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Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago
(Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter
submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in
Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April
1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It
consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page
4 and the left margin of all the pages.
2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and
executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that
the will was not executed and attested in accordance
with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of
the witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing
witnesses is material to the validity of a will
RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses
the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that
they are of good standing or reputation in the
community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness
in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in
court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not
mandatory that evidence be established on record that
the witnesses have good standing in the the community.
Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former
being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not
require evidence of such good standing. Credibility
depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in
court.
[G.R. No. L-4888. May 25, 1953.]
JOSE MERZA, petitioner, vs. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS,
respondent.
Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.
Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
WILLS; PROBATE OF DEFECTIVE WILLS; PHRASE
"IN OUR PRESENCE", EXPLAINED. Written in the local
dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as
translated into English in the record on appeal reads:
"The foregoing instrument consisting of three (3) pages,
on the date above mentioned, was executed, signed and
published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared
TUASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which
affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales denying the probate of the last will and
testament and a so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A
and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was
survived by her husband and collateral relatives, some of
whom, along with the husband, were disinherited in
Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein.
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged
defects of the attestation clause. Written in the local
dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as
translated into English in the record on appeal reads:
"The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on
the date above-mentioned, was executed, signed and
published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared
that the said instrument is her last will and testament;
that in our presence and also in the very presence of the
said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two
witnesses and the testatrix each of us three witnesses
signed this testament."
The opponent objected that this clause did not state that
the testatrix and the witnesses had signed each and
every page of the will or that she had signed the
instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The
Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that
"failure to state in the attestation clause in question that
the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and
every page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each
one of the pages of the instrument appears to be signed
by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve
vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, (1924); Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57
Phil., 437, (1932); Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd
Suppl. (October 18, 1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44
Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940)." But granting the correctness of
the premise, the court held the second objection well
taken and thus concluded: "The question whether the
testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses
can not be verified upon physical examination of the
instrument. Hence, the absence of the required
statement in said clause may not, pursuant to the
decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset by proof
aliunde even if admitted without objection."
The premise of this conclusion is, in our opinion,
incorrect.
It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very
poorly drawn, its language exceedingly ungrammatical to
the point of being difficult to understand; but from a
close examination of the whole context in relation to its
purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix
signed in the presence of the witnesses. Considering that
the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and
attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that
the only actors in the proceeding were the maker and the
2.
ID.; ID.; RIGHT OR POWER OF TESTATOR. "After
a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator
it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new
will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he
should die before he had a chance to present such
petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the
testator's death would be in order" (Report of the Code
Commission, pp. 53-54). The reason for this comment is
that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New
Civil Code).
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June
25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions of the
new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its
approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his
natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C.
Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to
the probate of the will alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she
was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her
legitime.
After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to
the essential requisites and formalities provided by law
for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued
an order admitting the will to probate. The court,
however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition
relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after
proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued
another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child
of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs
her legitime, with costs against petitioner.
From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his
intention to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, and
accordingly, the record was elevated to this Court.
It should be noted that petitioner instituted the present
proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will
availing himself of the provisions of Article 838,
paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a
testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for
the allowance of his will, but to such petition one Maria
Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she is the
acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she
was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her
legitime. In other words, Maria Catimbang does not
object to the probate of the will insofar as its due
execution is concerned or on the ground that it has not
complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather
"2.
That I, Juana Gatmaitan, hereby declare that the
house purchased by as was paid with my friend Leonarda
Macam's own money in the sum of three thousand pesos
(P3,000) and therefore, said house truly belongs to my
said friend. The following furniture likewise truly belong
to her:
"One (1) wardrobe with mirror and carved top.
"One (1) narra bed.
"One (1) small wooden wardrobe.
"One (1) small wooden table.
"One (1) narra chair.
"One (1) rattan sofa.
"One (1) dining room table.
"One (1) kitchen table.
"Two (2) dining room benches.
"Two (2) kitchen benches.
"One (1) ice box.
"3.
I, Leonarda Macam also hereby declare that the
Buick automobile and most of the furniture in the house
where we lived, as the narra chairs, wardrobe and bed,
truly belong to my friend Juan Gatmaitan, said
automobile and most of said furniture having been
bought with money exclusively belonging to her; and she
was also the one who had my house painted.
"4.
That in consideration of the friendship we
mutually profess, considering ourselves almost as sisters,
we have voluntarily agreed that whoever of us will die
first shall leave to the supervisor, as the latter's property,
the house and all the furniture therein together with the
Buick automobile above-stated, excluding the furniture
belonging to Leonarda Macam stated in paragraph 2 of
this document, which may be taken by the heirs of said
Leonarda Macam if she will be the first to give her soul to
God, as a remembrance to her surviving friend, and this
agreement shall be equivalent to a transfer of the rights
of the one who die first and shall be kept by the survivor;
and none of our heirs shall claim the property mentioned
in this document, left by any of us who dies first.
"In witness whereof, we affix our signature at the foot of
this document as a proof of the acceptance by each of us
of this agreement, this 12th day of July, 1932, in the
municipality of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, P. I."
It is inferred from the foregoing document that the
deceased Leonarda Macam and the defendant Juana
Gatmaitan lived together as friends, Leonarda having
contributed the house and Juana the Buick automobile
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