The Tea and Horse Trade With Inner Asia During The Ming

THE TEA AND HORSE TRADE WITH INNER ASIA DURING THE MING
Author(s): MORRIS ROSSABI

Source: Journal of Asian History, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1970), pp. 136-168
Published by: Harrassowitz Verlag
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MORRIS ROSSABI
(Case Western Reserve University)
THE
TEA AND HORSE TRADE WITH

DURING THE MING*
INNER
ASIA
aftera centuryof Mongol

Ming China was eager to be self-sufficient
of
was
She
trade, considered mercantile
contemptuous
occupation.
relations as tribute missions,and at the same time, perhaps not even
consciously,feareddependence on other states. Some modern scholars
and that she used
maintain that China was economicallyself-sufficient
the barbarian demand for Chinese goods as a political device rather
than for economic gain. T. F. Tsiang, whose views have been widely
publicized by his student John Fairbank, points out "on China's part
the permissionto trade was intended to be a mark of imperial bounty
and a means of keeping the barbarians in the proper state of submissiveness."1 1 will show how this view offersan inadequate explanation
of China's desire, despite her scorn for commerce,to pursue the tea
and horse trade.
The Chinese bred horses but they recognized that "the horses of
distant lands, usually to the West or North,and even of theirnomadic
enemies near at hand, [were] quite franklysuperior."2 Being larger,
faster,and hardierthan Chinese horses,the foreignsteeds were ideally
suited for warfare. Even a cursorylook at China's horse policy prior
to the Ming indicates her eagerness for foreign horses. In the first
dynasty, the Shang (1523 B.C. - 1028 B.C.), the Kings apparently
sent militaryexpeditionsto obtain horsesfromtribes on the periphery
* For a list of abbreviations,
see
and bibliography
unitsof measurement
p. 166.
1 Quoted in JohnFairbankand Ssu-yTeng, "On the Ch'ingTributary
System,"HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudiesVI, (1941),p. 140.
2 H. G. Creel,"TheRoleoftheHorseinChineseHistory,"
American
Historical
Review
, LXX, 647-672, (1965),pp. 655-656.

THE TEA AND HORSE TRADE WITH INNER ASIA
137
of the Chinese heartland.3Such expeditions must have been common,

for horses seem to have been plentifulas evidenced by the skeletons
found in Shang tombs. The appointment of Ma , military officials who cared for horses, and the widespread use of chariots also
attests to the prevalence and importance of these animals. In the
Chou (1027 B.C. - 256 B.C.), the practice of buryingsacrificialhorses
increased- as many as 114 horses were buried in the Hsin-ts'un site.4
Horses were also extremelyvaluable in warfare(i.e. cavalry), hunting,
and transportation. During the chaotic last centuries of the Chou
culminatingin the foundingof a centralized empire under the Ch'in
(221 B.C. - 207 B.C.), the worth of the horse in combat was amply
demonstrated.Nor is it an accident that the new victorious dynasty
derived fromwesternmostChina and used West Asian horses extensively.
Han Wu-ti (140 B.C. - 87 B.C.) was the most famous early Emperor
to recognize the superiorityof Central Asian horses and consciously
set out to import or expropriate them. When the King of Ferghana
refusedto comply with Wu's request for horses, Wu sent a large and
costly military expedition under Li Kuang-li to gain the 'bloodsweating" horses that he coveted.5 The costliness of the enterprise
deterredfutureEmperors fromusing this method to obtain horses.
The barbarian invasions followingthe fall of the Han (A.D. 220)
and the T'ang (A.D. 907) dynasties demonstratedthat China needed
horsesifshe wereto survive.The period ofMongol control(A.D. 12601368) was even more instructive,forthe Chinese recognizedthat "the
Mongols were able to establish theirempirebecause of theirabundance
of horses . . . Having established the empire, they were unable, from
the imperialcentrein China, to acquire enough horsesto back a regular
and realistic horse policy which would have given then the necessary
mobilityalways to act successfullyagainst rebels and retain the unity
of the empire."6
3 L. C. Goodrich,
A ShortHistoryoftheChinesePeople(3rd.ed., New York,
1958),p. 16.
4 ChengTe-k'un,Archaeology
in China (Vol.II), (Cambridge,
1960),Shang
China, p. 205; ChengTe-k'un,Archaeology
in China (Vol.Ill), (Cambridge,
1963),ChouChina, p. 77.
5 HomerDubs, Historyof theFormerHan Dynasty(Vol.II), (Baltimore,
1944),p. 132.
6 S. Jagchidand C. R. Bawden,"Some Notes on the Horse Policy of the
Yan Dynasty,"CentralAsiaticJournal
, X, (1965),p. 264.

138
MORRIS ROSSABI
When the firstMing Emperor took the throne, one of his vital
tasks, therefore,was to insurea steady supply of war horses.Following
he organized both the Yan-ma ssu
a policy of self-sufficiencey,
and
the
T'ai-p'u ssu, with four branch offices,all
(Pasturage Office)
under the aegis of the Ministryof War for the purpose of breeding
horses. Though their functionswere frequentlysimilar, the Yan-ma
ssu was responsibleforthe pasture areas set aside by the government
and for the rearing of horses, while the T'ai-p'u ssu conducted semiannual inspection tours checkingthe size, weight,and physical condition (includingthe eyes, teeth, and color) of these horses and reporting
negligent officialsand breeders to the Ministryof War which either
finedor arrested them.8
Despite these measures, China was unable to procureenough horses
for her Empire.9 The intensive agriculturepracticed by the Chinese
leftlittle land available forpasture. Even the meagre acreage allotted
to the Yan-ma ssu was constantlyreduced to meet the demands of
the farmers.In 1409, in the province of Shensi the Yan-ma ssu had
twenty-fourpasture areas but by the end of the fifteenthcenturyit
maintained only six of these.10In addition to the land shortage,few
competent breeders were available and one Emperor was forced to
assign criminalsto the Yan-ma ssu.11In 1504 Yang I-ch'ing, a leading advocate of reformin the horse administrationof the Ming, wrote
a memorialdeploringthe conditionof the Yan-ma ssu and requesting
that its pasture land be expanded and that more and better trained
personnel be assigned the important duty of breeding and tending
horses.12His plans were not completely implemented,and so in the
7 Here I am usingthe terminology
devisedby CharlesHuckerin his article
of
the
"Governmental
Dynasty,"HarvardJournalofAsiatic
Ming
Organization
Studies
, XXI, (1958),pp. 1-66.
8 Ming shu (hereafter
MShu), 66, p. 1325; Ming shih (hereafter
MS), 75,
801.
p.
9 Creel,op. cit.p. 669.DuringtheSung,WangAn-shihattempted
to procure
horsesby orderingeveryfamilyin the Northto raise one war horseforthe
See JohnMeskill(ed.), WangAn-shih:PracticalReformer?,
(Bosgovernment.
ton,D. C. Heath and Co., 1963),pp. 87- 88.
10Kansu ung-chih,
19, p. 1918; Shensiung-chih
STC), 42, pp.
(hereafter
16b- 17a; T'ai-tsungshih-lu
, 60,pp. 12b- 13a.
11STC 42, pp. 17a- 17b.
12MS 75,p. 801 (Yang's proposalswillbe discussedat somelengthlater).

THE TEA UND HORSE TRADE WITH INNER ASIA
139
late sixteenth centurywe findthe Jesuit Matthew Ricci commenting

that:13
TheChineseknowlittleaboutthetamingortraining
ofhorses.Thosewhich
theymakeuse ofin dailylifeare all geldingsand consequently
quietand
goodtempered.
Theyhave countlesshorsesin theserviceofthearmy,but
theseare so degenerateand lackingin martialspiritthattheyareput to
routevenbytheneighing
oftheTartars'steedsand so theyarepractically
uselessin battle.
Because China was unable to raise her own horses, the Emperors,
especially Hung-wu and Yung-lo, sent embassies to the Central Asian
states, one of whose objectives was to stimulate these states to offer
horses as tribute.14When foreignenvoys presentedhorses,the Emperors rewarded them with valuable goods such as silk and silver.15They
were particularly generous to Arab ambassadors who might present
themwiththe famedArabian steeds. In 1518,forexample, the Cheng-te
Emperor bestowed upon the King of Mecca the four-claweddragon
This
robe, an item rarely given to and highly prized by foreigners.16
was
for
Central
Asian
tribute
mission
successful,
policy
nearly every
mentioned in the Ming shih and Ming shih-lu offeredhorses to the
Emperor. Most of these states, however, donated tribute irregularly
and the number of horses they presented was not fixed. As a result,
they could not be relied upon to provide a continual flowof horses.17
In addition, the Chinese governmentincurred enormous expenses in
13Chinain theSixteenth
: TheJournalsofMatthew
Ricci, 1583- 1610
Century
Louis
13.
(translated
by
Gallagher),(NewYork,1953),p.
14Ch'enCh'eng,the authoroftheHsi-yfankuochili, "the mostimportant
sourceforthesituationin CentralAsia duringtheearlyMingperiod"(Wolfgang
Noteson theImportant
ChineseLiterarySourcesforthe
Franke,Preliminary
the
1368
1644
,
,
of
History
Ming Dynasty
ChengtuStudia SericaMonograph,
SeriesA, No. 2, 1948,p. 60),and Fu An,whowas keptas a prisoner
by Tamerleadersin two of theseembassies.See MS 332,p. 3829.
lane,wereprominent
I am currently
ofCh'en'swork.
at workon a completetranslation
15 Ta Minghui tien(hereafter
TMHT ), 112,p. 1655.
16MS 332,p. 3833.For theuses ofthe dragonrobein diplomaticrelations,
see Schuyler
ofDragonRobes by theMingand Ch'ing
Camman,"Presentation
CourtforDiplomaticPurposes,"Sinologica
, III , (1953),pp. 193- 220.
17JohnFairbankand Ssu-yTeng, "On the Ch'ingTributarySystem,"
HJAS, VI, 135- 246, (1941),p. 157. For example,Hami, the CentralAsian
state most closelyrelatedto China,sent tributeonly once everyfiveyears
duringthesixteenth
century.

140
MORRIS ROSSABI
providing for the upkeep of tribute envoys and it was in the best
interestsof the Empire to finda cheaper way of obtaining horses.
Another occasional source of horses was booty captured in war.
Several times, according to the Ming shih, Chinese forces confiscated
domestic animals- as few as 630 horses at one time and as many as
three hundred and fortythousand on another occasion.18But again
such bonanzas were infrequent.Often, in fact, the Chinese lost their
own precious horses to the barbarians.
The major dependable source for horses was trade. Trade, which
has been consideredby modernscholars repugnantto Chinese officials,
was necessary for the survival of the state. In the beginningof the
dynasty, this trade was controlledby the governmentwith minimal
participation by merchants,but as the dynasty declined and its need
forhorses became desperate,it forsookits prejudice against commerce
and allowed merchantsto play a dominant role in the horse trade.
On the northeasternborder of China, barbarian horses were traded
forChinese silver and silk and on the northwestan extensive tea-horse
trade developed.19The formerhas been studied by modern scholars,
but the latter has, with few exceptions, received little attention.20
A tea-horsetrade had existed as early as the Sung (A.D. 960- 1279).
The Ch'a-ma,ssu (Horse Trading Office)was created in the twelfth
century to supervise this trade.21It encouraged the barbarian merchants22to exchange their horses fortea. Trade was conducted in the
18MS 330,p. 3802; MS 330,p. 3800-01, 3807.
19See the articleby Hou Jen-chih,
"Ming-taiHsan Ta Shan-hsisan-chen
ma-shihk'ao", Yen-ching
(1938),pp. 183- 237; translatedas "Fronhseh-pao
tierHorseMarketsin theMingDynasty"in JohnDeFrancisand E -tuZen Sun
, (Washington,
1956),pp. 309- 332. Othercom(eds.), ChineseSocial History
inhorsetrading.Forthis,see
also
used
such
as
salt
and
were
modities,
porcelain,
Yen-shan-
angpieh-chi89, p. 3923and TMHT 153,p. 2139.
WangShih-chen,
sourceofhorseswas Korea. See Henry
enough,anotherimportant
Surprisingly
RelationsDuringtheYung-loPeriod, 1403- 1424, (WiesSerruys,Sino-Jrced
baden,1955),p. 32.
20A notableexceptionis Tani Mitsutaka's"Mindaichamabekino kenky"
[A Studyof Tea and HorseTrade in the MingDynasty"],Shirin(1966),pp.
733-751; 861-879.
21Sungshih167,pp. 17b- 18b.
22I do notuse theterm"barbarian"to malignordeprecatetheconglomerate
formanyofthemenjoyeda higherlevel
oftribesand groupson China'sborders,
of culturethanthe term"barbarian"usuallyimplies.In thispaper,the word
is used in its originalmeaning.As H. D. F. Kitto explains,"The Greekword
'barbaros'does not mean 'barbarian'in the modernsense; it is not a termof

141
fifthmonth of the year at T'ao-chou, in the sixth at Ho-chou, and in

the seventh at Hsi-ning.23The trading period was brief,so as to limit
contact betweenthe Chineseand the barbarians and to allow maximum
controlby the government.The system worked for a time but as the
governmentdeclined and lost its monopoly on tea, private merchants
exported huge amounts of it, reducing the barbarian demand for tea
and the attraction of the tea-horsetrade.
The Ming followed the example of the Sung in attemptingto use
the governmenttea monopoly not only as a way of obtaining horses,
but also as a potent means of pacifyingthe unruly barbarians. The
barbarians coveted tea for several reasons: it remained freshlonger
than other beverages such as koumiss; it contained fewerimpurities
than water; and it was a mild stimulant,particularlyafterprolonged
exposure to the cold. The Ming shih relates that without tea the barbarians would be "afflictedand therebyill" and should they trespass
upon the border lands of China, withholdingtea would render them
docile.24Theoretically,the tea-horse trade was encouraged in times of
loathingor contempt;it does not meanpeoplewholive in caves and eat their
meat raw. It meanssimplypeoplewho make noiseslike 'bar bar' insteadof
talkingGreek.If you did not speak Greekyou werea 'barbarian'..." (The
Greeks
, [PenguinBook, 1951]p. 7). In thiscase, "barbarian"is a convenient
did
borderof Chinawho commonly
termforthe peopleson the northwestern
notspeakChineseand whomtheChinesecalledby thatname.
23Li Shih-heng,
"Tsui-ch'uhua-fanch'a-mamou-ite ching-t'ung"
(Earliest
Tea-HorseTrade Betweenthe Chineseand the Barbarians),Kuo-li pei-ching
cKi-kan(1925),pp. 216- 217. RobertHartwelllists
she-huik'o-hseh
ta-hseh
a numberof Sung sourceson the tea-horsetradein his A GuidetoSourcesof
ChineseEconomicHistory
, A. D. 618- 1368, (Chicago,1964).
24MS 80,p. 843. For theuse oftea amongmodern-day
nomads,see George
Cressey,Land ofthe500 Million, (NewYork, 1955)p. 320. Tea as a stimulant
and as of medicinalvalue is discussedin WilliamUkers,All AboutTea, (New
to pacifythe barYork, 1935)Vol. I, pp. 539, 556. The policyof attempting
bariansby denyingthem cherishedproductsprevailedinto the nineteenth
Lin Tse-hsin hisfamousletterof 1839to QueenVictoriaassertsthat
century.
thereis nota singlethingwhich
"Ofall thatChinaexportsto foreign
countries,
whenused,
wheneaten,orofbenefit
to people: theyareofbenefit
is notbeneficial
whenresold:all are beneficial.
Is therea singlearticlefromChina
or ofbenefit
forexam? Take tea and rhubarb,
countries
whichhas doneanyharmto foreign
ple; the foreigncountriescannotget alongfora singleday withoutthem.If
then
forthosewhoareto suffer,
withno sympathy
Chinacutsoffthesebenefits
alive?" JohnFairbank
whatcan the barbariansrelyuponto keepthemselves
and Ssu-yTeng,China'sResponsetotheWest:A Documentary
, 1839Survey
1923, (Cambridge,1954),p. 25.

142
MORRIS ROSSABI
peace but abandoned in times of war. In reality, the need for horses
was so great that this threat was rarely carried out. If China was to
secure an adequate supply of horses and remain strong,the tea trade
had to be maintained. Tea and horseswere so inextricablyrelated that
officialsrepeatedlyrequested that the tea laws and the horse administration be supervised by the same man.25
ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE CWA-MA SSU
Government control of tea was, in Chinese eyes, the firststep in

the creation of a rational and effectivehorse policy. Hung-wu, in the
fourthyear of his reign,imposed a ten percent tax in kind on all tea.
The remainder,withthe exception of a small amount forthe producer's
personal consumption,was saved for governmentuse. The Emperor
also ordered his soldiers to cultivate tea on idle land. The soldiers
divided up twentypercent of this tea and governmentofficialsreceived the rest.26As a result, the government,according to Hung-wu,
would annually collect approximatelyone millionchin fromSzechwan
and 26,862 chin fromHan-chung fu in Shensi, two of the largest tea
producingareas in early Ming.27A Tea Tax Office(Ch'a-k'o ssu) with
branches primarilyin Szechwan was created to levy and collect the
fixed tea tax.20 Though the tea producers secured such privileges as
exemption fromlabor service, severe penalties were imposed on those
producers who evaded the tax by selling tea illegally to merchants.
These penalties ranged from twenty lashings for a firstoffenceto
confiscationof propertyand even death forrepeated transgressions.29
Ming officialsfrequentlywarned the merchants and producers that
private trading in tea was as much a crime as violating the salt
monopoly.30
After the tea was collected and packed, soldiers transportedit to
the Horse Trading Office.Initially this was not difficultfor branches
i
25MS 92,p. 971; TMHT 153,p. 2137.
26MS 80,p. 844; TMHT 37,p. 685; T'ai-tsushih-lu70,pp. 4a- 4b.
27TMHT 37,p. 683.
28MS 80,p. 844.
29TMHT , 37,p. 684.
3 TMHT , 37, p. 684; Li Chieh,Mingshih, p. 342.

143
of the Ch'a-ma ssu were located in both Shensi and Szechwan.31Since

most of the barbarian horse traders were close to Shensi, all but one
of the Szechwan branches were closed before 1400. Most of the one
million chin produced in Szechwan had to be transported to Shensi
fortrade.
The transport system created by Hung-wu was ill-advised and
precarious. He ordered his army in Szechwan to send the tea to the
Shensi borderwherethe armyofthat provincecarriedit to the Ch'a-ma
ssu. By transportingthe tea to the bordersinstead of having the barbarians bring their horses to Szechwan, the governmentavoided the
tremendousexpense of lodging and feeding the barbarian traders on
theirtrip throughChina.32Hung-wu failed to realize that if war broke
out and the army could not be responsibleforthe tea, both the monopoly and the transportationsystem would be endangered.
Aside fromthe one millionchin of tea used by the government,the
rest was sold to tea merchantsfordistributionwithinChina. Merchants
paid two hundred cash ( ch'ien) to the governmentand in returnreceived a license (yin) entitlingthem to one hundred chin of tea. They
could also, with a special license (yu-ieh), purchase a smaller unit
of tea (chi-ling).zz A Tea Control Station (P'i-ch'aso), referredto as
a surveillance agency by Charles Hcker, recorded the names, family
relationships, and the number of yin allotted to merchants.34The
merchantsthen took the licenses to the tea plantations and received
the specifiedamount of tea. They were accorded a set time limit,usually a year, within which they had to sell their tea and returntheir
licenses to the Tea Control Station for cancellation.35Merchants who
delayed the returnof theirlicenses were liable to have their tea confiscatedby officials.
31A goodaccountofthe originalbranchesofthe Ch'a-massu in Szechwan,
Ynnan,and Kueichowis foundin Tani, Op. cit.,pp. 84- 87. The Yung-ning
Ch'a-massu was theonlybranchin Szechwan.
32See E. Bretschneider,
MediaevalResearches
,
fromEasternAsiaticSources
expenditureon
(London,1888),Vol. II, p. 266 forexamplesof government
traders.
foreign
33 TMHT 37, p. 684; MS 80,p. 843.
34 TMHT 37,p. 684; T^ai-tsung
shih-lu55,p. 7b.
35 TMHT 153, p. 2138. Comparewiththe Yan monopolysystem.See
EconomicStructure
HerbertFranz Schurmann,
, (Harvard
oftheYuan Dynasty
Press,1956),pp. 193- 202.
University

144
MORRIS ROSSABI
Still more severe punishments were reserved for merchants who

exported tea illegally to the barbarians. Capital punishmentwas prescribed for those who smuggled tea outside the borders of China. In
Hung-wu's time, no mercy was shown towards smugglers.Hung-wu
had Ou-yang Lun, a relative by marriage,executed for this offense.36
Border officialswho abetted the smugglersin any way were also punished though usually not so severely.
In effect,the CKa-ma ssu in Shensi was the only organizationlegally empowered to carry on the tea-horse trade. Four major branches
were founded to fulfillthis task. The most important,Ho-chou, was
established as early as 1374, T'ao-chou sometime prior to 1383, Hsi37
ning (transferredfrom Ch'in-chou) in 1397, and Kan-chou in 1413.
Branches of the Ch'a-ma ssu were also foundin Min-chouand Chuanglang thoughbetween themthese handled less than one thousand horses
a year.38Many texts do not even mention the latter because of their
relative insignificance.
Each branch officeof the Ch'a-ma ssu traded with the barbarians in
its own area. Hsi-ning trading primarilywith the Uighur tribes of
Ch'-hsien, An-ting,A-tuan, and Han-tung in the Ch'ing-hai (Lake
Kokonor) region; Ho-chou and T'ao-chou tradingwithtribesorganized
into the Hsi-fan and Pi-li militarydistricts.380
None of these groups
could compete in wealth, land, and power with the Oirat Mongols
who were their neighborsto the northeast and the growing Moslem
state of Turfan to the northwest.Sporadic raids by these two powers,
as we shall see, led to the retreat and dispersal of the barbarians and
to the disruptionof the tea-horsetrade.
86Li Kuang-pi,"Ming-tai
hsi-ch'ai-mak'ao"[Examination
oftea-horse
trade
betweenMingand theWest],Chung-yang
Ya-hs-ya(1943),pp. 48- 49.
37 T'ai-tsu8hih-lu93, p. 6b; 155,p. 4b; 252, p. 3b; T'ai-tsungshih-lu88,
6b.
We do notknowwhentheT'ao-choubranchwas founded.It musthave
p.
existedpriorto 1383,forin thatyearit was mergedwiththeHo-choubranch.
It resumeditsindependent
existencein 1411.Ho-chouis Kansu'sTao-hohsien;
T'ao-chouis Kansu's Lin-t'anhsien; Hsi-ningis Ching-hai'sHsi-ninghsien;
Kan-chouis Kansu's Chang-ihsien;Min-chouis Kansu's Min-hsien;Chuangarebasedon Chung-kuo
ku-chin
langis Kansu'sP'ing-fanhsien;Identifications
ta tz'u-tien.
ti-ming
38For an enlightening
discussionofall thebranchesofthe CKa-massu,see
Tani,Op. cit.,pp. 88- 89.
asaThgKan-chouCKa-massu was activeonlysporadically
in thetea-horse
trade.It was founded
in 1413,butwasabolishedin 1442andwasnotreestablished until1563.

145
The Ch'a-ma ssu was staffedby a Surveillance Commissioner( Ta shih, of 9 a rank) and a Surveillance Vice Commissioner(Fu-shih, of
9 b rank) and the local branches also were assigned a Commander
(Ssu-ling) and an Assistant Commander ( Ssu-cK eng) .39I have found
no sources describingthe division of power among these various officials.I have also been unable to uncover the names of any officialsof
the CKa-ma ssu, but since they belonged to the lowest,the ninth,rank
of the civil bureaucracy, this is not unusual. Their position at the
bottom of the civil hierarchy,however,gives rise to speculation about
theireffectivenessand honesty. It is at least possible, if not probable,
that these ill-paid and low ranking officialsmightfor a fee have been
willing to overlook the activity of smugglers.Hung-wu and his successors were obviously worried about this development. Periodically
Hung-wu and Yung-lo issued gloomy edicts promisingsevere punishments for such illegal activities.40Later, as these pronouncements
failed to deter corruptofficials,Emperors sent Messengers(Hsing-jen)
and Censors (Y-shih) to patrol the borders and to reporton officials
who condoned and participated in acts of smuggling.41
Why the Chinese Emperors chose low ranking and underpaid officials to work in the Ch'a-ma ssu is difficultto understand. It was
perhaps the same attitude that motivated them to appoint eunuchs as
directorsofthe MaritimeTrade Superintendencies( Shih-poi-chu ssu)
in southeasternChina, an attitude springingfroman antipathytowards
commerceand a beliefthat highofficialsshould not demean themselves
in the market place. As I have already stated, though the Chinese
recognizedthe need fortrade they were continuallyscornfulof it.
There is no doubt that the governmentfavored and initiated the
tea-horsetrade. In 1375, Hung-wu sent the eunuch Chao Ch'eng with
silk, tea, and other valuable products attractive to the barbarians to
Ho-chou to trade for horses.42 In 1392, a second eunuch reached
Ho-chou with 300,000 chin of tea and traded with other barbarians
forover 10,000 horses,which were immediatelyturned over to border
officialsfor defense purposes.43Apparently,the barbarians enjoyed a
39MS 75,p. 802.
40STC 42, p. 15b; TMHT 37,p. 689.
41 TMHT 37, p. 691.
42MS 330,p. 3796; T'ai-tsushih-lu100,p. lb.
48Wang,Op. cit.,89,p. 3932; MS 330,pp. 3796-3797.

146
MORRIS ROSSABI
good cup of tea, and trade was conducted. Only after some effort
were the Chinese able to induce the barbarians to engage in trade.
Nevertheless,trade, once initiated,was conducted on Chinese terms.
In 1397, Hung-wu sent Li Ching to give the top half of 41 gold tablets
(chin-p'ai hsin-fu) to the barbarians and the bottom to the various
branches of the Ch'a-ma ssu- 21 to Ho-chou, 16 to Hsi-ning,and 4 to
T'ao-chou.44Every threeyears a Court officialcalled on the barbarians,
comparing their tablets with those stored in the Ch'a-ma ssu. If the
barbarian tablets were genuine, he proceeded to trade Chinese tea
forhorses.45Theoreticallythese restrictionswould reduce the likelihood
of smuggling both by barbarians and Chinese and would maximize
governmentcontrolof trade.
The prices of the horses and the number to be traded were also
determined by the Chinese. In 1389, Hung-wu ordered the Ch'a-ma
ssu to pay one hundred and twenty chin for superiorhorses, seventy
chin for average horses, and fiftychin for inferiorhorses.48Earlier,
prices for horses had fluctuatedfromfortyto eighteen hundred chin
per horse, depending on the demand.47By keeping prices stable, the
government would be assured a regular supply of horses. It could
maintain these prices only by curbing the private export of tea. If
the barbarians had access to smuggled tea, their demand forit would
be reduced, the price of tea would go down and the horse-tea price
ratio would be upset.
If successful, the government annually expected to use approximately one million chin of tea in exchange for fourteen thousand
horses. According to the Ta Ming hui tien, Ho-chou received 7,705
48
horses, T'ao-chou 3,050, and Hsi-ning 3,050, a total of 13,805. Most
of the horses were sent to frontiergarrisons: the mares were transported to the pasture areas of the Yan-ma ssu forbreeding; and the few
remaininggood horses were donated to the Emperor.
44Tani,op. cit.,p. 92.
45MS 80, p. 844. For a similarsystemthat was used withthe Southeast
Asian states,see Wang Huai-chung(trans),Uchida Naosaku,"Ming-taite
mao-ichih-tu"[TheSystemofCourtTributeand Tradein theMing
ch'ao-kung
Shih-huo
Period],
(December10, 1935),p. 32. OriginalJapanesearticleis in
Shina Kenky(1935),pp. 91- 101.
46MS 92,p. 971; STC 42, p. 16a.
47Li Chieh,op. cit.,pp. 342- 343; Wang,op. cit.,89,p. 3925.
48 TMHT 37, p. 688; Yang I-ch'inggives 14,051as the annualnumberof
horsesinvolvedin thetrade.

147
This elaborate system of trade required a major effortfrom the

Chinese government.Governmentsoldiers cultivated idle land, packed
tea, and transportedit fromthe Szechwan to the Shensi border. Government storehouses preserved the tea for as long as three years
while waiting for trade. Four agencies, the Horse Trading Office,the
Tea Tax Office,the Tea Control Station, and later the Tea Censorate,
were created to facilitategovernmentcontrolof the trade. The Government was eager to pursue this venture. When war and famine
caused soldiers to be diverted from the tea trade, the government,
unabashed, called upon the merchants to substitute for the soldiers
as tea agents.
The system was effectiveduring the early Ming and by the middle
of Hung-wu's reign,it was stabilized and operatingto the satisfaction
of both the governmentand the barbarians. Trade expanded with each
passing year. In 1378 the Chinese received 469 horses fromHan-tung;
by 1384 they received 560; by 1390 the number increased to 7060;
and by 1392 over 10,000 horses were acquired by the Chinese.49Hungwu was apparently able to impose the severe restrictionsneeded for
an effectivetea-horse trade.
Yung-lo initiallydemonstratedgreaterinterestin winningthe hearts
of the northwesternbarbarians so "that all countries,even the most
distant, should acknowledge his supremacy" than in following the
harsh policies of his father.50He relaxed the prohibitionson private
tea and caused the Gh'a-ma ssu to pay more for horses. Early in his
reign, one branch officepaid eighty thousand chin of tea for seventy
horses, an average of over one thousand chin per horse, far beyond
the maximum of one hundred and twenty chin established by Hungwu.51 Border officialsalso took advantage of Yung-lo's laxity and
traded with the barbarians, occasionally using coarse, adulterated
tea.52 China could not continue in this way for long because Chinese
tea was being consumed with little gain. Yung-lo apparently understood this when he was about to embark on his Mongol campaigns.
His five large scale militaryexpeditions against the Mongols created
49STG 42, pp. 15b- 16a; Wang,op. cit.,89,p. 3932.

50Bretschneider,
op. cit.,Vol. II, p. 247; MS 332,p. 3830.
61MS 80,p. 844.
62 T'ai-tsung
shih-lu39,pp. 7b- 8a.

148
MORRIS ROSSABI
a need for war horses, most of which could be supplied only by the
tea-horsetrade.53
In 1408, Yung-lo acted to revive the tea-horsetrade. He reimposed
prohibitionson tea smuggling and reinforcedthem with the threat
of a death sentenceforviolators.54In 1415 he set up furtherrestrictions
by sendingfourMessengersa monthfromthe thirdto the ninthmonth
of the year to curb the illegal outflowof tea. In 1421, curiouslyenough,
the gold tablet system was temporarilysuspended and was only reinstated in 1435.65 It is difficultto determine how this interruption
affectedthe trade, but probably the reduction of governmentcontrol
that this act representedreflecteda decline in the number of horses
acquired by the Chinese. AfterYung-lo's death, the Chinese were less
expansionist, the Empire was relatively peaceful, and the need for
war-horses was consequently diminished. Furthermore, Yung-lo's
strenuous efforts,especially from 1415 on, had led to a significant
increase in the number of horses.56Only when this number began to
53Fora briefaccountoftheseexpeditions,
seeWolfgang
Franke,"Chinesische
im
durch
die
15.
frhen
Jahrhundert,"
, III,
Mongolei
Sinologica
Feldzge
(1951-1953), pp. 81-88.
54 TMHT 37,p. 689.
55 T'ai-tsungshih-lu120, pp. 3a- 3b; MS 80, pp. 844- 845; TMHT 37,
p. 688. Accordingto TMHT , Yung-lostoppedthe tallysystemin 1416; this
in the previousyearto bolsterthe
seemshighlyunlikelyin viewofhis efforts
on tea smuggling.
Tani arguesthata morelogicaltimeforthestoprestrictions
pingwouldbe afterthe burningof the ImperialPalace in 1421.For this,see
Tani,op. cit.,pp. 94- 98.
56The Shih-lugivesunderthetwelfth
monthoftheyearstatistics,
ranging
fromtotal population(used by O. B. Van der Sprenkelin his "Population
StatisticsofMingChina,"BSOAS. XV, (1953),pp. 289- 326)to salttax,meant
to conveythe economicperformance
of the Empire.Though,in particular
instances,these figures,because of copyists'errorsand perhapsdeliberate
cannotbe reliedupon,generaltrendsmaybe perceived.For this,
falsification,
see Van derSprenkel'sintroductory
remarksin the above article.In thiscase,
thegeneraltrendin Yung-lo'sreignfrom1415on is a tremendous
increasein
the numberof horses.In 1415,the numberis 310,617;by 1417,514,439;and
The figures
forthetea tax duringtheMingarealso
by 1422,it roseto 1,199,315.
- in
extremely
suggestive.A steadydeclineis apparentafterYung-lo'sreign
1413,a highpointis reachedwiththe collectionof 1,997,808chinof tea; by
1426,a comparatively
meager630,852chinis collected;and by 1488,thefigure
is only89,000chin.A slightriseto 113,311chinoccursunderCheng-te
(1506a
1521)as resultofYangI-ch'ing-sreforms
(seepp. 155 159)butthetax never
exceedsthatafterCheng-te's
reign.

149
decline in 1435 did the Hsan-te Emperor (1426- 1435) returnto the
gold tablet system and seek to set rigid governmentcontrolsto rehabilitate the tea-horse trade. He and his successor triumphed- but not
forlong.
THE DECLINE
OF THE TEA-HORSE
TRADE
The invasions of Esen (Yeh-hsien), the Oirat chief,in 1449 dealt a

damaging blow to the tea-horse trade. For nearly a decade Esen had
engaged in a horse trade of his own with China. In 1448 the Chinese
eunuch Wang Chen tried to underpay Esen for his horses, infuriating
the Oirat chiefwho vowed revenge.57Shortlythereafter,claimingthat
his envoys had not been properly received by China, he embarked
upon a series of raids on China which culminated in the capture of
the Chinese Emperor.68His early raids were primarilydirectedagainst
the northwesternborder. He captured and devastated Kanchou and
Ninghsia and forced many of the barbarians involved in the horse
trade to seek refugein China while others driftedto remote areas of
Inner Asia.
As a result, the gold tablets, the sole binding element in the teahorse trade, were scattered and for the most part destroyed. About
fiftyyears later, Yang I-ch'ing was amazed to find a barbarian chief
who had in his possession a tablet and was aware of its function.59
Although a few of these tablets were preserved,they were rarely used
in trade again. Without them,the governmentwas severelylimitedin
determiningthe groups that could trade with the Chinese, in fixing
the price of tea and horses, and in preventingunscrupulous officials
and merchantsfromtrading with the barbarians.
Esen's invasions not only destroyed the gold tablet system, but
also disrupted the officialtransportationof tea. The army which was
*7MS 81,p. 857.
58For a good accountof this episode,see WolfgangFranke,"Y Ch'ien,
Serica, XI, (1946),
1398- 1457,"Monumenta
Staatsmannund Kriegsminister
pp. 94- 100.It shouldbe notedthatEsen's disputewithWangChenwas only
the last in a seriesof unpleasantincidentsthat beganwiththe Oiratchief's
ofOirats
conquestofHami in theearly1440'sand thatmarredtherelationship
and Chinese.
69Yang I-ch'ing,Kuan-chung
tsou-i,pp. 4a- 4b.

150
MORRIS ROSSABI
needed to repel Esen's forces could not be spared to carry tea. Even
before these invasions the army had difficultyin fulfillingits obligations, and the Cheng-ung Emperor reluctantly ordered that the
amount of tea collected and transportedby the army fromSzechwan
and Shensi be reduced to half the fixed quota - less than one half a
millionchin.60The rest of the tea tax was convertedinto paper money
and silver. Paradoxically Esen's invasions accentuated the need for
horses while simultaneouslypreventingtheir acquisition by the Chinese. The army was unable to fightand transporttea forthe tea-horse
trade at the same time.
Because the governmentno longer demanded a million chin of tea
from Szechwan, tea merchants obtained a greater share. Some sold
tea legally for internal consumptionwhile others saw a great opportunityfor quick profitin satisfyingthe barbarians' desire fortea. Tea
smugglingflourished,and the government,busily engaged in protecting itselffromthe Oirats, was unable to controlit. Consequently,the
tea-growersin Szechwan had no choice but to collaborate with the
merchants.If they refusedto cooperate, theirtea would not be distributed and would spoil.
Finally Esen's invasions created another problem that indirectly
affected the tea-horse trade. There had been periodic famines in
Shensi but Esen's assaults on China and the influxof Chinese soldiers
in the area markedlyincreased the need for grain.61The government
transportedgrain to relieve Shensi, an effortwhich, as I shall show,
disruptedthe tea-horse trade.
Ch'eng-hua's reign (1465- 1487) witnessedthe firstattempts to deal
withthese problems,althoughmany ofthese effortswere,undoubtedly,
makeshift.For example, followinga precedentset in early Ming times,
the Chinese used commoditiesotherthan tea to trade forhorses. From
1467 to 1470Ch'eng-hua convertedthe tea tax to silver to buy horses.
Possibly the barbarians desired tea more than silver or perhaps the
Emperor realized that had this policy continued for long, it would
have led to a disastrous outflowof China's silver. In any case, after
1470, Ch'eng-hua discontinued the practice.62 In 1479, during the
fifteenthyear of his reign, Ch'eng-hua in desperation ordered the
Censors, who originally investigated but now administered many
60STC 42, p. 18a.
61Ibid.,p. 18b.
62 TMHT 37,pp. 685- 686; Tani,op. cit.,p. 43.

151
functionsof the Ch'a-ma ssu , to trade for horses irrespectiveof regulations.63He urged the Censors to summon the barbarians forthe teahorse exchange and encouraged them to trade at their convenience
and with no price limitations.Perhaps he realized that this would not
necessarily assure a steady supply of horses and was also only a
temporarymeasure.
In seeking more permanent solutions,Ch'eng-hua adopted the policies of his predecessorsand prohibitedthe exportation of private tea.
He attempted to reimpose controls that the governmenthad abandoned after Esen's invasions. He ordered all who smuggled over 500
chin of tea to be drafted into the army.64He also refused to allow
tribute-bearingMoslems and Buddhist priests to buy tea before
returningto theirnative lands, a practice many Emperors had already
and would later condone.66In 1467,he triedto intimidatenegligentand
corrupt officialsand merchants by appointing Censors to patrol the
bordersand punish tea smugglers.All of those involved in this private
trading including the barbarians were outraged and demanded that
the Emperor appoint the relativelypermissiveMessengersratherthan
the strictCensors to performthis function.The barbarians refusedto
supply horses unless their demands were met. A compromise was
finallyeffectedpermittingthe appointment of Tea Censors who performed annual border inspections.66However, since they were not
permanently assigned to the border, they could not successfully
eliminatethe smuggling.
Ch'eng-hua was more successfulin increasingthe tea production of
Han-chung fu in Shensi. He realized that the army could not be used
to convey tea fromSzechwan to Shensi and decided to eliminate the
transportationproblem by expanding tea production in Shensi itself.
He orderedidle land to be reclaimed and placed under cultivationand
refugees from border areas were settled in Shensi as tea growers.67
63 TMHT 153,p. 2137.
64 TMHT 37, p. 689.
65He mayhavebeenthinking
hereoftheroleplayedby Buddhistpriestsin
Relations
JapanesetradewithearlyMing.For this,see WangYi-t'ung,Official
Between
Chinaand Japan, 1368- 1549, (HarvardUniversity
Press,1953),p. 3.
66MS 80,p. 845.
67 TMHT 19,p. 353. In his article"Fiscal Administration
DuringtheMing
in CharlesHucker(ed.), ChineseGovernment
in Ming Times
Administration,"
en(ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1969),Ray Huang discussesthe difficulties
- seepages77,87- 88.
inrevising
countered
thetax structure
bythegovernment

152
MORRIS ROSSABI
Within thirtyyears, tea production had risen to one millionchin per

year or as much as had been produced in Szechwan. One suspects that
Ch'eng-hua had anticipated that much of this increase would wind up
in the hands of the governmentas tax, but surprisingly,no effortwas
made duringhis reignto increase the tea tax of Shensi. Tea continued
to be taxed at the same rate of 26,000 chin ratherthan 1,000,000chin.
Finally, Ch'eng-hua chose the Tea Exchange ( K'ai-chung) system
to deal with the famine problem in Shensi. Using salt instead of tea,
this systemhad been initiated in 1370 to supply soldierson the Shansi
border.68Merchantstransportedgrain to the army stationed in Shansi
and in returnreceived certificates(yin) entitlingthem to government
salt. According to the Ming shih, "in this way the expenses of transportation will be economized and the supply of grain at the frontier
will be sufficient."69
Ch'eng-hua applied the same principlesin Shensi.
He ordered merchantsto send grain to the famine strickenprovince
and to the soldiers on the border, compensatingthem with tea from
the Ch'a-ma ssu. Later the Hung-chih Emperor varied the procedure
by selling tea to the merchantsforsilver which was then used to buy
grain.70
- the eliminationof restrictionson the
None of Ch'eng-hua'sefforts
horse trade, the use of Censors to curb smuggling,the increased production of tea in Han-chung fu, or the K'ai-chung system- ultimately
stabilized the tea-horse trade during his reign. After Ch'eng-hua's
death, when the Hung-chih Emperor took the throne,the private tea
trade flourished.Taking advantage of the disintegrationof the gold
tablet system,Chineseborderofficialsand merchantseagerlysmuggled
tea to the barbarians. Censors made annual inspectiontours but these
were too cursoryto be effective.Only a paltry number of horses was
obtained by the governmentand even these were inferior,since the
merchantsand officialstook the prize mounts.
The rise of Turfan in Central Asia exacerbated these problems.
Turfan,whichhad been a relativelysmall and peaceful- ifnot docile88See Wang Ch'ung-wu,
chih-tu"in Y-kung(Au"Ming-taite shang-t'un
"The
as
1
translated
15,
MingSystemofMerchantColonigust6, 1936),pp.
zation" in JohnDeFrancisand E-tu Zen Sun (eds.), ChineseSocial History
,
pp. 299- 308.
69 Ibid.,p. 300; MS 80,p. 838.Also,see Ho Ping-ti,"The Salt Merchants
of
Yang-chou,"HarvardJournalofAsiaticStudies,XVII, 130- 168,(1954),pp.
135-136.
70 TMHT 37,p. 686.

153
state in the early fifteenthcentury, had absorbed Lukchak (Liucenturyand

ch'eng) and Karakhoja (Huo-chou) in the mid-fifteenth
demanded that China recognizeher as a great Moslem power in Central
Asia. In 1469, its Sultan Ali requested that the Chinese Emperor grant
him the four clawed dragon robe, but the Board of Rites, regarding
Ali as arrogant,refusedhis demand. In 1473,Ali invaded and captured
Hami, an area which was an extremelyimportantthoroughfarein the
caravan trade between China and Central Asia, and which the Chinese
consideredstrategicto the defenseof theirnorthwesternlands. Ch'enghua sent a missionled by Li Wen70aand Liu Wen to oust Ali fromHami,
but the expedition was unsuccessful.AfterAli's death in 1482, Hanshen, the exiled leader of Hami, led an army of 1300 men, recaptured
Hami, and was recognized by the Chinese as its rightfulking. Turfan
refused to relent, and in 1488, the firstyear of Hung-chih's reign,
Ahmed, Ali's son,71treacherously killed Han-shen and reoccupied
Hami.72
HenceforthTurfancast a shadow on Hung-chih'sreign(1488- 1505).
The Chinese, hoping to pressure Turfan into submission without
resortingto military force, cut offtrade and tribute missions. But
China had to remain on her guard and in fact, on several occasions,
clashed with Turfan's troops. Once again China needed war horses for
her cavalry to meet the threat of force. One of Hung-chih's advisers,
Li Tung-yang,72a
urgeda restorationofthe gold tablet systemto procure
the beasts. Li pointed out that the eliminationof the system in 1449
led to an increase in private tea in which the officialsand merchants
had profited.According to Li, they used coarse tea and cheated the
barbarians who became disenchantedand sent inferiorhorsesto China.
Only with the return to the gold tablet system would China control
70a89-Index,II, p. 231a.
71MS 329,p. 3790.Mohammedan
sourcesmakeno mentionofAli and cite
a certainYunusKhan as Ahmed'sfather.See Ney Elias (ed.),E. DenisonRoss
ofMirza MuhammadHaidar, Dughlat,(London,
(trans.),The Tarikh-i-Raahidi
1895; reprint:SourceBooks and Studieson InnerAsia, New York,Praeger,
1970),p. 51.
72MShu 167,pp. 3294- 3296;MS 329,p. 3791.Twoimportant
contemporary
betweenTurfanand Chinahave beenpreserved.
accountsofthestruggles
One,
and
Ma Wen-sheng
Ha-michih,was written
theH8ng-fu
by theWar Minister
I
am
Chin.
man
Hs
the
theother,the P'ing-fanshih-mo,
working
military
by
on an extensivestudyofthisperiodbased on thesetwosources.
72a89-IndexII, p. 226c.

MORRIS ROSSABI
154
her officialsand merchants,regain the trust of the barbarians, and

revive the tea-horsetrade.73
In 1490, the Censor Li Luan advanced a proposal that was adopted
by Hung-chih. He urged that the governmentcompromisewith the
merchants,permittingthem to transport tea to the Shensi Ch'a-ma
ssu. The merchantswould receive 60% of the tea fortheirown private
trade and the governmentwould obtain 400,000 chin (40% of the
1,000,000 chin transported) which would be exchanged for 4,000
horses.74Li and Hung-chihfailed to anticipate problemsin implementing these policies. They assumed that merchants would not take
advantage of the compromise.The merchants,contraryto Li's expectations, kept the superiortea and presented to the Ch'a-ma ssu that
of the lowest quality. Thus in trade the governmenthad to be satisfied
with inferiorsteeds.
Li and Hung-chih also could not have foreseenthe onset of devastating faminesin Shensi, the firstof which struckin 1494. Hung-chih
was compelled to use the K'ai-chung system to relieve Shensi. He
released 2,000,000 chin of tea, which had been accumulated over a
number of years from many regions of China, to merchants who
transportedgrainto the border.75In the verynext year,he temporarily
suspended the horse trade and released four million more chin to
In 1501 he ordered officialsto sell four to
private entrepreneurs.76
five million chin to merchantsin exchange for silver, which was used
to buy grain in Shensi. Hung-chihrealized that the outflowof tea was
subvertingthe tea-horse trade, and in 1502 he decreed that the exchange of tea forgrain was prohibited.77
The prohibitionson the K'ai-chung system still left many problems
unresolved. Hung-chih was unable to find an effectivemethod of
transporting high quality tea to the borders. He relied upon the
merchantsto convey any tea that he was fortunateenough to get and
the merchantswere making good use of their leverage to insure great
profitsfor themselves. Hung-chih was unable to curb the merchants
who met the barbarian demand fortea and so he could not tempt the
barbarians with officialtea.
73MS 92,p. 971.
74MS 80,p. 845.
75 TMHT 37,p. 686.
76Ibid.,p. 686.
77Ibid., p. 686.

155
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Yang I-ch'ing was the firstofficialto devise a comprehensivereform
programof the Ming horse administration.Yang was born in Ynnan
in 1454 but as a child moved to Pa-ling in Hunan where his father
retiredfromofficiallife.He was a precocious child and, having qualified
as a Bachelor (hsiu-ts'aiJ at a young age, attracted the attention of
the Ch'eng-hua Emperor who assigned a tutor to instruct him. At
fourteenhe passed the provincial examinations (hsiang-shih) and at
eighteenhe became a chin-shih.His father's death and the mourning
period that followedtemporarilyimpeded his spectacular progressbut
he regained his momentum shortly. He was appointed an Assistant
Surveillance Commissioner (an-cKa ch'ien-shih) in Shansi and then
advanced to the Surveillance Vice Commissioner( an-cWa fu-shih
) in
Shensi. He stayed in Shensi for eight years and, being inquisitive in
nature, investigated Shensi's border problems, specificallythe horse
administration.His knowledge was not put to use immediatelyas he
was transferredto a post in Nanking. But in 1502 the War Minister
Liu Ta-hsia recommendedthat Yang be appointed Left Vice Censorin-chief( tso fu-tuy-shih) in Shensi with the power to directthe horse
administration.78
With his eightyears' tenurein Shensi and his study of horses during
that time, Yang was well qualified to reformand perhaps invigorate
the horse administration. Yang saw the necessity for more pasture
land if China were to succeed in breeding her own horses and wrote
memorialsto the Emperor urgingsuch an increase. He also requested
an increase in the number of herdsmenin Shensi, pointingout that in
earlyMingtherehad been 1220 herdsmenbut the numberhad gradually
been reduced to 745. Better trained personnel in the Yan-ma ssu,
according to Yang, would permit China to breed more of her own
horses and lessen her dependence on the barbarians. Finally, Yang
demanded that new pasture lands be created and that nearby exposed
towns ( cKeng) and forts( pao ) be built forprotectionagainst hostile
barbarians.79
78MS 198,p. 2303; Li Kuang-pi,op. cit.,p. 50. See HerbertGiles,A Chinese
, (London,1898),pp. 905- 906,and Tyrekishi
Biographical
Dictionary
daijiten
(vol.9), p. 97 forbriefbiographiesof Yang. Also, the 89-IndexIII, p. 153b
has moresourceson Yang. Yang deservesa full-scale
biography.
79Li Kuang-pi,op. cit.,pp. 50- 51.

156
MORRIS ROSSABI
Yang's most importantwork on the tea-horsetrade was a memorial

of over 6,000 characters writtenin 1505.80In it he presented a brief
history of the trade, analyzed its currentproblems, and furnisheda
programdesigned to remedyits weaknesses. Yang's immensepersonal
knowledge was evident throughoutthe memorial; he constantly referredto his own experienceswith border officialsand barbarians. He
had seen everythingwith his own eyes and was not the amateur who
dabbles in many fields that one frequently encounters in Chinese
history.Because he knew the situation,he realized that the merchants
had to be granted an importantrole in the tea-horsetrade. Though he
stillinveighedagainst commerceand privatetrafficin tea, he ultimately
offereda plan that was dependent on the merchantsforits success.
Yang began his memorialby brieflyexplainingthe relationsbetween
China and the barbarians. He pointed out that the Chinese gained the
barbarians' confidenceby supplying them with tea. As a result the
barbarians were willing to act as a bufferagainst hostile peoples in
Central Asia. If the barbarians dared to rebel, according to Yang,
their tea supply would be cut offand they would become ill and die.
With this threat, China regulated the barbarians. However, since the
gold tablet system had been abolished, private trading had made tea
available to the barbarians and the Chinese government had been
unable to obtain horses fromthem.
Sated with tea, the barbarians lost their inhibitionstowards China,
robbing and plundering the border areas. To pacify the barbarians
Yang suggested strongpunishmentfor one or two of the tribes to set
an example for the others. Even such forcefulaction would not in
itselfbe sufficientto reestablishproper relations with the barbarians.
China, asserted Yang, needed to reinstitutethe gold tablet systemand
to make clear the prohibitionson private tea.81Yang required officials
to scrutinize merchant licenses and to confiscateforgeries.Furthermore he wanted to increase the number of Censors patrolling the
borderto eradicate the "evil grass"- Yang's descriptionforthe corrupt
- which stifledthe tea-horse trade. Under Yang's plan, stiffer
officials
punishmentshad to be meted out to smugglersand private tradingin
tea had to be treated as a serious crime. Yang emphasized that the
80Included in a collectionof his memorialsentitledKuan-chungtsou-i.
forfurther
researchon thehorse
Thiscollection
providesexcellentopportunities
in theMing.
administration
81Yang I-ch'ingKuan-chung
tsou-i
, 3, pp. 5a- 6a.

157
early Ming Emperors who cherishedlife and were not fond of killing
considered tea smuggling a capital crime, so that even those who
smuggledas little as fouror fivechin were frightened.Later Emperors,
on the other hand, had been more lenient and as a result those smuggling fiftyor even five hundred chin were not afraid. Consequently,
Yang advocated harsherpunishments.
Yang also outlinedthe tradingconditionson the border.Every three
years trade would be conducted between the Ch'a-ma ssu and the
barbarians who possessed gold tablets. In the second year the Emperor
would send a proclamation in the barbarian language to the border
tribesurgingthemto bringtheirbest horsesfortrade. If the barbarians
came, officialswould reward them generously with tea and would
encouragethem to return.If the barbarians refusedto come afterthree
pleadings, the Chinese would attack one or two of the recalcitrant
tribes and in this way compel acquiescence.
All of these proposals were conventional- Yang envisioned a return
to the systemthat existedunderthe firstEmperors,a systemsupervised
and controlledby the Chinese government.The only problem lay in
transportingtea to the Shensi border and here Yang was compelled to
seek an accommodation with the merchants.The merchantsseemed to
be the onlygroup capable ofundertakingthistask and Yang reluctantly
turned to them. He ordered rich tea merchantsin Shensi to buy five
hundred thousand to six hundred thousand chin of tea annually
though no single merchantcould obtain more than ten thousand chin.
The merchants would carry the tea to the Shensi branches of the
Ch'a-ma ssu which would sell one third of it locally for silver. Fifty
Hang of silverwould be used to pay the merchantsforevery thousand
chin of tea, 25 Hang for the tea and 25 Hang for packing and transportation. The remainingtwo thirds or approximately four hundred
thousand chin of tea would then be available forthe horse trade.82
Yang wished to emphasize that his proposals differedfrom the
K'ai-chung system. He pointed out that, although both authorized
merchantsto transporttea to the border, the government,under his
plan, was the only agent empowered to sell tea to the barbarians. All
private trading was forbidden. Moreover, the government received
two-thirdsof the tea under Yang's system while it obtained only twofifthsfromthe K'ai-chung system.
82Ibid.,pp. 19a- 20b.

158
MORRIS ROSSABI
Apparently,Chinese merchantsbalked at this proposal and in 1506,

the very next year, Yang was again forcedto accommodate them. The
merchants could make greater profits from private selling of tea
through the K'ai-chung system than in receiving a fixed amount of
silver from the government.Naturally they objected to government
control of tea sales which Yang proposed. Within a year the government relented and revised Yang's plan to gain the support and cooperation of the merchants.The new regulationsthat were introduced
in the firstyear of Cheng-te's reign provided that merchantswould
transporttea to the Shensi borderand in returnwould receive fiftypercent of the tea forprivate sale.83This compromisefailed to remedythe
weaknesses of Li Luan's proposal of 1490 which also allowed merchants
to transportand sell private tea and which,as we have seen, merchants
used to their own advantage. Again, in order to obtain sorely needed
horses, the governmentwas willingto go to extreme lengths in compromisingwith the tea merchants.Because of the government'saction
Yang's program came to nothing. Nor was Yang's other important
proposal wholeheartedly implemented.He noted th^t Ch'eng-hua's
effortshad led to a sharp increase in the tea productionof Han-chung
fu in Shensi. Yet the area's tax on tea had not been adjusted and
remained the same as under Hung-wu, a low 26,862 chin. Yang asked
that the tax be raised and the Hung-chih Emperor responded by
doubling Han-chung fu's contributionto the government,making it
51,251 chin.S4
Nevertheless,since tea productionin Han-chung fu had
increased to well over a millionchin, this was only a token rise in the
tax and allowed much untaxed tea to flowinto private hands.
Though Yang's reformsinitially affectedthe tea-horse trade, their
influencewas feltonlybriefly.In the firstfouryearsofhisprogram,China
managed to collect 19,077 horses, less than 5,000 horses a year and
certainlypaltry compared to the 14,000 annually that were received a
hundredyears earlier.85Afterthat, the officialtea-horsetrade declined,
as merchanttrafficin tea expanded. Because Yang had been forcedto
compromiseby allowing merchantsto transporttea and retain half of
83MS 80,p. 845.
84Yang, op. cit.,pp. 14b- 17b. The Chia-chingHan-chungfu-chih3, pp.
7b- 8a givesthefollowing
breakdown
forthenewtax: Hsi-hsiang
hsien- 29,680
- 4,446chin:Shih-ch'uan
chin: Tzu-yanghsien- 12,959chin; Chin-chou
hsien1,765chin:Han-yinhsien- 1,401chin.
85 Wu-tsung
shih-lu25, pp. 9b- 10a.

159
it, the governmentwas presentedwith low quality tea by unscrupulous

merchants and had difficultyin obtaining superior horses from the
barbarians.
By the middle of Cheng-te's reign, therefore,it was evident that
Yang's reforms,the last serious effortto deal with the problemsof the
tea-horsetrade, had been sabotaged by the government'sreluctanceto
antagonize the merchantsor perhaps its inability to compel them to
85a
accept Yang's program.
During Cheng-te's reign (1506- 1521), the tea-horse trade and the
administrationof the northwesternborder grew less and less effective.
Cheng-tefavored the Buddhists and granted foreignBuddhist priests
the rightto export tea.86This increased the private trafficin tea and
decreased the barbarian demand for officialChinese tea. Starting in
1509, trade was made even more difficultwhen the Mongol chief
I-pu-la attacked the tribes on the northwesternborder.87I-pu-la's
invasions, like those of Esen sixty years earlier, dealt a blow to the
barbarians involved in the tea-horse trade. In 1512, An-ting and
Ch'-hsien,both areas supplying large numbers of horses, were overwhelmed by I-pu-la's forcesand were cut offfromChina. Much of the
Ch'ing-hai (Kokonor) area metthe same fate88.In the next year Hami,
the entrepot of Central Asian trade with China, surrenderedto Turfan's Moslem chiefMansur after fiftyyears of intermittentwarfare.89
The success of I-pu-la and Mansur was disastrous to the tea-horse
trade, for many of the northwesternbarbarians were scattered and
were unable to re-establishtheircommunities.Many of them virtually
disappeared fromthe Ming chronicles.From the earlysixteenthcentury
on China also shiftedher attention fromthe Northwestto the Northeast. The militarythreat posed by the ' 'Northernbandits," primarily
Mongols, seemed more potent than that fromthe Central Asian states
or the barbarian tribes. Turfan was satisfiedwith its conquest of Hami
and only occasionally attacked the northwesternboundary, while the
ssa part ofthe problemmayhave beenthedivisionwithinthe government
eunuchLiu Chinand Yang
itself.In 1507,a strugglebetweenthe influential
For this,see MS 198,pp. 2304- 2305.
endedwithYang's imprisonment.
88MS 80,p. 845.
87For I-pu-la,see Sei Wada, "A StudyofDayan," MemoirsoftheResearch
oftheToyoBunko, XIX, 1- 42, (1960),pp. 27- 29.
Department
88MS 330,pp. 3800-3801.
89MS 329,pp. 3792- 3793; Bretschneider,
op. cit.,II, pp. 197- 198.

160
MORRIS ROSSABI
bandits in the northeast continued to raid the border. To meet this

threat, the Chinese depended on horses provided by friendlynortheastern barbarians rather than by the northwesterntea-horse trade
since transportinghorsesfromShensi to the northeastwould have been
both time-consumingand expensive.
Desperate effortswere made duringthe reign of Chia-ching(1522 1567) to reestablish the tea-horse trade. The Censor Liu Lun89aproposed a complete prohibitionof private tea and a reinstitutionof the
gold tablet system,a motionthat was defeated by the Ministryof War
which claimed that the gold tablets could be forgedby the barbarians
and would go undetected by the few officialson the border. This
failure, the Ministryargued, would furthertarnish China's image.90
In 1551 the Emperor orderedthe creation of a k'an-hoor tally system
which was similar to the gold tablet system and which had been used
effectivelyby the Chinese in theirrelations with Japan and Southeast
Asia, but the plan was quickly abandoned since the governmentwas
apparently unable to muster the forces necessary to enforceit.91In
1552 the Emperor again triedto curb private tea by confiscatingstores
of tea about to be smuggled out of the countryby foreignBuddhist
priests.92
While the Chia-chingEmperor attempted to establish government
controlover the tea-horsetrade, he was at the same time compelled to
compromisewiththe merchantsand to defyhis own regulationsin other
ways. Famines on the Shensi borderled him to revive the K'ai-chung
system that had been abolished by Hung-chih. He tried to limit the
amount of tea released to merchantsto 300,000 to 400,000 chin but by
1547 the figurehad climbed to one million chin?z Again in 1564 the
Emperor ordered officialsto restrictthe quantity of tea to 500,000 or
600,000 chin, but the merchantscould still engage in private trade in
spite of these regulations.94Merchants also benefitedfromanother of
told the
Chia-ching's orders. In 1536 the Censor Liu Liang-hsiang948,
Emperor that the three year time limit between trading periods was
89a89-Index,III, p. 234b.
80MS 80,p. 846.
TMHT 153,p. 2137; MS 92,p. 971.
2 TMHT 37,p. 691.
M TMHT 37,p. 687.
94TMHT 153,p. 2137.
Ma89-Index,III, p. 238c.

161
too long causing much of the tea to be spoiled. Chia-ching,following

Liu's advice, orderedtea officialsto sell tea at any convenienttime to
anyone and to avoid storingit in the CKa-ma ssu for more than two
years.95This relaxation of regulationswas a disappointment- the teahorsetrade was not greatlystimulatednor were the merchantsdeterred
fromsmuggling.As late as 1561, Chia-chingwas still calling on officials
to prohibitmerchantsfromprivately selling tea forhorses.96
The Chinese governmentfaced the same problems throughoutthe
sixteenth century. The barbarians had scattered as a result of the
attacks of I-pu-la and Mansur; the governmentwas unable to impose
its will on the merchantsand gain a complete monopoly over the teahorse trade; and Chinese officialswere preoccupied with the northeastern border. These problems seemed insurmountable,though a few
feeble and ultimately unsuccessful attempts were made to reimpose
governmentauthorityover the tea-horse trade. In 1569, officials,by
imperialorder,convertedthe tea tax of Szechwan into silverwhichwas
used to buy horses.97In 1571, the Emperor demanded that harsh
measures be taken against merchantswho kept their tea licenses and
illegally used them more than once.98By 1585, the Wan-li Emperor
(1573- 1619) recognized the futilityof these effortsat total control
and again compromisedwith the merchants.He allowed them to sell
seventy percentof the tea they transportedto the borderif they gave
the governmentthe remaining thirtypercent, the lowest figurethe
governmenthad ever demanded.
Even morerevealing of the government'sfutileeffortsto controltea
of a high quality was the debate over the inferiorHunan tea. In the
sixteenthcenturytea productionin Hunan grew more rapidly than in
Szechwan and Shensi. Noting its abundance and lower cost, merchants
and a few officialsbegan exportingit to the barbarians. In 1595, the
Censor Li Nan98ademanded prohibitionson Hunan tea, assertingthat
it was bitter,injurious to the health, and in many cases could not be
classifiedas tea at all- it was in his words "false tea." The government,
desperate for any exportable tea, rejected Li Nan's demands and
instead adopted the proposal of the Censor Hs Ch'iao. Hs admitted
95TMHT 37,p. 690.
86TMHT 153,p. 2137.
97Himng-cKao
chi 12,p. 12a.
ma-cheng
98MS 80,p. 846.
98a89-IndexII, p. 246c;

162
MORRIS ROSSABI
that Hunan tea was bitterbut argued that ifit was mixed withkoumiss
it did not lead to sickness. He also agreed that much so-called Hunan
tea was "false tea" but pointed out that the tea authorities could
uncover any such deceit." Unfortunately,Hs did not specify any
government agency for this task, an act which made his proposal
valueless. The government,in its anxiety to obtain tea at any cost,
ignored both the weakness of Hs's plan and the inferiorquality of
Hunan tea. Even this final effortto increase exportable tea proved
futile,for,as the Ming shih points out, by the end of the Ming "the
tea laws, the horse administration,and the border defenses were all
ruined."100
The Ch'ing also established a CKa-ma ssu and the first Ch'ing
Emperor foundedbranches in the same six areas of Shensi as underthe
Ming.101Yet the Ch'ing Ch'a-ma,ssu never traded for as many horses
as its Ming counterpart.By the eighteenthcentury,the Ch'ing had
conquered most of modern-daySinkiang and Mongolia where it had
access to finehorses. The Ch'ing Court also discovered that Western
Europeans and Russians coveted tea and that China could realize
greater profitsfroma tea trade with these powers than with the barbarians on the northwesternborder.As a result,a flourishingtea trade
arose fromwhich China received silver forits tea.102
CONCLUSION
The Ming Court,thoughpubliclyscornfulof commerce,initiatedand
nurturedthe tea-horse trade with the barbarians through a series of
officialembassies in the Hung-wu period. China desperately needed
horses and could not affordto remain aloof fromcommercenor could
she wait forthe barbarians to pledge obeisance to the Emperor, as the
officialtribute system and traditional foreignrelations demanded. As
99Loc. cit.
100Ibid.yp. 847. Onelast effort
was madeto revivethetea-horse
tradewhen
the eunuchLi Mou-ch'iwas appointedto supervise
theCh'a-massu in Shensi.
Li's attemptsseemto havebeenunsuccessful.
See LungWen-pin,
Minghuiyao
39,p. 701.
101Ch'ingshihkao 147,pp. 3a- 3b.
102For a briefaccountof the declineof the tea-horsetradein Ch'ing,see
Kano Naosada,"Chamabekino shmatsu,"[OntheDwindling
oftheTea and
HorseTrade],TyshiKenky(1963),pp. 73- 95. See also thefineB. A. essay
at HarvardCollegeentitledTea System
oftheCh'ingDynastybyB. H. Whibeck
in 1965.
written

163
ProfessorFletcher writesin his recent study of Chinese relations with

Central Asia.103
"The earlyMingcourttook Chinesecommerceto the foreigners
. . . The
"tribute"embassiesand dealt with
courtnot onlywinkedat counterfeit
didnotrecognize
theemperor's
rulerswho,withthecourt'sfullknowledge,
andpromoted
commerce."
; thecourtitselfeventooktheinitiative
authority
Thus the assertionby Ming officialsstill adhered to by some modern
scholars that the tea-horse trade was solely a handy and inexpensive
way of pacifyingthe barbarians is highly suspect. According to this
theory,Chineseofficialscould controlrecalcitranttribesby withholding
tea. In fact, however,the Chinese rarely kept tea fromthe barbarians
because theyneeded horsesand were reluctantto antagonize barbarian
horse traders.The only suspensionsof trade occurredwhen the Chinese
governmentitself was unable to transport tea to the border as, for
example, afterits resoundingdefeat by the Oirat chiefEsen.
After Esen's raids and the sixteenth-centuryinvasions of I-pu-la
and Mansur, the Emperors and officialsabandoned the government
monopolyof tea and compromisedwith the Chinese merchants,a class
they viewed with contempt.They allowed merchantsto transportand
sell tea privatelyon the border,initiallyimposinga sizable tax in kind.
However, as the government'spower waned and its demands became
moremodest,officialsreducedthetea tax and merchantswereunimpeded in trade until the warehouses of the Ch'a-ma,ssu were empty and
the pasture lands and stables of China were without the prized barbarian steeds.*
103JosephFletcher,"China and CentralAsia," in JohnKing Fairbank,
, (Harvard
(editor),ChineseWorldOrder,TraditionalChina'sForeignRelations
Press,1968),pp. 216- 17.
University
* Aftercompleting
thispaper,I came acrosstheMinshishokkashi
yakuch
oftheMingshih
(2 vols.),editedby Wada Sei, a valuableJapanesetranslation
withsome interesting
shih-huo-chih
notesconcerning
the MS sectionon the
tea tax.
I wishto thankProfessor
JohnMeskillofBarnardCollege,Professor
Joseph
RichardGoodman,and Paula Harrellfortheir
FletcherofHarvardUniversity,
on thispaper.I am also pleasedto acknowledge
the aid of
helpfulsuggestions
Dr. JohnPope,DirectoroftheFreerGalleryofArt,duringmyyearas a SmithsonianFellow.Alongwithdomesticpursuits,teaching,and studyingChinese,
mywifeMaryJanesomehowfoundthe timeto typeand editthe manuscript
For thisand for
and to prodme intoquestioning
someill-founded
assumptions.
muchelse,I am grateful.

164
MORRIS ROSSABI
The Tea and HorseTradewithInnerAsia duringtheMing
List ofChineseCharacters
to MissLorettaPan, SeniorLecturerin Chinese,Columbia

(I am grateful
forwriting
theChinesecharacters)
University
A-hei-ma
fu-shih
A-li
A-tuan
fsffy
Ha-mi
Han-chungfu
Han-shen
an-ch'ach'ien-shih
''-
Han-tung
Ho-chou
;'if -W-|
Hsi-fan
Hsi-ning
ch'eng
Hsin-ts'un
chi-ling
hsing-jen
ch'ien
Hs Ch'iao
An-ting
ch'a-k'ossu
$-%$ s]
ch'a-massu
Chao Ch'eng
chin
Huo-chou
/j-
Ch'in-chou
-Mj
chin-p'aihsin-fu
Ch'ing-hai
'% ^
j|-
Ch'-hsien
Chuang-lang
^ -W-1
I-pu-la
k'ai-chung
k'an-ho
,
^
^
^
Li Ching
Li Kuang-li

-^yr4']

Li Luan
p'i-ch'aso
^ ^
Li Mou-ch'i
Pi-li
Li Nan
shih-pot'i-chssu ^
Li Tung-yang
Li Wen
t;
%
X.
liang
ssu-ch'eng
g ^
ssu-leng
1 ^
ta-shih
Liu-ch'eng
^ip
t'ai-p'ussu
fjjt^
Liu Chin
%' jj
T'ao-chou
-JLf
Liu Liang-hsiang ^f,^

ifflp
tso-futu y-shih
Liu Lun
T'u-lu-fan
^ ^ ^
WangChen
Liu Ta-hsia
Liu Wen
^ ;-j
Yang I-ch'ing
^,|
Yeh-hsien
ma
Man-su-erh
Min-chou
^ >/.[
y-shih
Ou-yangLun
fe
'>
yu-ieh
Pa-ling
g, fj[
fy
fa fe
yuan-massu
pao

m-
165
166
MORRIS ROSSABI
ABBREVIATIONS
MS
Mingshih
MShu
Mingshu
STC
Shensiung-chih
TMHT Ta Minglnuitien
89-Index CombinedIndicesto Eighty-Nine
Collections
of Ming DynastyBiographies(HarvardYenchingInstituteSinologicalIndex SeriesNo.
24)
UNITS OF MEASUREMENT1
chin
Hang
A catty.Approximately
586.82grams(ora littleovera pound).
37.30gramsor 1^ ounces.One Hangofsilverequals
Approximately
1000coppercoins.
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TEA AND HORSE TRADE WITH

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