with the notice requirement above.
AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownership
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other
cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.

FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their
father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They
initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on
equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios
family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner demanded from private
respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds
thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale
of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial.
Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife
in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the
motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not
appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the
respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the
proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from
the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by
the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then
remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the
pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pretrial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is
clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to
appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the
discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of
the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of the pretrial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when
they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house
and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at
any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale
shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot
agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and
its proceeds accordingly distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the
respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest
from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment
of the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial
court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE CASTRO, EFRINA DE
CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court
Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution dated March
15, 1996, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan
De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs.
They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010
located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty
nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale
was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is
the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected only his
undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent
to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of
jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the motion,
dismissed the complaint in an Order dated August 18, 1984.
On motion for
reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994, reconsidered the
dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion
for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari
anchored on the following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take
cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been decided with finality by the
Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority in
taking cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals, finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the petition in a Decision
dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 1996. Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting of the writ of certiorari
in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M). THE CAUSES OF ACTION
HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
(BR. 31) MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A FINAL DECISION BY THE HON.
SUPREME COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN
IT SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) DATED
OCTOBER 4, 1994, AND THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR. 79)
INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE AGAINST TCMC WHEN IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A FINAL
ORDER THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL. vs.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET. AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF,
SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN
IT CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE OF RES JUDICATA IN
THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not the Regional Trial
Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether or not
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court as its mode in obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Before
we dwell on the merits of this petition, it is worth noting, that for a petition for certiorari to
be granted, it must be shown that the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment,
forcertiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. [1] By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough -- it must
be grave.[2]
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of
the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. [3] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. [4] Acquiring jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to

reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the
petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence the courts jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. [5] This has
to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would be frustrated by
making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors
committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are revisable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. [6] Based
on the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellate court erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court, which earlier denied petitioners motion to dismiss,
such actuation on the part of the appellate court cannot be considered as grave abuse of
discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because certiorari is not available to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. It was petitioner who elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction
of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that courts jurisdiction in the same case. [7] To do
otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the
policy of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale. [8] Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other
disposition affects only the sellers share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what
corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since
a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for
the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for
division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the
co-owners who possessed and administered it. [9] Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. In Budlong vs.
Bondoc,[10] this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for
partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SERING v. PLAZO- Action for Ejectment
Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment.

FACTS:
Sering won an ejectment suit against Spouses Plazo and Suan. On appeal with the CFI,
respondents learned that Sering is not the sole owner of the property and they moved to
implead the other co-owners because they think that they are indispensable parties to the

case. Court granted and ordered Sering to amend complaint.

Due to the failure of the petitioner to amend the complaint, the case was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the other co-owners are indispensable to the ejecment case

HELD:
No, according to Art 478 Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment
(whether the action is forcible entry or unlawful detainer). The matter to be determined is
the prior physical possession of the plaintiff which was correctly alleged.
ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN- Co-ownership & Ejectment
A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of
including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who
is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to
himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property
provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate
and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his
allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had
been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said house and
lot was transferred in Dominadors name was when their parents were in need of money
for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated
deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the
estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was
survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC
ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also
granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of
Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana
are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the
case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir
of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana

became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by
consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one
of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring
such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is
presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation
of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
CORONEL v. CONSTANTINO- Sale of an Undivided Interest of a Property
Sale of an undivided interest of a property only binds the co-owner only up to the portion
of his/her interest; consequently he/she can only transfer ownership over the same to
other parties.

FACTS:
The disputed property was originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One half was inherited
by Emilia Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Cerefino, all surnamed
Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
Emilia sold her share of the lot to Jess C Santos and Priscilla Bernardo as evidenced by the
KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN. Santos and Bernardo then sold it to the
respondents. Petitioners built several constructions and improvements on the disputed lot.
Respondents then filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and
damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid? If yes, up to what extent?

RULING:
YES, only up to share of the land inherited by Emilia and her sons. Emilia signed only in
her behalf and not in representation of her three children thus the sale is only binding to
her share. The subject property was co-owned, pro-indiviso by petitioner Emilia together
with her petitioner sons. No proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that
existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners as never been
terminated. No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the
sale made by their mother. Since there was no partition made, Emilia is deemed to have
sold only her share of the lot which is thereof. Consequently SC declared respondents as
owner of undivided portion of the original lot which they inherited plus share (of their
) of petitioner Emilia Coronel.
(Heirs of Maninding vs CA)
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI,respondents.
FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during
his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4
children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other
hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana
Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third
time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal.
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and
was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the
registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in
the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage
license.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.