Hellenic Phil INC vs.

SIETE
FACTS:

Capt. Epifanio Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping
Co., Ltd.,
Sometime later, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he
had instructions from the owners to take over its command for unexplained
reason
Siete filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Petitioner alleged in its answer that Siete had been dismissed because of his
failure to comply with the instruction of Sultan Shipping to erase the timber load
line on the vessel and for his negligence in the discharge of the cargo at Tripoli
that endangered the vessel and stevedores.
POEA: dismissed the complaint, holding that there was valid cause for Sietes
removal.
Siete appealed to the NLRC contending that he was dismissed without even
being informed of the charges against him or given an opportunity to refute
them.
NLRC: reversed the POEA holding that the dismissal violated due process and
that the documents submitted by the petitioner were hearsay, self-serving, and
not verified.
Hellenic argues that whatever defects might have tainted the EEs dismissal
were subsequently cured when the charges against him were specified and
sufficiently discussed in the position papers submitted by the parties to the
POEA.

Issue: Whether due process was observed by the ER

HELD:
NO
The law requires that the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after.
That omission cannot be corrected by the investigation later conducted by the
POEA. As the Solicitor General correctly maintained, the due process requirement in
the dismissal process is different from the due process requirement in the POEA
proceeding. Both requirements must be separately observed.
While it is true that in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC and Rubberworld (Phils.) vs. NLRC,
the lack of due process before the dismissal of the employee was deemed corrected
by the subsequent administrative proceedings where the dismissed employee was
given a chance to be heard, those cases involved dismissals that were later proved
to be for a valid cause. The doctrine in those cases is not applicable to the case at
bar because our findings here is that the dismissal was not justified.

People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 1986
Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that SerapioAbug, private respondent herein,
"without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to
operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees
and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate
individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the
Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an
offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of
the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be
illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised
or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted
under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is
not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment
and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the
informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article
13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that,
"(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting,
contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic
rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The
presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in
consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of
the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
(of) workers."

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign
against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino
workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or
even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of
a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO, ,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA,.
G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993
Facts:
Manuel Pineda was an employee of the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy
Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC) he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989 Pineda
decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local
elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of
candidacy for the position .
His employment with the PNOC-EDC was questioned because under Section 66 of
the Election Code it provides that:
o Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
PNOC-EDC terminated his employment pursuant to Section 66 of the Election Code
and Pineda filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of
Pineda and was affirmed by the NLRC upon appeal hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the the section 66 of the Election Code applicable to all
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations?
Ruling:
Yes, The court held that that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies
to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even
those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having
an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service
Law but under the Labor Code. Therefore section 66 of the Election Code is
applicable to all employees of government-owned or controlled corporations.
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those
set forth in the Labor Code.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE T. LEOGARDO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AND VICENTE D.
ELLELINA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58494 July 5, 1989
Facts:

Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company

(PNOC). On 20 January 1978, it filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment a clearance application to dismiss/ terminate the services of
private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina for the alleged commission of a crime
(Alarm or Public Scandal).The Clearance was granted but later it was revoked
with an order for Ellelinas reinstatement.
PNOC-EDC appealed the decision but it was affirmed hence this petition for
Certiorari.PNOC-EDC allege that A) Under Article 277 of the Labor Code, the
Ministry of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over petitioner because
it is a government-owned or controlled corporation; B) Ellelina's dismissal is
valid and just because it is based upon the commission of a crime.
Minister of Labor contends that A) While the petitioner is a subsidiary of the
PNOC, it is still covered by the Labor Code and, therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor as petitioner was organized as a private
corporation under the Corporation Law and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission; B) Petitioner is estopped from assailing the Labor
Department's jurisdiction, having subjected itself to the latter when it filed
the application for clearance to terminate Ellelina's services; and
C)
Dismissal is too harsh a penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of Philippine National Oil Company-Energy
Development Corporation covered by the Labor Code even it is a governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Ruling:
Yes, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Thus, Article 277 of

the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:

The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government- owned and controlled corporations shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Those Company incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not
within its coverage of the Civil Service .However, under the present state of the law,
the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is
subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government
corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions. Therefore,
PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a
government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the
provisions of the Labor Code.

REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No.87676

December 20, 1989
Petitioner:
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Parks
Development Committee
Respondents:
The Hon. Court of Appeals and the national Parks Development
Supervisory Association &their Members
FACTS:

The NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as
the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial,
Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks
Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September21,
1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a
non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks
Development Committee, Inc.
"However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause
why its Certificate of Registration should not be suspended for. The NPDC
Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC that his Office had no objection
to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate of Registration
of NPDC.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 120, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry
(later Department)of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to
audit by the Commission on Audit and pursuant to Executive Order No. 120,

all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the
Civil Service Commission Commission.
Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of
employees holdingsupervisory positions in the different areas of the parks,
was organized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206. Two collective bargaining
agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local
Chapter No. 967)and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a
period of two years or until June 30, 1989.
On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort
Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna,
alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the
Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaint against the union to
declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers,
being government employees, have no right to strike although they may form
a union.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88-44048 praying for a declaration
of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of
its employees to strike.
HELD:
NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service
rules and regulations(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil
service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).While NPDC employees are
allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice,
there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a Labor dispute between
the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated
June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the
Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the
NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and
Employment. The petition for review is granted. The private respondents' complaint
should be filed in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council as provided in
Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 14-93

TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
SUBJECT:
GUIDELINES
ON
THE
KATARUNGANG
PAMBARANGAY
CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REVISED
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW [SECTIONS 399-422, CHAPTER VII,
TITLE I, BOOK III, R. A. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991].
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R. A. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992 and which
repealed P. D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority
granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in
the settlement of disputes within the authority of the Lupon.cralaw
In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its
effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of
certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested
by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby
issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them coming
from the Barangays:chanrobles virtual law library
I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly P. D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by
Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior recourse
thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government
offices, except in the following disputes:chanrobles virtual law library
[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities
and municipalities, unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical
entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation
proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];
[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units
adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00);
[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;