Exclusive: U.S.

Operates Drones From Secret

Bases in Somalia
Two decades after Black Hawk Down, U.S. special operations forces are
back in East Africas most troubled nation. FP provides a rare window into
their shadowy operations.

BY TY MCCORMICK-JULY 2, 2015

KISMAYO, Somalia Some say the Americans are everywhere.

Some say they are nowhere. Still others say they are everywhere and nowhere at
once. But the shadowy U.S. presence in this strategic port city in war-torn southern
Somalia has clear consequences for anyone with a share of power here. That includes
Somali regional officials who are quick to praise American counterterrorism efforts,
African Union forces who rely on U.S. intelligence as they battle back al-Shabab, and
even the al Qaeda-linked militants themselves, who are increasingly hemmed in by a
lethal combination of AU-led counterinsurgency, airstrikes, and raids by U.S. special
operators.
Based out of a fortress of fading green Hesco barriers at the ramshackle airport in
Kismayo, a team of special operators from the Joint Special Operations Command,
the elite U.S. military organization famous for killing Osama bin Laden, flies drones

and carries out other counterterrorism activities, multiple Somali government and
African Union sources have confirmed. Their presence in this volatile city, which until
2012 was controlled by al-Shabab, has not previously been reported. Nor has the
United States acknowledged operating drones from Somali soil. (Unmanned armed
and surveillance flights are said to originate from Camp Lemonnier in nearby Djibouti
or from bases in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.)
They have a base over there, Abdighani Abdi Jama, state minister for the presidency
in the interim regional administration in Kismayo, said of U.S. forces, gesturing to a
heavily fortified compound not far from the airports small terminal. He confirmed that
as many as 40 U.S. military personnel are currently stationed in Kismayo, roughly 300
miles south of the capital of Mogadishu, where he said they operate drones from the
airports single runway and carry out covert intelligence and counterterrorism
operations.
They have high tech; they have drones; they have so many things, said Jama. We
are really benefiting. Another regional official, Jubalands minister of planning,
international cooperation, and humanitarian affairs, Mohamed Nur Iftin, also confirmed
the existence of the U.S. outpost and the use of the runway for drones, as did a
cabinet-level official in Mogadishu. Kenyan Brig. Gen. Daniel Bartonjo, the sector-level
commander for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the multinational
peace enforcement mission that has been battling al-Shabab since 2007, said that his
troops have made gains against insurgents with the help of the Americans who are
here. He made this comment in a June 19 briefing in Kismayo for Nicholas Kay, the
special representative of the U.N. secretary-general for Somalia, attended by this
reporter.
The secretive outpost in Kismayo is one of several locations within Somalia where
U.S. special operations forces have set up shop beyond the prying eyes of the Somali
public and the American public that foots the bill. Somali government and AMISOM
sources confirmed the existence of a second clandestine American cell in Baledogle,
the site of an abandoned Cold War-era Air Force base in Somalias sun-blasted Lower
Shabelle region. These sources estimated that between 30 and 40 U.S. personnel are
stationed there, also carrying out counterterrorism operations that include operating
drones.
A spokesman for the U.S. Special Operations Command, which handles public affairs
for JSOC, referred Foreign Policy to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) for
comment. AFRICOM spokesman Chuck Prichard, in turn, confirmed that a small
number of U.S. personnel within AFRICOMs area of responsibility are special
operations forces, but declined to comment on the size or location of their units. He
also declined to comment on whether or not they are responsible for operating drones,
saying only that they are not tasked with directly engaging enemy forces.
While we cannot provide exact details because of operational security issues, we can
tell you [U.S. AFRICOM] has sent a limited number of trainers and advisors plus a
small military coordination cell to support AMISOM and Somali security forces in

international efforts to stabilize Somali, Prichard wrote in an email to Foreign Policy.

The sharing of information and expertise is key to assisting partner nations in their
mission. The exact nature of this support, weapons systems or number of personnel
involved in these operations cannot be disclosed in order to protect the integrity of
these operations and the safety of units in the region.
The expanded U.S. footprint in Somalia is part of a broader trend toward deeper
covert military engagement in the volatile Horn of Africa region. That engagement has
taken the form of ramped-up intelligence and special operations activities, as well as
military assistance programs that have grown dramatically in recent years without
much in the way of public debate orcongressional oversight. As the U.S. Defense
Department draws down its presence in Afghanistan and shutters bases across
Europe, and as the threat of terrorism surges in East Africa, the quiet accumulation of
military installations in this part of the world has been easy to miss. In addition to its
main hub in Djibouti, where some 4,000 American service members and civilians are
stationed, the U.S. military has established smaller outposts inEthiopia, Kenya, and
the Seychelles, a tropical archipelago located roughly 800 miles off the Somali coast. It
has also indirectly financed the training of thousands of AMISOM troops.
U.S. boots on the ground
Even as it became firmly entrenched in the region, the U.S. government for
years denied putting boots on the ground in Somalia, where the infamous Black Hawk
Down disaster in 1993 sparked an American exodus from the region. But in June of
last year, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy
Sherman acknowledged that a small contingent of U.S. military personnel had been
operating inside Somalia for several years. The news agency Reuters
later quoted an unnamed official of President Barack Obamas administration as
saying that there were up to 120 U.S. personnel stationed inside the country.
Although much of what the U.S. military does in Somalia remains shrouded in secrecy,
it is clear that the Americans are doing more than just gathering intelligence and
supporting African troops. In recent years, special operations commandos have staged
a number of daring raids on al-Shabab targets, including an aborted amphibious
assault in 2013 by Navy SEAL Team 6 aimed at capturing one of the suspects in the
Westgate Mall attack, which took place in neighboring Kenya and left 67 people dead.
U.S. forces have also carried out drone strikes and other airstrikes in Somalia since at
least 2007, when an American AC-130 gunship fired the opening salvo in the Somali
theater of the war on terror. That operation targeted a convoy carrying Aden Hashi
Ayro, an al Qaeda operative thought to be responsible for the murder of Western aid
workers. Ayro survived, only to be taken out by a U.S. missile strike one year later.
As the al-Shabab threat intensified in the middle 2000s, and as more and more foreign
fighters were drawn into the fray, Somalia began to inch up the Pentagons list of
priorities. When you had [American] Somalis leave from Minnesota [to go] to Somalia
and [blow] themselves up, then it really, really started getting people nervous, and
more and more discussions began to pop up about we need to spend more resources

[and] how do we fix this problem? said Rudolph Atallah, the Pentagons former top
Africa counterterrorism official.
Part of the fix opted for by U.S. policymakers involved ramping up airstrikes and other
kinetic operations against al-Shabab. Between 2007 and 2011, when the first lethal
drone strike was reportedly carried out in Somalia, U.S. forces launched at least
nine missile strikes or helicopter raids on al-Shabab targets, according to the Bureau
of Investigative Journalism. The United States has since carried out between eight and
12 additional drone strikes that have killed dozens of al-Shabab militants, among them
the movements top leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane.
Until now, though, U.S. operations were thought to originate from outside the country,
carried out by Navy SEALS and other special operators who swooped into Somalia
only briefly before retreating to the relative safety of Djibouti or Kenya. That assurance
has been eroded by the revelation of cells of special operators in Kismayo and
Baledogle, and by the small window into their activities provided by Somali and
AMISOM officials. In addition to flying drones and conducting other surveillance and
reconnaissance activities, sources say that U.S. special operators have on occasion
decamped for AMISOM forward operating bases and attacked al-Shabab targets
alongside African Union troops.
They come to our forward operating bases and sometimes do joint operations with
us, said a source with knowledge of Ugandan operations within AMISOM. (Ugandan
troops are responsible for the sector that includes Baledogle, whereas Kenyan troops
operate in and around Kismayo.)
We often dont get much notice, the source added. They dont trust us, and we dont
trust them.
Gains against al-Shabab, but at a cost
But its not just U.S. special operators that are leaving their mark on the Somali
conflict. As the comments by the AMISOM commander in Kismayo suggest, the United
States has also gotten mileage out of the advise-and-assist role it plays in support of
the African Union mission. In addition to passing intelligence to AU troops, who have
seen the lions share of the combat, the United States has invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in training and equipping its AU proxies. U.S. support for AMISOM
since 2007 comes to more than $500 million. Washington also chipped in
another $455 million to the U.N. assistance mission in Somalia that provides logistical
support to the AU forces.
This support has helped AMISOM turn the tide against al-Shabab, which at its height
in 2011 controlled huge swaths of Somalia. Five years ago, [al-Shabab] controlled 60
percent of this country. Today they control 6 percent, barely, said Somali Minister of
Planning and International Cooperation Abdirahman Yusuf Ali Aynte, who added that
the terrorist group still retains operational capacity throughout the country.
But experts caution that the gains made by AMISOM, which accelerated after the U.N.
Security Council topped up the peace enforcement mission with an additional 4,000

Ethiopian troops after the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, have not degraded the alShabab threat as thoroughly as some have claimed. Al-Shabab is simply retreating,
conceding ground, said Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Africa Center at the
Atlantic Council. They are not actually confronting AMISOM head-on anymore, which
means that their forces and weapons are mostly intact. They have shifted from a
conventional force to a pure terrorist one that is increasingly focusing its attention on
attacks outside of Somalia, in Kenya, and elsewhere in the region.
AMISOMs territorial gains have also spread its forces more thinly, leaving their supply
lines exposed to asymmetrical attacks. Ambushes and improvised explosive devices,
once relatively infrequent in Somalia, are now regular occurrences on the sparsely
monitored highways that connect pockets of AMISOM control. In the briefing in
Kismayo, Brig. Gen. Bartonjo reported that his forces had weathered 42 IED attacks
and ambushes, although he did not say within what time frame.
As African Union troops struggle to maintain order in areas captured from al-Shabab,
the importance of training competent Somali military and police units to help fill the
security void and eventually to take over for AMISOM, which at the moment has no
clear exit strategy has come to the fore. As a result, the United States is now
involved in training the Somali National Army as well as African Union forces.
Sharpening the spear
The Central Intelligence Agency, whose substantial presence in Mogadishu was
first exposed by the Nation magazine, is thought to have trained and equipped a
clandestine commando force of Somalis known as the Gaashaan, or Shield. This
force, which works in close concert with Somalias National Intelligence and Security
Agency, is considered a cut above the ragtag national army and has notched a
number of impressive military achievements. When al-Shabab gunmen descended on
Somalias Parliament last May, for example, the Gaashaan played a pivotal role in
repulsing the attack.
Now U.S. contractors are training another battalion, the Danab, or Lightning, which is
supposed to be Somalias answer to the U.S. Army Rangers. Its basically really at the
beginning stage, because weve only so far recruited and at least done some training
of three companies totaling around 450 troops, said a U.S. official with knowledge of
Somalia policy, who characterized the program as the most significant U.S. training
initiative to date. The U.S. official said that the elite companies, which are supposed to
include fighters from multiple clans and regions in order to encourage loyalty to the
central government, represent a model for the future Somali National Army.
Ultimately, the official said, youd like to see this multiplied out [to more battalions],
and we would like to do that, although frankly the resources arent there to do it as
quickly as some people would like to see done.
The training of Danab forces currently takes place in Baledogle at a facility run by the
contractor Bancroft Global Development. The shadowy U.S. outfit, which in 2011
was revealed to have hired a former French army officer convicted in South Africa of
recruiting mercenaries to fight in Ivory Coast, maintains a dingy, second-floor office in

the decrepit Soviet-era Air Force base, which is riddled with bullet holes and badly in
need of a paint job. In one otherwise Spartan room, a roster of Danab personnel,
complete with passport-sized photos, stared down from the wall. Elsewhere, there
were lists of Danab weapons and equipment.
Despite the willingness of U.S. officials to own the Danab training operation in
Baledogle, Bancroft employees downplayed their ties with the U.S. government. We
have nothing to do with the Americans, said one employee, a stocky former special
operator whose biceps bulged out of his tight-fitting company shirt. Were in charge of
training Danab. We have nothing to do with the Americans, and the Americans have
nothing to do with us.
Bancrofts executive director, Marc Frey, told Foreign Policy that the company has no
contracts with the U.S. government and no contract to train the Danab battalion with
any country. Instead, U.S. officials say the company trains Somali National Army
troops as part of a larger contract with the Ugandan government to provide what it
calls military mentors to AMISOM. The U.S. government then reimburses the
Ugandans for the cost of the training.
While this roundabout method of payment has been the norm for Bancrofts training of
AMISOM troops over the years, some officials worry that it shields the firm from the
additional scrutiny that goes along with contracting directly with the U.S. government.
Basically, its a way for the [United States] to avoid having to look too hard at what
Bancroft or any other contractor is up to, said a U.N. official in Mogadishu. If
everything was kosher, there would be no need to go through such maneuvers.
The U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea has raised concerns about the
conduct of other military contractors operating in Somalia in 2012,
it accused Sterling Corporate Services, a Dubai-based company involved in training
an anti-piracy force in the semiautonomous region of Puntland, of a brazen, largescale and protracted violation of the U.N. arms embargo but to date no allegations
of misconduct have been levied against Bancroft. In fact, the African Union turned to
the U.S. contractor to pick up the pieces after the Sterling venture fell apart, but
Bancroft declined to get involved after documenting ongoing violations of the arms
embargo.
The conditions under which Bancroft and other private military contractors operate,
however, offer little in the way of transparency or safeguards against abuse. Vast
swaths of Somalia are effectively lawless, and communications links between rural
communities are weak. Neither feature of the terrain augers well for accountability.
Even the glossiest [private security companies] think Blackwater back in the day
are prone to excesses of force, said the Atlantic Councils Bruton. In the Somali
context, those excesses are likely to go unreported, which makes abuse all the more
likely.
The same goes for any potential abuses committed by U.S. special operators or by the
African Union troops they coordinate with on the battlefield. As one senior military
official with special operations experience recently told theNew York Times, JSOC

investigates JSOC, and thats part of the problem.

Nobodys first choice
The secretive nature of U.S. special operations also makes it difficult to assess the
implications for civilians, who are often preyed upon whether or not al-Shabab is
present. The routing of the militant group from many areas has not yet translated into
improved day-to-day living for the majority of the population. Nor are the democratic
credentials of the replacement authorities all that much better.
In Kismayo, the cell of U.S. special operators is indirectly propping up an interim
regional administration presided over by a notorious warlord and former member of alShabab. Ahmed Mohamed Islam, better known as Madobe whose Ras Kamboni
militia hosted al Qaeda training camps in the 1990s and who Bruton describes as one
of the most radical militants seized power after Kenyan forces pushed al-Shabab
out of Kismayo in 2012. Madobe has since received the imprimatur of the United
Nations, which is providing his administration with technical assistance as it drafts a
new constitution. According to Matt Bryden, who used to head the U.N. Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Madobe was nobodys first choice to lead the
emerging U.N.-backed state-level administration.
The model in Kismayo strongman takes power and then establishes a parliament
is far from ideal, said Bryden. I dont think anyone thinks this is the way Somalia is
going to be stabilized over the long-run.
As long as U.S. drones keep a watchful eye over Madobes fiefdom, however,
nobodys first choice may remain the only viable one.
Photo credit: JOEL SAGET/AFP/Getty Images
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