Doctrines in Civil Law

1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINES
1. Doctrine of Estoppel
DESCRIPTIONS
CASES
It is based upon the grounds of public policy,

fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own act, representations, or commitments to
the injury of one to whom they were directed
and who reasonably relied thereon. The
doctrine springs from equitable principles and
the equities in the case. It is designed to aid
the law in the administration of justice where
without its aid injustice might result. It has
been applied by this Court wherever and
whenever special circumstances of a case so
demand.
In the Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional

Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo;
New Frontier Sugar Corp., et al., G.R. No.
170352. June 1, 2011
Based on the events and circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the assailed
orders, this Court rules that MEGAN is
estopped from assailing both the authority of
Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the RTC.
While it is true, as claimed by MEGAN, that
Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only
appearing for the hearing of Passi Sugars
motion for intervention and not for the case
itself, his subsequent acts, coupled with
MEGANs inaction and negligence to repudiate
his authority, effectively bars MEGAN from
assailing the validity of the RTC proceedings
under the principle of estoppel.
Ching vs. Nicdao G.R. No. 141181, Petitioner
Ching correctly argued that he, as the
offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of
the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos
acquittal by the CA. The civil action was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action
since he did not reserve his right to institute it
separately nor did he institute the civil action
prior to the criminal action. If the accused is
acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal
from the judgment of acquittal as it would

place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended
party or the accused or both may appeal from
the judgment on the civil aspect of the case
within the period therefor.
2. Doctrine of Apparent Authority
It is a concept used in agency law that refers

to the situation that arises when a principal,
such as a corporation, indicates to a third
party that an officer or agent is authorized to
act on its behalf and the third party relies in
good faith upon such authority. It is used a
defense when implied or espress actual
authority does not exist. When the defense is
successfully raised, the principal is estopped
from denying the authority of the officer or
agent.
Philippine Realty and Holding Corp. vs. Ley

Const. and Dev. Corp./Ley Cons. and Dev.
Corp. vs. Philippine Realty and Holding Corp.,
G.R. No. 165548/G.R. No. 167879. June 13,
2011.
The Court finds that the signature of Abcede
is sufficient to bind PRHC. As its construction
manager, his very act of signing a letter
embodying the P 36 million escalation
agreements produced legal effect, even if
there was a blank space for a higher officer of
PHRC to indicate approval thereof. At the very
least, he indicated authority to make such
representation on behalf of PRHC. On direct
examination, Abcede admitted that, as the
construction manager, he represented PRHC
in running its affairs with regard to the
execution of the aforesaid projects. Abcede
had signed, on behalf of PRHC, other
documents that were almost identical to the
questioned letter-agreement. PRHC does not
question the validity of these agreements; it
thereby effectively admits that this individual
had actual authority to sign on its behalf with
respect to these construction projects.
Prudential Bank v. CA. G.R. 103957. June 14,

1993.
If a corporation knowingly permits one of its
officers, or any other agents, to do acts within
the scope of an apparent authority, and this
holds him out to the public as possessing
power to do those acts, the corporation will,
as against anyone who has in good faith dealt
with the corporation through such agents, be
estopped from denying his authority.
3. Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis
Under this doctrine, the law of the place Germann and Co. V. Donaldson, Sim and Co. 1
where a contract, specially a marriage, was Phil. 63. A power of attorney was executed in
made or celebrated, governs.
Germany giving the recipient authority to
bring an action in the Philippines. Said power
of attorney was not authenticated by a notary
public. In Germany, no such authentication
was needed, contrary to Philippines rules. The
power of attorney was properly made insofar
as form was concerned because it was
executed in Germany. There is no reason why
lex loci celebrationis should not apply.
Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236,
G.R.No.2935. March 23, 1909. Mr. Frank being
fully qualified to enter into a contract at the
place and time the contract was made, he
cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at
the place where the contract is being
enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a minor
under Philippine laws, he was nevertheless
considered an adult under the laws of the
state of Illinois,the place where the contract
was made. No rule is better settled in law

than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made. Matters connected to its
performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of its performance.
Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing
of a suit, admissibility of evidence, and
statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of
the place where the suit is brought.
4. Doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti Commissi
It is the Latin term for "law of the place where

the delict [tort] was committed"[1] in the
conflict of laws. Conflict of laws is the branch
of law regulating all lawsuits involving a
"foreign" law element where a difference in
result will occur depending on which laws are
applied. The term is often shortened to lex
loci delicti.
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA G.R. 122191.

With the widespread criticism of the
traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability
have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
"State of the most significant relationship"
rule, which in our view should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of this
case.
In applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation

and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the
claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged
in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged here in
the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the "relationship" between the parties
was centered here, although it should be
stressed that this suit is not based on mere
labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as
plaintiff below against defendant (herein
petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
Navida, et.al. vs. Dizon, Jr., et.al. G.R. No.
125078. CHIQUITA argues that the courts a
quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the cases filed before them. The Amended
Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7
million in damages for each plaintiff claimant,
which amount falls within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent
matter is the place of the alleged exposure to
DBCP, not the place of manufacture,
packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said

chemical. This is in consonance with the lex
loci delicti commisi theory in determining the
situs of a tort, which states that the law of the
place where the alleged wrong was committed
will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other
defendant
companies
also
submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
making voluntary appearances and seeking
for affirmative reliefs during the course of the
proceedings.
None
of
the
defendant
companies ever objected to the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their
persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand
of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City, respectively.
5. Doctrine of Lex Loci Rei Sitae
It is the Latin term for law of the place where

the property is situated. It is a doctrine
which states that the law governing the
transfer of title to property is dependent
upon, and varies with, the location of the
property for the purposes of the conflict of
laws. Conflict is the branch of public law
regulating all lawsuits involving a "foreign"
law element where a difference in result will
occur depending on which laws are applied.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company

v. The Collector of Internal Revenue. G.R. No.
L-46720, June 28, 1940. He extended his
activities with respect to his intangibles, so as
to avail himself of the protection and benefits
of the laws of the Philippines, in such a way as
to bring his person or property within the
reach of the Philippines, the reason for a
single place of taxation no longer obtainsprotection, benefit, and power over the
subject matter are no longer confined to
California, but also to the Philippines. In the
instant case, the actual situs of the shares of
stock is in the Philippines, the corporation
being domiciled therein. And besides, the
certificates of stock have remained in this

country up to the time when the deceased
died in California, and they were in possession
of one Syrena McKee, secretary of the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, to
whom they have been delivered and indorsed
in blank. This indorsement gave Syrena McKee
the right to vote the certificates at the general
meetings of the stockholders, to collect
dividends, and dispose of the shares in the
manner she may deem fit, without prejudice
to her liability to the owner for violation of
instructions. For all practical purposes, then,
Syrena McKee had the legal title to the
certificates of stock held in trust for the true
owner thereof. In other words, the owner
residing in California has extended here her
activities with respect to her intangibles so as
to avail herself of the protection and benefit of
the
Philippine
laws.
Accordingly,
the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Government to
tax must be upheld.
Manila Gas Corporation vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 62 Phil. 895 (1935). The
absence of flight operations to and from the
Philippines is not determinative of the source
of income or the situs of income taxation. The
test of taxability is the `source'; and the
source of an income is that activity which
produced the income. Unquestionably, the
passage documentations in these cases were
sold in the Philippines and the revenue
therefrom was derived from a business

activity
regularly
pursued
within
the
Philippines. The word `source' conveys one
essential Idea, that of origin, and the origin of
the income herein is the Philippines
6. The Operative Fact Doctrine
The law is recognized as unconstitutional but

the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to
its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play. In fact, the invocation of the operative
fact doctrine is an admission that the law is
unconstitutional.
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,

March 14, 2008, G.R. No. 166006. The
doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Francisco I. Chavez v.
National Housing
Authority, R-II Builders, Inc., R-II Holdings, Inc.,
Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., and Mr.
Reghis Romero II. G.R. No. 164527, August
15, 2007. When the petitioner filed the case,
the JVA had already been terminated by virtue

of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties
and rights in question after the passage of
around 10 years from the start of the projects
implementation cannot be disturbed or
questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor
General at the time SMDRP was formulated,
had ample opportunity to question the said
project, but did not do so. The moment to
challenge has passed.
7. Doctrine of Relations
That principle of law by which an act done at

one time is considered by a fiction of law to
have been done at some antecedent period. It
is a doctrine which, although of equitable
origin, has a well-recognized application to
proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to
promote the ends of justice or to prevent
injustice end the occurrence of injuries where
otherwise there would be no remedy. The
doctrine,
when
invoked,
must
have
connection with actual fact, must be based on
some antecedent lawful rights. It has also
been referred to as "the doctrine of relation
back.
Alhambra Cigra vs SEC, G.R. No. L-23606, July

29, 1968. "Since the privilege of extension is
purely statutory, all of the statutory conditions
precedent must be complied with in order that
the extension may be effectuated. And,
generally these conditions must be complied
with, and the steps necessary to effect the
extension must be taken, during the life of the
corporation, and before the expiration of the
term of existence as original fixed by its
charter or the general law, since, as a rule,
the corporation is ipso facto dissolved as soon
as that time expires. So where the extension
is by amendment of the articles of
incorporation, the amendment must be
adopted before that time. And, similarly, the
filing and recording of a certificate of
extension after that time cannot relate back
to the date of the passage of a resolution by
the stockholders in favor of the extension so
as to save the life of the corporation. The
contrary is true, however, and the doctrine of
relation will apply, where the delay is due to

the neglect of the officer with whom the
certificate is required to be filed, or to a
wrongful refusal on his part to receive it. And
statutes in some states specifically provide
that a renewal may be had within a specified
time before or after the time fixed for the
termination of the corporate existence
8. Fair Use Doctrine
The general public is given the right to

reproduce a work subject to specific
limitations. Under Philippine law, fair use of a
work for criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, including multiple copies for
classroom use, scholarship, research and
similar purposes does not infringe copyright.
Fair use has no exact definition under the law.
However, authorities have agreed on the
following criteria enumerated in sec. 185.1 of
the Code:
1.) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit
educational purposes; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
2.) The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The Philippines has not had any case brought

before the courts to challenge fair use in this
context. To illustrate the point, we must draw
on American court decisions. In Princeton
University vs. Michigan Document Service,
Inc. (unreported, 1992), the U.S. Court did not
consider photocopying of materials for
compilation in course packs as fair use
because photocopying was done by a
commercial vendor. On the other hand, in
another case, the U.S. Court tended towards
the more fundamental aim of protecting the
progress of science and the arts. In Williams
vs. Wilkins Co. (487 F2d 1345) it gave the
opinion that medical science would be
seriously hurt if library photocopying was
stopped.
Traditionally, fair use is more easily accepted

when the purpose of copying is educational in
character and purpose than when it is
commercial or for profit. It does not mean,
however, that all copying for educational or
classroom purposes is fair use.
9. Fraus Et Jus Nunquam Cohabitant
Fraud and Justice never agree together. A Republic v. CA, G.R. No. L-60169, March 23,
maxim meaning that fraud corrupts justice 1990. Of course, we are well aware of the rule
regardless of the good faith or just intentions reiterated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Santos, that, generally, the State cannot be
put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. In that very case, however,
citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went further by
saying:
Nevertheless, the government must not be
allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously
with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations xxx, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private
individuals
Republic of the Philippines v. Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., Et al., Spouses Eduardo and
Arcelita Marquez and Rural Bank Of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. G.R. No. 155394., February 17,
2005. In any event, the verification survey
conducted by Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came almost
twenty-two (22) years after the February 28,

1966 certification of Jose Mendigoria; more
than twenty-one (21) years after the issuance
of Agunoy Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450 on
January 18, 1967 and its registration as
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 on
February 6, 1967; and more than eight (8)
years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon
the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.,
the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin
Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for about half a
decade thereafter, ownership over the
properties transferred from one buyer to
another, with each and every transferee
enjoying the presumption of good faith. If
only on this score alone that the present
petition must fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioners
submission that no amount of legal
technicality may serve as a solid foundation
for the enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is
thus understandable why petitioner chants
the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by
petitioner Republic, as well as in those other
cases where the doctrine of fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant was applied against a
patent and title procured thru fraud or
misrepresentation, we note that the land
covered thereby is either a part of the forest

zone which is definitely non-disposable, as in
Animas, or that said patent and title are still in
the name of the person who committed the
fraud or misrepresentation, as in Acot,
Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del Mundo and
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al. and, in
either instance, there were yet no innocent
third parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioners
own judicial admission, the lots in dispute are
no longer part of the public domain, and there
are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and
enjoying the presumption of good faith. This
brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino
vs. Court of Appeals and the cases therein
cited:
Even on the supposition that the sale was
void, the general rule that the direct result of
a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on
the theory that the spring cannot rise higher
than its source) cannot apply here for We are
confronted with the functionings of the
Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine
to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may become the
ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title
has already been transferred from the name
of the true owner to the name of the forger or
the name indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here,

there is no forger to speak of. The remark of
Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria about the
abandonment
by
Eusebio
Perez
and
Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark
may even turn out to be the truth. What
petitioner perceives as fraud may be nothing
more than the differences of professional
opinions between Land Inspector Jose
Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas. But regardless of who between
the two is correct, the hard reality is that the
properties in question are no longer floating
objects on a spring that cannot rise higher
than its source, as they are now very much
ashore and firmly standing on the high solid
ground of the Torrens system of land
registration.
10.
Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet
Literally meaning "no one gives what he

doesn't have" is a legal rule, sometimes called
the nemo dat rule, that states that the
purchase of a possession from someone who
has no ownership right to it also denies the
purchaser any ownership title.
Egao vs CA, G.R. No. L-79787. June 29, 1989.

Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected
within the prohibited five (5) year period are
null and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No
title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which
could be validly transferred to herein
respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat
Also, where goods are sold by a person who is quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that
not their owner, and who does not sell them which does not belong to him).
under the authority or with the consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to
While the government has not taken steps
the goods than the seller had, unless the

owner of goods is by his conduct precluded to assert its title, by reversion, to a
from denying the seller's authority to sell.
homestead sold in violation of the Public Land
Act, the vendor or his heirs is better entitled
to the possession of the said, the vendee
being in no better situation than any intruder.
Accordingly, respondents who are not
innocent purchasers for value have no
standing to question petitioners' right to the
land and to file an action for quieting of title.
Del Rosario v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 187056,
September 20, 2010. Since the donation in
this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is
that such kind of donation is deemed
perfected from the moment the donor learned
of the donees acceptance of the donation.
The acceptance makes the donee the
absolute owner of the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was
irrevocable or one given inter vivos,
Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by
then, he had no more rights to assign. He
could not give what he no longer had. Nemo
dat quod non habet.
The trial court cannot be faulted for
passing upon, in a petition for probate of what
was initially supposed to be a donation mortis

causa, the validity of the document as a
donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of
the donors subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Moreover, in opposing
the petition for probate and in putting the
validity of the deed of assignment squarely in
issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her
may not now claim that the trial court
improperly allowed a collateral attack on such
assignment.
11.
Doctrine of Processual
Presumption
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is and Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait v. Ma.
that foreign law is the same as ours.
Josefa Echin. G.R. No. 178551, October 11,
2010. In the present case, the employment
contract signed by Gran specifically states
that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes
for
termination,
termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by
the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to
the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is treated as a question of

fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove
the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus,
the International Law doctrine of presumedidentity approach or processual presumption
comes into play.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals and C.F. Sharp & Company Inc., G.R.
No. 112573. February 9, 1995. Alternatively in
the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese law, the presumption of identity or
similarity
or
the
so-called
processual
presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed
to be similar with the Philippine law on service
of summons on a private foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines. Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if
the defendant is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines, service may be
made: (1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that
effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents
within the Philippines. In as much as SHARP
was admittedly doing business in Japan
through its four duly registered branches at

the time the collection suit against it was
filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a
resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable
to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and
may be deemed to have assented to the said
courts' lawful methods of serving process. 27
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of
summons on it by the Japanese Court was
valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.
We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary
damages to be without merit. We find no
evidence that would justify an award for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary
damages warranted. Under Article 2234 of the
Civil Code, before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damaged. There
being
no
such
proof
presented
by
NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be
adjudged in its favor.
12.
The Renvoi Doctrine
The doctrine whereby a jural matter is

presented which the conflict of laws rules of
the forum refer to a foreign law which in turn,
refers the matter back to the law of the forum
or a third state. When reference is made back
to the law of the forum, this is said to be
"remission" while reference to a third state is
called "transmission."
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward

E. Christensen, Deceased. Adolfo C. Aznar,
Executor and Lucy Christensen, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, v.
Helen Christensen Garcia. G.R. No. L-16749,
January 31, 1963. It is argued on executors
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was
a citizen of the State of California, the internal
law thereof, which is that given in the
Kaufman
case,
should
govern
the
determination
of
the validity
of
the
testamentary provisions of Christensens will,
such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of
the decedents domicile, which is the
Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil
Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the
law on succ ession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to

the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
Testate Estate of Bohanan v Bohanan, et al.
106 Phil. 997. Since the laws of the State of
Nevada allow the testator to dispose of all his
property
according
to
his
will,
his
testamentary dispositions depriving his wife
and children of what should be their legitimes
under Philippine laws, should be respected
and the project of partition made in
accordance with his testamentary dispositions
respected, and with the project of partition
made in accordance with his testamentary
dispositions approved.
13.
Doctrine of Nullum Tempus
Occurrit Regi
It is the Latin of "no time runs against the

king", sometimes abbreviated nullum tempus.
It states that the crown is not subject to
statute of limitations. This means that the
crown can proceed with actions that would be
barred if brought by an individual due to the
passage of time.
Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil 693.

If the
statute of limitation or prescription cannot run
against the state, it is difficult to understand
how in the same action they may be used as a
defense against a public officer who has been
forcibly, with threats and intimidation, ousted
from a public office by the Government itself
as was done in the present case. The principle
that acts of limitation do not bind the King
(the State) or the people, applies to
proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being
that the representative of the state may file
an information on behalf of the people at any

time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar
to the proceeding, in conformity with the
maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. For the
state to claim that the statutes of limitation
do not apply to it and yet insist that it may
plead such statutes to bar the action of quo
warranto brought by one of its public officials
whom it itself has ousted from office, appears
to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable, and
not within the contemplation of sound
jurisprudence.
Mindanao Development Authority, now the
Southern
Philippines
Development
Administration v. The Court of Appeals and
Francisco and Bansing. G.R. No. L-49087, April
5, 1982. In any event, the real plaintiff in this
case is the Republic of the Philippines and
prescription does not run against the State
(De la Vina vs. Government of the P.I., 65 Phil.
262, 265; Republic vs. Ruiz, L-23712, April 29,
1968, 23 SCRA 348).
The maxim is nullum tempus occurrit regi or
nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae (lapse of
time does not bar the right of the crown or
lapse
of
time
does
not
bar
the
commonwealth). The rule is now embodied in
article 1108(4) of the Civil Code.
It is a maxim of great antiquity in English law.
The best reason for its existence is the great
public policy of preserving public rights and

property from damage and loss through the
negligence of public officers. (34 Am Jur. 301;
Ballentines's Law Dictionary, p. 891; U.S. vs.
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
Co., 118 U.S. 120,125).
Thus, the right of reversion or reconveyance
to the State of lands fraudulently registered or
not susceptible of private appropriation or
acquisition does not prescribe (Martines vs.
Court of Appeals, L-31271, April 29, 1974, 56
SCRA 647, 655; Republic vs. Ramos, 117 Phil.
45, 49).
The government officials concerned were
negligent in not intervening in the land
registration proceeding or in not promptly
asking Ang Banging to reconvey the disputed
lot to the Commonwealth or to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Such negligence does not prejudice the State.
The negligence or omissions of public officers
as to their public duties will not work an
estoppel against the State (10 R.C.L. 705,
cited in Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Unson, 50 Phil.
981, 990; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil. 653,
656; People vs. Ventura, 114 Phil. 162, 169).
14.
Doctrine of Indefeasibility of
Torrens Titles
A doctrine that a certificate of title, once De Pedro vs Romasan, GR 158002. According

registered,
should
not
thereafter
be to the report, the land claimed by the
impugned,
altered,
changed,
modified, petitioners was covered by the title under the
enlarged or diminished except in a direct name
of
respondent
corporation,
the
proceeding permitted by law.
petitioners claim for damages had no leg to
stand on.
15.
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Fiction
The doctrine used whenever a court finds that

a corporate fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, or to confuse legitimate issues,
or that a corporation is the mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person or where the
corporation id so organized and controlled.
One of the advantages of a corporate form of
business organization is the limitation of an
investors liability to the amount of the
investment.
This feature flows from the legal theory that a
corporate entity is separate and distinct from
its stockholders. However, the statutorily
granted privilege of a corporate veil may be
used only for legitimate purposes.
San Juan Structural v. Court of Appeals 296

SCRA 631(1998). The Court finds no reason to
pierce the corporate veil of Respondent
Motorich. Petitioner utterly failed to establish
that said corporation was formed, or that it is
operated, for the purpose of shielding any
alleged fraudulent or illegal activities of its
officers or stockholders, or that the said veil
was used to conceal fraud, illegality or
inequity at the expense of third persons like
petitioner. Veil can only be disregarded when
it is utilized as a shield to commit fraud,
illegality
or
inequity,
defeat
public
convenience, confuse legitimate issues or
serve as a mere alter ego or business conduit
of a person or an instrumentality, agency or
adjunct of another corporation.
David Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., G.R. L-3869,
January 31, 1952. During war, we may pierce
the veil of corporate identity, and go to the
very nationality of the controlling stockholders
regardless of where the incorporation had
been made. Thus a German-controlled
corporation, even if incorporated in the
Philippines, was considered an enemy
corporation during the war for the purpose of
freezing its assets. A contrary rule may
endanger Philippine security.

16.
The de facto Corporation Doctrine
Formulate to safeguard the security of

commercial transactions whenever they
involve the corporation. Parties dealing with
said corporation are secured by the fact that
the transactions entered into with said
corporations may be sued upon and they can
recover. That is why aside from the other two
requisites there must be a set of officers (i.e.
assumption of corporate powers) or directors
because of the principle that a corporation
can only act through its officers.
Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of

Southern Philippines, Inc. v Northeastern
Mindanao Mission of Seventh Day Adventist,
Inc. G.R. No. 150416 Juy 21, 2006. The de
facto doctrine thus effects a compromise
between two conflicting public interest[s]the
one opposed to an unauthorized assumption
of corporate privileges; the other in favor of
doing justice to the parties and of establishing
a general assurance of security in business
dealing with corporations.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners
arguments anchored on their supposed de
facto status hold no water. We are convinced
that there was no donation to petitioners or
their supposed predecessor-in-interest.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a Certificate
of Title is generally a conclusive evidence of
[ownership] of the land. There is that strong
and solid presumption that titles were legally
issued and that they are valid.
It is
irrevocable and indefeasible and the duty of
the Court is to see to it that the title is
maintained and respected unless challenged
in a direct proceeding. The title shall be
received as evidence in all the Courts and
shall be conclusive as to all matters contained
therein.
According to Art. 1477 of the Civil Code, the

ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof. Here, transfer
of ownership from the spouses Cosio to SDANEMM was made upon constructive delivery
of the property on February 28, 1980 when
the sale was made through a public
instrument. TCT No. 4468 was thereafter
issued and it remains in the name of SDANEMM.
17.
Unjust Enrichment
The principle that no person may unjustly

enrich himself at the expense of another
(Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari
potest) is embodied in Article 22 of the New
Civil Code. There is unjust enrichment when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2)
such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another. The main objective
of the principle of unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching oneself at the
expense of another. It is commonly accepted
that this doctrine simply means that a person
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at anothers expense.
Chieng vs. Spouses Santos, GR 169647,

August 3,
2007. The principle of unjust
enrichment obliges the respondents to pay
the remaining balance of the loan plus
interest. Relieving the respondents of their
obligation to pay the balance of the loan
would, indeed, be to sanction unjust
enrichment in favor of respondents and cause
unjust poverty to petitioner.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of
justice and equity, we hold, pro hac vice, that
respondents are still liable to pay the
remaining balance of the loan. Respondents
Eulogio and Teresita Santos are hereby
ORDERED to pay petitioner Antonio Chieng,
substituted by William Chieng, the balance of
the loan amounting to P93,000.00, plus legal
interest of 12% per annum from 30 July 1992
up to the finality of this Decision, and an
additional legal interest of 12% per annum

from the finality of this Decision up to its
satisfaction.
18.
Pari Delicto
A doctrine that provides that courts will not

enforce an invalid contract and that no party
can recover in an action where it is necessary
to prove the existence of an illegal contract in
order to make his or her case.
Hulst vs. PR Builders Inc., GR 156364,

September 3, 2007. A universal doctrine
which holds that no action arises, in equity or
at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation; and where the
parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief
of any kind will be given to one against the
other. This rule, however, is subject to
exceptions that permit the return of that
which may have been given under a void
contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 14111412, Civil Code); (b) the debtor who pays
usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil Code); (c)
the party repudiating the void contract before
the illegal purpose is accomplished or before
damage is caused to a third person and if
public interest is sub served by allowing
recovery (Art. 1414, Civil Code); (d)the
incapacitated party if the interest of justice so
demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code); (e) the party
for whose protection the prohibition by law is
intended if the agreement is not illegal per se
but merely prohibited and if public policy
would be enhanced by permitting recovery
(Art. 1416, Civil Code); and (f) the party for
whose benefit the law has been intended such
as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)

and labor laws (Arts.1418-1419, Civil Code).
Menchavez vs. Teves, G.R. No. 153201.
January 26, 2005. Avoid contract is deemed
legally nonexistent.
It produces no legal
effect. As a general rule, courts leave parties
to such a contract as they are, because they
are in pari delicto or equally at fault. Neither
party is entitled to legal protection.
A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it
produces no civil effect. It does not create,
modify or extinguish a juridical relation.[24]
Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the
aid of the law; the courts leave them as they
are, because they are deemed in pari delicto
or in equal fault. To this rule, however, there
are exceptions that permit the return of that
which may have been given under a void
contract. One of the exceptions is found in
Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover what
he has given by virtue of the contract, or
demand the performance of the others
undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties

is at fault, he cannot recover what he has
given by reason of the contract, or ask for the
fulfillment of what has been promised him.
The other, who is not at fault, may demand
the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply with his promise.
On this premise, respondent contends that he
can recover from petitioners, because he is an
innocent party to the Contract of Lease.
Petitioners allegedly induced him to enter into
it through serious misrepresentation
19.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Latin for "the thing speaks for itself," a

doctrine of law that one is presumed to be
negligent if he/she/it had exclusive control of
whatever caused the injury even though there
is no specific evidence of an act of
negligence, and without negligence the
accident would not have happened.
Professional
Services
Inc.
vs.
Agana,
GR 126297, January 31, 2007;
It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of
an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make
out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present
a question of fact for defendant to meet with
an explanation. Stated differently, where the
thing which caused the injury, without the
fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such
that it should not have occurred if he, having
such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation that the injury arose from the
defendants want of care, and the burden of
proof is shifted to him to establish that he has
observed due care and diligence. From the

foregoing statements of the rule, the
requisites for the applicability of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of
an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the control and management
of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such
that in the ordinary course of things, would
not have happened if those who had control
or management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of
the
foregoing
requisites,
the
most
instrumentalist the control and management
of the thing which caused the injury. In this
jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law, hence, does not per se create
or constitute an independent or separate
ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary
rule. In other words, mere invocation and
application of the doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Joaquinita P. Capili v. SPS. Dominador Cardana
and Rosalita Cardana. G.R. No. 157906,
November 2, 2006. The fact, however, that
respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a
result of the dead and rotting tree within the
schools premises shows that the tree was
indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing
by and calls for application of the principle of
res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where
(1) the accident was of such character as to

warrant an inference that it would not have
happened
except
for
the
defendants
negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive management or control of the
person
charged
with
the
negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,15 this Court held:
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been
explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or
presumed, and while the mere happening of
an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was
due to negligence on defendants part, under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for
itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may

be such as to raise a presumption, or at least
permit an inference of negligence on the part
of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
Where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as
in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury
arose from or was caused by the defendants
want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is that petitioners negligence is
presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once
respondents made out a prima facie case of
all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to
explain. The presumption or inference may be
rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference.
20.
Ignorantia Legis non Excusat
It is a Latin maxim meaning ignorance of law Agustin De Luna, et al., v. Jose Linatoc, G.R.
is not an excuse to a criminal charge. The

purpose of this maxim is that if ignorance is
considered an excuse, a person charged with
criminal offenses or a subject of a civil lawsuit
would merely claim that s/he is unaware of
the law in question to avoid liability.
Ignorantia juris non excusat is also known as
ignorantia legis non excusat.
No. L-48403, October 28, 1942. Mistake of law

does not make a contract voidable, because
ignorance of the law does not excuse anyone
from its compliance (art. 2, Civil Code; 8
Manresa, 646, 2d ed.). That the petitioners did
not know the prohibition against partition of
the conjugal partnership property during
marriage (art. 1432, Civil Code) is no valid
reason why they should ask for the annulment
of the sales made Exhibits C and D and
recognized in Exhibit I.
The United States v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L5272 March 19, 1910. The question then
squarely presents it self, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold
that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact,
if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which
under the law is a necessary ingredient of the

offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and
works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases
cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates
vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38
Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met.,
500.)
21.
Lex prospicit, non respicit
The law looks forward, not backward.
Antonio v. Reyes, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA

353. In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by
courts constitutes a part of the law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively
in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Alfredo Tolentino, et al., v. Antonio O. Alzate,

et al., G.R. No. L-9267, April 11, 1956.
Republic Act No. 1199 was approved on
August 30, 1954. Said Act enumerates the
cause whereby a tenant may be dispossessed
of the land among them being the desire of
the alndlord to cultivate the land "through the
employment
of
farm
machinery
and
implements." And it is therein provided that in
order that the mechanization may be
undertaken it is necessary that "the
landholder shall, at least one year but not
more than two years prior to the date of his
petition to dispossess the tenant file notice
with the court and shall inform the tenant in
writing in language or dialect known to the
latter of his intention to cultivate the land
himself, either personally or through the
employment of mechanical implements,
together with a certification of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the
land is suited of mechanization." (Section 50,
paragraph a.) It is now contended by the
tenants that because the landlord had not
complied with this requirement before filing
the present petition for mechanization, the
industrial to proceed with the hearing of the
case.
We find this claim to be without merit. While it
is true that under the new Act there is need to
comply
with
the
above
procedural
requirement in order that a landlord may

dispossess a tenant and give jurisdiction to
the industrial court to act on the matter, the
same cannot be invoked in the present case it
appearing that the petition herein was filed on
August 12, 1954, or prior to the approval of
Republic Act No. 1199. It is a well known rule
that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided" (Article 4,
new Civil Code). Or, as this Court well said, "A
statute operates prospectively and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to
the contrary is made manifest either by the
express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication" (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phi., 543).
There is nothing in said Act which would make
its provisions operate retroactively even with
respect to the provision regarding mechanized
farming.
22.
Dura Lex Sed Lex
The law may be hard to observe or difficult to

obey, but it remains the law and must be
therefore followed just the same. This is the
plain and simple meaning and implication of
the above cited Latin maxim which is well
known in a special way by those in the legal
profession. The Latin principle is objectively
right and the legal experts are professionally
right as well when invoking the Latin truism
but only by virtue of the following three
fundamental premises:
Anselma Diaz, guardian of Victor, Rodrigo,

Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero,
and Felixberta Pacursa, guardian of Federico
Santero, et al., petitioners, v. Intermediate
Appelate Court and Felisa Pamuti Jardin, G.R.
No. L-66574, February 21, 1990.
Senator Tolentino, while supporting
majority view of this Court states:
the
In the present article, the Code Commission

took a step forward by giving an illegitimate
Firstly, that the law is just in its objective child the right of representation, which he did
content, just for the subject party concerned,

and just to the society as a whole it is
mandated for observance. In other words
even but there is an iota of injustice in the law
in conjunction with any of the said qualifying
factors, a law may be difficult to comply with,
but an unjust law it remains. Thus it is that it
loses its nature and finality as a law.
not have under the old Code. But in retaining

without change provisions of the old Code in
Article 992, it created an absurdity and
committed an injustice, because while the
illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child
can represent, the illegitimate descendant of
a legitimate child cannot. The principle that
the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the
same status of illegitimacy has thus been
preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex,
sed lex.
Secondly, that the law equally applies to all

without fear or favor. This simply means
that everybody has exactly the same standing
the same basic human dignity and the basic
human rights before the law. This is the
cornerstone of the majesty of the law: it bows Salem Alex Palo y Toyur v. Hon. Francis J.
to no one for consideration of power and Militante, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
wealth.
of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XII, G.R.
No. 76100, April 18, 1990. It is suggested that
Lastly, that the law is interpreted and applied petitioner's deprivation of the benefits of
by a legal system that is not simply working probation was a product of misunderstanding
as designed and expected but categorically or miscommunication and that he would not
working according to the demands of social have pleaded guilty had that amendment by
justice specially in terms of its distributive Presidential Decree No. 1990 been brought to
dimension that is provident of public welfare his attention. We are, however, bound by the
or common goods.
actual proceedings that transpired and not by
what is represented to have been a party's
intent. Yet, assuming that there is some truth
in said surmise, from what has been said and
while one may empathize with petitioner's
submission, still even if he had not pleaded
guilty the end result would have been the
same. From the judicial record, a guilty
verdict, and even a higher penalty, would
have been a distinct probability. All told, dura

lex sed lex is the trite dictum which those
caught in the toils of the law have to live with,
including the changes therein and the
misapprehensions thereon.
23.
Doctrine of Stare Decisis
The operation of the doctrine of stare decisis

is best explained by reference to the English
translation of the Latin phrase. Stare decisis
literally translates as to stand by decided
matters. The phrase stare decisis is itself
an abbreviation of the Latin phrase stare
decisis et non quieta movere which
translates as to stand by decisions and not to
disturb settled matters. Basically, under the
doctrine of stare decisis, the decision of a
higher court within the same provincial
jurisdiction acts as binding authority on a
lower court within that same jurisdiction. The
decision of a court of another jurisdiction only
acts as persuasive authority. The degree of
persuasiveness is dependent upon various
factors, including, first, the nature of the other
jurisdiction.
Second,
the
degree
of
persuasiveness is dependent upon the level of
court which decided the precedent case in the
other jurisdiction. Other factors include the
date of the precedent case, on the
assumption that the more recent the case, the
more reliable it will be as authority for a given
proposition, although this is not necessarily
so.
Tala Realty Services v. Banco Filipino Savings

and Mortgage Bank. G.R. No. 137980. June
20, 2000. It is about a disagreement between
parties on which lease contract should prevail.
The Court ruled that tt is the policy of the
court to maintain judicial stability in
accordance to stare decisis. The case involves
the same questions relating to similarly
situated conditions which the court already
litigated abd decided upon and the rule on
stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate
the same issue (stare decisis et non quieta
movere follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has already been settled.) Stare
decisis should apply if the facts are
substantially the same even if the parties may
be different.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting,
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009. The
principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by
lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on
the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt

to relitigate the same issues, necessary for
two simple reasons: economy and stability. In
our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code.
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or
stare decisis was applied by the English courts
and was later adopted by the United States.
To be forthright, respondents argument that
the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively
for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument
was also raised but was struck down in Pesca
v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In
these
cases,
we
explained
that
the
interpretation or construction of a law by
courts constitutes a part of the law as of the
date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new
doctrine may have to be applied prospectively
in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of lex prospicit, non respicit.
24.
Doctrine of Lex Nationalii
Citizenship is the basis for determining the Juan Miciano v. Andre Brimo, GR No.22595,
personal law applicable.
November 1, 1927. Though the last part of the
second clause of the will expressly said that
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that laws it be made and disposed of in accordance
relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. This is the rule of
lex nationalii in private international law.
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
with the laws in force in the Philippine Island,

this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his
testamentary
dispositions.
The
court
approved the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator, in such manner
Regardless of where a citizen of the as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be legatees.
governed by the law of his nationality
(Philippine Laws) with respect to his or her Bellis vs. Bellis. G.R. No. L-23678, June 6,
family rights and duties, or to his status, 1967. The Supreme Court held that the said
condition or legal capacity.
children are not entitled to their legitimes
under the Texas Law, being the national law of
the deceased, there are no legitimes. The
parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil
Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the

order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed.
25.
Nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari
No man ought to be made rich out of

anothers injury.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both

with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the
person
whose
succession
is
under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,
G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007.
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in
the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the
expense of respondent. Petitioner received
more than what he is entitled to recover
under the circumstances.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies
the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made
rich out of anothers injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the

same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the
chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
the provisions of which were formulated as
basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order; designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience; guides for
human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law
may approach its supreme ideal which is the
sway and dominance of justice.[48] There is
unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience.
A sense of justice and fairness demands that
petitioner should not be allowed to benefit
from his act of entering into a contract to sell
that violates the constitutional proscription.
This is not a case of equity overruling or
supplanting a positive provision of law or
judicial rule. Rather, equity is exercised in this
case as the complement of legal jurisdiction
that seeks to reach and to complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of

cases, are incompetent to do so.[
The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in
cases where a court of law is unable to adapt
its judgments to the special circumstances of
a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Department of Public Works and
Highways, Commission on Audit and the
National Treasurer, v. Carlito Lacap, doing
business under the name and style Carwin
Construction and Construction Supply, G.R.
No. 158253 March 2, 2007.Article 22 of the
Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo
ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no
man ought to be made rich out of anothers
injury) states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil
Code on Human Relations, the provisions of

which were formulated as basic principles to
be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of
the social order, x x x designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience, x x x guides human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and
dominance of justice. The rules thereon
apply equally well to the Government. Since
respondent had rendered services to the full
satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner,
then the former should be compensated for
them.
To allow petitioner to acquire the
finished project at no cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner
to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust
enrichment is not allowed by law.
26.
Parens patriae
Literally, parens patriae means father of the

country. This doctrine has been defined as the
inherent power and authority of the state to
provide protection to the persons and
property of the persons non-sui juris. Non-sui
juris persons are those who lack the legal
capacity to act on his own behalf like the child
or the insane persons.
Melchora Cabanas v.Francisco Pilapil. G.R.

No. L-25843, July 25, 1974. The Constitution
provides for the strengthening of the family as
the basic social unit, and that whenever any
member thereof such as in the case at bar
would be prejudiced and his interest be
affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve according to the
best interest of that person. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the
mother shall show more care towards the

child than the uncle will. The application of
parens patriae here is in consonance with this
countrys tradition of favoring conflicts in
favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.
The People of the Philippines v. Domiciano
Baylon
G.R. No. L-35785, May 29, 1974. As was noted
in a recent case, People v. Molina, 32 it is
manifest in the decisions of this Court that
where the offended parties are young and
immature girls like the victim in this case, 33
there is a marked receptivity on its part to
lend credence to their version of what
transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The
state, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those, who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its utmost
protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of
rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim
alone. The consternation it causes her family
must also be taken into account. It may reflect
a failure to abide by the announced concern in
the fundamental law for such institution . 34
There is all the more reason then for the
rigorous application of the penal law with its
severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted. It has been aptly remarked that
with the advance in civilization, the disruption
in public peace and order it represents defies

explanation, much more so in view of what
currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of
relationship based on consent are hardly
minimal, self-restraint should even be more
marked.
27.
Solutio indebiti
Refers to the juridical relation which arises

whenever a person unduly delivers a thing
through mistake to another who has no right
to demand it.
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals

and B.P. Mata and Co., Inc. G.R. No. 97995,
January 21, 1993. The instant case fulfills the
indispensable requisites of solutio indebiti as
defined in Article 2154 that something (in this
If something is received when there is no right case money) has been received when there
to demand it, and it was unduly delivered was no right to demand it and (2) the same
through mistake, the obligation to return it was unduly delivered through mistake. There
arises.
is a presumption that there was a mistake in
the payment "if something which had never
been due or had already been paid was
delivered; but he from whom the return is
claimed may prove that the delivery was
made out of liberality or for any other just
cause."
While petitioner may indeed opt to avail of an
action to enforce a constructive trust or the
quasi-contract of solutio indebiti, it has been
deprived of a choice, for prescription has
effectively blocked quasi-contract as an
alternative, leaving only constructive trust as
the feasible option.
Petitioner argues that the lower and appellate

courts cannot indulge in semantics by holding
that in Article 1456 the recipient commits the
mistake while in Article 2154, the recipient
commits no mistake. 26 On the other hand,
private respondent, invoking the appellate
court's reasoning, would impress upon us that
under Article 1456, there can be no mutual
mistake. Consequently, private respondent
contends that the case at bar is one of solutio
indebiti and not a constructive trust.
Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc., v. City of Manila
and Marcelo Sarmiento, as City Treasurer of
Manila,
G.R. No. L-17447, April 30, 1963. In refutation
of the above stand of appellants, appellee
avers tht the payments could not have been
voluntary.At most, they were paid "mistakenly
and in good faith"and "without protest in the
erroneous belief that it was liable thereof."
Voluntariness is incompatible with protest and
mistake. It submits that this is a simple case
of "solutio indebiti"
In a recent case, We said: "The appellants
argue that the sum the refund of which is
sought by the appellee, was not paid under
protest and hence is not refundable. Again,
the trial court correctly held that being
unauthorized, it is not a tax assessed under
the Charter of the Appellant City of Davao and
for that reason, no protest is necessary for a
claim or demand for its refund" (Citing the

Medina case, supra; East Asiatic Co., Ltd. v.
City of Davao, G.R. No. L-16253, Aug. 21,
1962). Lastly, being a case of solutio indebiti,
protest is not required as a condition sine qua
non for its application..
28.
Legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet
A Latin maxim which means The construction

of law obtains the force of law. The
interpretation placed upon a written law by a
competent court has the force of the law.
Judicial decisions applying and interpreting
the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270. The application

and interpretation placed by the Court upon a
law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Supreme
Courts application and interpretation merely
established the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect.
Secretary of Justice ve. Catolico, 68 SCRA
607. Judicial Decisions of the Supreme Court
are authoritative and precedent setting while
those of the inferior courts and Court of
Appeals are merely persuasive. Indeed it is
the duty of the judges to apply the law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
29.
Prejudicial Question
The doctrine that comes into play generally in

a situation where civil and criminal actions are
pending and the issues involved in both cases
are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed.
Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in
a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to
People versus Adelo Aragon L-5930, February

17, 1954. The Supreme Court defined it as
one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is a logical antecedent of the
issues involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to other tribunal.
In the action of bigamy, if the accused claims
that the first marriage is null and void, and
cause the suspension of the latter pending

final determination of the former. It is one
which must be decided first before a criminal
action may be instituted or may proceed
because a decision therein is vital to the
judgment in the criminal case.
the right to decide such validity is vested in

another tribunal, the civil action for nullity
must first be decided before the action for
bigamy can proceed; hence the validity of the
first marriage is a prejudicial question.
Quimbao vs. Osorio G.R. No. L-48157.
Whether the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter
of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial
question which would operates as a bar to
said ejectment case.
Petition Granted, the SC held No prejudicial
question. A prejudicial question is understood
in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal
The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil
and criminal actions are pending and the
issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil
case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
30.
. Action De in Rem Verso
Action de in rem verso is an action for unjust

enrichment. In an action de in rem verso, the
plaintiff should show that enrichment was
bestowed, that the enrichment caused an
impoverishment, that there is no justification
for the enrichment and impoverishment, and
that the plaintiff has no other adequate
remedy at law, including no remedy under an
express or implied contract. In Roman law,
action de in rem verso is an action brought
against a paterfamilias or a slave-owner who
benefited from the transaction of a child or
slave.
Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. v. RRN

Incorporated, G.R. No. 172525, October 20,
2010. Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of
same to him.
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper,
the essential elements must be present: (1)
that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that
the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or
legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasicontract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely
an auxiliary action, available only when there
is no other remedy on contract, quasicontract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an
obtainable action under any other institution
of positive law, that action must be resorted
to, and the principle of accion in rem verso
will not lie.
As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the
CA, petitioner failed to prove that
respondent's free use of the manlift was
without legal ground based on the provisions
of their contract. Thus, the third requisite is
31.
Doctrine of actio personalis
moritur cum persona
A Latin expression meaning a personal action

dies with the person. Some legal causes of
action can survive the death of the claimant
or plaintiff, for example actions founded in
contract law. However, some actions are
personal to the plaintiff, defamation of
character being one notable example.
Therefore, such an action, where it relates to
the private character of the plaintiff, comes to
an end on his death, whereas an action for
the publication of a false and malicious
statement which causes damage to the
plaintiff's personal estate will survive to the
benefit of his or her personal representatives.
The principle also exists to protect the estate
and executors from liability for strictly
personal acts of the deceased, such as
charges for fraud.
missing.
Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977,
January 31, 1972. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100,
by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no
one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can,
by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself.
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no
need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the
suit, if the death of the spouse takes place
during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead.
A further reason why an action for legal
separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved,
is that these rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree
can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the
expected consequential rights and claims

would necessarily remain unborn.
Santos v. Sec. Of Labor, et.al , G.R. No. L21624, February 27, 1968. Invoking the
doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum
persona, the death of the deceased
terminates any action. Furthermore, public
office is a public trust; it is personal and that
which cannot be passed to his heirs.
The Court held that the jurisdiction of the
court had attached before the death of Santos
and the same jurisdiction continues until the
termination of the suit. Death will not dislodge
jurisdiction on the money claim it subsists.
The court went on the merits despite the
death of the deceased with the case pending.
32.
Doctrine of Alter Ego
A doctrine based upon the misuse of a

corporation by an individual for wrongful or
inequitable purposes, and in such case the
court merely disregards the corporate entity
and holds the individual responsible for acts
knowingly and intentionally done in the name
of the corporation. The doctrine imposes upon
the individual who uses a corporation merely
as an instrumentality to conduct his own
business liability as a consequence of fraud or
injustice perpetuated not on the corporation,
but on third persons dealing with the
corporation.
Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc. GR L31061. It is a doctrine well established and
obtains both at law and in equity that a
corporation is a distinct legal entity to be
considered as separate and apart from the
individual stock holders or members who
compose it, and is not affected by the
personal rights, obligations, and transactions
of its stockholders or members. The property
of the corporation is its property and not that
of the stockholders, as owners, although they
have equities in it. Properties registered in the
name of the corporation ordinarily have no
interest in the individual property of its

stockholders unless transferred to the
corporation, even in the case of a one-man
corporation. The mere fact that one is
president of a corporation does not render
that property which he owns or possesses the
property of the corporation, since the
president, as individual, and the corporation
are
separate
similarities.
Similarly,
stockholders in a corporation engaged in
buying and dealing in real estate whose
certificates of stock entitled the holder thereof
to an allotment in the distribution of the land
of the corporation upon surrender of their
stock certificates were considered not to have
such legal or equitable title or interest in the
land, as would support a suit for title,
especially against parties other than the
corporation.
Concept Builders, Inc. vs NLRC GR 108734. It
is a fundamental principle of corporation law
that a corporation is an entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders and from other
corporations to which it may be connected.
But, this separate and distinct personality of a
corporation is merely a fiction created by law
for convenience and to promote justice. So,
when the notion of separate juridical
personality is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat
the labor laws, this separate personality of the
corporation may be disregarded or the veil of

corporate fiction pierced. This is true likewise
when the corporation is merely an adjunct, a
business conduit or an alter ego of another
corporation. The conditions under which the
juridical entity may be disregarded vary
according
to
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of each case. No hard and fast
rule can be accurately laid down, but
certainly, there are some probative factors of
identity that will justify the application of the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, to wit:
(1) Stock ownership by one or common
ownership of both corporations; (2) Identity of
directors and officers; (3) The manner of
keeping corporate books and records; and (4)
Methods of conducting the business. The SEC
en banc explained the "instrumentality rule"
which the courts have applied in disregarding
the
separate
juridical
personality
of
corporations as "Where one corporation is so
organized and controlled and its affairs are
conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere
instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the
fiction of the corporate entity of the
"instrumentality" may be disregarded. The
control necessary to invoke the rule is not
majority or even complete stock control but
such domination of instances, policies and
practices that the controlled corporation has,
so to speak, no separate mind, will or
existence of its own, and is but a conduit for
its principal. It must be kept in mind that the
control must be shown to have been exercised

at the time the acts complained of took place.
Moreover, the control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for
which the complaint is made." The test in
determining the applicability of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as (1)
Control, not mere majority or complete stock
control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at
the time no separate mind, will or existence of
its own; (2) Such control must have been used
by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty or dishonest and
unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal
rights; and (3) The aforesaid control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the
injury or unjust loss complained of. The
absence of any one of these elements
prevents "piercing the corporate veil." In
applying the "instrumentality" or "alter ego"
doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality
and not form, with how the corporation
operated and the individual defendant's
relationship to that operation. Thus the
question of whether a corporation is a mere
alter ego, a mere sheet or paper corporation,
a sham or a subterfuge is purely one of fact.
33.
Doctrine of Privity of Contract
This doctrine provides that a contract cannot

confer rights or impose obligations arising
under it on any person or agent except the
parties to it. The basic premise is that only
parties to contracts should be able to sue to
enforce their rights or claims to damages as
such.
Marquez and Gutierrez Lora vs. Varela and

Varela G.R. No. L-4845. The principle
underlying defendants' objection is one of
substantive law, recognized under common
law, where no one could sue for a breach of a
contract who was not a party thereto, and the
action allowed to be brought only in the name
of the one holding the legal title. The
requirement was based upon the doctrine of
privity of contract.
Yu vs. CA G.R. 86683. Honorable Cesar V.
Alejandria, Presiding Judge said: Resolving
plaintiff's motion embodied in the complaint
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction
after
hearing,
but
without
prejudging the merits of the case, and finding
from the evidences adduced by the plaintiff,
that the terms and conditions of the agency
agreement, Exhibit "A-inj." between the
plaintiff and The House of Mayfair of England
for the exclusive distributorship by the
plaintiff of the latter's goods, apertain to
them; that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant; that
the controversy in this case arose from a
breach of contract by the FNF Trading of
Germany, for having shipped goods it had
purchased from The House of Mayfair to the
Philippines; The House of Mayfair was
demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF
Trading for restitution of plaintiff's alleged loss
on account of the shipment of the goods in
question here in the Philippines and now in
the possession of the defendant; it appears to

the Court that to restrain the defendant from
selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF
Trading of Germany, would be without legal
justification.
34.
Doctrine of indefeasibility of
torrens titles
A doctrine that a certificate of title, once

registered,
should
not
thereafter
be
impugned,
altered,
changed,
modified,
enlarged or diminished except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law.
De Pedro vs Romasan GR 158002. According

to the report, the land claimed by the
petitioners was covered by the title under the
name
of
respondent
corporation,
the
petitioners claim for damages had no leg to
stand on.
35.
Doctrine of Mortgagee in Good
Faith
The rule that all persons dealing with property

covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as
buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title.
The public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as
evidence of the lawful ownership of the land
or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a
buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied
upon what appears on the face of the
certificate title.
Cavite Devt. Bank vs. Sps. Lim GR 131679.

Despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the
owner of the mortgaged property, his title
being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and
any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are
given effect by reason of public policy. This is
the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith".
This principle is cited by petitioners in
claiming that, as a mortgagee bank, it is not
required to make a detailed investigation of
the history of the title of the property given as
security before accepting a mortgage.
Bank of Commerce vs. Spouses San Pablo GR
167848. A mortgagee has a right to rely in
good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor of the property given as security,
and in the absence of any sign that might
arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no
obligation to undertake further investigation.

This doctrine pre-supposes, however, that the
mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of
the property, has already succeeded in
obtaining Torrens title over the property in his
name and that, after obtaining the said title,
he succeeds in mortgaging the property to
another who relies on what appears on the
title. This is not the situation in the case at
bar since Santos was not the registered owner
for he merely represented himself to be the
attorney-in-fact of the spouses San Pablo. In
cases where the mortgagee does not directly
deal with the registered owner of real
property, the law requires that a higher
degree of prudence be exercised by the
mortgagee.
36.
Doctrine of Clean Hands
A person who has acted wrongly, either

morally or legally, will not be helped by a
court when complaining about the actions of
someone else.
Nancy L. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and

Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 188302, June 27,
2012. An implied trust could not have been
formed between the Bank and Tala as this
Court has held that "where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud.
A legal doctrine which is a defense to a

complaint, which states that a party who is
asking for a judgment cannot have the help of
the court if he/she has done anything
unethical in relation to the subject of the
lawsuit. Thus, if a defendant can show the The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek
plaintiff had "unclean hands," the plaintiff's enforcement of its alleged implied trust with
complaint will be dismissed or the plaintiff will Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As
be denied judgment. Unclean hands is a admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its
common "affirmative defense" pleaded by branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to

defendants, which must be proved by the pursue its expansion program and purchase
defendant.
new branch sites including its main branch in
Makati, and at the same time avoid the real
property holdings limit under Sections 25(a)
and 34 of the General Banking Act which it
had already reached x x x .
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the
limitations on its real estate holdings under
the General Banking Act and that its
"warehousing agreement" with Tala was a
scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus,
the Bank opted not to put the agreement in
writing and call a spade a spade, but instead
phrased its right to reconveyance of the
subject property at any time as a "first
preference to buy" at the "same transfer
price". This agreement which the Bank claims
to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus,
while we find the sale and lease of the subject
property genuine and binding upon the
parties, we cannot enforce the implied trust
even assuming the parties intended to create
it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos
case, "the courts will not assist the payor in
achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a
resultant trust for him in accordance with the
'clean hands' doctrine." The Bank cannot thus
demand reconveyance of the property based
on its alleged implied trust relationship with
Tala.
The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no

affirmative relief should be given to one
against the other. The Bank should not be
allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala
nor should Tala be allowed to further collect
rent from the Bank. The clean hands doctrine
will not allow the creation or the use of a
juridical relation such as a trust to subvert,
directly or indirectly, the law. Neither the Bank
nor Tala came to court with clean hands;
neither will obtain relief from the court as the
one who seeks equity and justice must come
to court with clean hands.
Serrano vs. NSDB 10 SCRA 626. He who
comes into equity must come in clean hands
37.
Doctrine of part performance
An equitable principle that allows a court to

recognize and enforce an oral contract
despite its legal deficiencies and provides a
way around the statutory bar to the
enforcement of an oral contract. By applying
the doctrine, a party can establish the
existence of a contract despite the lack of any
written evidence. Generally, without written
evidence, a contract does not satisfy the
formal requirements set by the legislature
under the statute of frauds. The doctrine is an
exemption to this as it allows failure to comply
with the statute of frauds to be overcome by a
partys execution, in reliance on an opposing
partys oral promise, of an oral contracts
Rosario Carbonnel v.Jose Poncio, Ramon

Infante, and Emma Infante, G.R. No. L-11231,
May 12, 1958. Subject to a rule to the
contrary followed in a few jurisdictions, it is
the accepted view that part performance of a
parol contract for the sale of real estate has
the effect, subject to certain conditions
concerning the nature and extent of the acts
constituting performance and the right to
equitable relief generally, of taking such
contract from the operation of the statute of
frauds, so that chancery may decree its
specific performance or grant other equitable
relief. It is well settled in Great Britain and in
this country, with the exception of a few
requirement.
states, that a sufficient part performance by

the purchaser under a parol contract for the
sale of real estate removes the contract from
the operation of the statute of frauds.
The true basis of the doctrine of part
performance according to the overwhelming
weight of authority, is that it would be a fraud
upon the plaintiff if the defendant were
permitted to escape performance of his part
of the oral agreement after he has permitted
the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the
agreement. The oral contract is enforced in
harmony with the principle that courts of
equity will not allow the statute of frauds to
be used as an instrument of fraud. In other
words, the doctrine of part performance was
established for the same purpose for which,
the statute of frauds itself was enacted,
namely, for the prevention of fraud, and arose
from the necessity of preventing the statute
from becoming an agent of fraud for it could
not have been the intention of the statue to
enable any party to commit a fraud with
impunity.
When the party concerned has pleaded partial
performance, such party is entitled to a
reasonable chance to; establish by parol
evidence the truth of this allegation, as well
as the contract itself. "The recognition of the
exceptional effect of part performance in
taking an oral contract out of the statute of
frauds involves the principle that oral
evidence is admissible in such cases to prove

both the contract and the part performance of
the contract".
Marta C. Ortega v. Gabriel Leonardo, G.R. No.
L-11311, May 28, 1958. "The continuance in
possession may, in a proper case, be
sufficiently referable to the parol contract of
sale to constitute a part performance thereof.
There may be additional acts or peculiar
circumstances which sufficiently refer the
possession to the contract. Continued
possession under an oral contract of sale, by
one already in possession as a tenant, has
been held a sufficient part performance,
where accompanied by other acts which
characterize the continued possession and
refer it to the contract of purchase. Especially
is this true where the circumstances of the
case include the making of substantial,
permanent, and valuable improvements."
It is also stated that "The making of valuable
permanent improvements on the land by the
purchaser, in pursuance of the agreement and
with the knowledge of the vendor, has been
said to be the strongest and the most
unequivocal act of part performance by which
a verbal contract to sell land is taken out of
the statute of frauds, and is ordinarily an
important element in such part performance.
Possession by the purchaser under a parol
contract for the purchase of real property,
together with his making valuable and

permanent improvements on the property
which are referable exclusively to the
contract, in reliance on the contract, in the
honest belief that he has a right to make
them, and with the knowledge and consent or
acquiescence of the vendor, is deemed a part
performance of the contract. The entry into
possession
and
the
making
of
the
improvements are held on amount to such an
alteration in the purchaser's position as will
warrant the court's entering a degree of
specific performance."
Again, it is stated that "A tender or offer of
payment, declined by the vendor, has been
said to be equivalent to actual payment, for
the purposes of determining whether or not
there has been a part performance of the
contract. This is apparently true where the
tender is by a purchaser who has made
improvements. But the doctrine now generally
accepted, that not even the payment of the
purchase price, without something more, is a
sufficient part performance.
And the relinquishment of rights or the
compromise thereof has likewise been held to
constitute part performance.
In the light of the above four paragraphs, it
would appear that the complaint in this case
described several circumstance indicating
partial performance: relinquishment of rights

continued
possession,
building
of
improvements, tender of payment plus the
surveying of the lot at plaintiff's expense and
the payment of rentals.
Hence, as there was partial performance, the
principle excluding parol contracts for the sale
of realty, does not apply.
The judgment will accordingly be reversed
and the record remanded for further
proceedings. With costs against appellee.
38.
Doctrine of Immutability and
Inalterability of a Final Judgment
Once a judgment has become final and

executory, it can no longer be disturbed,
altered or modified. The court loses
jurisdiction over the judgment to amend
(except for clerical errors) or alter the same
but it retains jurisdiction to execute it during
the its lifetime.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hermin Arceo,

Romeo L. Santos, Macario A. Ignacio, Agnes
D.C. Marquez and Rodel V. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
158270, July 21, 2008. When a final judgment
is executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in
any respect either by the court which
rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine
is founded on considerations of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become
final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine that has a two-fold purpose: 1)

to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and 2) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why The doctrine of immutability and inalterability
courts exist.
of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to avoid delay in the administration of justice
The doctrine admits several exceptions, like: and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
(1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so- discharge of judicial business and (2) to put
called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments;

and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.
occasional errors, which is precisely why

courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time.
Records reveal that the RTC decision had
attained finality. Per certification issued by the
Postmaster of San Fernando, Pampanga,
petitioner LBP received a copy of the RTC
decision on December 3, 2001. It had fifteen
(15) days, or until December 18, 2001, to file
a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
RTC decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration only on December 20, 2001,
or two (2) days beyond the reglementary
period. At that time, the RTC decision was
already final and executory. It is well-settled
that court orders and decisions become final
and executory by operation of law. It is the
lapse of time which renders a court decision
final and immutable.
Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33,
July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 509. The Court, in
dismissing the administrative complaint filed
against CA Justice Rodrigo Cosico, necessarily
sustained the recall of the entry of judgment
made by Justice Cosico, as ponente, in a
criminal case appealed to the CA. The Court
explained that the recall of entry of judgment
might have been an error of judgment, for
which no judge should be administratively
charged, in the absence of showing of any

bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose. It noted
that Justice Cosico had recalled the entry of
judgment to afford due process to the
accused, because the CA decision had been
sent to the house of the counsel of the
accused but had been returned with the
notation Moved Out. The CA was thus
prompted to resend the decision to the
counsels new address, thereby allowing the
accused to file a motion for reconsideration.
39.
Doctrine of Res Judicata
The Latin term for "a matter already judged",

and may refer to two things: in both civil law
and common law legal systems, a case in
which there has been a final judgment and is
no longer subject to appeal. The term is also
used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to
bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such
cases between the same parties, which is
different between the two legal systems. In
this latter usage, the term is synonymous with
"preclusion".
In the application of the doctrine of res
judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second
action is for the same cause of action as the
first, the test generally applied is to consider
the Identity of facts essential to their
maintenance, or whether the same evidence
would sustain both. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions
Spouses Rodolfo A. Noceda and Erna T.

Noceda v. Aurora Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No.
178495, July 26, 2010. The principle of res
judicata lays down two main rules, namely:
(1) the judgment or decree of a court of
competent
jurisdiction
on
the
merits
concludes the litigation between the parties
and their privies and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the
claims or demands, purposes, or subject
matters of the two suits are the same. These
are considered the same within the rule that

the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action. If, however, the two
actions rest upon different states of facts, or if
different proofs would be required to sustain
the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar
to the maintenance of the other.
two main rules mark the distinction between

the principles governing the two typical cases
in which a judgment may operate as
evidence. The first general rule above stated,
and which corresponds to the afore-quoted
paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
judgment"; while the second general rule,
There are two kinds of res judicata: FIRST, bar which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the
by prior judgement (b); and SECOND, same section and rule, is known as
conclusiveness of judgment (c). The elements "conclusiveness of judgment.
of the said doctrine are:
Under the principle of conclusiveness of
(1) a former final judgment rendered on the judgment, such material fact becomes binding
merits;
and conclusive on the parties. When a right or
(2) the court must have had jurisdiction over fact has been judicially tried and determined
the subject matter and the parties; and
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when
(3) identity of parties, subject matter and an opportunity for such trial has been given,
cause of action between the first and second the judgment of the court, as long as it
actions.
remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with
them.[13]
Thus, petitioners can no longer
question respondents ownership over Lot No.
1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title.
Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars
the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action.[14]
Furthermore, we agree that petitioners
instituted the instant action with unclean
hands. Aware of their defeat in the previous
case, they attempted to thwart execution and
assert their alleged ownership over the land

through their purported purchase of a lot from
Cecilia Obispo-Dahipon. This later transaction
appears to be suspect. A perusal of G.R. No.
119730 reveals that the Court was not
unaware of Dahipons alleged claim over the
same parcel of land. It noted that Dahipon did
not even bother to appear in court to present
her free patent upon respondents request, or
to intervene in the case, if she really had any
legitimate interest over the land in question.
[15] In any event, petitioners assertion of
alleged good title over the land cannot stand
considering that they purchased the piece of
land from Dahipon knowing fully well that the
same was in the adverse possession of
another.
Thus, we find no reversible error in the
appellate courts ruling that petitioners are in
fact buyers in bad faith.
Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
G.R. Nos. 76265 and 83280, March 11, 1994,
231 SCRA 88. The second concept
conclusiveness of judgment states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or

their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the
same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as
to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend
on the determination of that particular point
or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the
first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required but merely identity of issue.
40.
Principle of Abuse of Rights
The principle of abuse of rights is found under Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v.
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 783 (1989). It was
Philippines, which states that:
elucidated that while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of relations and for the maintenance of social
his rights and in the performance of his order, it does not provide a remedy for its
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due violation. Generally, an action for damages
and observe honesty and good faith.
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to The Court said: One of the more notable
another, shall indemnify the latter for the innovations of the New Civil Code is the
same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Although the requirements of each provision
is different, these three (3) articles are all
related to each other.
The elements of an abuse of right under
Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own
sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully
or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right
or duty, causes damage to another, shall
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which
is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with
intent to injure. Thus, under any of these
codification of "some basic principles that are

to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of
the social order." The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code
which merely stated the effects of the law, but
failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience"
and which were also meant to serve as
"guides for human conduct [that] should run
as golden threads through society, to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal,
which is the sway and dominance of justice."
(Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights, but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
three (3) provisions of law, an act which exercise, the norms of human conduct set
causes injury to another may be made the forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
basis for an award of damages.
though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless
Of the three articles, Art. 19 was intended to become the source of some illegality. When a
expand the concept of torts by granting right is exercised in a manner which does not
adequate legal remedy for the untold number conform with the norms enshrined in Article
of moral wrongs which is impossible for 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
human foresight to provide specifically in wrong is thereby committed for which the
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
ones acts can make him liable for damages while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for injury caused thereby, with more reason for the government of human relations and for
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. the maintenance of social order, it does not
The absence of good faith is essential to provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
abuse of right. Good faith is an honest an action for damages under either Article 20
intention to abstain from taking any or Article 21 would be proper.
unconscientious advantage of another, even
through the forms or technicalities of the law, Republic, et al. v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253,
together with an absence of all information or March 2, 2007. The SC had the occasion to
belief of fact which would render the once again say that Article 22, NCC was
transaction unconscientious. In business formulated as basic principles to be observed
relations, it means good faith as understood for the rightful relationship between human
by men of affairs.
beings and for the stability of the social order,
designated to indicate certain norms that
While Article 19 may have been intended as a spring from the fountain of good conscience,
mere declaration of principle, the cardinal guides human conduct that should run as
law on human conduct expressed in said golden threads through society to the end
article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that that law may approach its supreme ideal
where a person exercises his rights but does which is the sway and dominance of justice.
so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties Since respondent had rendered services to
in a manner that is not in keeping with the full satisfaction and acceptance by
honesty and good faith, he opens himself to petitioner, then the former should be
liability.
compensated for them. To allow petitioner to
acquire the finished project at no cost would

Article 19 of the Civil Code, sets certain undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for
standards which may be observed not only in the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent.
the exercise of ones rights but also in the Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
performance of ones duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give
In this case, the respondent undertook
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and works for the government, made advances for
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the the purchase of materials and payment for
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their labor costs. The State however refused to pay
exercise, the norms of human conduct set on the ground that it had an expired license at
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, the time of the execution of the contract.
though by itself legal because recognized or Despite the same, it is entitled to be paid for
granted by law as such, may nevertheless completed projects.
become the source of some illegality.
41.
Doctrine of mobilia sequuntur
Doctrine holding that personal property held

by a person is governed by the same law that
governs that person, so that if a person who is
legally domiciled in one jurisdiction dies with
property in a second jurisdiction, that
property is legally treated as though it were in
the first jurisdiction.
Wells Fargo v. Collector, 70 Phil 325. This case

involves the collection of inheritance taxes on
shares of stock issued by the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Corporation and owned
by Lillian Eye. Said shares were already
subjected to inheritance taxes in California
and are now being taxed by Philippine
authorities.
Originally, the settled law in the United States
is that intangibles have only one situs for the
purpose of inheritance tax the domicile of
the decedent at the time of death. But this
rule has, of late, been relaxed. The maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam, upon which the
rules rests, has been decried as a mere fiction
of law having its origin in considerations of
general convenience and public policy and
cannot be applied to limit or control the right

of the State to tax property within its
jurisdiction. It must yield to established fact of
legal ownership, actual presence and control
elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do so
would result in inescapable and patent
injustice.
The relaxation of the original rule rests on
either of two fundamental considerations:
1.
Upon the recognition of the inherent
power of each government to tax persons,
properties and rights within its jurisdiction and
enjoying the protection of its laws; or
2.
Upon the principle that as to
intangibles, a single location in space is hardly
possible, considering the multiple, distinct
relationships which may be entered into with
respect thereto.
The actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled
therein. And besides, the certificates of stock
have remained in this country up to the time
when the deceased died in California, and
they were in the possession of the secretary
of the Benguet Corporation. The secretary had
the right to vote, collect dividends, among
others. For all practical purposes, the
secretary had legal title to the certificates of
stock held in trust for Eye. Eye extended in
the Philippines her activities re: her intangible

personal property so as to avail herself of the
protection and benefits of the Philippine laws.
The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio
Campos Rueda, G.R. No. L-13250, October 29,
1971. The Board found from the documents
submitted to it proof of the laws of
Liechtenstein that said country does not
impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on
intangible property of Filipino citizens not
residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board
declared that pursuant to the exemption
above established, no estate or inheritance
taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a
resident of Liechtestein when he passed
away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling:
"The Collector hereafter named the
respondent cites decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and of this Court,
holding that intangible personal property in
the Philippines belonging to a non-resident
foreigner, who died outside of this country is
subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the
principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such
property is admittedly taxable here. Without
the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock
owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be
concededly subject to estate and inheritance
taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to
make an exemption where conditions are such
that demand reciprocity as in this case. And
the exemption must be honored."
42.
Doctrine of
contravent legis
43.
aequitas
nunquam Equity never acts in contravention of the law.
Doctrine of Attractive Nuissance
A person who maintains in his premises a

dangerous instrumentality of a character
which is attractive to children if tender years
at play and who fails to exercise due diligence
to prevent such children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a
child who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser.
Air Philippines Corporation v. International

Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc. G.R. No.
151963, September 9, 2004. The interests of
justice require that positive law be equally
observed. Petitioner has not sufficiently
proved the injustice of holding it liable for the
negligence of its counsel. On the contrary,
there is a preponderance of evidence to
demonstrate that both law and justice
demand otherwise. Much leniency has already
been shown by the lower court to petitioner,
but "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis."
Equity never contravenes the law. For these
reasons, the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against petitioner by reason of its
counsels simple negligence is therefore
apropos. To hold otherwise and grant a new
trial will never put an end to any litigation," as
there is a new counsel to be hired every time
it is shown that the prior one had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned."
Hidalgo
Enterprises
Inc.
v.
Guillermo
Balandan, Anselma Anila and The Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952. The
doctrine of attractive nuisance states that
One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting
The principle reason for the doctrine is that thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who
the condition or appliance in question

although its danger is apparent to those of
age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach,
get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an
implied invitation to such children
44.
In Articulo Mortis
is injured thereby, even if the child is

technically a trespasser in the premises.
American Jurisprudence shows us that the
attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location. In the case bar,
the tanks themselves cannot fall under such
doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held
liable for Marios death.
The translation of articulo mortis is "at the

point of death" or "in the moment of death"
and a marriage in articulo mortis is a marriage
that is performed when either the bride or
groom is at the point of death and unable to
sign a marriage license application or
certificate.
De Loria v Felix G.R. No. L-9005, June 20,

1958. The marriage in Articulo Mortis is valid.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages,
without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such
affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The first
practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if
Some locales allow these marriages to be a marriage celebrated without the license is
solemnized without a marriage license and to not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage
be solemnized by a ship captain, an airplane should not also be voidable for lack of such
pilot, or a military commander.
affidavit.
People v. Bautista G.R. No. 117685. June 21,
1999. A dying declaration, also known as an
ante mortem statement or a statement in
articulo mortis, is admissible under the
following requisites: (1) that death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of
that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such

death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts
which the victim is competent to testify to;
and (4) that the declaration is offered in a
case wherein the declarants death is the
subject of the inquiry.
In the case at bar, the trial court
correctly rejected the ante mortem statement
of the victim. Records show that Jose Gagaza,
Jr., the person who allegedly heard the
victims ante mortem statement, was never
presented in court to testify on the matter. It
has been held that if the dying declaration
was made orally, it may be proved by the
testimony of the witness who heard the same
or to whom it was made.
45.
Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
A doctrine of common law, which declares the

presumption that the husband is impotent
should the wife still remain a virgin after living
together with the husband for three years.
This is in contrast to the general presumption
under our law in favor of potency.
Tompkins v. Tompkins 92 N.J. Eq. 113 111 Atl.

599.
The court held that under the doctrine of
triennial cohabitation, the husband In this
case is presumed to be impotent. The claim of
the husband that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse is hard to believe. Such
solicitation of a groom is noble; of a husband,
heroic. The husbands plea does not inspire
confidence. Common experience discredits it.
And if in fact he had the physical power and
refrained from sexual intercourse during the
five years he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings,
he deserves to be doubted for not having

asserted his rights, even though she balked.
The presumption of impotency has not been
overcome, and the decree of annulment will
be granted.
46.
Lex Loci Contractus
The law of the place where the contract was

made.
Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 23.

This Court applied the doctrine of lex loci
contractus. According to the doctrine, as a
general rule, the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into governs with
respect to its nature and validity, obligation
and interpretation. This has been said to be
the rule even though the place where the
contract was made is different from the place
where it is to be performed, and particularly
so, if the place of the making and the place of
performance are the same. Hence, the court
should apply the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued, when the passengers
are residents and nationals of the forum and
the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline.
47.
Doctrine of Ultra Vires
A corporation is a creature of the law and has

only such powers and privileges as are
granted by the State the ultra vires doctrine
is a product of the theory of concession; it
upholds the fiduciary duty of directors and
officers to the stockholders or members
such duty dictates that the corporation
engage only in transactions to which the
stockholders and members bind themselves
Atrium Management Corp. v. Court of

Appeals. G.R. No. 109491. February 28,
2001. De Leon was authorized and such
issuance is not an ultra vires act. Ratio: De
Leon as treasurer of the corporation is
authorized to sign checks for the corporation.
As a rule, the act of issuing checks is within
the ambit of a valid corporate act. And
securing a loan to finance the activities of the
by way of the provisions of the purposes

clause. This is also necessarily include an
obligation not to enter into transactions which
violate the law.
Whether the act in question is in direct and
immediate furtherance of the corporations
business, fairly incident to the express powers
and reasonably necessary to their exercise.
The strict terms direct and immediate refers
to the business of the corporation while the
liberal terms fairly incident and reasonably
necessary with reference to the powers of
the corporation. With regard to the business
of the corporation as the reference point,
much latitude is given to the corporation to
enter in to various contracts as long as they
have logical relation to the pursuit of such
business. On the other hand, when the
purpose clause used limiting words that Court
will hold such corporation to such limited
business.
Second Type of Ultra Vires:
When the President enters into speculative
contracts, without prior board approval, and
without subsequent submission of those
contracts to the Board for approval or
ratification, nor were the transactions
included in the reports of the corporation,
such contracts do not bind the corporation. It
must be pointed out that the Board of
corporation is not an ultra vires act. While an

ultra vires act is one committed outside the
object or which a corporation is created as
defined by law of its organization and
therefore beyond the power conferred upon it
by law, the act pertained to in the case is not
an illegal act. De Leon on the other hand was
negligent in confirming that such checks were
issued to ET Henry as payment for their
companys debt with the former. That is why
she was held to be personally liable to Atrium.
Safic Alcan & Cie v.Imperial Vegetable Oil Co.,
Inc. 355 SCRA 559 (2001). The grant or
donation in question is remunerative in nature
and was given in consideration of the services
rendered by the heirs father to the
corporation. The donation has already been
perfected such that the corporation could no
longer rescind it. It was embodied in a Board
Resolution. Representatives of the corporation
and even its creditors as the NDC have given
their concurrence. The resolution was actually
carried out when the corporation and
Estefania entered into an agreement that the
proceeds will be entered as a loan. Estefania
accepted the donation and such was recorded
by the corporation. The Board of Directors
approved Estefanias purchase of the house in
New York. Company stockholders formally
ratified the donation. The donation was a
corporate act carried out by the corporation
not only with the sanction of the Board of
Directors, not the

corporate powers.
President,
exercises Directors but also of its stockholders. The

donation has reached a stage of perfection
which is valid and binding upon the
corporation and cannot be rescinded unless
there exists legal grounds for doing so. The
SEC opinion nor the subsequent Board
Resolution are not sufficient reasons to nullify
the donation. The donation is also not an ultra
vires act. The corporation was given broad
and unlimited powers to carry out the purpose
for which it was organized which includes the
power to (1) invest and deal with corporate
money not immediately required in such
manner as from time to time may be
determined(2) aid in any other manner to any
person, association or corporation of which
any obligation is held by this corporation. The
donation undoubtedly comes within the scope
of this broad power. An ultra vires act is (1) an
act contrary to law, morals, or public order or
contravene some rules of public policy or
duty.
It
cannot
acquire
validity
by
performance, ratification, estoppel. It is
essentially void (2) those within the scope of
the Articles of Incorporation and not always
illegal. It is merely voidable and may become
binding and enforceable when ratified by
stockholders. Since it is not contended that
the donation is illegal or contrary to any of the
expressed provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation nor prejudicial to the creditors
of the corporation, said donation even if ultra
vires is not void and if voidable, its infirmity
has been cured by ratification and subsequent

acts of the corporation. The corporation is
now estopped or prevented from contesting
the validity of the donation. To allow the
corporation to undo what it has done would be
most unfair and contravene the well-settled
doctrine that the defense of ultra vires cannot
be se up or availed of in any completed
transaction.
48.
Trust Fund Doctrine
Considers the subscribed capital stock as a

trust fund for the payment of the debts of the
corporation, to which the creditors may look
for satisfaction. Until the liquidation of the
corporation, no part of the subscribed capital
stock may be turned over or released to the
stockholder (except in the redemption of the
redeemable shares) without violating this
principle. Thus dividends must never impair
the subscribed capital stock; subscription
commitments cannot be condoned or
remitted; nor can the corporation buy its own
shares using the subscribed capital as the
consideration therefore.
Donnina C. Halley, v. Printwell, Inc., G.R. No.

157549, May 30, 2011. Both the RTC and the
CA applied the trust fund doctrine against the
defendant
stockholders,
including
the
petitioner.
The trust fund doctrine enunciates a rule that
the property of a corporation is a trust fund
for the payment of creditors, but such
property can be called a trust fund only by
way of analogy or metaphor. As between the
corporation itself and its creditors it is a
simple debtor, and as between its creditors
and stockholders its assets are in equity a
fund for the payment of its debts. We clarify
that the trust fund doctrine is not limited to
reaching
the
stockholders
unpaid
subscriptions. The scope of the doctrine when
the corporation is insolvent encompasses not
only the capital stock, but also other property
and assets generally regarded in equity as a
trust fund for the payment of corporate debts.
All assets and property belonging to the
corporation held in trust for the benefit of

creditors that were distributed or in the
possession of the stockholders, regardless of
full payment of their subscriptions, may be
reached by the creditor in satisfaction of its
claim.
Also, under the trust fund doctrine ,a
corporation has no legal capacity to release
an original subscriber to its capital stock from
the obligation of paying for his shares, in
whole or in part,] without a valuable
consideration, or fraudulently, to the prejudice
of creditors. The creditor is allowed to
maintain an action upon any unpaid
subscriptions and thereby steps into the shoes
of the corporation for the satisfaction of its
debt. To make out a prima facie case in a suit
against
stockholders
of
an
insolvent
corporation to compel them to contribute to
the payment of its debts by making good
unpaid balances upon their subscriptions, it is
only necessary to establish that the stock
holders have not in good faith paid the par
value of the stocks of the corporation. To
reiterate, the petitioner was liable pursuant to
the trust fund doctrine for the corporate
obligation of BMPI by virtue of her
subscription being still unpaid. Print well, as
BMPIs creditor, had a right to reach her
unpaid subscription in satisfaction of its claim.
Boman Environmental Dev. Corp. v.CA, 167
SCRA 540 (1988).

The requirement of unrestricted retained
earnings to cover the shares is based on the
trust fund doctrine which means that the
capital stock, property and other assets of a
corporation are regarded as equity in trust for
the payment of corporate creditors. The
reason is that creditors of a corporation are
preferred over the stockholders in the
distribution of corporate assets. There can be
no distribution of assets among the
stockholders without first paying corporate
creditors. Hence, any disposition of corporate
funds to the prejudice of creditors is null and
void.
49.
Doctrine of Laches
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands

is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitation, is not
merely a question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to been forced or
asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. Ultimately, however,
the question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, since it is
an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable consideration.
Vda. de Tirona v. Encarnacion, GR 168902, 28

September 2007. While jurisprudence is
settled
on
the
imprescriptibility
and
indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is
equally an abundance of cases where we
unequivocally ruled that registered owners
may lose their right to recover possession of
property through the equitable principle of
laches. Laches means the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. The defense of laches is an equitable one
and does not concern itself with the character

of the defendants title, but only with whether
or not by reason of plaintiffs long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting his claim at all, because to allow
him to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to defendant. Laches has been defined as
such neglect or omission to assert a right,
taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in
equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another
because of the inequity founded on some
change in the condition or relations of the
property or parties. It is based on public
policy which, for the peace of society, ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand
which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is
different from and applies independently of
prescription. While prescription is concerned
with the fact of delay, laches is concerned
with the effect of delay. Prescription is a
matter of time; laches is principally a question
of inequity of permitting a claim to been
forced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is
statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in
equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is
not.
Llemos vs. Llemos, GR 150162, 26 January

2007. It is a well-settled doctrine that laches
cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate
fraud and injustice. Neither should its
application be used to prevent the rightful
owners of a property from recovering what
has been fraudulently registered in the name
of another.
50.
Action of Reconveyance
Legal and equitable remedy granted to the

rightful owner of the land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey
the land to him.
Heirs of Salonga Bituin, v Teofilo Caoleng, Sr.,

et al., GR 157567, 10 August 2007. Well
entrenched is the rule that an action for
reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the
reckoning point of which is the date of
registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. In an action for reconveyance, the
decree of registration is highly regarded as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title, which has
been erroneously or wrongfully registered in
another persons name to its rightful or legal
owner, or to one who has a better right.
However, in a number of cases in the past,
the Court declared that if the person claiming
to be the owner of the property is in actual
possession thereof, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet
title to the property, does not prescribe. The
reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be
the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the

rationale for the rule being that his
undisturbed possession provides him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature
of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be
claimed only by the one who is in possession.
Crisostomo v. Garcia, 516 Phil. 743 (2006).
When property is registered in another's
name, an implied or constructive trust is
created by law in favor of the true owner. The
action for reconveyance of the title to the
rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the
issuance of the title.
An action for
reconveyance
based
on
implied
or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.
It is now well settled that the prescriptive
period to recover property obtained by fraud
or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust
under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years
pursuant to Art. 1144. This ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the
date the adverse party repudiates the implied
trust, which repudiation takes place when the
adverse party registers the land.
51.
Presumption of Survivorship
If there is a doubt, as between two or more

persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof,
it is presumed that they died at the same
time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other.
Joaquin vs. Navarro. 93 Phil. 25. Where the

death of the mother and her son occurred
during the massacre of civilians in February,
1945 and at the time when Manila was being
bombarded during the war, the Supreme court
upheld the ruling of the trial court (which was
reversed by the Court of Appeals) that, from
the evidence presented, the son died before
the mother. Pertinently, it was based from the
When two persons perish in the same testimony of one of the witnesses of the
calamity, such as a wreck, battle, or incident who was with Joaquin Navarro Jr., Mr.
conflagration and it is not shown who died Lopez.
first,
and
there
are
no
particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred,
the survivorship is presumed the probabilities
resulting from the strength and age of the
sexes, according to the following rules.
If both were under the age of fifteen years,
the older is presumed to have survived. If
both were above the age of sixty, the younger
is presumed to have survived. If one be under
fifteen and the other above sixty, the former
is presumed to have survived.
52.
Doctrine of implications
(necessary implications)
The doctrine of implications means that that

which is plainly implied in the language of a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed.
City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez.

G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981. The
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
implications in statutory construction and
sustained the City of Manilas contention that
the additional one-half percent realty tax was
sanctioned by the provision in Section 4 of the
Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of
implications means that that which is plainly

implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed.
The obvious implication is that an additional
one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law
(the ordinance) fixed at two percent the realty
tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law,
as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code
(later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three
percent
impliedly
authorized
the
augmentation by one-half percent of the preexisting one and one- half percent realty tax.
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) v.
Torres. G.R. No. 93468. December 29, 1994.
As regards the other claim of respondent Bank
that Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers are confidential employees, having
control, custody and/or access to confidential
matters, e.g., the branch's cash position,
statements of financial condition, vault
combination, cash codes for telegraphic
transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable
instruments, 23 pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of
the Central Bank Manual regarding joint
custody, 24 this claim is not even disputed by
petitioner. A confidential employee is one
entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or care
and protection of the employer's property. 25
While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out
managerial employees as ineligible to join,

assist or form any labor organization, under
the doctrine of necessary implication,
confidential
employees
are
similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof
as that which is expressed, as elucidated in
several cases 26 the latest of which is Chua v.
Civil Service Commission 27 where we said:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all
the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for
the unfolding events of the future. So-called
gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory
construction used to fill in the gap is the
doctrine of necessary implication. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis .
In applying the doctrine of necessary
implication, we took into consideration the
rationale behind the disqualification of
managerial employees expressed in Bulletin

Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, 28 thus: "if
these managerial employees would belong to
or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might
not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union
can also become company-dominated with
the presence of managerial employees in
Union membership." Stated differently, in the
collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of
the employer, to act as its representatives,
and to see to it that its interests are well
protected. The employer is not assured of
such
protection
if
these
employees
themselves are union members. Collective
bargaining in such a situation can become
one-sided. 29 It is the same reason that
impelled this Court to consider the position of
confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees
were written in the provision. If confidential
employees could unionize in order to bargain
for advantages for themselves, then they
could be governed by their own motives
rather than the interest of the employers.
Moreover,
unionization
of
confidential
employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining would mean the extension of the
law to persons or individuals who are
supposed to act "in the interest of" the
employers. 30 It is not farfetched that in the
course of collective bargaining, they might

jeopardize that interest which they are dutybound to protect. Along the same line of
reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja 31 reiterated in Philips Industrial
Development,
Inc. v. NLRC, 32 that
"confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who,
having access to confidential information,
may become the source of undue advantage.
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of
either party to a collective bargaining
agreement."
53.
Doctrine of Collateral Attack
A decree of registration and registered title

cannot be impugned, enlarged, altered,
modified, or diminished either in collateral or
direct proceeding, after the lapse of one year
from the date of its entry.
In terms of marriage, as a general rule, a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked. This
means that the nullity of a marriage can be
asserted even if it is not the main or principal
issue of a case and that no previous judicial
declaration of nullity is required by law with
respect to any other matter where the issue
of the voidness of a marriage is pertinent or
material, either directly or indirectly.
De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro. G.R. No.

160172. Petitioner filed a complaint for
support against her husband to compel the
latter to support their child. The husband
interposed an affirmative defense claiming
that the petitioner and she were not married.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the case
was one of support, the lower court can make
a declaration that the marriage was void to
determine the rights of the child to be
supported. The Supreme Court rejected the
contention that a separate case for judicial
declaration of nullity must be filed first before
the lower court, in a case for support, can rule
that the marriage was void.
Where a direct attack is necessary has been
alluded to by the Supreme Court in Ninal vs.
Badayog (328 SCRA 122), when it said that
for purposes other than remarriage, no

judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
However, for other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise
in the case. When such need arise, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
Ybanez v. IAC, G.R. No. 68291, March 6, 1991.
A collateral attack is not allowed. It was
erroneous for Arcidio to question the Torrens
OCT issued to Valentin in an ordinary civil
action for recovery of possession filed by the
registered owner Valentin of the said lot,
by invoking as affirmative defense in his
answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands
issued pursuant to the investigatory power of
the Director of Lands under Section 91 of
Public Land Law (CA No. 141 as amended).
Such a defense partakes of the nature of a
collateral attack against a certificate of title

brought under the operation of the Torrens
system of registration pursuant to Sec. 122,
Land Registration Act, now Sec. 103, PD 1259.
54.
Doctrine of Waiver
It
is
the
intentional
or
voluntary
relinquishment of a known right or such
conduct as warrants and inference of the
relinquishment of such right.
Requisites for a valid waiver:
1. waiving party must actually have the right
he is renouncing
2. he must have full capacity to make the
waiver
3. waiver must be clear and unequivocal
-waiver must not be contrary to law, public
order, public morals, etc.
-when formalities are required, they must be
complied with.
DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA G.R. No. 137873.

Private respondent Maria Juego filed in the
Pasig Regional Trial Court a complaint for
damages against petitioner for the death of
her husband Jose Juego. Jose was employed
by petitioner as a construction worker who fell
14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig
and died. Maria availed of the death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner is
claiming that she can no longer recover
damages under the Civil Code because her
prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. The trial court and CA
decided in favor of Maria
Whether Marias availment of the death
benefits provided under the Labor Code
amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for
damages from petition under the Civil Code.
Maria was only ignorant of the fact and of her
rights as well. Marias election of the death
benefits does not bar any action inconsistent
with the elected remedy. For a waiver to
become valid there must be an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis
upon which waiver of its can rest. Waiver
requires acknowledge of the right waived with

an awareness of its consequences. Thus
ignorance of material fact negates waiver.
Velasco v. Court of Appeals 96 SCRA 616. If a
corporation waives (by selling) in favor of the
GSIS all the formers right in a subdivision,
and assumes the payment of debts for
materials used, and later said corporation
becomes insolvent, the GSIS should answer
for said debts for it has obtained the benefits
(the improvements of which the GSIS is now
the owner).
55.
Doctrine of Contra Bonus Mores
Means against good morals and is applied

through Article 19, 20 and 21 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: 1) There is an act which is
legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and
it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under
any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act
which causes injury to another may be made
the basis for an award of damages.
Gashem Shookat Baksh, petitioner, v. Hon.

Court of Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 97336, February 19, 1993. In the light of
the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We
are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love
by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that
promise
thereafter
becomes
the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to

her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found
that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24
In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner
could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article
338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest
that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim
of moral seduction.
Beatriz P. Wassmer v. Francisco X. Velez, G.R.
No. L-20089, December 26, 1964. It must not
be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set
for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The brideto-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was
bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but
two days before the wedding, defendant, who
was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and
the next day, the day before the wedding, he
wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured

returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition
that the damages awarded were excessive.
No question is raised as to the award of actual
damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of
the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article
21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The

argument is devoid of merit as under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... ,
reckless [and] oppressive manner." This
Court's opinion, however, is that considering
the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
is deemed to be a reasonable award.
56.
Molina Doctrine
The Court created the Molina guidelines to aid Danilo A. Aurelio v. Vida Ma. Corazon P.
the courts in the disposition of cases involving Aurelio, G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011. This
psychological incapacity, to wit:
Court,
pursuant
to
Supreme
Court
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the modified
the
above
pronouncements,
marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that
(2) The root cause of the psychological the certification of the Solicitor General
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically required in the Molina case is dispensed with
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly Code mandates that the appearance of the
explained in the decision.
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
existing at the time of the celebration of the collusion between the parties and to take care
marriage.
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to that the allegations contained in respondents
bring about the disability of the party to petition are insufficient to support a
assume the essential obligations of marriage. declaration of nullity of marriage based on
(6) The essential marital obligations must be psychological
incapacity.
Specifically,
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the petitioner contends that the petition failed to
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, comply with three of the Molina guidelines,
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the namely: that the root cause of the
same Code in regard to parents and their

children.
Such
non-complied
marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.
psychological incapacity must be alleged in

the complaint; that such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition.
It bears to stress that whether or not
petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations
is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first
instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines
would show that the same contemplate a
situation wherein the parties have presented
their evidence, witnesses have testified, and
that a decision has been reached by the court
after due hearing. Such process can be
gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which
refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after
trial on the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at
first
instance
whether
the
allegations
contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate
a
case
for
psychological
incapacity. Let it be remembered that each
case involving the application of Article 36
must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.[18] It would

thus be more prudent for this Court to remand
the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best
position to scrutinize the evidence as well as
hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and
expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting,
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009. In
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We said that instead
of
serving
as
a
guideline,
Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket,
forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which
is not only contrary to the intention of the law
but unrealistic as well because, with respect
to psychological incapacity, no case can be
considered as on all fours with another.
57.
Meeting of the Minds in a Contract
of Sale
This doctrine speaks of the intent of the

parties in entering into the contract
respecting the subject matter and the
consideration thereof, and if the words of the
contract appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail
over the former.
Sps. Buenaventura and Joaquin, et.al. v. CA.

G.R. No. 126376. A contract of sale is not a
real contract but a consensual contract, valid
and binding upon the meeting of the minds as
to the price. If there is a meeting of the mind
of the parties as to the price, the contract of
sale is valid, despite the manner of paymen ,
or even the breach of that manner of
payment. If there is no meeting of the minds

of the parties as to the price, because the
price stipulated in the contract is simulated,
then the contract is void, according to Article
1471 of the Civil Code. It is not the act of
payment of the price that determines the
validity of a contract of sale. In the present
case, petitioners failed to show that the prices
in the Deed of Sale were absolutely simulated,
thus there was meeting of the minds.
San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Sps.
Huang G.R. No. 137290. In the present case,
the SC held that the stages of a contract of
sale are: 1. Negotiation, covering the period
from the time the prospective contracting
parties indicate interest in the contract to the
time the contract is perfected; 2. Perfection,
which takes place upon the concurrence of
the essential elements of the sale, which is
the meeting of the minds of the parties as to
the subject of the contract and upon the
price,; and 3. Consummation, which begins
when the parties perform their respective
undertakings under the contract of sale,
culminating upon the extinguishment thereof.
58.
Ownership by Right of Accretion
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to

the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters. This doctrine has 3
Martinez Canas vs Tuason. 5 Phil 688. This is a

case of boundary dispute between the owners
of two estates (Mariquina estate and Payatas
estate), in which dispute the Tuasons claimed
30 hectares of land which had been swifted
59.
Alluvial Formation Along the
Seashore Forms Part of the Public
Domain
requisites: 1. that the deposit be gradual and

imperceptible; 2. that it be made through the
effects of the current of the water; and 3. that
the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers.
over to the Payatas estate side of the

Mariquina River. Though the evidence for the
owners of the Mariquina estate was much
stronger than that of the Payatas estate in
this case, the Supreme Court, nevertheless,
held that the owner of the Payatas estate had
acquired title to the land by accretion.
Alluvial formations along the seashore forms

part of the public domain and therefore, not
open to the acquisition by adverse possession
by private persons. The adjoining registered
owner of the foreshore land cannot claim
ownership by right of accretion
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L12958

May 30, 1960. It is not disputed
that the land applied for adjoins a parcel
owned by the applicant which he had acquired
from the Government by virtue of a Free
Patent in 1936. It has also been established
that the parcel in question was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on
the southwest. Applicant and petitioner
Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land
since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and
that his possession thereof had been
continuous, adverse and public for a period of
twenty years until said possession was
disturbed by oppositor
and private
respondent Valeriano. On the other hand, the
Director of Lands sought to prove that the
parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb
and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed
part of the public domain.
Hrs. of Navarro vs IAC G.R. No. 68166. In the
light of the vintage but still valid provision of

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, which is where the said doctrine on
alluvial formations is derived, unequivocal is
the public nature of the disputed land in the
controversy of the present case, the same
being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all
legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is.
As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and
so long as the land in litigation belongs to
the national domain and is reserved for public
uses, it is not capable of being appropriated
by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form of a
competent authority.
60.
Ownership of Abandoned River
Beds by Right of Accession
Riverbeds which are abandoned through the

natural change in the course of waters ipso
facto belongs to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to
the area lost. However, the owners of the
lands adjoining the old bed, shall have the
right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof which value shall not exceed the
value of the area occupied by the new bed.
Requisites of the application of Art. 461 of the
New Civil Code in accordance to the
aforementioned doctrine are: 1. The change
must be sudden in order that the old river
may be identified; 2. The changing of the
course must be more or less permanent, and
Sps. Galang vs. Sps. Reyes G.R. No. 184746. If

indeed a property was the former bed of a
creek that changed its course and passed
through the property of the claimant, then,
pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the
old bed left to dry by the change of course
was automatically acquired by the claimant.
Before such a conclusion can be reached, the
fact of natural abandonment of the old course
must be shown, that is, it must be proven that
the creek indeen changed its course without
artificial or manmade intervention. Thus, the
claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove
three key elements by clear and convincing
evidence. These are: 1. The old course of the
61.
Doctrine of Collateral Attack on
Titles
not temporary overflowing of anothers land;

3. The change of the river must be natural; 4.
There must be definite abandonment of the
government; 5. The river must continue to
exist, that is, it must not completely dry up or
disappear.
creek; 2. The new course of the creek; and 3.

The change of course of the creek from the
old location to the new location by natural
occurrence. In this regard, the Reyeses failed
to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the
old and new course, and the natural
abandonment. In the face of a Torrens title
issued by the government, which is presumed
to have been regularly issued, the evidence of
the
Reyeses
was
clearly
wanting.
Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not
suffice to convince the Copurt to order the reconveyance of the property to them.
A doctrine stating that collateral attack on

titles is not allowed, pursuant to Sec. 48 of
P.D. 1529, which states that A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled
except in direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Abobon vs Abobon, et.al. G.R. No. 155830. In

order to properly assail the validity of the
respondents TCT, he must himself bring an
action for that purpose. Instead of bringing
that direct action, he mounted his attack as a
merely defensive allegation herein. Such
manner of attack against the TCT was a
collateral one, which was disallowed by
Section 48 of P.D. 1529.
Aymundo and Perla De Guzman v. Praxides J.
Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566, February 19,
2008. Upon the expiration of said period of
one year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other person

responsible for the fraud.
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral
attack. A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and
the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto
may be attacked on the ground of falsification
or fraud within one year from the date of their
issuance. Such an attack must be direct and
not by a collateral proceeding. The rationale is
this:
The public should be able to rely on a
registered title. The Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
An action is deemed an attack on a title when
the object of the action or proceeding is to
nullify the title and thus challenge the
judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the object
of the action is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral
when, in an action to obtain a different relief,

an attack on the judgment is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof.
In the present case, the attack on OCT No. P30187 was merely collateral because the
action was principally for the declaration of
nullity of the deed of donation and the other
deeds of conveyance which followed.
However, the principle of indefeasibility does
not apply when the patent and the title based
thereon are null and void.
An action to
declare the nullity of a void title does not
prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well
as to collateral, attack. OCT No. P-30187 was
registered on the basis of a free patent which
the RTC ruled was issued by the Director of
Lands without authority. The petitioners
falsely claimed that the land was public land
when in fact it was not as it was private land
previously owned by Carmen who inherited it
from her parents. This finding was affirmed
by the CA. There is no reason to reverse it.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued
over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private
ownership of land as when there is a prima
facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information or a clear showing of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, by present or previous occupants
is not affected by the issuance of a free

patent over the same land, because the Public
Land law applies only to lands of the public
domain. The Director of Lands has no
authority to grant free patent to lands that
have ceased to be public in character and
have
passed
to
private
ownership.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of
the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding only if the land covered by it is
really a part of the disposable land of the
public domain.
Since the Director of Lands has no authority to
grant a free patent over privately owned land,
any title issued pursuant thereto is null and
void.
Therefore, although OCT No. P-30187 was
merely collaterally attacked, it was still
correctly nullified because the free patent on
which it was based was null and void ab initio.
62.
Rescission by Reason of Subject
being Under Litigation
Resolution of Litigation is not a condition to

rescission. Contracts which are rescissible due
to fraud or bad faith include those which
involve things under litigation, if they have
been entered into by the defendant without
the knowledge and approval of the litigans or
of competent judicial authority. Thus, Article
1381 (4) of the Civil Code provides: The
following contracts are rescissible: (4) Those
Luz, et.al. vs. Baylon G.R. No. 182435. It bears

stressing that the right to ask for the
rescission of a contract under Article 1381 (4)
of the Civil Code is not contingent upon the
final determination of the ownership of the
thing subject of litigation. The primordial
purpose of the said provision is to secure the
possible effectivity of the impending judgment
by a court with respect to the thing subject of
63.
Doctrine of jus sanguinis
which refer to things under litigation if they

have been entered into by the defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the
litigans or of competent judicial authority.
The rescission of a contract under Article
1381 (4) of the Civil Code only requires the
concurrence of the following: first, the
defendant, during the pendency of the case,
enters into a contract which refers to the
thing subject of litigation; and second, the
said contract was entered into without the
knowledge and approval of the litigans or of a
competent judicial authority. As long as the
foregoing requisites concur, it becomes the
duty of the court to order the rescission of the
said contract.
litigation. It seeks to protect the binding effect

of the courts impending adjudication vis--vis
the thing subject of litigation regardless of
which among the contending claims therein
would subsequently be upheld. Accordingly, a
definitive judicial determination with respect
to the thing subject of litigation is not a
condition sine qua non before the rescissory
action contemplated under Article 1381 (4) of
the Civil Code may be instituted.
Latin of right of blood, it is a principle of

nationality law by which citizenship is not
determined by place of birth but by having
instead one or both parents who are citizens
of the state or more generally by having state
citizenship or membership to a nation
determined or conferred by -ethnic, cultural or
other- descent or origin
Cirilo R. Valles v. Commission on Elections and

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, G.R. No. 137000,
August 9, 2000. The Commission on Elections
ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore,
qualified to run for a public office because (1)
her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was
married to a Filipino, thereby making her also
a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia

and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there
are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 9254 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a
Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the
elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native
of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916,
also known as the Jones Law. So also, the
principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 19734 and
19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private

respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia
is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to
her possession of dual citizenship.
Zoilo Antonio Velez v. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, JR., G.R. No. 161634.
March 3, 2004. Section 2, Article VII, of the
1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ
appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus

sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary
basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While
the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on
11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of
the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol
mother, Marta Reyes.
Introduced by
petitioner was an uncertified copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be

twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be
twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August
1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
64.
Doctrine of political question
These are non-justiciable cases that are Mabanag v. Vito, 78 Phil. 1. It was held that if
beyond the jurisdiction, competence or ability ratification of an amendment is a political
of even the Supreme Court to decide.
question, a proposal which leads to ratification
has to be a political question. The two steps
The so-called Political Question Doctrine holds complement each other in a scheme intended
that it would be a meaningless, inconsistent, to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted
contradictory
and
unacceptable
self- that the amendatory process as provided in
referential invalidation for a Supreme Court to section I of Article XV of the Philippine
even take up the validity or legitimacy or Constitution consists of (only) two distinct
Constitutionality of the revolution, coup parts: proposal and ratification. There is no
d'etat, or other political process that logic in attaching political character to one
established that Constitution and the Court.
and withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress
in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution
itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is
less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal.
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196. The
Senate and the House of Representatives
passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which,
upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967,became
Republic
Act
No.
4913,
providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14,
1967.Two cases were filed against this act of
Congress: One is original action for
prohibition, with preliminary injunction by
Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino
citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. Another one
is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and
non-partisan organization the objective of
which is to uphold the rule of law in the
Philippines and to defend its Constitution
against erosions or onslaughts from whatever
source.
The issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly
violates
the
Constitution
essentially
justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to
judicial review.
65.
Doctrine of Lis pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit.

Doctrine that refers to the jurisdiction, power
or control which a court acquires over a
property involved in a suit, pending the
continuance of the action, until final
judgment.
Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon. The Court allowed

the issuance of an alias writ of execution
against the transferees pendente lite, who
had knowledge of the pending litigation on
the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens on their titles. The Court clarified
therein that there was no need for the
The reason behind the doctrine are first, o victorious [parties] to file a separate action to
protect the rights of the party causing the enforce their right to recover the property as
registration of the lis pendens, second is to against the new registered owners.
advise third persons who purchase or contract
on the subject property that they do so at Associated Bank v. Pronstroller, G.R. No.
their peril and subject to the result of the 148444, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 113. The
pending litigation. It may involve actions that Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and
deal not only with title or possession of a appellate courts cancelling the titles of the
property but also with the use and occupation spouses Vaca, who were transfereespendente
of a property. The litigation must directly lite of Associated Bank, despite the fact that
involve a specific property which is the spouses Vaca were not parties to the case
necessarily affected by the judgment. The between
Associated
Bank
and
the
notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole Pronstrollers.
world that a particular real property is in
litigation. The inscription serves as a warning The Court explained therein:
that one who acquires interest over litigated Admittedly, during the pendency of the case,
property does so at his own risk, or that he respondents timely registered a notice of lis
gambles on the result of the litigation over the pendens to warn the whole world that the
property
property was the subject of a pending
litigation.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending
suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control
which a court acquires over property involved
in a suit, pending the continuance of the
action, and until final judgment. Founded
upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens
is intended to keep the properties in litigation

within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated, and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a
twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter
of the litigation within the power of the court
until the entry of the final judgment to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by
successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land
subject of the litigation to the judgment or
decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.
This registration, therefore, gives the court
clear authority to cancel the title of the
spouses Vaca, since the sale of the subject
property was made after the notice of lis
pendens.
Upon Associated Banks MR, the spouses Vaca
filed a motion to intervene arguing that they
had a real interest in assailing the July 14,
2008 Decision, which ordered the cancellation
of their title. The Court denied the
intervention. It was held that the interests of
the spouses Vaca in the subject property were
properly represented in the action by their
transferor/vendor Associated Bank, which was
already a party thereto. As transferees
pendente lite, the spouses Vaca stand exactly

in the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest,
Associated Bank.
66.
Lack of Capacity to Sue
Means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise

of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualification to appear in the case,
or does not have the character or
representation he claims such as on account
of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party.
Columbia Pictures, Inc., et.al, vs. CA. G.R. No.

110318. August 28, 1996. The Supreme Court
discussed the grounds for a motion to dismiss
under the Rules of Court are lack of legal
capacity to sue and that the complaint states
no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to
sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have
the necessary qualification to appear in the
case, or does not have the character or
representation he claims. On the other hand,
a case is dismissible for lack of personality to
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to
state a cause of action. The term lack of
capacity to sue should not be confused with
the term lack of personality to sue. While
the former refers to a plaintiffs general
disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of
juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to
the fact that the plaintiff is not the real partyin-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;
whereas the second can be used as a ground
for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that
the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently
states no cause of action.

Applying the discussion to the instant petition,
the ground available for barring recourse to
our courts by an unlicensed foreign
corporation doing or transacting business in
the Philippines should properly be lack of
capacity to sue, not lack of personality to
sue. Certainly, a corporation whose legal
rights have been violated is undeniably such,
if not the only, real party-in-interest to bring
suit thereon although, for failure to comply
with the licensing requirement, it is not
capacitated to maintain any suit before our
courts.
Evangelista, et. Al vs. Santiago. G.R. No.
157447. April 29, 2005. The Supreme Court
said that first, it should be clarified that the
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action are two different grounds for a
motion to dismiss or are two different
affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish
between the lack of legal capacity to sue
from the lack of personality to sue is a fairly
common mistake. The difference between the
two is explained by this Court in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
In the present case, the Court assumes that
the respondent is raising the affirmative
defense that the Complaint filed by the
petitioners before the trial court stated no
cause of action because the petitioners lacked

the personality to sue, not being the real
party-in-interest.
It is the respondents
contention that only the State can file an
action for annulment of his certificates of title,
since such an action will result in the
reversion of the ownership of the Subject
Property to the State.
67.
Doctrine of Ostensible Agency
The doctrine which imposes liability, not as

the result of the reality of a contractual
relationship, but rather because of the actions
of a principal or an employer in somehow
misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists.
Professional Services Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

et.al., En Banc, GR No. 126297, February 2,
2010. The Court, while affirming the existing
doctrine that hospitals as a general rule are
not civilly liable for the tortuous acts of their
medical consultants in view of the absence of
an employer-employee relationship between,
nonetheless made the following pro hac vice
doctrinal pronouncements on the liability of
the respondent hospital based on the
doctrines
of
ostensible
agency
and
corporate negligence, thus:
After gathering its thoughts on the issues, this
Court holds that PSI is liable to the Aganas,
not under the principle of respondeat superior
for lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the
principle of ostensible agency for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice,
under the principle of corporate negligence
for its failure to perform its duties as a
hospital.
The Court cannot speculate on what could

have been behind the Aganas decision but
would rather adhere strictly to the fact that,
under the circumstances at that time, Enrique
decided to consult Dr. Ampil for he believed
him to be a staff member of a prominent and
known hospital. After his meeting with Dr.
Ampil, Enrique advised his wife Natividad to
go to the Medical City General Hospital to be
examined by said doctor, and the hospital
acted in a way that fortified Enrique's belief.
This Court must therefore maintain the ruling
that PSI is vicariously liable for the negligence
of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent.
All this notwithstanding, we make it clear that
PSIs hospital liability based on ostensible
agency and corporate negligence applies only
to this case, pro hac vice. It is not intended to
set a precedent and should not serve as a
basis to hold hospitals liable for every form of
negligence of their doctors-consultants under
any and all circumstances. The ruling is
unique to this case, for the liability of PSI
arose from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil
and an admitted corporate duty to Natividad.
Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial
Court of Ilo-Ilo, Branch 68, Dumangas, Ilo-Ilo;
New Frontier Sugar Corporation and Equitable
PCI Bank. G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011.
MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of
Atty. Sabig as they have already clothed him
with apparent authority to act in their behalf.

It must be remembered that when Atty. Sabig
entered his appearance, he was accompanied
by Concha, MEGANs director and general
manager. Concha himself attended several
court hearings, and on December 17, 2002,
even sent a letter[28] to the RTC asking for
the status of the case. A corporation may be
held in estoppel from denying as against
innocent third persons the authority of its
officers or agents who have been clothed by it
with ostensible or apparent authority.[29]Atty.
Sabig may not have been armed with a board
resolution, but the appearance of Concha
made the parties assume that MEGAN had
knowledge of Atty. Sabigs actions and, thus,
clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent authority
such that the parties were made to believe
that the proper person and entity to address
was Atty. Sabig. Apparent authority, or what is
sometimes referred to as the "holding out"
theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency,
imposes liability, not as the result of the
reality of a contractual relationship, but rather
because of the actions of a principal or an
employer in somehow misleading the public
into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists.
68.
Doctrine of Reformation of Written
Instruments
Reformation of an instrument is that remedy Veluz vs. Veluz et. al. G.R. No. L-23261, July
in equity by means of which a written 31, 1968. Plaintiff prayed that judgment be
instrument is made or construed so as to issued "ordering the reformation of the deed
express or conform to the real intention of the

parties when some error or mistake has been
committed. It is predicated on the equitable
maxim that equity treats as done that which
ought to be done. The rationale of the
doctrine is that it would be unjust and
unequitable to allow the enforcement of a
written instrument which does not reflect or
disclose the real meeting of the minds of the
parties. However, an action for reformation
must be brought within the period prescribed
by law, otherwise, it will be barred by the
mere lapse of time.
of sale to express the true intention of the

parties, to wit: the same be made as a deed
of mortgage ... " and that defendants be
ordered to pay actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees.
The Court viewed, based upon the allegations,
and the relief prayed for, in the complaint,
that the action is clearly one for the
reformation of an instrument as contemplated
in Articles 1359 and 1365 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The lower court is in error. The action for
reformation of instrument should not be
confused with the action for annulment of
contract.
Reformation
of
instrument
presupposes a valid, existing contract, in
which there had been a meeting of the minds
of the parties but the instrument drawn up
and signed by them does not correctly
express the terms of their agreement.
Annulment of a contract, on the other hand,
presupposes a defective contract in which the
minds of the parties did not meet, or the
consent of one was vitiated. The equity of
reformation is ordinarily limited to written
agreements, and its purpose is to establish
and
perpetuate
the
true
agreement;
annulment, on the other hand, is intended to
declare the inefficiency which the contract
already carries in itself and to render the
contract inefficacious.
Rosello Bentir vs. Leanda . G.R. No. 128991.

April 12, 2000. Petitioner entered into a
contract of lease of a parcel of land with
Defendant for a period of 20 years starting
from 1968. P is the lessee; D is the lessor. In
1989, D sold the leased premises to the CoDefendant. P questioned the sale alleging that
it had a right of first refusal. P filed a case
seeking reformation of the expired contract of
lease on the ground that its lawyer
inadvertently omitted to incorporate in the
contract of lease executed in 1968.
The action for reformation did not prosper
since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement
of the rights and obligations of the parties for
their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith and not to settle issues
arising from the breach thereof, it maybe
entertained only before the breach or
violation of the law or contract to which it
refers. Here, P brought the present action for
reformation after an alleged breach or
violation of the contract was already
committed by D.
69.
Doctrine of Public Policy
The doctrine under which, as applied to the

law of contracts, courts of justice will not
recognize or uphold a transaction when its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to
Sy Suan v. Pablo L.
June 30, 1956. It
agreements against
and void. Under the
Regala, G.R. No. L-9506,

is a general rule that
public policy are illegal
principles relating to the
be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law
morality or to civic honesty.
of contracts, courts of justice will not
recognize or uphold any transaction which, in
its object operation, or tendency, is calculated
to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to
sound morality, or to civic honesty. The test is
whether the parties have stipulated for
something inhibited by the law or inimical to,
or inconsistent with, the public welfare.
An agreement is against public policy if it is
injurious to the interests of the public,
contravenes some established interest of
society, violates some public statute, is
against good morals, ends to interfere with
the public welfare or society, or as it is
sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests
of society and is in conflict with the morals of
the time. An agreement either to do anything
which, or not to do anything the omission of
which, is in any degree clearly injurious to the
public and an agreement of such a nature that
it cannot be carried into execution without
reaching beyond the parties and exercising an
injurious influence over the community at
large are against public policy. There are
many things which the law does not prohibit,
in the sense of attaching penalties, but which
are so mischievous in their nature and
tendency that on grounds of public policy they
cannot be admitted as the subject of a valid
contract.
The question whether a contract is against

public policy depends upon its purpose and
tendency, and not upon the fact that no harm
results from it. In other words all agreements
the purpose of which is to create a situation
which tends to operate to the detriment of the
public interest are against public policy and
void, whether in the particular case the
purpose of the agreement is or is not
effectuated.
70.
Doctrine of Self-help
Doctrine in juridical science which holds that a

person has the right to exclude another from
the enjoyment and disposal of his property,
with authority to use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation thereof.
German Management & Services, Inc., v. Hon.

Court of Appeals and Ernesto Villeza. G.R. No.
76217 September 14, 1989.
Both the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial
Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
of private respondents on the basis of the
doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429
of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is
unavailing because the doctrine of self-help
can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in
the case at bar. When possession has already
been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is
clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which
states, "(I)n no case may possession be
acquired through force or intimidation as long
as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or right
to deprive another of the holding of a thing,
must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

People vs Depante, C.A., 58 O.G. 926
If the propety is immovable, there should be
no delay in the use of force to recover it; a
delay, even if excusable, such as when is due
to the ignorance of the dispossession, will bar
the right to the use of force.
71.
Doctrine of Regalian
All lands of public domain, waters, minerals,

coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife,
and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural,
industrial
or
commercial,
residential, or resettlement lands of the public
domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploration, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twentyfive years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than
development of water power, in which cases,
beneficial use may by the measure and the
limit of the grant.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural

Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000. All lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Incontrovertible
evidence must be shown that the land is
alienable or disposable in order to overcome
such presumption. It does not negate native
title to lands held in private ownership since
time immemorial.
Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935. An
Igorot applied for the registration of a certain
land. He and his ancestors had held the land
as owners for more than 50 years, which he
inherited under Igorot customs. There was no
document of title issued for the land when he
applied for registration. The government
contends that the land in question belonged
to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands
belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is
no prescription against the Crown.
The land in question does not belong to the

Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through
Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to
say that when, as far as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never
to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since
time immemorial and independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
72.
Guardian ad litem
An independent party appointed in family law

disputes to represent parties that cannot
represent themselves, such as minors,
developmentally disabled, or elderly.
Borbon v. CA G.R. No. 138495 Dec. 9, 2004.

Petitioner, through his brother, Candido
Borbon, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 145, Makati City a complaint for
reconveyance of property against spouses
Renato
and
Princesita
Sitay,
Amparo
Investment Corporation and Ernesto Catindig,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1135.
Petitioner, in his complaint, alleged that the
contracts of sale and mortgage of the subject
property are all void because of lack of

consent on his part as he was then suffering
from acute schizophrenia. On June 9, 1997,
the trial court appointed Candido Borbon as
petitioners guardian ad litem.
Felimon Tse and Alice Tse thru their guardian
ad litem Esmaela Dawat, v. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-20708, August 31,
1967. In accordance with Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code, the father
and the mother have, with respect to their
unemancipated
children,
the
duty
to
represent them in all actions which redound to
their benefit. In the present case, the basic
petition shows that the same was filed in the
name of the minor petitioners, assisted by
their mother as their guardian ad litem.
Whether the latter was or was not actually
appointed by the lower court in that capacity
seems to be of little consequence considering
that under the legal provision just cited she
may be deemed to have filed the petition
jointly with her children or in their behalf.
Lastly, it may not be amiss to remember that
the jurisdiction of courts over the subject
matter depends upon the nature of the action
or proceeding and not upon the capacity or
incapacity to sue on the part of one of the
parties; neither is it an absolute pre-requisite
to jurisdiction over an action by a minor that
he sue by guardian ad litem. The action is not
deemed void on such ground alone because if

the lack or absence of a guardian ad litem
constitutes any defect at all, the same is
amendable. In the present case, it is clear that
the lower court was fully cognizant of the fact
that the mother of the petitioners appeared as
their guardian ad litem. This being so, the lack
of any positive proof that no order appointing
her as such has ever been issued justifies the
presumption either that she was actually so
appointed or that the lower court inferentially
authorized her appearance as such.
73.
Doctrine of Act-of-God
74. Doctrine of Res Nullius
The doctrine that requires all human agencies

to be excluded from creating the cause of the
mischief. Such doctrine cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps
to
forestall
the
possible
adverse
consequences of loss or injury. Since the delay
in payment in the present case was partly a
result of human participation whether from
active intervention or neglect the whole
occurrence was humanized and was therefore
outside the ambit of a caso fortuito.
MIAA v. Ala Industries Corp., G.R. No. 147349,

February 13, 2004. First, processing claims
against the government are certainly not only
foreseeable
and
expectable,
but
also
dependent upon the human will. Second, the
Christmas season is not a casofortuito, but a
regularly
occurring
event.
Third,
the
occurrence of the Christmas season did not at
all render impossible the normal fulfillment of
the obligation. Fourth, MIAA cannot argue that
it is free from any participation in the delay. It
should have laid out on the compromise table
the problems that would be caused by a
deadline falling during the Christmas season.
Furthermore, it should have explained to ALA
the process involved for the payment of ALs
claim.
Res nullius, is a Latin-based legal term that Sps. Gulla vs Labrador G.R. No. 149418 July
refers to a property or object that has no

owner or has been abandoned. The term is
derived from Roman law and, when
translated,
literally
means
"nobodys
property." There are a variety of objects that
can be claimed as res nullius and are
considered ownerless property, meaning they
are free to be owned.
In this definition, the object, or res, must be
something a person can claim to own. While
the law covers animals and land, the object in
question cannot be a person, though its
original meaning covered slaves as property
rather than as people. As stated by law, if the
owner of an object abandons or gives up his
property, then it is automatically deemed res
nullius. Traditionally, the abandoned property
can then be owned by any person and the
person who first takes possession of said
property is deemed its rightful owner. Res
nullius does not apply to any object or
property that has been stolen or illegally
acquired, only to property that has no owner
or has been abandoned.
27, 2006. The spouses Gulla insisted that the

trial court erred in relying on the survey report
of Engr. Magarro. In contrast, their evidence
showed that Lot A, with an area of 562 square
meters, is alienable and disposable, and is
covered by a 1936 tax declaration under the
name of Alfonso Bactad. Since the property is
located within the salvage zone, it is res
nullius, hence, could not have been acquired
by the Labradors through accession under
Article 440 of the New Civil Code. They also
insisted that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to declare them entitled to the possession of
Lot A since the Republic of the Philippines was
not a party to the case. The spouses Gulla
concluded that they cannot be held liable for
monthly
rentals, actual
damages
and
attorneys fees, since the claimed title over
the subject property is fraudulent.
The trial court, the RTC and the CA were one
in ruling that the 562-square-meter property,
Lot A, is part of the public domain, hence,
beyond the commerce of men and not
capable of registration. In fact, the land is
within the salvage zone fronting the China Sea
as well as the property covered by OCT No. P13350 in the name of respondents. The
provision relied upon is Article 440 of the New
Civil Code, which states that the ownership
of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto,
either naturally or artificially. The provision,

however, does not apply in this case,
considering that Lot A is a foreshore land
adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of
the tides. Such property belongs to the public
domain and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the
government to be no longer needed for public
use. Respondents thus have no possessory
right over the property unless upon
application, the government, through the then
Bureau of Lands, had granted them a permit.
75.
Doctrine of Force Majeure
Force majeure is generally intended to include

risks beyond the reasonable control of a
party, incurred not as a product or result of
the negligence or malfeasance of a party,
which have a materially adverse effect on the
ability of such party to perform its obligations,
as where non-performance is caused by the
usual and natural consequences of external
forces (for example, predicted rain stops an
outdoor event), or where the intervening
circumstances are specifically contemplated.
Japan Airlines v. CA, G.R. No. 118664, August

7, 1998. The Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented
JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule.
Such event can be considered as "force
majeure" since the delayed arrival in Manila
was not imputable to JAL. When JAL was
prevented from resuming its flight to Manila
due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of
hotel and meal expenses the stranded
passengers incurred, cannot be charged to
JAL. Indeed, in the absence of bad faith or
negligence, JAL cannot be liable for the
amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event.
Asset Privitization Trust vs. T.J. Enterprises,
G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009. The matter of
fortuitous events is governed by Art. 1174 of
the Civil Code which provides that except in

cases expressly specified by the law, or when
it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation requires
assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable. The elements of a fortuitous event
are: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, must have been
independent of human will; (b) the event that
constituted the caso fortuito must have been
impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable,
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
have been such as to render it impossible for
the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a
normal manner, and; (d) the obligor must
have been free from any participation in the
aggravation of the resulting injury to the
creditor.
A fortuitous event may either be an act of
God, or natural occurrences such as floods or
typhoons, or an act of man such as riots,
strikes or wars. However, when the loss is
found to be partly the result of a persons
participationwhether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to actthe whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from
the rules applicable to a fortuitous event.
76.
Doctrine of Adherence Jurisdiction
Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is PLDT vs. Dulay G.R. no. L-53446 April 19,
retained up to the end of the litigation , it 1989. The rule of adherence of jurisdiction
remains with the court until the case is finally until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated
terminated .
does not apply when the change in jurisdiction
is curative in character. Thus in the instant
The exception to the rule: when a newly case, there is nothing wrong in holding that
enacted statute changing the jurisdiction of a Courts of First Instance/Regional Trial Courts
court is given retroactive effect. It can divest no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid
a court of jurisdiction over cases already monetary claims of labor.
pending before it is which were filed before
the statute came to force or became effective. There is therefore no reason why P.D. 1691
should not be given retroactive application to
this pending case. P.D. 1691 merely restored
the jurisdiction earlier vested in Labor Arbiters
before the enactment of P.D. 1367. It was
intended to correct a situation where two
tribunals would have jurisdiction over
separate issues arising from the same labor
conflict.
In any case, private respondents can still file
an
action
before
the
administrative
machineries in the Department of Labor and
Employment. While it is true that the
respondents-employees' cause of action has
already prescribed, since Article 291 of the
Labor Code provide for a three-year
prescriptive period for all money claims
arising from employer- employee relations,
equity dictates that petitioners be allowed to
file the proper action before the appropriate
labor tribunal. At the time the petitioners filed
their complaint with the then Court of First
Instance, the regular courts were the proper
forum for all claims for damages arising from

employer-employee relations. Under these
circumstances, the retroactive application of
Pres. Decree 1691 should not unduly deprive
petitioners of the right to pursue their claim in
the proper tribunal if they choose to do so.
Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros vs. Rural Bank
Of Canaman Inc. G.R. No. 176260 November
24, 2010. The Court recognizes the doctrine
on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however,
must be reminded that such principle is not
without exceptions. It is well to quote the
ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is neither unmindful nor unaware of
the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction.
However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction
is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the
exceptions is that when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character
In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation
is proper considering that the liquidation court
has jurisdiction over Lucias action. It would
be more in keeping with law and equity if
Lucias case is consolidated with the
liquidation case in order to expeditiously
determine whether she is entitled to recover
the property subject of mortgage from RBCI
and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive
from the remaining assets of the bank.
77.
Doctrine of Presumed Revocation
Where a will which cannot be found, is shown

to have been in the possession of the testator
when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed.
Gago v. Mamuyac , G.R. No. 26317, January

29, 1927. The Doctrine of Presumed
Revocation applies, which provides that:
where a will which cannot be found, is shown
to have been in the possession of the testator
when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed. The
same presumption arises where it is shown
that the testator had ready access to the will
and it cannot be found after his death.
The presumption is, however, not conclusive
and anyone who has proof to the contrary
may rebut the presumption.
78.
Doctrine of Power to Rescind
Obligations
The power to rescind obligations is implied in

reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent
upon him.
The injured party may choose between the
fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case.
He may also seek rescission, even after he
has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc., vs Jandecs Trans. Co.

G.R. No. 168522 December 19, 2007. The
right of rescission is implied in every
reciprocal obligation where one party fails to
perform what is incumbent upon him while
the other is willing and ready to comply.
Certainly, petitioner's failure to deliver the
units on the commencement date of the lease
on October 1, 1997 gave respondent the right
to rescind the contract after the latter had
already paid the contract price in full.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, Furthermore, respondent's right to rescind the
unless there be just cause authorizing the contract cannot be prevented by the fact that
fixing of a period.
petitioner had the option to substitute the
This is understood to be without prejudice to stalls. Even if petitioner had that option, it did
the rights of third persons who have acquired not, however, mean that it could insist on the
the thing, in accordance with Laws.
continuance of the contract by forcing

respondent to accept the substitution. Neither
did it mean that its previous default had been
obliterated completely by the exercise of that
option.
Benos vs. Lawilao G.R. no. 172259 December
5, 2006. The court said: The power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones in
case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him is clear from
a reading of the Civil Code provisions.
However, it is equally settled that, in the
absence of a stipulation to the contrary, this
power must be invoked judicially; it cannot be
exercised solely on a partys own judgment
that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation. Where there is nothing in the
contract empowering the petitioner to rescind
it without resort to the courts, the petitioners
action in unilaterally terminating the contract
in this case is unjustified.
It is evident that the contract under
consideration does not contain a provision
authorizing its extrajudicial rescission in case
one of the parties fails to comply with what is
incumbent upon him. This being the case,
respondents-spouses should have asked for
judicial intervention to obtain a judicial
declaration of rescission. Be that as it may,
and considering that respondents-spouses
Answer (with affirmative defenses) with
Counterclaim seeks for the rescission of the

Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, it
behooves the court to settle the matter once
and for all than to have the case re-litigated
again on an issue already heard on the merits
and which this court has already taken
cognizance of. Having found that petitioners
seriously
breached
the
contract,
we,
therefore, declare the same is rescinded in
favor of respondents-spouses.
79.
Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation
The doctrine that regards as mutually

interrelated the acts of a testator destroying a
will and executing a second will. In such
cases, if the second will is either never made
or improperly executed, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the testator would have
preferred the former will to no will at all,
which allows the possibility of probate of the
destroyed will.
Molo v. Molo, G.R. No. L2538, September 21,

1951. Granting for the sake of argument that
the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by
the testator after the execution of the second
will, which revoked the first, could there be
any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier
will was destroyed by the testator in the
honest belief that it was no longer necessary
because he had expressly revoked it in his will
of 1939? In other words, can we not say that
the destruction of the earlier will was but the
necessary consequence of the testator's belief
that the revocatory clause contained in the
subsequent will was valid and the latter would
be given effect? If such is the case, then it is
our opinion that the earlier will can still be
admitted to probate under the principle of
"dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent
relative revocation, and is usually applied
where the testator cancels or destroys a will
or executes an instrument intended to revoke

a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for
the old, and the new disposition is not made
or, if made, fails of effect for same reason.
The doctrine is n limited to the existence of
some other document, however, and has been
applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law. (68 C.J.P.
799).
The rule is established that where the act of
destruction is connected with the making of
another will so as fairly to raise the inference
that the testator meant the revocation of the
old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the
revocation will be conditional and dependent
upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and
if, for any reason, the new will intended to be
made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in
full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
This is the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment
of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will.
But a mere intent to make at some time a will
in the place of that destroyed will not render
the destruction conditional. It must appear
that the revocation is dependent upon the

valid execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p.
751; Gardner, p. 253.)
80.
Doctrine of Substantial
Compliance
A legal principle which says that if a good

faith attempt is made to perform the
requirements of the agreement even if it does
not precisely meet the terms of the
agreement or statutory requirements, the
performance will still be considered complete
if the essential purpose is accomplished.
Spouses Efren Mason and Digna Mason v. The

Honorable Court of Appeals and Columbus
Philippines Bus Corporation, G.R. No. 144662,
October 13, 2003.
The question of whether the substantial
compliance rule is still applicable under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which
applies squarely to the instant case. In the
said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal
office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao
City and with branches at 2492 Bay View
Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City,
entered into a sale with development
agreement with private respondent Imperial
Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed
to comply with its contractual obligation,
private respondent initiated a suit for breach
of contract and damages at the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Summons, together with the
complaint, was served upon Villarosa through
its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper service of summons and
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the
motion and ruled that there was substantial
compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired

jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter
questioned the denial before us in its petition
for certiorari. We decided in Villarosas favor
and declared the trial court without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
We held that there was no valid service of
summons on Villarosa as service was made
through a person not included in the
enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised
the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. We discarded the trial courts basis for
denying the motion to dismiss, namely,
private respondents substantial compliance
with the rule on service of summons, and fully
agreed with petitioners assertions that the
enumeration under the new rule is restricted,
limited and exclusive, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius.
Had the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
rule on service of summons, we said, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise
language.
Absent a manifest intent to
liberalize the rule, we stressed strict
compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our
ruling in Millenium to support their position for
said case is not on all fours with the instant
case. We must stress that Millenium was
decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were

still in force and effect, unlike the instant case
which falls under the new rule. Hence, the
cases cited by petitioners where we upheld
the doctrine of substantial compliance must
be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is
the later case.
SPS. Heber & Charlita Edillo v. SPS. Norberto
& Desideria Dulpina. G.R. No. 188360, January
21, 2010
There was substantial compliance with the
Rules because the background facts can be
found within the four corners of the petition
and its incorporated annexes, is not a novel
ruling for this Court. In the case of Deloso v.
Marapao35cralaw
(involving
the
same
deficiency for lack of a specific and separate
statement of facts outlining the factual
background relied upon), we said:
An examination of the petition filed with the
Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not
contain a separate section on statement of
facts, the facts of the case are, in fact,
integrated in the petition particularly in the
discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the
decision of the DARAB which contains the
facts of the case was attached to the petition
and was even quoted by the appellate court.
The petition also sufficiently discusses the
errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed
decision.
There was, therefore, substantial compliance

with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is
settled that liberal construction of the Rules
may be invoked in situations where there may
be some excusable formal deficiency or error
in a pleading, provided that the same does
not subvert the essence of the proceeding
and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; they are used only to help
secure substantial justice.
Given this precedent, it only remains for us to
determine if we can apply a liberal
construction of the Rules because a
meaningful litigation of the case can ensue
given the Petitions prima facie merit.
81.
Doctrine of Mirror
The general rule is that a purchaser may be

considered a purchaser in good faith when he
has examined the latest certificate of title. An
exception to this rule is when there exist
important facts that would create suspicion in
an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond
the present title and to investigate those that
preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a
person who deliberately ignores a significant
fact which would create suspicion in an
otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent
purchaser for value. A purchaser cannot close
his eyes to facts which should put a
Lucena vs. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25,

1999.
One who purchases real property which is in
the actual possession of another should, at
least make some inquiry concerning the right
of those in possession. The actual possession
by a person other than the vendor should, at
least put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can
scarcely, in the absence of such inquiry, be
regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against
such possessors.
Amancio, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 152627,
reasonable man upon his guard, and then

claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor as has been held in other cases, if
the buyer fails to take the ordinary
precautions which a prudent man would have
taken under the circumstances, specially in
buying a piece of land in the actual, visible
and public possession of another person,
other than the vendor, constitutes gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.
September 16, 2005.

Being a corporation engaged in the business
of buying and selling real estate, it was gross
negligence on its part to merely rely on the
sellers assurance that the occupants of the
property were mere squatters considering
that it had the means and the opportunity to
investigate for itself the accuracy of such
information.
In this connection, it has been held that

where, the land sold is in the possession of a
person other than the vendor, the purchaser
is required to go beyond the certificate of title
to make inquiries concerning the rights of the
actual possessor. Failure to do so would make
him purchaser in bad faith.
82.
Doctrine of Extrajudicial Partition
Without creditors to take into consideration, it

is competent for the heirs of an estate to
enter into an agreement for distribution
thereof in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by the rules from which,
in the first place, nothing can be inferred that
a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid.
Cua Vs. Vargas et.al. G.R. No.156536 October

31, 2006. The Supreme Court said that the
procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is
an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out
or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement
has already been executed as what happened

in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not
constitute constructive notice to the heirs who
had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of
execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was
never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful
participation in the decedents estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case
confirm that respondents never signed either
of
the
settlement
documents,
having
discovered their existence only shortly before
the filing of the present complaint. Following
Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not
bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.
Bautista v. Bautista et.al G.R.no. 160556
August 3, 2007. The deed of extra-judicial
partition in the case at bar being invalid, the
action to have it annulled does not prescribe.
Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is
invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilos coheirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer
by Angelica and Alegria of of the property
to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as
the transfer of of the property to Cesar

Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no
rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
83.
Doctrine of a Good Father of a
Family or Reasonably Prudent Man.
The Supreme Court described a good father of

a family by first stating who is not. He is not
and is not supposed to be omniscient of the
future; rather, he is one who takes
precautions against any harm when there is
something before him to suggest or warn him
of the danger or to foresee it
Picart v. Smith, G.R. No. L12406, March 15,

1918.
The Supreme Court described a good father of
a family by first stating who is not. He is not
and is not supposed to be omniscient of the
future; rather, he is one who takes
precautions against any harm when there is
something before him to suggest or warn him
of the danger or to foresee it.
A good father of a family is likewise referred
to as the reasonable man, man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence, or ordinary
reasonable prudent man. In English law, he is
sometimes referred to as the man on top
Antonio Francisco, substituted by his heirs:
Nelia E.S. Francisco, Emilia F. Bertiz, Rebecca
E.S. Francisco, Antionio E.S. Francisco, Jr.,
Socorro F. Fontanilla, and Jovito E.S. Francisco
v. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Incorporated. G.R.
No. 193577, September 7, 2011. The heirs of
Francisco argue that the Court of Appeals
erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable
to CBCI because he failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family when he
bought the diesel fuel. They argue that since
Francisco was blind, the standard of conduct

that was required of him was that of a
reasonable person under like disability.
Moreover, they insist that Francisco exercised
due care in purchasing the diesel fuel by
doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his
son to check the identity of Bacsa; (2)
Francisco required direct delivery from Petron;
(3) Francisco required that he be named as
the consignee in the invoice; and (4) Francisco
required separate receipts from Bacsa to
evidence actual payment.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected
conduct that is required by the nature of the
obligation
and
corresponding
to
the
circumstances of the person, time and place.
The most common standard of conduct is that
of a good father of a family or that of a
reasonably prudent person. To determine the
diligence which must be required of all
persons, we use as basis the abstract average
standard corresponding to a normal orderly
person.
However, one who is physically disabled is
required to use the same degree of care that
a reasonably careful person who has the same
physical disability would use. Physical
handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness
or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable
person must act. Thus, the standard of
conduct for a blind person becomes that of a

reasonable person who is blind.
84.
Mercado vs Espiritu Doctrine
85.
Burca Doctrine
Sale of real estate, made by minors who (or

actively misrepresented) to be of legal age,
when in fact they are not, is valid and they
will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them or to have them annulled
(Mercado vs Espiritu, 37 Phil 215, 1917)
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien

woman who marries a Filipino citizen, dies not
by mere fact of marriage automatically
become a Filipino Citizen (Burca vs Republic,
L-24252, January 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 186)
In the Mercado case, the minors who

pretended or actively misrepresented their
age were estopped from contesting the
contract executed by him. However, in the
case of Bambalan vs Maramba (51 Phil 417
G.R. No. L-27710, 1928), it was not applied
because the minors passively misrepresented
or did not pretend their age and his minority
was known to the purchaser. This was also
the same in the case of Braganza v. Villa
Abrille (105 Phil. 456 G.R. No. L-12471, 1959)
where it held that failure of minor to disclose
his minority when making contract does not
constitute fraud
Moy Ya Lim Yao et al vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration. G.R. No. L-21289 October 4,
1971 41 SCRA 292. By constitutional and legal
precepts, an alien woman who marries a
Filipino citizen, dies not by mere fact of
marriage automatically become a Filipino
Citizen. The reason is that she must possess
all the qualification and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization as held in
Ly Giok Ha et al vs Galang (L-31332, March
13, 1966). This rule was applied to naturalborn Filipino in the case of Austria vs Conchu
(L-20716, June 22, 1965), in the case of
naturalized Filipino in Lao Chay et al vs
Galang (L-19977, October 30, 1964) and by
election. However, the said case was reversed

86.
Doctrine Of Apparent Sign
Easements are inseparable from the estate to

which they actively or passively pertain. The
existence of apparent sign under Art. 624 is
equivalent to a title. It is as if there is an
implied contract between the two new owners
that the easement should be constituted,
since no one objected to the continued
existence of the windows.
Uy v. CA,G.R. No. 120465, September 9,

1999. Agents are not a party with respect to
that contract between his principal and third
persons. As agents, they only render some
service or do something in representation or
on behalf of their principals. The rendering of
such service did not make them parties to the
contracts of sale executed in behalf of the
latter.
The fact that an agent who makes a contract
for his principal will gain or suffer loss by the
performance or nonperformance of the
contract by the principal or by the other party
thereto does not entitle him to maintain an
action on his own behalf against the other
party for its breach. An agent entitled to
receive a commission from his principal upon
the performance of a contract which he has
made on his principal's account does not,
from this fact alone, have any claim against
the other party for breach of the contract,
either in an action on the contract or
otherwise. An agent who is not a promisee
cannot maintain an action at law against a
purchaser merely because he is entitled to
have his compensation or advances paid out
of the purchase price before payment to the
principal.
87.
Error Placitandi Aequitatem Non
Tollit
A clerical error does not take away equity.
Ingson vs Olaybar, G.R. No. L-28734,

December 4, 1928. Out of the foregoing
descriptive narration of the history of the
case, there arise certain definite points. The
first point is that the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros made a mistake
in informing the clerk of this court that the
attorney for the defendant was notified on
August 19, 1927, of the order denying his
motion for a new trial, when the true date was
September 24, 1927. The second point is that
while this court accepted in good faith the
original statement of the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, in the
motion presented by the attorney for the
appellant in which he attempted to set right
the court, he did no more than make an
assertion and ask the court to revise the
record to substantiate the truth assertion,
without corroborating his allegation by the
necessary affidavits. The question now is what
to be done at this late date. An error was
made but the case is an old one and some
violence will have to be done to regular
proceduree if it be reinstated.
There is in civil law what is known as errors in
fact. There is in the common law what is
known as a mistake of fact. In applying the
principles relating to errors in fact and a
mistake of fact, the courts are guided by the
maxim Error placitandi aequitatem non tollit
("A clerical error does not take away equity"),
and the maxim Error scribentis nocere non

debit (An error made by a clerk ought not to
injure; a clerical error may be corrected").
Comparatively speaking, this is a trivial case.
Yet trivial or not, the litigant has a right to
review. He would have had that right had not
a clerk made a mistake. That mistake should
now be set right. Dislike of taking time to
investigate to the detail a small matter,
hesitancy in acknowledging error, and pride in
maintaining one's position at any cost, must
all give away to the doing of exact justice. The
prayer is addressed to the conscience of the
court. It should there receive equitable and
just consideration.
88.
Doctrine of Culpa Aquiliana
In Culpa Aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when

an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of
intentional tort, 8 moral damages may aptly
be recovered. This rule also applies, as
aforestated, to contracts when breached by
tort.
Spouses Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal v.

Spouses Luz San Pedro and Kenichiro
Tominaga, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.
G.R. No. 164601, September 27, 2006
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in
two different senses: either as culpa aquiliana,
which is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission which creates a vinculum juris and
gives rise to an obligation between two
persons not formally bound by any other
obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is
the fault or negligence incident in the
performance of an obligation which already
existed, and which increases the liability from
such already existing obligation.

Culpa
aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and the immediately following
Articles; while culpa contractual is governed
by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2202,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
In the present case, it is clear that the
petitioners, in carrying out their contractual
obligations, failed to exercise the requisite
diligence in the placement of the markings for
the concrete perimeter fence that was later
constructed. The placement of the markings

had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal
who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later
discovered that it was not he but his wife,
petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed
geodetic engineer and who is, therefore, the
one qualified to do the work. Petitioner Frank
Batals installation of the concrete cyclone
monuments had been done without the
adequate supervision of his wife, Erlinda. As a
result, the placement of the monuments did
not accurately reflect the dimensions of the
lot. The respondents, upon assurance given
by petitioner Frank Batal that they could
proceed with the construction of the
perimeter fence by relying on the purported
accuracy of the placement of the monuments,
erected their fence which turned out to
encroach on an adjacent easement. Because
of the encroachment, the respondents had to
demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus,
suffered damages.
Elcano vs. Hill, G. R. No. L-24803, May
26,1977, 77 SCRA 98. A separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminality prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not snowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to receiver
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the

extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.
89.
Jura
Distingue Tempora et Concordabis
Distinguish times and you will harmonize

laws.
The United States v. Alvir, G.R. No. L-3981,

January 14, 1908. The defendant did not
appeal nor attempt to appeal from the
judgment of the court below. After having
undergone his term of imprisonment, and
upon a writ of attachment being issued
against his property to enforce the payment
of the P500, which, according to the
judgment, he was required to pay the
offended party, he filed a motion asking the
court to permit him to keep the child in his
own house and to be released from the
obligation of paying to the offended party the
P15 monthly, as ordered by the court below.
The accused based his claim on article 149 of
the Civil Code. The motion of the accused was
overruled by the court in the following terms:
The court holds that such option can not be

exercised by an accused against whom final
judgment ordering him to support the
offspring has been entered in a cause
instituted
against
him
for
seduction,
ravishment, or rape, in view of the fact that
the provision contained in article 149 is not
applicable to cases wherein the obligation to
provide support constitutes one of the
findings of the decision rendered in criminal
causes.
From the above decision the accused has
appealed to this court, and the question at
issue now is, whether the party who provides
the subsistence is in this case entitled to
claim that the person who enjoys the same
shall live with him in his own house, and there
receive the support which he is under
obligation to provide. It is a juridical maxim,
distingue tempora et concordabis jura.
90.
Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio
Out of fraud no action arises.
Titong vs CA, G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998.

Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the
requirements of good faith and just title. As
aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff's
admitted acts of converting boundary line
(Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and
thereafter claiming ownership thereof were
acts constituting deprivation of the rights of
others and therefore "tantamount to bad
faith." To allow petitioner to benefit from his
own wrong would run counter to the maxim

ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can
allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing).
Extraordinary
acquisitive
prescription cannot similarly vest ownership
over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of
the Civil Code states that "(o)wnership and
other real rights over immovables prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith." Petitioner's alleged
possession in 1962 up to September 1983
when private respondents entered the
property in question spanned twenty-one (21)
years. This period of time is short of the thirtyyear requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
R.B. Industrial v. Enage, G.R. No. L-27741, July
29, 1968 Eastern's cause of action is anchored
on the deed of assignment and affidavit both
executed by Kittilstvedt on December 29,
1959 conveying to Eastern all his rights under
Ordinary Timber License 1286-'59 (New). But
did Eastern acquire any right under these
documents to entitle it to sue for the
performance of any prestation thereunder by
Kittilstvedt?
The Supreme Court answer is No. First,
the license had already expired. There was no
license to transfer. Second, the license itself
says that such license is non-transferable.
And, Eastern is duty bound to be guided by
that prohibition. Third, the conveyance was

illegal. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. A party
to an illegal contract cannot come to court
and ask to have his illegal objects carried out.
91.
Ex Pacto Illicito Non Oritur Actio
A Latin maxim which means that From an

illicit contract no action arises. A right does
not arise from an unlawful act. A right to file
an action does not arise upon an unlawful
agreement. To render an agreement valid, it
should comply with the requisites of a valid
contract.
Lita Enterprises v. Second Civil Cases Division,

G.R. No. L-64693 April 27, 1984. The parties
herein operated under an arrangement,
comonly known as the "kabit system",
whereby a person who has been granted a
certificate of convenience allows another
person who owns motors vehicles to operate
under such franchise for a fee. A certificate of
public convenience is a special privilege
conferred by the government . Abuse of this
privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be
countenanced. The "kabit system" has been
Identified as one of the root causes of the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the
government transportation offices. In the
words of Chief Justice Makalintal, "this is a
pernicious system that cannot be too severely
condemned. It constitutes an imposition upon
the goo faith of the government.
"Ex pacto illicito non oritur actio" [No
action arises out of an illicit bargain] is the
tune-honored maxim that must be applied to
the parties in the case at bar. Having entered
into an illegal contract, neither can seek relief
from the courts, and each must bear the
consequences of his acts.
Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian v.

Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and
Pedro N. Nale.
G.R. No. L-65510, March 9, 1987. "'Ex pacto
illicito' non oritur actio" (No action arises out
of illicit bargain) is the time-honored maxim
that must be applied to the parties in the case
at bar. Having entered into an illegal contract,
neither can seek relief from the courts, and
each must bear the consequences of his
acts." (Lita Enterprises vs. IAC, 129 SCRA 81.)
However, as the purchase of the motorcycle
for operation as a trimobile under the
franchise of the private respondent Jaucian,
pursuant to what is commonly known as the
"kabit system", without the prior approval of
the Board of Transportation (formerly the
Public Service Commission) was an illegal
transaction involving the fictitious registration
of the motor vehicle in the name of the
private respondent so that he may traffic with
the privileges of his franchise, or certificate of
public convenience, to operate a tricycle
service, the parties being in pari delicto,
neither of them may bring an action against
the other to enforce their illegal contract [Art.
1412 (a), Civil Code].
92.
Res Inter Alios Acta
This is a technical phrase which signifies acts

of others, or transactions between others.
Neither the declarations nor any other acts of
those who are mere strangers, or, as it is
Harold V. Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, Lloyd

Antiporda and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., G.R. No.
177727, January 19, 2010. The rule on res
inter alios acta provides that the rights of a
usually termed, any res inter alios ada, are

admissible in evidence against any one when
the party against whom such acts are offered
in evidence, was privy to the act, the
objection ceases; it is no longer res inter alios.
party cannot be prejudiced by an act,

declaration,
or
omission
of
another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and
is considered as hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a mans own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him.
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it
would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is
an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration
of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in

evidence against co-conspirators provided
that the conspiracy is shown by independent
evidence
aside
from
the
extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his
or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence
other than the admission itself (b) the
admission relates to the common object and
(c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their
constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine
them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession,
which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged
conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of
Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Cruz vs CA, G.R. No. 126713 July 27,
1998. Respondent Court found that several
deeds of sale and real estate mortgage, which
petitioners executed when they sold or
mortgaged some parcels adjudicated to them

under the DPP, contained the statement that
the vendor/mortgagor was the absolute owner
of the parcel of residential land and that he or
she represented it as free from liens and
encumbrances. On the basis of these pieces
of evidence, Respondent Court held that
petitioners were estopped from claiming that
there was a co-ownership over the disputed
parcels of land which were also covered by
the DPP. Petitioners contend that Respondent
Court, in so ruling, violated the res inter alios
acta rule.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Res
inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits
the admission of evidence that tends to show
that what a person has done at one time is
probative of the contention that he has done a
similar acts at another time. Evidence of
similar acts or occurrences compels the
defendant to meet allegations that are not
mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in
his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant
issues, and diverts the attention of the court
from the issues immediately before it. Hence,
this evidentiary rule guards against the
practical inconvenience of trying collateral
issues and protracting the trial and prevents
surprise or other mischief prejudicial to
litigants.
The rule, however, is not without
exception. While in admissible in general,

collateral facts may be received as evidence
under exceptional circumstances, as when
there is a rational similarity or resemblance
between the conditions giving rise to the fact
offered and the circumstances surrounding
the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of
similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and
deceit, because it sheds light on the state of
mind or knowledge of a person; it provides
insight into such person's motive or intent; it
uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it
reveals a mistake.
93.
Impossibilium Nulla Obligation Est
A maxim meaning that a legal obligation that

is impossible to perform must be of no legal
obligation.
Ramon A. Gonzales v. Hon. Francisco I.

Chavez, in his capacity as Solicitor General,
Presidential
Commission
on
Good
Government, and Commision on Audit. G.R.
No. 97351, February 4, 1992. As to matters
that are of great pith and moment, suffice it to
say that the recent Benedicto "compromise"
agreement, not to mention the SMC-UCPB
Compromise settlement, is sub judice or
under
advisement
not
only
of
the
Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable
Court in separate "incidents," and suffice it to
state that the relationship, obtaining between
the Government offices/agencies and the
Office of the Solicitor General as counsel, is
not at all like one that simply would obtain
between private client and private lawyer in
private
practice,
although
constant
consultation and advice are sine qua non in
both types of relationship. The relationship is
rather one, created as it is by law, where
imposed upon OSG is the responsibility to
present to the courts the position that will
uphold the best interests of the People, the
Government and the State, albeit the same
may run counter to its client's position or
route of action. At any rate, the PCGG through
nationwide TV broadcast and print media,
publicly announced that PCGG had disposed
with or otherwise did not need the legal
services of the Lawyer of the Government,
and thus OSG descended, not the unmerited
remark of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten
wealth cases, but the time-honored principle
of impossibilium nulla obligatio est, i.e., there
is no obligation to do impossible things (Lim
Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in
any way casting any aspersion on the moral
integrity of any Commissioner or PCGG
official, as made clear by the Solicitor General
to the President in a meeting with PCGG.
Hence, in the light of all the foregoing
circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as
not to prejudice "the interest of the
Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General
withdrew as counsel for PCGG in all said cases
by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of
Appearance with Reservation."
Chui vs Posadas, G.R. No. L-23487, February

11, 1925.
It may possibly be, as intimated by Judge
Cooley in his standard treatise on Taxation,
volume 2, page 901, that "there might be
excuses for non-payment which would justify
the interference of the courts." The maxim is:
Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. There is no
obligation to do impossible things. But here,
there is no allegation in the complaint that the
inability of the Chinese to pay their taxes on
time was due to any order by the Government
or to any action taken by the Government,
and no allegation that the delay in payment
was caused by the fault of him to whom it was
to be paid. On the contrary, the averment in
the complaint is that the Chinese closed their
homes and stores and stayed therein "as a
result of a mutual agreement had thereon."
94.
Lex Neminem Cogit Ad Vana
The law compels no one to perform a vain or

useless act.
W. E. Hicks v. Manila Hotel Company, G.R. No.

L-9973, November 6, 1914. The legitimate
object is to enable the party upon whom it is
made to perform his contract and discharge
his liability agreeable to the nature of it
without a suit at law; and whenever such
party wholly denies the right of the other to
assert title in himself or unqualifiedly refuses
performance of the obligation, a demand is
made useless, and therefore unnecessary,
since lex neminem cogit ad vana. For the
same reason and upon the same principle the
failure to make a demand before suit may be
cured by proof that the defendant could not

have complied with the demand if it had been
made; as where a person contracts to assign
his interest in certain lands to another within
a
specified
time
upon
payment
of
consideration therefor, and the vendor prior to
the stipulated time assigns his interest to a
stranger. In such case a request by the
vendee for the performance of the contract is
unnecessary. The rule stated otherwise is to
the effect that where a party bound to the
future performance of a contract puts it out of
his power to perform it, the other party may
treat this as a breach and sue him at once,
having thus an immediate right of action for
breach of the contract by anticipation.
95.
Longi Temporis Possessio
The acquisition of title to property by long

period of possession, or by continued or
uninterrupted possession.
Gallosa v. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300 June 21,

1978.
A
rudimentary
knowledge
of
substantive law trial procedure is sufficient for
an ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal
perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is
baseless trial unwarranted.
What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment"
of a last will trial testament duly probated in
1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding
is coupled with an action to recover the lands
adjudicated to the defendants by the same
court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will,
which action is a resuscitation of The
complaint of the same parties that the same
court dismissed in 1952.

It is evident from the allegations of the
complaint trial from defendants' motion to
dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is barred
by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense,
trial
by
prescription,
acquisitive
trial
extinctive, or by what are known in the jus
civile trial the jus gentium as usucapio, longi
temporis possesio and praescriptio.
Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3,
1974, 61 SCRA 284. It is evident from the
allegations of the complaint trial from
defendants' motion to dismiss that plaintiffs'
1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, trial by prescription,
acquisitive trial extinctive, or by what are
known in the jus civile trial the jus gentium as
usucapio, longi temporis possesio and
praescriptio
96.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento
protest
Merchandising
v.
Consolacion
Natural law is clear in that no one shall be Pacific
Insurance, G.R. No. L-30204 October 29,
enriched by the injury or loss of another
1976. As the trial court aptly observed "... it is
One cannot unjustly enrich himself at the only simple justice that Pajarillo should pay for
expense of another.
the said claim, otherwise he would be
enriching himself without paying plaintiff for
the cost of certain materials that went into its
construction. ... It is however, that he did so
only as a receiver of Leo Pajarillo by virtue of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 50201 all of the
properties of Leo Enterprises, Inc. passed on

to Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 50201. This Roman Law principle of
"Nemo Cum alterious detrimento locupletari
protest" is embodied in Article 22 (Human
Relations),
and Articles 2142 to 2175
(QuasiContracts) of the New Civil Code. Long
before the enactment of this Code, however,
the principle of unjust enrichment which is
basic in every legal system, was already
expres jurisdiction.
Serrano v. Court of Appeals, L-35529, July 16,
1984; 130 SCRA 353. It is imperative to
dissect the rationale of the insurance scheme
envisioned by the Social Security System. The
Mortgage Redemption Insurance device is not
only for the protection of the SYSTEM but also
for the benefit of the mortgagor. On the part
of the SYSTEM, it has to enter into such form
of contract so that in the event of the
unexpected demise of the mortgagor during
the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the
proceeds from such insurance will be applied
to the payment of the mortgage debt, thereby
relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from
paying the obligation. The SYSTEM insures the
payment to itself of the loan with the
insurance proceeds. It also negates any future
problem that can crop up should the heirs be
not in a position to pay the mortgage loan. In
short, the process of amortization is hastened
and possible litigation in the future is avoided.
In a similar vein, ample protection is given to

the mortgagor under such a concept so that in
the event of his death; the mortgage
obligation will be extinguished by the
application of the insurance proceeds to the
mortgage indebtedness.
The interpretation of the Social Security
Commission goes against the very rationale of
the insurance scheme. It cannot unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of another (Nemo
cum alterius detrimento protest). "Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith" (Article 19, Civil
Code). Simply put, the SYSTEM cannot be
allowed to have the advantage of collecting
the insurance benefits from the private life
insurance companies and at the same time
avoid its responsibility of giving the benefits
of the Mortgage Redemption Insurance plan to
the mortgagor. The very reason for the
existence of the Social Security System is to
extend social benefits. For SSS to be allowed
to deny benefits to its members, is certainly
not in keeping with its policy "to establish,
develop, promote and perfect a sound and
viable tax-exempt social security service
suitable to the needs of the people throughout
the Philippines, which shall provide to covered
employees and their families protection
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old

age, and death with a view to promote their
well-being in the spirit of social justice"
97.
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Accusare
No person shall be compelled to accuse Villaflor vs Summers, G.R. No. 16444,

September 8, 1920. The maxim of the
himself.
common
law,
Nemo
tenetur
seipsum
accusare, was recognized in England in early
days, but not in the other legal systems of the
world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and
the rack. A legal shield was raised against
odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating
an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever present
temptation to commit the crime of perjury.
The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the
textwriters was testimonial compulsion. As
forcing a man to be a witness against himself
was deemed contrary to the fundamentals of
republican government, the principle was
taken into the American Constitutions, and
from the United States was brought to the
Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide but no
wider a scope as it existed in old English
days.
The
provision
should
here
be
approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but
with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of
both its benefits and its abuses.
Perhaps the best way to test the
correctness of our position is to go back once
more to elements and ponder on what is the
prime purpose of a criminal trial. As we view
it, the object of having criminal laws is to

purgue the community of persons who violate
the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow
men. Criminal procedure, the rules of
evidence, and constitutional provisions, are
then provided, not to protect the guilty but to
protect the innocent. No rule is intemended to
be so rigid as to embarrass the administration
of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the
truth. No accused person should be afraid of
the use of any method which will tend to
establish the truth. For instance, under the
facts before us, to use torture to make the
defendant admit her guilt might only result in
including her to tell a falsehood. But no
evidence of physical facts can for any
substantial reason be held to be detrimental
to the accused except in so far as the truth is
to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty
person.
98.
Doctrine of Obiter Dictum
These are opinions not necessary to the

determination of a case. They are not binding
and cannot have force of judicial precedents.
It has been said that an obiter dictum is an
opinion uttered by the way, not upon the
point of question pending. It is as if the
court were turning aside from the main topic
of the case to collateral subjects.
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Higinio

Macadaeg. G.R. No. L-4316. May 28, 1952
An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the
way, not upon the point or question pending,
as if turning aside from the main topic of the
case to collateral subjects" or the opinion of
the court upon any point or principle which it
is not required to decide or an opinion of the
court
which
does
not
embody
its
determination and is made without argument

or full consideration of the point, and is not
professed deliberate determinations of the
judge himself.
A cursory reading of the decision of this Court
in G. R. No. L-2188 ** against respondent
Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of
the Court that the said respondent is not
entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not
an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the Court
on an issue expressly raised by the party
appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the
course of the trial of his case. It is not an
opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling
on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was
not unnecessary to make that ruling; the
ruling was absolutely essential to a
determination of a question of fact and of law
directly in issue. It was not made without
argument or full consideration of the point; it
was deliberately entered by the Court after
arguments on both sides had been heard. This
could not have avoided determining the issue
without the peril of rendering an incomplete
decision.
99.
Doctrine of Ratio Decidendi
"The reason" or "the rationale for the

decision." It is a legal phrase which refers to
the legal, moral, political, and social principles
used by a court to compose the rationale of a
particular judgment.
Unlike obiter
dicta,
Sande Aguinaldo v. Honorable Commission on

Electionn. G.R. No. L-53953, January 5, 1981.
It is of "no materiality" to distinguish whether
the petition for disqualification against the
winning candidate was filed before the
100
Doctrine of Pari Materia
the ratio
decidendi is,
as
a
general
rule, binding on courts of lower and later
jurisdictionthrough the doctrine of stare
decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule
decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction
however, out of interests of judicial comity,
they generally try to follow coordinate
rationes.
election or after the proclamation of the

winner since "the ratio decidendi is broad
enough to cover the present situation for it
would be time-consuming and in the end selfdefeating if at this stage the pre-proclamation
controversy is not laid to rest. The better
view, as noted in Venezuela (G.R. No. 53532,
July 25, 1980), is that resort be had to the
remedy of an election protest or a quo
warranto, whichever is proper.
A designation applied to statutes or general

laws that were enacted at different times but
pertain to the same subject or object.
Statutes in pari materia must be interpreted
in light of each other since they have a
common purpose for comparable events or
items.
Philippine global Communicatins, Inc., v. Hon.

Benjamin Relova, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XI, PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE
CORPORATION,
CAPITOL
WIRELESS, INC. and RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. L-60548
November 10, 1986. In Opinion No. 76 the
view taken was that a message, to fall within
the purview of the franchise, once sent by a
transmitter within the Philippines, cannot be
received by any station within the Philippines
even for the purpose of retransmitting such
message to points outside the Philippines. I
believe that the interpretation given to the
above-quoted clause was too strict and does
not conform with the spirit of said provision. I
take the view that the franchise has reference

to the destination of the message and not to
the manner of transmittal. Not as to whether
it should be sent to the point of destination
directly or through relays. The reservation in
favor of the Philippine Government under
section 4 of the franchise of "all wireless
communications between points of stations
within the Philippine Islands' is clearly
intended
to
refer
only
to
domestic
communications.
It should be understood, however, that no
extra fees or tolls could be collected for the
transmittal of messages from a relay station
to the principal station in Manila. For to do so
would make it a domestic service and would
bring such service in competition with the
domestic radio and telegraph service of the
Bureau of Posts.
The above-quoted opinion was reiterated and
reaffirmed by the Undersecretary of Justice on
November 28, 1973, in answer to the query of
the Acting Chairman of the Foreign Trade
Zone Authority as to whether or not GlobeMackay Cable and Radio Corporation is
"authorized under its franchise to set a relay
station inside the Foreign Trade Zone in
Mariveles,
Bataan,
which
will
receive
interstate
communications
for
onward
transmission by its main station in Manila.
The above-stated opinions of the Secretary of
Justice and Undersecretary of Justice are
material because Republic Acts Nos. 4630 and
4617 are in pari materia. As the Court has
reiterated:
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when
they relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things, or have
the same purpose or object. (Sutherland
Statutory Construction, Vol. 11, pp. 535-536)
When statutes are in pari materia; the rule of
statutory construction dictates that they
should be construed together. (Black on
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 106) ... (City of
Naga vs. Agna, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 176,
184)
City of Naga v. Catalino Agna, G.R. No. L36049 May 31, 1976. Section 2309 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
refer to the same subject matter-enactment
and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this
respect they can be considered in pari
materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when
they relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things, or have
the same purpose or object. When statutes
are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be
construed
together.
This
is
because
enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject matter are supposed to form
part of one uniform system; that later statutes
are supplementary or complimentary to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its
acts the legislature is supposed to have in
mind the existing legislation on the same
subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto.
Having thus in mind the previous statutes
relating to the same subject matter, whenever
the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed
to have enacted the new provision in
accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there
is an express repeal of the old and they all
should be construed together.

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Doctrines in Civil Law

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1DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is based upon the grounds of public policy,

In the Megan Sugar Corporation v. Regional

2DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

from the judgment of acquittal as it would

It is a concept used in agency law that refers

Philippine Realty and Holding Corp. vs. Ley

3DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Prudential Bank v. CA. G.R. 103957. June 14,

4DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

was made. No rule is better settled in law

It is the Latin term for "law of the place where

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA G.R. 122191.

5DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

residence, nationality, place of incorporation

6DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said

It is the Latin term for law of the place where

Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company

7DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

certificates of stock have remained in this

8DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

therefrom was derived from a business

The law is recognized as unconstitutional but

Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,

9DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

the JVA had already been terminated by virtue

That principle of law by which an act done at

Alhambra Cigra vs SEC, G.R. No. L-23606, July

10DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

relation will apply, where the delay is due to

The general public is given the right to

The Philippines has not had any case brought

11DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

Traditionally, fair use is more easily accepted

12DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

twenty-two (22) years after the February 28,

13DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

covered thereby is either a part of the forest

14DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

It is even worse in this case because here,

Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet

Literally meaning "no one gives what he

Egao vs CA, G.R. No. L-79787. June 29, 1989.

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the goods than the seller had, unless the

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was initially supposed to be a donation mortis

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law. The foreign law is treated as a question of

18DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

through its four duly registered branches at

19DOCTRINES: CIVIL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Renvoi Doctrine

The doctrine whereby a jural matter is

In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward

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jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to

It is the Latin of "no time runs against the

Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil 693.

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an information on behalf of the people at any

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public policy of preserving public rights and